THE IMPACTS OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT ON INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIO- POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN LESOTHO

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to three of my late grandmothers:
Nkhono `Mathabang Lylian Buti, Nkhono `Malinkeng Mofephe and Nkhono `Mateboho
Nts`oetsa

As flowers that blossomed and withered away, I carry the beautiful fragrance that you each
left behind always.
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- To my siblings Tumi and Kani: Know that I strive to be nothing but an inspiration and source of pride to you.

- A special thanks to my friends and family who have supported me throughout this journey. It truly has been a team effort.

- Most importantly, I am grateful to the Lord my God. You carried me through this journey and saw what you started in me to fruition. Thank you, heavenly Father!

What a mighty God we serve!
ABSTRACT

The recent political instability in Lesotho has led to a breakdown and collapse of two consecutive coalition governments in the past five years. Amongst other factors that have contributed to the conflict is the insufficient legal support or governance frame-work, internal conflicts within political parties and a polarized political environment. The continued instability has placed the country at the risk of losing lucrative investment deals such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Lesotho has been perceived as a risky investment destination. The aim of this study was to examine the influence of a coalition government on investment opportunities and socio-political development in Lesotho. The objective was to evaluate the functionality of coalition governments in effective policy implementation and assess the challenges that may hinder investment opportunities in Lesotho. Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony as well as the policy monitoring and policy evaluation models were utilized in this study as a measure of understanding and examining a coalition type of government and its impacts on socio political development and investment opportunities in Lesotho. The study employed a mixed-method approach in which 200 questionnaires were distributed to different business sectors and three in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants. The results show that a coalition government is problematic in Lesotho, stakeholders have no clear understanding of the context and content of the coalition type of government has the collapse of two such governments before their respective end of term. The political unrest fueled by conflict between political parties and the killing of two army commanders within the space of three years arose as a result of conflicting interest between coalition partners and has made coalition unsustainable. The country has found itself embroiled in a series of unfortunate incidents that have led to numerous social and economic hardships. As a result, the mayhem has not only created an environment that is inconducive for businesses to thrive and for investors to invest but it has also tarnished the image of the country globally. Furthermore, the study established that there is a lack of civic education and a lack of political maturity amongst political parties and their leaders. The study recommends that a more detailed frame-work on the functioning of a coalition government with clearly defined goals, objectives and guidelines be formulated to ensure future success for a coalition type of government in Lesotho.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABC - All Basotho Convention
ACCORD – African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AGOA- African Growth Opportunity Act
AU- African Union
BCP – Basutoland Congress Party
BNP - Basutoland National Party
CCL – Christian Council Of Lesotho
CODESRIA- Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
DC – Democratic Congress
DCEO -Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences
EISA – Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
FPTP – First Past the Post
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GNU – Government of National Unity
GPA- Global Political Agreement
IMF- International Monetary Fund
LDF -Lesotho Defence Force
LMDA – Lesotho Millennium Development Agency
LPC Lesotho People’s Congress
LRA- Lesotho Revenue Authority
MCC- Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDC- Movement for Democratic Change
MFP- Mare- Matlou Freedom Party
MMP – Mixed Member Proportional
NIP – National Independent Party
ODM – Orange Democratic Movement
PNU – Party of National Unity
PR – Proportional Representation
PREPFAR – President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
SADC- Southern African Development Community
SAHC- South African High Commission
STERP- Short- term Emergency Recovery program
ZANU- PF – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

This chapter includes the background of the study, the research objectives, research questions as well as the theoretical frame-work that informs this study. The formation and collapse of more than one coalition governments in Lesotho in five years sparks the need to assess the impacts that this type of government has had on investment opportunities and socio-political development in the country. Secondly the technicalities that lead to conflict which is the stimuli for the formation of coalition governments and the driving force behind their demise will be explored. This research will be underpinned by Gramsci’s Hegemonic theory, the Policy monitoring and Policy evaluation models respectively. It is through the hegemonic theory and policy monitoring and evaluation models that a coalition government and its impacts on the above-mentioned variables will be understood.

1.1 Background

The resort to coalition governments due to disputed elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe has pioneered a new trend in unlocking political gridlock in Africa Biegon (2008). The formation of these types of governments has granted a lot of interest and constitutional controversy, at least practically, since independence. The formation of the first coalition government in Lesotho was a result of the constituency based electoral system, which the country has been using since it obtained its independence on the 4th October 1966. Prior to 2012, only one political party has always been able to garner the required majority to form a government in Lesotho without any controversy Hoolo (2016). This would change in the national assembly elections in 2012.

Lesotho like most African countries received its independence in the 1966 and became a constitutional monarchy within a parliamentary system. While most African countries like Botswana, South Africa and Angola have attained notable economic growth or political stability post-independence, Lesotho remains one of the most underdeveloped and politically unstable countries in the Southern African region. This has been a subject of great concern, not only for majority of its citizens but also for the regional body which Lesotho is a founding
member of, the Southern African development Community (SADC). Vhumbunu writes for the African center for constructive resolution of disputes ACCORD 23rd October 2015 writes that:

*Numerous measures have been undertaken by the regional body to try and bring Lesotho to stability and order. Since the events of 30th August 2014 in Lesotho, when a coup d’état was reported to have been attempted against the Prime minister of the first coalition government Kingdom of Lesotho Prime Minister Thabane- which subsequently forced him to flee and seek refuge in South Africa, SADC of which Lesotho is a founding member, has been occupied with efforts to manage and resolve ensuing conflicts in the mountain kingdom.*

According to Monyane (2009), from the beginning, the monarchy was not comfortable with this arrangement as it limited its power. The democratic regime inaugurated with the 1965 elections would only last until 1970, when the ruling party under Chief Leabua which opposed the monarchy, declared the election results invalid and suspended the constitution after his ruling party lost to the opposition. Chief Leabua was however, toppled from state power in 1986 by the military which went on to rule for eight years. The two institutions; the military, and the monarchy therefore became factors of survival of democracy in Lesotho Monyane 2009.

What would follow those early days would be a series of anarchic episodes that can be considered as major stumbling blocks to the attainment of socio- political development and economic growth through investment. The reason being that instead of being known for what it can provide, Lesotho has become increasingly popular for its political notoriety and instability. Monyane (2009) reveals that democratic rule was relaunched in 1993 in Lesotho. However, the 1993 and 1998 elections were followed by violent power struggles. This time, the constituency based electoral played a catalytic role for the political crises that prevailed and was seen to be faulty. This was because the parliamentary seats did not reflect electoral support as opposition parties were not adequately represented in parliament. Constitutional reforms followed and in 2002 democratic rule was reintroduced. The Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) system was then introduced, this is a hybrid between constituency based and proportional representation. Despite the electoral forms at the time, uncertainties remained as the result of escalating socio-economic problems.
Kadima (1999:14), writes that re-democratization in Lesotho in 1993 was followed by the formation of the Lesotho Congress for democracy (LCD) in 1997 which won the 1998 elections overwhelmingly. The LCD won 79 out of 80 seats with a 60% majority of the vote. This became the turning point also for the First Past the Post electoral system as the Basotho National Party won 24.5% of the vote with only one seat. This outcome lead to dissatisfaction and bitterness among opposition parties as they felt excluded from the political system. The South African Led Military intervention managed to restore law and order, and this paved the way for the electoral reforms that would create a more inclusive electoral system. The 2002 national Assembly election took place against this background. A mixed electoral system that combined First Past the Post (FPTP) and Proportional representation (PR) known as the mixed member Proportional (MMP) system was adopted for the 2002 elections and set out that parties, would submit lists for 80 constituency-based seats and political party seats for the 40 proportional seats (government of Lesotho, Interim Political act, 1998) in Monyane (2009:10).

Maudeni (2010: 128) has a different view on what could be the source of political unrest in Lesotho. Firstly, he asserts that, Lesotho has experienced a state of dysfunctionality that is uncommon with big states. He purports that it is surprising that Lesotho has suffered political instability and state dysfunctionality even though it is a very small country. However, whilst state’s dysfunctionality is common to big states that are characterized by diverse ethnic differences and religious tensions; Lesotho’s was tied to a turbulent political history in which brothers, sons and cousins of successive paramount chiefs, were appointed to senior positions in the traditional state. They disrespected the paramount chief, led rebellions and fought numerous wars with neighboring black and white states. Secondly, he denotes that the editors of Big African states, assert that the bigness defines state viability is a West European notion which has failed Africa and that it is surprising that there has not, in general, been a focus on country size when discussing Africa’s problems. Size and the dysfunctionalit of the large states should be the context in every discussion concerning Africa (Herbst Mills, 2006). “In contrast, Lesotho defies the implied logic that smallness, ethi homogeneity and the absence of religious tension, define state viability in Africa” Maudeni (2010:128).

On his account on the politics of coalition formation and democracy in Lesotho, Kapa (2008) states that coalitions /alliances are almost a permanent feature of pluralistic democracies although they are relatively new to the African continent. He further denotes that their
emergence in Africa can be traced to the third world wave of democratization in the 1990s in a bid to oust from power, different forms of tyrannical regimes. Coalitions are becoming entrenched in Africa’s political systems as weapons through which the political elite fights political battles. Furthermore, he reveals that Lesotho’s political parties have since independence been reluctant to join forces and resources both prior to and after election. This he suggests, may be because of the country’s then biggest party, the Basutoland Congress party (BCP) and the Basutoland National Party (BNP) between 1993 and 1998, and later the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the BNP (1998 and 2002) each thought it could do well in elections and govern the country without the support of other political parties.

Nevertheless, the small parties did not see a need to make coalitions among themselves or with the bigger ones. Instead of coalescing, Lesotho political parties have been characterized by never-ending inter-party and intra political conflict and feuding that is sparked by personality clashes and power struggles. Kapa (2008) further indicates that personality clashes often lead to party splits and power struggles as well as lack of cooperation even on matters of mutual interest and concern. Nevertheless, following the introduction of the mixed member proportional electoral model (MMP) Lesotho’s political parties have joined the trend taken by their counterparts to form coalitions as in other countries in the Southern African Sub-region and in other parts of the world (Kapa, 2008).

According to Sejanamane (2016), the 2012 elections in Lesotho, held under the MMP electoral model, brought about a hung parliament. It became inevitable that political parties would have to come together to form a coalition government. In the end, three parties – the All Basotho Convention (ABC) the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho National Party, managed to cobble together a coalition government that had a small minority in government. They were supported by a small number of political parties that were not part of the coalition but pledged to provide support in parliament. These parties constituted themselves as a bloc of political parties. At first, this arrangement provided the newly formed coalition government with a comfortable majority in parliament, but the bloc’s support later proved fleeting as some parties began to waver, while others joined the opposition party the – Democratic Congress (DC) to reconvene parliament after it had been prorogued by the Prime Minister Sejanamane (2016).

Additionally, the first coalition government in Lesotho received support from the public, attracting crowds at the swearing in of the prime minister. Letsie (2012) reiterates that the
weeks following intensive campaigning, Basotho went to the polls on Saturday May 26th, 2012. Numerous groups of people, both local and international observed the elections. Most notably amongst the observers, were the commonwealth election observer group and the SADC electoral observer mission. Despite this support, the new government was met with a series of overwhelming challenges that rocked the alliance to the levels that had not been anticipated. Consequently, its tenure was cut short and instead of a five-year governance tenure, the coalition collapsed within two years of its seizure of power (Mahlakeng, 2016).

The collapse of the 2012 coalition government between the ABC, LCD and the BNP did not mean that the alliance had been without any successes during its brief tenure. Matjama (2013) acknowledges that, within the first one hundred days of governing, the coalition unleashed the Directorate on Criminal and Economic offences (DCEO) from direct government control and gave parliament authority over it. This move was clearly designed to demonstrate the new authority’s commitment to weeding out corruption in government and state-owned entities. Because of this effort, implicated individuals were exposed, and some high-profile cases ended up in the courts of Law. This move, and numerous others were a positive step into nation building and development. This, however, would prove inadequate for keeping the government in-tact, for cracks between the coalition partner’s relationship began to show and consequently rendered them incapable of holding the government together.

Mahlakeng (2017) indicates that the collapse of the 2012 tripartite coalition government led to the 28th February 2015 snap elections which resulted in a second coalition government comprising of seven parties i.e. the Democratic Congress (DC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), Marematlou Freedom Party, (MFP), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho people’s Congress (LPC) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) which also barely completed its expected term of governance. However, contrast to the causes of the collapse of the Thabane led coalition government (i.e. a fallout between coalition partners), the prolonged power struggle within the seven parties, particularly the major coalition partners the DC and the LCD became a major factor in the demise of the coalition. Mahlakeng (2017) further relates that these power struggles led to the formation of factions within these parties and subsequently caused splinter groups to emerge, thus affecting the stability and the size of the government to rule legitimately as a majority government.

The introduction of a coalition system in Lesotho has been a subject of much debate in recent times not only in Lesotho but also in countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe as indicated earlier.
in this chapter. Not much has been written or said about a coalition government as a clear
guideline for this type of government but only a vague provision from the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Lesotho (1993) Section 87 (2) stipulating that “the King shall appoint the Prime
Minister, a member of the National Assembly who appears to the council of state to be the
leader of a political party or coalition of political parties that will command the support of a
majority of members of the National Assembly”. It can therefore be said that Lesotho’s move
into a coalition type of government has been a circumstantial one. The country had its first
coalition government in 2012. The recent political instability that has led to the breakdown and
collapse of two consecutive coalition governments in five years from 2012 to 2017 in Lesotho
can, amongst other factors, reasonably be traced to the insufficient legal provisions as to how
this system of governance should operate.

Due to an unstable political environment that led to the Southern African Development
Community’s intervention in 2015, the country of Lesotho ran a risk of losing one of the most
lucrative investment opportunities that would leave more than 40,000 textile garment and
industry employees jobless as the United States of America threatened to pull out on the

Moreover, as a beneficiary of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation. A cooperation that was
established by the US Congress in 2004 as an innovative foreign aid agency to help eradicate
poverty by working with selected partner countries to identify requisite areas in need of
Funding. Lesotho received its first fiver year MCC compact worth US $362.5 million in July
2007. The Compact helped fund the construction of the Metolong Dam as well as the
president’s Emergency plan for AIDS relief (PREPFAR) to mitigate the negative economic
impact. The continued funding of Compact II development that was paused in December 2015
only for Lesotho to be reselected after a two-year hiatus, was over the MCC’s concerns on
issues of governance and the rule of law in Lesotho, particularly after the Killing of former
This suggests that the continuity of this aid depends entirely on the country’s ability to maintain
good governance and stability. Due to the political and governance insecurity in Lesotho,
Policy making and the socio and economic development of the country as one of the most
important tasks of government stand a great chance of being impacted negatively on, leaving
investment, poverty eradication and the country’s economy in a dilemma.
In a paper that sought to assess political party alliances and coalitions in Lesotho, with a focus on their causes and consequences for party systems, democratic consolidation, national cohesion and state governability, Kapa and Shale (2012) argue that, “the formation of the pre 2007 political party alliances can be explained in terms of office- seeking theory in that the political elite used alliances to access and retain power.” It can be argued that in the same breath, the same strategy was used from 2012 in the formulation of three coalition governments between the periods 2012-2017. Matjama (2013), reports that while there were celebrations both in Lesotho and around the region when the opposition won the elections, how the new government would cope was still an uncertainty. This, he asserts was not only because Prime Minister Mosisili of the Lesotho Congress for democracy (LCD) then, had been in charge for so long, but also because it was a coalition system of governance which was a first for the country and a rarity in the continent.

Accustomed to a single party rule, in 2012, The All Basotho Convention, Lesotho Congress for democracy, and the Basotho National Party formed an alliance and became government after an outright win by a single party could not be attained Matjama (2013). Given the complexity of governance as a whole, and now faced with different ideologies, the three coalition parties came to an agreement on how they would ensure that they work towards carrying out the mandate of the electorate. They would work together in parliament and in government to form an inclusive government, allocating key positions in proportion to the number of seats each party had in parliament to form a joint Monitoring implementation committee. The committee would be composed of two competent members of each party to ensure the implementation of the agreement and to collaborate with the bloc. Not fully integrated into the government, “the bloc sits between the government and the opposition and its constituency members retain their individual identity as distinct parties, just as the coalition members have done” (Kapa 2014:105).

Mahlakeng (2016) acknowledges the strength of coalition governments in their ability to share a mandate as was the case with the 2012 coalition government of Lesotho according to the coalition agreement. This, he argues leads to broader representation and greater scrutiny of policy making. Nevertheless, the disadvantage to this form of government is the conflict that may arise due to conflicting ideologies leading to policy standstills, thus affecting the stability and functioning of government. Mahlakeng further notes that, one complex and detrimental issue in coalition governments is dependency, which subsequently creates what he calls a “one size fits all” meaning your problems and worries become my problems and worries”. This
dis disadvantageous dilemma became a reality for Lesotho as it was evident in the collapse of the 2012 coalition government after just two (2) years in power, and went on to resurface and challenge the subsequent coalition government of 2015 that consisted of seven parties which were, Democratic congress (DC), Lesotho Congress for democracy, (LCD) Marematlou freedom Party, (MFP) Basotho Congress Party (BCP), National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho people`s congress (LPC) and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), Mahlakeng (2016).

