

# **South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: Partner or Hegemon?**

**BY**

**Sakhile Hadebe**

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy, in the Graduate Programme in  
Political Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal,  
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

**Supervisor: Dr BR Mngomezulu**

**2015**

## DECLARATION

I, Sakhile Hadebe, declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
  - a. Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
  - b. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks, and referenced; and
5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the References sections.

Student Name: Sakhile Hadebe

Supervisor: Dr B.R. Mngomezulu

Signature: .....

Signature:.....

Date: .....

Date:.....

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my daughter Ndalwenhle. This should be a challenge for you my girl.

I dedicate this work, in loving memory of my parents: my mother Ziphi Eugenia Radebe (the late) and my father Dubula Johannes Ngubane (the late). INkosi yamaNazaretha izibe nani lapho nikhona. It is my view that you left me too early; you should have not. My soul mates in everything I do and in every step I take I will be missing you, thou shall rest in peace.

Lastly, I dedicate this work to my inner selfish drive which drove me to do this. It was nothing but a selfish drive. I hope the outcomes of my drive will be of public good one day.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I am grateful to both the Radebe and the Ngubane families for their unconditional love and support throughout, ngibonga angiphezi. Your endless and eternal love is known only to my heart.

It won't suffice to forget my supervisor Dr Bheki Mngomezulu. You have been my torchbearer in the darkness of dissertation writing, thanks for your supervision and comments. Words alone can never be adequate to convey how thankful I am for making my job easier, BABA DLAKADLA, izandla zidlula ikhanda.

My gratitude falls upon my friends and colleagues who contributed in one way or the other. To Project 2017 Brigade [Phakathi, Siyanda, Dlamini and Gumbi (the lazy one)] you guys kept me going throughout this journey. To Cebi Zulu, I know one day you will understand why I chose this route, academia.

## ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CRR	Country Review Report
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DG	Director-General
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DoD	Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ECOSOC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investor / Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Area
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNU	Government of National Unity
G8	Group of 8 [Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

G20	Group of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 20 major economies: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States of America and Turkey
G77	Largest intergovernmental organization of developing states in the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGOs	International Governmental Organisations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ITAC	International Trade Administration Commission
ITED	International Trade and Economic Development Division
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCACC	National Conventional Arms Control Committee
NEC	National Executive Committee
NICOC	National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NNP	New National Party
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SANDF	South African National Defence Force

SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	South African Development Coordination Conference
SADF	South African Defence Force
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SAIIA	South African Institute for International Affairs
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SANGOCO	South African Non-governmental Organisations Coalition
SANT	South African National Treasury
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
STS	Sovereign Territorial States
TNC	Trans-national Corporations
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US/USA	United States of America
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZEC	Zimbabwean Electoral Commission
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association

## TABLE OF CONTENT

<b>Contents</b>	<b>Page</b>
TITLE PAGE.....	i
DECLARATION.....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iv
ACRONYM/ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENT.....	viii
TABLES.....	xiv
FIGURES.....	xv
<b>CHAPTER ONE.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1Background and Outline of Research Problem.....	1
1.2 Preliminary literature study, and reasons for choosing topic:.....	2
a. Preliminary literature study.....	2
b. Reasons for choosing the topic.....	5
1.3 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked... ..	5
a) Statement of the problem.....	6



b) The objectives of the present study.....	6
Key questions to be asked:.....	6
c) Research problems and objectives: Broader issues to be investigated.....	7
1.4 Research methodology and methods.....	7
1.5 Structure of dissertation.....	9
 <b>CHAPTER TWO.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>LITERATURE REVIEW.....</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	12
2.2 Contextualizing post 1994 South African Foreign Policy.....	12
2.3 Post-1994 South African Foreign Policy Literature.....	16
2.4 Justification for Study.....	21
 2.5 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE STUDY.....	 22
2.5.1 Introduction.....	22
2.5.2 Foreign Policy.....	23
2.5.3 Foreign Policy Goals and Anticipation.....	25
2.5.4 Southern Africa.....	27
2.5.5 National Interests.....	30
2.5.6 State Actors.....	32
2.5.7 Non-State Actors.....	33
2.6.8 Partner.....	33

2.5.9 Hegemon.....	34
2.5.10 Multilateralism.....	37
2.5.11 African Renaissance.....	39
2.5.12 Conclusion.....	41
 <b>CHAPTER THREE.....</b>	 <b>42</b>
 <b>THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS .....</b>	 <b>42</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	42
3.2 Conventional theoretical approaches.....	42
3.2.1 Realism.....	42
3.2.2 Liberalism.....	44
3.2.3 Marxism.....	46
3.2.4Development Theories.....	49
3.3 Theories which guided the study... ..	49
3.3.1 Theory of Hegemonic Stability.....	52
3.3.2 Of Pivot States, Middle and Emerging Powers .....	60
3.3.3 Discourse Theory.....	66
3.4 Conclusion... ..	67

**CHAPTER FOUR.....69**

**SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES & ACTORS.....69**

4.1 Introduction.....	69
4.2 Foreign Policymaking: Theoretical Background.....	69
4.3 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Principles.....	72
4.4 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Actors.....	76
4.4.1 The Presidency.....	77
4.4.2 The Department of International Relations and Cooperation.....	80
4.4.3 The Department of Trade and Industry.....	84
4.4.4 The Department of Defence.....	85
4.4.5 The African National Congress (ANC).....	87
4.4.6 Parliament.....	88
4.4.7 Intelligence.....	90
4.4.8 Civil Society.....	91
4.5 Conclusion.....	92

**CHAPTER FIVE.....95**

**SOUTH AFRICA’S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN AFRICA.....95**

5.1 Introduction.....	95
5.2 South Africa’s Multilateral Relations in Africa.....	96
5.3 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU).....	96
5.3.1 Changes in the Revenue Sharing Formula.....	98
5.3.2 South Africa Benefits from SACU to the Detriment of other Member States.....	99
5.3.3 South Africa is the Only Destination for Investment in the Region.....	100

5.3.4 South Africa Wants to Collapse SACU.....	91
5.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC).....	101
5.5 The African Union (AU).....	105
5.6 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).....	108
5.7 African Renaissance.....	111
5.8 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).....	115
5.9 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC).....	117
5.10 Conclusion.....	118
<b>CHAPTER SIX.....</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SADC REGION: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE.....</b>	<b>121</b>
6.1 Introduction.....	121
6.2 The Genesis of Zimbabwe's crisis.....	122
6.3 The 2008 Zimbabwe General Elections.....	127
6.4 Quiet Diplomacy in Southern Africa.....	129
6.5 Merits of South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy.....	132
6.6 Demerits of South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy.....	136
6.7 The 2013 Zimbabwean Elections.....	137
6.8 Security a Priority for South Africa.....	139
6.9 South Africa's Economic Diplomacy.....	142
6.10 Conclusion.....	143
<b>CHAPTER SEVEN.....</b>	<b>145</b>
<b>DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>145</b>

7.1 Introduction.....	145
7.2 Data Presentation.....	146

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

8.1 An Allison–model Assessment of country’s Foreign Policy Formulation.....	156
8.2.1 The rational actor model.....	156
8.2.2 The organizational process model.....	158
8.2.3 The bureaucratic politics model.....	160
8.3 Conclusion.....	161
9. Concluding Remarks.....	162
Appendix A.....	170
Appendix B.....	171
Bibliography.....	173

## **TABLES**

Table 1.1:	Standard Interview Questions
Table 2.1:	Scenarios on SA's presence in the region
Table 2.2:	Differentiating between SADCC and SADC
Table 3.1:	Contradictions of Shoprite Checkers in Zambia
Table 3.1:	Distinctions between middle and emerging powers
Table 3.2:	South Africa's Multilateral Engagements

## FIGURES

Figure 2.1:	The Map of Southern Africa
Figure 2.2:	The Map of Southern Africa
Figure 3.1:	Developed-Underdeveloped Relations
Figure 6.1:	Manufacturing output index from 1980 to 2005
Figure 6.2:	Gold production volume from 1997 to 2006
Figure: 6.3:	Wheat Production from 1975 to 2007
Figure: 7.1:	Characterisation of South Africa's relations with Southern Africa
Figure: 7.2:	Assessment of South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa
Figure: 7.3:	South Africa's importance for the development of the region
Figure: 7.4:	South Africa's foreign policy actors
Figure: 7.5:	South Africa's future, partner of hegemon

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

#### **1.1 Background and Outline of Research Problem**

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century came with a number of changes in the South African political landscape which eventually affected the country's foreign policy towards Southern Africa, Africa and the rest of the world. However, there are two major factors which helped to shape post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy. Firstly, it was the demise of apartheid inside South Africa in 1994. This enabled South Africa to rebuild relations with other states based on equal terms. Secondly, it was the changes at the international level as informed by the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This brought about many changes especially in the economic sphere as superpowers started to withdraw their support for proxy states. South Africa as a leader in terms of economy, political stability and military capabilities meant that other Southern African states relied on its role to lead in socioeconomic and political advancements. Due to this new development, many states were determined to enter into bilateral relations with South Africa a trend which has continued unabated to-date.

Since South Africa is perceived as a regional leader in many respects, it is then expected that it should demonstrate its leadership capabilities within the sub-continent. In line with that, there is a global and regional anticipation for South Africa as an emerging economy to assume a developmental role in the continent. Since then, substantial research has been done which relates to South Africa's foreign policy and its implementation in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole (Ogunnubi, 2013). Due to this state of affairs, there has been much controversy surrounding South Africa's foreign policy especially its implementation. It has been argued that South Africa has not assumed the role of being a regional leader; instead, the feeling is that it has assumed that of being a self-interested player who seeks to control its neighbours within the context of the theory of realism. South Africa has mainly been accused of pursuing a Western-oriented agenda on the African soil.



The research problem of the study arises from the controversy relating to South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa, particularly its role in the sub-continent. For the purpose of the study the research problem is demarcated as follows: Firstly, it is a conceptual demarcation. This relates to the characterization of South Africa and looks at whether it suits the concept of partner or that of hegemon. Secondly, it is a geopolitical demarcation. This relates to South Africa's role in Southern Africa. Included in the discussion is South Africa's role and subsequently Africa's representation in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Lastly, it is a temporal demarcation. This relates to the period to be covered which is from 1994 when South Africa became a democratic country to 2014 which marked 20 years of South Africa's democracy. However, a reference to South Africa's pre 1994 foreign policy decisions is made for background purposes and to provide the context within which the study should be conceived.

The broad research question the study seeks to answer is: "What has informed post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy during the twenty years of democracy?"

## **1.2 Preliminary literature study, and reasons for choosing topic:**

### **a. Preliminary literature study.**

Democratic South Africa carefully chose to establish new relations with Southern African states which are different from those of its predecessor government. According to Pfister (2005), apartheid South Africa's foreign policy towards the Southern African region was based on destabilization. It aimed to punish and weaken the frontline states which were in favour of the liberation movements. The Southern African region was only important in providing South Africa with labour reserves in industries and mining (Adebajo, 2007).

The end of the Cold War came with massive changes in the domestic political landscape of South Africa and led to the shift of political dynamics. The then president, F.W. de Klerk (the last president under the old dispensation) released all political prisoners and unbanned their liberation movements. According to Chhabra (1997) immediately after his release, Mandela and de Klerk embarked on an African journey. They traversed the continent meeting heads of states, albeit with different positions to lobby for. On the one hand, de

Klerk was lobbying for the relaxation of sanctions and the recognition of the National Party government's legitimacy. On the other hand, Mandela lobbied for the continuation of sanctions until true democratic transition. Both positions shaped the nature of South Africa's relations with the African continent.

Mandela prior to assuming the presidency of the Republic conveyed his concern that if human rights issues were to be neglected that would bring about disaster in the international arena (Mills, 2000). He further guaranteed that "new" South Africa's foreign policy would be based on human rights and democracy. He held that South Africa's future depended on the African continent particularly Southern Africa and that South Africa would pursue regional cooperation as opposed to domination (Mandela, 1993). In that sense, South Africa's renewed relations with the rest of Africa was conceived even before the historic 1994 general elections. Due to its political history and re-admission to the international arena South Africa was seen as a "beacon of hope" especially for the oppressed (The Economist, 2008). This meant that South Africa had moral obligation to protect and promote human rights (Mills, 2000).

During Mandela's tenure in the presidency of the Republic, South Africa's foreign policy was widely criticized for lack of clear direction (Chhabra, 1997). This can be attributed to many factors such as the newness of the administration in office; and lack of enthusiasm on the side of the ministers responsible for effecting the anticipated policy changes. Most importantly was the staff of the old regime which did not share the view of the new government. As informed by its past experience of apartheid, human rights were at the centre of South Africa's new foreign policy imperatives. Mandela's main concern was the idea of universal human rights (Barber, 2005). Mandela's administration took a harsh position against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In 1996, Mandela openly called for the sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria's Sani Abacha. This stance was a response to the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni nine (Vale and Maseko, 1998; Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of states. South Africa went on to withdraw its representative in Nigeria. In turn South Africa suffered a blow when Western superpowers continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South Africa's call (Barber, 2005).

South Africa has also been seen as a unilateral actor in pretence of high moral ground. According to Kebemba (2007) when Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was attacked by opposing forces Southern African states intervened but South Africa isolated itself and maintained neutrality. This non-participation in the collective intervention is usually contrasted with the country's military intervention in Lesotho to halt the 1998 military coup. This double standard faded the country's proclaimed moral high ground in its foreign policy (Ley, 2005). A number of scholars like Baregu and Landsberg, (2003); Nel and Van der Westhuizen, (2004) and Landsberg, (2006) questioned South Africa's decision to supply arms in conflict areas like Rwanda and Uganda. Mandela heavily depended on his personality while his successor Mbeki depended on quiet diplomacy in softening rivals behind the scenes (Landsberg, 2006).

During Mbeki's tenure as the president, South Africa took a conscious decision of being part of the continent. He consulted with other heads of states in the decision making process. This signalled a clear shift from unilateral decision making as embraced by Mandela's administration towards multilateral decision making (Buhlungu, et al., 2007). It can be argued that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy towards the situation in Zimbabwe should be understood in this sense. South Africa openly pronounced that foreign policy decisions relating to the region and the continent will be taken within the mechanisms of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and, since 2002, the African Union (AU), respectively.

Addressing parliament in March 1995 the Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>, the late Alfred Nzo stressed the importance of South Africa in promoting regional and continental economy. He said that for South Africa to drive economic development without the partnership of its neighbours was a wild dream. Nzo emphasized that South Africa would involve the corporate sector with the intention to establish development to its fullest. With these vows from the minister, South Africa was expected to be at the centre of Southern Africa's economy (SAGI, 2008). Some of the foreign policy expects have attentively looked at the South Africa-Nigeria relations and the partnership aimed towards achieving the "new" Africa (Baregu and Landsburg, 2003; Ogunnubi, 2013). The assumption is that good

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) currently known as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)

governance and sound economic policies ought to be implemented within the New Partnership of African Development's (NEPAD) mechanisms.

President Zuma followed on his predecessors' footsteps; South Africa maintained its contribution to the AU and its organs (Ogunnubi, 2013). Among many accomplishments so far, the formation of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) stands out. The agency in principle takes the form of President Mbeki's African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund. This fund is geared towards the integration of national government departments on human resource development to establish one solid and viable entity which will enhance state intervention (Ogunnubi, 2013).

Despite all these mechanisms, South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa and Africa as a whole and its role has been characterized by flaws. Scholars like the ones cited above have tried to analyse post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy in general and with regard to Africa. However, none of them has provided a comprehensive analysis which covers the full twenty years of democracy. It is this gap that the present study will fill. The recent PhD thesis by Ogunnubi (2013) came close to achieving this goal but did not use oral interviews to supplement archival and secondary data. The present study will address this gap too and supplement the findings made by Ogunnubi.

#### **b. Reasons for choosing the topic.**

South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa and Africa as a whole and its role has been characterized by flaws. South Africa's human rights approach and other operations have triggered controversy amongst other players especially from the continent. It has been labelled differently by different players. While others maintain that it is a hegemon aimed at advancing self-interests, others maintain that it is only a team player. The study is important because it seeks to contribute to the range of policy options available to South Africa's foreign policy actors in quest to contribute meaningfully in the Southern African region. The findings of the study will shed light on South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa during the entire twenty-year period. The findings will help in determining whether South Africa is a hegemon or just a partner.

#### **c. Justification for Study**

South African foreign policy literature is very rich. This is evident in the vast literature available which ranges from articles, books to discussion papers. However, one would suggest that it is just a misleading fiction. The volumes of available literature cannot be a substitute for proper foreign policy analysis. Despite the abundance of literature, South African foreign policy remains vague and ambiguous. This is in line with Habib's assertion that "post-apartheid South Africa has not taken kindly to critical scrutiny" (2003: 56). This on its own is worrisome; however, the major problem is the African National Congress' (ANC) failure or lack of political will to establish a clear foreign relations *modus operandi*. According to O'meara (1996) and Williams (2000) the ANC is suffering from 'intellectual inertia' in relation to foreign policy. Foreign policy analysis has failed to effectively shape South Africa's foreign policy making. Seemingly the only writings which get ruling party's attention are the ones which reflect ANC's early idealist goals. South Africa's pledge to regional initiatives is perpetually met with diverse critics. To recall Winston Churchill's assertion "foreign policy operates in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent" (cited in James, 2008: 4).

This study seeks to contribute towards reviving South Africa's foreign policy ills as identified by leading scholars like Habib, Vale, Landsberg and Adebajo. The importance of the study is informed by first-hand information to be gathered directly from representatives of countries concerned, think tank organizations and academics. The findings will add to the already existing literature which has failed to influence policy making. The findings will shed light on South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa. They will help in determining whether South Africa is a hegemon or just a partner. The study comes at the right time when as a country South Africa celebrates twenty years of democracy and freedom. This is indeed an appropriate time to review the country's progress in different sectors including foreign policy making.

### **1.3 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked**

#### **a) Statement of the problem:**

The research problem of the study arises from the controversy relating to South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa, particularly its role in the sub-continent. For the purpose of the study the research problem is demarcated as follows: Firstly, it is a conceptual demarcation. This relates to the characterization of South Africa, whether it suits the concept of partner or that of hegemon. Secondly, it is a geopolitical demarcation. This relates to South Africa's role in Southern Africa.

Included in the discussion is South Africa's role and subsequently Africa's representation on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Lastly, it is a temporal demarcation. This relates to the period to be covered which is from 1994 when South Africa became a democratic country to 2014 which marked 20 years of South Africa's democracy. However, a reference to South Africa's pre- 1994 foreign policy decisions is made for background purposes and to provide the context within which the proposed study should be conceived.

**b) The objectives of the present study are:**

**Key questions to be asked:**

The study seeks to address the following questions:

Main questions:

- What has informed South Africa's foreign policy agenda during the past twenty years?
- Do South Africa's foreign policy imperatives define the country as a hegemon or a team player?

Sub-questions:

- ✓ What has been South Africa's role in Southern Africa?
- ✓ Who have been the major actors in South Africa's foreign policy making?
- ✓ What role is South Africa expected to play regionally and continentally by its neighbours?
- ✓ Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in the multilateral setting?
- ✓ To what extent has there been nexus between South Africa's foreign policy articulation and implementation?

**c) Research problems and objectives: Broader issues to be investigated:**

- To analyse South Africa's foreign policy imperatives for the past two decades;
- To establish what informed South Africa's foreign policy agenda during this time;
- To find out who were the key role-players in the country's foreign policy formulation;
- To identify factors responsible for inconsistencies in South Africa's foreign policy agenda;
- To find out how other African countries and the international community have viewed South Africa's foreign policy.

## **1.4 Research methodology and methods.**

This study better suits the qualitative method as opposed to the quantitative approach because it deals with the clarification of terms and concepts as attained through literature review. It also applies deductive methods starting with analysing dominant terms as foreign policy. It moves from the general account of South Africa's foreign policy making and actual implementation narrowed to the specifics in order to answer the key question whether South Africa is a partner or a hegemon. The proposed methodological approach is in line with Creswell (2003) who acknowledged that qualitative research is used in various academic disciplines but was traditionally used in social sciences. Qualitative researchers strive to get a thorough understanding of human behaviour and the rationale behind it. This approach is more suitable as the study seeks to understand the variation of South Africa's behaviour with regard to foreign policy making options. It explores every detail of the

decision making and usually a smaller sample is required. Qualitative research has several meanings, for example, the term can be used interchangeably with the terms such as naturalistic, ethnographic, subjective, and post-positivistic (Babbie & Mouton, 2003). According to Wolcott (1990), qualitative research is geared towards gaining an understanding of human systems.

The study analytically describes the relationship between South Africa and other Southern African states. In pursuit of this an “inside out” approach is used. The study deliberates on both policy making and actual implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy. Through literature, it seeks to explain South Africa’s decision to give priority to issues of human rights and peace and security.

In conducting the study, a number of sources were used. Sources were divided into primary and secondary sources, respectively. Primary sources included document analysis. Some of the documents were be Jacob Zuma’s interview with Patrick Smith; speeches and addresses by Ministers and other officials; and DIRCO website and other relevant websites. Some of these documents were obtained from the archives of the former Department of Foreign Affairs (now DIRCO). Secondary sources used will included a number of analytical materials examining South Africa’s role in Southern Africa. The material included the works of leading scholars and commentators in the field in question. These are among others: Landsberg (2006), Cox (1995), Habib, (2010) and Selinyane (2004), Keohane (2004), Schoeman (2007) and Adebajo (2007). Recent dissertations such as that of Ogunnubi (2013) and Naidoo (2010) were also used. In these sources, the scholars gave an account of the foreign policy in broader sense then specify on South Africa’s foreign policy. They also gave different conceptual clarification of terms like hegemon and foreign policy.

In addition to that structured open–ended interviews were conducted with purposively selected informants. This enabled the researcher to get first-hand information directly from the scholars and practitioners relevant to the field. The study had a sample of ten informants categorized as follows: four officials from SADC countries with embassies in South Africa, four academics that are well inclined with the South African foreign policy and two representatives from the think tank organization – the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).



**Table 1.1: Standard Interview Questions**

Question 1: How would you characterize South Africa's relations with Southern African countries?

Question 2: Assess South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa.

Question 3: How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?

Question 4: What role is South Africa expected to play regionally and continentally by its neighbours?

Question 5: Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in the multilateral setting?

**Source: Author's Compilation**

### **1.5 Structure of dissertation:**

The dissertation has been organised under the following seven chapters:

#### **Chapter One:** Introduction and background

Chapter one provides background information to the study. It states the study's aims/objectives as well as the research questions addressed in the study. The chapter introduces the dissertation stating what each chapter entails.

#### **Chapter Two:** Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter has been to review existing literature on the subject of the study to provide the context within which the present study could be understood. The trend in the discussions and existing gaps in the literature were enumerated as a justification for the

present study. Moreover, conceptual framework and key terms were addressed. The terms defined included foreign policy, national interests, state actors, non-state actors, partner as well as hegemon.

### **Chapter Three:** Theoretical Framework

In this chapter the theoretical frameworks on which the study is grounded were outlined. In this regard, development and hegemonic stability theories were discussed and their relevance to the study spelt out.

### **Chapter Four:** Role-players in South African Foreign Policy Making

The chapter discussed role-players central in South African policy making and implementation – including state and non-states actors – and demonstrated how each role-player had contributed to the country's foreign policy over twenty years.

