Contemporary Afrikaner cultural identity and the Suidlanders:
A discursive analysis of the Suidlanders Inligting DVD 2

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2012.
I declare that this is my own work and that all the sources have been acknowledged.

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Abstract

This dissertation is a discursive analysis of the Suidlanders DVD2. It explores white Afrikaner identity through discourses such as those offered in the Kill the Boer debate, and an all-encompassing fear discourse that flourishes through crime, a South African terrorism as experienced through farm attacks, and a perceived ‘white genocide’ conspiracy. The dissertation examines through critical discourse analysis how ways of talking about ANC rule and the ‘problems’ experienced in the new dispensation are used to validate an Afrikaner identity that, were it not for a prevailing fear discourse, would otherwise remain on the fringes of identity in the country. The dissertation concludes that a traditional, apartheid era Afrikaner identity persists when opposing discourses across the cultural divide are pitted against each other, that ‘white’ cannot conceive of itself without ‘black’ and vice versa, and that Afrikaner identity as portrayed through an extremist group like the Suidlanders, is an identity caught in discursive limbo where everyday experience of fear paralyses all other means of rationalising a sense of self beyond that of a potential victim.
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Chapter One: Introduction

"Afrikaners are divided and distracted, apolitical and apathetic. One must hope then that the ANC makes the same mistake that the colonial British government did. Goad them until they are really *gatvol*. Then the boere might bestir their comfortable lard-arses and actually do something."

(Saunderson-Meyer, March 13, 2010)

White Afrikaner identity has become something of an anomaly in the new South Africa, as a foreboding “the-one-who-cannot-be-named” unease has, for the meantime, clamped the mouths both of those still ill at ease in taking the Rainbow Nation at face value and those only too ready to discard the iniquitous title of being Afrikaans, out of fear of being at odds with the live and let live sentiments that now feature in South Africa. However, the goodwill of the Rainbow Nation has soured amid regression policies, a crime rate of formidable proportions, and the ‘Kill the Boer’ rantings of infamous ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, leaving racial relations simmering precariously beneath the lid of our democratic pot. South African courts have ruled that the song is equivalent to hate speech. Its subsequent banning has seen the ANC retaliating that it is in fact a song of liberation stemming from the struggle against white-favouring apartheid, therefore a part of black South Africans’ heritage and that the court rule "... bans reference to an integral part of their history" (SABC, September 9, 2011). The ANC’s insistence that to sing ‘Kill the Boer’ is the right
of black South Africans has left Afrikaners once again feeling at odds, their symbolic connection to South Africa threatened (Sapa, April 15, 2011). "Not only white farmers failed to see the humour in the song in a time when an average of two white farmers is killed every week in the country. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, an estimated 2,500 white South African farmers have been murdered - only last year, 120 were killed" (afrol NEWS, March 29, 2011).

In 2007, it so happened, right wing group the Suidlanders predicted imminent white genocide after the even more imminent death of former president Nelson Mandela. Apparently biding their time before the event, they distributed a DVD concerning the possibility of a white genocide, which they believe is the driving force behind farm attacks that have plagued white farmers in South Africa. Suidlander leader Gustav Muller has compared the coming of a total onslaught against whites to that of a natural disaster, saying that whites need to prepare for the alleged Doomsday when blacks will besiege cities in the country and hunt down the vastly outnumbered white race (Suidlanders DVD2). It has been dubbed the Night of the Long Knives, Operation uHuru, and Operation White Clean-up, which has been, according to the Suidlanders’s leader in the DVD, seconded by various politicians, in a slogan that reads: "The day Mandela dies, we kill the whites like flies" (Suidlanders DVD2).

In an uncanny turn of events, the murder of former AWB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche on Easter Saturday in 2010 by his Ventersdorp farm workers
occurred amidst the ‘Kill the Boer’ furore, polarising racial relations to a fractious extent at the time. “Outside the Ventersdorp Magistrate’s Court, matters came to a head when a group of black and white observers taunted each other with songs. A white group sang the apartheid national anthem, *Die Stem*, while the black group sang the original version of *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika*, which was sung by ANC cadres before liberation” (Sapa, April 7, 2010). In the same article it reads that President Jacob Zuma had to call for calm twice over the weekend of Terre’Blanche’s murder, although AWB member Pieter Steyn said: “There’s nothing to fear ... there will be no revenge. [However] people say they are getvol [fed up]” (Sapa, April 7, 2010).

The weeks leading up to the Fifa Football World Cup hosted by South Africa in 2010 saw a sweep of arrests of alleged right wingers involved in a bomb plot aimed at black townships. Some of the arrests were made in the capital Pretoria, one of the host cities for the 2010 tournament. “They were planning to test some of their explosives in any black township,” said Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa (Hurd, 2010). The police said suspects had also been seized in the Western Cape and Limpopo provinces as part of a sweep for illegal weapons following the end of a gun amnesty last month ... some of those detained had “strong links to far right groups”. The arrests followed the murder of Terre’Blanche, whose death inflamed racial tensions in South Africa and led to calls for revenge from his far-right supporters that were later retracted” (Hurd, 2010).
That sentiments such as these exist in the new dispensation is what has spurred on an exploration of white Afrikaner identity, and in locating this identity in South Africa, this dissertation looks to delve into the rhetoric surrounding the question of, “who will you side with, if the Suidlanders’ prophecy comes true?”

It could be argued that South Africa remains a country where the memories of apartheid are still fresh in our fledgling democracy; a plethora of cultures continues to rummage about for a sense of belonging while identity has been left with a certain history in which to find its roots. Since Mandela’s proclamation of a society free of racial division in 1994, the rule of the land has changed hands from ‘Madiba the Statesman’, through ‘Thabo Mbeki the Educated’ who sought to create an African superpower while leaving the country to settle their differences amongst themselves, to current President Jacob Zuma, ‘the Zulu chief’, man of people who have come to find their traditions embodied in a leader with five wives and ethnic pride. With this changing of hands, the insecurities of the ousted colonial and the shame-faced Boer have had time to ferment into a wary concoction flavoured with a bitter sweet willingness to embrace the new South Africa’s ideals, while keeping a beady eye on the fate of their own cultural futures.

In Zuma’s first interview with an Afrikaans newspaper, *Beeld*, since he took over the presidency, he encouraged Afrikaners to find their own version of ‘Nkandla’, a rural area in northern KwaZulu Natal of which he is its reigning chief (Du Toit &
Steenkamp, February 17, 2011). He said Afrikaners should find a “psychological home” where they feel safe and where they have the freedom to live in a way that is important to them, and that this home is not found in a state republic like Orania, but with the rest of South Africa. In the article he says that unlike Vendas or Zulus, the Afrikaners do not have concentrated “homelands” in certain areas of the country, but that they are spread across South Africa and therefore do not have a “physical Nkandla” (Du Toit & Steenkamp, February 17, 2011). Zuma elaborates on the Afrikaners’ “unique history which distinguishes them from other whites in the country: ‘they are the only group who can say that they also fought for their freedom against the British ... They contributed to the development of South Africa to make it what it is. It is an important group. It’s the sort of group that carries only one passport not two’.” (Du Toit & Steenkamp, February 17, 2011).

As it stands, today BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) managers shed their corporate suits for traditional garb on weekends for the pilgrimage to the mountains to remember their ancestors, while the sturdy women of the white folk swop recipes for boere raad and powdered eggs after church, sharpening their skills as proud women of the Boer volk, like their own Voortrekker ancestors would have done in days of an emergency trek to the laagers. It is amidst this live-and-let-live existence that on a crisp winter Sunday in April 2010 news headlines blurt the death of AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) leader Eugene Terre’Blanche, murdered by his farm workers in the dead of night on his
farm outside Ventersdorp. A cognitive leap to Julius Malema’s ‘Kill the Boer’ song sung at a political rally mere weeks earlier brings the country to a trepid standstill. Sordid details of sodomy and the old Afrikaner stalwart’s naked dead body jolt readers’ minds and ‘farm attacks’ are on the lips of all belonging to Africa’s white tribe.

In this scenario, the Suidlanders’ prophecy of white genocide doesn’t seem so far-fetched and in that moment, as the Afrikaans saying goes, “die koel is deur die kerk” (the spark to the gunpowder has taken). Racial battle lines are drawn, the arch rivals of apartheid are reborn in mere moments and relations are taut with expectation as the county waits for what’s next.

The context in which this dissertation takes form stems from previous research on the Afrikaner, which specifically focused on the progression of Afrikaner youth in light of the music video Delarey (Lategan, 2007). A fundamental conclusion of that project indicated that while multiculturalism is at work in the formation of cultural identity for youth in South Africa, it draws its sense of self from a globalised context in the form of the so-called ‘MTV-generation’: Afrikaner youths have been afforded a moment to reflect on, if not their current realms of identity formation, certainly where their historical lineage lies. The music video’s success, as research established, lies in “the need for cultural recognition outside an amorphous amalgamation of identities” (Lategan, 2007:31).
Concurrently, a system of democracy in South Africa has taken effect which requires an enquiry into the effect of multiculturalism, a cultural strategy prevalent in postcolonial and democratic South Africa. The problem of cultural minorities is characterised by a struggle for representation within the politics of South Africa's democratic governing at present, where the voting system does not work for the minority. Feelings of insignificance, such as those harboured by the older generation Afrikaner, are encapsulated in a *Witness* column “Stirrings in the heart of Die Volk”: “Detribalised, marginalised and satirised. The Afrikaner, conventional wisdom has it, is no longer a factor in South African politics” (Saunderson-Meyer, March 13, 2010). Yet Saunderson-Meyer suggests that this very feeling of insignificance has throughout history been the perfect condition for the Afrikaner to find their characteristic endurance. “There is the scary ability to endure hardship and to take on vastly superior forces, in the unshakeable belief that they will overcome. And then there is their unquenchable love for this land” (March 13, 2010). Yet it is the prerogative of the post-apartheid condition that the rights of the peripheral Afrikaners are left to jostle for their say within the black-majority ruled Rainbow Nation. “While one cannot help but stifle a snigger at their new fondness for constitutional checks and balances, one can take consolation in the fact that everyone will benefit if they pursue democracy with the same doggedness that they advanced apartheid” (Saunderson-Meyer, March 13, 2010).
Of importance here is the paradoxical interplay between multiculturalism and cultural nationalism, particularly referring to those Afrikaners who consider themselves to be aligned with the Suidlander organisation. It is notably a sense of victimisation that drives the verve of rightwing-minded Afrikaner nationalism represented by a group like the Suidlanders. It is an identity that is at odds with Afrikaner pragmatists such as the Deon Maases and Breyten Breytenbachs of the ‘new Afrikaner’ intellectualism that has denounced a ‘God-sanctioned’ sense of aloofness to ANC-rule on the strength of racial superiority, but more importantly a perceived racial victimisation. As far as cultural nationalism is concerned, a group such as the Suidlanders counters any form of integration into a multicultural status quo, and this study, through a discursive analysis of the Suidlanders Inligting DVD, seeks to explore the foundations of this form of cultural nationalism that is based on a perceived victimisation.

In the same breath, it must be borne in mind that this dissertation aims to assert that an organisation such as the Suidlanders, in their apparent capacity to represent an area of counter narrative or discourse, gives voice to ever present disparities that may not be as widely accepted in social arenas more likely to adhere to the liberal nature of multicultural discourse. “Let’s face it, Anglophone South Africans of all races are too aggravated by a honed instinct for appeasement” (Saunderson-Meyer, March 13, 2010).
The counter narrative referred to in the Afrikaner context, particularly in the last remaining laagers of its cultural disposition, is one themed by fear: a fear of extinction fuelled by the perceived threat of a black majority secretly orchestrating the final and catastrophic end of Africa's white tribe, as is suggested by the DVD.

The dissertation will be focusing primarily on the right-wing Afrikaner, using the Suidlanders as a case study of relevance, in understanding the processes behind cultural nationalism in the face of a multicultural collective. Furthermore, the dissertation seeks to engage with mediated events and discourses that have insinuated and imbued the climate in which this (Afrikaner) minority culture seeks to validate itself. This will be drawn from selected mediated discourse that concerns itself with the mindset of an identity clinging tenaciously to its survival, focusing primarily on the 'Kill the Boer' hate speech trial. The question here is what a cultural minority, depicted and pursued in the Suidlander DVD, offers white Afrikaners in the new dispensation. By the same token, is the Afrikaner cultural identity pursued in the Suidlanders DVD a Utopian cause?

This research therefore seeks to ask the following questions:

- Of what significance are Nelson Mandela's ideals with regard to the Afrikaner's cultural heritage/sense of belonging in South Africa?
• At what cost or benefit to a minority culture are its members/groups able to be of significance and relevance within the multicultural establishment? (multicultural integration vs. cultural nationalistic preservation);

• What does a group such as the Suidlanders offer Afrikaner identity in the way of cultural belonging, and how does this sense of belonging relate to belonging in the new South Africa?

• How do the Suidlanders situate themselves in the new South Africa? (counter narrative)

• What significance does their discursive interpretation of South Africa have in the democratic dispensation?

• Is it possible to classify a ‘true’ Afrikaner?

Reasons for choosing this particular topic rest firstly on previous research that I completed on Afrikaner identity, which arrived at the assumption that Afrikaner identity formation (particularly amongst the youth) has begun to find its frame of reference within the multicultural atmosphere of democratic South Africa. In the Delarey music video young Afrikaners were confronted with the legendary general who, for the Boers in the great South African war, led a nation on the brink of defeat to a final surge of battle for their beloved land. For white South Africans just after 1994, it could be said, Nelson Mandela adopted the same quality in the manner in which he mapped the way ahead for the shunned white race to step into the new South Africa. Mandela’s importance in South Africa for whites even now, over a decade later, rests in the very vision of what he
embodied then and still embodies now – even more so when it seems apparent that the memory of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, in which Mandela symbolically invited Afrikaners to share in the building of the new South Africa, has lost its power to demonstrate faith in a new dispensation that has become embroiled in a seemingly hypocritical rhetoric.

For a while, Afrikaners forgot about their worst fears of 'black majority rule' and that 'the blacks will do to us what we did to them'. There were other sweeteners: their beloved national rugby and cricket teams could once again compete internationally; national conscription was abolished; international sanctions were scrapped; and the South African passport was again acceptable everywhere.

In fact, during the first two years of democracy most Afrikaners were surprised that their lives had changed so little, and where their lives did change it was, in most cases, for the better.

It went so well that most Afrikaners would have told you then that they were enthusiastic members of the new South African nation. They sang 'Shosholoza' with gusto and simply loved their black president with the number 6 rugby jersey at the rugby World Cup.

(Du Preez, 2005)

The arrival at this assumption led to the second encouragement in pursuing this topic, especially when I encountered the Suidlanders Inligting DVD. What I came
across was a depiction of the ‘old style’ Afrikaner apparently still cowering beneath the shards of a minority group identity. I began to question this minority identity complex that is quite clear from one’s first encounter with the DVD. It was at that point that I began to wonder whether or not there still is a place for this group, the *Suidlanders*, on the splattered palette of the Rainbow Nation.