1.2 Problem statement

Finely (2012:1) views a coalition mainly based on its advantages and disadvantages, but firstly, defines this phenomenon as a government that consists of two or more parties that must compromise on principles and share a mandate. This, he describes as mostly occurring due to the inability of a single party to gain majority of seats in parliament. Finely maintains that “coalitions are mostly formed through elections but coalition governments arguably divide opinions, but those who favour proportional representation believe it can lead to consensus politics” these may enable or ensure the proper formulation due to wide representation of the public in the legislature and government and consequently formulation and implementation of policies. These types of government are famous for being undemocratic as they lead to drastic policies being put through upon a mandate that was not agreed upon. Problems of proportionality, as coalition governments are known to have broader representation as the two or more parties have to compromise on their opposing ideologies in order to create policies that result in legislation are nonetheless, reduced. Furthermore, greater policy scrutiny is also prominent in coalition governments which could prove beneficial for the electorate as this should in theory benefit a larger proportion of individuals than a single party government as the two opposing parties reflect a broader spectrum of voters (Finely 2012:2).

The First coalition government of Lesotho that was formed as a result of inconclusive National Assembly elections in 2012 faced great challenges that led to its ultimate collapse within a period of two and a half years. According to Sejanamane (2016:289) “the agreement among the three parties was to divide the government into three parts, leading to continuous stalemate in its operations. The most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup.” When the coalition government took over, there was no awareness that it had agreed to implement a semi feudal arrangement whereby coalition partners shared government ministers as opposed to merely sharing ministerial positions, rather than
establishing a credible coalition government, the partners shared the spoils and created the basis for its collapse.

The power struggle that ensued had its roots in their semi feudal arrangement which was confirmed in an agreement signed by three political parties, and which would prove to be instrumental in the collapse of the coalition. The rift between the 2012 coalition parties that led to its collapse became so serious that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) through the facilitation of the then Deputy President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, had to intervene to bring about stability in the country. Efforts were made to ultimately resolve the political and security chaos that followed the effective dissolution of the coalition government. This intervention brought about an agreement to open the parliament after it had been prorogued, restrict the mandate of parliament and hold elections in February 2015. Despite these efforts, the issues that brought about the dissolution of the coalition the continued insecurity remained Sejanamane (2016: 289). The issue of insecurity brought on by political instability became a cause for concern for the general population of Lesotho and even more for investors and diplomatic missions.

Lesotho times 24th November 2017, reports that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave a warning to the 3rd coalition government of Lesotho to control its spending and address the fragile political situation in the country. Moreover, the government was also advised by the IMF that the implementation of the multi-sectoral reforms as per the recommendations of the SADC commission of inquiry report would be paramount to the achievement of economic prosperity and peace. In an article for the African Independent, Mokhethi (2016), reports that Lesotho’s eligibility for the African Growth Opportunity act (AGOA), was at the risk as the United States of America table its dissatisfaction with the political unrest in the country. The US government urged Prime Minister Mosisili to review the proposed amnesty bill that was a result of the many deliberations by SADC and other stakeholders in the quest to restore the stability of the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Failure to comply, he asserts, would result in the termination of the AGOA agreement between Lesotho and the US as well as the termination of the Funding of Compact II development overseen by the Lesotho Millennium development Agency a derivative of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation. Mokhethi (2016) further reveals that the government of Lesotho had also been told that, its benefits for the subsequent years under AGOA would be based on the
progress it has made in the implementation of the SADC recommendations African Independent 13th December 2016.

1.3 Objectives

1. To examine the influence of a coalition government system on investment opportunities in Lesotho.
2. To evaluate the extent to which coalition governments are functional and effective in the implementation of policies
3. To assess the challenges that face coalition governments that may hinder investment opportunities in Lesotho
4. To examine the policies that inform a coalition Government in Lesotho

1.4 Research Questions

1. To what extend does policy making in a coalition government influence investment opportunity?
2. What are the challenges that face coalition governments that may hinder investments in the country?
3. What impact has a coalition government had on the Socio-political development in Lesotho?
4. Are there laws or regulations that make allowance for investment in a coalition government context?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in the realisation of the increasing popularity of a coalition system of government in recent times in Lesotho and how it seems to be increasingly difficult for an outright win to be attained in the future due to a highly polarized political atmosphere. The insufficient legal frameworks that would guide this type of governance has, consequently resulted in the collapse of two coalition governments within a space of five years. This being said, this subject becomes an issue of great interest and makes this study both relevant and significant for a lot is at stake if this type of government is not handled with the seriousness it ought to be, through proper legislative frame works and constitutional reforms.
1.6 THEORETICAL FRAME-WORK

This section presents the theoretical-frame-work that informs the study. Principal theories upon which the study is constructed are: Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, providing rationale on how it best fits this study. The penultimate part of this section discusses policy monitoring and evaluation models as frame-works on which the study is underpinned.

The driving force behind the formation of coalition government and this study thereof, is conflict According to Ritzer (2000:238) Conflict theory, a theory that was pioneered by Karl Marx “is a development that took place at least in part, in reactions to what sociologists call Structural Functionalism. Where functionalists emphasize the orderliness of society, conflict theorists see dissention and conflict at every point in the social system.” For purposes of this study Neo Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci’s work will be used.

Gramsci’s work represents a multifaceted and dialectic interrelation between hegemony, civil society and the state. Against this backdrop, the civil society plays a two-fold role. Firstly, the civil society acts as an agent of the government and is endowed with hegemonic powers that control the state. The civil society therefore becomes an apparatus to sustain prevalent relations of power in any given society. Secondly, the civil society becomes a field of creativity in which counter hegemonic forces, ideologies and practices are developed. Smith (2010) denotes that the term hegemony has recently come to be synonymous with the idea of the domination of one group over another, especially in the field of international relations. It is most frequently linked to Gramsci’s work on the political relations emerging out of the revolutionary ferment of early twentieth century Europe. Jackson (1985) designates that Gramsci’s most interesting ideas cluster around the concept of cultural hegemony. He used this, to address the relation between culture and power under a capitalist society. This analogy will be utilized in this study.

As one of the most prominent Marxist thinkers, Gramsci utilized the concept of hegemony to designate the procedure of obtaining political control through ideological mastery. This he does by providing an insightful revelation on how ruling elites use popular culture, religion, media, the state and educational forces to strengthen an ideology which supports their position. This dominant group of “elites” establish a self-servicing ideology which common men and women cannot see through Parkash (2016). In this theory, it would seem that intellectuals determine everything for even thoughts, goals and dreams of the public are the product of theirs. In relation to this study, the above would suggest that power lies in the hands of the political elites who get to make all the decisions. That is, which party gets to join which one to form
government, which policies should be implemented and the terms and conditions of investment.

The formulation and implementation of policies also, lies in the hands of the political elites as well as the investors who have their own terms and conditions laid out for investing in a state. Applying this concept in this study, this section reflects on the construction of the coalition government. It suggests that this construction of a coalition government is merely a reflection of hegemonic ideologies tantamount to instruments of ruling elites and that, as the study argues, is in contrary to intellectual and moral leadership privileged by the masses. The notion by Parkash (2016) that the intellectuals determine everything applies in Lesotho. Bobbio (1988) in Parkash (2016) reiterates in his assertion that:

Dominant classes maintain their position not only through acts of coercion but also through symbolic action... Hegemony is the nexus of material and ideological instruments through which the dominant classes maintain their power. Hegemony thus mediates between ruling ideas and subjects. The hegemony of the ruling/dominant class is maintained through coercion and consent. The material sphere is a “structure” that is allied with a superstructure of ideas. These ideas are institutionalized in the civil society; the law courts the bureaucracy the religious and educational systems. The coercive apparatus is the state with its army and police apparatuses.

From the foregoing, this study holds that the citizens of Lesotho unconsciously contributed to the supremacy of the ruling elites by accepting the coalition government and that can be equated to the Gramscian discourse of the dominant culture. In order to have an effective coalition government, this study concurs with Gramscian precept that collective practices should not represent the cultures of the ruling elites but should integrate inclusive views and visions of the masses and the civil society at large. Jackson (1985) accentuates that Gramsci inspires fresh thought inspires fresh thought in historians trying to understand how ideas reinforce or undermine existing social structures and social historians seeking to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the power wielded by dominant groups and the relative cultural autonomy of the groups whom they victimize. Therefore, besides ventilating the Marxist tradition, Gramsci’s work has provided a theoretical frame-work and a vocabulary for understanding historiographical problems that have asserted themselves with special force in numerous years.
1.6.1 Cultural Hegemony

The Concept of cultural hegemony on Gramsci’s account, acknowledges differences in wealth and power even in “democracies” and seeks to show how those inequalities have been maintained or challenged in the sphere of culture. Jackson (1985) denotes that a convenient vocabulary for beginning to identify those elements in the dominant culture that serves existing powers relations and those that subvert them is provided. Unlike liberal notions of consensus, Gramsci’s vision acknowledges the social and economic constraints on the less powerful, then aims to see ways in which culture collaborates with those constraints. The hegemonic culture for Gramsci, depends not on the brainwashing of “the masses” but on the tendency of public discourse to make some forms of experience readily available to consciousness while ignoring or suppressing others. Banerjee and Rich (2017) makes mention of the following hegemonic apparatuses of the intellectuals who are seen as the dominant group in society:

1.6.2 The Economic structure:

Parkash (2006) begins by indicating that in a man’s life, economic conditions play a very significant role because a man’s life is almost determined by capital (prosperity). How individuals relate with each other and with the world affected by their livelihood. Intellectuals establish terms and conditions of economic structure of the country. They determine that who will be peers, assistants and subordinates in an economic structure. Furthermore, they set the policy for a society shrewdly and even determine that, which sections will gain benefits of the policy and which will not. They also establish terms and conditions of how business and industry will be run in the country. The 2016 Investment Policy final draft of Lesotho is an example of Parkash’s analogy of the economic structure under Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. “The Government of Lesotho promotes and regulates private investment within the fundamental national objective of sustainable and inclusive development for its citizens.”

1.6.3 Class structure:

According to Parkash (2016:3), ideology establishes the structure of the civil society, and what will be its cultural values, norms, faiths etc. It determines how many sections and sub sections will be in society and how they will work. In his recommendation on hegemony, Strinati (1995) in Parkash (2016) maintains that; “Subordinated groups accept the idea, values and leadership of the dominant intellectuals neither because they are physically or mentally induced to do so,
nor because they are ideologically indoctrinated, but because they have reasons of their own.” In addition, intellectuals are said to be the base of the superstructure of the ruling system because their principles work as the rules and regulations of the ruling system of a country. The supremacy of the intellectuals is based on economic domination, moral leadership, ideological attitude etc. The political elites and investors or intellectuals as Parkash (2016) submits, persuade the classes of society to accept moral, political and cultural values of intellectuals because these are fine and valuable for a good life. In this case the political leaders in their respective parties as well as coalition partners make decisions in the form of manifestos and subsequently coalition agreements and policies without proper public participation and consultation.

Ideology, as one of the hegemonic apparatuses of the intellectuals is referred to by Parkash (2016) as a superstructure of the ruling class because through it, the intellectuals express their thoughts, interests, philosophy etc. Thus, ideological hegemony is as the recourse of maintaining and legitimizing the intellectual’s ideology. Gramsci’s notion of ideology submits that, “men acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies”. Those revolutions are facilitated by shifts in the economic structure and their outcomes are decided on the level of ideologies. Ideology is, therefore, the site of class conflict for Gramsci. He provided a redefinition of ideology by emphasizing the institutional and cultural base of ideology. For him, ideology may be of any form: Political propaganda, sermon, folklore and popular song. Parkash further mentions that intellectuals gained control not only with state power, violence, political and economic coercion but also through ideology Parkash (2016:6). Simon (1982) remarks that “the practices of the intellectual class or its representatives is to gain state power and maintain it later” Gramsci boldly asserts that the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules Parkash (2016:5)

Political parties as an apparatus of the intellectuals in Gramsci’s hegemonic theory is seen opposite to each other but all these, move according to established norms of the ideology of intellectuals. Parkash mentions that political parties formulate the structure of consciousness which expresses the views of a particular class. In the case of this study, it can be said in alignment with this theory that, the Political parties that are formed by the political elites create a structure of consciousness which represents and expresses the views of the same elites. This means that the government at the helm, which consists of politicians and the investors, referred
who are considered to be the elites, push their own agenda with the investors only playing a role of influence while the civil society and the population remain powerless.

The government of Lesotho presented the National Reforms Commission Bill on 17 January 2018, which aimed at establishing a commission to spearhead national dialogue towards the implementation of Multi-sectoral reforms amid strong protests by the opposition legislators. Legislators eventually walked out to protest what they said was government arbitrariness and lack of consultation on the Bill Lesotho times 18 January 2018. This narration is indicative of the conflict of interest between not only the political elites with other stakeholders of the state such as the general population as well as the civil society, but also one that exits between the political elites themselves. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony thus becomes a suitable underpinning theory for this study.

1.6.4 Policy evaluation model

The public policy analysis frame-work will be used in this study. It will explain the existence of an underlying or identified problem in policy making and implementation in a coalition government context. Two main models that form part of the public policy analysis frame-work used in this study are:

- Policy monitoring/ maintenance
- Policy evaluation

One of the most important tasks of governance is policy making. Changes and problems of governance and their collapse as is the case in Lesotho, inevitably impact on this important process. The abovementioned models of public policy analysis frame-work are both interdependent and interrelated. Each will be explained in detail and their relationship and usefulness in this study will be also be explicated.

Cloete (2006) defines a policy as a program of action to give effect to specific goals and objectives aimed at changing (and preferably improving) an existing unsatisfactory situation. In relation to this study and its objectives it is worthwhile to provide what a public policy making, as a task of government is. The 21st century perspective on Public Policy making is that; it is a choice that the government makes in response to a political issue or a public problem Geurts (2014). This choice does not take place out of nowhere, rather it is based on specific values and norms. As already outlined earlier in this chapter, one of the objectives of this study
is to evaluate the extent to which coalition governments are functional and effective in the implementation of policies.

Policies are aimed at bridging the gap between these values and norms and a situation. Geurts (2014) points out that the term ‘public policy’ used in this context always refers to the decisions and actions of government and the intentions that determine those decisions and actions. This model, therefore, evaluates whether the coalition governments in Lesotho formed since 2012, and those succeeding the first one have been able to carry out this task and whether those policies have been successfully implemented and achieved their set out goals. The process of policy making is a decision-centric and goal driven process. Additionally, this process is characterized by the coexistence of a political and a production dimension and the interaction between the elements in these dimensions Geurts (2014).

Scriven (1991:1) defines evaluation as a “process of determining the merit, worth, and value of things.” Vedung (1997), writes that evaluation is a key analytical procedure in all disciplined intellectual and practical endeavors. While acknowledging that the process of determining the merit, worth and value of things infuses every domain of thought and practice, in the present work evaluation will delimit to suit the demands of public service and governmental affairs. Fischer and Muller (2006) assert that the policy evaluation process forms part of a very crucial step in the public policy cycle as evaluations can lead to diverse patterns of policy learning; one pattern would be that successful policies are reinforced and those that fail can be terminated. Therefore, it can be said that the policy evaluation process is a step that is much concerned with how a policy has fare or played out in action: during the process the policy successes and failures are identified Howlett and Ramesh (2003).

The United Nations Evaluation group UNEG (2005) puts it this way, “an evaluation is an assessment, as systematic and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, program, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector etc. Out of the numerous types of evaluation, this study focuses on the programmatic evaluation. This type of evaluation provides an in-depth understanding of how and why results and outcomes have been achieved over several years and examines their relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency. Gasper (2006) defines effectiveness as the production of approved effects that is, the fulfilment of set objectives. These are usually laid out in government policy papers as well as party manifestos. In this study, the respondents, whose businesses are influenced by the policies set in place by government will rate the
effectiveness, success of lack thereof of the policies that the coalition governments have implemented.

1.6.5 Policy Monitoring Model

Dunleavy (1986) defines policy monitoring as a process that often involves the gathering of evidence of a policy while the policy is being implemented and then using the collected findings to influence future of course action. Cloete (2006) on the other hand maintains that policy monitoring is the regular, systematic collection of data on the basis of specified indicators to determine levels of progress and achievement of goals and objectives. A coalition government itself, in this context will be used as a unit of analysis. This means that the results gathered on this phenomenon will be used to measure the effectiveness of this type of governance as well as to determine whether it is doing what is was envisioned to do or solve what it was intended to solve Howlett and Ramesh (2003).

The systematic collection of data on the basis of specified indicators to determine levels of progress and achievement of goals in policy monitoring is considered to be a very important project implementation and management tool but has been linked to the concept of evaluation over time Cloete (2006). Contrary to monitoring, policy evaluation is seen as a systematic judgement or assessment of policy program. It can include a systematic assessment of resources, organizational processes to convert such resources to policy outputs or products, and the extent to which these policy programs have the intended results in the form of outputs, outcomes, or impacts, measured against envisaged goals and objectives Cloete (2006). The 2015 Coalition agreement for stability and reforms declared the second coalition government of Lesotho’s commitment to, “Growing the economy faster through institutional reforms, effective use of natural resources, infrastructure development, attracting investment on the basis that protects Lesotho’s interests and ensuring that a greater proportion of the earnings from the natural sources remains in Lesotho”.

In this study, the evaluation and the monitoring models will be applied in the analysis of the data obtained to establish whether the coalition government was successful in attaining its set goals as per the respective coalition agreements. These models will also be used to determine whether the objectives of this study are met.

1.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced the topic of the study. Firstly, it provided the study background that focused on the political history of Lesotho and discussed its triumphs and tribulation in issues of governance over the year. The problem statement that gives an outline on why there is a crisis worth looking into that has been brought forth by the emergence of a coalition government was also discussed in this chapter. This was followed by the justification of the study which revealed why it was necessary to undertake. Lastly the research objectives and research questions were delineated.