### **Chapter Five:** South Africa and Multilateral Institutions

This chapter scrutinized South Africa's role in multilateral institutions such as SADC, Southern African Customs Union (SACU), NEPAD, and the UN Security Council. The role played by former President Thabo Mbeki was examined and compared to President Zuma's first term in office (2009-2014).

### **Chapter Six:** South Africa's Foreign Policy in the SADC Region: The case of Zimbabwe

This chapter specifically assessed South Africa's foreign policy making and implementation regarding the SADC region, using Zimbabwe as a case study. This was done in an attempt to test the extent to which South Africa acted as a partner or a hegemon in regional politics.

### **Chapter Seven:** South Africa's Foreign Policy between 1994 and 2014: A critical reflection

This chapter provided a general assessment of South Africa's foreign policy during the period in question in an attempt to paint a broader picture which demonstrated how the country's foreign policy should be perceived, i.e. whether it epitomised a partnership or a

hegemonic stance. In a nutshell, this chapter will constitute the research results, data analysis and interpretation. After that a chapter contained the research results.

## **Chapter Eight**

This chapter provided analysis of the data presented in the preceding chapter and gave an overall summary.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2 LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Literature review is more than just the summary of the existing literature in a certain field of study. It is a combination of an assessment and evaluation of the already existing body of knowledge with intent to respond to the research question or hypothesis. It is an indication that a researcher has thoroughly engaged literature and reveals knowledge that is already known regarding a particular topic. In some cases it can point out areas which remain unanswered or contentious, therefore opening a space for further research to fill the identified gap. According to Neuman (2000:80) “a literature review is based on assumption that knowledge accumulates, that we learn from and build on what others have done. Scientific research is not an activity of isolated hermits who ignores others’ findings”.

This chapter is made up of two distinct but relevant sections. The first one provides a review of the vast literature in the field of post-apartheid South African foreign policy. Due to its vastness one will divide it into three categories. The first category is predictive in nature mostly produced from 1990-1993. The second category relates to the actual time of transition. The third category emerged after transitional period which institutionalized the idea of ambiguity in South African foreign policy. The second one seeks to clarify terms and contextual issues relevant to this study, pertaining to South Africa’s relations with other SADC countries. Concepts to be clarified include foreign policy, national interests, partner and hegemon. It should, however, be noted that the terms are explained to enhance the understanding of the reader. The reader needs to know the intended meaning of the term used by the researcher in this study. It is of no importance that the reader submits to the definitions given here. However, it is of cardinal importance that there is a shared understanding of each concept.

#### **2.2 Contextualizing post 1994 South African Foreign Policy**

Democratic South Africa carefully chose to establish new relations with Southern African states which are different from that of its predecessor government, the apartheid

government. According to Pfister (2005), apartheid South Africa's foreign policy towards the Southern African region was based on destabilization. It aimed to punish and weaken the frontline states which were in favour of the liberation movements. The Southern African region was only important in providing South Africa with labour reserves in industries and the mining sector (Adebajo, 2007). As such, South Africa's foreign policy under apartheid towards Southern African countries was confrontational and destructive in nature.

The end of the Cold War came with massive changes in the domestic political landscape of South Africa and led to the shift of political dynamics. The then president, F.W. de Klerk (the last president under the old dispensation) announced his intention to release all political prisoners and subsequently released them and lifted the ban on their liberation movements. One such leader was Nelson Mandela. According to Chhabra (1997), immediately after his release, Mandela and de Klerk embarked on an African journey. They travelled meeting heads of states; however, they had different positions to lobby for. On one hand, de Klerk was lobbying for the relaxation of sanctions and the recognition of the National Party government's legitimacy. On the other hand, Mandela lobbied for the continuation of sanctions until true democratic transition took place in South Africa. Both positions shaped the nature of South Africa's relations with the African continent. De Klerk was in a position to shape the country's foreign policy by virtue of his position as head of state. For his part, Mandela could only influence African countries not to embrace South Africa's foreign policy imperatives until full democracy had been entrenched in the country and all-inclusive elections were held in a free political environment.

Mandela prior to assuming the presidency of the Republic conveyed his concern that if human rights issues were to be neglected that would bring about disaster in the international arena (Mills, 2000). He further guaranteed that "new" South Africa's foreign policy would be based on human rights and democracy. He held that South Africa's future depended on the African continent, particularly Southern Africa, and that South Africa would pursue regional cooperation as opposed to domination (Mandela, 1993). In that sense, South Africa's renewed relations with the rest of Africa was conceived even before the historic 1994 general elections. Due to its political history and re-admission to the international arena South Africa was seen as a "beacon of hope" especially for the oppressed (Economist,

2008). This meant that South Africa had a moral obligation to protect and promote human rights (Mills, 2000). This would transcend South African boundaries and apply to Southern African countries which had provided sanctuary for the liberation movements which relentlessly fought against the notorious apartheid regime. The day of the election came on 27 April 1994 and Mandela assumed the presidency on 10 May 1994 following the ANC's landslide victory by 62.65%, with the New National Party (NNP) only managing 20.39% of the votes.

But during Mandela's tenure in the presidency of the Republic, South Africa's foreign policy was widely criticized for lack of clear direction (Chhabra, 1997). This can be attributed to many factors such as the newness of the administration in office; and lack of enthusiasm on the side of the ministers responsible for effecting the anticipated policy changes. Most importantly was the staff of the old regime which did not share the view of the new government. As informed by its past experience of apartheid, human rights were at the centre of South Africa's new foreign policy imperatives – something that was in direct contrast to what prevailed under apartheid. Mandela's main concern was the idea of universal human rights (Barber, 2005). His administration took a harsh position against dictatorial and oppressive regimes in line with the new foreign policy. For example, in 1996 Mandela openly called for the sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria's Sani Abacha. This stance was a response to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni nine activists opposed to Abacha's dictatorial powers (Vale and Maseko, 1998; and Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of states who saw Mandela's call as "un-African". South Africa went on to withdraw its representative in Nigeria. In turn South Africa suffered a blow when Western superpowers continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South Africa's call (Barber, 2005). This incident marked early signs of the hurdles South Africa's new foreign policy would face in a continent that was tolerant of dictators and the West which had no backbone, saying one thing and doing the other.

South Africa has also been seen as a unilateral actor in pretence of high moral ground. According to Kebemba (2007), when Laurent Kabila in DRC was attacked by opposing forces Southern African states intervened but South Africa isolated itself and maintained

neutrality. This non-participation in the collective intervention is usually contrasted with the country's intervention in Lesotho to halt 1998's military coup. This double standard faded the country's proclaimed moral high ground in its foreign policy (Ley, 2005). A number of scholars like Baregu and Landsberg (2003); Nel and Van der Westhuizen, (2004), and Landsberg (2006) questioned South Africa's decision to supply arms in conflict areas like Rwanda and Uganda. Mandela heavily depended on his personality while his successor Mbeki depended on quiet diplomacy in softening rivals behind the scenes (Landsberg, 2006).

During Mbeki's tenure as the president, South Africa took a conscious decision of being part of the continent. He consulted with other heads of state in the decision-making process. This signalled a clear shift from unilateral decision making as embraced by Mandela's administration towards a multilateral decision making approach (Buhlungu, et al., 2007). It can be argued that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy towards the situation in Zimbabwe should be understood in this sense. South Africa openly pronounced that foreign policy decisions relating to the region and the continent will be taken within the mechanisms of SADC and, since 2002, the AU, respectively.

Addressing parliament in March 1995 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the late Alfred Nzo, stressed the importance of South Africa in promoting regional and continental economy. He said that for South Africa to drive economic development without the partnership of its neighbours was a wild dream. Nzo emphasized that South Africa would involve the corporate sector with the intention to establish development to its fullest. With these vows from the minister, South Africa was expected to be at the centre of Southern Africa's economy (SAGI, 2008). Some of the foreign policy experts have attentively looked at the South Africa-Nigeria relations and the partnership aimed towards achieving the "new" Africa (Baregu and Landsburg, 2003; and Ogunnubi, 2013). The assumption is that good governance and sound economic policies ought to be implemented within NEPAD mechanisms.

On occupation of the presidency in mid-2009, the South African citizenry was expecting a number of changes in South Africa including new policy directions. This meant that the foreign policy direction was also expected to take a new direction. The new administration

immediately changed the name of Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) into the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). This fuelled the perception that South Africa's foreign policy was due to take a new direction which would prioritise domestic issues. The incumbent in the office minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, explained that the change of name was in line with the new direction which would be to enhance partnership and co-operation. According to Landsberg (2012:77), Nkoana-Mashabane articulated that the move was "largely motivated by international trends which require states to put emphasis on co-operation over competition, and collaboration over confrontation". Landsberg (2012) suggest that the change of name was an indication that the new administration was coming with a new style of leadership towards foreign policy making and implementation.

President Zuma followed on his predecessors' footsteps; South Africa maintained its contribution to the AU and its organs (Ogunnubi, 2013). Among many accomplishments so far, the formation of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) stands out. The agency in principle takes the form of President Mbeki's African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund. This fund is geared towards the integration of national government departments on human resource development to establish one solid and viable entity which will enhance state intervention (Ogunnubi, 2013).

Despite all these mechanisms, South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa and Africa as a whole and its role has been characterized by flaws. South Africa's human rights approach and other operations have triggered controversy amongst other players especially from the continent. It has been labelled differently by different players. While others maintain that it is a hegemon aimed at self-interest others maintain that it is only a team player.

### **2.3 Post-1994 South African Foreign Policy Literature**

According to Naidoo (2010), Peter Vale a reputable writer on South African foreign policy pointed out in 1991 a need for an all-inclusive study on South Africa's future foreign policy. Since then, a plethora of South African foreign policy literature has proliferated.



Academics and practitioners in the field have engaged on this dynamic topic; as a result three major categories of literature can be identified.

“The first category of literature was predictive in nature. It was produced during 1990-1993 period and it aimed at predicting and influencing the direction post-apartheid South African foreign policy would take. Prominent to those were: Mills and Baynham (1990) “Changing the Guard: South African Foreign Policy into the 1990s” Evans (1991), “Myths and Realities in South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy” Vale (1992), “Points of Re-entry: Prospects for a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy” and Du Pisani (1993), “Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa.”

The second category of literature was at the point of actual transition. Prominent among others were: Mills (1994), “From Pariah to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994” Bischoff (1995), “Democratic South Africa One Year After: Towards a New Foreign Policy” Landsberg (1995), “Selling South Africa: New Foreign Policy” and Vale (1995), “Continuity rather Than Change: South Africa’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy”.

The third category emerged in 1997 which institutionalized the idea of ambiguity embedded in South African foreign policy. This idea continues to characterize South African foreign policy even today. This literature revolves around the contradiction between theory and practice of South African foreign policy. Prominent literature includes, among others: Heywood (1997), “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems” Le Pere, Lambrechts and Van Nieuwkerk (1999), “The Burden of the Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the New Millennium” Taylor (2001), “Stuck in Middle Gear: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations” Sidiropoulos (2004), “Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994-2004” and Adebajo et. Al. (2007), “South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era.”

One might propose that foreign policy academics and scholars are very keen to explore new directions for South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa and

Africa in general. The expectation was that post-apartheid South Africa would use its relative stronger economy to its advantage and subsequently be imperialist and interventionist more than the past regime. There were further expectations that an already established hegemon would take a leadership role. No matter what ambitions were, all directions were bound to have their own losses and gains. Despite all ambitions and obsessions regarding South Africa's relations with the Southern African region they remain ambiguous. However, they can be broadly summed up in the manner presented below.

**Table 2.1: Scenarios on SA's presence in the region**

SCENARIO	ASSESSMENT	PREDICTION
Fragmentation	South Africa as a major actor in the Southern African region is at the forefront of attaining regional cooperation and integration in line with its national interests and ambitions of being a regional hegemony. As a result, the region's political economic structure is asymmetrical benefiting South Africa. According to McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998), the status quo enables South Africa to act as hegemon as opposed to a partner. This might open space for marginalization and fragmentation leading towards uneven	This approach is likely to be fruitful for South Africa in the near future; however, it is likely to blow out and contradict its long-term regional and global goals.

	<p>development. Flowing from this, one might suggest that South Africa is implementing a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy. This policy is of unbalanced integration where by South Africa raises the African Renaissance flag while its corporations advance greedy interests of self-enrichment.</p>	
Exploitation	<p>The South African government together with South African corporations are advancing their narrow business interests at the expense of their regional counterparts. This neo-mercantilist route on one hand allows South Africa to pursue its own bias interest while on the other hand being adamant to the general necessities of the region. This approach contradicts South Africa’s long-term goals of bridging the gap and addressing the current imbalances among the member states. Davies, Keet,</p>	<p>This approach is the most non-compatible route towards the establishment of the favourable conditions for growth and sustainable development. Overnight benefit will not be of usefulness in the long run.</p>

	and Nkuhlu (1993) proposed that the nerve of South Africa's foreign policy towards its neighbours would be of asymmetry and non-symbiosis. South Africa would infiltrate the region's market but remain adamant in addressing other issues of importance.	
Partnership	South Africa is currently implementing parasitic policies, entering into non-mutual beneficial alliances and partnerships with the expectation that all parties will benefit in the near future. The aim is to establish a regional capacity and to create an environment suitable for the sustainable development as well as political and economic growth.	This is in line with state officials who constantly reiterate the ANC's position as outlined in the ANC Foreign Policy Perspectives " ...we address our own problems as part of a family of Southern African nations, our destiny inextricably linked by geography, history and our huge collective potential" (ANC Foreign Policy Document, 1994).
Strategic Autarky	A number of academics and scholars in the foreign policy arena seem reluctant to accept the possibility of South Africa playing no key regional role. Regardless of	This might work in early stages but in the long run it is likely to be cost ineffective. According to Cheru (1996, 34) "selfish hegemonic

	<p>South Africa's scarce resources and huge domestic responsibilities, its interests in Southern Africa remain suspicious. This is informed for an example by its decision to intervene militarily in Lesotho and its non-interventionist stance in the case of Zimbabwe.</p> <p>This might cause South Africa to redirect its interests to other places like Asia, Europe and North America. This would mean minimum participation in sub-regional initiatives.</p>	<p>relationship will facilitate South Africa's integration into the world economy but will undermine the possibility of reversing the century old structure of dependence and marginalization and is unlikely to bring development to Southern Africa".</p>
--	--	---

**Source: Author's compilation; adapted from Naidoo (2010)**

The above scenarios offer a necessary but basic outline of what is or should South African foreign policy be. Nonetheless, it restricts policy analysis to traditional categories and norms of sovereign states and their interrelationships. As Kissinger (1994:17) proposed "What no leader must ever do is suggest that choice has no price or that no balance needs to be struck".

## **2.5 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE STUDY**

### **2.5.1 Introduction**

In the field of political science scholars tend to use the same term to refer to different events or processes. This means that one term is likely to have different meanings. This is contrary to natural science, which has fixed definition of terms which are universally accepted. This submission is in line with McGowan and Nel (2000:15) who hold that:

Scholars in international relations are very eclectic, and they use methods and conceptual tools from a whole range of disciplines to carry out their investigations. As such, concepts form the basic tools with which researchers can describe, interpret, explain, predict and make normative judgments.

These scholars suggest that international relations scholars should come up with “appropriate” meanings for the terms to be used. Owing to the complexities of the international relations discipline even “common” terms are given different meanings by different scholars. It is therefore, important to explain terms when used for the purpose of clarity. According to Olivier (2009) concepts and theories emerge to explain existing realities of the society. Flowing from this, one can conclude that there are a number of terms which are used to analyse South Africa’s foreign policy. This section seeks to clarify terms and contextual issues relevant to this study, pertaining to South Africa’s relations with other SADC countries.

### **2.5.2 Foreign Policy**

According to De Plussis (2002) international relations scholars generally agree that foreign policy is a contested and ambiguous concept. It is therefore important to state that this study does not seek to give a comprehensive and single definition; instead it seeks to offer a general but detailed conceptualization of this term. Russet and Starr (1996) hold the view that the variety of interpretations, arguments and statements on foreign policy are as a result of the absence of the universally agreed upon foreign policy definition. It is because of this “vacuum” that scholars from different schools of thoughts have coined different definitions and interpretations. Foreign policy decisions based on “hot” issues like human rights, democracy and international law can be better interpreted through the application of certain

theories” (GCIS, 2009). Orwa and Utete (1985) hold that foreign policy is a sum of policy goals and interests persuaded by a state. However, this definition has its own discrepancies. It creates a false impression that foreign policy represents states’ interests only, therefore, side-lining the non-state actors. This is a realism orientated definition which assumes a state as the only rational and unitary actor in the international system. This definition leaves out other actors like the civil society and individuals (Hill, 2003). Du Plessis (2002: 112) submitted that foreign policy refers to:

[T]hose actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated directives, and performed by government representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities are manifestly directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which ... lie beyond their sphere of territorial legitimacy.

This definition is accommodative; it recognises the role of both state and non-state actors like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in foreign policy related issues. While the state was understood to be the central actor in the international system now NGOs like the International Red Cross and Human Rights Watch have come to play. State is still the most primary actor but this does not suggest that NGOs are not important actors (Hill, 2003).

Foreign policy is different from domestic policies as it is a tool for attaining states’ policy goals outside the country. Perhaps the most suitable way to define it would be to split it and take into account sovereignty and territory (Russett and Starr, 1996). It is “foreign” because it seeks to develop and sustain relations outside the state’s borders (Hill, 2003). At the same time it is described by Russett and Starr (1996) as the decisions taken by diplomats to achieve foreign policy goals of their states.

It will be useful to turn to the roots of the word “foreign”. It comes from the Latin word “*foris*” translated into English as ‘outside’. That is why foreign policy relates to issues outside the state’s borders. “Foreign” also serves as an indicator that the international system is divided into different components and that foreign policies seek to close the gap

between these components. This policy relates to the tactics which states employ in order to display their identity abroad. So, foreign policy is a medium through which states justify their international activities. Such activities can be economic or political (Hill, 2003).

Du Plessis (2002) and Holsti (1995) refer to foreign policy as an activity. However, Russett and Starr (1996) reject such a claim. They (Russett and Starr) hold that foreign policy is not an activity instead it is a link between two activities; local and abroad activities, respectively. They argue that policies are mere abstracts. However, they admit that policy related activities like diplomacy, mediation and negotiations can be understood as activities. Adar (2006) concurs that foreign policy remains a hypothetical statement awaiting implementation. It is also important to differentiate between foreign policy and diplomacy; the two are intertwined but different. The former entails interests and objectives and states outside a country's borders, whereas the latter is the *modus operandi* through which those interests are achieved. Foreign policy is taken as a policy mainly because it involves state's interests and objectives. Foreign policy can be based on a number of aspects like security, economy and politics (Du Plessis, 2002). Now let one turn to stages of foreign policy.

According to Knecht and Weatherford (2004) foreign policy making is a long process which involves different actors; they further break the process to the following five stages:

- Stage one is Agenda Setting. Here policymakers compile a list of potential areas of focus and decision makers clearly point out the rewards and dangers involved.
- Stage two is Opinion generation. This is more of a brainstorming session. Decision makers make a list of the most important and urgent areas of concern.
- Stage three is Policy Design. Here policy decisions are made as per the issues identified in the latter stage. This is the important stage regarding foreign policy formulation.
- Stage four is Implementation. This includes strategies and tactics through which the policy formulated is put into action. This stage involves a number of different actors both state and non-state actors.



- Stage five is Policy review. Here the decision makers evaluate the failure or success of the policy and make necessary amendments or abandon the policy depending on the outcomes of the evaluation process.

### **2.5.3 Foreign Policy Goals and Anticipation**

Every state's foreign policy is goal- orientated; as a result there are always objectives to assist in achieving such goals. Usually, foreign policy objectives reflect potential ambitions of the state and are set by the few elites on behalf of the entire group. The difference in states' foreign policy is the manner in which each state pursues its objectives. As mentioned earlier, foreign policy is the policy guide for action (Landsburg, 2006). Success in attaining policy objectives is not given; other states fail to achieve their objectives. Foreign policy varies from one state to the other depending on the goals set.

Taking into account the aforementioned stages of foreign policy making, Holsti (1995) identifies common foreign policy goals usually set by actors. Foreign policy is usually aimed at:

- Ensuring security domestically and to a certain extent outside borders. This usually includes the prevention of insurgency, secession and violence. Depending on the type of government, some have suppressed political and civil rights in the name of national security.
- Competency towards attaining prosperity. This may include provisions for public welfare. Governments seek to develop and maintain public welfare through economic and social services provisions.
- Gaining international prestige. States want to be respected by other states in the international system and most states use military power to gain prestige.
- Maintaining independence and autonomy. This involves the state's ability to formulate and action its own policy without outside interference.

Decision makers need to take into account issues of morality when deciding on their relations with others states. Despite the anarchic nature of the international systems there are actors who follow the rules while others just break them. Those who follow the rules do

that within organizations like UN and the AU (Hill, 2003). In moral terms, states are expected to act modestly and in good faith; this is in line with the international norms. This suggests that states' foreign policies should mirror equality of all states and fairness. Issues relating to military intervention and human rights violations are highly controversial issues from the morality point of view (Holsti, 1995).

Policy makers usually set too many goals which are way beyond the state's capacity in terms of implementation. Over ambition on the side of policy makers raises hopes for the general public only to find that the goals are unachievable. In the same vein, setting very few goals might create the impression that there is a lack of competency on the side of the state and therefore result in the state losing its level of credibility. According to Hill (2003:45) "it should be borne in mind that it is common to have exaggerated political expectations of what can be done with foreign policy ... just as there is an academic trend towards expecting too little". However, it is risky to promise what is not achievable. Promising equal global distribution of wealth is suicidal as it is unlikely to be achieved (Borer and Mills, 2009). Policy makers tend to set all these unachievable goals in pursuit of national interests.

#### **2.5.4 Southern Africa**

McGowan (2002) suggests that Southern Africa is usually defined as a community of fourteen member states of SADC. It is a total of twelve countries located in the most Southern part of the African continent with DRC being the most Northern plus two islands located in the Indian Ocean: Mauritius and Seychelles, respectively. Naidu and Roberts (2004) concur with McGowan (2002) that Southern Africa is made up by most Southern countries including Tanzania and DRC.

**Figure 2.1: The Map of Southern Africa**



**Source:** <http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/southern-african-development-community-sadc>

Nonetheless, the division of Africa into Southern, North, East and West Africa is not based on any solid foundations. There is a view that “SADC’s original membership was defined by the apartheid state’s economic, political and military destabilization campaigns and therefore reflected both South Africa’s historical economic ties on the continent and its military reach” (McGowan, 2002:268). Tanzania for example, was a founder of the Frontline States and of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and SADC.

**Table 2.2: Differentiating between SADCC and SADC**

	SADCC	SADC
ESTABLISHMENT	It came as a decision of the political formation of the Frontline States.	It emerged out of deliberations of the SADCC Conference on the 17 <sup>th</sup> of August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia.
OBJECTIVE	To achieve regional autonomy free of South Africa.	To come up with Southern Africa's united position in the dynamic international economic system.
MEMBERSHIP	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

**Source: Author's compilation**

There is no dispute in terms of what constitute Southern Africa relative to physical boundaries. The definition adopted is basically helpful and of general usage (Simon, 1998). However, certain additional countries are included for particular objectives or context. The ten countries generally undisputed under any context are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These countries by all means make up the Southern region under any circumstances (Simon,

1998). For the purpose of this study the Southern African region will be understood as comprising the ten above mentioned countries as illustrated by the map bellow.