My only recollection of South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994 is of an ordinary school day when, as a child of eight, my classmates and I sang to the tune of “Strawberry lippe, die *kaffirs* gooi klippe, Mandela gaan suffer want hy is a *kaffir*” with the reckless abandon that only children have. When I sang the same song at home that afternoon, my mother took to the wooden spoon and that was the last of that. Years later I would have to learn to reconcile ‘grown up’ conversations on ‘blacks and whites’ with my world in which ‘black and white’ was not supposed to exist. As a young adult with a father who was a policeman during apartheid and an English liberal from Durban as a mother, my experience of identity became a balancing act that on the one hand had to placate an old generation with unyielding ideas of inter-racial relations, and on the other had to forge ahead in new ways of thinking in order to embrace a society that I had been educated in, a society where my black peers would become of my closest friends. In many instances then, South African identity to me was two-faced, a dual existence that allowed you to respect the home in which you were raised while living in a world that was sometimes in complete defiance of it.
I am looking to navigate through a seemingly paradoxical entity – minor cultural identity – which, to my reasoning, may either adapt to the greater collective cultural identity of a nation, or remain immovable and therefore an insular body, forfeiting its 'cultural citizenship' as it were, within the collective state of being. Regardless, whether a culture is evolving and modifying itself, adapting or discarding certain cultural attributes for others, or excluding itself from this process of evolution in order to resolutely preserve its original identity, the liminality of culture and the difficulty of choosing between cultural purity or cultural survival remain at loggerheads.
Chapter Two: Literary Review

"The Afrikaners fought the first anti-colonial war in modern history against Great Britain. So Afrikaners have a deep understanding of the need of a people to be free."

FW de Klerk in Stewart, 2004:21

(i) Afrikaner history and Die Suidlanders

"I shall not leave, I am an Afrikaander, even if the landdrost beats me to death or puts me in jail. I shall not, nor will I be silent ..."

(Giliomee: 2003: 22)

In order to make sense of the Afrikaner’s cultural disposition, and more importantly that of the Suidlanders’, it is crucial to be aware of its historical development as a means to understanding cultural specificity in the present. To begin, the first record of a European using the word ‘Afrikaner’ to describe himself was in March 1707, and was uttered by a young man called Hendrik Biebouw in Stellenbosch (Giliomee, 2003). Until then ‘Afrikaner’ was applied to “indigenous people or to the offspring of ‘natives’ and slaves or free blacks” (Giliomee, 2003: 22). In this instance, a long history in which the Afrikaner would be tied up with the idea of resistance to being ruled by others was initiated (Altbeker, 2010).

“In 1708 the Reverend E.F. le Boucq spoke of the danger that ‘the Africaanders will fall to the level of Hottentotdom’. And in 1712 an
official document on the conflict between Van der Stel and the
burghers used the term ‘Africaan’ to distinguish among Europeans
according to their place of birth.”

(Giliomee, 2003: 22-23).

As such, this announcement and proclamation of Biebouw’s identity already
suggests the burghers’ affiliation to the African soil. Giliomee suggests that the
occurrence of this incident at the time was “symptomatic of the increasing strains
colonial society was experiencing” (2003:23). The result of this declaration saw
“the first white man who called himself an Afrikaner... banished in 1707, and he
died a lonely outcast on the west coast of Australia” (2003: 665). Much of this
can be summarised in various and noticeably increasing doses of insecurity that
were bred out of the imposition of colonial life in South Africa at the time.

According to Giliomee, the burghers who settled at the Cape with the Dutch East
India Company were initially citizens of the Netherlands who inhabited the lower
ranks of society. The promise of a new beginning and a better life is what drew
them to Southern Africa as employees of the Company, burghers of the Cape
and farmers of land in service of the Company’s economic endeavour, which
ensured a supply of food to ships at the Cape and the survival of burghers, their
existence at the Cape colony depending on food production.

Company policy instructed that officials be exempted from supplying the market
for this very reason: “If ... a coterie of officials and wealthy burghers – cornered
the market, the ordinaryburghers’ link with Cape Town and the small towns would have been cut, and the burgher-dominated system of local administration and defence might have disintegrated.” (2003: 23) However, when by 1705, a third of farming land was owned by Company officials due to policy inconsistencies, the resulting opulent lifestyle of these officials aggravated the envy of ordinary burghers, thus initiating the first whisperings of distrust amongst the burghers. Of consequence was the eventual migration of what became frontier burghers further inland, spearheaded by the trekboere. Despite the harshness of the region, they “desired no other life. They had turned their backs on Europe and were trying to become indigenous without losing their commitment to European culture and civilisation – a special kind of African” (Giliomee, 2003: 31). As the historian Cornelius de Kiewiet wrote:

"Their life gave them a tenacity of purpose, a power of silent endurance, and the keenest self-respect. But this isolation sank into their character, causing their imagination to lie fallow and their intellects to become inert. Their tenacity could degenerate into obstinacy, their power of endurance into resistance to innovation, and their self-respect into suspicion of the foreigner and contempt for their inferiors." (In Giliomee, 2003: 35)

As such, the beginnings of what Giliomee terms ‘Boer racism’ amongst the burghers unfolds. Up until this point, a notion of the source of the Afrikaner
culture is evident, yet Moodie (1975) views this as really the general basis of the culture:

...events were unimportant except to the extent that they delineated a scant ‘myth of origin’...every Afrikaner knows that Jan van Riebeeck founded the first Dutch settlement in 1652, and that two hundred French Huguenots, fleeing religious persecution in their homeland, followed in 1688. Many Afrikaners believe also that the harsh rule of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape and the hard life on the frontier fostered a spirit of unity and independence within the pioneer settlement. So, according to their creation story, Afrikaners were Calvinists of Western European origin and a nation in their own right before the English.

(Moodie, 1975: 2)

Moodie interprets the Afrikaner in terms of its civil religion which he suggests lies embedded in the Great Trek, which he sees as the eventual result of British occupation at the Cape, “…the national epic-formal proof of God’s election of the Afrikaner people and His special destiny for them” (1975:3). This lay in the pursuit of a pilgrimage of martyrdom which led them out of the Cape Colony, away from British oppression that saw the Anglicization policy at the Cape where the Boers were “excluded from the juries because their knowledge of English was too faulty, and their causes and actions had to be determined by Englishmen
with whom they had nothing in common” (1975:4). Furthermore, the Afrikaners were called out by the British government on their treatment of slaves which the Afrikaners saw as “not so much love for the native that underlay the apparent negrophilistic policy as hatred and contempt for the Boer” (Reitz in Moodie, 1975: 3). Moodie cites Reitz (1900) who wrote of the Boer rebellion in 1815 which lead to the execution of six Boers. The imagery is inciting of cultural nationalism, to say the least, and it is no wonder that a sense of self-preservation and a flight to a ‘promised land’ is what imbues the nature of the then Afrikaner culture.

...six of the Boers were half hung up in the most inhuman way in the compulsory presence of their wives and children. Their death was truly horrible, for the gallows broke down before the end came; but they were hoisted up in the agony of dying, and strangled to death in the murderous tragedy of Slachter’s Nek ...[I]t was at Slachter’s Nek that the first blood-stained beacon was erected between Boer and Briton in South Africa.

(Reitz in Moodie, 1975:4)

The Afrikaners seemed to hold onto a powerful religious belief in a destined promised land and this, alongside a feeling of cultural persecution allows for an understanding of the cultural innuendos within the origins of the Boer. In the event of the Anglo-Boer war, the powerful
imagery of Kitchener’s scorched earth policy, the destruction of their beloved promised land, is what is etched into the cultural mind’s eye of the Afrikaner – an entrenchment of protection, come what may, of the volk, is what encouraged a heightened sense of self-preservation. The existence in 2007 of the music video Delarey, in a multicultural South Africa, is potently reminiscent of this, and that it is still delivered to the white Afrikaner’s cultural senses in post-apartheid South Africa, is worth noting. The Afrikaner’s reign throughout the 20th century was ultimately a culmination of a history that centred itself on a right to cultural survival, which was intrinsically related to a territorial manifestation of identity that pivoted around notions of the right to exist, live and defend their promised land. The eventual achievement of this led to its paranoid obsession and devotion to the protection of this right – an arguable ideological brainwashing as it were that exploited an Afrikaner mind frame that was ripened for just such a cause.

Afrikanerism is a culture that has arrived at the dawn of democracy with what one could term a ‘certain history’. This history is made up of a martyred disposition that speaks of futility, a “fatalistic anticipation of inevitable collective defeat and a mysterious vitality” (Giilomee, 2003: 665). At the dawn of democracy, however, the Afrikaner is faced with the ultimate question of survival – adapt or die. And in this sense, what this research aims to interrogate here is what the survival of Afrikaner identity
entails in a multicultural society. But what is to be made of the Afrikaners’ ‘certain history’ in light of its role in pointing out a certain cultural heritage that is to survive in the new South Africa?

(ii) Afrikaner essentialism

The debate between essentialism and hybridity is of value in coming to grips with the Afrikaner cultural identity in relation to South Africa’s multicultural disposition. This is illustrated in Werbner & Modood’s (1997) *Debating Cultural Hybridity*:

> There are no clear differences between ethnicity, between essentialising discourses of otherness and multicultural identities. All is hybrid... Against this conflation of racism with ethnicity, we interrogate here the difference between a shifting, hybridizing politics of cultural multiplicity (Werbner, Baumann, Hutnyk) and racism as a violating, exclusionary process of essentialism that ultimately seeks to negate ambivalence.

(Werbner, 1997:16)

Thus, in a hybrid society essentialised ideas of culture, ethnicity and even race can be considered as a strategy of identification amidst a multicultural ‘sameness’ that is prescribed by the Rainbow Nation ideal, which in its South
African context strives to allow for cultural diversity. Hybridity assumes the inclusion of cultural activity at work on the margins of society and alludes to relations between cultural identities even to the point where a sense of being is no longer steeped in a singular, easily defined culture, ethnicity, religion or nationality. Identity is blurred, influenced and malleable to the point where terms such as ‘whiteness’, ‘African’ and ‘Afrikaner’ no longer refer to their ‘original’ conceptions. For instance, the term Afrikaner historically makes reference to a generalised identity that is white, anti-colonial, racist even, but an Afrikaner does not necessarily have to be white to be identified as Afrikaans.

Yet, as in most hybrid societies, historical experience dictates a sense of belonging and this reference to heritage is one that operates as a distinguishing force in laying claim to a sense of belonging in relation to an identity of a different historical experience. This sense of belonging could be said to be tied up with a generational idea of identity where time and experience points to the extent of ‘cultural metamorphosis’. For instance, in the case of the Afrikaner identity, a younger generation will have a different, presumably more globalised experience feeding its identity, thanks to access to a globalised sense of place in, for example, social media networks which allows for an identity that transcends national borders and therefore also ‘normalised’ frames of reference in identity formation. In contrast, an ‘older’ Afrikaner’s experience reaches as far back as the apartheid experience.
It is here where a discursive interpretation of time and place is important. The ‘Kill the Boer’ debate signifies a clash of cultures because it negates the claim of an Afrikaner identity as inferred by the term ‘Boer’ to a sense of belonging. The very nature of multiculturalism allows for an existence of minority culture that is the Afrikaner, and the Kill the Boer debate alludes to the pertinent question: what exactly does this existence entail with regards to Afrikaner participation in South Africa, as a territorial homeland which they surely would like to recognise as their own? It is here where discourse of heritage, such as that delivered in the debate, forces the hand of an essentialised sense of being, where the term ‘Boer’ is very much tied to historical experience; where the stance taken in the debate depends on the individual’s experience of South African history. The Afrikaner’s sense of belonging in the new South Africa is threatened by the phrase ‘kill the boer’, which in turn leads to a revival of an essentialised identity that has historically defended its right of existence on South African soil.

On the other hand, those in support of singing "Kill the Boer" lay as much claim to historical significance, in a cultural heritage that identifies with liberation from apartheid. In a multicultural nation state which acknowledges difference, essentialised ideas of race are really an anti-hybridising characteristic that can loosely be termed as a symptom or perhaps an outcome of cultural nationalism.

At the heart of everything we’re trying to achieve in this democracy of ours is our fight against racism and racial divisions and
inequalities. We still call it our national question. It is the special role the universe has given South Africa to play in the world: to prove that in the country where all humanity originated, where racism was perfected as a religious ideology, there can be a positive co-existence of colours and cultures and classes. We are the test tube of all humanity.

(Du Preez, 2005)

In a column entitled “My kinders verdien ‘n Afrikaanse universiteit” (My children deserve an Afrikaans university) in the Rapport (April 1, 2010), Deon Maas uses the Afrikaans language debate to illustrate the essentialist traits that have come to characterise Afrikaans as a cultural identity. He writes that the implied younger generation of Afrikaners (or his children) deserves to be schooled or study at an Afrikaans university, simply because as an official language among eleven others in South Africa, it is allowed, because there is a law that says so. However, he goes on to say the only problem with his children’s right to studying in Afrikaans, is that they are immediately associated with a group of people they have nothing in common with – the stereotypical gun-wielding, khaki-clad Afrikaner or the ‘Reitz Four’ (students at Free State University who filmed an ‘initiation ceremony’ which humiliated workers at the university). Maas criticises Afrikaans universities, saying they are a “breeding ground for those who want to use the Afrikaans language to cloak their racial ideas in a cultural jacket”.

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My children have been raised in a house where they have been exposed to other influences. Afrikaans isn’t something they need to discuss; it’s simply what they are.

(Rapport, April 1, 2010)

Maas asserts that Afrikaans is a medium of communication, not a political statement; that ‘Afrikanerism’ is not an identity but a language – something that is fluid, moveable and that can be independent of cultural affiliation. He proposes that a true Afrikaner is one that is forward-thinking and who deserves the chance to open his mind in the mother tongue – to place his ‘Afrikaner-ness’ within the context of a broader world as a global citizen.

In this case Maas’s article strives to debunk an essentialised social category which has become associated with the Afrikaner cultural identity through a sustained, normalised linguistic construction or discourse. Sue Wright in Van der Waal (2008) indicates that language is “behaviour and has no existence outside the speaker, writer, listener or the reader who uses it” (2008: 56). It is in fact the meaning with which terms like ‘boer’ are injected that leads to a sustained, essentialised interpretation in the event of the coverage of the ‘Kill the Boer’ saga. This meaning-making process is derived from a pre-existing discourse, a system of language that is not “mere reflections of speech actions, but are ideological identity constructions, symbols of ‘imagined communities’” (2008: 56). Van der Waal points out that an imagined community is “a social category. The
members are never all in contact with each other or ever able to know each other, and therefore do not form a real community or a social group.

Newspapers, radio and television help to create the idea of a virtual community and reinforce the assumed definite boundaries in a community of communication" (2008: 60).

From the day that AWB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche’s murder was reported, media coverage sustains these "imagined identities" in order for the particular event to resonate in a certain way with certain segments of South African society. The polarisation of imagined identities – the typified Boer versus ANC Freedom Fighter – through a heritage narrative assumed in the Kill the Boer debate illustrates this. It is then that the Suidlanders’ existence as so called ‘God-appointed guardians’ of this essentialised Afrikaner identity becomes a validated ‘reactive’ essentialism, as the perceived threat that underlines the Afrikaner’s historical narrative is relied on to make sense of these events in mainstream media.