The next chapter will focus on the existing literature around the subject matter of this study. The literature will be reviewed on coalition governments and their different types, electoral systems and their effects on coalition building and on coalition governments and their impacts on investment opportunities. Lastly, the chapter will present case studies of coalition governments/ power-sharing arrangements in Kenya and Zimbabwe together with the lessons to be learned from each country.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on coalition governments, their types and the formation of one such government in Lesotho. The chapter further looks into literature on the impacts of coalition governments on economic development in different states, and issues surrounding them.

2.1 Coalition Government

Oyugi (2006), asserts that the formation of coalitions before or after elections, whether in presidential, parliamentary or “mixed systems”, is usually a manifestation of the absence of a dominant party capable of controlling the majority in a legislative assembly. Therefore, political parties enter alliances before an election in the hope that in doing so, they will stand a better chance of winning an election and subsequently constituting a working majority in parliament. Coalition or alliance, involving formation of both before and after elections is often designed to serve the individual and the collective interests of the cooperating parties. Sometimes these alliances are opportunistic in character. At other times they are guided by principles and precepts based on the established values and ideologies which the partner parties affirm. Oyugi notes that the concept of coalition politics and a coalition government seems to have arrived at a settled meaning and refers to what Altman defined:

Temporal combination of groups or individual formed to pursue specific objectives through joint action. Especially it is a set of parliamentary political parties that agree to pursue a common goal or a common set of goals: pull their resources together in pursuit of their goal to communicate and form building commitments concerning their goals (and) agree on distribution of pay offs to be received on obtaining their goals.

Although the objectives of coalition formation in Altmans formulation capture the motives of coalition makers, his confirming of coalition making to parliamentary parties appears to be restricted to post election activities. However, if one accepts both the concepts of “coalition of parties”, in accordance with the distinction made by Bawn and Rosenbluth (2003) in their study
of 17 European countries during the period of 1970-1990, one would also accept that the case exists where political parties both represented and not represented in parliament come together to form a coalition or alliance for purposes of winning an election. By so doing, they reconstitute themselves into a single party outside parliament. This was the case in Kenya resulting in the formation of the National Rainbow coalition government. Karume (2003) in Oyugi (2003:54) on the other hand, writes that, coalition building is a process of organizing parties collectively in pursuit of a common goal. It entails key elements and actions, that is, pooling off resources in pursuit of this goal, communication about the goal, forming building commitments concerning this goal and an agreement on the distribution arrangement of the product that may result from achieving this goal. The action of such political coalitions consists mainly of individual legislations and political parties seeking purposely/ explicitly to control the executive.

Finely (2012:1) views a coalition mainly based on its advantages and disadvantages, but firstly, defines this phenomenon as a government that consists of two or more parties that must compromise on principles and share a mandate. This, he describes as mostly occurring due to the inability of a single party to gain majority of seats in parliament. Finely maintains that “coalitions are mostly formed through elections, but coalition governments arguably divide opinions, but those who favour proportional representation believe it can lead to consensus politics” these may enable or ensure the proper formulation due to wide representation of the public in the legislature and government and consequently formulation and implementation of policies.

These types of government are famous for being undemocratic and they lead to drastic policies being put through upon a mandate that was not agreed upon, problems of proportionality as coalition governments are known to have broader representation as the two or more parties must compromise on their opposing ideologies to create policies that result in legislation. Furthermore, greater policy scrutiny is also prominent in coalition governments which could prove beneficial for the electorate as this should in theory benefit a larger proportion of individuals than a single party government as the two opposing parties reflect a broader spectrum of voters (Finely 2012:2).

Schofiled (2003), reveals that there are different models of coalition governments and argues that early research of multi-party governments in European democracies was based on the construction of typologies designed to distinguish between different qualitative features of the
various political systems (Duverger 1951; Sartokr 1966; Rokkar 1970) in Schofiled (2003). He states that in the early 1970s further development of this line of work concentrated on Empirical relationships between the fragmentation of party systems and the duration of multi-party coalition governments (Taylor and Herman 1971, Herman and Sanders 1977: Warwick 1979). A related research program examined the types of government that were formed. The question here, concerned the motivations of those involved in the distribution of payoffs of office, such as Cabinet portfolios, then this would lead to a prediction that government coalitions would be Minimal Collected Winning (MCW) (Axelrod 1970: de Swaan 1973: and Mokken 1980) in Schofiled (2003).

These various predictions and thus, the models underpinning them, were compared by Taylor and Laver (1973) and Laver (1974). The conclusions of these authors suggest that ideology does not in general play an important role in explaining the stability of multi-party coalitions. Juma (2013) denotes that periodic elections play a vital role in the establishment of democratic governments i.e. stability and the rule of law are at the centre of building coalition governments. Dahl (1971) in Juma (2013) provides a model (polyarchy) which forms the basis of most current definitions of democracy. In the models he calls for the ability to contest and/ or to participate in the election of officials of the government. Diamond et.al. (1995) in Juma (2013) improves on the model by providing a criterion in the competition by people for office in government through election and necessary civil and political liberties to ensure the integrity of the process.

Mill (1948) challenges the possibility of democracy persisting in the multi-ethnic states. His belief is that institutions would not be able to function properly due to many countervailing opinions. Conversely, Acton (1964) in Juma (2013) argues that countervailing opinion of various group force the state to keep away from taking absolute actions. Acton (1964) envisages semi-autonomous groups working together in a central government for purposes of achieving common goals. Juma (2013) reveals that there are two broad categories of coalition governments that can be extracted from the existing practices: Classical coalition governments (formed to attain primary majority) and Consociational coalition governments (adopted to avert political crisis in divided societies). Both categories are formed from the interaction of diverse socio-political situations in any given society making no two coalition governments similar in the rationale behind their formation structure. This process ordinarily gives rise to two kinds of classical coalition governments: pre-electoral and post-electoral coalition governments.
2.1.1 Classical Coalition Governments

Juma (2013) purports that a classical coalition government is traditionally embraced by political parties and elite leaders for political convenience. The primary motive of forming classical coalition government is therefore, to attain the majority in parliament. For this reason, Oyugi (2006) is prompted to contend that coalition is usually a manifestation of the absence of a dominant party capable of controlling the majority in a legislative assembly while Pre-electoral coalitions exist where parties chose to coordinate their electoral strategies as they run for offices instead of each doing it alone. Golder (2006) in Juma (2013) adds that parties agree to cooperate hoping that doing so puts them in a better position to jointly win an election and constitute a working majority in parliament.

2.1.2 Consociational forms of Government

While classical coalition governments are formed mainly as a means of attaining majority in parliament and are known to be formulated for opportunistic reasons mainly for the political elites, consociational forms of coalition governments are designed to guarantee stability by accommodating minority segments in a deeply divided society. Institutional design in pluralistic societies can be favourable to some groups and not to others. This then calls for a design of institution of governance that accommodates the interests and demands of diverse groups. According to Lijphart (2008) in Juma (2013:18) these interests, and demands are best met by establishing a power sharing frame-work under a consociational model of democracy, which as concept, provides for grand coalition formation, group autonomy, proportional representation and minority veto as avenues within which such interests and demands can be guaranteed. Juma (2013) emphasises that, “consociational democracy in its purest form has not been operationalized in Africa but has practically been adopted to bring stability and political systems in counties that have undergone transition either from repressive to democratic regimes from the civil war to peace”.

A model dealing with both coalition types and duration was proposed by Dodd (1974, 1976) in Schofiled (2003:2) who suggested that, party systems with moderate fragmentation would give rise to relatively long- lived minimal winning coalitions, and those (with more than a majority) depending on whether there was ideological conflict in the polity. Dodds work seemed to imply that the rikers model, based solely on the notion of constant sum gains, was not sufficient to provide an adequate account of a coalition formation in the European context,
instead some account of policy positions of coalition partners appeared important for understanding the phenomena. In Lesotho on the other hand, Letsie (2012), accounts that the weeks that followed intensive campaigning, the people of Lesotho went to the polls on Saturday 26th May 2012 after attendances from all the party rallies had suggested that the serious competition would be among the All Basotho Convention (ABC), the Basotho national Party (BNP), the Democratic Congress and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). On the basis, some party leaders warned the country to brace itself for a coalition government. The four-party contest was a new occurrence in the country’s electoral history. Pre-electoral campaigns had in the past, been two party races. In 1998 between the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the (BNP).

Numerous groups, both local and international observed the elections and among these groups were; the Commonwealth election observer group, headed by the former Malawian president Baki Muluzi and the Southern African development Community Electoral observer mission led by South Africa’s then deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim. Also, present was a mission from the Electoral institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) headed by former Zambian president Rupiah Banda, Letsie (2012:2). Lesotho’s national assembly consists of 120 seats. Of these, 80 constituency seats are filled through the First past the Post element of the country’s Mixed Member Proportionality Model and other 40 are party seats determined by Proportional Representation (PR) consequent to the outcome of the results, parties were compelled to negotiate among themselves with the view of forming a coalition government. Based on the allocation of seats, the DC was best placed to lead the resultant coalition, by virtue of it having a majority of 48 seats the party needed just 13 seats to reach the 61 seats required to form a government in terms of Section 87 (2) of the Constitution. This however was not the case, with the ABC securing more seats in the PR and the LCD playing king maker to a coalition government, (Lestie, 2012:3).

Although the kingdom of Lesotho was only introduced to a coalition system of government for the first time in 2012, this system of governance itself is not new. Government of National Unity, another term often used interchangeably with a coalition government was established in Kenya in by the former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anann. According to Mukuhlani (2014:169) the term Government of National Unity (GNU), is used to refer to a case in which all the major parties in a country form a coalition, he further denotes that modern Political Scientists have predicted the formation of unity government as the panacea to political
deadlock such as the one witnessed in Zimbabwe in 2008. “In Zimbabwe, the 2008 Government of National Unity was not without its challenges, when it began to work, the economy in Zimbabwe was at a crossroads, given the extent of the crises, a radical re-think was required, boldness, fairness, and the solid craft of competence. It would also mean pain, Zimbabwe was dying, and emergency surgery was in order,” Biti (2014:7).

The Government of National Unity (GNU) had to start by identifying the nature and causes of the crises. Biti (2014) argues that African policy makers often make wrong and faulty diagnosis of their situation which in turn results in false solution. At the same time, they polarized the status quo of Zimbabwe then, all the economic challenges were blamed on external factors, particularly Western imposed sanctions. The new authorities in the Ministry of Finance are said to have understood that the immediate challenges facing the economy arose from self-imposed distortions. For a very long time, the country had been suffering under the weight of costly, inconsistent, and incoherent policies and that needed to be addressed urgently.

Biti (2014) asserts that the Government of Zimbabwe needed an emergency plan to navigate the myriad of challenges that faced the country. “But a plan would not be enough for Zimbabwe as it had many economic blue prints since independence, but few had been implemented, if anything, the country suffered from an excess of unexecuted programs. The plan therefore had to be credible, realistic and relevant.” In 2008, Biti reports that food availability in Zimbabwe was on top of any agenda, agricultural production sunk with maize production less than a fifth of the country’s requirements. Shops were empty and donors including the World Food Program (WFP) were providing food to vulnerable communities. Following close on the list of priorities was hyperinflation. “Taming out of control price increase would require a prudent Micro-economic framework and unprecedented fiscal discipline. A third priority was to restore Social service delivery, particularly health and education.” Schools were closed, and hospitals were operating without drugs, staff and other essential amenities, people were dying in large numbers. Another major priority was to rebuild national confidence and trust (Biti 2004:37). GNU’s are fragile, acrimonious, usually transitional arrangement with a high risk of disintegrating at the slightest opportunity (Mapuva 2010) in Mukuhlani (2014:170). Mukuhlani continues to argue that “Zimbabwe’s GNU can be dubbed as ‘marriage of convenience’. The three political parties Zimbabwean African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU- PF) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC .M) and (MDC .T), were forced to this ‘marriage of convenience’ by circumstances on that ground, that is the political and economic turbulence within the country Mukuhlani (2014:170).
2.1.3 Electoral Systems and their effect on coalition Building.

Three types of electoral systems are usually in operation in democracies. These are, proportional representation (PR) and the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) and a combination of the two. There is a general belief that the mode of election in a given country has direct effect on the likelihood of a coalition formation. In counties where members of parliament represent individual constituencies and are elected on majoritarian or pluralistic criteria under the FPTP system, coalition building has tended to be done on a post hoc basis. Some scholars suggest that coalition formation is more common in countries that use PR as an electoral system. Diermener and Merlo (2001). Oyugi (2006:53) suggests that, if coalition making involves a process which leads to the sharing of power as well as the material benefits that go with it, then coalition formation is a process which normally occurs only because neither or none of the cooperating parties can manage to win an election and govern on its own. It is therefore unavoidable in the sense that normally no party ever coalesces except in circumstances in which not doing so forfeits getting into power.

The question of why coalitions of parties or executive coalitions (coalitions formed in parliament to exercise government function) are formed, has a lot to do with the socio-political situation in a given society. In a paper that sought to assess political party alliances and coalitions in Lesotho, with a focus on their causes and consequences for party systems, democratic consolidation, national cohesion, and state governability. Kapa and Shale (2012) argue that, “the formation of the pre-2007 political party alliances can be explained in terms of office-seeking theory in that the political elite used alliances to access and retain power.” The same strategy was used from 2012 in the formulation of three coalition governments between the periods 2012-2017. Matjama (2013), reports that while celebrations both in Lesotho and around the region when the opposition won the elections was entirely sure on how the new government would cope, and this he asserts was not only because prime Minister Mosisili of the Lesotho Congress for democracy (LCD) then, had been in charge for so long, but also because it was a coalition system of governance which was a first for the country and a rarity in the continent.

Accustomed to a single party rule, in 2012, The All Basotho Convention, Lesotho Congress for democracy, and the Basotho National Party formed an alliance and became government after an outright win by a single party could not be attained Matjama (2013). Given the complexity of governance, now faced with different ideologies, the three coalition parties came
to an agreement on how they would ensure that they work towards carrying out the mandate of the electorate. They would work together in parliament and in government to form an inclusive government, allocating key positions in proportion to the number of seats each party had in parliament to form a joint Monitoring Implementation committee composed of two competent members of each party to ensure the implementation of the agreement and to collaborate with the bloc, the bloc is not fully integrated into the government, it sits between the government and the opposition and its constituency members retain their individual identity as distinct parties, just as the coalition members have done. (Kapa 2014:105).

Mahlakeng (2016) acknowledges the strength of coalition governments is their ability to share a mandate as was the case with the 2012 coalition government of Lesotho according to the coalition agreement. This, he argues leads to broader representation and greater scrutiny of policy making. Nevertheless, the disadvantage to this form of government is the conflict that may arise due to conflicting ideologies leading to policy standstills, thus affecting the stability, and functioning of government. He further notes that one complex and detrimental issue in coalition governments is dependency, which subsequently creates what he calls a “one size fits all” meaning your problems and worries become my problems and worries”. This disadvantageous dilemma became a reality for Lesotho as it was evident in the collapse of the 2012 coalition government after two years in power, and went on to resurface and challenge the subsequent coalition government that got into power in 2015.

Mahlakeng (2017) denotes that the dissolution of the ninth parliament in Lesotho on the 6th March 2017 because a successful vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili put an untimely end to the seven-party coalition that was formed in 2015. The no confidence vote against the PM meant two realities. At first, the PM who was the leader of the Democratic Congress (DC) and a leading partner in the coalition government would have to resign as PM. This would allow for his party Deputy to lead the DC in parliament and subsequently become the PM. Secondly, the passing of this motion meant that that the PM acting according to section 83(1) and (4)(b) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho would have to advice the king as head of state to prorogue/ dissolve parliament. This would not be the first time that a head of government and coalition resorted to the dissolution of parliament for it had previously been done by PM Mosisili’s predecessor PM Thomas Thabane about three years prior when the
relations between him and his coalition ally deteriorated further leading to the coalition collapse.

The option of the dissolution of parliament would ultimately mean that an announcement on election date had to be declared. The PM opted for the latter and advised the king to dissolve parliament. Consequently, the country had to prepare for fresh national assembly elections after a pronouncement of election date was declared. It is worthy to note that, in Lesotho, a constitutional Monarchy, the role of the king who is the head of state is ceremonial and therefore the decisions that he makes are a result of being “advised” by the PM who is the head of government.

2.1.4 Coalition and Investment

The National Strategic Development Plan adopted by the first coalition government in Lesotho in 2012 acknowledged that investment development in Lesotho lacked clarity. It was suggested that this called for the creation of a sign overarching investment policy. The National Investment Policy of Lesotho was drafted and dedicated to national and foreign investors to reveal to them the governments goals and policies in promoting and regulating investment, and as a provision of clarity about their obligations and opportunities. The objectives of the 2012 investment policy as outlined in the 2016 Investment policy draft included;

- The promotion and regulation of private investment within the fundamental national objective of sustainable and inclusive development for its citizens. This is done because of the government’s awareness of the crucial role played by private investment as the most effective way of raising living standards through the creation of sustainable jobs.

- Secondly, the government encouraged the development of an entrepreneurial culture in which hard work and risk taking would be rewarded and success valued in communities. The policy would support Basotho business in improving know-how and access to facilities and finance.