**Figure 2.2: The Map of Southern Africa**



Source: <http://www.google.co.za/imgres?imgurl=http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-GJwaUOTTeac/T8Hwvgymb9I/AAAAAAAAACO4>

### **2.5.5 National Interests**

National interest theory conceptualizes states as self-centred actors in the international system. States are seen as rational actors with interests just like human persons (Frankel, 1963). Bullard (2006) claims that there is no universal definition of the phrase national interests; therefore it is defined differently by different people. As much as it has no

common definition it is, however, generally accepted that the term relates to foreign policy. According to Hill (2003:119) “national interests cannot be a guide to foreign policy goals because they are tautologous”. He holds the view that national interest is a yardstick because it determines whether a policy is domestic or international and whether it is public or private. This shows that foreign policy goals originate from people’s interests (Alden and Soko, 2005).

In the conceptualization of national interests by the scholars of the realist school of thought the importance of power stands out. A realist Morgenthau (1978) holds that national interest can be defined on the bases of power. Defining interest as power might create an impression that politics as a field is independent and separate from fields like economy and security. National interests of a state are power orientated (Pham, 2008). States and other foreign policy actors justify their actions both good and bad as being carried out in the name of national interests (Adar, 2002).

The elite-centric model upholds that there is little or no relationship between public and foreign policy. This is in line with the realists who hold that the public has no input in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Both these models suggest that the general public lacks competency to contribute to foreign policy making and its implementation because of their inherent human weakness. They stress that the general public is sometimes vulnerable to the point that it succumbs to weak personalities like inconsistent moods and irrationality. Both schools of thoughts suggest that decision makers should abandon the preference of the nation, however, continue using the phrase when referring to foreign policy goals (Knecht and Weatherford, 2004). This is a true reflection of the reality since decision makers in foreign policy hardly consult the public during the decision -making process.

There is a concern regarding the correctness of the usage of the phase “national interests”. Dissidents submit that it is senior government officials who are direct custodians of the foreign policy formulation and implementation and that there is minimal or no input from the general public and the corporate sector. Hence, the phrase “goal of the government of

the day” would be more suitable than national interests (Adar, 2002). The phrase national interest is largely utilized by realists because it better explains the state’s behaviour. From a realist angle, “one country’s military presence in other conflict-stricken countries can be ascribable to that country’s power related national interests, let alone the motivation behind peacekeeping” (Schoeman, 2007:98). However, dissidents would reject this because most people do not know that their governments are involved in peacekeeping operation abroad. Despite this, decisions are conveyed as if they are based on the majority, the nation.

#### **2.5.6 State Actors**

The term actor might appear as complex and ambiguous, but for the purpose of this study it refers to the state and civil society which are involved in foreign policy making. According to Hill (2003) the state is a sum of public institutions responsible for order and social stability in a defined territory. A modern state is categorized according to its authority over the citizen of the given geographical space. This enables a hospitable environment for the operation of government on behalf of a state. One must stress that there is a difference between the state and the government. While the former is an embodiment of public institutions and citizens, the latter is the tool in which state authority is exercised. According to McGowan and Nel (2002:13) “State actors comprise the sovereign territorial states (STSs) in the world together with the intergovernmental organisations ... that they form”. States in the international systems are results of different groups and individuals. These groups and individuals are not always agreeing with one another and therefore need to be treated as different rational actors. In addition to this, intergovernmental organizations that emerge from states’ effort like SADC and the AU can also be referred to as state actors.

Realist scholars hold the view that states are rational and unitary actors because of the power they are commanding over their respective citizens (Hicks, 2004). States are usually not honest with one another in the bilateral and multilateral forums. Morgenthau (1978) believes that the selfish behaviour of states in the international system should be attributed to the anarchic nature of the system as opposed to state actors.

Goodrich (2004) opines that the rejection of realism's conception of the state as a rational and unitary actor usually meets with a lot of criticisms. Generally speaking, it is not easy to be rational in every issue every time. The rationality of any given state is subject to a given issue in a given time; states are not rational in everything they do. Likewise, according to Higgott, Underhill and Bieler (2001) the rejection of the realist assumption should not create a false impression that states' role have been reduced, however, it has shifted. This shift is due to increasing challenges posed by non-state actors. Currently, states are dominant only at the domestic level where they provide for governance services.

### **2.5.7 Non-State Actors**

According to Hornby (2005) the nature of non-state actors can be approached from the linguistic perspective. The prefix "non" means "not", therefore, not state actors. The discussion here revolves around actors which are not state actors; these are neither established nor maintained by the state. However, they function within the domestic state laws. This alone shows the amount of power and authority states enjoy at least at the domestic level (Adar, 2002).

There has been a substantial increase in number of non-state actors in the international system mainly due to globalization. The increase relates to the number of actors; size of the actors and the power they command. Idealist scholars reject that states are the most single important actors in the international system. Vincent (2002:147) submits that "... idealist scholars have argued that non-state actors have a significant impact on questions of politics, morality and peace, and that ... the state might not be the most important variable for explaining world events". As much as idealism advocates for non-state actors it, however, excludes unwanted actors like terrorist organizations.

### **2.5.8 Partner**

South Africa's foreign policy has found itself trapped in the controversy regarding its identity in the international system. This alone has led to disputes on whether South Africa is looking for partners in her neighbouring states or is just a self-interested hegemon. It is



therefore of paramount importance to explain these two concepts as they are at the centre of this study.

Partnership can be understood to be meaning friendly political and economic relations between and among actors in the international system. The root of the usage of the term can be traced back to the colonialization period. It was used to refer to the situation where Britain had granted certain limited autonomy to its colonies which did not constitute full independence. They were granted minor powers enough though to manage own affairs. With the developments between the master and a colony the term partnership started being used interchangeably with dominions and dual policy (Duncan, 2007). In partnership, concerned actors are assumed to be sharing same goals and objectives with equal treatment, yet it is known that not all partners are equal in relation to power (Schoeman, 2007). It goes beyond just cooperation. Instead, “It is the highest level of reciprocal commitment between international actors. In partnership, there can also be mutual interests, “interdependency”, “cooperation and trust”, “quality control” and “standards” amongst allies. Although there ought to be some extent of interdependence among partners, there must also be a strong sense of sovereignty and independence” (Duncan, 2007:55). Similar to all partnerships in the international system, there is expectation of tolerance and commitment. It is however important to note that regardless of the goals and objectives partners do not agree on everything every time (Schoeman, 2007). Now it is important to turn to another concept, hegemon.

#### **2.5.9 Hegemon**

Hegemon comes from hegemony, which was derived from the Greek word *hegemonia* which translates ‘to lead’ in English. According to the neo-realists hegemon relates to a state which plays a strong and credible leadership role. It should also discharge unchallenged leadership (Schoeman, 2007). From this, one can infer that a hegemon is a state which has power to dominate and control other states (Evans & Newnham, 1998). A hegemon at times becomes monopolistic and implements its own interest although states become beneficial sometimes to other actors. The issue of unchallenged leadership can also

be exercised by any powerful actor, state or non-state alike. In most cases hegemony is linked with the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (McGowan & Nel, 2002).

The term hegemony is more effective compared to other concepts it is usually equated to, like middle power or emerging power. Hegemony thoroughly explains the hierarchical and possibly the ideology of a predominant actor within that particular arena. While a hegemon has been closely related to the emergence of the US as a global hegemon, it has been principally used in international relations to refer to the bilateral relations between developing and already developed states (Prys, 2007). Currently the term hegemon is usually confined to regional relations. According to Prys (2007) this does not mean that a hegemon can be effectively used interchangeably with terms like regional leader or emerging middle power. This, however, does not seek to dispute that all these actors have the same goal that is to develop and coordinate the regions. The concept 'hegemon' can also be defined using normative and empirical evaluations. Regardless of the failure to provide a concrete definition of hegemony, it can be divided to several types like capitalist hegemony, regional hegemon and economic hegemon among others.

A hegemon in a broader sense can be either positive or negative. Positive hegemony is usually characterized by the willingness to regulate and manage for the communal benefits of the hegemony and its subordinates. The legitimacy of the hegemon rests on its ability and strength to set rules to be followed by the subordinates without the use of force (Selby, n.d.). This kind of hegemon usually takes good care of public good and works towards educating its subordinates. Contrary to this, a negative hegemon desires repressive domination with the imminent use of force and power imbalances (Selby, n.d.). Adebajo (2007) adds that negative hegemons have bullying and arrogance tendencies. This behaviour is compared with that of Britain in the 19<sup>th</sup> century during colonialism.

The global hegemon is understood to be an entirely dominant single actor obsessed with hegemonic desires. However, Taylor (2001) suggests that global hegemon relates to provisional partnerships which seek to change social forces. This term shows the power of a strong structure of economic and political forces and the exercise of leadership where there

is lack of potential alternative. In such scenarios, one dominant state within the collective assumes the supreme responsibilities, economic or political. Nevertheless, this does not seek to dismiss the idea that the major source of hegemony is based in the hegemon's ability to address domestic and foreign challenges which culminate in a particular collective of actors relating with a dominant actor. According to Gramscianism, being a hegemon in whichever sphere goes beyond material (military and monetary) possession to also incorporate "intellectual and moral leadership" on the grounds of ideological affiliation (Taylor, 2001:12).

Hegemonic leadership can be comprised of cooperative and supportive actors within the particular forum; regional or international. In Gramscian terms hegemonic leadership is not dependent on material resources the hegemon possess but also depends on the capability to persuade other players to follow on ideological basis (Prys, 2008). Here a hegemon relies on the rational interests that need to benefit the hegemon together with the subordinates. The presence of a hegemon is likely to bring about political order and decreases the chances to use force, but this is not guaranteed everywhere and all the time. Prys (2008) recommends the following measurements which must be taken into account when attempting to fully understand hegemonic systems.

- Perceptions: This relates to self-perception and perception by other actors concerned.

Hegemons are generally perceived to be ready to assume the responsibilities of a hegemonic situation. It is because the failure to assume such responsibilities leads to confusion and regrets particularly where there is a huge vacuum between expectations and successes. Leadership requires followership; hence, there will be no hegemon without subordinates. Most likely, not all subordinate states welcome and accept the leadership of a hegemon. Some will defy, challenge and condemn the hegemon. The establishment of a hegemon relies on the individual actor's response in the multilateral setting.

- **Projection:** A hegemon should demonstrate its interests to other actors as opposed to imposing on them. Hegemons need to be mindful of how they operate in pursuit of their vision. For example, if a hegemon wants to involve itself in conflict resolution it needs to do that in a multilateral setting through bodies like SADC and AU.
- **Provision:** A hegemon in any level where it exists is characterized by unilateral provision of public good. Services commonly provided for by hegemonies include free market trade, security and infrastructure.

A hegemon is not only determined by material resources. It can also be determined through its ideological allegiances. A hegemon pursues and defends what it ideologically believes in. The ideal image of what a hegemon stands for “can be identified as the way in which it views and interprets the world and its contents, perhaps partly influenced by its national interests” (Schoeman, 2007: 3). For the purpose of illustration, South Africa is the example of a regional actor in the SADC region and the continent to a limited extent, respectively. The US exemplifies both a continental and global hegemon. It is the regional hegemon in the continent North America and world hegemony. In the recorded history of the international relations three hegemonies have emerged: Holland, Great Britain (1800s) and the US (1990s). However, there are different views regarding the US’s global hegemonic status with some disputing it (McGowan and Nel, 2002). Thus, hegemonic status remains contested.

#### **2.5.10 Multilateralism**

The term multilateralism was traditionally defined as global government of the many; this definition was coined by the US in 1945. The US then was at the forefront in establishing multilateral and treaty organizations to face the common challenges. The advocates of this idea acknowledged the existence of one hegemon; however, they believed that multilateralism would benefit secondary actors for the purpose of stability. The major reasons for forming multilateral bodies were to bring about security and cooperation (Slobodchikoff, 2009).

Currently there is a “hot” but stimulating debate among schools of thought regarding multilateralism. According to the constructivist point of view states are just actors playing in the multilateral relations with their objectives and behaviour shaped by the shared norms (Verdier, 2005). Contrary to this, realist scholars believe that morality has no standing in global politics. They aver that states’ behaviour is guided by their own interests as a result hegemons would remain dominant within the alliance unless secondary actors join forces to counter the hegemon (Verdier, 2005). However, if states are perpetually engaging in conflicts with one another there will be little chances of progress. If it happens that there is progress despite perpetual conflicts then the multilateral organization in question is likely to reflect the hegemon’s national interest. The institutionalists’ approach mirrors both realists’ and constructivists’ point of view. On one hand, they agree with constructivists that competition among actors can be regulated by institutional means. On the other hand, they concur with the realists’ that states are self-interested actors who only enter into multilateral bodies to pursue their own agenda (Verdier, 2005).

With the prominence of the multilateralism, common challenges have revolved around global economy. Multilateral institutions came with several advantages. According to Wedgwood (2002) states with large pools of resources contribute largely in the multilateral institutions for greater good. Kegley (1995:11) submits that:

A multilateral environment is a great platform where states are obliged to respect international law and cooperate in many areas of development including health, security, economic development and technology. They also get to exchange each other’s interests and concerns; simultaneously seeking to resolve their differences.

However, multilateralism comes with its flaws. Decision making for example delays because of many actors contributing different views. It takes more time than in a bilateral forum. Sometimes important matters end up being not addressed mainly because decisions are often broadly taken; therefore, lacking practical implementation strategy. The idea of

independence distorts decision making because other actors do not reveal certain domestic information in pretext of national security (Wedgwood, 2002).

Realists have consistently rejected multilateralism as a proper platform for interaction. Realists claim that super powers exploit relatively weaker states and pursue their individual interests (Wedgwood, 2002). Slobodchikoff (2009) asserts that the US is applying multilateralism in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while applying bilateral principles in multilateral forums like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Slobodchikoff (2009) claims that should a state choose multilateralism as a preference it should go for it in all foreign relations. Neoliberalism also rejects the universalization of the idea of multilateralism. It prefers regional multilateralism over global multilateralism as a forum for interaction. Regional multilateralism is better equipped to address international problems. The reason is that cooperation and effective policy implementation is difficult in large organizations like the UN (Kahler, 1992).

#### **2.5.11 African Renaissance**

The term African Renaissance has been the centre of attention for many African statesmen. However, this seems to dwindle as a result of the departure from office of its advocates like South Africa's Thabo Mbeki; Libya's Muammar Kaddafi; and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo. These statesmen were at the forefront leading the road to the African Renaissance. Since President Mbeki resurfaced the term there has been an attempt to analyse and to define it (Okumu, 2003). African Renaissance refers to the state where Africa's culture and economy experiences development (Hornby, 2010). In essence African Renaissance stresses that the African future is in the hands of the Africans themselves. This means that Africans ought to face socio-economic and political challenges that characterize the African continent (Maloka, 2011). In the South African context, the term African Renaissance emerged following the election of President Mandela as the head of state. It was thereafter popularized by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki particularly when he addressed the Constitutional Assembly. In his speech titled 'I am an African' Mbeki (1996) noted:

I am born of a people who are heroes and heroines ... Patient because history is on their side, these masses do not despair because today the weather is bad. Nor do they turn triumphalist when, tomorrow, the sun shines. ... Whatever the circumstances they have lived through and because of that experience, they are determined to define for themselves who they are and who they should be.

He further noted “I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face of our native land. ...” (Mbeki, 1996). Mbeki was seriously worried about the continual conflicts in Africa in the age of an economically globalizing world (Ajulu, 2001). More concerning was that the African continent has vast natural resources like gold, copper and uranium to name the few, but is still at the periphery of the world economy (Ayittey, 1999).

According to Mbeki in order for the African Renaissance to succeed decision makers and policy makers need to focus on social cohesion, democracy and economic rebuilding. In addition to that is the institution of Africa as an important player in the geopolitical issues (Ayittey, 1999). President Mbeki’s aid Vusi Mavimbela characterized African Renaissance as a third moment in post-colonial Africa. The first moment is decolonization, the second moment being the widespread of democracy during the 1990s, and the third moment being the African Renaissance (Mavimbela, 1998). As much as President Mbeki recently promoted the idea of African Renaissance, the ability of Africa to rise above its seemingly embedded challenges was identified long time ago. Addressing the audience at Columbia University in 1906 one of the founders of the ANC (Pixley ka Izaka) Seme (1906) noted:

The brighter day is rising upon Africa...Yes the regeneration of Africa belongs to this new and powerful period. The African people...possess a common fundamental sentiment which is everywhere manifest, crystallizing itself into one common controlling idea...The regeneration of

Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to be added to the world.

The idea of renaissance itself pre-existed before Pixley ke Izaka Seme's period; it can be traced as far back as the fifteen century in Europe. During the renaissance in Europe there was a renewal of Europe's interests in Greek culture (Lotter, 2007). (Obonye, 2012) believes that the notion of African Renaissance is not a new development. He makes reference to Africans who have also talked about the same idea; they include Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Robert Sobukwe. They preached among other things self-reliance, democracy and sustainable development as the centres of African Renaissance. While the idea of African Renaissance is not a new invention, it remains one of the best ideas to emerge from the Africans themselves today.

#### **2.5.12 Conclusion**

This chapter was twofold; the first section reviewed the vast literature in the field of post-apartheid South African foreign policy. Due to its vastness the literature was divided it into three categories. The first category was predictive in nature mostly produced from 1990-1993. The second category related to the actual time of transition. The third category emerged after transitional period which institutionalized the idea of ambiguity in South African foreign policy. The second section attempted to clarify terms and contextual issues relevant to this study, pertaining to South Africa's relations with other SADC countries. Concepts that were clarified included foreign policy, national interests, partner and hegemon. It was, however, noted that the terms were explained to enhance the understanding of the reader. The reader needed to know the intended meaning of the term used by the researcher in this study. It was of no importance that the reader submits to the definitions given here. However, it was of cardinal importance that there should exist a shared understanding of each concept. Having dealt with literature review and key concepts, the following chapter will give key theories in which the study will be constructed.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

According to Cox (1995) theories emerge out of reality because they are shaped by practical events and processes. However, they lead reality making since they shape the minds of those who change or reproduce the reality through their actions. In relation to this study, theories are helpful constructs for better comprehending shifting dynamics of the international politics. This study was guided by development and hegemonic stability theories, as well as middle power paradigms to better comprehend South Africa's foreign policy hesitance between hegemony consolidation and promotion of an African agenda in the region. The study swerves from the conventional international relations theories like realism, idealism and globalism which have always been at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy analysis. However, the aim is not to reject or dispute their significance and relevance in South Africa's foreign policy analysis. According to Dunn and Shaw (2001), traditional international relations theories are not sufficient to help us to better comprehend the African inter-state relations and by application foreign policy. However, in the course of the study, reference to conventional theories' assumptions was made. The idea is to offer a distinct theoretical understanding of South Africa's foreign policy dilemma.

#### **3.2 Conventional theoretical approaches**

##### **3.2.1 Realism**

For the realist scholars the global area is anarchic by nature; this refers to the lack of central government with authority (Waltz, 1979). All traditional actors are sovereign and independent from one another and there is nobody to dictate relations among them. They act out of either own will or out of forcible means. Due to lack of the central authority power becomes very important. Power becomes a variable of interest since states would need it to defend themselves. Both soft and hard powers are important for states' survival; however, military capabilities determine international politics (Waltz, 1979).

According to Mearsheimer (1994) this view of the international system is based on the following assumptions: Firstly, all states struggle for survival. All states are in danger of being invaded by outside military forces and being subjugated. This applies even if states reflect benevolent goals; anarchic nature requires power for self-defence and advancement of interests for survival. Secondly, states are assumed to be rational actors. Taking into account the eagerness of states to survive, they ought to act carefully in order to realise the goal for survival. Thirdly, realist scholars assume that every state has certain military capabilities since no state can tell what other states intend to do. This means that the international system is risky and full of imminent threats. Lastly, the international system is for the super powers to dominate (Mearsheimer, 1994).

Realist scholars themselves differ on certain issues. The offensive realists hold that states seek to increase their power for the purpose of survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). They assume that if state A has more power relative to state B then state B is in danger. It is therefore the best option to strive for being a hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). Contrary to that, defensive realists hold that domination is a bad idea for survival (Waltz, 1979). Moving towards being a hegemon might threaten other states and subsequently cause enemies. Defensive realists advocate for stability through the balance of power. This entails a fairly equal distribution of power. This is likely to ease tension and it eliminates the perceived eminent danger of being invaded by other states (Waltz, 1979). However, the overarching obsession of the Realists by state of anarchy results in a shallow view of both international law and institutions (Mearsheimer, 1994). According to the realist scholars in the absence of clear central authority law can solely be enforced through state power.

According to Sabine and Thorson (1973) realism sees international relations as a field full of competing states and when such competition becomes hostile it can lead to war. Dunn and Shaw (2001) acknowledge that African states usually do not militarily engage one another; however, in the early 1990s with the change of the world order tensions have been high. Nossal (1998) holds that realism sees the world realistically, that is, each state pursues its own interests and it is watching other self-interested states in the system. In the international relations, national security and state survival are at the centre of the foreign policy formation (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003). In the view of realists, power is a

fundamental feature in the international relations while the state becomes the central player. However, Dunn and Shaw (2001) assert that notwithstanding the realists' thought, most African states are weak.

South Africa as a perceived regional power is an important player within the African continent particularly with the emergence of the so called African century. The major objectives of the foreign policy are to project and defend the national interests of the state (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003). Landsberg (2006) asserts that the application of the realists' interpretation on South Africa's foreign policy reveals that South Africa is pursuing to be a regional hegemony. Realist puts national interests before any other consideration. According to Hattingh (2007), the ANC's foreign policy is formed on the basis of business expansion. It seeks to expand South Africa's business' interest all over the continent. Using this trajectory to interpret South Africa's activities in Southern Africa, we could conclude that the country subscribes to the realist theory.

### **3.2.2 Liberalism**

Liberalism provides for a complicated and interrelated analysis compared to Realism. The point of departure is that domestic features of individual states are important for their foreign relations. This is contrary to the Realists' view of states being self-interested and being in the struggle for survival. According to Doyle (1997), the emergence of the democratic peace phenomena is the best development in the Liberalist circle. As earlier envisaged by Immanuel Kant democratic peace professes the absence of war between and among liberal states. The assumption is that mature liberal democracies do not wage war against one another. Statistical analysis shows that there are only few instances where mature liberal democracies have waged war against each other (Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1996). However, there have not been compelling reasons provided as to why liberal democracies do not fight each other. In addition to that, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) claim that the actual democratization process is a bloody one compare to autocratic regimes.