It is clear that social classification and essentialist concepts such as 'nation', volk and 'ethnic group' are very useful for political mobilisation in situations of polarisation such as ethnic competition for access to resources, and even more so in extreme situations such as war and genocide (Van der Waal: 2008, 58).
In *Essentialism in a South African discussion of Language and Culture* (2008), Kees van der Waal makes the distinction between the Saussurean *langue* (language as a system) and *parole* (the spoken variety of language) – which is implied in Maas' article – where "language as a system serves as a model for understanding culture, viewed as a symbolic system similar to a language system" (2008: 57). Van der Waal argues that the problem in focusing on language and culture as structures and formal systems is that it underrates the importance of agency, creativity, contradiction and change. For instance, the reports of Terre'Blanche's murder can be analysed at this structuralist level, where the AWB leader operates as a signifier in relation to his murder on his farm in Ventersdorp by alleged disgruntled farm workers. The event makes sense on a 'prescribed' level of meaning where Terre'Blanche himself becomes a signifier of varied meanings operative in a certain discursive system. Terre'Blanche symbolises the Boer, the oppressor, the white land owner. The word 'murder' in this instance immediately implies 'farm attack' as it took place on his farm, believed to be at the hands of the classic disgruntled farm worker, which can also denote the poor, perhaps unfairly treated black man seeking revenge on his oppressor. Even the word Ventersdorp can play a part as a signifying prop in this mediated narrative that is unconsciously constructed as the details of the murder unfold – the typical South African *dorpie*, home to the khaki-clad, gun-wielding white Afrikaner that Maas speaks of.
The polarisation of the imagined identities is complete when a newspaper screams “Showdown at court” (Witness, April 7, 2010) coupled with two enlarged photos, one of an angry white mob clothed in typical Boer fashion and the other of an equally angry black mob, snarling at each other across the front page. In this presentation of the first court date subsequent to Terre’Blanche’s murder, identities are assumed and adopted by the producers of the media; the roles that members of society are expected to play are inadvertently dictated to them as they take on their stock characters and identities in a storyline that they have come to be so familiar with.

Van der Waal’s argument that language is a system that sustains discourse can be applied here when he writes that these standard forms of language “are not mere reflections of speech actions, but are ideological identity constructions, symbols of ‘imagined communities’” (2008: 56). And it is in the ‘imagined’ world portrayed in media where the Suidlanders operate.

While it can be assumed that most black South Africans will revel in the death of Terre’Blanche, on the other side of the spectrum, the fear of a perceived threat is revived amongst the white Afrikaner. It is in this instance that the proverbial laager is drawn tighter.
(iii) Laager Mentality and Political/Social Participation

"The handful who survived drew themselves up into a small laager on Vegkop (Battle Hill), and trusting in God to defend them, they withstood a second attack of barbarians in numbers of thousands fifteen days later."

(Moodie,
1975:5)

The question of ‘laager mentality’ has remained a consistent means of identification of the Afrikaans culture. Since the ultimate objective of my dissertation is to understand and perhaps even estimate the viability of the Afrikaans culture in democratic, multicultural South Africa, it is important to consider the political implications that post-apartheid South Africa may have for citizenship and participation in both politics and its society, particularly those on the margins of political and public influence.

Similarly, coming to grips with the nature of the Afrikaner culture that chooses to ‘frequent’ the safety of the laager as it were, also comes in to play. In Afrikaner Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Fourie makes the distinction between that Afrikaner who is hesitant to step out into the unknown realms of a new South Africa (the verkrampte or narrow-minded) and the Afrikaner who is ready to embrace the notion of being able to identify with an identity beyond that of Afrikanerism (verligte or enlightened):
an orthodox, traditionalistic, archaic Afrikaner who fears the present
and the future, who wants to resurrect a colonial past long gone,
and a grown-up Afrikaner who supports reform because he knows
that apartheid was an utopia, that the old past is gone forever, and
that a future for the Afrikaner can only be built if he is prepared to
accept the South African society in its totality, i.e. that group
identities are safeguarded by means of self-governance, so that
‘South Africa’ eventually can speak with one voice to the outside
world...The emphasis has thus shifted from race to ‘civilised
values’.

(Van Jaarsveld in Fourie, 2008:253)

From this point then, the value of a comparison between what I would term the
‘Delarey-generation’ and the seemingly traditional Afrikaner which is portrayed in
the Suidlander DVD seems paramount to contextualizing this dissertation.
However, it must, in addition, be investigated why there remains an atmosphere
of ‘laager mentality’ amongst the traditional Afrikaner (which in this case can refer
to the general collective of the older generation of Afrikaner). It is at this stage
where the importance of a discursive interpretation of the Suidlander DVD must
be emphasised which could prove useful in relation to current discourses
concerning South Africa in general, i.e. affirmative action, equity employment, the
crisis in Zimbabwe, and at the forefront of current discourse, the latest debacle
of the ‘Kill the Boer’ song sung by Julius Malema, which was followed by the
murder of Terre'Blanche, ruffling the feathers of many with or without right wing
inclinations. In the unfortunate turn of events, the conspiracy theory of white
genocide, founded in the gore that has become synonymous with farm attacks
and naturally alleged by white extremists, reached mainstream media during a
week in which newsrooms were at pains to tone down any sensationalist
tenclivities that could spark the fractious racial relations at the time. Needless to
say, until then the alleged conspiracy had been swept under the proverbial carpet
as an ill-founded inability to adhere to the good intentions of the Rainbow Nation
cause. Its resultant connection to the Afrikaner's minority identity complex is what
underpins the idea of laager mentality.

This begs the question: is the Afrikaans culture itself able to provide a platform of
cultural participation for its 'members' on a multicultural level? Did it ever have
this capacity to begin with? Surely there is more to a culture than its religious
preferences and the language spoken. For instance, when a group of Afrikaans
youths viewed the music video Delarey it "did not seem to have the same stirring
effect on the younger group as it had on the older group. The younger group did
identify with the culture portrayed in the video in that it merely spoke to them in
their language, reminding them of their history" (Lategan, 2007:51). This
contributes to the theoretical context of the dissertation in that it questions the
dynamism and cultural complexity of the Afrikaner culture. The rationale behind
this challenge entails the origins of the culture and whether it does in fact make
room for individual expression within its realms.
Afrikaner nationalism emerged as an ethnic process amidst the broader conditions of interacting and competing forces during the period of British imperialism. Ethnicity is always a process of identity formation that occurs between two or more social identities that oppose each other.

(Van der Waal, 2008:61)

This suggests that the Afrikaner culture has based its formation in opposition to other cultures, leaving the fibres of its identity lacking in intricacy of character. Culture as is portrayed through the Afrikaner (as white, Christian) resonates with the notion of culture that "emphasises the boundaries of separate entities that were seen as being homogenous, static ... with a set of essentialist qualities and lists of characteristics" (2008:59). In the context of hybrid societies, culture is seen as "something diverse, differentiated, fluid and in process, even contaminated ... There is an interest in the specific historical process of culture formation; in fact, the emphasis is on culture as a verb ('culturing') rather than a noun" (2008: 60). If this is the case, then,

As for Afrikaans, its promotion, to the extent that it is desirable and practical, has to be done in full consciousness of the larger political and economic context. Webb (2002: 247) poses the important question of how Afrikaans speakers can contribute to equity,
democratisation and development in South Africa. What rights can Afrikaans speakers expect in the context of 10 other language categories? ... In order to get rid of the myths of purity and essentialism that are crippling successful dialogue, it is necessary to embrace variety and process in their place.

(Van der Waal, 2008:71)

This extends to the idea of the Self versus the Other, on which Afrikaner culture, it could be argued, is fundamentally based. "The typification of the Other has a determining influence on individuals' definition of the Self and their behaviour. By defining the Other's role beforehand, the individual takes on a predefined role" (Fourie: 2008, 245). For the Suidlanders, there prevails a group mindset that lives in fear of an ever-present perception of a threat which has become their social reality, and this social reality is reliant on taken-for-granted perceptions of an enemy. "The truths held by the in-group are a 'matter of course' and 'self-evident', while the ways of the Other are looked at with 'repugnance, disgust, aversion, antipathy, hatred or fear'" (Fourie, 2008: 245).

So then, what is a 'real' Afrikaner? From what can be deduced when referring to its historic development, so far it alludes to the following:

Nationalism was built into the Afrikaner's social being as a kind of instinctive mechanism to prevent absorption by the English on the
one hand and miscegenation with black people on the other (Van Jaarsveld in Fourie, 2008:19). An important aspect of this nationalism was the theological justification thereof: To be an Afrikaner was to be a Christian, resulting in the concept of Afrikaner Christian nationalism. Combined with being in Africa, the Afrikaner’s Christianity manifested in two ways: (1) being part of a chosen people with a mission, and (2) while guardianship of an inferior black population.

(Fourie, 2008:249)

In order for the Suidlanders to offer cultural functionality, in their capacity as an extreme right wing identity measured according to a multicultural, democratic political continuum, they would have to declare themselves a minority (which they already are anyway). As far as democratic representation goes, if a culture were to remove itself entirely from these realms of categorisation, then they would have declared themselves really only unto themselves – existence as an insular cultural body. However, in considering laager mentality, as the quote above also confirms, a laager was a means of protection against overpowering forces in numbers, and the Voortrekkers’ only chance at survival was by surrounding themselves with their wagons which created an impenetrable barrier against the onslaught of the Matabele tribe. It must be borne in mind that this protection or cordonning off from society, as the Suidlanders or the folk in Oranje are currently subscribing to, does not necessarily mean complete isolation. It merely suggests insecurity in response to that which lies beyond the boundary of the laager.
Insecurity in what, one might ask? Most certainly, the Voortrekkers were drawing barriers around them to survive. To suffer from laager mentality today would of course, relate to cultural survival. In post-apartheid society, cultural 'laagerism' would perhaps suggest protection against absorption into society until the Afrikaner culture is no longer recognised purely within its traditional perimeters. Adapt or die, was the question faced by Afrikaners prior to the elections. It is now still an important factor that affects confidence in 'black rule', as affirmative action and farm attacks that are so vividly connected to Voortrekker days see a white flight to 'greener pastures'. Some ventured beyond the cultural constraints of the laager, while others found comfort in belonging on the safe side of the wagons.

Laager mentality is the counter-heritage that will remain in contrast with the current dominant ideological heritage or narrative that is held in the notion of multiculturalism. Laager mentality is a negative reaction to an invitation to share difference in heritage in the same geographical location.

(iv) Multiculturalism, Heritage & South Africa

Consider this: if one were to stand on any bit of South African soil today, it is well worth noting that you were standing on top of centuries' worth of heritage. The heritage of what has gone before you lies as a cushion of reference beneath the weight of your heritage that you offer to the pile. Heritage is a signifying system of symbols that imbibes a sense of self in a historical adaptation to a physical
location. It is through this relation of the self to the place in which you find yourself that heritage operates: "People call upon an affinity with places, or at least, with representations of places which, in turn, are used to legitimate their claims to territory" (Ashworth et al, 2007: 5). This was overtly apparent with the first white man who claimed to be an Afrikaner – a white African, a notion that saw him as identifiable according to his existence on African soil. Of course, as we have seen, this was followed by the idea of an 'Afrikaan' culture, arguably as indigenous a tribe of Africa as a Zulu or Xhosa would see themselves.

Incidentally, debates regarding claims to African identity by a person of Western origin now characterise multicultural discourse in democratic South Africa today, most certainly as a means of validating a culture’s existence to be as important as the next one, encapsulated within the country’s second democratic president Thabo Mbeki’s I am an African speech, which suggests a multicultural strategy that acknowledges a diverse society. Furthermore, Ashworth et al (2007) argue that heritage is more than merely an imagined representation of any one territorial mark of existence. As I mentioned earlier, the place of heritage is essentially what you make of it, and is most certainly related to the time in which you made something of it.

If individuals create place identities, then obviously different people at different times, for different reasons, create different narratives of belonging. Senses and images of place, which are thus user-determined, polysemic and unstable, must also be related to
senses of time if only because places are in a continuous state of
becoming.

(Pred in Ashworth et al, 2007: 6)

In this case, as is currently in progress in multicultural South Africa, heritage is a
dynamic means of creating narratives of belonging suited to continuously
evolving societies. It is quite clear that the formation of Afrikaner culture can be
directly located as a place identity, linked furthermore with its affiliation to its civil
religion, and its medium of expression within the Afrikaans language, all of which
is deeply rooted in the Afrikaner's experience upon African soil.

However, to acknowledge cultural identity as such, leads to the inevitable
question of the purpose of culture, which is a problematic notion to engage with.
Mitchell in Ashworth et al (2007) warns against the concept of culture, as one
that is needed to be understood rather than defined in order to be implemented
adequately. What is meant by this, is that culture ought to be acknowledged just
as heritage is, as a 'system of signification', a discourse which alludes to a way of
thinking, a way of associating practice with a cultural identity, and this association
can also presume identity. "Culture is a level, or sphere, or domain, or idiom; but
it is also a way of life. Culture is clearly language – or 'text' or 'discourse' – but it
is also the social, material construction of such things as 'race' or gender'.
Culture ... is politics" (Ashworth et al, 2007: 7).
Thus, if culture is a signifier of political representation, which is very much the case with the Afrikaner culture, then the notion of culture can only serve the purpose here of suggesting an essentialist fathoming of belonging. What I mean by this is that white Afrikaner identity as an entity relies on a discursive system that is embroiled in race and ethnicity. Furthermore, one can only think of the self in opposition to another race or ethnicity, as is the political nature of culture. Without one, the other cannot conceptually exist. Hence, with the inception of multiculturalism, an all-encompassing culture adheres to a role of distinguishing, through ideas of belonging and so also through heritage, between one culture and the next. It can be assumed that the establishment of an integrated multicultural heritage will follow in order to establish a national identity that is able to encapsulate those identities within the Rainbow Nation. Like culture, the notion of heritage brings about a navigation of inclusion and exclusion in making sense of cultural heritage. Its place in the form of identity within the discourse of multiculturalism is linked to the idea of democracy and its quantitative means of representation, in that power in number relates to power of representation, a majority-right-of-way as it were. It must be kept in mind that multiculturalism is a convenient strategy in the somewhat superficial accommodation of pluralized identity in post-apartheid South Africa.

Yet, what is multiculturalism? An understanding of multiculturalism is needed in order to evaluate its effectiveness as such, and as an integrative cultural strategy in the South African nation-state. According to Ashworth et al (2007), to define
multiculturalism becomes problematic as the conceptualisation and its practice is ambivalent in nature. Reasoning with multiculturalism entails the conflicting tension between the recognition of diversity "driven by liberal concerns over an insistence on 'parallel lives' and a concomitant failure to assert and prioritise key national values" and the right of different cultures or ethnic groups to "remain distinct rather than assimilating to mainstream norms" (Ashworth et al, 2007: 14).