Lesotho’s notable success in manufacturing has been based on textiles, garments, and footwear exports, this it has helped by preferential market access and is not deeply rooted in a domestic supply chain. This was to diversify and deepen manufacturing for regional and international markets to promote sustainable job creation. Investment in agriculture, mining, and tourism along with supplier industries and services is encouraged as an integral part of the goal of
broadening the economic base and widening job opportunities. The invest policy draft of 2015 notes that the government of Lesotho actively encourages in all areas of the economy, apart from certain small-scale business which are reserved for Lesotho’s citizens. The provisions of the government policy dictate that, once established, foreign investors should enjoy the same rights and protections as national investors. It is mandatory that they abide by the law. The investment policy reveals that the coalition government of Lesotho in 2012 became aware of the challenges it was faced with as a small and least developed country in facilitating investment and consequently pledged its commitment to ensuring that it cultivates an environment conducive for investment. In an article on coalition politics and economic development, Noruddin (2011) speaks to the seminal puzzle that Barry Weingast posed: “The fundamental political dilemma forces us to ask what form of political system is required so that a viable private market economy is a stable policy of choice of that political system” (Weingast 1995) in Noruddin (2011). In the Weingast thesis, “market preserving federalism, an apparently depoliticized form of government, was proposed as a solution to the credible commitment dilemma. Norrudin roots for “more democracy” instead and argues that countries in which policy making authority is diffused across political institutions controlled by actors responsive to different social constituencies are better able to make credible commitments to long term policy stability.

The causal mechanism works as follows: Minority or coalition governments entail diffusion of policy making authority among multiple parties representing diverse societal preferences, which in turn prevents governments from making arbitrary policy choices, bolsters investor confidence, ensures longevity of investments, and attenuates growth rate volatility Norrudin (2011).

2.1.5 African Growth and Opportunity Act

According to Lekunya and Oranje (2016), the achievement of rapid, inclusive and sustainable economic growth that is enabled by and contributed to the development of dynamic, responsive and inclusive and resilient human settlement development has been a long-standing objective and challenge for the countries of Sub Saharan Africa (Vastveit,2013:1) in Lekunya and Oranje (2016). A common held solution to this challenge has been to emulate the Chinese manufacturing and trade led success story and to serve as access of manufactured goods from the South Saharan region to the dynamic markets of the affluent North (Poplack, 2012; Wrobleswska, 2015). In accordance with this prevailing wisdom, the congress of the United
States of America (USA) enacted the African Growth and Opportunity Act AGOA in 2000 (Congress of the USA, 2000).

The main Objectives of the act were to facilitate duty and quota free trade in designated goods between the US and the sub-Saharan African region and in so doing, promote, support and strengthen economic growth, job creation and economic diversification, development, poverty reduction, democracy, the rule of law and stability in countries in the SSA region and assist their integration into the global economy (Congress of the USA, 2000:3-4; 2015; 2, 2011:50). Key in this this regard was the reward for countries that pursued market based economic policies, maintained clean human rights, labour and governance records. In addition, these countries were also expected not provide support for acts of international terrorism or engaged in activities that posed as a threat to the national security of the USA 2000; vastveit, 2015; 39, Kamara, 2008:27 in Lekunya and Oranje.

After the successful enactment of the AGOA policy in 2000 by the 200th Congress, Lesotho became a beneficiary since it met all the eligibility requirements of the act. Lekunya and Oranje reiterate that, “Lesotho was designated as eligible for trade benefits under AGOA in October 2000 and satisfied the AGOA agreement in April 2001 (central Bank Lesotho, 2011:1). Soon after this date, it started exporting designated goods as per the act, in the form of textiles and apparels to the USA, which was noted by the contribution of the sector to the country’s GDP grow to approximately 20% and approximately 40,000 Basotho working in AGOA related clothing factories in the country” (Keletso, 2015; AGOA. Info.2016; England, 2014; kamara, 2008:47-48 USITC/department of Commerce.

2.1.6 The impacts of a coalition government

Following the 2012 national elections that produced the first coalition government in Lesotho, the country has been marked by unprecedented political havoc and instability that has resulted in the collapse of 2 consecutive coalition governments in the space of five years, the fleeing of political leader to neighbouring countries as well and the killing of two military commanders in a space of two years. Vhumbunu, (2015), relates that “since the events of 30th August 2014 in Lesotho when a coup d’éetat was reported to have been attempted against Prime Minister Thomas Motsoaahae Thabane which subsequently forced him to seek refuge in South Africa. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), of which Lesotho is a member, has been occupied with efforts to manage and resolve the ensuing conflict in the mountain kingdom. Lesotho has been a prominent conflict agenda item at SACD summits and

Vhumbunu (2015) further notes that throughout Lesotho’s history of conflict, SADC has facilitated interventions in collaboration with neighbouring states, specifically South Africa and Botswana, in search of peace and political stability. It is alarming however, that despite all calls for the restoration of peace in Lesotho as well as the February snap elections which were a result of the SADC facilitation by the then deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, there was still no restoration of peace and normalcy in Lesotho. The assassination of the former Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) army chief Maaparankoe Mahao on the 25th June 2015 just outside Maseru, became a huge concern for SADC as well as the international Community including the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the USA a major investor in the country of Lesotho through AGOA and Compact II development program overseen by the Lesotho Millennium Development Agency (LMDA).

2.2 Coalition governments in other countries and their impact on the socio-political development and investment opportunities of their countries

While the formation of the first coalition Government in Lesotho was due to the failure of a single party to gain sixty plus one seats as prescribed by the Proportional Representation electoral model used, these kinds of governments have become increasingly popular in modern global politics as a solution to conflict and political deadlocks in other countries. In a study on the impacts of post-election power sharing agreement on horizontal mechanisms for political accountability, Otunba (2013) asserts that “Globally, power sharing has become an international policy approach to mitigating conflict in ethnically or religiously diverse societies. Today, power sharing is increasingly becoming part of almost every post conflict peace agreement.” An election deadlock in 2008 led Kenya to the brink of a civil war. International mediators through the United Nations mediated and power sharing as a post conflict resolution tool was implemented for the first time to resolve an election deadlock. Subsequently, post-election power sharing as it has come to be known as, was implemented in Zimbabwe and it continued to be proposed in other countries Otunba (2013).

Otunba (2013) accounts that in Kenya, power sharing is “somewhat new unlike in the past where power-sharing was mainly used to end civil wars. Kenya had gone through violent conflict but no civil war.” The 2007 election deadlock and violence incited international mediators led by former United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan to facilitate and call for
a power sharing agreement between the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga of the Orange democratic movement (ODM) after careful deliberation. Ontuba further reveals that, the agreement resulted in the creation of the office of Odinga, while Kibaki remained as President. It is further revealed that the agreement split both by creating the second executive office, but also divided cabinet ministers, equally among Kenyans main political parties. The consent of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and PNU which are the two major political parties the largest representation in parliament was required for virtually every major action and decision of government, Kenya became the first case in which a predominantly post conflict-resolution (power sharing) tool was implemented in a post-election or election deadlock situation Otunba (2013:4).

In the face of the increasing popularity of coalition governments and governments of national unity, there is very limited literature on the actual suitability, effectiveness, efficiency as well as their impacts on the socio-political development and overall well-being of critical pillars of the states in which they are established. Otunba (2013) reiterates that, even though there is a growing support for the use of post-election power sharing to resolve election deadlocks, there is a conspicuous lack of detailed studies dedicated specifically to the suitability of using such post conflict arrangements in dealing with post-election deadlock. He further notes that political institutions which are the building blocks of good governance are almost entirely ignored in the few existing literatures Otunba (2013). A section of this literature will focus on numerous other impacts that governments of national unity or coalition governments may have on other key structures and stakes of governance.

2.2 Democracy as a prerequisite for investment and socio-economic development

Stability and the rule of law or democracy have been regarded as and proved to be fundamental necessities in ensuring prosperity and socio-political development in many countries of the world. Instability is known to create a very uncertain environment for investment and to be a major hindrance to economic grown and development in general. (Bratton and Van de Welle 1997:10) in Tumbare 2014 define democracy as a term derived from Greek words ‘Kratos’ and ‘Demos’ which mean rule/ power and people, respectively. i.e. the lose translation of these words “rule by the people” which Saward (1998:7) defines as a “political act” that can be made to mean and suit the interests of the one who defines it Tumbare (2014). Despite the various definitions of democracy there are some generally agreed principles that govern it. Heywood (2007) in Tumbare (2014) denotes that these principles of democracy have to do with the
general will or collective will rather than individual will. Furthermore, the misconceptions of democracy are based on the principle of governments by the people, meaning the people get to govern themselves when they participate in crucial decision making that shapes their lives and determine the fate of their society.

Robinson (2006) contests that two great divergences have dominated the modern world. One is the great divergence in per capita incomes that has taken place since the 1800s and the other is democracy. He further notes that, “Just as countries started to become more prosperous than others in the nineteenth century others started to become more democratic than others” Robinson (2006). This assertion, therefore, goes into an investigation of the correlation between economic development or prosperity and democracy. Chigora and Guzura (2008) contend that “in the Zimbabwean case, the government of National Unity poses many threats to democracy.”

In an article on governance by the Institute of Economic affairs, Boadi (1995) mentions that the extreme weakness or sometimes total absence of governance has been identified as a leading factor in Africa’s poor development record and related economic, social, and political crisis. It is further relayed in the World Bank 1986 report through its analysts and reformers from different ideological persuasions that “underlying the litany of Africa’s problems are crises caused by poor governance”. Moreover, Nyong’o (2007) gives an account of an intense debate in the Council for the development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) bulletin as well as the CODESRIA Journal of African development on the relationship between democracy and development in Africa. He contended that democracy is good for development in Africa. He elaborates on this by giving an example of countries like Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire that he considers to be more democratic than others in terms of having civilian regimes, holding periodic elections and being tolerant of some amount of press freedom. Nyong’o (2007) argues that these countries have done much better than others have on the terms elaborated. The countries he points out were open to some democratic accountability through semi-competitive elections. He maintains that, “democracy is good for political stability” Nyong’o (2007).

Mkandawire (1988) in Nyong’o (2007) on the other hand strongly objected to Nyongo’s notion by contending that “democracy is good in and off itself”, period. He emphasizes that it does not need to be justified in terms of developmental or other outcomes. Secondly, he pointed out that evidence available shows that the authoritarian regimes have done much better at achieving
high rates of economic growth and development than democratic ones giving an example of the Asian tigers. Thirdly, those regimes in Africa that were characterized as “democratic” except for Botswana and Mauritius were in fact authoritarian regimes which tolerated some degree of participation in the political arena either within the one-party frame-work or multi-party frame-work Mkandawire (1988) in Nyong’o (2007).

Nyong’o (2007) further points out that many more countries have had competitive democratic elections with ruling parties giving way to opposition challenges in the last fifteen counties. He mentions countries such as Benin, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Ghana and further indicates that Africa’s much stable democracies seem to score consistently higher on economic growth indicators such as economic freedom (by the Cato institute), property rights (Vancouver Simon Fraser institute). Global competitiveness and economic growth rates in terms of GDP per Capita (World Bank, African Development Bank and Davis world Economic Forum) Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa are according to Nyong’o the only countries that seem to systematically correlate their democratic achievements with their economic growth and development performance World Bank and International Monetary Fund report (IMF) 2005 in Nyongo (2007). This account, therefore, demonstrates the interconnectedness of democracy and good governance and the key role they both play in achieving economic prosperity for all types of government.

2.3 Kenyan coalition government case-study

After the disputed 2007 presidential election and fighting broke between the supporters of incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. The announcement that Kibaki had retained the presidency triggered the violence. Ultimately, 1200 lives were lost while 350 000 people were displaced. Schrieber (2016) relates that, a power sharing agreement between the two political leaders Kibaki and Odinga helped restore order. This power sharing, Horowitz asserts, was adopted in response to the widespread ethnic violence triggered by a disputed residential election in late 2007 and it ended in the subsequent multi-party election in 2013 in Kenya. The history of violence associated with elections as well as the lack of necessary and favorable conditions for power sharing agreement to thrive became the driving forces that led to governance and coalition challenges in Kenya. Worse even, the lack of a strong moderate committed leadership to bring about needed change in governance structures demanded by majority of Kenyans led to political instability. Moreover, this would have been enhanced during the 1991-2007 transition to a democratic state. Instead, due to this lack of
committed leadership, Kenya went to the 2007 polls severely polarized from ethnic tensions occasioned by economic inequalities, exclusion from power and poor living standards (Biegon, 2008). Several scholars have pointed out that in coalition systems heterogenous societies have the most challenges since ethnic differences tend to exacerbate polarization thus leading to severe conflict even in politics and governance.

The formulation of a coalition government or power-sharing arrangement is but just a single step to a much greater task that lies ahead for it usually only ends the conflict momentarily. Finding a way to govern together in a new power sharing government under the newly formed coalition soon proves itself to be a challenge afterwards. Kenya would have both a president and a prime minister until either the dissolution of parliament, a formal withdrawal by either party from the agreement or the passage of a referendum on a new constitution. The agreement further stipulated that each party would have half the ministerial portfolios. Schrieber reveals that the leaders from the cabinet secretariat and the new prime minister’s office worked to forge policy consensus, coordinate, and encourage ministers to focus on implementation (Schrieber, 2016).

As expected of the formation of coalition governments and due to the circumstances under which they are usually adopted, the power-sharing accord in Kenya had the immediate effect of ending the spiral of communal violence through two related mechanisms. First, by co-opting opposition leaders, Horowitz (2013) denotes that the power sharing accord removed incentives for opposition politicians to encourage or support the election violence to enhance their bargaining position with the incumbent government. Second, the incorporation of opposition figures provided an important signal to their supporters, appeasing the fears of exclusion and inter communal resentments that contributed to the eruption of violence. Hitherto, the power-sharing institution did little to incentivise deeper reforms among political leaders with vested interests that ran counter to change. In summation of the sources of instability, the Kenyan case submits that “power-sharing can serve as an effective strategy for addressing outbreaks of ethnic violence but is less likely to generate incentives for more thorough-going reform in setting where political elites prefer the status quo” (Horowitz, 2013:2).

As it has already been said earlier in this chapter, coalitions or power sharing agreements are usually adopted with the quest to bring about stability in situations in which there is conflict or inconclusive election results. Kenya was one of the first African countries to adopt one such agreement to bring about consensus post the 2007 elections. Horowitz relates that the violence
between ethnic communities in Kenya escalated in the weeks after the election. Consequently, a long list of foreign dignitaries attempted to restore stability and resolve the political gridlock between the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The list of such dignitaries included Bishop Desmond Tutu, the president of Ghana John Kufuor, the then UN general secretary Ban Ki Moon, Condoleezza Rice the then US Secretary of State. These two conflicting parties were urged by heads of states and international donors to find consensus and bring about stability Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009; brown 2009; kanyinga and Walker 2013) in Horowitz (2013). Negotiations with the mentioned diplomats did not yield much results prior to the arrival of a negotiation team that was spear headed by the former UN general Secretary Kofi Annan in January 2008. The negotiations began with a focus on the positions of the two opposing parties. The ODM’s stance was that an interim government should be created for a period of six months, after which the presidential election would be re-run. In contrast, PNU was unwilling to consider a re-run of the election and argued instead that ODM should submit any complaints regarding election fraud to the courts. As soon as it became clear that a re-run for the election was unlikely, the negotiations shifted to seeking terms for a power-sharing arrangement that would allow the two parties to govern jointly Horowitz (2013).

Standing out from all of the other issues raised in the negotiations, would be the demand of the ODM that the Position of Prime Minister be created. The role of the occupant of that position would be to serve as head of government and have the authority to appoint and remove government officers, including cabinet members. Second, ODM demanded that Cabinet portfolios be divided equally and that high-profile ministries for example, interior and finance be shared between two parties. Lastly, the ODM sought to have the deal entrenched in the constitution. One the other hand, the PNU demanded that the president remain as the head of Government and retain the authority to determine the composition of the cabinet. The negotiators representing PNU pushed for a prime Minister that would oversee the ministries without the executive functions related to hiring and firing Horowitz (2013).

The negotiations lasted up to five weeks with the sharp contrast of the demands of the two opposing parties threatening to derail the bargaining. Progress through the facilitation of Annan and his task force was made. After much deliberation, Horowitz (2013) notes that a settlement was reached, and the deal was signed on February 28th, 2008. It is worth noting however, that this deal was limited in scope; the accord called for the establishment of a coalition government that would include the PNU and the ODM as equal partners. The position of the Prime
Ministers would be created and filled by the party or coalition with the largest number of seats in parliament. Therefore, this meant that the ODM, which held the largest share of seats would be able to nominate Odinga to fill the position. Two Deputy Prime Ministers would be created, one to be filled by ODM and the other by PNU. In addition, “the principle of portfolio balance” would be followed, whereby the number of seats would be assigned in proportion to the parties’ strength in parliament” Horwitz (2016:11).

The settlement was made with caution against some complexities that would arise in mind. For instance, the possibility of reneging was safeguarded by providing guarantees to the ODM which was as the opposition party. Weaker in position, it would be able to remove the Prime Minister through a vote of no confidence passed by a majority in parliament. Given that the ODM held the most share of parliamentary seats, this provision mean that it would be difficult to remove the PM without ODM’s consent. In the same way, cabinet ministers would be removed from office only with consensus from both parties.