Moravcsik (1999) provides a common outline of liberal theory in relation to global politics. The outline is based on three assumptions: Firstly, non-state actors as opposed to states are key actors in the international system. This emphasises the primary role being played by

NGOs, IGOs, individuals and private groups in the international system. Secondly, states are simply dominant actors out of many domestic actors in the society which merely serve society's interests. Finally, the configuration of these preferences throughout the global arena dictates states' behaviour (Moravcsik, 1999). Issues relating to power distribution are treated as non-dynamic limitations on the relations of socially-derived state preferences. In line with this view, states are not just objects struggling for survival in the anarchic world but a network of different actors whose interests are projected by government. Survival might be important too but not a primary goal; there are ideological and commercial issues in the equation (Moravcsik, 1999).

Liberalism focuses on individual rights and freedom which is the base for modern civil society. It also emphasizes on democratic principles and capitalist economy (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003). By implication international relations are not centred on the struggle for power among actors. Instead, it is centred on states, groups and individual actors. What is important is that different societies are able to work together for the common good. Scholars like Ezeoha and Uche (2005) hold that South Africa's advocate for democracy using the African Renaissance concept can be better understood within liberal confinements.

In comparison to the realist school of thought, liberals tend to have a positive view towards human nature, hence believe in human progress (Jackson and Sorenson, 2003; Nossal, 1998). Sociological liberalism asserts that international relations go beyond states' interaction to include international institutions and transnational groups. According to Landsberg (2006) in pursuit for peace and democracy in Africa, South Africa is acting out of good faith. South Africa strongly believes that it can simply export democracy as means to resolve conflict in places like Sudan and DRC (Hughes, 2006). Van Nieuwkerk (2006) notes that the shift away from Mandela's universalization of human rights towards the promotion of neoliberal principles helps South Africa to better prioritize its national interest. This follows from the fact that it is much easier to pursue national interests through negotiation than war. Hence the African Renaissance project should be understood in this context. South Africa as a perceived regional power is involved in peace initiatives and it aims to be a "good global" citizen with its promotion of human rights (Hughes, 2006).

South Africa partakes in the collective initiatives like NEPAD, AU and SADC in the continent. Liberal conceptualisations of South Africa's foreign policy on their own, unfortunately, do not sufficiently grasp the issue of national interests which at the end are the core of foreign policies. The link between the country's foreign policy and liberalism is that South Africa believes in peaceful means of resolving conflicts which are not confrontational. This reduces the prospects for war but still guarantees the country's safety.

### **3.2.3 Marxism**

Karl Marx's theory revolves around class struggle specifically over the production and distribution of the means of production. The capitalist class which owns the means of production tries by all means to keep the profit to themselves while oppressing the working class (Sabine and Thorson, 1973). According to Jackson and Sorensen (2003) capitalism is by nature exploitative: those in the capitalist class are dependent on exploiting the working class to make profit. In order to put Marxism into context, one might argue that there exists a political struggle not only between states but different classes in the society. Therefore, the class struggle is within and across states. According to Nossal (1998), imperialism should be understood as the last stage of development. Imperialists pay better wages for domestic workers in home country to defuse them while exploiting workers in the host country. Sabine and Thorson (1973) contend that democracy should be understood as an effective way of addressing contradictions embedded in production. They see politics and economics as binaries which provide space for class struggle.

According to Landsburg (2006) South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy in Southern Africa and in Africa as a whole is seen by Marxists as a foundation for the capitalist to secure profit. Landsburg (2006) concurs with Tleane (2005) and points out to the South African media and information companies which are dominating beyond Limpopo borders in pursuit of maximum profit. Swartuk (2000) holds that South Africa is emerging as a bully in the region; however, its views are discarded. Although South Africa acts as a hegemon, it has a difficult time in commanding the block which has no clear direction. South Africa's hegemonic status exposes its interest to lead the region towards its own selfish interests in pretence on the African Renaissance agenda (Swartuk, 2000).

Buhlungu claims that South African companies operating abroad breach the code of ethics in host countries. He refers to South African companies which continued with extraction of resources especially during 1996 and 1998 DRC's civil war (Buhlungu, et al, 2007). According to Swartuk, (2001), South African companies have secured for themselves labels like exploiters and neo-colonizers as evidenced in the case of Zambia where Shoprite was accused of exploiting workers to the extent that the Zambian government had to intervene (see Table 3.1 below). This is in line with neo-Marxist scholars who hold that capitalism by nature is exploitative and disregards host countries in pursuit of profit. Other actors who label South Africa as a sub-imperialist are not fooled by the pretence of the African Renaissance project. It is unfortunate that Marxist's view on South Africa's foreign policy reduces issues of national interest to class struggle. In doing this, it undermines South Africa's effort for peace and development through multilateral forums.

**Table 3.1: Contradictions of Shoprite Checkers in Zambia**

In the spirit of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), African countries are nurturing an economic union, which will allow Africa to grow to greater self-sufficiency and economic stability. Shoprite wants to play a meaningful role in building a 'United States of Africa', dominated not by foreigners but African companies... Apart from offering consumers quality products at the lowest prices, the respective local economies also benefit from... retail property infrastructure, job creation, the upliftment of local producers.

*(Shoprite's African Vision as cited in the Shoprite Checkers Annual Report 2003)*

Versus

*[excerpts from the studies conducted by Miller (2003) and Muneku (2003)]*

They (these investors) are not helping Zambia to develop. Shoprite, whatever they sell, the monies are transmitted to SA right away. Even the government is aware that that these people, they are just using Zambia as a market, just to sell their things and send all their profits to SA. So Zambians are not benefiting from it....

If we look at all the products, the merchandise they have, they all come from South Africa, which means that manufacturers in South Africa are on the benefit side, because they are the ones that receive the money ...

Control of Shoprite Zambia lie firmly with head office in the Western Cape and the six top jobs – such as general manager and finance manager – are held by white expatriates...


**Source: Naidoo (2010)**

### 3.2.4 Development Theories

A number of development theories are based on the conviction that the foreign policy of states is based solely on the structure of international systems. This is also evident in the works of Myint (1954) and Myrdal (1957) who pointed to the strong political urgency relating to the promotion of economic development in less developed regions to ensure international stability post World War II. In line with this, South Africa's foreign policy after 1994 towards Africa, particularly Southern Africa is similar to *American Policy in Asia* by Rostow who writes: "The United States must develop a more vigorous economic policy in Asia. Without such a policy our (American) political and military efforts in Asia will continue to have weak foundations..." (Rostow, 1955:43). This approach is based on inequalities in the international arena and links development with wider political issues like stability. Contrary to this, pluralists hold that the international system is a reflection of interconnectedness and interdependency that drives development. This line of reasoning is informed by developmental projects like the Maputo Corridor and Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme. The former links Mozambique and South Africa and the latter links Lesotho and South Africa, however, both projects benefit South Africa more than the partner countries. Just like other semi-peripheral states, South Africa's influence stretches beyond its borders reaching the Southern African region. According to Graaff (2007) Lesotho and Mozambique's economies heavily rely on providing South African mining sector with migrant labor. In addition to that, other industries like construction, manufacturing and transport have become widespread throughout the continent. In neighboring Namibia, for instance, all the above South African companies can be identified. This expansion makes South Africa to have characteristics of a sub-imperial state (Barber, 2005). Despite the increasing cooperation among neighbouring countries, there are still scepticisms in relation to unequal development between the interdependent partners. This can be better understood using dependency theory which is illustrated by figure 3.1 below.



**Figure 3.1: Developed-Underdeveloped Relations**



Source: [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/Dependency\\_theory.svg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/Dependency_theory.svg)

A central issue for the dependency school of thought is the dominance- dependence relationship. This is as a result of contestation between the poor and the rich countries, where the former is exploited and the latter benefit. If this analysis is to be adopted, then the question of how poor economies develop in the light of comparative advantage and capital accumulation arises. The success of the already developed economies cannot set precedent for the developing economies. During the 1950 -1960, there was a general understanding that growth strategies were uniform around the globe. The most influential proponent of this view is Rostow (1960) in *Stages of Economic Growth*. He suggests that the development of the core countries was largely dependent and based on specific events and processes. He cites colonialism as a process which was exploitative and dependent. For the countries developing now it is unlikely for them to follow the same suits of those developed earlier. It is therefore important for the dependent states to adopt self-reliance policies. This is in conflict with the neo-liberal models advocated for by the Bretton Woods Institutions.

A deeper integration into the international market is a bad choice for the underdeveloped countries and reflects the certification of autarky. The failure of Julius Nyerere's Ujamaa in Tanzania and Great Leap Forward in China reject autarky as a best policy option. Developing economies should only enter to partnerships where it is in the best interest of larger citizenry.

It is generally accepted that dependency theory is for analysing North-South relations; however, it can also be used to analyse South Africa's post -1994 relations in the region, hence its relevance in this study. Dos Santos (1970) suggests that dependency happens where an economy of a country relies on the development of another country which it is subjected. According to Frank (1978) the poor countries will never develop unless they abandon any relations with the rich countries and undergo internal revolutionary change. It is this line of reasoning which creates perceptions of scepticism of African countries towards South Africa.

According to dependency theorists, countries are capable of imposing uneven exchanges in order to delay the development of their partners. By doing this, they entrench dependence on them as developed countries. Faletto does not believe that dependency is as a result of only external factors imposed by rich countries, but also as a result of internal struggle. Cardoso and Faletto write: "Economic relations, including the impetus for development, are a product of the different class struggles to change or preserve interests" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 14). It can be said that the static South African economic relations can be credited to the capitalist class who want to maintain the status quo at the expense of the poor. This is in line with the studies done on the rise of the 'black' elite in South Africa. In his study Iheduru (1996) contends that there can never be assurance that the post- 1994 foreign policy would be friendlier than pre- 1994 foreign policy when the interests remain the same. As much as dependency theorists believe that interests of transnational capital has a potential to bring about development to the poor countries, they however do not believe that the core-periphery relations lead to mutual benefits. Based on the above discussion, dependency theory is applicable to this study.

### **3.3 Theories which guided the study**

#### **3.3.1 Theory of Hegemonic Stability**

The inequalities which are at the core of the core-periphery model which the development theories criticize have been misinterpreted. The theory of hegemonic stability rises above the traditional interpretation of these inequalities to realize that such inequalities can be used to bring about stability. Theorists from the different schools of thought in the international system agree that there is a need for hegemony to sustain liberal world order. The premise is that there is a need for one dominant actor in the international arena who will articulate, enforce and uphold the rules of engagement in the multilateral environment. In this way, issues of security are likely to be handled better because of the presence of the dominant power that can create multilateral security regimes and look out for rogue states. These thoughts are in line with Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (1987) who hold the view that the uneven allocation of material and economic capabilities are more favourable to regional stability. In essence, as much as the liability to provide public good would heavily rest on the hegemon, it is far better off with the provision than lack thereof.

In addition to that, scholars of the realist school of thought including Krasner (1976) and Gilpin (1987) point to the allocation of power among actors as a crucial aspect in the stability of the international economy. They concur with Kindleberger (1973) the forefront advocate of the theory of hegemonic stability in the 1970s. The theory holds that a clear hegemony guarantees an open and stable economy. The hegemony manages and reprimands other actors in order for them to feel secure and open their markets to it. On the contrary, the theory of hegemonic stability links the decline of hegemony with economic meltdown, instability and unhealthy competition of blocks. To drive the point home, the scholars quote Great Britain in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the United States in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, respectively. In the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Britain as a hegemon sustained globalization, the emergence of multinational corporations and political stability in Europe. However, World War 1 put to an end both hegemony and conditions it had promoted. It replaced the latter with economic meltdown. Despite the fact that the United States was the strongest actor towards the end of the war, it did not take the leading role which had been abandoned by Britain. The United States opted to close its markets to imports (Kindleberger, 1973).

This isolationist policy option by the United States led to the economic meltdown as the international system lacked hegemony to coordinate the economies. The United States learned from the unintended consequences of isolationist policy option. As a result it assumed the leadership position after World War II. It adopted an open market model based on GATT and monetary system based on Bretton Woods's system.

On the other hand, Keohane (1989) and Lake (1993) reject the abovementioned relationship between hegemony and economic stability. They reject it on the basis that there is no universal barometer to major hegemony. This theory emerged despite the apparent fall of American hegemony and rise of Japan. The behaviour of the United States during the inter-war period demonstrates that the availability of resources means neither beneficial outcome for the international system nor influence. According to these scholars, this shows that the allocation of power is not the only factor determining the international economy. However, Keohane (1989) accepts that hegemony can play a huge role in the establishment of regional and international institutions, but once up and running they take on a life of their own independent of hegemony. Keohane's views do not hold water in light of the calls to reform institutions like the UN, UNSC, World Bank and WTO on the bases that they are in the hands of a few hegemonies.

The theory of hegemonic stability stresses the necessity for cooperation. From this assertion it can be said that there are symbiotic relations between multinational institutions and hegemons. Institutions do not emerge and operate on their own, but they are established and driven by powerful players in the system. Hegemonies contribute more than ordinary players in the maintenance of the institutions. As a result they benefit more than other players. According to Kennedy (1987) multilateral institutions take some of the responsibilities of bringing about stability from hegemonies, hence covering their relative decline in global power. Taylor (2011) contends that a hegemon can be accepted since it offers certain services and goods benefiting its counterpart. This contention is in line with the Gramscian view. In an attempt to round up Triepel and Gramsci's positions on hegemon, Ogunnubi (2013) submits that hegemons are based on both the nature and means adopted to exercise hegemony. Military over-stretch is the potential problem to be faced by

powers whose security ambitions exceed the resources available. These arguments rationalize South Africa's decision to use multilateral mediums as the AU and SADC to push for their peace and stability agenda.

These arguments rationalize South Africa's decision to use multilateral mediums as the AU and SADC to push for its peace and stability agenda. However, this does not explain why South Africa does not partner with powerful countries like Nigeria to pursue its regional objectives. Gill (1993) asserts that the lack of undisputed hegemony as it is the case in Africa makes states to opt for coalitions. This can be seen as sharing hegemony. Alden and Veira (2005) hold that where there is no single hegemony the international community is likely to confer hegemon status to a middle power to guide other states. However, the effort to get international and regional legitimacy is difficult and leads to ambiguity in terms of identity, and South Africa is the classic example of such lack of clear identity.

Ikenberry in Milner (1998) holds that hegemonies would usually opt for multilateral cooperation regardless of losing their autonomy. He insists that relying solely on material dominance without social frameworks to legitimize it becomes risky because it is likely not to last. Multilateral institutions come with a strong base for legitimacy. In multilateral institutions hegemonies bind and commit themselves to certain restraint while the weaker states accept their legitimacy (Milner, 1998). Wohlforth (2004:199) asserts:

Legitimate hegemonies are far cheaper and safer to maintain over the long run than illegitimate ones. Institutionalized hegemonies are far cheaper and safer to maintain than over the long run than non-institutionalized ones. And hegemonic powers that find ways to accommodate the status drives of lesser states face fewer costs over the long run. Aggressively unilateral policies undermine legitimacy, corrode institutions and heighten status anxieties, generating higher costs and greater instability over the long run.

South Africa's role in Zimbabwe is a good illustration. South Africa's role as per the mandate of SADC was acknowledged as having led to the 2008 elections as opposed to its bilateral quiet diplomacy.

An evaluation of a state to test whether it can be characterized as hegemony or not should rest mainly on three aspects. The first one is dominance. This is the perpetual use or threat to use force on neighbours. Secondly is hegemony. This aspect appeals on the fact that hegemons usually use other means as opposed to the actual use of force when interacting with weaker states. Lastly is primacy. This relates to a country's willingness to take a leadership role (Bull, 1977). This framework reveals the degree in which two terms, hegemony and dominance have been used interchangeably. To illustrate this, Schoeman (2002:228) is relevant. She submits: "hegemons are considered to be 'natural leaders' within particular international systems, such as a region and/or sub-region and this position of leadership is based on their relative strength (economic and in some instances military) vis-à-vis other states in the same system". She then in her article titled "South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994-2003" asserts that "hegemon in the pejorative sense belongs more to the idea of a behemoth: a big and powerful state (militarily and economically) that has very little sense of, or shows little care for, the effect of its actions on other states" (Schoeman, 2007: 93). Taking this into account, one would be receptive to Guzzini's (1998) assertion that hegemonic stability theory is a modified realism as it is based on power. Greater powers coerce their relatively weaker counterparts. However, Foucault (1980:39) distinguishes between domination and hegemony:

It [hegemony] differs from simple domination by being based on consent and legitimacy and thus presupposes a certain commonality of values. A prospective hegemon needs to behave in a manner deemed acceptable by those actors whom it wishes to lead, and it has to present its own objectives and strategies as furthering the public good. Such an ability to persuade is not so much an antithesis of power, but rather an integral element in power.

In the same vein Habib and Selinyane (2004) draw a direct link between hegemony and leadership. According to these aforementioned authors hegemon is an international or regional leader in terms of both soft and hard power. Hegemonies are not confined to military and economic power but go beyond borders to consider transnational platforms and pursue them. Hegemonies would strive to implement their goals mainly of stability, development and security. This however does not seek to suggest that hegemonies operate on one man basis but they take it upon themselves to shape and lead the initiatives. A status of being hegemony can be limiting because every time, hegemony should display concern for public good as opposed to being selfish. It is therefore of paramount importance to suggest features of hegemony. Firstly, it is the capacity to enforce laws relying on fast growing economy, technological advancement and military power. Secondly, it is a political will to act in a mutually beneficial system. Lastly, hegemony must have an ideology which is acceptable to other actors. According to Van der Westuizen (2010), a real hegemony has consent from other states in the system. It imposes its own ideas to relatively weaker states and thereafter the ideas are conveyed as that of a collective institution.

If one evaluates South Africa's potential of being a hegemony against the points mentioned above, it is evident that it has the capacity and political will; however, it is not accepted by other actors as a hegemon. It is acceptable that it outplays its neighbours, militarily and economic wise. South Africa's capabilities in relation to the enforcement of rules are indisputable. In relation to the last point, the commitment to mutually beneficial system, post- 1994 South African administration has put an enormous commitment. South Africa has worked hard towards the establishment of multilateral institutions like NEPAD and AU. President Mbeki lobbied extensively for the NEPAD to the G8, EU and the UN. Contrary to this, South Africa's commitment has been undermined by its national interests. This was the case in the World Conference against Racism in 2001 where it rejected demands for reparations for slavery, colonialism and apartheid. In Mexico in 2002, during the UN Conference on Development Finance in Monterrey, South Africa rejected the proposal to break connections with the imperialist institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.

Maybe the most practical scenario will be that of the tension between South Africa and its neighbouring Zimbabwe. The issue lied on South Africa's decision to use economic muscle during trade negotiations, the issue which was reduced to personal differences between President Mugabe and President Mandela. The perceptions of rivalry which have emerged between South Africa and its long-time friend Angola can be interpreted as harbouring ambitions of being hegemony in the South of the Sahara. South Africa's commitment to Africa raises concerns from its neighbours that it is likely to pursue its narrow national interests. However, Habib (2003:86) believes that "...as the US relations with Western Europe in the post-World War II period indicate, national interests of hegemons can under certain circumstances coincide with those of particular regions". In this regard, Habib (2003:88) noted that:

...a hegemonic role has to be undertaken by South Africa if we are committed to the realization of stability, security, and development in South Africa, in Southern Africa, and in Africa. Lesotho is the example we need to learn from. Zimbabwe is the example to avoid.

Habib's examples can be rejected instead be used to legitimize South Africa's scepticism to totally assume the hegemonic leadership role. On one hand, South Africa was widely condemned for its military intervention in Lesotho while, on the other hand, its quiet diplomacy was fruitful in comparison to Britain's confrontational approach. Despite being deemed as ineffective South Africa's approach afforded the time and platform for dialogue which led to the 2008 Global Political Agreement. President Zuma lashed out those who criticize South Africa's position towards Zimbabwe saying that they have done nothing to remedy the situation until South Africa came into the picture.

Nonetheless, it is apparent that post -1994 South Africa's ambition to drive Africa's regional agenda is hindered by the region's lack of political will to have South Africa driving the agenda. African countries are neither prepared nor willing to give South Africa a driving role. The major problem with leadership is that it requires followership, that is, in order to lead you must be followed. This explains why South Africa cannot lead despite its



desire and commitment to lead; it lack followers. Perhaps one should differentiate between hegemony and leadership. Hegemony is the ability of a relative stronger state to dictate policies to its relatively weaker states. Leadership is the general ability to engage and influence relatively weaker states to adopt the leader's goals and present them as their own. South Africa is generally taken as a regional hegemony, but it has not been successful in delivering on the African vision. According to Marais (1998) South Africa's hegemony is limited to the economic aspect, and does not match Gramscian terms. Gramsci (1971), believes that in order for a state to be hegemony it must enjoy an active consent from other states. In this sense South Africa is a dominant actor but not a hegemon. As opposed to being labelled even as a leader perhaps it can be correctly labelled as a *primus inter pares*. This does not seek to dispute that conventional power attributes (economic and military muscles) are of importance, they are not enough to bring about hegemony.

Conventional power attributes by all means contribute to the hegemony making, however, the key lies with acceptance of state's goals and rules. To borrow Evans and Newnham's (1998:221) words "a hegemon's ability to lead is derived as much from what it stands for as from how it seeks to achieve its goals". In line with this, the perception of being a hegemon is incorrectly measured by the ability of a state to imitate hegemony. Even here, the controversy over South Africa's position towards neighbouring Zimbabwe is useful. The supposed failure of the South African government to be more decisive against President Mugabe's administration received criticisms from both domestic and international. Alden and Schoeman (2004) held that obvious hegemonies are not real hegemonies; they cannot extend their influence on relatively weaker states unless their visions and goals are acceptable by relatively weaker states.

This was not for the first time South Africa proved not to be hegemony. Mandela's administration took a harsh position against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In 1996 Mandela openly called for the sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria's Sani Abacha. This stance was a response to the execution of Ken Saro -Wiwa and the Ogoni nine (Vale and Maseko, 1998; Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of states. South Africa went on to withdraw its representative in

Nigeria. In turn South Africa suffered a blow when Western superpowers continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South Africa's call for isolation (Barber, 2005). Adebajo (2006: 78) believes that "It is probably not an exaggeration to say that this single incident greatly influenced Mbeki's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe. African efforts to depict Pretoria as a western stooge over Nigeria were a painful experience that Pretoria was determined never to repeat". South Africa's shameful experience might be one of the key factors which redirected Mbeki's administration away from Mandela's radicalism.

Habib (2003) refers back to the piece of writing by Rob Davies in 1992 where he pinpointed South Africa's role in the region. Firstly, it is a South Africa first approach. Secondly, it is integration under South African hegemony approach. Lastly, it is a non-hegemonic and regional cooperation approach. Habib further draws from an article by McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998). Here the authors explain South Africa's options between hegemony and partnership. This shows the common assumption that the former and the latter cannot coexist. Habib (2003) carefully notes that any thorough observation of hegemonic behaviour shows that partnership is a method of engagement as other aggressive methods. Nonetheless, Habib and Selinyane (2006) maintain that South Africa's combined abilities in terms of economy and military define South Africa as a hegemony or regional power. This status came with certain privileges and responsibilities which make it to be unique to both its African counterparts and other middle powers. Perhaps it is a benign hegemony which can bring about equitable and sustainable development provided its counterparts are willing to acknowledge its leadership. However, it can be argued that Habib's conclusion is based on widely distorted South Africa's capabilities. Regional hegemonic systems in Africa will not be driven by one actor, not South Africa and not Nigeria. Instead it will be shaped by regional powers together with other regional actors.