The prefix 'multi' in front of cultural implies only that there is more than one culture: it is a quantitative measure which says nothing about the relative qualitative valuation or social roles of the cultures, let alone anything about the relationships between the constituent cultures in such a society. The 'how much and how many?' questions have two dimensions. First, there is the number of members needed to constitute a group, which could be resolved by a fairly arbitrary choice along a scale from an all inclusive unity to an individual atomisation ... Second, how important should the contribution of any such groups be within a society in order to earn recognition in this way? Either some weighting is introduced which favours some groups over others, or all are presumed to make an equal contribution.

(Ashworth, 2007: 16-17)
The concept of multiculturalism is further problematised in a democratic society where majority vote is often deemed to threaten spaces of identification for minority groups. Minority group Solidariteit responded to the Beeld interview with Zuma, in which he encouraged Afrikaners to find a psychological safe haven in the new South Africa, by saying:

Zuma rightly points out that it is more difficult for Afrikaners, as a group that is spread across South Africa, to find a regional safe haven as it is for him as a Zulu. The Afrikaner reality is true for numerous groups in the world who as minorities do not have regional safe havens. That is why the United Nations (UN) ... have long since taken this problem into account and has developed certain standards. The core of these best practices are that governments not only tolerate these groups, but that it is the duty of the state to help create these safe havens that the president speaks of. Similarly, these governments are forbidden from removing or taking over these safe havens that minority groups already have. The goal of these international standards is to ensure that the rights of cultural communities are respected and that they receive the necessary power and resources to realise these rights. Otherwise minorities will only have the power to decide on paper rights. This means that constitutions and governments are to provide for the cultural freedom of these groups so that all can feel at home in a multi-ethnic country ... A minority can only come into its own
right if it also has a say in the spaces where it is in the majority.

(Flip Buys & Henk Schalenkamp in *Beeld*, February 22, 2011)

The article argues that transformation policies which result in the changing of Afrikaans-medium institutions or schools to English are interpreted as a systematic breaking down of ‘cultural treasures’ that threatens the so-called safe havens in which Afrikaners are able to practice cultural freedom, operating as democratic exclusion rather than inclusion.

With the Afrikaner’s relinquishing of power, it is no novel idea that majority rule would see the Boers left at the bottom of the democratic food chain. Yet, in relation to the assimilation of a multicultural heritage, it could be said that the importance of Nelson Mandela’s role in the country’s transition became the Afrikaner’s next cultural signifier. Like the Voortrekker monument in Pretoria, the black president who bore the number six jersey of their beloved rugby team, was entrenched as the iconic ‘heritage’ that would allow the Afrikaner to step out into the new South Africa with some sense of security in belonging. The question remains, however, what the implications of this belonging in the new South Africa would be for the Afrikaner culture. Surely, with the advent of assimilating into the new South Africa, an insular culture is no longer a viable means of participation.

It is here where the concept of multiculturalism falls short of directing the way to parallel co-existence. The acknowledgment of difference that lies embodied in
the Rainbow Nation signifier is a homogenising difference, so eradicating it in the process. Of course, what complicates the creation of a pluralized heritage in South Africa, is an inherited dilemma that concerns “the unequal nature of the starting point for the construction of the rainbow nation ... The resulting paradox is that the rainbow model, with its central concept of equality of treatment, can only be brought into existence by the, at least temporary, implementation of unequal treatment” (Ashworth et al, 2007:196). The misfortune of this is that in the meantime, a counter discourse arises via the minority whites which makes complete sense, particularly in relation to the personalised heritage of the white Afrikaner, which sees an essentially reverse apartheid eroding away at the already flimsy morale of pluralized heritage and its consequent national identity. This can be identified in the introduction of Black Economic Empowerment (affirmative action), which essentially sees a ‘fast-tracking’ of black employees to speed up the process of having the previously disadvantaged groups (blacks) restored to an even footing of opportunity with the considered ‘previously advantaged’ whites, who benefited from similar if not more blatant policies during the Nationalist Party rule. Of course, to the disempowered white minority, this does not ring true with the Rainbow Nation ideal.

Counter discourse or narrative, according to Roger Hewitt, is: “arguably an expressive instrument of any individual or group experiencing discursive exclusion and perceived injustice ... This is evident in the white working-class groups who see themselves as being invisible in the ideological market place and
see instead a multicultural discourse that validates the very groups that appear to threaten them." (2005:69)

At its most base level, a South African example of this counter-narrative is clearly detected and merely enforces a recurring cycle of essentialist rhetoric that underlies racist narratives of belonging which the notion of multiculturalism was supposed to dispel, and the reinforcement of the self in relation to the other is entrenched once more on racist lines.

The counter narrative presented by the Afrikaner comes to a head in the Kill the Boer debate when heritage of both the Boer and the freedom fighter clash for right of legitimacy. The Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations (FAK) chairperson, Professor Danie Goosen told the Equality Court in Johannesburg during the kill the boer hate speech trial that the song “is seen as a threat to [the Afrikaners’] symbolic connection to South Africa. This ‘kill the boer’ concept creates a problem between the majority and the minority” (The Witness, Friday April 15, 2011). He continued that ‘Kill the Boer’ is experienced by the Afrikaners as an utterance which places the ideals of the Afrikaner in a difficult space, and that the song comes from a deep-seated insensitivity which reveals that the majority does not understand the problems of minority groups. At the same time, ‘Kill the Boer’ can also operate as a signifier of the black South African as it marks the historical narrative as presented in the Freedom
struggle for the relief from the oppression of the Boer's apartheid. Yet, for
the Afrikaner, the term 'Boer' refers to the cultural tie to his land which he
defends against any form of perceived threat, be it the English onslaught
or the black.

By the same token, the significance of Mandela and his imminent death
for the Suidlanders can also be seen as a perceived threat to the
Afrikaner's existence in the new South Africa. As Freedom Front Plus
leader Pieter Mulder said: “South Africa needs a ‘Mandela atmosphere’
and not a ‘Malema atmosphere’” (The Witness, 15 April 2011).
Chapter 3: A culture of fear

In previous chapters I mention the Witness’ presentation of the Eugene Terre’Blanche “Showdown at court” report following his murder. The polarisation of black and white was an event that required no “sexing up” as it were, as it was something that was truly at play. However, what follows is a brief discussion of the relationship between media and the societies they serve; it takes into account that media reflect social discourse and so also then become the source of social discourse to the point where contexts of meaning-making cannot escape themselves, creating an all-encompassing vacuum in which production and reception of events are trapped within a dominant, overriding discourse. Of course, most news stories have human fear, a basic and instinctive emotion, as their central selling point. David L. Altheide (1997) examines the marketability of fear in mass media, a “fear machine” that employs fear through “problem frames” to instill normalised and accepted perceptions that danger permeates everyday existence. Events are presented though fear as an ideological framework and it is through this framework that they are received and accepted as everyday reality, and that fear becomes the overriding discourse. It is through these frames that societies recognise the “problems of the world”.

The Suidlanders are an acute example of a society’s relationship with its conditions of existence and the media reflection thereof; there is a fear discourse at play which becomes an ideological framework in which to make sense of reported events of South Africa’s ‘problems’ – which media are duty bound to
report – until a self-imposed victimizing sees rationality beyond discourses of fear in a state of paralysis.

The Suidlanders DVD re-presents a discourse of fear; it is an understanding, an interpretation of fear which for South Africans as a whole is particularly characteristic of everyday living, a state of being that has become a part of what it is to be South African as much as braaing or our accent is in the way of national identity. Fear is entrenched in a conscious and eventually subconscious sense of living detectable in the installment of alarm systems, preferring air-conditioned cars to an open window, avoiding suspicious areas and even people out of fear of exposure to an anticipated criminal threat. Fear is much like faith in its belief in the unseen, that there is something ‘out there’, an anticipated threat that becomes an accepted fact. Fear, of course, is human and real, but it is the perception of danger or threat that is just that – perception. All societies and nations experience fear of some kind as do communities and individuals. It comes in various forms that are encapsulated in some form of terrorism or other, for instance, America’s ‘War on Terror’, and even the so called township phenomenon of xenophobia which centres on a general mistrust of foreigners because they pose a threat to already scarce job opportunities for poverty stricken South African nationals. South Africans’ conscientiousness when it comes to security is noticeable and even foreign to non-South Africans when considering the dogged looking-over-ones-shoulder existence. Leaving a door unlocked or a gate open is almost unthinkable, even horrifying, so much so that
not only has security become deemed as necessary as running water, but fear itself is a lucrative emotion and a very viable commodity.

The commodification of fear is clearly apparent in the newsworthiness of crime reporting as it capitalises on the maximum impact of a gruesome murder or theft that is accompanied by violence. Of course, in many instances crimes are associated with race which will then further operate hand in hand with fear of the other; an unseen but accepted and expected danger that almost certainly lurks beyond an electric fence or a garden wall, to which a face must be put. In the event of Terre’Blanche’s murder the news value of crime increases almost solely because of race, in that its impact resonates with readers as fear of crime, the black other (farm workers) and even an anticipated cold blooded vengeance for apartheid. These are all identifiable rationales that add to the tangibility of people’s fears – making this fear reasonable and even justifiable. This is brought about by a normalised handling of the issue of fear, where historicised discourse has laid the foundations of this fear rationale that can be traced throughout South African history.

For instance, the death of a victim who was familiar with his/her murderer, a relation, is almost incomprehensible as it defies the logic in modes of understanding a crime, codes or typecasts that offer avenues to make sense of an act of violence; but a farm attack or particularly violent burglary, on the other hand, is conceivable, understandable even as roles are applied to perpetrator
and victim. There is also a strange satisfaction when acts of crime validate perceptions of groups, such as the colonial/white assumption that blacks are criminal, violent, even savage.

At this junction it is important to understand that whether a reader is liberal-minded or an extreme rightwinger, the same modes of production are used in the AWB leader’s murder to ensure that the news report has resonance and impact. These modes are familiar and so deeply entrenched that they become a part of an unquestioned and taken for granted context. The same plays on fear are present in the Kill the Boer issue that had already begun to mould reception in an already continuous preparation of how the Terre’Blanche crime report would be received weeks later.

The Suidlanders are one of many small pockets of extreme Afrikaners that have internalised this fear culturally, plugging into its cultural history discourse to make sense of their insecurities in the new South Africa – and there is a notable disregard for the fact that black South Africans experience the same fears, quite likely on a more amplified scale when taking into consideration that poverty and living conditions expose them to a more probable threat than would generally be the case in the fortresses of white suburbia.

The issue here is that crime and race have become a key money spinner, particularly in the press, and there are two instances that I would like to highlight
in this section where I argue that the media have fallen into the irresistible trap of sensationalism. First is the murder of AWB leader Terre’Blanche. The news values here are obvious: the old Afrikaner, once powerful and symbolic of a dangerous patriotism, is murdered in a typical South African crime. But the story’s most powerful hook is not in the event itself, but because ANC Youth League leader Malema sang ‘Kill the Boer’ weeks earlier.

The danger lies predominantly in the idea that Afrikaners’ worst fears (usually deemed irrational and unfounded) have come true after all. The spin-offs of the event include a retaliation of the peeved Afrikaner based on the assumption that all Afrikaners would react to the murder because all Afrikaners have been expecting, waiting for the event to take place so that, at last, they can say, ‘We told you so, how much more of this must we endure?’ But not all Afrikaners are of this thinking, and not all Afrikaners define themselves according to this fear discourse. And, of course, no retaliation from the goaded white group occurred. The news values inherent in the ET murder were not concerned so much with what happened, but with what might have happened. In doing so, carefully worded headlines in the South African media only served to amplify the fears of readers, making them legitimate in the most unjustifiable way. It would have been a bold newspaper that chose to bury the ET murder deep in the inside pages (and my question is, why was there no such newspaper?).
In contrast, the Norwegian media’s handling of the Breivik trial shows a sensitivity to insecurities, unfounded or not. The Norway massacre, in which Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people in an Oslo bombing first and then by opening fire at an island youth camp, revealed a similar national issue to the one portrayed in the fractious multicultural new South Africa. Breivik refused to plead guilty, saying the attacks were necessary to stop the “Islamisation” of Norway. While Breivik’s actions were extreme, the Norwegian media refused to broadcast his trial and in doing so recognised the susceptibility of the Scandinavian country’s fears of losing its identity as a result of an Islamic diaspora. While not all citizens of Norway harbour such extreme mentalities over the state of their ‘nationhood’, Norwegian media deemed it in the public interest not to allow Breivik a soapbox for his ideals. This may be for various reasons, including ill feeling, however mild or extreme, towards a perceived Islamic invasion and a subsequent threat to national/cultural purity, and a fundamental recognition that the media creates consciousness, that it can be inadvertently hypnotic, persuasive and pervasive.

Its handling of the massacre in Olso contrasts greatly with that of America’s continued installation of fear of terrorists in the ‘War against Terror’ which has led to consequent unease in relations that has resulted in a general distrust of Islamic citizens in the US. The American press’ dogged focus as well as the government’s agenda in eradicating terrorism has led to a sanctioned abhorrence of anything Islamic in the process of reigniting an American patriotism in the face of the terrorist threat – a result of the 9/11 attack in 2001.
These events are increasingly less subtle proclamations of what can be termed a 21st century fascism that is cloaked in a counter-revolutionary quest, driven by ever-pervasive and varying fear discourses that are skeptical at best of a perceived 'multicultural evil' that threatens/challenges perceptions of a secure society. This quasi-revolution on the part of right wingers in general becomes concerned with freeing themselves from the now 'victorious' societies/communities it once ruled and oppressed, which are now deemed to be the oppressors. It becomes the mission of right wingers, as in the case of the Suidlanders, to take upon themselves the burden of protection against a perceived threatening status quo of, for instance, sexuality, race and/or religion, which was once a task for the state. Breivik, as do the Suidlanders, then poses as an individual who is representative of an imagined community that adheres to fears of a loss of identity and conditions of existence no longer upheld by traditional institutions.

The crucial question that must be applied to fear discourse is one that pits 'lunacy' against extremist logic and draws a paradigm with the idea of 'sensible human discourse'. This brings the moral legitimacy of these fears under scrutiny. To quote a *Los Angeles Times* article by Nathan Lean titled "Norway's sane killer" (Lean, 2012): "Hate is hardly the stuff of lunatics. It is a dangerous political reality with destructive consequences." Breivik is a product of his society in Oslo West, not, as Lean puts it, from "Planet Wacko".
The Mail & Guardian's front page article "Inside a commando camp that turns boys' doubts into hate" (Van Geldes, 2012) reveals another instance when South Africa's culture of fear is illuminated. The Kommandokorps is affiliated with the AWB and the Suidlanders. Young teenage boys without any conception of apartheid, very much children of the Rainbow Nation, are sent to this camp in Carolina, Mpumalanga to become 'real men'. For them, and perhaps even more so for their parents, this 'manhood' means protecting their families. From what, one might ask? This boot camp, orchestrated by an ex-apartheid soldier, Major Jooste, provides the idea of a threat – blacks. The great concern here is when fear itself is really the ultimate threat to the security of living in South Africa. It is not the extremists that pose a threat – how can they in their minority? – but fear itself and its erosion of harmonious societal values and relations among its citizens. The extremism at work here only serves to reveal an ugly underbelly that Afrikaner identity is battling to shake. The article focuses on a nine-day camp during which teenage boys are ultimately brainwashed into hating blacks – including trampling on the South African flag, singing Die Stem, and donning bloodied uniforms of former soldiers. Young boys plucked from the Rainbow Nation incubator, are conditioned to re-enter society post-boot camp as 'men' harbouring hate for their classmates and fellow South African citizens.