This agreement would be rooted in the constitution through a bill passed by parliament. While the position of the PM and the ministers was clearly provided for, other aspects of the agreement remained unclear. Regarding the powers of the PM, the accord stipulated that the PM would “co-ordinate and supervise” affairs of government, without specifying exactly what power and authority would be vested in the position and how executive powers would be divided between the PM and the President. It soon became clear that is agreement was only a temporary fix, the accord left unresolved the question of how long the coalition would last and what would happen if it collapsed. The agreement postulated that the coalition would be dissolved if the parliament were dissolved, however, it did not specify what would happen if the coalition were to collapse before the next election that was scheduled for 2012. The coalition survived through the full term and expired at the subsequent election, which after being delayed was held in March 2013 Horowitz (2013).

2.4 Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe

In an article that sought to assess the efficacy of a government of national Unity in Zimbabwe Sachikonye (2009) in Mukuhlani (2014) reveals that the period from 2000-2008 in Zimbabwe was that of severe economic woes. Bratton and Masununguru(2011) in Mukahlani refers to this point in time in Zimbabwe as a “crisis decade.” As a result of sour relations between ZANU-PF government and the West, most multinational companies such as the Laver brothers scaled down while majority of the other companies relocates. Zimbabwe was heavily sanctioned by
both the European Union and the United States. This was only a tip of the ice berg to Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political woes.

While the formation of a coalition government was a result of inconclusive election results in Lesotho, it is worth noting that the formation of such governments in some instances has been for different reasons. Tumbare (2014) denotes that power-sharing is a long-standing conflict resolution strategy. In South Africa, she relays that a GNU was formed immediately after the end of apartheid Cedras et.al. (2013). One such government was established with a clear mandate of bringing about political transition in July 2007 in Libya. Following the violent and disastrous 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, SADC intervened to find lasting peace and stability in the country. The intervention led to a Global Political Agreement (GPA). This agreement would serve as a highlight on the terms on which the new GNU would be created Tumbare (2014). Accordingly, GNU was assigned to initiate a national process that would eventually culminate in the drafting and adoption of a new constitution, hereafter signaling a new peaceful and democratic era for Zimbabwe. Tumbare (2014) further indicates that this process was backed by the African Union (AU) and other international organizations.

From 2000 to 2005 all parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe were held under repressive legislature measures. As is often the case, in conflicts that arise and are settled through power-sharing agreements or GNU’s Zimbabwe also faced the same dilemma during the 2000 to 2005 time period. Tumbare (2014) relates that parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe were all blighted by intimidation and violence, as well as extensive voting irregularities before the formation of the GNU. Given this, it can be said that elections held in Zimbabwe at the time could not be regarded as free and fair as expected following the tenets of democracy. It was during this time when the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was born Mukuhlani (2014). MDC immediately participated in the elections after its inception. What followed was a series of violent attacks against the new opposition party, its members as well as its leadership. While the violence intensified, well documented cases of electoral fraud by ZANU-PF also mounted Masamvu, Sims and Mirrel (2010:8) in Tumbare (2014). Facing intense pressure and violence, MDC was soon embroiled in bitter intra party disputes that resulted in a split into factions. Masamvu et. al. (2011) suggests that the cause for the division may be the differing view-points amongst party leaders of the MDC on whether or not to boycott the Senate elections. The main faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai was now referred to as MDC-T while the other faction led by Arthur Mutambara became known as MDC-M.
The Chaotic state that Zimbabwe found itself in from the culmination of all the mishaps that became the order of the day took became a huge center of attention in world global affairs and politics. The International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute report (IBAHRI) (2011:11) revealed that from 2005, the government’s domestic policies such as the cleaning of slum areas through operation Murambastvina displaced an estimated 700 000 people from their homes and fanned widespread domestic opposition, particularly in Urban areas. It was at this point that SADC through the facilitation of former South African President Thabo Mbeki stepped in to mediate on the political struggles that prevailed (Allamok, Egyescult and Congress 2008) in Tumbare 2014.

Following tough negotiations between the conflicted parties and the mediators, a settlement was arrived at and a GNU was agreed upon as a way forward into peace keeping and progressive governance. This proved to be a necessary measure if Zimbabwe were to be salvaged form the economic crisis it was faced with. The terms of the agreement provided that president Robert Mugabe retain the executive Presidency (head of state and government), portfolios of commander in chief of the armed forces and chair of cabinet. Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) on the other hand, became the Prime Minister while Arthur Mutambara became the deputy prime-minister. Biti (2008: 21) adds that “cabinet positions were awarded to the two formations.” The executive powers of the GNU would lie in the hands of the president, the prime minister and the cabinet Tumbare (2014).

Subsequent to the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe, those in power were faced with the challenge of getting the country out of the economic rut it found itself in. Biti (2014) accounts that the extent of the crisis in Zimbabwe required radical change as well as craft that would be solid, fair and competent. One of the biggest underlying challenges in Zimbabwe was an excess of unexecuted programs, self-imposed distortions that resulted from costly, inconsistent and incoherent policies that needed to be addressed urgently. “From the first day of the new government, the ministry of Finance set about to craft a new economic blueprint. The Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) was to be the road map that would set the direction of the new government” Biti (2014:8).

The new government was able to build on existing material. The president’s office and the reserve bank had prepared draft plans. Additionally, the Harare office of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), under the leadership of Mark Simpson developed a document titled “the comprehensive Economic recovery in Zimbabwe” Biti (2014). Under the leadership
of economists from its Fiscal Affairs Department, the Ministry of Finance worked in time to produce a draft with valuable inputs from some of Zimbabwe’s top economists and academics from reputable institutions in South Africa.

Biti (2014) propagates that STERP was centered on four main areas. First, microeconomic reforms were developed to contain hyper-inflation, negative interests’ rates, and runaway budget deficit. Second, supply side measures were designed to kick start production and stimulate capacity utilization. Third, establishing social safety nets to support the mostly vulnerable would address poverty. The last area dealt with interventions promoting peace and democratization, including financial support for constitutional reform. As a guide to Zimbabwe’s rebuilding and stabilization, STERP was approved and well received by the SADC heads of states in a summit held in Swaziland. STERP’s macro-economic provisions included the adoption of a multi-currency regime learning on the South African Rands as a reference currency Biti (2014).

In the quest to bring about radical change, inclusion becomes a necessity if success is to be attained. The GNU in Zimbabwe was able to bring about a significant amount of change from the beginning due to the team effort that it took to remedy the situation that prevailed. Biti (2014) mentions that “the Ministry of Finance team consisted of mostly young, freshly graduated economists that made up for their lack of experience with acumen and dedication. The new Minister was assisted by a group of eight top directors, including the permanent secretary. This extremely key Ministry was bound by a high level of trust, which was essential to execute the necessary reforms. Biti reveals that by July 2013, Zimbabwe felt like a different country. In some countries he maintains, drastic improvements were felt almost immediately after the on- set of the coalition government. The most notable success was the end of the hyperinflation. By June 2009 reports indicated that monthly inflation had fallen by 1 % by year end it had dropped to -7.7%, the lowest in the continent Biti (2014:19). For the first time in 14 years, Biti notes that the economy expanded in 2009, with GDP recording at a 5.5 % growth. During the first two years of the coalition government, Zimbabwe became the fastest growing economy in the world, expanding by an average 9% a year. The legal and regulatory environment affecting the economy underwent major improvement. The Reserve Bank act was amended, the Zimbabwe securities act was overhauled, a raft of new laws that would deal with income tax, anti-money laundering, public finance, audit office and micro-finance were noted and documented Biti (2014).
2.4 EMERGING ISSUES FROM THE CASE STUDIES

- **Kenya**

Despite the uncertainty of the outcomes of the negotiations into a power-sharing or coalition agreement in Kenya, the coalition had numerous successes. Perhaps most significant and worthy of note is the fact that it completed its full term and was able to end the conflict that led to its formation. Horowitz (2013:15) confirms that “by any measure, the power sharing agreement succeeded in achieving the primary goal of ending the conflict and restoring stability.” The establishment of a coalition or power-sharing agreement is usually just the first step of a long and challenging journey of governance. The pressure on coalition leaders to accommodate their partners in such arrangements tends to create coordination. However, subsequent to that, tension between ministries soon begins to mount. Schrieber (2016) mentions that President Kibaki’s previous willingness to expand the size of the coalition partners resulted in Kenya having the largest cabinet in East Africa. This placed the government in a compromising position in that problems that already existed would only get worse if the leaders could not agree on such key administrative issues. It therefore, became essential to create structures and practices that would ensure that ministers from opposing sides were continually consulted and included throughout the entire policy making process. From this it is learned that, the issue of inclusion and consultation with other coalition partners and stakeholders is vital in the proper functioning of power-sharing agreements. Finally, Schrieber (2016) emphasizes that “principals and their teams have to develop ways that encourage ministries to follow through and concentrate on policy implementation rather than on internal politics.”

- **Zimbabwe**

From the Zimbabwean case study, the importance of setting aside differences in dealing with issues of national importance can be drawn. Bickering and conflict between parties usually takes center stage and hinders the nation building process. The successes of the Zimbabwean coalition government can therefore be credited to the team spirit of those in charge of key Ministries in redressing the problems in the country despite their differences in political ideology.

The amendment of outdated laws was also key in driving the country into the right direction and nipping its problems in the bud. The review of such laws meant that an in-depth analysis
of the problems in Zimbabwe were carefully assessed and steadfastly remedied through strategic and legal processes. The drafting of new laws that dealt with issues such as money laundering were key in rooting out constructs such as corruption to ensure economic growth. Most noteworthy of the Zimbabwean GNU case study is a lesson on the importance of courage and boldness that is gathered from the MDC political party that stood up to intimidation and violence waged against it by a dominant political party. From this, the importance of standing against undemocratic behavior displayed by politicians is demonstrated.

2.5 Chapter summary

In conclusion, the literature reviewed above has given an account on how different scholars define a coalition government, the circumstances that lead to the formation of such governments, as well as the extent to which these types of governments are effective in addressing the challenges they are often created under. Literature on the formation of successive governments of this nature in Lesotho have been discussed as well as the challenges they have been faced with. Given that Lesotho is not the first country to be led by a coalition government, two case studies of Kenya and Zimbabwe were discussed in this chapter. From these, the successes of each case study were highlighted and lessons to be drawn from them noted.

The next chapter will deal with the research methods employed in this study. It will present both the qualitative and quantitative methods adopted as the methodology to guide the study by showing how the sample was selected and how data was collected and analyzed. The research ethics observed in this study will also be highlighted in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents all the research methods employed in conducting this study. It gives an account on the nature of study conducted, the sources of data used, the research instruments that were used to collect data as well as the methods used to analyze the data obtained. This study will employ both the qualitative and quantitative research methodologies in the quest to assess the impacts of a coalition government on investment opportunities and socio-political development in Lesotho, making it a mixed methods research.

Kothani (2004:7), attests that a research methodology is a way to systematically solve a research problem, it may be understood as a science or studying of research that is done scientifically. It is necessary for the researcher to know not only the research methods, but also the methodology. It is essential therefore for the researcher to design a methodology for the problem as it may differ from problem to problem. Research methods on the other hand are “various procedures, schemes and algorithms used in research, they include: theoretical procedures, experimental studies, numerical schemes and statistical approaches” (Rajasekar, 2013). Research methods are important in a research as they enable the researcher to collect samples of data and find solutions to a problem.

3.1. Research Design

Babbie and Mouton (2001) point out that research methodology encompasses the research designs, data collection processes, samples, population, procedures of data analysis and the measurement of variables. In this study, both the qualitative and quantitative approached were used, this increased the validity of the results. Greene et al. (1989) in Bryman (2006) reveals that from the two schemes employed in coding the justification for combining quantitative and qualitative research, five (5) justifications namely: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation and expansion can be isolated.

This study used both the qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection for purposes of triangulation. As applied in this study, triangulation refers to convergence, correspondence
or results from different methods. The emphasis here, is placed on seeking corroboration between qualitative and quantitative data. In this study, triangulation is demonstrated through the use of a likert scale questionnaire to obtain quantitative data and in-depth interviews conducted to obtain qualitative data. It was through this process that validity of the research results was enhanced. Complementarity as one of the justifications of combining these research methods, seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results from one method with the results from another Greene et. at., (1989:259) cited in Bryman (2006). In this study, the element of complementarity is seen in this study in the instances whereby the results obtained from the questionnaires did not make room for detailed information to be given by the respondents due to the type of survey used. The in-depth interviews conducted with key informants made up for such gaps.

According to Kyeyune (2010:18) the earliest classic studies using mixed methods that have been cited are the Hawthorne effect experiments (1939) and the Yankee studies (1941). Malina (2010) views quantitative research methodology based on their inherent value to show how using both simultaneously “creates a research outcome that is stronger than either method individually” Malina (2010:4). Overall, combined quantitative and qualitative methods allow exploring more complex aspects and relations of the human and social world. Firestone (1987) in Malina (2010) suggests that “quantitative studies persuade the reader through de-emphasizing individual judgement and stressing the use of established procedures. This leads to results that are generalizable to populations. Qualitative research on the other hand persuades through rich descriptions and strategic comparisons across cases, thereby overcoming the abstractions inherent in quantitative studies and permitting generalizations to theory (Yin 2004) in Malina (2010). Qualitative research typically answers research questions that address how and why whereas quantitative addresses ‘how often’ and ‘how many. The use of both these research methods in this study is beneficial in that the quality of the results is enhanced.

Furthermore, the study utilized the evaluation strategy of inquiry as part of its research design. In a well-known text on evaluation research, Leonard Rutman states that “program evaluation entails the use of scientific methods to measure the implementation and outcomes of programs for decision making purposes” Rutman, (1984:10) in Babbie and Mouton (2011:335). Fredman and Rossi (1993:5) on the other hand, define evaluation research as “the systematic application
of social research procedures for assessing the conceptualization, design, implementation and utility of social intervention programs.” In this study, this design was used to assess the impacts that a coalition government has had on investment opportunities and socio-political development in Lesotho. Following this procedure, questionnaires were distributed to different business sectors selected randomly from the Lesotho Business Directory that has an aggregate of all registered businesses. The researcher also conducted three interviews with representatives from the South African High Commission, the Christian Council of Lesotho as well the Lesotho Millennium development Agency. These entities were selected purposively by virtue of their contribution, stake-holding and influence in issues of governance in Lesotho. Results obtained in the interviews conducted as well as those obtained through the questionnaires were analyzed to respond to the questions raised by this study.

### 3.2 Population

The population of this study consists of members of the civil society that have played a role in the call for political stability in the last five years. These include a representative from the South African High Commission, a representative from the Lesotho Millennium Development Agency which is a government entity that has been charged with the responsibility of overseeing and implementation of the Compact II development programs that are a result of foreign aid from the United States of America. A representative from the civil society that is made of several stakeholders in particular, as well the Christian Council of Lesotho as a faith-based organization which also happens to be a non-governmental organization whose tasks include: civic education and electoral observation among other functions Musanhu (2009). These groups have been chosen based on their involvement in political issues in Lesotho making them an ideal target groups for this study. A telephone directory that contains all registered companies as a recruitment tool was used to select business men and women from different sectors using random selection. These business people were issued likert scale questionnaires to establish from them how they perceive the effectiveness of the coalition government, its impacts on business, investment, socio-political development and other business-related issues.

### 3.3 Sample

According to (Polit and Beck 2004: 731; Uys and Basson 1999:87), sampling as a process of selecting a portion of the population that possesses the qualities that one seeks to study. It is a
subset of the population selected to participate in a study. The Lesotho Business Directory (www.globaldatabase.com/lesotho-companies-database) reveals that there 4053 businesses in the country. This study took place in Maseru where the number of registered businesses from all the sectors selected randomly from the directory stands at 1772. Business people from 10 different sectors were selected using convenience sampling technique. The sample size of was arrived following a formula and drawing from the total number of registered businesses as per the Lesotho business directory. The sample size of 200 was ideal in that allowed sufficient representation thereby influencing the validity of the results positively. However, the response rate was a total of 187 out of the 200 questionnaires that were distributed for some participants refused to participate.

These sectors are: the agricultural sector which has farmers as its participants, petroleum industry which is made up of fuel providers and filling stations, hospitality industry, telecommunication sector, financial services industry, informal sector, health care industry, information industry and lastly the transport industry. From all these participatory sectors and industries, the researcher prepared 200 questionnaires in order to obtain information from these respondents that is relevant to the study.

3.3.1 Sampling Technique

Given the fact that this study utilized mixed methods, there are two sampling techniques that were utilized. Firstly, to obtain Quantitative data through the use of a likert scale questionnaire, the study employed the probability sampling technique which allows for the respondents to be selected randomly. Simple random sampling in this study focused chiefly on accessing representatives from the listed business sectors. Tashakkori and Teddle (1998) reveal that quantitative data often involves random selection or sampling so that each individual has an equal probability of being selected and the sample can be generalized to the larger population. Sarantakos (2005:154) propagates that “the characteristic of this type of random sampling is that the sampling units, apart from having equal chance of being selected, are independent from each other.” Their chance of being selected therefore, does not depend on the selection of others. Thus, questionnaires were distributed to different businesses in the Maseru district to participants from business sectors that have been outlined early in this section. It is important to note that those businesses were not selected in any particular order. They were instead, selected randomly from the Lesotho business directory. The researcher conducted three in-depth interviews with key informants from the South African High Commission, The CCL and
the LMDA respectively. These interviews were conducted following the non-probability sampling procedure which permits the purposive selection of respondents. Therefore, the sampling technique employed was the purposive sampling technique. Marlow (1998) indicates that purposive sampling allows the researcher to select the sample according to the nature of the problem and phenomenon under study. Nieuwenhuis (2007:79) further explains that purposive sampling is a technique in which “participants are selected because of some defining characteristics that make them the holders of the data needed for the study.” The sampling decisions, “are not only restricted to the selection of participants but also involve the settings, incidents and activities to be included for the data collection.” In this study, these respondents were also selected by virtue of the independence of the organizations they lead which made the information they provided free from bias. Cresswell (2009:217) points out that “In quantitative data collection, purposeful sampling technique is used so that individuals are selected because they have experienced the central phenomenon.” In this case, all the respondents in the study have experienced governance by three coalition governments from 2012 and as a result were ideal and relevant participants to this study.