Overall, being a hegemon does not mean having absolute and incontestable power. It solely lies to other states to accept or reject the hegemonic status depending on the kind of that particular hegemony and their own national interests. For example, South Africa's diplomatic efforts in DRC were undermined by Namibia and Angola by sending armed forces to intervene in the troubled country in 1998. Above that, Adebajo (2006) believes

that as long as South Africa's neighbours such as Zimbabwe and Angola have ambitions of leadership South Africa will not be able to affirm its regional leadership, not even in SADC. He holds that South Africa's need for partnerships outside SADC as Nigeria contributes immensely to its failure to emerge as a clear regional leader in the conventional sense. By all accounts, the hegemonic stability theory best explains South Africa's activities in the Southern African region.

### **3.3.2 of Pivot States, Middle and Emerging Powers**

Hegemonic stability models prevent greater powers from leadership role except hegemonies. In line with this, there is an alternate theory which has not been deeply explored in the theoretical considerations, that is of pivot state. In Landsberg's (2003:96) terms:

A pivot state is one that in comparison to its neighbours is, *ipso facto*, a powerful state. From such relative powerfulness flows the capability to influence other states, events and regions. The pivot state is influential in a region because internal developments in such states or lack thereof, are so significant that it typically holds major implications for states in its immediate region.

The two models, hegemonic stability and of pivot state are different. The former relies on its power to make laws and dominates the region, while the latter acts towards common good through cooperation with other actors (Landsberg, 2003). Here Landsburg committed an error which has been identified by Habib that of assuming that hegemonic leadership cannot co-exist with partnership or cooperation. Flowing from this, it can be inferred that there is a little distinction between hegemonic leadership as articulated by Habib and pivot state as articulated by Landsberg. Habib and Selinyane (2004) went on to claim that all hegemonic states are pivot states who want to be more. However, a thorough investigation produces a core distinction between hegemonic states and pivot states. The difference lies in pivot state's inherent vulnerability. Landsberg (2003:111) notes that:

The pivot state is delicately poised between potential success and possible failure: it has the potential to work a significant beneficial or harmful effect on its region. While such a state might be stronger and more developed vis-à-vis others, it also suffers from its own significant socioeconomic challenges, such as deep inequalities and massive levels of poverty.

Internal hindrances are a major cause of the pivot state's scepticism to undertake leadership position which is central to hegemonic states. Taking into account both Landsburg and Habib's arguments one can conclude that the pivot state model is more appropriate in explaining South Africa's choice of multilateral action over unilateral actions.

However, as pointed out above, the pivot state model has not been explored in comparison to the hegemonic model. The possible explanation for that is likely to be the abundance of literature on middle and emerging powers since they are based on the same theoretical foundations. The literature includes but is not limited to Habib and Selinyana (2004); Cooper et al. (1993) and Spence (2004). Distinctions between middle and emerging powers is summarized in table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1: Distinctions between middle and emerging powers**

<b>MIDDLE POWER (SWEDEN)</b>	<b>EMERGING POWER (BRAZIL)</b>
Have a well-developed economy.	Have a stable and secure economy
Morality elements accompany its foreign policy.	Seeks to take a leadership role.
Sets achievable and reasonable goals.	Seeks to emerge as a super power.
Strategically involves itself where its presence would make difference.	Look for active regional role.

**Source: Author's compilation; adapted from Naidoo (2010)**

A number of scholars including Schoeman (2003) held that South Africa does not match the standards of being an emerging power. She suggests that it has unstable domestic dynamics and it further lacks both political will and the capabilities necessary to assume emerging power status. It is not a credible leader within the region as opposed to emerging powers whose credibility is acceptable to their neighbouring states. Another major factor which contributes to South Africa's failure to qualify as an emerging power is its general geopolitical status. Chase's asserts (1996:44) "in global geopolitical terms, South Africa is a rather small country. For example, its total GDP is about the same size as Ford Motor Company's global sales. It has variously been labelled as insignificant, at worst and as a middle power or pivotal state, at best". Le Pere and Nieuwkerk (2002) agree that South Africa might be a dominant regional actor in terms of economy, but internationally it is just a middle income placed on medium human development ranking on the United Nations Development Programme index. With this ranking, it is placed below Cuba and next to Sri Lanka. McGowan (1993) shares similar sentiments that in the international system South Africa is a semi-periphery state; however, due to its dominance in the region it is usually ranked with countries like Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel and Malaysia. Scott in Marais (1998) went as far as to suggest that South Africa is just one of the middle income developing countries without any special contribution to the international economy. He maintains that South Africa better suits middle power status than emerging power status.

Robert Cox (1989) held that middle powers by definition are positioned in the middle rank in terms of their abilities, militarily and economically. Usually they seek to strengthen multilateral platforms in order to enhance cooperation. Therefore, middle powers are closely related to multilateralism. Prioritizing collaborative methods as opposed to competition is regarded as anti-hegemonic in the global arena. According to Keohane (1969) middle power states are those who lack the capacity to act effectively when alone but prefer to act under the umbrella of an international institution. It is therefore safe to suggest that South Africa's choice of multilateral diplomacy is a reflection of lack of resources and its political will to be part of collaborative world. It is worth noting that the

apartheid South Africa was lacking in this area due to a number of reasons. It was no longer a member of the Commonwealth; it was already excluded by the UN General Assembly and other specialized agencies of the UN.

Post 1994 South Africa's foreign policy has been the subject of multilateralism. Jackie Selebi, the former Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, while still in office was cited in Nel et. al., (2001) as saying: "South Africa attaches immeasurable significance to its multilateral engagements. Indeed, multilateralism is the cornerstone of this country's foreign policy" (2001: 1). South Africa joined many intergovernmental organizations and entered into a number of treaties. South Africa further assumed leadership positions in the region and globally. This is reflected in Table 3.2 below.

**Table 3.2: South Africa's Multilateral Engagements**

RESPONSIBILITY	ORGANIZATION	PERIOD
Chair	Southern African Development Community	1995-1999
Presidency	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	1996-1999
Chair	Non-aligned movement	1998 -1999
Chair	Commonwealth	1999-2002
Chair	Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights	1998
Chair	Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mine	1998

Member	G 20	1999
Member	UN Security Council	2007
Member	BRICKS	2010
Chair	AU Commission (Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma)	2012
Chairperson	SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation	2014

**Source: Author's compilation**

Taylor (2001) concluded that South Africa's multilateral efforts can be organized as follows:

- Full of activism within multilateral framework; reliance on multilateral platforms to pursue broader foreign policy goals and endorsement of multilateral forums as means for interaction.
- Reinforcement of already existing regional and international institutions in order to represent developing world's interests; and
- An attempt to initiate changes to the already existing institutions to ensure that they better address developing countries problems including their marginalization.

The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, once indicated that South Africa is fully committed to multilateralism as a tool for social security (Cilliers, 1999). This commitment was further intensified by President Mbeki when addressing parliament. He said that participating in multilateral affairs is the best option in an attempt to disjunct the negative impact of globalization on weaker countries. South Africa has played a huge role in G 20 redirecting policy directions towards reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. In addition to this, South Africa is committed to the transformation of the UN (Nel et. al. 2001). In line with this, President Mbeki drove the developmental agenda while participating in platforms such as: G 77 Conference held in Cuba; EU Summit held in Portugal; UN Millennium

Summit held in New York and G 8 held in Tokyo. Cited in Westhuizen et. al. (2001:111), Howard Barrell lamented that “as a result of his recent interventions, Mbeki has emerged over the past six months (January – June 2000) as the developing countries’ single most important voice in the world economy”.

According to Black (1997) middle power leadership is usually grounded on moral principles. In this case, South Africa is suitable to be characterized as a middle power countries because of its ‘moral thrust’ approach in its foreign policy which prioritizes the developing world. However, a thorough investigation into the foreign policy of middle power including South Africa disputes the assumptions of high moral standing. Middle powers often fail to take a clear position in conflict situations even when they are appointed as mediators. Because of this usual failure they have secured themselves the label of “fence-sitting”. Cooper et. al. (1993) draw the example of Australia and Canada to demonstrate the point of moral relativism of middle powers. These authors compare the two countries’ failure to intervene in 1990-91 Gulf conflict in Kuwait on the guise of sovereignty and their lack of capacity to act or condemn the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975. South Africa is seen through the same lenses. The above examples show the problem of assuming that middle powers are kind of caring actors who balance their national interests and general interests. In actuality, they reaffirm the notion that national self-interests are the major influence in foreign policy making of middle powers. Middle powers act as if they are honestly devoted to common interest; however, in cases where they contradict national interest, the former is abandoned and the latter emerged victoriously (Solomon, 1997). Scholars such as Cox (1989) and Black (1997) concur with one another that middle powers are not mere middle powers because of their role in mediation but it is because of their long- term interests.

According to Van der Westhuizen et. al. (2001) South Africa has been at the forefront advocating for global governance system which would see accommodation of the interests of the South. This is despite its approval of trade liberalization which reinforces its presence in SADC and the region as a whole. In the same vein, Naidu (2004) points out that the role of South Africa in multilateral platforms like WHO and G8 including regional initiatives



like NEPAD is founded on basis of sub imperial agenda. South Africa is pursuing its national agenda and advances its corporate agenda into Africa without taking into account its neighbours.

South Africa finds itself in the dilemma parallel to the one of Australia which is a middle power. Australia's support for the USA on the war on terror shows inconsistencies in government decision making. This is taken as a major loophole since it has a negative effect on long held relationships with regional players (McKay, 2004). Above all, South Africa's middle power status is controversial as other emerging powers or hegemonies who use multilateral platforms to maintain flawed processes. This perpetrates deep rooted perception that South Africa is a selfish hegemon which sustains the system which favours it.

### **3.3.3 Discourse Theory**

The analysis of realism, liberalism, hegemonic, middle power, emerging power and pivot states statuses shows that one state is likely to have different social identities. Such identities can be cooperative or conflictual. Among the advocates of this view are Adler (1997) and Wendt (1999) who held that the international arena comprises of social relationships and material capabilities. This view claims that identities and state's national interests are dependent on the relationship states have with one another. According to Collins, "When social actors acquire resources, they seek to convert them into something that has more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. When this conversion process is blocked, the tension builds and status hierarchies become unstable" (1986:7).

This approach gives a better analysis of South Africa-Africa relationship and the former's failure to decisively pursue its transformative developmental agenda. Turner (2008) characterizes this as status dissonance. It is the failure of actors to arrange themselves hierarchically because they are not agreeing on all matters. The discourse theory is relevant to this study because it is centred on matters relating to status and identity which are also the basis for discourse theory. In Howarth and Stavrakakis words "discourse theorists are

not just concerned with the way in which social actors understand their particular worlds, but attention is focused more on the creation, disruption and transformation of the structures that organize social life” (2000: 6). Social antagonisms are important in political discourse theory. As Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000:4) note, “antagonisms show the points where identity is no longer fixed in a differential system, but is contested by forces which stand outside or at the very limit of that order”. Antagonisms emerge out of failure of actors to fully obtain their identity. It can therefore be reasonable to suggest that South Africa’s failure to position itself in the region is due to this. This failure to position has led to negative effects on South Africa’s regional transformative development agenda.

According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the major reason for failing to achieve a clear identity is dislocation events. It destroys the identity while at the same time forming the basis for new identity. This is in line with Howarth and Stavrakakis’s (2000:13) observations that “if dislocations disturb identities and discourses, they also create a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to ‘fix’ the dislocated structure”. This analysis is useful in explaining the dislocatory effects of both internal and external dynamics of post-apartheid South Africa which saw South Africa being no longer viewed as a selfish hegemon especially in the SADC. External and internal dynamics came with clear limitations in South Africa’s dominant discourse, hence the need for an alternative discourse. The failure of South Africa to secure the status of being a partner can be attributed to its neighbours’ refusal to allow for the construction of the new identity. Perhaps the contradiction between South Africa’s foreign policy on paper and in practice is responsible for this identity discourse. The former has concerns for the region and the latter is concerned with national and economic interests. The lack of a clear post-apartheid identity negatively affects its transformative developmental efforts (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000).

### **3.4 Conclusion**

This chapter attempted to give a broader theoretical perspective relating to South Africa’s relations with its neighbours. It explored directly the contentious issue of South Africa’s

identity. In the process it became clear that there is no single theory which can fully grasp South Africa's identity in relation to its foreign policy. The author deliberately swerves from the conventional international relations theories like realism and idealism which are dominant theories in international relations and consequently at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy analysis. However, the aim is not to reject or dispute their significance and relevance in South Africa's foreign policy analysis but to provide for the "new" and broader perspective. The choice to provide a wide range of theoretical scholarship is informed by the complexity of South Africa's foreign policy identity. The study is primarily guided by development and hegemonic stability theories, as well as middle power paradigms to better comprehend South Africa's foreign policy hesitance between hegemony, consolidation, and promotion of an African agenda in the region. The other theories discussed here are meant to demonstrate the complex nature of South Africa's relations with other countries in Southern Africa. Secondly, they prove that as much as certain theories consciously guided this study, they are not the only ones but were chosen for the sake of convenience. Having enumerated and discussed the theories which informed this study, the next chapter will focus on a number of role-players central in South African policy making and implementation. These will include state and non-states actors.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4. SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES & ACTORS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

In both the process of formulating foreign policy and that of trying to study the already formulated foreign policy, it is of paramount importance to understand and consider the domestic affairs of the concerned state. It is a general understanding that domestic affairs contribute to foreign policymaking. According to Holsti (1995:17), “issues such as wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomatic manoeuvres, isolation, and the many goals of diplomatic action “can be viewed as the results of domestic political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion, or economic and social needs”. In many instances, the foreign policy of any given state is a response to citizens’ grievances and values at domestic level as opposed to international dynamics.

This chapter provides an overview of South Africa’s foreign policymaking with special reference to “foreign policy actors. It is a descriptive analysis of South Africa’s foreign policymaking under the new political dispensation since 1994 to 2014. The major argument is that South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is multifaceted. This is informed by the fact that it involves a number of issues, numerous actors and follows a long policy formulation process. The first section of the chapter addresses general theoretical background of foreign policy decision making. The second section gives an analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy principles. The last section provides the discussion which revolves around South Africa’s foreign policy actors and their level of engagements in the foreign policy formulation process.

#### **4.2 Foreign Policymaking: Theoretical Background**

Actors in the foreign policy formulation form a crucial part of foreign policy making and are very influential. According to Holsti (1995), these are “state behaviour” determinants. These policy makers have discretion to decide on foreign policy purpose, aims and objectives and implementation of foreign policy on behalf of a state. “However, this does

not mean that they are free to do as they please; they are constrained by several domestic and international factors. They are guided by party leadership and principles among other things but are allowed to alter certain policy change to match their style of leadership and prevailing environment (Hill, 2000).

According to the theory of bureaucratic politics, the process of foreign policy formulation encompasses different conflicting state actors. These actors include different government departments which influence policy “choices” using different power techniques (McGowan & Nel, 2006). In line with this, Graeme Allison in Hughes (2004) makes an argument based on interdepartmental and interpersonal difficulties in foreign policy making. The theory goes on to bring into scrutiny red tape factors such as national interests and foreign policy goals relating to foreign policy making. Allison in Hughes (2004) suggests that certain foreign policy components might at some point in time conflict even if they are good policies, and this might lead to discrepancies. This suggests that bureaucratic roles and contradicting foreign policy formulation usually end up with an undesired outcome. This is especially evident when there is no correlation between desired goals and objectives and actual outcomes. Frankel (1963) postulated that in such environment non- complementary foreign policies are likely to emerge. Competitive and hostile relations usually turn a good formulated policy to just a haphazard statement. In global politics” contradictory foreign policies are commonly seen where there is a democratic and developing state which consistently relates with its relatively powerful autocratic neighbour state (Hill, 2003).

On the one hand, the bureaucratic politics model emphasises foreign policy formulation as being hampered by bureaucratic processes. On the other hand, the expected utility model stresses that policy makers advance national interests and their own inclinations. This model is comparable to realism and is based on the following principles:

- Individual policy makers are rational actors who base their foreign policy choices on national interests.
- Individual policy makers know and understand their national interests.

- Individual policy makers opt for the choice which is likely to yield anticipated goals (Russett & Starr, 1996).

The expected utility model holds that foreign policy makers are usually uncertain when implementing their foreign policy choices. This doubt is caused by the unpredictability nature of such implementation. This scepticism has a potential to influence the psyche and confidence of the policy makers. This model stresses on willingness and capacity to action only foreseeable policy options as opposed to just predictions as the only base for policy formulation (Russett & Starr, 1996).

In the terms of realism state actors are primary actors in the international relations including foreign policy making. However, the pluralist-interdependence model stresses that it is non-state actors in the corporate world which set the agenda for policy making. Holsti (1995) concluded that policy making is a multidimensional and continuous process of engagement between private transnational groups, politicians and other role players.

Russett and Starr (1996) offer six mandatory elements which have to be taken into account when doing any foreign policy analysis:

- Individual Policymakers: Must know and be aware of individual policymakers, compare them with their predecessors to establish different patterns of decision making along generation lines.
- Global System: Policy makers need to take into account the general order of the global arena before decisions can be made.
- Functions of Decision-makers: The types of policy decisions policy makers take depend on the types of responsibilities entrusted to them. They have an already established duties and level of engagement which can limit their actions and shape their behaviour.
- Social Characteristics: This relates to economic differences that exist in different societies. For example, well developed societies will find it easy to spend more

money on sophisticated weaponry. Contrary to this, developing or underdeveloped societies will generally find it difficult to spend more on weaponry making it relatively vulnerable to invasion compare to their developed counterparts. This means that decision to be taken by policy makers also rest on the economic capabilities of the country.

- **Government Formation:** Type of government can largely shape policy makers. In a democratic society, for an example, policy makers can be seriously challenged by opposition parties, lobby groups and general society at large. In this case policy makers have limited and constrained authority to make policies. This is contrary to authoritarian policy makers who can formulate and implement policy without opposition playing any role whatsoever.
- **International Affairs:** Policy makers need to pay special attention to decisions they make as they act on behalf of the state. Foreign policy decisions directly affect state's relations with other states. Additionally, democracies generally relate better with each other and they are not likely to go to war with each other. Complications might arise in the case of democracy-dictatorship relationship because both parties embrace wholly different values and belief systems. The same applies to rich-poor relationship. The poor is likely to depend on the rich, hence being dominated.

The above arguments necessitate deliberation on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy principles as set by the ruling party, the ANC within the broader context outlined above. The discussion now turns to South Africa's foreign policy principles looking at the number of actors the country must respond to in executing its policy formulation agenda.

#### **4.3 South Africa's Foreign Policy Principles**

Just like in any other policy formulation, policy principles are vital in foreign policy formulation and decision making. Domestic values of general citizenry confine and shape personality and professional attributes of decision makers. This applies even to decision makers who do not subscribe to the idea that any ideology can influence the psych of any decision maker in the foreign policy arena (Hill, 2003; Hugh, 2004). According to Frankel (1963:117) values or principles remain as elements of the environment that exercise an

influence on and penetrate into the psychological environment of the decision-makers". Given that these are social values and not personal values the influence they exert on decision makers varies depending on the decisional consciousness one possesses. Because decision makers act on behalf of the state and the general community, it then follows that the entire process should be based on public culture or interest. According to Hugh (2004), the ideas that are currently shaping foreign policy-making in the South African context are powerful and are ideas of the African Renaissance. Schoeman (2007) concurs with Hugh (2004). He claims that post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy is by all means Africa-oriented. However, he acknowledges that South Africa did not adopt this position straightaway after 1994, it took time before the country could take this direction. He emphasises that pre-1994 South African foreign policy was never African but hostile towards it. According to Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2004) post-apartheid South Africa opted for a foreign policy framework which has been criticised for being more idealistic than practical. Despite being criticised, South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy put forward the development of the African Agenda.

There are a number of normative principles which post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy rests on. Paramount to them is the promotion and protection of human rights. This is not limited to the political arena but also encompasses the environmental and socio-economic arena. It was President Mandela who prioritized the protection and promotion of human rights. It is generally understood that this stance on human rights issues was informed by the ANC's long struggle for human dignity (Barber, 2004). However, a number of scholars and commenters such as Schraeder (2001) find Mandela's advocacy for human rights inconsistent and self-contradictory. This is based on South Africa's position to distance itself when SADC countries intervened in DRC to halt violation of human rights.

According to Maluwa (2000), during Mandela's tenure human rights considerations were an essential aspect of South Africa's foreign policy. Such emphasis on human rights was not limited to the political arena but extended to economic and social realms. South Africa is also committed to the doctrine of peace, justice and international law. However, its commitment to regional security was not immediate but was only evident in the 1998



Lesotho's intervention whereby South African soldiers entered Lesotho in order to bring political stability following an unstable political environment occasioned by differences of opinions around the elections. Thereafter, it joined the peacekeeping mission in the DRC in 1999. It then aligned itself with Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). South Africa contributed immensely both regionally and globally in the development of the global prohibition of anti-personnel landmines (Schoeman, 2007). Assessing how "African" South Africa's intervention on the African soil rests on the practical evidence as opposed to its principles and values.

South Africa committed itself in conducting peacekeeping operations when these became necessary. According to Inglis (2008), South Africa became a relatively stronger military power on the African continent. In conducting its security operations be it negotiation or intervention it has been consistent in operating under the banner of the SADC, UN or AU. Among other African states there is an expectation for South Africa to be a "regional peacemaker and keeper". Since 1994, South Africa participated in peace-making and peacekeeping missions in many African states which included DRC, Ivory Coast and Burundi (Adebayo, Adedeji & Landsberg, 2007). It also undertook peacekeeping operations in Lesotho in 1998 together with Botswana (Landsberg, 2000).

South Africa devoted itself to respect and promotion of justice and international law in the SADC region and Africa as a whole. The security operations referred to above were based on South Africa's value for justice and international law. According to *The SA Yearbook 2008/9* all foreign policy actors concerned with the justice and international law should "...identify and research legal questions that relate to matters pertaining to the administration of justice between South Africa and other states ..." (GCIS, 2009b: 360). It must pursue international legal cooperation and mutual assistance treaties. South Africa further committed itself in participating and cooperating towards the realization of economic development both in the SADC region and the entire African continent.

In 1996, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo reiterated the necessity of economic development in the African continent (SAGI, 2008). South Africa enhanced its

trade relations with other African countries sharply during the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. According to Schoeman (2007), South Africa is seen as an economic powerhouse in the sub-Saharan region with 35% of combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Rabobank (2009) adds that South Africa is also the biggest Foreign Direct Investor (FDI) which by implication is the core trading partner with many African countries. This is evidenced by a large number of South African transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in the continent. In 2002, South Africa's exports to the continent exceeded combined imports from the entire continent of Africa. However, South Africa has been largely criticized by other African trading partners for trade asymmetries which characterize their contact with South Africa. According to Alden & Soko (2005), the country's economy is developing and South Africa is now a biggest investor in the African continent. In the meantime, Inglis (2008) remain dismissive of the insinuation that trade asymmetries result to South Africa being perceived as an African hegemon.