The story is alarming for many obvious reasons, but mostly because it reveals a looming danger of the power of irrational fear. Consider that it is not so much the existence of a rightwing mindset in the new South Africa that is newsworthy or
even threatening to society – the time of the large, gun-slinging Afrikaner
cowboys of old has come and gone and can only exist on the extreme fringes of
the democratic society. What is alarming is that the article reflects a nation
captured in a limbo discourse, in which a new generation will always be trapped in
ever-echoing racist thinking.

From apartheid to democracy ‘racism’ has supposedly changed to ‘civil values’.
Civil values? I suspect that there is little difference between the two concepts,
ecept an ineffectual political correctness that does little to mask fractious
relations among South Africa’s ‘races’. Understandably, South Africans have to
start somewhere to fulfill the Rainbow Nation quest, but meanwhile a
schizophrenic dual existence has come to characterise the nature of social
relations. Children, such as those young boys in the Carolina bootcamp, are
captured between the two minds of a past still fresh in the mind’s eye of an older
generation and a new generation born into a society where the notion of
apartheid is or should be irrelevant, inconceivable as they grow into a society
where, the younger the society, the less recollection of a mired, polarized society
there is. But the young always look to their fathers. While the young become
educated, grow up and make friends in now widely accepted multiracial schools,
there are mothers and fathers at home who are not quite as comfortable with ‘the
other’ at such close quarters. The youth of both white and black are caught in a
psychological tussle for the land of their fathers, so to speak, on the one hand,
and the land they indeed presently live in on the other. Inviting a boarding school
friend to stay for the weekend is not quite so cut-and-dry as expected where parents of the opposing divide have to mind their political Ps and Qs while their young are innocently at play.

‘Civil relations’ has replaced outright racism as South Africans attempt to forge an amiable but certainly superficial co-existence as their children share classrooms, school buses and bathroom facilities. The Rainbow Nation marketing ploy that touts a colourful and diverse society is employed to convince tourists and citizens alike that the country has discarded its unpleasant past to the dusty archives of history. In the meantime, children born as products proper of the Rainbow Nation receive mixed signals, while they simply live their day-to-day lives alongside the ‘other colour’ but go home to adult conversations that concern the root of all evil at the centre of a country wrangling with democratic hypocrisy. South Africa’s society is one in which blame is hurled from the poor, illiterate blacks who lap up ridiculous JuJu (Julius Malema’s nickname, commonly known in South Africa) rhetoric to the wily white yet to shed that inherent colonial thrift with which they remain in front of the queue to wealth, despite the guise of equality for all.

Of course, the media cannot be blamed for merely doing its job, but surely the time has come, 19 years since the dawn of the new democracy, for a new discourse, one that is not steeped in a rhetoric of political double standards and
Chapter 4: Research Methodology

My methodological approach entails the analysis of how the Afrikaner is represented in the *Suidlanders Ingliigting DVD2* by locating the discourses of the DVD within the context of the new South African democracy.

I will be drawing on Norman Fairclough’s conception of critical discourse analysis as a primary method in this dissertation in an effort to locate white Afrikaner identity in South Africa today. In doing so, I will also be engaging in a discourse analysis using various print and online media that are of particular relevance to the ‘Kill the Boer’ debate, firstly as matter that informs the social reality of South Africa, but also the interpretations of this social reality according to a group such as the Suidlanders.

Critical discourse analysis is concerned with the systematic exploration of “relationships between causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes”. It investigates “how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles of power” (Fairclough, 1995:32). It is the study of discourse that views language as social practice, where social practice as discourse then becomes an “active relation to reality” (Fairclough, 1992:41).
The Suidlanders' activity in relation to the realities of the new democracy entails a language employed, a discourse, an understanding of themselves, in relation to the South African reality through a fear discourse, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how this group positions itself through this discourse to create a sense of belonging. What is of particular significance here are Fairclough's three characteristics of discourse through which the Suidlanders' social practice can be explored, the operations behind their sense of being. These characteristics are genres, discourse and styles (Fairclough, 2003: 26).

- Genres (ways of acting) can refer to ways of manipulating and framing discourse through, for example, church sermons, interviews and political speeches. The Suidlanders DVD can be categorized as a genre as it serves as the point of discursive communication that provides a framework for an audience to comprehend discourse as both a gathering at one place, and broader communication to viewers of the DVD. Genre is then the epicentre of power, resistance or domination.
- Discourse (representation) is central to the assessment of how the world is understood from different positions that form perceptions of reality.
- Styles (ways of being) refer to how discourse is used to constitute ways of being and identity, ie how identity is revealed through the application/practice of discourse.
In an attempt to pin-point white Afrikaner identity in the new South Africa, this study will also bear in mind the avenues offered through Alfred Shutz’s phenomenological approach, because of its allowance for assumption rather than adhering too stringently to defined disciplines of methodology. “Phenomenology accepts that the world of everyday life is the human being’s fundamental and pervasive reality” (Fourie, 2008: 241), and it firstly concerns itself with man’s ability to give meaning to his actions (Jansen in Fourie, 2008: 240). “Anything that is within us as knowledge ... actually exists and is unquestionable evidence” (Fourie, 2008: 240). Secondly, the phenomenological approach asserts that “man actively and consciously creates his own social reality”, the everyday life-world of the individual. (2008:241).

The purpose of phenomenology is to discover the essence of this every-day life world and “to understand the essence of something is to understand its meaning” (2008: 241). In the same breath, the phenomenological approach takes into consideration that individuals/people take for granted that the experience of ‘social reality’ is a shared site of the lived experience. And in this case, it implies then that “the everyday life world of the individual consists of the shared general knowledge and taken-for-granted interpretations of everyday life ... it functions as a type of reference framework according to which the physical world can be ordered and understood by interpreting and then categorising certain aspects of it” (Fourie, 2008: 242). By the same token, social phenomena do not have an
objective existence, but they do have an essence which affirms their objective validity (Fourie, 2008).

For example, in a farming community there may exist a farmer who has suffered the onslaught of a farm attack. Farmers in the surrounding area will invariably identify with the victimised farmer in that they share an identity that is born of being farmers in the same area, and thus are at the same risk of becoming victims as well. On a grander scale, this communal identification can stretch across a country such as South Africa, by the mere report of another farm attack. The murder of Terre’Blanche saw a flare in animosity between races as it at once pointed to the identification of farmers (who may be either white, Afrikaans, or both) that represent the threatened whites of the country in general, and furthermore almost went so far as to validate fears of eventual extinction at the hand of black majority rule. This validation comes about in the essences that characterise the typification of the Self that “consists of a shared general knowledge and taken-for-granted interpretations of everyday life (the so-called natural attitude)” (Fourie, 2008: 242). “Although individuals find themselves each in their own unique biographical situation, they also exist within a world of shared social meaning – the social stock of knowledge ... [which] is made up of standard recipes or typifications ... generated from certain social structures long before the individual became a part of the structure.” (2008: 242)
Here, the existence of a DVD such as that of the Suidlanders becomes the site of communication (as well as its website) between individuals who take for granted that a common everyday life world is experienced by his/her neighbour, and that these individuals therefore share in the same "social stock of knowledge" which "acts as a socially determined frame of reference for the individual" (Fourie, 2008: 241).

The identity represented in the Suidlander DVD is one that makes sense of its experience through an assumed shared social reality where "experience could not, by definition, be the ground of anything, since one could only 'line' and experience one's conditions in and through the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture ... experience was their effect" (Hall, 1996: 41). This shared "social stock of knowledge" can be viewed then as a discourse, a certain way of making sense of one's social reality. According to Michel Foucault, discourse constructs the frames of reference in which we make sense of our society and culture within a certain production of historical context: "It defines and produces objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others" (Foucault in Hall, 1997: 44).
Chapter 5: Data analysis

"The day Mandela dies we kill the whites like flies" (Suidlanders DVD)

This analysis will go about identifying various discourses that the Suidlanders draw on in their DVD, firstly to validate its production and communication, and secondly (and concurrently) to reinforce a survivalist cultural existence among whites that remains in opposition to the new South Africa. Discourses can include a pervasive crime discourse that justifies a fear of existence as whites in an ANC-ruled country, and draw on heritage discourse that has ties to war and Afrikaner religion that are relied on to suggest a way of cultural survival. What is worth noting from the outset is that the DVD uses events reported in the media – and becomes an event in itself – to reinforce ways of ‘talking about’ and making sense of the South African situation. It is also important to recognise that the gathering portrayed in the DVD operates in very much the same manner as a mid-week prayer meeting or a meeting ahead of a ‘kerk bazaar’ (church fete) in that it is behaviour that is practiced with the concern of cultural ‘being’ at its centre.

The DVD, providing the study with the genre of the analysis, comes across as conversational – albeit a conversation of great importance – and resembles in many ways a casual gathering where a right-wing discourse is at its source. It is here where cultural action is decided, where justification of cultural practice is re-enforced and validated, and where the decision is made to be of a certain cultural
identity in relation to the South African reality. The relationship between media reports and their subsequent discussion, internalisation and interpretation at this gathering is sustained by the media's inadvertent recognition of fears in the new South Africa through the performance of its watchdog role, and by the 'susceptibility' that this particular cultural group suggests in becoming receivers of the reports.

The Suidlanders Inligting DVD is a video recording of Suidlanders leader Gustav Muller in which he delivers a set of 'facts' to an audience that is presumably made up of whites harbouring insecurities regarding their safety of existence in the new South Africa. The DVD serves as a site of communication that is there to offer a validation of sentiments held by a group identity that makes sense of itself and its shared lived experience within a multicultural dispensation. These sentiments are the manifestations of an idea of a social reality that is made 'true' by a heritage narrative that is substantiated in the DVD, which operates within the myth of total black onslaught against whites and that has fed the white Afrikaner's sense of self against the black 'other'.

Muller extracts quotes from press clippings in which political figures and ANC-supporting persons have allegedly alluded to a perceived conspiracy to wipe out the last remaining whites living in South Africa. The day that South Africa's first democratically elected president Nelson Mandela dies is, according to Muller, the 'go-ahead' signal for a planned, synchronised attack on white South Africans.
(Suidlander DVD2). As far as identity is concerned, the relevance of the Suidlanders DVD for white Afrikaners lies within an imagined insecurity that can be said to be rooted in a general distrust of the Rainbow Nation ideal, a term for South Africa’s version of an adopted multicultural nationality. The Suidlanders represent a cultural identity that is sceptical of this strategy and which internalises the illuminations of its flaws within present-day discourse reported in the media to validate a white identity’s perceived threat to its existence and relevance as a minority within an ANC-majority ruled democracy. The DVD draws on an age-old cultural discourse that has permeated the Afrikaner’s sense of self throughout its history that in turn guides white perceptions of themselves as a community with little say in their fate which now hangs, it could be said, at the mercy of black rule.

The content of the DVD reveals a minority discourse counter to dominant sentiments of harmonious existence in a culturally and, for purposes of this dissertation, racially diverse society. The Suidlanders rely on Nelson Mandela as a unifying symbol of South Africa’s diversity; his death has now become representative of a holistic ideal that is threatened by violent crime that is perceived by this group as targeted at them. This is of course, prescribed in the notion of the Rainbow Nation ideal of which Nelson Mandela, it could be said, has become a figurehead for South Africans, more significantly so for the white Afrikaner. But for the Afrikaner, it is in the seemingly imminent death of the former president, iconic of the end of apartheid’s racism, that the ideals of
Mandela’s new South Africa are beginning to wane. As far as the typification of the other in relation to the Afrikaners’ sense of self is concerned, Mandela can be viewed as the “exception to the rule” of the perception of blacks.

“We live in a land which we feel is dangerous – that’s why we are here,” says Muller. He then goes on to compare the role he is playing for the white minority to that of Mandela’s during the freedom struggle against apartheid. He offers a ‘facility’ to “ons volk, ons mense, my volk, u volk” (Suidlanders DVD2).

The leader explains a situation which consists of a ‘kruitvat’ and ‘vonk’ (Suidlander DVD2). ‘Kruitvat’ can be roughly translated to mean a literal barrel of ammunition or gunpowder, while the ‘vonk’ would be the spark that causes the ammunition to ignite. He applies these terms to the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York where the ‘vonk’ was the planes flying into the Twin Towers with the resultant ‘kruitvat’ being U.S. president George Bush’s declaration of war on terror in that it sparked a subsequent conflict situation (Suidlander DVD2). For the Suidlanders, this is analogous to the situation in South Africa, where the issue of crime, such as the brutal attacks on farmers, poses as the Afrikaners every-day experience of ‘terrorism’ which is gradually creating a conflict situation ripening to an explosive peak that will be sparked with the death of Nelson Mandela. The DVD suggests a war conspiracy in this instance; the goading by ‘conspiring black forces’ of white South Africans who are becoming increasingly fearful as crime statistics rise, particularly farm attacks, where a perceived black
terrorism is interpreted as threatening to whites’ ties to South Africa. This links to the Afrikaner's historic war discourse throughout its cultural history that reinstates traditional ideas of white Afrikaner identity: a right to exist in South Africa and a religious calling to protect this existence as such, even if in the face of an overwhelming majority.

A current situation which resonates with this analogy is the murder of AWB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche following ANC Youth League president Julius Malema’s singing of ‘Kill the Boer’. His murder, a farm murder, can be perceived as the assassination of the last of the iconic Afrikaner extremists of old. While his murder can be understood in terms of an expected retaliation against ill treatment of black farm workers, Muller makes his point in the DVD by mentioning the murder of ‘the White Zulu’ David Rattray as symptomatic of the attack on white farmers, contributing to the so-called ‘kruitvat’ condition awaiting an eventual spark (vonk), which can be seen to be antagonising the white community to the point of eventual retaliation. Of course, Terre'Blanche’s murder happened after the production of the DVD, so referring to the murder is done to contextualise the reasoning of the Afrikaner as represented in the DVD.

The significance of Rattray in this case lies in white rhetoric that even though the ‘White Zulu’ – a term referring to a white liberal – embraced and was well-versed in the history and culture of the Zulu, and was fluent in the Zulu language (thus integrated and willing to co-exist in the new South Africa), his ‘whiteness’ and the
fact that he is a landowner still qualifies him to be the target of a brutal farm murder. Sentiments within certain sectors of South Africa’s white community would have it that his murder was driven by the assumption of the black farm labourer’s latent hate of the white ‘baas’.