Table 1

Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability sampling (quantitative data)</th>
<th>Non-probability sampling (qualitative data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business people (187) from the following sectors: Agricultural sector Petroleum sector Hospitality sector Telecommunication Sector Financial services sectors Retail Sector Health Care sector</td>
<td>Members of the diplomatic Corps South African High Commission (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Data Collection

Data collection methods for this study were based on three in-depth interviews and two hundred likert scale interviews of which there was a response rate of 187. Gliem and Gliem (2003) explain that gathering information in the social sciences, marketing, medicine or business, relative to attitudes personalities and descriptions of people’s environment involves the use of likert type scales. This entails the quantifying of the constructs which are not directly measurable such as those mentioned above. A likert scale questionnaire was therefore, used and because of its nature (multi-item scales and summated ratings) became useful in the collection of quantitative data. The respondents were issued a questionnaire with an attached informed consent, the identification of the researcher and a copy of the ethical clearance certificate. The business participants responded to the questions by way of ticking the appropriate scale attached to each question.

Three in-depth interviews were conducted with three vital informants from three previously mentioned entities: SAHC, CCL and the LMDA. According to Boyce and Neale (2006) the main advantage of in-depth interviews is that they provide much more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys. They are also
known to provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect information since people are more likely to feel more comfortable having a conversation in the quest to gain information than any other means. With the respondent’s permission the researcher used a voice recorder and took notes during the interviews. The interviews progressed steadily and were engaging as well as insightful with all the respondents being assertive, impartial and free in expressing their opinions.

The interviews were conducted in very conducive environments that were secluded and enabled the researcher to get the respondents full attention. Due to their vast knowledge on the subject matter of this research, communication between the respondents and the researcher was greatly enhanced. This method of interviewing was used to establish from the respondents their opinions on the coalition government in Lesotho focusing on its impacts on investment opportunities as well as socio-political development in Lesotho. Boyce and Neale (2006) note that In-depth interviews are useful when one wants detailed information about a person’s thoughts behaviors or when there is a need to explore issues in-depth.

3.5 Data analysis

Data obtained through interviews was analyzed using a qualitative data analysis procedure known as thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) define a thematic analysis as a process of identifying patterns or themes within qualitative data. The data from the interviews that was recorded using a voice recorder and written verbatim was transcribed and presented in the following five stages proposed by Terre Blance and Kelly (2002): Familiarization, theme induction, coding, elaboration and lastly interpreting and checking.

Stage 1: Familiarization and immersion: This is the first step of the thematic analysis procedure and it involves going over the data obtained in the interviews repeatedly in order to immerse one’s self in the text for familiarity. Terre Blanche and Kelly (2002) in Mofoka (2016).

Stage 2: Theme induction: this step involves finding an optimal level of complexity within the main themes of the content. In this study, the themes and sub themes were extracted from the interviews. These themes were extracted and focused on without deviating from the main topic of the research.

Stage 3: Coding: Chamaz (2006:46) defines coding as the pivotal link between data collection and explaining the meaning of data. He further explains that a code is a “descriptive construct designed by the researcher to capture the primary content of or essence of data. In this study,
the data obtained through the interviews was marked down using highlighters to create themes. The coded themes that emerged from the data were compared and contrasted to the quantified data obtained from the questionnaire. The data obtained was then related to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, the policy monitoring and evaluation models as well as to the case studies discussed in the Literature review chapter of the study.

**Stage 4:** Elaboration: this step entails the careful review of the established themes. The purpose of this step is to find gradations of meaning that were not captured in the original coding system. Mofoka (2006), Terre Blanche and Kelly (2002) in Mofoka (2016) stress that it is vital to experiment with the different ways of structuring the data until a good account of the content is understood.

**Stage 5: interpretation and checking:** This is a presentation of a written account of the phenomenon under study. The researcher in this case, interpreted the data obtained following the above-mentioned steps.

Quantitative data obtained in this study was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). There were no inferences made hence the use of descriptive statistics and its presentation into tables and a pie chart.

**3.6 Study Limitations**

The researcher was not confronted with too many challenges apart from the reluctance of some respondents to participate due to the political sensitivity of the study. As a result, 187 participants issued with the questionnaires agreed to participate out of a total of 200. This was despite the fact that the researcher had assured the respondents that their identities would be protected and served them with relevant documents to support that notion.

**3.7 Ethical Considerations**

In this study, the researcher warranted that the anonymity of the participants is ensured. The interviewers were presented with the researcher’s ethical clearance certificate and identification. Babbie et.al (2001) maintain that anonymity as one of the ethics of social research must be maintained with a given respondent. The research participants were also asked to complete the consent forms as per the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal research policy. The participant's names have been withheld for confidentiality purposes.
When issuing the informed consent forms the participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that if they were to decide that they did not want to continue, they would not be coerced into partaking any further. The researcher further alerted the participants that they would not be getting any benefits from participating in the study. It was however made clear to them that their opinions were highly valuable and would make a difference in ensuring that good governance is enhanced and that a conducive environment for investment and socio-political development is created.

3.8 Summary

The mixed methodology approach employed in the study on the impacts of a coalition government on investment opportunities and socio-political development in Lesotho has been effective. The use of both the qualitative and quantitative research methods ensured that there were no loopholes when obtaining the relevant data. The methods utilized in this study ensured that detailed information is obtained for deeper understanding on the subject matter.

The subsequent chapter will focus on the thematic presentation of the research findings as they were obtained from the field.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LESOTHO

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the research. The aim of this study was to evaluate the impacts of a coalition government on investment opportunities and socio-economic development in Lesotho. A mixed method approach was employed in this study, as a result the findings will be presented under two main headings. This chapter present first, the qualitative research findings that speak to the role of a coalition government in Lesotho. When coding the qualitative data, the researcher organized the responses given by the key informants on the basis of their responses. These responses were reviewed through continuous reading. This step was succeeded by a compilation of all responses given and their categorization into themes and patterns that began to emerge Babbie (2014) in Mofoka (2016). The quantitative research results obtained that speak to the same heading or theme will be presented in the form of tables, and charts. The objectives of the study that are quantitative in nature, the statistical data presented will be descriptive as there were no inferences drawn.

4.1 Demographic information

The study was conducted in Lesotho where the country is currently under the governance and leadership of its third coalition government in five years. The respondents of this study range from key informants with whom interviews were conducted to business people from the agricultural, petroleum, hospitality, telecommunication, financial services, retail, healthcare, information and media, transport and manufacturing sectors all amounting to 187 respondents out of 200. The respondents with whom interviews were held represented the three different entities whose emphasis and outlook on the rule of law and stability has a propensity to influence governance in Lesotho. The interviews were held within the premises of the South African High Commission in Lesotho, CCL and the LMDA respectively. There are no gender biases in this study since there is adequate representation of both the male and female genders from the study population.
4.1.1 AGE

Table 2: Age Range of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 and above</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents data obtained on the age range of the respondents. From this demonstration, the study established that people between the ages range of 18-25 are 12 in number. This constitutes 6.3% of the study population as compared to those whose ages range between 36-45 and 46 and above which is 78 and 54 respondents respectively. Therefore, majority of the business population of the study ages range from 36-45 which constitutes 41.3% of the study population. The total number of respondents in this case was 187. The issue of age in this study when looking into business is important as it gives a revelation of the age range that participates more in the building of the economy through business. O’Malley (2004) in Murimi (2009) emphasizes the importance of the participation of the youth in business and economic development in his assertion that through participation, youths cease to be passive recipients of services or passive victims of indomitable social and political forces. They instead, become social stakeholders with distinct and legitimate interests and thus are entitled to share in the exercise of power at all levels.

4.1.2 GENDER

Table 3: Gender representativeness of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table above presents the gender of the respondents. Given the numbers presented in the table, it can be drawn that there was adequate representation of both genders. 101 respondents from the study population were male while 85 of them were female. There was however, a case as indicated in the table of a missing system, which simply implies that 1 respondent did not provide information on the gender variable.

### 4.1.3 Business Sectors

**Figure: Business sector representation of respondents.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUSINESS SECTOR</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and media</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 above presents a pie chart of the Business sectors under which the respondents of the study fell. These business sectors were extracted from the Lesotho Business directory, which provides a compilation of all registered businesses in Lesotho in the different sectors under which they fall. 26 respondents indicated that they were in the Agriculture business sector, 15 of them fell with the petroleum sector, 14 respondents fall within the hospitality sector, 11 respondents fall under the telecommunications sector, while 18 fell under the financial services sector. Out of a total number of 187 respondents, 20 respondents indicated that they fell under the retail business sector, 17 under the health care sector, 15 respondents classified their businesses as falling under information and media business sector. Majority of the population,
which is 29 respondents constituting 15.3% of the population fell under the transport business sector. Lastly, 11 respondents fell under the manufacturing business sector.

4.2 Coalition government in Lesotho

Due to their complexity, majority of the study participants responded in the affirmative that coalition governments require great political maturity in leaders of political parties in which they are formulated. Another key informant indicated that coalition governments can only function properly in mature democracies that have adequate legislative support. In Lesotho, the key informants of the study all came to a similar argument that the Constitution of Lesotho is outdated and does not make clear provisions as to how this type of government must be administered. In his response, one of the informants from the LMDA mentioned that despite the many challenges that face coalition governments in Lesotho, it prevents single party dominance in the governance, business and economic management. In one of the interviews, the respondent revealed that the formation of most coalition governments have been purely motivated by the selfish interests of the political leaders, regardless of the fact that the election results demanded that it be formed. The literature reviewed for this study supports reiterates with this proposition through Juma’s (2013) argument that “a classical coalition government of is traditionally embraced by political parties and elite leaders for political convenience”.

4.2.1 Effectiveness of a coalition government

Table 4 below presents the respondents’ views on the question of the effectiveness of a coalition government in Lesotho

Table 4: Respondents views on the effectiveness of coalition governments in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Out of 187 respondents that fall within the previously outlined business sectors 72 respondents that constitute 38% of the study population disagree with the notion that a coalition government has been effective. 57 respondents disagreed that the coalition has been effective, 29 respondents remained neutral on the effectiveness of a coalition government. Minority of the population were of the view that coalition governments have been effective in Lesotho with 8 respondents agreeing with the statement while (1) greatly agreed that coalition governments have been effective. Generally, from the table above, it can be drawn that a good majority of business people in Lesotho are of the view that coalition governments have not been effective forms of government in Lesotho. The views of the business people presented in the figure above reiterate with the views of the key informants with whom interviews were held in which one interviewee responded that “The coalition government in Lesotho has not been as effective as it ought to be.”

4.2.2 Conducive environment for Business

Figure: 2 respondents’ views on the conduciveness of the business environment in Lesotho
Figure 4 above indicates that a majority of the respondents disagree that the coalition government has created a conducive environment for businesses to thrive. A fair number of the respondents were neutral on the topic of the conduciveness of the environment for business while very few of the respondents were of the view that coalition governments in Lesotho have created a conducive environment for businesses to flourish. In response to the question of the coalition government impacting negatively on the viability of business, research participants from the South African High Commission pointed out that uncertainty and lack of continuity have been major characteristics of the past two coalition governments. In the absence of peace and stability, businesses are unable to and have not been able to thrive as the environment poses as a threat to investors. Investor friendly policies have been compromised. This revelation is in line with the views of Nyongo (2007) in his proposition that countries with much more stable democracies such as Ghana, South Africa, Benin, Senegal and Botswana score consistently higher on economic growth indicators such as economic freedom and property rights. This further validates the notion that democracy and good governance are equally key in the achievement of economic prosperity and development as well as the creation of investor and business friendly environments.

4.2.3 Improved political environment in Lesotho

The table below presents the participant’s responses of their views on whether the political environment in Lesotho has improved under coalition governance. Out of a total of 187 participants, 37 greatly disagree with the notion that there has been an improvement in the political environment in Lesotho under coalition governance. 70 responded that they disagree, 50 respondents were neutral on the topic, 30 participants responded in the affirmative that there a coalition system of governance has improved the political environment in Lesotho. Given that there has been three coalition governments in Lesotho from 2012, the findings of this research reveal that majority of the study population are of the view that there has been no improvement in the county’s political environment. In Zimbabwe on the other hand, Biti (2014) propagates that the Government of National Unity or coalition in this case, was able to bring about a significant amount of change from the beginning of its inception due to the team effort that it took to remedy the political and economic crisis that the country prevailed prior to 2008.

Table 5: Frequency representativeness of participants views on the political environment in Lesotho
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2.4 Opportunities for investment

**Figure 3: Respondents views on the opportunities for investment in Lesotho**

The figure above demonstrates that majority of the respondents disagree that opportunities for investment have been created under a coalition type of government. In an interview with the
SAHC, the interviewee revealed that many international partners are aggrieved by Lesotho’s display of lack of rule of law in the past few years, the rogue military and never-ending political battles have created an environment that is not investment friendly. To this issue, the key informant of the study representing the CCL as a member of the civil society pointed out that it has been observed that business in Lesotho continues to shrink resulting in the inability of the Lesotho Revenue Authority to meet its targets. In his article on distribution of investment subsidies under coalition governments with Turkey as a case study, Kemahlioglu (2008) relays that even in large cities like Istanbul, which is composed of three electoral districts and was represented in a total by sixty-one legislators, the number of investment subsidies per year ranged from a low 405 to 1071 between 1992 and 1997. This being said, the importance of focusing on creating investment of opportunities by coalition governments in Lesotho is highlighted.

4.2.5 Improved Economy

Table 6: Business people’s views on economic improvement in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 above presents the business people’s views and response to the question of whether the economy of Lesotho has seen any improvement in the advent of a coalition government. In this table it is demonstrated that majority of the study population disagrees that the economy has improved under the governance of a coalition government. The issue of economic growth is at the center of any government’s agenda these results therefore paint an alarming picture that highlights the need for change in order for the economy of the country to improve. Although the reasons for the formation of a coalition in Lesotho were different to those of both Zimbabwe and Kenya, working towards the growth of the economy is mandatory for all
governments despite the differences in the circumstances that led to their formation. Biti (2014) submits that the Zimbabwean economy expanded in 2009, with GDP recording at a 5.5% growth in the first two years under a coalition government. He further notes that Zimbabwe became the fastest growing economy in the world, expanding by an average of 9% a year. The results presented in the chart above indicate that successive coalition governments have not been as successful in facilitating economic growth in Lesotho.

4.2.6 Viability of business

**Figure 4: Business people’s responses on the viability of business in Lesotho under coalition governance**

The figure above indicates that majority of the business population disagree that the government has taken stern measures to sustain the viability of business in Lesotho. In response to the question on whether the government has taken stern measures to sustain the viability of business, a key informant from the LMDA’s response is in contrast to the views of the respondents that are members of the different business sectors. The key informant propagated that in the advent of a coalition government, the current coalition government formed in 2017, has tried to restore relations with international partners. He further pointed out that the many concerns that were previously raised during the rife political instability and lack of rule of law that reigned under the second coalition government have been addressed by the 2017 coalition
government. As a result, the much-needed stability has created an environment that enhances and sustains the viability of business.

4.2.7 Implementation of relevant policies

Table 7: Respondents views on the implementation of relevant policies by coalition governments in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the participants views on whether there has been successful implementation of relevant policies under a coalition government. Majority of the respondents disagree with the notion while a small minority responded that there has been successful implementation of relevant policies. The results also show that a significant number of participants remain neutral on the issue. Shermann and Enser jedanastik (2013) relate that in parliamentary democracies with the proportional representation electoral systems, the necessity to form coalition governments regularly subjects the translation of party platforms into government policy to the uncertainties of inter party bargaining. They further assert that, this raises the question as to how parties in coalition governments arrive at a common policy agenda in the face of potentially different preferences. From this revelation in relation to the research findings, Shermann and Ender Jadanstick (2013) provide an insightful view that the nature of a coalition government is such that policy-making and implementation may become a challenge due to the differences in the preferences of the coalition partners.
4.2.8 Compromise between different parties

Figure 5: respondent’s views on whether there is a compromise between different parties despite their opposing ideologies in Lesotho

The bar chart above, demonstrates that majority of the participants which is 40 % of 187 participants, are of the view that there has been a compromise between different parties despite their opposing ideologies in Lesotho. 30 % of the participants stance was neutral. In response to the question on how the different political parties relate and the extent to which their relationship has impacted on socio-economic issues, a key informant from the CCL revealed that “the problem with party leaders in Lesotho is that they do not know when to move from competition to cooperation. once they have agreed to power-sharing, cooperation becomes a challenge that often leads to fallouts and the collapse of the coalition agreement or government. This lack of cooperation, has had negative impacts on the socio-economic development of the country.” From the LMDA, the respondent with whom an interview was held a different view and explained that “a coalition government has allowed for democracy to be expressed in the right way through regular elections, and freedom of speech. However, the opposition argues that the police are being interfered with and the independence of the Judiciary is being tempered with.” Kapa and Shale (2012) view the compromise on ideological differences by different
parties as opportunistic. They maintain that “the formation of pre-2007 political party alliances in Lesotho cab be explained in terms of the office seeking theory in that the political elite use alliances to access and retain power.” Similarly, Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci’s theory of Hegemony supports this deposition. The theory argues that dominant classes, which would be the political elite in this instance, maintain their position not only through acts of coercion, but also through symbolic action. Therefore, “the hegemony of the ruling/dominant class is maintained through coercion and consent.” Bobbio 1988 in Parkash (2016:33) In this study, the participants responses validated by both literature and theory reflect that a coalition government can be used as an apparatus by political elites to attain and keep power even if it means compromising their ideological differences.