Attainment of national democracy is one of the central foreign policy principles in South Africa's foreign policy. This is aimed at addressing humanitarian problems in the continent. As a "new" democracy itself, South Africa is determined to democratise African states. It applies the same *modus operandi* it applied to get its own democracy, the "democracy through peace deal model". According to Curtis (2007) and Vines (2010) there are prerequisites for this kind of democracy, they include protection and promotion of human rights, political will to negotiate and liberal democratic values to name just a few. Hudson (2007) holds the view that it is not likely to be easy to realize this dream because it is not easy to democratise foreign policy. The reality has proven that it is difficult to attain democracy especially in countries that are perceived as authoritarian like the neighbouring Zimbabwe. It is difficult because these countries do not meet the requirements as highlighted above. According to Landsberg (2000), the supposedly use of 'quiet diplomacy' in Zimbabwe's conflict by South Africa under President Thabo Mbeki was bound to negatively affect South Africa's ambitions to democratize in the continent. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) believe that South Africa's foreign policy heavily relies on abstract ideas as regional democratisation and forgets about proper execution strategies. South Africa is also dedicated to upholding Africa's interests both political and socio-economic (DIRCO,

2009b). South Africa played a central role in the establishment of NEPAD and the transformation of the OAU to the AU. South Africa's muscles were clearly demonstrated when it coordinated the NEPAD Secretariat meetings and to chairmanship of the AU 2002/3 term of office. It also aligned itself with bodies like the Pan African Parliament (PAP). This is a clear indication that South Africa is dedicated in partnering with other African states (Schoeman, 2007).

South Africa's foreign policy has been a subject of criticism mainly for only spelling out its goals and not further providing implementation strategies. According to Hudson (2007) South Africa idealizes foreign policy as opposed to being practical. Venter (1997) believes that it is South Africa's broad identity the "rainbow nation" which is problematic. This broad identity results to South Africa's foreign policy ambiguity. This 'rainbow' foreign policy does not suffice; South Africa just cannot afford to be seen as everything to everyone. This approach of wanting to be everything to everyone is unachievable. Instead, it will turn South Africa into being nothing to everyone including to itself. The centrality of human rights, democracy and economic development issues is undeniable; however, South Africa needs to carefully choose fewer priority issues to focus on regarding its continental commitment. This will enable South Africa to have an identifiable notion of the self (Van der Westhuizen, 1998).

Hudson (2007) labelled the country's post -1994 foreign policy as inconsistent and incoherent. He suggests that such incoherence is as a result of policy makers who possess wholly different mind-sets. Different as they are, they are still entrusted with the responsibility to formulate one coherent foreign policy. Contrary to Hudson (2007), Spence (2004) holds that the country's post -1994 foreign policy is fairly coherent and goal - oriented. The principles discussed above generally examine ethical guidelines for South Africa's foreign policy. They offer a solid base for South Africa's foreign policy formulation. According to Hill (2003:51) "Foreign policy actions cannot be understood without an appreciation of their implementation phase, which is at least as important as that of decision-making". Due to this, against the outline of the above principles, it is important to deliberate on South Africa's foreign policy actors.

#### **4.4 South Africa's Foreign Policy Actors**

Foreign policy is two-sided just like a coin; it relates to both internal and external matters of the state. It concerns itself with local issues, processes and institutions which are an integral part of foreign policy making and also concerns itself with external issues on which the real foreign policy decisions rest (Carlsnaes, 2008). In the post-apartheid South African context for an example, foreign policy making takes place at the national level. However, there is government's emphasis on its projected regional goals and objectives. According to Hill (2003:28) "... foreign policymaking is a complex process of interaction between many actors ...". During the foreign policy making process of any given state in international relations, different actors have different roles to play. It is generally acceptable to find some players playing a more prominent role than others (Carlsnaes, 2008:86). It is usually the state actors like politicians who usually dominate non-state actors like civil society (Kent-Brown, 2002). Foreign policy actors are different from one state to another; as such they have different responsibilities and titles. According to Hill (2003), some states have Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Presidents as the most important players in foreign policy, but in the US they have the Secretary of the State and in Great Britain they have the Prime Minister as their most primary actors. In line with the above structure, the head of government and the Foreign Affairs Minister are the most primary actors in the foreign policy decision making. International law recognises the head of government as the authoritative and legitimate head of foreign policy making and implementation. The Minister in Foreign Affairs is responsible for supporting a head of government and renders advisory services. Regardless of the actor's title, level of engagement and influence the actor possesses, all participants need to be recognised for the role they are playing. This section discusses South African foreign policy actors and their functions. Actors include the Presidency, DIRCO, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Parliament and other actors.

##### **4.4.1 The Presidency**

The former president of the US Harry Truman once stated that "the President makes foreign policy" (Frankel, 1963:21). Hills (2003) agrees with President Truman that almost all heads of governments indisputably form a large and an integral part of foreign policy making and execution. Heads of governments devote large amount of time on foreign policy issues.

This is uniform in all countries like South Africa and France where the president is both the head of state and government. According to Suttner (1996), in South Africa, the president of the country is the most powerful figure in policy making. This however does not mean that the president is the only foreign policy actor. According to Landsberg & Masiza (1995) and Kent-Brown (2002), certain limited powers are allocated to the Deputy President and few strategic ministries.

Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2004) suggest that President Mandela was prominent in most of the foreign policy matters he entered into. This was mainly because of the personality and international prestige he possessed. Accordingly he secured himself a label “Colossus of Rhodes”. He got the name because there was a growing notion that South Africa’s foreign policy had started to reflect his public opinions and profile as opposed to reflecting on his leadership based on already established foreign policy frameworks (Mills, 1997). Landsberg and Masiza (1995) point out the fact that when President Mandela visited the neighbouring Namibia he unilaterally took a decision to cancel Namibia’s R 80 million debt to South Africa. He took such a drastic decision without consulting the ruling party, the ANC, parliament or the executive. Another outstanding action under President Mandela’s tenure was the call for sanctions on Nigeria. This was the reaction to the killing of the Ogoni nine in 1995. This call for sanctions did not yield any results as other African leaders did not support it. In terms of the established procedure, the president of South Africa ought to consult the executive on current major issues. This clearly shows the amount of powers vested in the President of South Africa.

A number of scholars in the field of international relations including Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004) criticize President Mandela’s unilateral approach to foreign policy. They argue that it undermined and compromised the role to be played by other actors. Suttner (1996:65) attempted to contextualize why the South African president’s role in foreign policy is so confusing. He articulated:

...in South Africa it is not clear exactly how the Office of the State President relates to the foreign structures. It is not clear how the foreign

policy structures advise the State President before he makes any decisions on foreign policy.

Despite the fact that President Mandela's foreign policy was generally haphazard and lacked direction compared to President Mbeki's, it had its own successes. During South Africa's reappearance in the international relations Nelson Mandela was at the forefront of that process. He became the most celebrated political prisoner of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and subsequently became the face of South Africa in the international relations. It was his personal profile which overshadowed other actors like the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This resulted in the clear and evident discrepancies in South Africa's foreign policy making and implementation. In line with this, Mills (2000:286) argued that President Mandela's personal profile led to the "... inconsistencies in the conduct of South Africa's foreign relations ..." (Mills, 2000:286).

Compared to Mandela's, President Mbeki's foreign policy was more coherent and consistent. According to Landsberg (2006a), President Mbeki used his impressive and influential diplomatic skills during his tenure in the Presidency. He had attained sharp diplomatic skills over the long period when he served as the Chief International representative and diplomat of the ANC in exile. His foreign policy saw the reconfiguration of South Africa-US relations, South Africa-EU relations and SA-Africa relations. The latter includes the active participation in the promotion of the concept "African Renaissance" and the formation of NEPAD (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:252; Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:123-124). Schoeman (2007) credits President Mbeki for transforming South Africa's unilateral approach towards multilateralism.

In 2012-2013 the Presidency remained the primary actor in South African foreign policy formulation. However, it did not enjoy the same prominence it has had before in the formal diplomatic circle. Instead the president bordered himself with the group of capable advisors to take charge of different issues. For example, Lindiwe Zulu was appointed the International Relations adviser; the presidency's current spin doctor Mac Maharaj participated in the Zimbabwe mediation effort; the High commissioner in Mozambique

Charles Nqakula was also co-opted to the Zimbabwe group and Welile Nhlapho came back from Washington DC to take the President's National Security Advisor post but later joined the Diamond Kimberley Process as the chairperson (Landsberg, 2012). Following his defeat at the Mangaung ANC's 53 National Conference the then Deputy President Kgalema Motlante's role was down-sized. He was only limited to ceremonial duties like receiving other heads of states.

Based on these facts presented above one can conclude that the president of South Africa can have supreme powers to direct South Africa's foreign policy to either hegemony or partnership. This all depends on the president's personality and preferences. A number of international relations scholars have been raising dissatisfaction in relation to the presidency's role in foreign policy making comparing it with DIRCO's role.

#### **4.4.2 The Department of International Relations and Cooperation**

In almost all countries, the department responsible for the international relations becomes one of the major actors in foreign policy making. The ministers in this office come and go with governments but the foreign policy is a continuous process. According to Frankel (1963), the ministry responsible for the international relations works hand in hand with other departments concerned with foreign policy formulation and implementation. It is a general practice that the international relations ministry put other cabinet ministers abreast with all new foreign policy developments (Hill, 2003). Frankel (1963) reiterates that all other ministries have to be briefed on new developments even if they are ignorant on foreign policy matters. In such a case an advise of an expert can be sought. Hill (2003:53) stresses that international relations ministers partake in foreign policymaking "... by virtues of specializing in external policy but ... they are always likely to be trumped by a head of government who decides to take a direct interest in foreign affairs". Hill (2003) then put forward key functions which should be uniform to all international relations ministries:

- Routine Information-Gathering: The ministry responsible for the international affairs usually depend on its diplomats for information gathering and analysis. The diplomats gather information about other actors and analyse it on behalf of the

department. They work with the intelligence services to collect the information but sometimes they also use the media.

- Policymaking: While politicians deployed to head DIRCO rely on the assistance of their party (the ANC) in executing their duties, they also need assistance from experts in the field of foreign policy. This is to allow for proper and efficient decision making and implementation in the department. It would be an absolute disaster to find the minister receiving, analysing and processing data as this is a complex and demanding exercise.
- Memory: DIRCO officials have an important role to keep records of the department's activities. This includes keeping records of treaties state enter into, bilateral and multilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding. These records become useful when it comes to policy making in the future. For example it will likely be difficult to recall in years to come that Africa was "... the second largest export region after Europe, with a R16.7 billion trade balance in 1994 in South Africa's favour had the very data not been kept in the system in spite of the changes in government since 1994 (Venter, 1997:85).

During the first democratic tenure, Alfred Nzo was at the helm of DIRCO. In this period DIRCO faced a number of intra-departmental challenges like all other "new" ministries. According to Suttner (1996), the first challenge was informed by the racial composition of staff within the department. Between 1994 and 1999 DIRCO was mainly dominated by white officials in its ranks. Alden and Le Pere (2004) claim that by 1997 DIRCO still had 60% of its officials being whites and blacks constituted only 40%. It is further noted that most of the white officials were holdovers from the apartheid regime. There were now expected to mix with the "new" ANC appointees in servicing the ANC. During Minister Alfred Nzo's period in DIRCO the most challenging part was to basically find an ethnic equilibrium in the department. The second challenge was gender imbalance in the department's staff. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004) share the same sentiment with Suttner (1996) that from 1994 the department had a huge gender imbalance. The department was dominated by men (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004). However, with the introduction of Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 things turned around. In 1999, the



number of female staff was 1270 while that of males was 1083 (DIRCO, 2009b). This was the drastic change in the department brought by the human resources division in line with the new laws.

The third challenge which was the threat to DIRCO's functioning was ideological differences. This brought about major divisions in the department and nearly brought it into collapse. The major rivalry groups were the "neo-mercantilists" against the "internationalists", respectively (Van der Westhuizen, 1998). According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004), the former group was mainly the holdovers who believed heavily on the past regime's trade and self-interest. This was based on the neo-realism and new diplomacy values. The latter group constituted mainly of the ANC members who had just returned from exile. This group was of the view that South Africa should show a large degree of solidarity with African developing countries (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). According to Van der Westhuizen (1998), this group further pursued pro- human rights foreign policy taking into account the country's human rights history.

The fourth challenge related to the leadership of the department and its foreign policy coordination (Cilliers, 1999). The then minister in DIRCO, Alfred Nzo, was not able to provide a clear direction. He lacked boldness and assertiveness; as a result he could not take bold decisions relating to foreign policy formulation and pursuit of staff transformation (Alden and Le Pere, 2004). His leadership weaknesses were widely credited to his shy personality. Muller (1997) recalls that the Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad ended up doing more job than Alfred Nzo. Alfred Nzo's submissive character created an impression that he was not executing his duties properly. Nzo's lack of leadership qualities together with other challenges led to the department's failure to formulate a coherent and consistent foreign policy informed by clear strategic purposes (Muller, 1997). The diversity of attitudes and personalities in the department contributed to the poor policy formulation and execution. Suttner (1996) and Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2004) both suggest that the large number of different players within DIRCO was always a recipe for disastrous foreign policy. This is because different individuals and camps have different interests which can be contradictory at times.

The last challenge for DIRCO has always been its hostile relations with the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation in parliament and other departments like the Department of Defence (DOD) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). According to Landsberg and Masiza (1995), the relations between the portfolio committee and DIRCO were more hostile than that of DIRCO and other departments. The portfolio committee complained about being side-lined by DIRCO and the ruling party, the ANC. The Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation seems to be ineffective compared to other portfolio committees in parliament.

DIRCO plays a very important role in the execution of South Africa's foreign policy through diplomatic means. Diplomacy is the *modus aparandi* adopted by the South African government in communicating and relating to its neighbours in the SADC region. This is the unit within DIRCO which is directly responsible for pursuing the country's national interests. South Africa's representatives abroad play a crucial part during implementation. The officials include ambassadors, consular officials and diplomats.

In line with the South African government's foreign policy framework, DIRCO has a responsibility to consult with all other departments partaking in foreign policy making. However, it has not established any good relations with DTI which is one of the major players (SAGI, 2008). The sour relations between DIRCO and DTI in South Africa is not something new, they were there even prior to 1994. Over a period of time the DTI has been raising concerns relating to governments budget allocation. The DTI alleges that the government is allocating more resources to DIRCO. In 1994 the DIRCO-DTI personnel ratio was 7:1 and the "new" government seemingly is ready to address. The high officials of the abovementioned departments have a history clashing personalities. One practical example is that of Rusty Evans and Zav Rustojee, the then Directors General of the two departments, respectively. The infightings were usually cited as the one of the major causes of the lack of cooperation between the two departments (Mills, 2000).

Recently DIRCO was headed by Minister Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who now has been replaced by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (from 2009 to-date). Since DIRCO is a bureaucratic overseer of the South Africa's foreign policy, it envisions a peaceful, democratic and united SADC region which can massively contribute towards establishing a stabilized Africa (DIRCO, 2009). DIRCO has an inherent responsibility to promote South Africa's interests abroad. It is also entrusted with the responsibility to pursue the African Renaissance agenda and uphold values like patriotism, *Ubuntu* and *Batho Pele*.

Suttner (1996) suggests that the political head of DIRCO, which is the minister, should be at the forefront of foreign policy decision making. However, due to various reasons this is not the case. The power is concentrated in the presidency. Among others is the fact that the minister is usually not in the country. As reflected above, Hugh (2004) suggests that DIRCO and DTI have shown that they are engaged in a bureaucratic competition. The conflict between the two is further fuelled by the overlapping duties. These are some of the challenges that need to be addressed to ensure a smooth process in foreign policy formulation and implementation.

#### **4.4.3 The Department of Trade and Industry**

In South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has been seen as the major overseer of South Africa's bilateral and multilateral trade and investment relations (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). It is worth noting that there is a slight difference between trade policy and foreign policy. As a result, there is a strong relationship between the DTI and major actors like the presidency and DIRCO. According to Suttner (1996), most of the policies crafted by the DTI directly or indirectly influence South Africa's foreign policy. There are three major trade policy units that drive the DTI's participation in foreign policy. At the centre there is the International Trade and Economic Development Division (ITED) as a chief negotiator. The International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) serves as the administrator of the trade policy. Trade and Investment South Africa promotes investment and exports (Draper, 2005). In a nutshell these three units variably address issues relating to economic development, expansion and industrialization strategy.

In comparison to DIRCO, the DTI is generally performing better and has quite a number of good deals. According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:124):

...the DTI spectacularly succeeded in bargaining free trade agreement with the EU. Consequently, it also occupies an increasingly high profile in the WTO in spite of departmental capacity limitations emanating from lack of personnel and inexperienced trade negotiators and many other administrative and operational issues.

In 1995 DIRCO projected that in 2014 it would have had "... a restructured and adaptive economy characterised by growth, employment and equity, built on the full potential of all persons, communities and geographic area". After all, the DTI has an important role to play especially on trade- based matters. Schoeman (2007) characterizes South Africa's interaction with the rest of the continent as remarkable and impressive. South Africa uses different businesses to sustain its partnerships; they include tourism, banking, mining and telecommunications sectors (Games. 2010). All these businesses function behind the banner of DTI. However, the operation of South African companies in SADC and the continent at large is not without criticisms. South Africa is criticized for wanting to be a self-interested dominant player and for pursuing hegemonic aspirations. The argument is that South Africa is not seeking partnership instead it want to dominate and become a hegemon. According to Schoeman (2007), these criticisms are fuelled by South Africa's big businesses like MTN and Shoprite who are conquering the neighbour's market with dodgy trade patterns which benefit South Africa.

#### **4.4.4 The Department of Defence**

The Department of Defence (DOD) is one of the most active actors in South Africa's foreign policy formulation (Kent-Brown, 2002). It is the key actor when it comes to decisions relating to military interventions. For an example, before a decision to intervene or not to intervene militarily can be made, the DOD takes into account mainly two things. Firstly, the human rights record of the concerned country. Secondly, the general security

assessment is made. The final decision to intervene or not to intervene is the discretion of the DOD in conjunction with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and the Presidency. The SANDF operates under the DOD to fulfil South Africa's peace missions outside of the country. The SANDF is the unit which is more concerned with execution as opposed to the actual formulation of the foreign policy (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004).

Regardless of a number of prior concerns raised in relation to SANDF's capacity to execute all its mandates effectively, in March of 2009 the SANDF's operation in the DRC was extended. SANDF's personnel were deployed to provide training to the local army and it was to run up to March 2010. The deployment was approved by the cabinet. In the same vein, an extension to the deployment in Burundi was also approved regardless of the concerns relating to the capacity of the SANDF. In June the same year there was a slow withdrawal of SANDF's armed personnel in Burundi which was concluded in August with the total withdrawal. This marked the end of the operation which began in 2001 at the request of Nelson Mandela during a civil war period. In Burundi a handful of SANDF members were left behind after the withdrawal to help in the post-construction period (Vines, 2010). Vines (2010) further claims that it was South Africa's contribution through the SANDF that ensured the end of the fifteen-year civil war in Burundi. The end of war saw political parties contesting elections which were generally seen as free and fair. A successful intervention in Burundi showed that South Africa is capable of taking a leading role although its resources are overstretched. In accordance with the deployment framework SANDF should only deploy one battalion for peace operations. However, in 2009 South Africa exceeded this and deployed three battalions: 1 330 soldiers in the DRC, 973 soldiers in Burundi and 636 in Darfur (Vines, 2010). According to Vines (2010: 59) in addition to these deployments the executive further deployed the SANDF to other operation in the continent:

These include the AU Mission in Northern Uganda (Operation Bongani), the South African Detachment Assisting with Integration, and Training in

the DRC. Also, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Specialist and Advisory Team in the DRC (Operation Teutonic), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, and the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC, Operation Mistral).

These are some of the practical roles played by SANDF in the African continent. SANDF's involvement on a number of operations intensifies the discussion on whether South Africa is a partner or hegemony in Africa in general and SADC specifically. Kent-Brown (2002) concurs with Van Nieuwkerk (1994) that there are common areas of concern which need to be taken into account when instituting peace in Africa. These include the establishment of regional security regime to effect the SADC defence pact and enhancement of intelligence services.

All the decisions by the DOD affect South Africa's foreign policy towards SADC in one way or the other. However, according to Suttner (1996) there is a lack of central point where all interventions are to be coordinated. This will ensure that all interventions are in line with South Africa's foreign policy principles.

#### **4.4.5 The African National Congress (ANC)**

The ANC is one of the most important actors in South Africa's foreign policy formulation and execution. Its contribution is highly valued and influential as the ruling party. Mid-2012 the ANC held its National Policy Conference to prepare for its National Conference held later the same year. Within the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC there are a number of sub-committees and one of them is the Sub-Committee on International Relations (Kotze, 2012). In the period from Polokwane and Mangaung National Conferences the committee was headed by Mr Ebrahim. However, after the last conference he was then replaced by Mr Obed Bapela, who by all means has no traceable background or experience in international affairs. It must be noted that Lindiwe Zulu President Zuma's international relations advisor at the time was part of the committee but not as its head; instead she was the head of the Sub-committee for Communications and Media. The committees were endorsed by the NEC in January 2013 (ANC, 2013).

In the SADC region bilateral relations are usually conducted through party to party relations as opposed to official state diplomatic avenues. It is because of this reason that the ANC needs a fully functional committee. Currently the committee comprises the following members: Obed Bapela (Chairperson), Ebrahim Ebrahim, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Miriam Segabutla, Thenjiwe Mthintso, Billy Masetlha, Collins Chabane (The late), Rob Davies, Lindiwe Zulu, Sue van der Merwe, Charles Nqakula, Bheki Cele, Joyce Moloi-Moropa and Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba (ANC, 2013). The ANC as a party focuses more on African issues on its foreign policy making. It usually leaves other issues like climate change, trade, technological developments and tourism to DIRCO. However, in relation to policy hierarchy, the ANC's National Conference remains the most influential body making decisions including policy decisions.

The ANC's policy discussion document put more emphasis on reinforcing African institutions and leadership (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013). "Governance of states and their institutions – especially in the form of good governance, democracy, and management of the African Peer Review Mechanism – received attention" (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013:56). The ANC is further committed to the formation of one government for the whole continent. However, the ANC's vision is not the same as that which was envisioned by the late Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013). The ANC made a strong point for the reinforcement of the regional economic communities in general but SADC specifically. The ANC is of the view that Southern Africa should be an absolutely a free trade zone. The discussion document acknowledges that the SADC region is faced by peace and security issues which become more and more complicated. As a result of the re-occurrence of peace threatening conflicts the ANC has proposed 'African solutions to African conflicts' approach. This suggests that the local citizenry of the concerned country should come up with their own solution to their problems. This proposal has not been fully discussed within the ANC. However, there are clear implications for such a proposal if it is passed. While it will shift away the criticisms of the UN's approach to African conflict, it might be criticized for giving the opportunity to domestic elites to mediate in the conflict. This will mean that the general citizenry will be side-lined (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013).

#### **4.4.6 Parliament**

In apartheid South Africa parliament could not be fully involved in foreign policy making. It could not even indirectly influence it (Suttner, 1996). This really does not matter because even if it did have any contribution it was going to be the contribution of the minority white supremacy. It was going to side-line the majority of the general citizenry which was already oppressed. According to Muller (1997), during the P.W. Botha tenure it was the State Security Council and a few departments which were identified as appropriate for South Africa's foreign policy making.