This can further relate to the sense of futility harboured by a fringe identity such as that which the Suidlanders represent, in their scepticism or even outright refusal to accept the Rainbow Nation ideal for its mandate to exist in free-of-racial-discrimination harmony with the black.

The crime discourse develops into that of conspiracy when Muller claims to have ties with military intelligence, suggesting that he knows more than he lets on, but the day of the white onslaught is known within South African intelligence circles as uHuru, Operation Iron Eagle, Night of the Long Knives and Operation White Clean-up. He also alleges Operation uHuru is being planned in the Kremlin – to the National Party government during apartheid the root of ‘communist evil’ driving the ANC revolution – and its purpose is to kill as many whites in one night as possible. He outlines the operation strategy which begins with the first sign of catastrophe in the fall of Johannesburg – “anarchy which police will not be able to curb”. The siege of all South Africa’s large cities will follow and the “farm attack effect” (rapes, brutal murders) will overlap into the cities (Suidlander DVD2).
According to Muller, former Cosatu president Willie Madishe generates a membership of six to seven million, of which he is presumably referring to its black following, and he questions a phrase which he quotes from an unspecified newspaper article which reads, “Although the Cosatu president may survive the Night of the Long Knives ...” (Suidlanders DVD2). He leaves his quotation here, using it only to suggest that concepts like ‘Night of the Long Knives’ appear to be in common use and deduces a connection to the black mass turning on the outnumbered white nation in South Africa. The idea of being outnumbered can be traced in the white Afrikaner’s self-identification as a persecuted people throughout its cultural history, again alluding to an Afrikaner war discourse that can be linked to its cultural survival as a minority.

Muller draws on an interview in an SABC journalistic programme with Peter Ndoro who interviews a ‘black female guest’ who says, “Uhuru is still on track, most definitely”. Another guest on the programme uses an extract from her poem “Amandla! Uhuru is here”. Ndoro ends the show with, “Thanks for coming in. Uhuru.” With this, Muller aims to assert that Uhuru is certainly a possibility, saying that the title phrases synonymous with Uhuru, as mentioned above, are regionally specific and entails synchronised mass murder similar to that of the Tutsis in the Rwandan massacre. In this instance the crime discourse is extended to a perceived savagery among blacks and can also be linked here to farm attacks. It incorporates discourses that regard blacks as the ‘savage other’, incapable of civilised government or rule.
Muller draws on crime statistics, which according to him, state that in the years 2005/06 22 000 murders and 55 000 rapes were recorded, which he says contribute to the ‘kruitvat’ situation. He says that service delivery strikes are really a smoke screen for orchestrated exercises in the mobilisation of numbers to carry out mass action. Muller points out that no strikes occurred after the 1994 elections until 2005/06, and now they seemingly take place “all the time”. He uses an example of a trucking strike involving Imperial Cargo, which he says was the first protest since democracy in 1994. Within hours, Muller says, drivers were killed, likening it to the Winnie Mandela scandal in the 1980s involving the necklacing of blacks in townships who did not join in the struggle (Suidlanders DVD2). He suggests that the attacks, some apparently involving the chopping off of hands, on union members who do not participate in the service delivery protests, are a means of discipline within the ‘black ranks’ (Suidlanders DVD).

In this manner, the DVD purports Afrikaners’ typification of themselves in its apparent referral to the perceived ‘savage’ nature of the black culture, a colonialist notion that also has ties with both the imperialist prerogative to ‘civilise’ African colonies and the Afrikaner’s Calvinist sense of religious morality which further purported racial ‘othering’ between the white and the ‘heathen’ black throughout history. Fourie (2008:247) speaks of the perceptions of the Voortrekkers of black people who were portrayed as “‘barbarous, predacious, bloodthirsty and treacherous’ (Van Jaarsveld in Fourie, 2008: 247). In addition,
God willed that the children of Ham should remain cursed eternally, as hewers of wood and drawers of water” (Van Jaarsveld in Fourie, 2008: 247).

The Afrikaner’s religious discourse is used in the process of othering in referring to the ‘disciplining within black ranks’ and likening the black onslaught to the Rwandan massacre. The barbaric necklacing, chopping off hands and Rwanda’s massacre are used to substantiate a perceived disregard for human life on the part of blacks – even of their own ‘kind’ – and so on this moral basis the Suidlanders reinforce the idea that the white Afrikaner is superior to the black.

This interpretation can be extended to the whites’ wariness of the numerical power of blacks who are thought to be in constant cohorts in a conspiracy of mass onslaught of a white minority which would presumably be hard pressed to defend itself against the harnessed ‘savagery’ of such mass proportion as that which mass strike action seems to pose for the Suidlanders. Of course, this fear of the blacks’ ‘power-in-numbers’, which threatened white minority rule during the apartheid regime, can be said to have been for Afrikaners realised in the ANC’s coming into power in 1994. Thus, for the Suidlanders, mass action is not viewed as a democratic right in post-1994 South Africa, but rather an action which is reserved for black behaviour – unruly, anarchistic and savage that overpowered the control of the Nationalist Party.
Muller uses the Afrikaans phrase “Jakkals verander van haar maar nie van snaar” (Suidlanders DVD2), which is the equivalent of the English phrase “A leopard doesn’t change its spots”, to say that the blacks’ racist sentiments have not changed from what they entailed pre-1994, despite the ‘coat of democracy’. Of course, it is a universal truth that a ‘Jakkals’ (a fox or jackal) is a creature that cannot be trusted. And this distrust of the black culture can, for the Afrikaner, be traced back to the battlefields in South African history of which, incidentally, the late David Rattray was a world renowned expert. The Battle of Blood River bares testament to the brutal onslaught the Boers suffered at the spears of the mighty Zulus, and this is further linked to the treacherous murder of Piet Retief and company who were lured into the kraal of Zulu King Dingaan on the pretext of peace talks and land negotiations.

In using the Afrikaans saying above, there is seemingly an allusion to the Afrikaans heritage narrative or its historical discourse that is tied up to its constant battle for survival in Africa alongside Africans. Muller questions the merits on which black/ANC rule is to be trusted, suggesting that whites are lambs to the slaughter who have been lulled into believing that they have come to co-exist in a multicultural society that is the new South Africa.

The Suidlanders leader recalls a Rapport article which reported that 1 300 black soldiers were mistakenly loaded off in Mozambique on their way to military training (Suidlanders DVD2). “Training for what? Is there war?” Muller asks,
before he explains four phases of war which he relates to current activities in South Africa, the first of which is mobilisation using the trade union strikes and the influx of illegal immigrants into the country from its neighbours. Secondly, he deems farm attacks (over 2 000 farmers have been brutally murdered, he says) a form of terrorism. Thirdly, he blames guerrilla warfare, which he says consists of groups of 20 to 30 members, for transit robberies and ATM bombings, and recalls that the ANC used these methods to fund their cause during the freedom struggle. Furthermore, he relays an incident, the time of which he does not specify, in which taxis blocked the R54 out of Johannesburg heading for Vereeniging. He points out that this route has no townships or squatters and offers a "clean way out" of the city, presumably a safe escape route for whites who would naturally take great pains to avoid ‘dodgy’ areas where ‘criminal black folk’ are likely to lurk. Muller alleges the incident was an exercise in breaking down access to infrastructure, including access to petrol stations, which would cripple attempts at fleeing.

The South African crime discourse can be detected here, firstly in the perception that crime is the root of a black conspiracy, and secondly in the paranoia brought about by fear that has become intrinsic to the South African social consciousness and way of life in a country with alarming crime statistics. While a group such as the Suidlanders will perceive crime as a social ill inherent in the black culture and an attack on whites – which is also how the apartheid government validated minority white rule during the South African revolution – it can also be deemed a
social illness stemming from poverty among those who are yet to receive the benefits of being ‘free’ in the new South Africa.

Muller paints a picture of an ANC-ruled state seemingly unsupportive of the white man’s plight. In the *Standerton Advertiser*, Muller says, it was reported that a commando facility was shut down without replacement. He also points out that, according to legislation, a rapist for instance cannot be shot ‘in the act’ and that by insisting on private gun licences, the state is disarming whites of defence weapons. He advises members not to hand in their guns to police stations, but to keep them instead as protection against crime. The ANC government’s apparent inability to address crime reciprocates a feeling among whites that, with the dawn of democracy, their rights would be cast to the wind in favour of forwarding the interests of ‘previously disadvantaged’ black South Africans, further ‘legitimising’ white fears that relate to the crime conspiracy as vengeance for the previously disadvantaged black.

With the high crime rate in South Africa a crime discourse has developed that is threatening to debunk the viability of a reconciliation discourse or the Rainbow Nation ideal. The importance of Nelson Mandela for whites, especially white Afrikaners, is worth noting at this junction. As much as he is iconic in the release from apartheid oppression of black South Africans, for whites his apparent imminent death could also mean the death of a democratic ‘protection’ of whites within a black majority-ruled country. His role in white heritage narrative is
significant in that he stood for an equality that sought to free whites of their role as oppressors in the new South Africa and, in doing so, rid whites of guilt for oppressing black South Africans. His vision of a society free of racial discrimination holds much stock in the sense that it would theoretically release ‘race’ in South Africa from its stereotypes of white and black, oppressor and oppressed.

More importantly, his vision arguably sought to discourage the seeking of revenge on the part of black South Africans. In any event, tit-for-tat justice would have been a natural impulse in correcting the proverbial ‘ills of the past’. Here I am referring to black exclusion from a ‘privileged’ existence afforded to whites courtesy of apartheid rule which was founded on the self-assumed superiority of the white race in relation to the ‘sub-human’ black. This was apparent in the notion of Bantu education, the group areas act, and so on, which sought to nurture a separatist development of whites, instilling a ‘right of way’ for whites to prosper during the reign of the National Party at the expense of black claims to basic human rights. Of course, it is inevitable that corrective policies would have to be put in place to fast-track black South Africans’ development before they can be considered to be on an even footing with their fellow, if somewhat paler, compatriots. BEE and other such transformation policies could be seen as a small price to pay as far as whites are concerned if it meant easing a niggling guilt going into the new democracy.
The Kill the Boer debate encompasses everything the white Afrikaner fears in the new South Africa. For them it illuminates a threat to their cultural existence as whites, their historical significance post-apartheid, a threat which, it can be said, is personified in the figure of Julius Malema, the former ANCYL president. Malema for the Afrikaner poses as the anti-thesis of Nelson Mandela, who in his inaugural speech in 1994 said; "The time for healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. The time to build is upon us" (Dlanga: 30 March, 2010).

There is another discourse at play here for black youth in South Africa that has come to be a way of making sense of a perceived anarchistic younger generation led by Malema who are deemed to be in political defiance of the so called wisdom of freedom struggle stalwarts that are now in power. This is probably most clear in the ANC's eventual disciplinary action against Malema that resulted in his expulsion from the ANC after he called for regime change in Botswana, saying that its government was a "puppet" for imperialists who were "undermining the African agenda" (Duncan Kgankenna in The Botswana Gazette: August 3, 2011). Malema was charged for creating dissent in the ANC, and it is interesting that his charge came about after using anti-colonial rhetoric to do so.

Malema reverts to a colonial discourse in asserting that wealth promised with the coming of the new South Africa is still reserved for ever-remaining prosperous white elite, and if not white, a small posse of the rich. His insistence on the
nationalisation of South Africa’s mines similarly positions the state of the economy in a juxtaposition of capitalism and communism via colonial discourse. For the young black generation he becomes the figurehead of a youth who will assert their entitlement to prosperity in the new dispensation, where the ruling ANC who is hesitant to nationalise the country’s mines are deemed to be a part of an elite, capitalist rich who are depriving an impoverished, jobless youth of opportunities. And so, Malema and his youth following appear to be not only in defiance of ANC rule, but also become an entity in South Africa that is deemed uncontrollable, violent and dissenting.

Malema’s ‘Kill the Boer’ negates Mandela’s setting of the ‘Rainbow Nation status quo’ by reiterating those very racial stereotypes that the country’s first democratic president sought to debunk. The ability of the struggle song to stir up racial tension afresh lies in the recreation of the characters of apartheid: the boer, the white landowner, the oppressor, the embodiment of apartheid. More importantly, it places the boer as of old in its stock position of a land owner who must defend his essence of existence that is his land against the threat of black vengeance. In doing so it naturally refreshes the character of an oppressed black people and Khaya Dlanga, in a News24 column, similarly wrote that the singing of ‘Kill the Boer’ in the new South Africa negates the fact that since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, blacks are masters of their own fate, that singing the song places their fate anew in the hands of the white. “This oppression was in fact the direct reason the song came in to being in the first place. Had there
been no apartheid, no brutality against peoples of colour, the song would never have had a reason to exist ... This song only serves to tell black people that they remain in bondage. It tells them to be angry at something they have already overcome" (Dlanga, 30 March 2010).

In the singing of ‘Kill the Boer’, Malema symbolises the realisation of an ever-present fear that the black nation will eventually rise up to take back what is deemed owed to them, in the form of a ‘reverse-apartheid’. In a Daily Maverick column, Kevin Bloom recalls the historical significance of the ‘Kill the Boer’ song, which offers the analysis here the context from which ‘Kill the Boer’ was born:

On a Saturday morning in winter 2002, scores of luxury sedans descended onto what was then known as the University of the North in Mankweng, outside Polokwane. In the cars were struggle veterans, government ministers and many of the icons of the ANC – amongst them former president Nelson Mandela, president Thabo Mbeki, deputy president Jacob Zuma, and "mother of the nation" Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Formal proceedings had begun at 7am at the nearby home of the deceased, and emotions had been building for hours. When Limpopo premier Ngoako Ramathodi announced that the coffin of Peter Mokaba had arrived in the university’s stadium, the crowd spontaneously erupted into a chant of "Kill the boer, kill the farmer".
It was a refrain that Mokaba had first uttered at a Chris Hani memorial rally in Cape Town in 1993, during the explosive months when it seemed possible that South Africa would descend into all-out race war. On that day Mokaba, the then president of the ANC Youth League, galvanised his organisation's deep anger at Hani’s murder by rightwing whites into something concrete: a song that perfectly (and terrifyingly) expressed the anger.

Race war was averted, thanks in large part to the efforts of Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, but nine years later, around the time of Mokaba’s funeral, there was still a community in South Africa who believed they were being targeted and killed because of the colour of their skin. These were the boers themselves, the white farmers, and they had the numbers to back themselves up.

A Dutch journalist by the name of Adriana Stuijt, a former anti-apartheid activist, was quoted saying the following after the funeral of Mokaba: “Why has the South African farmer become the world’s most endangered species? Why are South Africa’s few remaining commercial farmers now most at risk of being murdered in the whole world? They are being murdered at 264 per 100,000 population group. It is the highest in the world! A Nedbank probe recently described these farm attacks as ‘deliberately targeting specific homesteads to kill the Afrikaner victims.’”
Stuijt also pointed out that if these “vicious” farm murders had occurred in Zimbabwe, they would be global news. She felt that post-apartheid South Africa was somehow immune to the truth of what was going on in the platteland.