4.2.9 Increase in Donor Funding

Figure 6: Response on the increase of donor funding under a coalition government in Lesotho

From the figure above, it is drawn that majority of the participants, which is 40% out of a total of 187 participants disagree that there has been an increase in donor funding in Lesotho under a coalition government. Literature reveals that political instability led to the collapse of the 2012 and 2015 coalition governments placed Lesotho under the risk of failing to secure the
second Compact development plan from the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC). The MCC is a bilateral American Foreign Aid Agency established by United States Congress in 2004 with countries expected to meet certain conditions such as good governance and respect for the rule of law to qualify (Lesotho Times 21st October 2017). Despite the negative response by majority of the participants to the notion that there has been an increase in donor funding under coalition governance, Matlosa (1999) acknowledges the importance of foreign aid in Lesotho in his deposition that “Lesotho’s heavy dependence on foreign aid over the years is recognized.” He also submits that foreign aid is a valuable external resource that contributed immensely to the country’s economic situation. This is further supported by the reviewed literature in the study which reveals that the MCC Compact I development contract referred to earlier in this section helped fund the construction of the Metolong Dam as well as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS relief (PREPFA). This being said, creating an environment that adheres to the tenets of democracy and does not pose as a threat to foreign aid partners is of utmost importance for coalition governments to strive for in Lesotho.

4.3 Increase in Business Sectors

Table 8: Responses on whether business sectors have increased under coalition governance in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the participants responses to the question of whether there has been an increase in the number of business sectors under a coalition government. From this presentation it can be drawn that out of the 187 participants, 80 participants who constitute the majority in this case disagrees that there has been an increase in the number of business sectors under a coalition government in Lesotho. 43 participants greatly disagree with the notion, 45
held a neutral stance, 16 participants responded agree while 3 respondents greatly agree. Although majority of the study population refute the notion that there has been an increase in businesses in differing sectors under coalition governance in Lesotho, it is worth mentioning that literature reviewed in this study suggests otherwise.

Literature reveals that the National Strategic Development Plan adopted by the 2012 coalition government acknowledged that investment in Lesotho lacked clarity. To salvage this problem, the government decided that the lack of clarity in investment called for the creation of an overarching investment policy. The investment policy of Lesotho was then drafted and dedicated to national and foreign investors to reveal to them the governments’ goals and policies in promoting and regulating investment as a provision of clarity about their obligations and opportunities. Additionally, and most significant to the question at hand, it is notable that the objectives of the 2012 coalition government as outlined in the 2016 Investment policy draft included: the promotion and regulation of private investment within the fundamental National objectives of sustainable and inclusive development of an entrepreneurial culture in which hard work and risk taking would be rewarded and success valued in communities. The National investment Policy submits that it will support Basotho business in improving know-how and access to facilities and finance National Investment Policy of Lesotho (2015).

4.3.1 Increase in Production

Table 9: Responses on increase in production under coalition governance in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above shows the participants responses on whether there has been an increase in production during a coalition government. Out of 187 participants, 55 greatly disagree that there has been an increase in production during a coalition government. 76 respondents who
form majority population, disagree that there has been an increase in production. 37 respondents remained neutral on the issue, 10 participants agree while 9 greatly agree with the statement. Through the African Growth Opportunity Act of which Lesotho is a beneficiary, (Poplack 2012; Wrobleswka 2015) maintain that a commonly held solution to the Sub-Saharan Africa to achieve rapid, inclusive and sustainable economic growth that is enabled by and contributed to the development of dynamic, responsive and resilient human settlement development was established. Literature reviewed in this study suggests that through AGOA, there has been a significant increase in production in the manufacturing sector. This, however, predates coalition governance in Lesotho although it continued to function even under it.

A report by the Lesotho Times (13th October 20170 concurs with the response given by majority of the participants that disagree that there has been an increase in production under coalition governance in Lesotho. the report reveals that Lesotho’s main source of production for many years, the agricultural sector, has gone through trying times over the years. It further acknowledges that, ensuring that Basotho farmers in country, produce enough food for the nation and export is a vision that the Ministry of Agriculture has had for many years. However, this has proved to be difficult to fulfil. One of the reasons submitted for this decline in growth in production is the lack of continuity in programs that have been implemented by different coalition governments in the past five years Lesotho times 13th October 2017. The lack of continuity characterized by the coalition governments in Lesotho as pointed out by literature, coupled with 70% (greatly disagree and disagree) of the participants whose views on the subject are that there has been no increase in production, call for those in power to ensure that policy implementation and continuity are exercised and maintained in order to create an environment that is conducive for production to be enhanced.

4.3.2 Increase in Gross Domestic Product

Table 10: Response on the increase in Gross Domestic Product under a coalition government in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10 above presents the participants responses to the question of whether coalition governments have been able to increase the Gross Domestic Product. From a total of 187 participants, 25 greatly disagree that there has been an increment in GDP, 64 respondents that constitute majority of the population disagree with the statement, while 29 responded in the affirmative by agreeing that coalition governments have led to growth in the country’s GDP, 10 respondents greatly agree with the notion. The negative responses to the issue at hand by majority of the respondents is substantiated by the IMF Country report for the Kingdom of Lesotho (2016). According to this report, real GDP growth averaged about 4.5% a year from 2010 to 2014 before plummeting to an estimated 2.6 percent in 2015. This drop was mainly a reflection of recent weakness in the manufacturing and construction sectors and spillovers from slower growth in neighboring South Africa. The report further indicates that overall government expenditure in Lesotho remains comparatively high, government expenditures have amounted to about 60% percent of GDP or more in recent years, with spending becoming increasingly slanted towards recurrent expenditures. The formation of a coalition government in 2012 and two more afterwards has done little to improve the serious problem of high government expenditure. Consequent to the ever-growing cabinet as a result of power-sharing agreements amongst other factors, the government wage bill rose to 21.5% of GDP in 2014/2015 which was the highest in Sub Saharan Africa and was budgeted to increase to 23% of GDP in the Subsequent year IMF country report for the Kingdom of Lesotho (2016). It would appear in this discussion that a major hindrance to an improved GDP in Lesotho can be traced to the incessant increase in its wage bill, the expansion of the cabinet in order for politicians to consolidate their power by satisfying their coalition partners at the expense of the masses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>59</th>
<th>31.2</th>
<th>31.6</th>
<th>79.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter has presented and provided an analysis of the findings of this study on the role of a coalition government in Lesotho. The findings in this chapter demonstrate that although Lesotho has had three coalition governments from 2012 to date, this type of government has not been effective in carrying out its mandate. Lack of proper provision for this type of government by the constitution as well as an immature democracy and leadership have been pointed out as some of the factors that led to this ineffectiveness. The results show that there has been a decline in production under a coalition government and as a result the GDP has not increased. Instead, the expansion of the cabinet to accommodate more people as per the respective power-sharing agreements has led to an extremely high wage bill. The unprecedented fallouts between coalition partners have also led to political instability and uncertainty, thereby creating an environment that is inconducive for businesses to thrive and for donors to provide foreign aid. Additionally, this chapter has discovered that there has not been an improvement in the livelihoods of citizens under a coalition government in Lesotho.

The next chapter presents the research findings on the challenges and opportunities created by coalition governments in Lesotho.
CHAPTER 5

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN LESOTHO

5.0 Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the study findings in which a presentation of the research findings under the theme: “the challenges and opportunities created by coalition governments in Lesotho” will be presented. In this chapter, both the statistical data and transcribed data obtained from interviews following the questions on whether fiscal discipline, economic recovery and proper representation of stake-holder’s interests in the legislature will be presented. Moreover, the questions on the promotion of human rights, democracy and the empowerment of the civil society in promoting the democratic process, and how they have been achieved under coalition governance will also be presented.

5.1 Government and Fiscal Discipline

Table 11: Response on whether fiscal discipline has been achieved by coalition governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Agree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the participants responses to the question of whether fiscal discipline has been stimulated by a coalition government. The results show that out of 187 participants, 47 respondents greatly disagree with the statement, 81 respondents disagree, 37 were neutral, 16 respondents agree with the posed statement while a minimum of 6 respondents greatly agree.
From this, it has been gathered that majority of the participants are of the view that a coalition type of government has not stimulated any fiscal discipline in Lesotho. Literature reveals that in the last decade, Lesotho shifted from an export driven economy to one driven by government spending. In the past four years, the government maintained public spending above 60% of GDP. The World Bank Partnership frame-work document (2016) provides that the biggest contributor to this spending is the wage bill which grew from 18.9% of GDP in 2012 to 23% in 2015/2016 landing it among the highest in the world. Consequently, such lack of restraint and discipline in public expenditure which is dependent on volatile SACU revenues, has made the microeconomic environment less stable, and unable to sustainably drive economic growth to address Lesotho’s extreme poverty and shared prosperity needs.

These findings are also corroborated by the submission made by Martin and Vanberg (2013) that chief amongst all issues that usually lead to contentions between coalition partners due to the differences in their ideologies and perspectives is that of a budget. They maintain that the fact that coalition parties can be held separately accountable, provides strong reasons for each to push for spending on priorities that its constituents favor. They further argue that coalition governments confront a “common pool resource” (CPR) problem in budgeting that is likely to lead to a larger public sector as more parties are added to the cabinet (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006: Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2007) in Martin and Vanberg (2013). From this submission, it is drawn that the nature of a coalition government and its composition predisposes a county governed by it to excessive government expenditure. In addition, The World Bank, Kingdom of Lesotho Country Partnership Frame-Work document (2016) purports that increased public spending further crowds out private sector investment. As a result, limited job opportunities in the private sector have exacerbated poverty and inequality and led to a situation in which the public sector has become de facto a social safety by absorbing employment which has led to a bloated public sector and oversized spending. This, as well as the report claims, has led to a vicious cycle that simultaneously crowds out investment in the country.

5.1.2 Proper representation of stakeholder interests in the legislature

The table below presents the participants responses to the question of whether the coalition government has ensured proper representation of stakeholder interests.

Table 12: Responses on the representation of stake-holder interests in the legislature
The results presented in the table above show that out of 187 participants, 9 greatly disagree that the coalition government has ensured proper representation of stakeholder interest. 21 participants disagree, 60 participants who form a majority of the total population in this particular instance remained neutral. 56 participants agree that the coalition government has ensured proper representation of stakeholder interests while a total of 41 participants greatly agree. The summation of the participants whose responses ranged from agree to greatly agree sums up to 97 respondents which indicates that most respondents agreed with the notion that stakeholder representation has been ensured by a coalition government. In an interview with a key informant from the South African High Commission (SAHC), the representative held a different view from that which has been presented of the business population.

In his response to the question of stakeholder involvement in coalition governance in Lesotho, the informant indicated that “stakeholders such as NGO’s have little influence in issues of governance in Lesotho and can only make recommendations that are not binding. Therefore, in situations of political instability it becomes a big challenge to make any changes or resolutions as there are no legal grounds for stakeholder recommendations to be implemented.” An interviewee from the CCL on the other hand had this to say in response to the same question; “Several recommendations have been made by members of the civil society. The CCL in particular, proposed a Government of National Unity and called for the implementation of the reforms proposed by the Maseru Declaration of Ramaphosa/ Phumaphi report as well as those proposed in the New Zealand Report.” Although the statistical results indicate that most participants are of the view that there is proper representation of stakeholder interests in the
legislature, civil society organization representatives and members of the diplomatic corps representatives are of a different view. From their narration, it is discovered that stakeholders have limited powers on issues of governance as their recommendations and resolutions have no legal grounds and are therefore not binding. As a result, the civil society organizations as stakeholders in governance issues are ineffective.

5.1.3 Multi-Party - Political Participation

Table 13: Participants responses to the question of whether multi-party participation has improved under coalition governance in Lesotho.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table above the results presented indicate that 7 participants out of a total of 187 greatly disagree that multiparty-political participation has improved. 25 participants responded that 25 participants disagree, 55 respondents were neutral. From the total population 58 participants that constitute a majority agree that multiparty participation has improved under a coalition while 42 agree. Literature reviewed in this study corroborates with these findings and suggests that the All Basotho Convention, Lesotho Congress for democracy, and the Basotho National Party formed an alliance and became government after an outright win by a single party could not be attained Matjama (2013). Given the complexity of governance, now faced with different ideologies, the three coalition parties came to an agreement on how they would ensure that they work towards carrying out the mandate of the electorate. To further substantiate the majority view that multi-party-political participation has improved in Lesotho, the Media and Monitoring results report on Lesotho Elections (2015) reveals that in the 2015 general elections, the Independent Electoral Commission registered 23 political parties. This revelation is indicative of the extent to which multi-party participation has been enhanced in
Lesotho. For a country as small as Lesotho the absence of a threshold for the number of political parties that can be registered and allowed to compete for elections has proved to be a matter for concern for numerous stakeholders. An informant from the CCL asserted that “Multi-party competition or participation in Lesotho is not a problem. However, having multi-political parties in a country as small as Lesotho is something that should be frowned upon. A proposition to have a threshold or bench mark for the number of political parties Lesotho should have is extremely necessary. A lack of regulation on how many political parties the country can have has created a problem of political parties getting into power without the numbers.”

5.1.4 Cordial relationship between Political Parties

Table 14: Views on whether there is a cordial relationship between political parties in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Agree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above shows the participants responses to the question of whether there is a cordial relationship between political parties. As portrayed in the table, 24 participants greatly disagree that the relationship between political parties in Lesotho is cordial. 55 participants forming 29% of the study population disagree, 48 respondents gave a neutral response, 39 participants greatly agree with the statement while 11.1% of the 187 respondents greatly agree. From this presentation, it is discovered that majority of the study population are of the view that the relationship between political parties in Lesotho is not a cordial one. For a representative from the LMDA on the contrary, “a healthy relationship is demonstrated by the fact that they seem to work together and agree on a common purpose to refashion the country into a peaceful and stable one”. Nevertheless, given the polarity of the political landscape in Lesotho, these findings are not without founding. Indicative of the lack of cooperation and cordiality between
the coalition partners in Lesotho is the delay in the implementation of the Multi sectoral reforms as recommended by SADC in Lesotho due to conflicting political parties and their leaders. Literature relays that the government of Lesotho presented the National Reforms Commission Bill on 17 January 2018, which aimed at establishing a commission to spearhead national dialogue towards the implementation of Multi-sectoral reforms amid strong protests by the opposition legislators. Legislators eventually walked out to protest what they said was government arbitrariness and lack of consultation on the Bill Lesotho times (18 January 2018.)

5.1.5 One party domination

Table 15: response on whether Lesotho politics is dominated by one party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>41.8</td>
<td>42.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the participants views to the question of whether Lesotho Politics is dominated by one party which limits governmental accountability. Out of 187 respondents, 58 greatly disagreed with the notion that there is a situation of a single party dominating which limits governmental accountability. 79 participants disagreed, 38 remained neutral on this question, 11 respondents greatly agreed while only one respondent greatly agreed with the statement. From this description, it is discovered that majority population is of the view that there is no single party domination in Lesotho limiting governmental accountability. These findings are verified by the discussion of the preceding tables in which there was a discovery that there is multi-party participation in Lesotho politics. For one of the Key informants from the LMDA Lesotho having had three consecutive coalitions in the space of five years is indicative of democracy. In his view “the dissolution of a parliament and fresh elections that elect a new leadership are in indication of democracy irrespective of whether the elected government has served its term or not.” In Zimbabwe literature reveals that Zimbabwean
Politics had been dominated by one party which is the ZANU-PF for decades and opposition was strongly resisted until a call for a GNU by president Thabo Mbeki as a result of the severe economic and political woes that the country was faced with was made Tumbare (2014).

5.1.6 Free and Fair Elections held regularly

Table 16: Views on whether there are free and fair elections held regularly in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the participants views to the question of whether there is free and Fair elections held regularly in Lesotho. The results show that only 20 respondents out of a total of 187 respondents gave a negative response i.e. responses ranging from greatly disagree to disagree. 52 participants gave a neutral response. A majority of 112 participants responded in the affirmative by agreeing and greatly agreeing to the statement that there is free and fair elections held regularly in Lesotho. In an interview with a representative from the CCL, it was closed it “all elections that have led to coalition government formations have been credible. The CCL held a prayer at the UN House in Lesotho in 2012, 2015 and 2017 respectively for peaceful elections. Another key informant from the SAHC concurred with these findings in his assertion that “the elections held under a coalition government have been credible and the voters roll is well compiled. However, this is to be expected of a small country” the informant further acknowledged that “there has indeed been no disruptions since Basotho people are generally cultured and peaceful people. The elections therefore have been free and fair.” Although the elections held under a coalition have been free and fair, the fact that the coalition governments formed after those peaceful elections have collapsed all before the end of their terms has been a subject of much concern for numerous stakeholders including the regional
body, SADC. As already indicated in the previous discussion, some participants have argued that the regular holding of peaceful elections is a demonstration of democracy.