With the democratic dispensation in 1994 the parliament like all other institutions underwent a number of changes. A Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation was established, and it was a multiparty in nature. The major objective of the formation of this committee was to monitor the operations of DIRCO in relation to foreign policy making (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004; Kent-Brown, 2002). According to Hudson (2007), this marked the integration of South Africa's parliament in foreign policy making. The parliament is the legitimate structure which represents the general citizenry on a number of issues including foreign policy. According to Schmitz, 2005:3:

More often anywhere around the world where parliament is inferior to a national constitution, concrete parliamentary participation in international issues such as foreign policy implementation usually counts very little in determining state actions. Parliamentary and public contributions have practically had less influence on the organisational and other mechanisms of foreign policy execution.

In South Africa, parliament has been raising concerns that its input during the foreign policy making process is being perpetually side-lined. The Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation is also faced with a number of challenges in executing its mandate (Suttner, 1996). Suttner (1996:67) laments "... often a decision is taken before the committee even gets a chance to meet". This is just one example of many challenges which make it almost impossible for the committee to fulfil its rightful mandate of overseeing DIRCO. Hudson (2007) proposes that the side-lining of parliament in foreign



policy making will continue and there is a reasonable doubt that things will turn in favour of parliament in the near future. The public's only chance they have to air their views is when they talk among themselves in the absence of DIRCO.

Taking into account the frustrations faced by the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation it can be inferred that parliament has a very minimal solid role in South Africa's approach to SADC and the entire continent to determine whether it is a partnership or hegemony.

#### **4.4.7 Intelligence**

In his first term of office President Jacob Zuma heavily featured the national intelligence as one of the most prominent actors in South Africa's international affairs. The then State Security Minister Dr. Siyabonga Cwele was part of almost all of Zuma's visits to SADC countries. He also formed part of Zuma's team to attend summits and other visits. He appeared next to the president even when his DIRCO counterpart was absent. This approach is likely to be informed by his history in the ANC where he had served as the head of its intelligence and security in exile. This enabled him to know the intelligence and security field. According to Kotze (2012):

It could also suggest a particular style or approach to international relations which relies on security defined and articulated information as most relevant or appropriate for international relations – reliance on confidential information – in preference to public processes of debate, and a more closed-group approach to the processes.

Immediately after assuming the office President Zuma took charge of the intelligence services. He started by removing high ranking officials from the office which including Moe Shaik and Mbeki's staunch loyalist Barry Gilder. The latter was the coordinator of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). The National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act 37 of 1998 gives wide-ranging responsibilities to NICOC, including to "produce and disseminate intelligence which may have an influence on any

state policy with regard to: the detection and identification of any threat or potential threat to the national security of the Republic, or the protection and promotion of the national interests of the Republic, for consideration by the cabinet”. Studies relating to the role of intelligence services in the international affairs are rarely undertaken. However, given Zuma’s approach to include intelligence services in the international affairs necessitates more studies to be done.

#### **4.4.8 Civil Society**

McGowan and Nel (2002) suggest that all actors which fall outside the ambit of the state are non-state actors and they constitute civil society. These can be the media, religious groups, corporations, individuals, NGOs, academia and labour unions to name a few. Specifically, these are role players like “the South African Non-governmental Organisations Coalition (SANGOCO), research institutions such as South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)” (McGowan and Nel 2002: 24). In addition to that is the print media such as the *Sunday Times*, *Mail & Guardian*, *City Press* and digital media like *e-News Channel*. The former category continually publishes articles relating to South Africa’s foreign policy formulation while the latter hosts and broadcasts discussions on the issue.

A number of these non-state actors are capable of making quite a large contribution using seminar presentations, publication of research findings and engaging other actors involved in foreign policy making. The role of non-state actors must be clearly understood; they do not directly participate in the foreign policy making process as they lack *locus standi*. However, they have the ability to influence and shape the psyche of policy makers or at least they aim to do so. Although the civil society is not a legitimate representative of the citizenry as it has no official mandate from the public, it however represents their views and informs them on foreign policy matters. At times it works together with the legitimate representatives of the people, the parliament, to criticise government decisions and their implementation (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:125). For example, a number of non-state actors heavily criticized the ANC’s *South Africa’s Foreign Policy Discussion*

*Document.* The argument is that this discussion document is indeed well crafted but it is very idealistic. One of the prominent actions undertaken by the civil society was its participation in the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines (Naidoo, 2004). Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2002) also note the civil society's contribution in conceptualization of the DOD's peacekeeping framework and also the South Africa-EU free trade agreement.

Regardless of the attempts by the civil society to fully participate in the foreign policy making process, it faces many challenges including deliberate rejection by the state actors. Its rejection can be equated to that which is faced by parliament. A number of scholars believe that civil society should feature in foreign policy making but Suttner (1996: 73) claims that "... there has not been regular and consistent involvement of civil society in this regard". From the above discussion one can conclude that civil society's participation in South Africa's foreign policy making is without obstacles. Perhaps this is just a reflection of the secretive nature of South Africa's foreign policy.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

The chapter gave an overarching outline of South Africa's foreign policy formulation and implementation since the democratic dispensation. The chapter was two-fold; it presented the outline of the doctrines which foreign policy should rest upon and the actors involved in the foreign policy formulation, respectively. The former part dealt with principles like promotion and protection of human rights, respect for the international law, continental democracy and the development of African interests. These are some of the key principles which South Africa's foreign policy should be based upon.

The latter part dealt with the role-players which are part of both foreign policy making and implementation. In the post-apartheid South Africa, it became evident that the president who is both the head of government and the head of state is the most primary actor on foreign policy decisions. It is mainly because traditionally in most countries the head of government is the integral part of foreign policy making and implementation. This by no means suggests that the president is the only actor responsible for foreign policy making. So far three presidents have been at the helm of the post - apartheid South Africa, Nelson

Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (the researcher deliberately leaves out Kgalema Motlanthe)<sup>2</sup>. From the events and processes that have unfolded within the foreign policy circles it is apparent that the incumbent president has a major influence in deciding whether South Africa embraces partnership or hegemonic approach towards its neighbours in the SADC region. A number of events stood out during Mandela's tenure. These include his unilateral decision to cancel Namibia's R 80 million debt to South Africa without consulting or informing his party the ANC, the executive or the parliament. He also called for the sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria after the hanging of Ken Saro- Wiwa and the Ogoni nine. The chapter has argued that President Mbeki was a forerunner in the revival of the concept of African Renaissance and the establishment of NEPAD. He committed himself and South Africa in finding lasting solutions in the region through multilateral forums. He was a key figure in SADC, the AU and the UN.

The chapter has also demonstrated that a number of government departments participate in the foreign policy making and implementation processes but that the major participants are DIRCO and DTI. DIRCO plays an important role in foreign policy formulation mainly using diplomacy as a tool. Diplomacy refers to the method employed by the government to interact with its neighbours. It is this departmental unit which is responsible for pursuing South Africa's national interests through its personnel like the diplomats and ambassadors. They are key players in advancing the country's interest whether in partnership terms or hegemonic terms.

There is no clear distinction between foreign policy and trade policy; as a result it is important that the DTI and DIRCO together with other actors like the presidency work closely. This is mostly important because a number of trade policies engineered by DTI largely affect foreign policy in general. The country's economic relations are sustained by means of the country's businesses like tourism industry, mining industry and telecommunications industry to name just a few. All the businesses operate behind the DTI banner. South Africa is criticized for wanting to be a self-interested dominant player and for

---

<sup>2</sup> Kgalema Motlanthe took over as the president of the Republic of South Africa following the resignation of his predecessor Thabo Mbeki after the ANC's decision to replace him. He took over in September 2008 to finish the term of office which ended in 2009.

pursuing hegemonic aspirations. The argument is that South Africa is not seeking partnership instead it wants to dominate and become a hegemon.

In relation to the DOD, before a decision to intervene or not to intervene is made two things are taken into account. Firstly, the human rights record of the concerned country is considered. Secondly, the general security assessment is made. The final decision to intervene or not to intervene is at the discretion of the DOD in conjunction with the SANDF, NCACC and the Presidency. The SANDF operates under the DOD to fulfil South Africa's peace missions outside of the country. The SANDF is the unit which is more concerned with execution as opposed to the actual formulation of the foreign policy.

The parliament participates in foreign policy making mainly through the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. The committee is responsible for DIRCO related affairs in parliament. It is responsible for discussing policy related issues long before they can be considered for passing into law. It also performs an oversight function on DIRCO. The parliament's participation on foreign policy formulation and execution is very limited. It is confined to discussing and airing the public's view while it has no direct influence on what constitutes the actual foreign policy making and implementation. Lastly, the role played by the civil society is not very distinct to that of parliament. Civil society seeks to represent the general public in many forms; it can be academia, businesses and NGOs, to name but a few. It does not really have a direct participation role but seeks to influence and inform foreign policy making.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **5 SOUTH AFRICA'S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

It is a general assumption by realism theorists that all states have their own national interests, but in the international arena they are sometimes expected to moderately compromise their national interests especially if they contradict the international law or if they are not in line with multilateral institutions. The latter view is espoused especially by both liberalism and institutionalism. South Africa's foreign policy is articulated such that it complements its capacity. According to Spies (2008), South Africa falls under the emerging middle power category in terms of the ranking of countries. Middle powers usually align themselves with the multilateral institutions in search for solutions in international affairs. Middle powers have an important contribution to make within international organizations such as the UN and regional organizations. The former DIRCO Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma used to stress that multilateralism is the most "effective" and "efficient" mechanism to address international issues.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore South Africa's multilateral engagements in SADC in particular and in Africa in general. The chapter is centred on South Africa's multilateral affiliation and its contribution in multilateral engagements in Africa. It makes a preliminary evaluation on whether post-apartheid South Africa has adopted the partnership or hegemonic approach in its engagements within multilateral institutions in Africa. In a nutshell, the discussion will revolve around South Africa's foreign policy operations within African institutions such as SACU, SADC, AU and NEPAD. South Africa's role in the development of the concept of "African Renaissance" will be discussed as a way of testing the country's view on multilateralism. It is the view of the researcher that South Africa's role in the UNSC is necessary even though it falls outside of the African vicinity. It is relevant because while serving in the UNSC South Africa represented the African continent as a whole and espoused and articulated the continent's (political) aspirations.

## **5.2 South Africa's Multilateral Relations in Africa**

Multilateral institutions to a certain degree have the ability to indirectly reshape the states' national interests or their priority to ensure that they conform to the international standards. A lay example is apartheid South Africa. Due in part to increasing external pressure from the international community, the apartheid government had to compromise its apartheid national interests and opted for democratic principles (SAGI, 1996).

Suttner (1996) proposes that in the multilateral engagements there must be multilateral agreements including all concerned parties. At a certain point in time the South African apartheid government lost its membership in many multilateral institutions because of its domestic policies. Its numerous attempts to regain its membership in international multilateral institutions were perpetually rejected. However, just after the dismantling of the apartheid system in 1994, the entire international community welcomed democratic South Africa's government to the international community. It was allowed to re-join multilateral institutions like SACU, SADC, AU, UN and the Commonwealth. According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002:265) "since 1994, South Africa has actively engaged in multilateral issues such as human rights, economic and social development, disarmament, peacekeeping and global security, refugees and migration, and illegal drug trafficking". One of South Africa's goals is to represent developing countries and also to protect them against malevolent products of globalization. For Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) South Africa is more effective in implementing its foreign policy objectives when operating within multilateral institutions. Moving from this premise, the discussion on South Africa's role in multilateral institutions is necessary in order to establish whether it is a partner or hegemony. This is important because there is no consensus on these evidently diametrically opposed viewpoints.

## **5.3 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)**

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) emerged out of dissolution of its predecessor organization, the Sub-Regional Custom. The Sub-Regional Custom was formed in 1889 and it was transformed to SACU in 1910 amid the formation of the Union of South Africa. This move was aimed at enhancing economic development by means of regional

coordination trade (Gelb, 2002). SACU remains the oldest and most functional economy-orientated organization in the Southern African region. Its member states are: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. In 1969 member states deliberated and signed SACU Treaty which allowed for “duty-free” movement of goods and services with an exception of labour force among all member states. SACU member states are at liberty to apply common external tariffs; this is the shared tariff to non-member states (McGowan, 2006).

The end of apartheid in South Africa neutralized the hostile environment between SACU and South Africa which served as a base for the review of both the 1910 and 1969 SACU Agreements (Alden and Soko, 2005). This change also enabled South Africa to engage its neighbours on a number of issues. Such engagements were not possible under South Africa’s apartheid regime. Instead, the popular view was that South Africa should not affiliate itself with any integration organization but attempt to assume SACU’s role in the Southern African region. This attempt or view “forced” post-apartheid South Africa to quickly align itself with SACU and fully partake in regional affairs (Gelb, 2002). Former President, Nelson Mandela came out harshly criticizing SACU’s Agreement. He referred to it as “a reflection of the colonial oppressors’ mentality”. President Mandela further condemned South Africa’s apartheid regime’s action to bully its neighbouring states (Alden & Soko, 2005). South Africa’s mission was to democratize SACU and to transform its “colonial” perspective. This was evident in South Africa’s prioritization of SACU’s transformation.

Following robust discussions SACU member states finally agreed on revised the agreement on 21 October 2002. The revised agreement comprises three units: “a customs component, an excise component, and a development component” (Alden & Soko, 2005:371). South Africa has committed itself to playing an administrative role since SACU has no secretariat. It has been observed that “Its Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels while the Departments of Customs and Excise, and Trade and Industry collect most duties and coordinate all SACU functions” (McGowan, 2006:324). SACU member states were committed to working toward establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA). FTA was endorsed by



the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government which was convened in 2008. This initiative is one of many initiatives which seek to establish and enhance mutual trade partnership among member states (GCIS, 2009).

Despite South Africa's effort to ensure mutual trade partnership, its partnership with other member states has been characterized as imperialist (Alden and Soko, 2005). According to Alden & Soko (2005:371), "...notwithstanding generous relations between South Africa and the entire SACU community, recently incorporated trade, financial and other noneconomic proposals (with reference to, for instance, infrastructure) bind SACU affiliates closer to South Africa, compromising their individual sovereignty". It has been criticised for creating and implementing bias trade policies and practices. Such policies include protectionism policies which restrict access to its market, thus benefiting South Africa at the expense of other SACU member states. South Africa has an advantage because it "is responsible for recommending tariff levels and administering all excise, customs, and other duties" It is reported to have "... often blocked its neighbours' industrialisation efforts" (Adebajo, et. al. 2007:22).

Even lately, South Africa continues to be criticised for being a bully on its neighbours. That is, it is responsible for both hindering growth and economic crises in countries like Swaziland and moderately Lesotho. Most of these perceptions are entirely not true while some are distorted. It is therefore important to rebuke some of the common myths regarding South Africa and SACU.

### **5.3.1 Changes in the Revenue Sharing Formula**

The revenue sharing formula is very important in SACU's operations because it is a mechanism which is used to regulate and determine cash inflow distribution among member states. It regulates money from all customs and other cash inflows (Flatters & Stern, 2006). The three elements which are taken into account when deciding how much each member state gets are: customs, excise and development. The formula is quite complex and the prevailing one came into effect in 2006 after years of deliberations. Since then, it has not changed nor has it been amended in any way (Flatters & Stern, 2006).

The 2008-2009 global crises led to a major reduction of funding given to countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The global crises directly affected SACU's revenue pools especially customs duty collections (Grynberg & Motswapong, 2010). This decrease was inevitable since there was a decrease of the global demand and commodity prices. Although South Africa is responsible for collecting and distributing most of the cash inflow, it does not have unilateral control over the entire revenue. It therefore cannot dictate who gets what, but the adopted formula prevails (Grynberg & Motswapong, 2010). The process of sharing the cash inflow is managed and overseen by domestic Finance Ministers of all member states.

### **5.3.2 South Africa Benefits from SACU to the Detriment of other Member States**

South Africa is the biggest benefactor in SACU's revenue pool. This is informed by the fact that South Africa is the major trader and is the biggest economy in the Southern African region. According to Grant and Chapman (2011:21):

The three components as mentioned above are distributed as follows: the customs component is allocated according to each "country's share of total intra-SACU trade, including re-exports; the excise component, net of the development component, is allocated on the basis of GDP and lastly, the development component is fixed at 15% of the total excise pool and distributed to all SACU members according to the inverse of each country's GDP/capita. Nevertheless, in 2008 and 2009 alone South Africa accounted for over ZAR45 billion which equate to 98% of the overall revenue pool but only got a share of ZAR21 billion.

A shallow analysis of the distribution of money within the SACU framework does not give an accurate story. Therefore, an in-depth analysis is necessary. Given that South Africa has a bigger trade surplus compared to its BLNS counterparts, the customs element is intertwined to intra-SACU imports. Some authors argue that "This helps to reward BLNS for the cost-raising and polarization disadvantages of being in SACU with powerful South

Africa”. These transactions escalated to ZAR27 billion in 2008 which equate to 1.15 % of South Africa’s GDP (Grant & Chapman, 2011).

A number of scholars including Dr. Mzukisi Qobo suggest that this amount to “aid” from South Africa to the BLNS. They suggest that it is a form of development since the money is taken from the same pool of money which can be used to address South Africa’s socio-economic problems (Grant & Chapman, 2011). If indeed this is an aid, then, South Africa is among the biggest donors in the world. This conclusion takes into account the fact that most of the developed countries fail to meet their assistance of targeted 0.7% of GDP. This state of affairs gives scholars and other commentators enough to ruminate about as far as South Africa’s relations with her neighbours through SACU is concerned.

### **5.3.3 South Africa is the Only Destination for Investment in the Region**

It is undisputable that there are huge differences among SACU member states’ economies. South Africa remains the dominant economy in most aspects (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2010). Nonetheless, South Africa is not the only country capable of attracting foreign investors within SACU. A number of investments and industrial developments have occurred in the SADC region but outside South Africa. For example, Namibia has attracted significant interest from emerging partners from China and Russia who are looking to invest in mineral resources projects and other sectors such as the investment in Ohorongo Cement which is valued at 2.5 billion Namibian Dollars (N\$). Some six investments worth N\$1.5 billion were approved in the manufacturing sector and an additional six, worth N\$1.177 billion, in the construction industry (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2010:33).

In addition to that, South Africa should not be treated as if it is the only SACU member to give incentives to appeal to investors and give local industries support. Botswana for example, at one point gave support to textile manufactures and it remains one of the risk lenders in the continent.

### **5.3.4 South Africa Wants to Collapse SACU**

South Africa through the South African National Treasury (SANT) has forwarded a proposal for the review of the current revenue sharing formula, but this does not mean it wants to collapse SACU as some believe. This allegation cannot be sustained; South Africa's presence in SACU seeks to bring about a high level of economic stability in the Southern African region. According to South African officials the proposed amendments to the revenue sharing formula will see BLNS states achieving a higher level of stability on cash inflow from SACU's revenue pool. By not having all of the SACU revenue linked to trade "there is a greater chance to ensure more predictable funds for the member states" (Hichert, *at al* 2010:21). Certainly, South African representatives have on more than one occasion been frustrated by SACU especially during the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations with the EU. But such obstacles have been turned into positive by member states as they afforded them a chance to engage one another thoroughly. A proper analysis of SACU will reveal that it is facing a number of challenges. A major one is the declining revenue pool and the attainment of inclusive economic growth which can decrease the high level of unemployment.

In line with the above discussions, Alden and Soko (2005) suggest that SACU offers an appropriate example where South Africa's presence is characterized by historical contradictions and economic dominance. There is a view that South Africa has previously acted as an imperialist "malevolent hegemonic power", while it is striving to uphold the image of a "benign" regional hegemon" (Hichert, *at al* 2010:18). Despite these and many other challenges South Africa is expected to provide leadership in SACU.

### **5.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

After the democratic breakthrough in 1994 South Africa joined SADC and immediately became one of the major actors in that regional block. According to Landsberg (2006), South Africa is entrusted with the leadership responsibility in the SADC region. It is then expected to spell out its leadership plan. What is worth noting is that South Africa coordinates Finance and Investment units and also participates in the Peace and Security Council of SADC. According to Adebajo, *et al* (2007:26) South Africa "... should strive to

achieve regional economic development by utilising the instrument that is ready at hand, in the form of SADC”.

In relation to regional economic cooperation or integration, South Africa declared that it would adopt a careful step by step approach using cooperation as opposed to direct radical approach. It resolved that it would be guided by principles of equality, communal partnership and non-hegemonic tendencies as the means for foreign policy implementation. Regional economic integration as opposed to market integration is likely to be advantageous, especially for the low-income countries as it is likely to come with important economic opportunities and benefits. Market integration has the tendency of leading to regional economic polarization which in turn leads to uneven and unsustainable development (Alden & Soko, 2005).

Contrary to the popular realist perspective, South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa was reshaped to match today’s political dynamics. This is despite the fact that it is still based on political and economic interests. Today South Africa’s economic interests in the continent are based on the accelerated trade and investment. It flows from South Africa to the SADC community and thereafter to the entire continent, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. The major goal of this approach is to increase domestic economic growth and create employment opportunities in the SADC region. This is evidenced by South Africa’s commitment in encouraging its NGOs to fully participate in development and construction projects in the SADC region (Gelb, 2002). According to Adebajo, *et al.* (2007), South Africa remains the biggest foreign investor in SADC and it has committed itself to the revival of SADC as an institution. Large degree of resources has been directed specifically to the implementation of free trade protocols, politics, defence and security. When South Africa was given a chance to chair the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government in 2008, it stressed the necessity to establish the Free Trade Area (FTA). That summit opened the way for the launch of FTA afterwards. Above that, a number of treaties were signed including the Agreement of Amending Article 20 of the Protocol on Trade, the Agreement Amending the SADC Treaty and other treaties (GCIS, 2009a).

A number of scholars including Prys (2009) acknowledge that South Africa has made a commendable contribution to the Southern African community directly and indirectly. Prys (2009) claims that President Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" ensured regional unity and stability. She holds that it would have amounted to "foreign" tendency to join the West imperialists in condemning its neighbouring states. At this point Southern African states had already been victims of prejudicial criticisms for different issues including South Africa's denialist approach to HIV/AIDS. Nonetheless it must be acknowledged that South Africa's "quiet diplomacy" almost ruined its international credibility. South Africa was seen as a unifying symbol when it led a boycott on the SADC-EU Ministerial Summit in 2002. The meeting was to exclude Zimbabwe, however, due to the boycott the EU had to reschedule the summit and move it from Denmark to Mozambique to accommodate Zimbabwean officials.

Despite South Africa's efforts to attain regional integration it has received a plethora of criticisms. According to Du Plessis (2002) the status quo of underdevelopment of the Southern African region clearly attests to South Africa's foreign policy failure towards the region. He holds that South Africa needs to reconsider its focus on SADC and intensify its engagement with SADC institutions. He further suggests that South Africa needs to be at the helm of the entire regional integration process.

Murphy and Smith (2002) argue that regional economic cooperation is not likely to be achieved particularly in the developing world. Their argument is based on the fact that in the early stages of regional economic cooperation weak economies are likely to depend on their relatively stronger counterpart for bailout. For example, a middle income country like South Africa might be expected to assist low-income countries like Lesotho. Due to this fact, South Africa will have to adopt a liberal approach as opposed to a conservative approach in the allocation of resources. In the meantime, South Africa's critics continue to lash South Africa for regional trade inequalities. The citation below buttresses this submission.