A further eight years later and, for reasons nobody can quite explain, another leader of the ANC Youth League rolled out the “kill the boer” slogan, although this time in a slightly different form. In protest, Afrikaner lobby group Afriforum took a petition to the ANC’s head offices in Johannesburg – along with the petition, they handed over a list of 1,600 recent victims of farm attacks in South Africa. The Youth League’s response was to throw the list into the gutter and trample on it.

(Bloom: 29 March, 2010)

For whites, and for the Suidlanders whose sense of cultural affinity is tied to the threatened existence of the Boer in relation to brutal farm attacks perceived to be motivated by racial hatred of an oppressor who robbed a black nation of their land and left them an impoverished people, Malema represents an increasingly frustrated people who are yet to reap the benefits of the ANC’s coming into power. The ANC Youth League leader’s insistence to reclaim white-owned land and nationalise mines resonates with whites as a ‘Zimbabwe-like’ annexation of whites’ right to existence in the rising of a neo-apartheid movement. Furthermore, it also extends to discourse that is of the perception that African leaders, for
example Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, run their respective countries to
ruin post-colonial rule, and that Malema, as a political figure in stark contrast to
Nelson Mandela, is the proverbial embodiment of 'when things fall apart'.

The Luthuli House protest in August 2011 can be interpreted as such. It entailed
the ANC’s disciplinary hearing of Julius Malema after he had previously said that
the ANCYL would send a team to Botswana to consolidate local opposition
parties to go about regime change. Malema was charged with bringing the ANC
into disrepute and sowing division in ANC ranks. This correlates with Malema’s
push to have mines nationalised in an attempt to distribute wealth to help
alleviate poverty of an unemployed black mass, which he deems to be the doing
of "white capitalists".

The question of the nationalisation of mines remains up for debate, although the
ANC has been reluctant to take a stance on the issue. However, on the first day
of the disciplinary hearing at ANC headquarters Luthuli House, anarchy prevailed
as reportedly 6 000 Malema supporters (who were allegedly bussed in from
across the country) ran riot:

There were violent clashes between African National Congress Youth
League supporters and police officers in Johannesburg’s city centre on
Tuesday morning ... protesters had broken through barricades and were
pelting police and journalists with glass bottles and stones ... Malema
supporters could be seen burning ANC flags and T-shirts and by 10 am were metres away from the entrance to Luthuli House.

(Mail & Guardian, August 31, 2011)

It can be argued that Malema’s rise as a political threat to white South Africans has reached its culmination in an apparent disregard for even the authority of his ANC leadership. To contextualise this steady removal from political discourse of the ‘let-bygones-be-bygones’ Rainbow Nation that Mandela is believed to have envisioned, a continuum of progression could perhaps be traced in the presidents that have followed since the affectionately known Madiba held presidency.

In his inaugural speech, South Africa’s first democratic president said: “We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of the millions of our people” (Dlanga, 30 March, 2010). As much as Mandela posed as the promise of a future for whites in the new South Africa, more significantly he stood as the realisation of the freedom of blacks from apartheid oppression. Following 1994, Mandela could be said to have been a mediator of racial relations in the new democracy, and in doing so ensured a means of inter-racial ‘bonding’. His involvement in the 1995 Rugby World Cup is seen by most South Africans as Madiba’s most powerful gesture, of a promise that the new ANC rule would embrace whites in the new South Africa. Up until the day of the Springboks’ victory over the New
Zealand’s All Blacks in 1995, rugby was “a white sport, and especially the sport of the Afrikaners, South Africa’s dominant white tribe – apartheid’s master race. The Springboks had long been seen by black people as a symbol of apartheid oppression as repellent as the old white national anthem and the old white national flag. The revulsion ought to have been even sharper if, like ... Mandela, you had spent time in jail for fighting apartheid” (Carlin, 2008: 11). The South African rugby team was naturally a side that blacks would love to hate and the role that Mandela played in turning black sentiments in favour of the white man’s victory was always going to be an arduous task, but a role of which its symbolic nature strove to convince whites that the ANC president’s mandate was one of reconciliation and not revenge.

But the plan was fraught with peril. Mandela could be shot or blown up by extremists. Or today’s pageant could simply backfire. A bad Springbok defeat would not be helpful. Even worse was the prospect of the Afrikaner fans jeering the new national anthem that black South Africans held so dear, or unfurling the hated old orange, blue and white flag. The millions watching in the black townships would feel humiliated and outraged, switching their allegiances to the New Zealand team, shattering the consensus Mandela had striven to build around the Springboks, with potentially destabilising consequences.

(Carlin, 2008: 16)
Beyond his warm receiving of the ‘white man’s game’ into a multicultural identity, perhaps an understanding of Afrikaners’ affections for Madiba can be wholly understood in his treatment of instilling the country’s new national anthem. A country’s anthem as is its flag is a most significant symbol of identity and, particularly for Afrikaners, changing or even replacing such a powerful resource of national pride, and in this case Afrikaner patriotism, could have been deemed as an undermining of white standing in the new dispensation. Below follows an extract from John Carlin’s *Playing the Enemy* (2008), which offers an account of Mandela’s reconciliatory intent:

The old anthem was clearly unacceptable. A part of “Die Stem”, a sombre, martial tune, was an acceptably neutral entreaty to God to ‘guard our beloved land’; but another part of it – and this was the part black people heard – celebrated the triumphs of Retief, Pretorius, and the rest of the ‘trekkers’ as they drove upward through South Africa in the nineteenth century, crushing black resistance, their ‘creaking wagons cutting their trails into the earth’. The unofficial anthem of black South Africa, ‘Nkosi Sikelele’, was the richly soulful expression of a long-suffering people yearning to be free … The consensus [of the National Executive Committee (NEC)] was overwhelmingly in favour of scrapping ‘Die Stem’ and replacing it with ‘Nkosi Sikelele’ … And then Mandela sternly set forth his point of view. ‘This song that you treat so easily holds the emotions of
many people who you don’t represent yet. With a stroke of a pen, you would take a decision to destroy the very — the only — basis that we are building upon: reconciliation’ ... He had in fact lectured the NEC on the business of winning over the Afrikaners, on showing respect for their symbols; on going out of one’s way, for example, to employ a few words of Afrikaans at the beginning of a speech. ‘You don’t address their brains,’ he told them, ‘you address their hearts.’

(Carlin, 2008: 147 - 148)

The secret to the power of Mandela’s Rugby World Cup gesture for Afrikaners and whites alike lies perhaps in an invitation to take part in the reconciliation between South Africans after the apartheid that the colour of their skins so stereotypically represents. In doing so, it allowed white Afrikaners to extend their heritage narrative beyond 1994, dispelling fears of cultural extinction that the end of apartheid rule posed. And, in multicultural vein, it served to share the symbolic cultural artefact of Afrikaner pride that rugby is and that has come to hold equal historical significance for both white and black. Mandela’s donning of the No. 6 Springbok jersey on the day of the World Cup final in June 1995, the jersey of Springbok captain Francois Pienaar, is representative of a meeting of two leaders – Pienaar at that stage perhaps posing as a last bastion of Afrikaner leadership: “The gods at that moment were Mandela and Pienaar, the old man in green, crowned king of all South Africa, handing the cup to Pienaar, the young
man in green, anointed that day as the spiritual head of born-again
Afrikanerdom" (Carlin, 2008: 243).

With the end of Mandela's term, a new president in Thabo Mbeki was at the helm of South Africa's democracy. Mbeki is deemed to be something of a Jan Smuts in his interest in forwarding South Africa's economic policy in a global context, so while his tenure saw him to foreign shores, he was felt to have left a young democracy to its own devices. His ousting at Polokwane in 2008 saw the introduction of president Jacob Zuma, a Zulu, a man of the people who for most black South Africans, yet to see the change in prosperity from apartheid to the new South Africa, would at last deliver on the promise of jobs for a now educated but still jobless and increasingly frustrated black mass. But Zuma's murky association with the arms deal, the rape trial in which it emerged that his idea of safe sex is to take a shower – and which, much to the chagrin of some South Africans not as fervent in their support of the man of the people, only boosted his campaign to eventually become president – and the reflection of his Zulu culture to take five wives, which flies in the face of 'Western logic', has not lent itself to easing ever-increasing white reservations.

In the DVD Muller asks, "Surely we are not in South Africa only to become extinct?" While this is a direct reference to the perceived violent extermination of white farmers in South Africa, the question can also pertain to a cultural survival of the Afrikaner 'volk'. On perusal of the Suidlanders' website, among the various
points regarding survival in fleeing persecution once Mandela has indeed died, it is stipulated that the Suidlanders are a group who holds the interests of an orthodox Afrikaner identity at the heart of its mandate.

Below are extracts of sections in the Suidlanders mandate that clearly elucidate discourses that have come to characterise the traditional Afrikaner identity:

Godsaak [God’s role in the existence of the Suidlanders] (biblical discourse)

1. Ons herkoms as Volk lê gefundeer in Godsiens en dit is wie ons is. Bybelse beginsels en ons Godsiens is deel van ons menswees.

   Our origin as a people lies fundamentally in worship of God and this is who we are. Biblical principles and our religion are a part of who we are as a people.

2. Die Suidlanders glo dat die saak ‘n Godsaak is, en ons handel en wandel spreek daarvan.

   The Suidlanders believe that this matter is a matter that concerns God and our everyday lives speak thereof.

Politiek [Politics] (political discourse)

1. Alhoewel ons NIE ‘n politieke organisasie is met politieke doelwitte nie, glo ons dat dit tyd geword het dat die leuens van die politici van
die hede en die verlede uitgewys moet word. (Dit is as gevolg van
die leuns dat die blankes in Suid Afrika die bedreigings in die gesig
staar)

*Although we are NOT a political organisation with political aims, we
believe that the time has come for the lies of the current and past
politici to be exposed. (It is because of these lies that whites in
South Africa are staring threats in the face.)*

2. Die Suidlander bestuur sal ook van nou af politieke uitsprake maak,
veral rondom politieke situasies wat die veiligheids situasie in die
land beinvloed.

*The Suidlanders’ management will also from now on offer political
opinion, particularly regarding political situations that affect safety in
the country.*

Rigting aanuiding, waar gaan die Suidlanders heen. [(What is the
direction of the Suidlanders.)](survival discourse)

1. Die Suidlanders beywer ons vir die herstel van die verhouding
tussen ons Volk en ons Skepper.

*The Suidlanders concern themselves with the recovery of the
relationship between our volk and our Maker.*

2. Om weer ‘n Godvresende Volk op te rig.
To re-establish a God-fearing volk.

3. Die voorbereiding vir die hervestiging van God se Volk volgens Sy raadsplan.

Preparation for the re-establishment of God’s people according to his advice.

4. Ons beywer ons vir die herstel van ons eie Republiek(e).

We concern ourselves with the recovery of our own Republic(s).

5. Om ons vir eenheid en eensgesindheid tussen ons Volksgenote te beywer en verdeeldheid te verwyder.

To foster unity and unanimity between members of our volk and to remove dissent between us.

With regard to identity, the Suidlanders validate their existence through a perceived threat to cultural survival that lies in the assumed attack on a marginalised white identity which finds its source of identification with the ‘victimised’ white farmer. Through the Kill the Boer debate it is evident that Suidlanders, and those who find a sense of belonging within a group of this nature, create a sense of being that is based on the fundamentals of racial othering driven by fear and distrust of a black opposition. Suffice to say, this identity is one that is based on a racial sense of belonging, an essentialist
fathoming that is centrally characterised by ‘whiteness’ and that in this sense uses the Afrikaner’s historical experience to allow for the interchangeable use of the terms ‘Afrikaner’ and ‘whiteness’. It is an imagined existence that finds its ‘reality’ in discourses like those portrayed in the Kill the Boer debate that resonate with the persecuted Boer during the Great Trek in his quest to locate a promised land for the ‘volk’ where they can exist in their own right; the Anglo Boer War and the Afrikaner’s resurgence in the face of the overwhelming might of the British, blood spilled for the cause of belonging; and lastly the marginalised white whose privileged association with apartheid has them at the wrong end of black compensation in a democratic, black-ruled dispensation.

At this juncture, it is important to note that the Suidlanders represent a group whose freedom in existence does not lie in the ‘white flight’ to foreign shores, as this would be forsaking a cultural sense of being that is very much located in a geographic heritage narrative. The white identity that the Suidlanders claim to stand for is one that is on the frontline of battle against integration, as a concept that discourses of cultural ‘persecution’ cannot allow. It is an identity of a people that is determined not to leave, that is adamant in its resilience to stand as martyrs while the figures of farm attacks steadily climb. Yet, as far as the orthodox and utopian cultural existence on Afrikaner terms is concerned, perhaps the establishment of Orania in 1993 can offer the closest realisation of its outright refusal to integrate in the new South Africa for the sake of retaining Afrikaner ‘purism’. Brian Mayer (2011), in a paper on the Orania community in which he
aims to locate a post-apartheid white identity, offers a surprisingly positive account of Orania's self-removal from the new South Africa. While the Suidlanders can be said to be practicing a white Afrikaner identity that is founded on the fear of a perceived threat, Oranians view themselves not as victims but as "cultural crusaders" (Mayer: 2011).

The community, to them, is not about racism but about the continuance of Afrikanerdom as a legitimate cultural project. They see themselves therefore less as racial purists than as cultural purists, and view their town very much as a bastion of Afrikaner purity. Said one Oranian teacher: Orania's growth depends to a large extent on the situation in the rest of the country. If Afrikaners feel threatened in [South Africa] Orania will grow quicker, but fear should not be the driving force for people to move to Orania—neither racism. Orania cannot be seen as a place to escape—it may not be a negative action, but proactive and a positive challenge.

(Mayer: 2011)

Although Orania can be deemed an extension of "a nationalist project of apartheid" (Mayer: 2011), it can be argued that their cause concerns not mere cultural survival but cultural advancement as is constitutionally protected in democratic South Africa. While they may be accused of drawing the proverbial laager against multicultural integration, their sense of identity is one that balks at "the sapping of Afrikaner identity" in the form of "Afrikaner pragmatism" and a self-imposed marginalization of the Afrikaner in the face of discourses of which
the Kill the Boer debate is characteristic and of which the Suidlanders are representative (Mayer, 2011). "Observed Carel Boshoff IV, the grandson of Orania’s founder, ‘What was once a resolute community that demanded respect has now developed into a loose bundle of individuals that totter between nostalgia and opportunism’" (Mayer, 2011:2). In its isolation, Orania can stand as “a self-determined community of proactive, proud Afrikaners. Oranians hope to practice Afrikanerdom in all its purest linguistic, racial, religious and cultural forms free of outside molestation. Only Afrikaans is spoken, the only church is the Dutch Reformed Church, and no non-Afrikaners are allowed to live in Orania—not even white, English-speaking South Africans (unless they identify with the Afrikaner)” (Mayer, 2011: 2). Although being white is a prerequisite to becoming an Oranian, it can certainly be argued that the focus of the Oranian identity rests rather on ‘Afrikanerness’, a concept of which the term ‘white’ is but a small detail for the crux of the Afrikaner identity as has been proven in the eventual and inevitable rule of the black majority, and simply cannot be found in racial dominance.