5.1.7 Clear voter representation in Government

Table 17: Views on whether there is clear voter representation in government in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table below presents the data obtained from the question of whether there is clear voter representation in government. From 187 respondent’s majority of the study population, which is 68, agreed that there is clear voter representation in government while only a minority of 6 respondents disagreed with the posed question while 62 respondents gave a neutral response. These findings confirm the submission laid by Hoolo (2016) that “in accordance with the democracy principle, section 20 of the constitution gives every single citizen of Lesotho the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly through freely chosen representatives and to vote or stand for election.” He further pointed out that the section establishes both representatives and direct democracy. This study submits therefore that the issue of lack of representation of voters in government is not a problem in Lesotho. However, the challenge is in the ability of the representatives to carry out the mandate of the electorate or the voters. In this matter, a representative from the CCL argued that, “Lesotho is a young democracy with weak democratic institutions, a serious leadership problem, inadequate civic education and no mandate is taken from the voters.”

5.1.8 Mechanisms for government official’s accountability

Table 18: Responses on whether there are mechanisms that hold government officials accountable in Lesotho
The table above presents the data obtained on the question of whether there are mechanisms that hold government officials accountable for their actions. Out of 187 participants, 13 greatly disagree that there are mechanisms that hold government officials accountable for their actions in Lesotho. 23 participants disagreed with the statement, 58 participants gave a neutral response, majority of the population, and 79 respondents agree that there are mechanisms that hold officials accountable while 14 participants greatly agreed. Literature reviewed in this study confirms these findings by revealing that within the first one hundred days of governing; the coalition unleashed the Directorate on Criminal and Economic offences (DCEO) from direct government control and gave parliament authority over it. This resolution was formulated to demonstrate the new authority’s commitment to weeding out corruption in government and state-owned entities. Because of this effort, implicated individuals were exposed, and some high-profile cases ended up in the courts of Law. This move, and numerous others were a positive step into nation building and development. This would prove inadequate for keeping the government in-tact for cracks between the coalition partner’s relationship began to show, and consequently rendered them incapable of holding the government together.

This study contests from these findings that the launching of institutions such as the DCEO as a mechanism for ensuring government accountability is not enough if such institutions do not go through processes of monitoring and evaluation to ensure that they meet their set goals and objectives. The study employed the policy monitoring and policy evaluation models to highlight the importance of carrying out a monitoring and evaluation process on government programs and policies. Dunleavy (1986) defines policy monitoring as a process that often involves the gathering of evidence of a policy while it is in the implementation stage and then using the collected findings to influence future of course action. Policy evaluation on the other hand is “an assessment, as systematic and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, program,
strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector etc.” United Nations Evaluation Group (2005). In this regard, the call for the DCEO and other similar institutions that carry out a similar mandate to go through a monitoring and evaluation process to ensure that indeed all the goals and objectives of those institutions are met is key.

5.1.9 Increased employment and eradication of poverty

Table 19: Responses on the increase in employment and eradication of poverty by the coalition government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Disagree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the participants responses to the question of whether the coalition government has led to an increase in employment and the eradication of poverty. The results above show that 54 participants out of 187 greatly disagree that employment has increased, and poverty eradicated under coalition governance in Lesotho. 92 respondents that form majority of the study population disagree with the pose question. 32 gave a neutral response while a minimum of 9 respondents were of the view that under coalition governance, poverty has been eradicated and employment has increased. In the previous chapter, the data obtained revealed that majority of the population in Lesotho who are into business are between the ages of 46 and 45. This suggests that the youth being majority population in the country is faced with a major challenge of unemployment. In support of these findings, the 2012 Economic review (2012) indicates; “Lesotho like other countries of the world is faced with the problem of high youth unemployment. While the number of university and college graduates increases from year to year, most of those graduates are not able to get employment.” On the contrary, trading economics [https://tradingeconomics.com/Lesotho/unemployment-rate](https://tradingeconomics.com/Lesotho/unemployment-rate) reports that unemployment decreased to 27.25 percent in 2017 from 27.78 percent in 2016. Unemployment
rate in Lesotho averaged 32.34 percent from 1991 until 2017 reaching an all-time high of 44.16 percent in 1998 and a record low of 22.96 percent in 2000. Additionally, the IMF executive board report of (2018) alludes that “although Lesotho has grown faster than its regional peers over the last decade, partly driven by capital intensive mining and infrastructure projects, high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality persist.”

5.2 Safety and Security

Table 20: Response on safety and security under coalition governments in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents data obtained in response to the question of whether there is safety and security as a result of a coalition in Lesotho. The results show that out of 187 participants, 38 participants greatly disagree with the posed statement, 71 respondents disagree, 52 were neutral, 21 participants agree while only 5 respondents greatly agree that there is safety and security in Lesotho under coalition governance. These findings show that majority of the study population is of the view that there is no safety and security under a coalition government in Lesotho. a representative from the SAHC in support of these finding, mentioned that “the fact that two army commanders have been killed in broad day light within a space of 3 to 4 years is an indication that safety and security have been and could still be a challenge in Lesotho.

From the CCL, the interviewee mentioned that “the 2012 coalition government experienced security problems due to the politicization of the military while the 2015 coalition government promoted impunity, corruption and lack of rule of law.” In his views, “The coalition government formed in 2017 has tried to restore the rule of law to the satisfaction of the investors and the international community has the awarding of the Compact II development contract.”
He further noted that “Basotho have started to enjoy freedom from the past few years of instability and insecurity. Therefore, there is hope also for the signing and implementation of the reforms on the National agenda.” These submissions validate the arguments made by Gramsci’s hegemonic theory on the lengths that the political elite will go to in order to maintain dominance and to consolidate their power creating a situation of conflict and contention. The politicization of the military by the political elite is a perfect demonstration of the hegemonic theory in practice.

5.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the data obtained on the challenges and opportunities created by a coalition government in Lesotho. The findings in this chapter reveal that the formation of successive coalition governments in Lesotho has taken its toll on the country’s fiscus. That is, there is a lack of financial discipline under a coalition government in Lesotho due to the growing size of the cabinet to accommodate members of different parties into the executive. The findings of this study also indicate that the increased wage bill in Lesotho has created a dent in the country’s GDP. The study established that multi-party participation is enabled thereby enhancing democracy, however, the lack of restriction in the number of political parties that can be registered to contest for elections has shown itself to be a problem in that some political parties get into power without the numbers through the PR electoral system. In this chapter, the findings that the presence of a civil society as well as other mechanisms that are created that are meant to hold the government accountable do are present but lack legal backing to make binding recommendations have been discussed. Employment and poverty were discovered to be at a high rate and safety and security a persisting problem under coalition governance.

The next chapter will provide a summary of the study and the conclusions drawn from the results obtained and the literature reviewed in the preceding chapters. Lastly, recommendations will be presented drawing from the summary and conclusions arrived at.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the study, the final and overall conclusion and recommendations. The final conclusion is drawn from the data obtained, literature reviewed and then linked to the objectives of the study as outlined in chapter one. The aim of this study was to investigate the impacts of coalition government on investment opportunities and socio-political development in Lesotho.

6.1 Summary of the major findings

To begin with, the objectives of the study were to; examine the influence of a coalition government on investment opportunities in Lesotho. Secondly, to evaluate the extent to which coalition governments are functional and effective in the implementation of policies. Thirdly, the study sought to assess the challenges that face coalition governments that may hinder investment opportunities in Lesotho and lastly to examine the policies that inform a coalition government in Lesotho. These outlined objectives were explored and the themes that emerged were extracted in discussion of the subject matter. The findings of this research were discussed in chapter four and five under the respective themes under which they fell. Chapter three provided the methodology employed in carrying out this research, chapter one introduced the study, discussed the theoretical frame-work underpinning the study and outlined all the chapters as they have been explored. The subsequent chapter, chapter two, reviewed relevant literature and case studies. This is a reflective account of the inception of the study, how it was structured, carried out and presented.

The first objective of the study was to examine the influence of a coalition government system on investment opportunities in Lesotho. The results have revealed that under a coalition government, the country of Lesotho has been marred by political instability and insecurity both if which culminated in the killing of two army commanders within a space of three years. Consequent to these mishaps, foreign aid donors and investors have found the environment in Lesotho inconducive for investment. Additionally, the study established that, due to the differences in party ideologies, and the fallouts between coalition partners that led to the collapse of government, there is also a lack of continuity in policy implementation Lesotho
times 13th October 2017. These factors have created an environment that is hostile to investment and the successive coalition governments have had a difficult time in creating investment opportunities in Lesotho. The second objective of the study was to evaluate the extent to which coalition governments are functional and effective in the implementation of policies. In fulfilment of this objective, the results obtained in this study indicate that coalition governments aren’t the ideal types of government in terms of policy implementation. Shermann and Ender Jadanstick (2013) reestablish these findings in their submission that the nature of a coalition government is such that policy- making and implementation may become a challenge due to the differences in the preferences of the coalition partners.

The third objective of the study was to assess the challenges that face coalition governments that may hinder investment opportunities in Lesotho. The findings of the study reveal that the relationship between political parties in Lesotho lacks cordiality, this strain has proved to work against the progress of the country as more time is spent on feuds and animosity between political parties and coalition parties than on serious matters. The Lesotho times 18th January reports that the government of Lesotho presented the 2018 National Reforms Commission Bill of 2018. These were aimed at establishing a commission to spear head national dialogue towards the implementation of multi-sectoral reforms. This move was however, met with tough resistance by the opposition legislators that eventually walked out to protest what they said was government arbitrariness and lack of consultation. It is worth noting that, the lack of cooperation by party leaders and government on important issues such this one hinder investment in Lesotho.

Lastly, the study sought to examine the policies that inform a coalition government. This study discovered that that there are no clear guidelines and policies that inform a coalition government in Lesotho. More so, literature revealed that the constitution of Lesotho does not give clear provisions of how this type of government must be administered. The constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho (1993) section 87 (2) only stipulates that “the king shall appoint the Prime Minister, a member of the National Assembly who appears to the council of state to be the leader of a political party or coalition of political parties that will command the support of a majority of members of the National Assembly.” In response to the question of the availability of legislation that guides coalitions, it was also discovered from the literature and study results that all the three coalition governments formed in Lesotho from 2012 were only guided by a coalition agreement between the allied parties. A representative from the CCL revealed in support of this conclusion that “the constitution of Lesotho does not make clear
provisions for a coalition government. It is a Westminster type of constitution that was adopted under the military regime in 1993.” The informant further noted that the constitution of Lesotho is “only a copy and paste provision that is ambiguous and does not speak to the prevailing situation in Lesotho.” On this note, this study concludes that there are no policies or legislative frame-works that speak to a coalition government in Lesotho hence the collapse of two such government within five years.

6.2 Conclusion

The data obtained in this study reveals that a coalition type of government in Lesotho has not been effective thus far. The formation of such governments in a country where the is no threshold for the number of political parties that can contest for elections predisposes the country to a situation whereby everyone stands a chance of getting into power. This has resulted in a bulging cabinet and extremely high wage bill. Additionally, the results show that there is a lack of a comprehensive legal frame-work for a coalition type of government in Lesotho. The absence of one such document has resulted in a confusion as to how this type of government should be administered thus leading to fallouts between coalition partners. This has led to political instability and insecurity that have created an environment that is hostile to investment and socio-political development.

This study concludes that the reformation of the Constitution of Lesotho with regards to coalition formation is of extreme importance to ensure the smooth running and success of such governments. Moreover, the implementation of the recommendations of the New Zealand report that speak to improved leadership is central to solving the political conflict between coalition partners that often becomes a hindrance to the country’s development. In addition, the politicization of institutions such as the military have been discovered to be the measure causes of instability and insecurity. In order to create an environment that is investment friendly, safety and security must be ensured through the de-politicization of institutions such as the military.

Finally, this study submits that there are major challenges that face coalition governance in Lesotho that hinder investment and socio-political development. The implementation of all the proposed recommendations may prove to be a shift into the right direction for future success of such governments.
6.3 Recommendations

Excessive government expenditure has been established to be a big problem in Lesotho, particularly under a coalition government. The study recommends that tightly controlled measures and strategies to reduce government spending be implemented. This will impact positively on the GDP that has taken a punch as a result of the extremely high wage bill in Lesotho.

The political instability that Lesotho has suffered in the past five years has been a result of conflicts between political parties and coalition partners. The results of this study indicate that there is no threshold for the number of political parties that can be registered by the Independent Electoral commission of Lesotho, this has resulted in more political parties than is necessary in Lesotho. This study, therefore, calls for a regulation and restriction on the number of political parties that can be registered and run for election.

The insufficiency of mechanisms that hold government officials accountable has been established to be a problem in Lesotho. The study therefore recommends that more legal powers be given to institutions such as the ombudsman to be able to call all government officials including members of the executive to account.

Lastly and most importantly, this study recommends that a more comprehensive legal framework on the functioning of a coalition government with clearly defined goals, objectives and guidelines be formulated to ensure the future success of coalition governments in Lesotho.

6.4 Areas for further research

This study focused on the impacts of a coalition government on investment opportunities in Lesotho. Numerous issues that did not fall within the scope of the study emerged while it was undertaken. Excessive government expenditure and an extremely high wage bill have been established to be contributing factors to the decline in GDP. The nature of Coalition governments under the Proportional representation electoral model in Lesotho are such that every party has a chance of getting into power without numbers. This study proposes that future areas of research look into the Suitability of the PR electoral model in small countries such as Lesotho.
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All tables and figures presented on chapter 4 and 5 were compiled by the Author of this dissertation.
Appendices
Appendix 1

Informed Consent Document

Dear Participant,

My name is . I am a master’s candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus. The title of my research is: . The aim of the study is to . I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about (how long?).
- The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures)

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg. / Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: ; Cell: ; My supervisor is who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus / Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email ; Phone number: ;

My co-supervisor is who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Howard College Campus/ Howard College Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email ; Phone number: ;

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ; Phone number;

Thank you for your contribution to this research.
DECLARATION

I……………………………………………………………………………………………… (full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT DATE

……………………………………………………………………………………………………
Appendix 2

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What is your understanding of a coalition government in Lesotho?
2. How effective is the coalition government in attracting investment and ensuring peace and stability in the country?
3. To what extent has the coalition government impacted on the viability of business in Lesotho?
4. What is the impact of this kind of government on its image globally?
5. What is the response of stakeholders regarding the coalition government (how are they responding to that type of government?)
6. To what extent does the coalition government promote multi-party competition and individual rights?
7. What is the relationship between political parties and what is the impact of that relationship on socio-economic issues?
8. To what extent are the elections held under the coalition government credible?
9. In your opinion, would you say that a coalition type of government has improved community and political participation in Lesotho?
10. How effective is the coalition government in ensuring safety and security in Lesotho?
Appendix 3

Dear respondent,

Thank you for taking the time to answer this brief questionnaire. The aim of this survey is to assess the Impact of a Coalition government on investment opportunities and Socio-political development in Lesotho from 2012-2016

Demographics

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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</table>

Business Sector

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<th>Petroleum Sector</th>
<th>Hospitality Sector</th>
<th>Telecommunications sector</th>
<th>Financial services Sector</th>
<th>Retail sector</th>
<th>Health care Sector</th>
<th>Information and media Sector</th>
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<th>Manufacturing Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section A: Coalition Government in Lesotho

Rate the following statements in relation to the coalition government in Lesotho. | Greatly disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Greatly agree |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greatly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Greatly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The coalition government has been effective.

2. The coalition government has created a conducive environment for businesses to thrive.

3. The coalition government has improved the livelihoods of people.

4. The coalition government has improved the political environment in the country.

5. The coalition government has created opportunities for investment in Lesotho.

6. The coalition government has created opportunities for investment in Lesotho.

7. As a result of the coalition government, the economy has improved.

8. The government has taken stern measure to sustain the viability of business in Lesotho.

9. The coalition government ensures proper representation of stakeholders’ interests in the legislature.

10. The coalition government in Lesotho has facilitated the formulation and implementation of relevant policies.

11. Due to a coalition government drastic and undemocratic policies are being put through.

12. The coalition government has led to a compromise between different parties despite their opposing ideologies.

**SECTION B: Economic impacts of a Coalition government**

13. Coalition government has stimulated fiscal discipline.

14. The coalition government has paved a way to economic recovery.

15. The coalition government has opened opportunities for investment.
16. The coalition government has created access to financial assistance

17. The coalition government has led to an increase in donor funding

18. The coalition has led to an increase in the number of businesses in different sectors

19. There has been a reported increase in production during a coalition government

20. The coalition government has increased the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country

SECTION C: The Impact of a coalition government on the Political environment in Lesotho

21. The multiparty political participation has improved

22. There is a cordial relationship between political parties in Lesotho

23. Lesotho politics is dominated by one party which limits governmental accountability

24. Coalition government has created a conducive environment to promote multi-party competition and individual rights

25. There is free and fair elections held regularly

26. There are reported cases of deeply flawed election results

27. There is clear voter representation in government

28. Poor political institutions have caused/resulted in lack of business confidence

29. Lack of democratic institutions has affected direct foreign investment

30. There is no mechanism that holds government officials accountable for their actions

31. The constitution does little to effect separation of powers between the legislature, judiciary and the executive

SECTION D: The impact of a coalition government on the social Aspect

32. The coalition government has led to tolerance and cooperation amongst citizens
33. The coalition government has compelled the country to promote democracy and the eradication of poverty
34. The coalition government has made change inevitable
35. The coalition government has made life easy in Lesotho
36. As a result of a coalition there is safety and security in the country
37. The coalition government has compelled the country to promote democracy and human rights
38. The coalition government has enhanced the transition to democracy.
39. The coalition government has empowered the civil society in promoting the democratic process