In contrast, the Suidlander identity is one that validates itself against the failure of black rule – a notion that is impossible to measure – a failure which for this strand of white identity means the eventual realisation of white ‘extermination’. Of course, for the Suidlanders, if the failure of black rule were to be ‘realised’ it would mean that the anticipated ‘white genocide’ would have come true, thus on the one hand making ‘true’ their sense of belonging as a last remaining white laager, but on the other hand a laager that must be wiped out for its ‘being’ or
existence to be accepted as believable and true. So then, the Suidlanders must
die just so that they can say that their apocalyptic prophecy was true all along – a
paradoxical and ironical identity to say the least in its ‘suicide bomber’ like
positioning for cultural implosion.

While the statistics of farm murders do pose a grave national concern, in actual
fact the ‘truism’ of the Suidlanders’ white identity banks on the event of an
apocalyptic end to whites at the stroke of Nelson Mandela’s death, and this
‘reality’ is only true as far as the perception of a like-minded community is
concerned in its imagined sense of cultural being.

While the Oranian cause can be said to be one of self-determinism, the
Suidlanders tout one of self-protection, which was central to the Afrikaner identity
in guarding its minority-rule during apartheid. Muller asserts that “We [the
Suidlanders and those who adhere to its sense of identity] have every reason to
go to war” before saying: “Hy wat die swaard trek sal met die swaard val” [He
who lives by the sword, dies by the sword] (Suidlanders DVD2). This serves to
suggest that it is not the Suidlanders who are instigating an onslaught, that they,
as of old, are only concerned with living in peace according their ideals of
‘Afrikanerness’, and that it is not they who will eventually draw the first blow when
a ‘war’ situation unfolds. It reaffirms their victimhood as Afrikaners in the new
South Africa and that they are not seekers of conflict, but forced to retaliate when
their existence upon their beloved African soil is at stake.
Muller uses General Delarey, a legendary figure for the Afrikaner volk during the Anglo Boer War, to illustrate that only when the Boers had no choice but to go to war did the reluctant general lead the Boer uprising against the overwhelming might of the British. General Delarey, throughout the Afrikaner history, poses as a man of legend for the Boer volk as he personifies an Afrikaner pride founded on resilience in the face of certain defeat, and his heroism was born out of images of farms in flames and women and children starving in concentration camps during Lord Kitchener’s scorched earth campaign.

It is important to note here that the Afrikaans singer Bok van Blerk’s Delarey music video was released in 2006 to an audience of Afrikaans youths who can associate easily and freely within a globalised identity that prevails in popular culture. It is within this realm that the music video was released and it resulted in an affirmation of identity within a multicultural society. The act of listening to or viewing the music video was foremost a pass time of a youth culture, while incorporating within it the dimension of doing so within a language that the Afrikaans youth identifies with. The song became a cultural practice, listening to lyrics sung in one’s language while celebrating the values of Afrikanerness through the narrative of General Delarey. The success of the music video was founded on Afrikaner patriotism that focused on a pride in the Afrikaner nation because of its resilience. It is the cultural practice of listening to the music and of being able to understand its meaning because you are of Afrikaans descent that was celebrated. The narrative of the video focuses on the victory of being proudly
Afrikaans despite losing the Anglo-Boer War, as was evident at the time of the release (2006) of the popular song, when Afrikaners young and old would stand up with their fists to their breasts at the sound of the song over the radio or sound system at the pub.

Muller, instead, uses the narrative of General Delarey to emphasise white Afrikaner victimhood. His discourse around General Delarey is one that reverts to Boer racism that developed in reaction to British domination and that is used interchangeably in the perception of black rule that for the Suidlanders symbolises eventual white extinction. The images of Kitchener’s scorched farmlands and strewn bodies of Boers invoke images of what would befall whites in South Africa when Operation uHuru is executed. This further serves to reinforce the ‘social reality’ of the Suidlander identity in the new South Africa as an inverted Boer racism that comes about in the perception of reverse apartheid ideologies in the new South Africa.

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanising and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned ... the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

(Foucault in Hall, 1997: 49)
Chapter 6: Conclusion

In conclusion, Afrikaner identity as portrayed by the Suidlanders is one that is caught in multicultural limbo; a South African fear discourse has left its cultural progression in a state of flux where social transformation as promised by the term ‘Rainbow Nation’ has been left to erode by pervasive fears that have curtailed a secure sense of belonging beyond the confines of an essentialist Afrikaner identity. Because of national insecurities experienced across the cultural divide in South Africa, Afrikanerness (as well as other cultural affiliations in the Rainbow Nation) offers an opportunistic psychological safe-haven, an identity in which to withdraw from perceived multicultural perils, albeit an identity that is culturally perilous itself as its fate is one of eventual extermination.

Findings:

1. Nelson Mandela’s significance to the Afrikaner’s cultural heritage/sense of belonging in South Africa

Nelson Mandela operates as an emblem of multicultural heritage for all South Africans. He is symbolic in the Afrikaner’s heritage narrative because of his role in moving South Africa’s disparate nation into the new dispensation, and in this manner becomes an object of identification for cultural identity. As a personified monument of multicultural heritage, he affirms a connection for Afrikaners to South Africa in the form of affiliation to place or physical location
of identity. This affiliation can be said to be operating, for example, in images of the 1995 rugby World Cup in which he wears the No. 6 Springbok jersey. He is thus a supplement to another object of identification in the sport of rugby and more specifically the Springbok rugby team, which for many white South Africans is a source of pride, a national artefact as it were, and in its unification of the country it becomes a site of shared identification for South Africans. This unity, or sharing of a national identity, comes about in arenas of meaning-making where Mandela is representative of black freedom, and representative of blacks in general. His presence at the World Cup final, participating in the support of rugby which was previously considered a ‘whites only’ cultural pass-time in its perception of being played and followed by big and burly Afrikaners, was the unifying factor in sharing this cultural site with black South Africans. The Springbok victory over the All Blacks then symbolises a victory not only for whites, but also for blacks and so becomes a production of heritage for a post-apartheid, multicultural and of most importance, multiracial society, which was apparent in the marketing slogan at the time: ‘One Team, One Nation’. In Mandela’s transformation of the perceptions surrounding rugby, a white cultural artefact becomes a source of national pride and whites become contributors to multicultural national identity. Springbok captain Francois Pienaar, categorically big, Afrikaans-speaking and white (and his team) becomes a site of cultural ownership not only for whites, but all races in the country. But, most importantly for whites,
through the event of the Rugby World Cup, they found a claim to significance in the new South Africa.

Mandela is synonymous with the Rainbow Nation ideal. He is the primary object in the production of a Rainbow Nation identity and becomes central to a dominant reconciliation discourse ideology in post-apartheid South Africa. This discourse entails dispelling myths that have been created in typifications of the Self and the Other as a means of acknowledging difference. For Afrikaners, the Rainbow Nation ideal means operating in a cultural discourse that no longer operates in racial ‘othering’, but in a progressive culturalism that is in constant change and independent of binary opposites such as white and black.

2. At what cost to a minority culture are its members/groups able to be of significance and relevance within a multicultural social establishment?

With the advent of the new democracy power was shifted to dominance in numbers. In the South African context the Afrikaner interpretation was that they were faced with the question: adapt or die? Under apartheid Afrikaner culture had become the dominant political ideology; it was supremacist, racist and was based on the strength of white superiority and subsequent privilege at the expense of blacks. However, under ANC rule the Afrikaner was forced to reevaluate its cultural fabric for, as a political identity, it could have no future
as the essentials of its cultural character left it at odds with the new dominant ideology centred on multiculturalism. As a minority, its function within a democracy ought to be one that ensures not only cultural preservation but cultural freedom. While this freedom should entail the unquestioned ability to practice one's everyday existence as an Afrikaner, Indian and so on, it similarly should also allow for practice within a greater whole. The 'within' as well as the 'among' dimensions are necessary for cultural integrity and self-realisation. Rightwing ideology, as portrayed by the Suidlanders, precludes the 'among' dimension.

3. What does a group such as the Suidlanders offer the Afrikaner identity in the way of cultural belonging?

As has been previously discussed, the identity represented by the Suidlanders is one that is based on a self-perception of victimisation. It operates within a myth of the total black onslaught that is based on a social reality based on prevailing farm attacks associated with a conspiracy regarding white genocide. While not all members are necessarily victims of farm attacks, like-minded associates of the Suidlander identity share in an assumed lived experience that is validated in the latter categories of identification: This categorisation is amplified in the Kill the Boer debate, as historical lineage dictates a cultural affiliation with the term 'Boer' (farmer) as an Afrikaans naming of a white land owner, but in the context that it has been
sung, a white oppressor of an angry black mass bent on ‘taking back what whites took from them’. It can be concluded that what this identity offers is an essentialist notion of belonging and that it is born of neo-apartheid discourse – an inversion of the apartheid of old where the oppressed have become the oppressors. The Suidlander identity is one that then offers a means of self-protection for white Afrikaners, and can by no means be deemed a progressive identity in its apparent withdrawal from multicultural society. Its appeal as a cultural identity lies in an imagined confirmation that the Afrikaner, after all, is better served by being ruled by their own as a race (or volk) that is favoured by God to protect its own kin, than left in the hands of black rule.

4. How do the Suidlanders situate themselves in the new South Africa?

The discourse prevalent in the Suidlander DVD operates in narrative that counters that of the new South Africa. It finds its strength in identification in a laager mentality that strives to cordon off participation in the Rainbow Nation. Yet this mentality differs from the apparent ‘laagerism’ displayed in the establishment of the self-determining state of Orania. Oranians justify their choice of existence in the constitutional right to practice Afrikaner culture as they wish. In contrast, the Suidlanders’ mentality is a reactionary one, steeped in fears of reverse-racism. It is a fringe identity and its nature as such does not allow for the absorption of multicultural ideals, as its sense of
belonging is founded on typifications of the self to counteract a 'sameness' in difference. Their subsequent idea of themselves positions them within minority discourse that expresses feelings of not being represented in a multicultural discourse where narratives of belonging entail shared narratives of heritage.

5. What significance does the Suidlanders’ discursive interpretation of South Africa have for the democratic dispensation?

The Suidlanders identity operates in discourses of Afrikaner 'whiteness'. It has already been noted that the Suidlander identity, with its emphasis on a threat to white existence, also alludes to the general perception that in a majority ruled democracy, representation of this identity in politics is not in favour of the shunned white. What the Suidlander mind frame exposes is a 'watchdog' role of minority groups, a role played by political opposition parties such as the Freedom Front Plus, Afriforum and even the Democratic Alliance, who seek to ensure that ANC rule is accountable to the multicultural Rainbow Nation ideal. It is Afriforum who took Julius Malema to court on charges of hate speech for singing 'Kill the Boer'. The media storm surrounding the visit of the Dalai Lama to South Africa also highlights a distrust of ANC rule to adhere to the Rainbow Nation ideal: The third visa refusal of the exiled Tibetan leader seeking to visit Archbishop Desmond Tutu flies in the face of the new South Africa's assumed identity. Tutu slammed the ANC, saying the
ruling party no longer represented him, as iconic of the Rainbow Nation ideal as Mandela is: “Hey Mr Zuma, you and your government don’t represent me. You represent your own interests. We will pray as we prayed for the downfall of apartheid government, we will pray for the downfall of a government that misrepresents us.” (Sapa in TimesLive, 4 October 2011). Of course, this likening of ANC rule to apartheid by the Archbishop allows most South Africans, not only the Suidlanders, to relate to his imagined sense of what South Africa’s social reality should be like, that all under the Rainbow Nation experience the problems of the new dispensation in similar ways, that all have the same concerns.

It can be concluded that the Suidlanders’ mentality reveals a conflict in meaning-making in the assumed ideas of what South African society entails. Similarly, it can also be concluded that the Kill the Boer debate portrays a shared site of heritage that is in conflict, where affiliations to physical places are in conflict within numerous physical locations of identity. And within this conflict essentialised ideas of belonging are reaffirmed, within which the Suidlanders signify a far rightist reaction to conflicting discourses within the Rainbow Nation ideal. Malema, who operates as a signifier for a mentality such as the Suidlanders of an equally counter discourse to the Rainbow Nation ideal, illustrates this.
6. Is it possible to classify a ‘true’ Afrikaner?

Through the discussions that prevail in this dissertation there can be no one ‘true’ classification made of the Afrikaner identity without resorting to essentialised ideas of belonging. In doing so, room for agency would in fact be limited and would not account for an individualistic sense of self, nor the ability for identity to be fluid, malleable or able to be subject to change. The Suidlander identity is illustrative of an essentialised classification of the Afrikaner. In the beginning of this dissertation I referred to the practice of culture using the example of black businessmen who return to their ancestral homes on weekends. This denotes a practice of ceremony, an adherence to cultural beliefs in the practice of the slaughtering of a chicken to thank the ancestors for a family member’s success in, for instance, landing a job. It is a cultural activity that affirms one’s lineage, rather than differentiating it from another lineage; it is a cultural behaviour that simply is. In the same breath, I referred to the proverbial ‘Afrikaans tannies’ who swop traditional Boere recipes after church, again a practice that is not questioned but that is merely a tradition that has been passed along generations of Afrikaans women. For all we know, Mrs Dlamini and Mrs Botha will be attending yoga classes at Virgin Active during the week. The problem arises when these cultural practices are imbibed with meaning and become objectified. In my theoretical chapter Deon Maas’s essential argument also rests on the objectification of the Afrikaans language. Women belonging to the Suidlanders organisation
will be trading in boere raad recipes because they are preparing for a black onslaught, and these recipes would be a tool of survival in this event. Without this mythical onslaught, there would be no reason for survival recipes for powdered eggs to be consumed while hiding at pin-pointed venues across the country. These recipes become objectified within typifications of the self that are only 'true' as far as typifications of the other are 'true'. Furthermore, these are historicised, with discourses pertaining to Voortrekker survival, Boer racism and so on.

The Suidlanders base the typification of themselves on apartheid typifications of blacks, by making sense of mediated events such as the killing of AWB leader Terre'Blanche in a way that has them taking it for granted that they belong to a victimised white race — an imagined community — on the precipice of extinction. Outside of these assumptions, boere recipes have no meaning for the Suidlanders. Thus the Suidlanders' identity is the typified apartheid racial identity, albeit an inverted apartheid identity that sustains ideologies of whiteness to maintain superiority over a black majority, even though this 'superiority' in the new South Africa does not imply, as it did in apartheid, that white rule should be a given. Without the one the other cannot exist. An identity such as this can also extend to ideas of 'Afrikaner opportunism' when Afrikaner-ness becomes politicised, as, for example, discourses within the 'Kill the Boer' context are viewed as a direct threat aimed at whites, as the
term Boer is objectified with meanings pertaining to a persecuted white Afrikaner.

This dissertation was limited to a discursive critical analysis of the DVD and qualitative discussion stemming from that analysis, placed in the current South African context. Further research could draw on an ethnographic exploration of Suidlander members which would undoubtedly offer further valuable insight into this group of self-alienated South Africans.
7. Bibliography


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