Arguably, South Africa's competitive trade advantage has culminated in regional business domination and imposed an unbearable pressure on the local manufacturing capacity of the other SADC states. As a result, trade imbalances between South Africa and the rest of its regional counterparts also compromise the primary vision of SADC, which is grounded in the principles of "equity", "reciprocity", and symbiotic relations (Alden & Soko, 2005:376).

According to Gelb (2002), South African foreign policy makers do not seem to consider SADC as an important medium for implementation of their regional agenda. They have raised a number of concerns relating to SADC's bureaucratic obstacles and the wastefulness experienced within SADC administration. SADC's lack of commitment to effectively engage on developmental issues has undermined the collective efforts to develop the entire continent. In the same token, South Africa was widely criticized for failing to provide leadership on the then Zimbabwe's chaired SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (Gelb, 2002). To put this into context, since post-apartheid South Africa's involvement in SADC there has been perpetual rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa for leadership positions. This contestation was evident on continuous problems facing the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security of SADC. The rivalry in question had boomerang effects, particularly in civil conflicts in the DRC and in Lesotho. It further facilitated the deteriorating relations between South Africa and other SADC counterparts (Schoeman, 2000).

In relation to the 1998 Lesotho's intervention, South Africa's intervention was denounced and condemned by many. It was condemned despite the fact that South Africa did not make a unilateral decision but intervened under the umbrella of SADC and the AU. South Africa's action received criticisms based on different reasons from different players. One view was that the aggression and coercion used is not in line with South Africa's position on conflict resolution strategy, not to mention the rationale of the decision itself and the *modus operandi* of the intervention. According to Schoeman (2000), South Africa attracted a series of criticisms because of its publicly known position on peaceful solutions, at least in principle. However, South Africa categorically stressed that in line with SADC standards, it is prepared to adopt forceful means where democracy is threatened or is under

imminent threat. Schoeman (2000) suggests that none of the above two civil clashes fulfilled this precondition. Also, during this time South Africa had already occupied a high position in SADC, so there was no point for it to convey its military strengths.

### **5.5 The African Union (AU)**

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed on 25 May 1963; it is the predecessor organization of the AU. Its headquarters is situated in the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. The predecessor organization was formed with the specific goal to organize inter-state relations in the continent, build and sustain unity and pursue economic integration (Gelb, 2002). Throughout its existence, the OAU was consistently criticized by different players for a variety of reasons relating to its operation. Its detractors pointed out that it was caught in lingering functional defects. This was prominent in the 1970s and 1980s when it opposed *coups d'état* as the mechanism for resolving national leadership crisis amongst member states. At the helm of the OAU was the principle of non – interference in the domestic issues of the member states. A number of weaknesses were attributed to the organization's charter which explicitly states that the organization "... would not interfere in the domestic affairs of its members, and would protect their territorial integrity and defend their sovereignty". The organization's rules like this one indirectly undermined its capacity to fulfil its mandate and appeared as a toothless dog before law violators (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002).

In light of the overwhelming security related problems like human security, conflict prevention and peacekeeping there was an urgent need to transform the organization. As a result, in the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government Summit held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999, the decision to transform the OAU into AU was taken (Landsberg, 2006a). According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) the following year, 2000 marked the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The act provides for the establishment of the following organs within the UN:

- Assembly



- Executive Council
- Specialised Technical Committees
- Financial Institutions (the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank)
- Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)
- Peace and Security Council (PSC)
- Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
- Economic, Social and Cultural Council (Ecosoc)
- African Court of Justice
- African Court on Human and People's Rights; and
- African Commission on Human and People's Rights (GCIS, 2009a:243).

The AU was officially launched on 09 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. South Africa had a privilege of being both the host and the inaugural chair of the newly established AU. In the same meeting, member states set their objectives which included “upholding the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member-countries; ensuring continental peace, security and stability; and developing the principles of democracy, good governance and public participation” (Schoeman, 2002:219). According to Landsberg (2006a) South Africa was determined and central in the process of formulating the organization's goals and objectives. So far, South Africa has attracted a series of criticisms for allegedly taking into account the national interests of certain states while abandoning the national interest of others. The then South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki took upon himself to pursue “his” vision of African Renaissance by heavily lobbying and to the certain extent “dictating” for its integration into the AU. On the idea of the African Renaissance, South Africa has always enjoyed the support of countries like Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, Algeria, Senegal and Nigeria among others. Alongside President Mbeki was the then Minister of DIRCO Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, together they dominated both the Assembly and Executive of the AU. South Africa was also instrumental in the AU's Permanent Representatives Committee to such an extent that in 2004 it was named as the permanent host of the PAP (Landsberg, 2007).

Since South Africa re-joined the organization it has been at the forefront in prioritizing the need to "... strengthen AU actions in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, with ... emphasis on peace support missions ..." in war-torn parts of the continent (Landsberg, 2007). This move is contrary to the OAU's position which was deeply entrenched in "military-defined state". Under the auspices of the "newly" formed AU's PSC South Africa heavily lobbied for the prioritization of human security and social justice. South Africa proposed the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee. This was a clear indication that South Africa wanted to abandon the OAU's principle of non-intervention and replace it with the interventionist AU. Both these structures were to operate as functional units of the AU's PSC. These initiatives required a large amount of financial and human resources. As a result, relatively stronger economies like Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Egypt pledged to give more from their reserves. Each of the above mentioned countries' levies increased to reach 8.25% individually of the overall AU's annual funds. They further committed to increasing their annual levy by 6.75% reaching a sum of 15 % levy individually. After all, the continent's superpowers' collective levy amounted to 75% of the AU's annual budget (Landsberg, 2007). Despite its contribution South Africa continued to be faced by resource and capacity related issues which are likely to diminish its capacity to lead within the AU (SAGI, 1996).

South Africa is determined to treat all other AU member states as "equals" irrespective of size, military strength and economic muscles they may possess. This is one of the cornerstones of South Africa's foreign policy. It seeks to avert any hegemonic tendencies under the auspice of the AU (SAGI, 1996). Landsberg in SARPN (2003:6) argues that "South Africa rejected any hegemonic aspirations and is committed to forging a partnership and alliance with African states. South Africa is expected to work towards championing the cause of Africa and of the South at large in spite of its hegemonic tendencies questioned by some African countries". Alden and Soko (2005) claim that the hegemonic perception is created by the fact that South African businesses are continuously spreading to the whole continent. These businesses seem to be dominating the market and they have huge economic influence.

South African companies operating abroad are alleged to breach the code of ethics in host countries. Bahlungu *et al* (2007) refers to South African companies which continued with extraction of resources especially during 1996 and 1998 DRC's civil war). According to Games (2003), South African companies have secured for themselves labels like exploiters and neo-colonizers as evidenced in the case of Zambia where Shoprite was accused of exploiting workers to the extent that the Zambian government had to intervene. This is in line with neo-Marxist scholars who hold that capitalism by nature is exploitative and disregards host countries in pursuit of profit. Other actors who label South Africa as a sub-imperialist are not fooled by the pretence of the African Renaissance project.

Landsberg (2007) cautioned South Africa to refrain from giving overarching support to NEPAD over the AU. South Africa is accused of focusing on NEPAD which is the functional unit as opposed to the bigger structure, the AU. The concern is that NEPAD remains the AU's project which should function under its auspice as it is not an independent project. This biasness by South Africa led to rivalries between the two concerned institutions and partially diminished the AU's reputation. Details on South Africa's participation in the NEPAD will be explored in the next section.

### **5.6 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)**

In a quest to attend to a number of socio-economic ills in the African continent the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was formed in July 2001 in Zambia's capital, Lusaka. It was endorsed by the 37<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. NEPAD's major mandate is to provide for vision and policy framework for hastening economic co-operation and integration among member states. This is one of the recent efforts by the African states to promote economic and social development in the continent. According to Ezeoha & Uche (2005: 7) "Essentially, the long-term objective of NEPAD is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation arena".

Landsberg (2007) concurs with Gelb (2001) that as much as NEPAD was a product of collective engagement by the South African government and other African states, it highly embodies former President Thabo Mbeki's idea of development. It is clear that it was President Mbeki who lobbied other African countries like Egypt and Nigeria to actively advocate for the formation of NEPAD. It was also South Africa's idea to have NEPAD headquarters in South Africa. Notwithstanding the overwhelming proof of South Africa's hegemonic domination in NEPAD, it continued to search for mutual partnership relations as opposed to domination (Gelb, 2001). Through the formation of NEPAD, President Mbeki aimed at closing the gap between the North and the South. He also intended to root out Afro-pessimistic views as held by most of the already developed countries. He wanted to improve the North's participation in African development by cancelling debts, building leadership capacity, increasing foreign investment and improving infrastructure. Thus, Gelb concludes: "It is therefore the objective of NEPAD associates to reduce power and development inequalities between developed and developing countries on political, economic, social, and other fronts through the very backing of the First World" (Gelb, 2001:241).

Bischoff (2003) believes that South Africa as the custodian of NEPAD must take the responsibility to ensure that it develops. Nonetheless, being the custodian of NEPAD does not mean immunity to leadership challenges. For example, trying to instil values of good governance can be a very challenging exercise in the African continent. Any attempt to democratise African states is likely to be faced with hostile responses to certain countries especially by absolutist authoritarians and dictators. By its nature, exportation of democracy is a difficult and challenging task; a clear example of such is the US's attempt to export democracy to Iraq (Hudson, 2007). This suggests that a number of African states will not embrace aims and objectives on the NEPAD idea. At this point in time, a number of African states see South Africa as the West's outpost which seeks to pursue Western interests on the African soil (Bischoff, 2003).

Despite that, the South African government still believes that the execution on NEPAD ideals is important especially in the consolidation of the African Agenda. Following a

proposal by NEPAD Heads of State and the Government Implementation Committee, “NEPAD was integrated into the AU during the NEPAD Brainstorming Summit that was held in Algeria in March 2007” (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 246). Just after its inception South Africa articulated its plan to transform the NEPAD to integrate other issues relating to good governance. These are inclusive of collective security and protection and promotion of human rights (Alden & Soko, 2005). In addition to that, the South African government under the leadership of President Mbeki collaborated with other African national governments and established an inseparable link between politics and economics through NEPAD. Given that some parts of Africa remain faced with different challenges like poverty, civil wars and other socioeconomic problems NEPAD set up the Peace and Security Cluster, Democracy and Political Governance Cluster and Economic and Corporate Governance Cluster to address these social ills. President Mbeki believed that it was the high time for Africa to stand up for itself to face its problems as oppose to keep on blaming the West for its miseries. According to Landsberg (2007), President Mbeki was quite confident that NEPAD could be used as a useful marketing mechanism to market Africa abroad.

According to Alden & Soko (2005), the commitment displayed by the South African government towards the development of NEPAD is noticeable. It went out of its way to ensure that other African states become part of NEPAD. It made it clear that NEPAD would give an indication to potential investors that Africa as a continent is ready to accept FDI. Gelb (2002:36) argues that:

South Africa seems to be the only country in the NEPAD leadership that is concerned about NEPAD processes and assuring that it prospers. For this reason, one of South Africa’s national interests on the continent is to ensure continental development of which good governance is the crucial first step. Another critical step for South Africa is to ensure that states commit themselves to governance improvement programmes, independent peer assessment, and punitive measures in the case of under-performance. The commitment to these principles by African leaders is essential to develop NEPAD’s reliability, particularly if civil society in these countries is involved.

Following President Mbeki's departure from the presidency in September 2008, his short-lived successor President Kgalema Motlanthe announced that in terms of policies it was going to be business as usual because he was there to finish "Mbeki's" term of office. After that, the highly anticipated President Jacob Zuma assumed duties as the President of the Republic of South Africa in 2009. There were wide speculations relating to NEPAD's future given the scattergun approach to foreign policy by the incumbent President Zuma's policy makers. President Zuma's administration got into office in 2009 but it was only in 2012 that it came out publicly to pledge its support for the NEPAD. It had been mumbling for three years which to some signalled the abandonment of NEPAD. It would have been bizarre that a front runner state in the formation of NEPAD would quickly turn its back to it because of the change in administration. South Africa reluctantly committed itself to NEPAD, betterment of continental socio-economic conditions and placing Africa on the global agenda (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2009a).

### **5.7 African Renaissance**

The founding President of Ghana (1951-1966), President Kwame Nkrumah reportedly made reference to the concept of the African Renaissance. However, this does not mean that he coined it but the concept was based on his philosophy. The founding President of the Republic of South Africa also proposed the idea of African Renaissance in his visit to Tunisia. It was the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki who took upon himself to adopt and popularize the idea of African Renaissance. He claimed the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the African century. When he defined the notion of the African Renaissance he refers to a "... common vision in favour of African unity and solidarity, African development and renewal, and an end to the marginalisation of our Continent" (Alden & Soko, 2005:383).

After Mbeki's advocacy the term African Renaissance has been the centre of attention for many African statesmen. However, this seems to dwindle as a result of the departure from office of its advocates like South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, Libya's Muammar Kaddafi, and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo. These statesmen were at the forefront leading the road to the African Renaissance. Since President Mbeki resurfaced the term there has been an attempt

to analyse and to define it (Okumu, 2003). The concept has no specific meaning. However, in simple terms, African Renaissance refers to the state where Africa's culture and economy experiences development (Hornby, 2010). In essence African Renaissance stresses that the African future is in the hands of the Africans themselves. This means that Africans ought to face socio-economic and political challenges that characterize the African continent (Maloka, 2011). As mentioned above, in the South African context the term African Renaissance emerged following the election of President Mandela as the head of state in 1994. It was thereafter popularized by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki particularly when he addressed the Constitutional Assembly. In his speech titled 'I am an African' Mbeki (1996) noted:

I am born of a people who are heroes and heroines ... Patient because history is on their side, these masses do not despair because today the weather is bad. Nor do they turn triumphalist when, tomorrow, the sun shines. ... Whatever the circumstances they have lived through and because of that experience, they are determined to define for themselves who they are and who they should be.

He further noted "I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face of our native land. ..." (Mbeki, 1996). Mbeki was seriously worried about the continual conflicts in Africa in the age of an economically globalizing world (Ajulu, 2001). More concerning was that the African continent has vastness of natural resources like gold, copper and uranium, to name few, but is still at the periphery of the world economy (Ayittey, 1999).

According to Mbeki in order for the African Renaissance to succeed decision makers and policy makers need to focus on social cohesion, democracy and economic rebuilding. In addition to that is the institution of Africa as an important player in the geopolitical issues (Ayittey, 1999). President Mbeki's aid, Vusi Mavimbela (1998), characterized African Renaissance as a third moment in post-colonial Africa. The first moment is decolonization, the second moment being the widespread of democracy during the 1990s, and the third

moment being the African Renaissance. As much as President Mbeki recently promoted the idea of African Renaissance, the ability of Africa to rise above its seemingly embedded challenges was identified long time ago. Addressing the audience at Columbia University in 1906 one of the founders of the ANC Pixley ka Seme (1906) noted:

The brighter day is rising upon Africa...Yes the regeneration of Africa belongs to this new and powerful period. The African people...possess a common fundamental sentiment which is everywhere manifest, crystallizing itself into one common controlling idea...The regeneration of Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to be added to the world.

The idea of renaissance itself pre-existed before Pixley ka Seme's period; it can be traced as far back as the fifteen century in Europe. During the renaissance in Europe there was a renewal of Europe's interests in Greek culture (Lotter, 2007). (Obonye, 2012) believes that the notion of African Renaissance is not a new development. He makes reference to Africans who have also talked about the same idea; they include Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Robert Sobukwe. They preached among other things self-reliance, democracy and sustainable development as the centres of African Renaissance. While the idea of African Renaissance is not a new invention, it remains one of the best ideas to emerge from the Africans themselves today.

South Africa's quest for being the leader of the continent Africa and beyond is in line with President Mbeki's doctrine as articulated in the idea of African Renaissance. South Africa's leadership responsibilities in the renewal of Africa is carefully implied and clearly spelt out in this doctrine. A careful consideration of South African officials when relating to the notion of the African Renaissance reveals that they consistently used "we" and "us". This clearly indicates South Africa's commitment to Africa as a whole not just itself as a country in the realism context. When South Africa was awarded the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), President Mbeki proclaimed "as South Africa assumes the presidency of the NAM, we need to ask ourselves a question: in what way can the NAM enhance the



drive towards the restructuring of the world order and the project of the African Renaissance?" (Schoeman, 2000: Internet). The rationale behind the use of inclusive words is to neutralize the widely held perception of being a hegemon or a dominant player towards implementation of the African Agenda (Gumede, 2006). This perception of being a hegemon is generally held within and outside South Africa. However, Landsberg (2006b:8) believes that African states view South Africa "as a leader and a reliable partner, cooperating with African states, and not as some hegemon dictating the terms to the continent". Also, Adebajo, *et. al.* (2007) believes that South Africa's foreign policy reflects some of the African Renaissance agenda features. The basis of his conclusion is on South Africa's participation on number of peace missions and democratization in the region.

In mid-1997 the Office of the President of the Republic of South Africa through the then Deputy President realized Thabo Mbeki issued a document titled "The African Renaissance: A Workable Dream". According to Taylor & Williams (2001:267) the document highlighted South Africa's commitment towards "addressing and entrenching democracy in Africa; accelerating the process of globalisation on the continent; the "emancipation of African women from patriarchy"; the sustainable economic development; the rallying of the youth; and retrieving African history and culture. President Mbeki aimed at using the African Renaissance idea to offer solutions to problems facing continent Africa (Taylor & Williams, 2001).

Taylor and Williams (2001) believe that the African Renaissance is a wish list for Africa's development based on traditional liberal approach to international development. For this reason, Mbeki's African rejuvenation concept "also embodies coercive but liberal markets, trade and "polyarchic" organisations on the continent" (Du Plessis, 2002:126). They argue that the idea of African Renaissance will remain a wish list if the SADC region and the entire continent remain uncoordinated. Another issue with this idea is that it is more of a mere promise than it is an actual policy. It lacks a clear mechanism for accountability of different governments to their domestic electorate. According to Bischoff (2003), it only acknowledges states as the important actors excluding non-state actors. Despite his departure from the Presidency, Thabo Mbeki continues with his direct involvements in the

African renewal programmes. He launched two institutions: the Thabo Mbeki Foundation and the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, respectively. These institutions are there to facilitate Africa's revival. According to Ncana (2010), President Mbeki holds that Africa as a continent is on the right route to good governance and economic growth but the major problem is the shortage of human resources for implementation.

### **5.8 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)**

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was formed in 2003 as a self-monitoring instrument. It comprises the AU member states that voluntarily signed the memorandum of understanding. The mandate of the APRM is to tackle issues pertaining to the lack of service delivery, corruption and poverty in African states. The APRM strives to bring about stable political and economic environment, and sustainable development (GCIS, 2009b). According to Landsberg, (2006:259), APRM is aimed at "... exposing underachievers by identifying government flaws, where there are any, and bringing about ways through which such leadership shortcomings can be rectified through government evaluation". Just like in the formation of NEPAD, President Mbeki played a pivotal role in the formation of APRM. Member states which have already undergone the review process include Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa (GCIS, 2009a).

South Africa's review was in 2005. Given that governments get to review themselves there has been an outcry from the civil society. Such outcry is accompanied by an extensive lobbying for the increased public participation. This is to ensure that the host government does not "dictate" and "dominate" the review process. In line with the APRM regulations, civil society has a major role to play in the review process (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007). Due to this "requirement" the South African government under President Mbeki brought diverse stakeholders on-board. In 2006 for example, a panel comprising NGOs and academics was formed and participated in the peer review process. The panel received and discussed draft reports on diverse issues like corruption and leadership efficiency. The November 2006 report titled *Country Review Report: Republic of South Africa* revealed that there is a minimal consultation between government and the citizenry. This lack is

prominent especially at the local and provincial spheres of government, respectively. According to Landsberg (2007:207), the report further recommends that:

South African government fixes its focus on contentious issues incorporating capacity constraints and inefficient delivery of public goods and services; corruption; crime; diversity; HIV/AIDS; land reform; unemployment; women and child abuse; and racism and xenophobia. The government must attend to these issues if it were to be successful in terms of the requirements of the APRM.

In the 7<sup>th</sup> Summit of the African Peer Review Forum 2007 held in Ghana, South Africa was applauded for having completed its Self-Assessment Report. Other countries acknowledged that South Africa's review process was inclusive and participatory. President Mbeki received praises for leading the government which is able to conduct an open and unbiased peer review within the allocated period (DIRCO, 2007). According to Tjemolane (2011:106), upon receiving such praises President Mbeki asserted:

the innovative approach included shortening the questionnaire and its translation into all languages, inviting research institutions to participate as partners, the validation process of the 2nd National Conference, involvement of civil society through the SA ECOSOC10 chapter, the establishment of Provincial Governing Councils, the role of Community Development Workers in enhancing popular participation in the APRM process, the use of outside broadcasts, the APRM song and blitzes in taxi ranks and major street corners to popularise the APRM process.

In line with the APRM expectations, South Africa submitted its second report highlighting progress made as far as the APRM's programme of action is concerned (Gruzd, 2014). The report mainly responded on the recommendations made in the previous Country Review Report (CRR) released in 2007. The previously recommended areas of attention included advancement of gender equality, fighting corruption and access to information relating to

human rights and justice. The second report also featured two areas which were not part of the first report which are the institutionalisation of democracy and the institution of traditional leadership, respectively. Early in 2014 the meeting of the AU Heads of States and Governments received a third report from South Africa. In this meeting, once again South Africa led by example as it was commended for numerous best practices including financial management system and tax collection system (Gruzd, 2014). The South African government further stated that South Africa was ready to share its experience and expertise when requested to do so. President Mbeki said information sharing would boost the peer review mechanism.

### **5.9 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)**

South Africa's multilateral engagements and representation of Africa goes as far as reaching the "supreme" international platform, the UN. However, for the purpose of this study only South Africa's role in the UN's functional wing, the UNSC is being assessed. According to Spies (2008) the UNSC is the most relevant body of the UN with regard to African issues and it is the most contested terrain. Despite the "hot" contestation between South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, South Africa was awarded the non-permanent seat in the UNSC in 2006. South Africa was to start serving in the 2007 term of office. Its appointment came as no surprise due to its peace and security credentials, especially in Africa. It had conducted a number of interventions including countries such as Burundi, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire and other conflict torn countries. South Africa's commitment to comply with the international law was evident when it voluntarily dismantling nuclear program and signed NTP (Spies, 2008). Even if South Africa is anti-hegemonic, it is equally not aiming to be just another player in the global arena especially in Africa. South Africa had displayed its capacity and willingness to partake even in international security issues.

In the same vein, South Africa keeps on dodging allegations of having hegemonic tendencies leveled against it. Such allegations are further fuelled by its status of being Africa's representative in the UNSC. Some scholars note that "Those who interpret a concept of "hegemony" as referring to nothing else but "state leadership" believe South Africa harbours ample hegemonic elements because it is conceived of as an African leader

in the UNSC” (Habib, 2010:46). According to Habib (2010) South Africa’s performance in the UNSC in its first term of office was underrated. He submits that South Africa was very enthusiastic, representing Africa and the whole world. It was able to secure African issues on the agenda of the UNSC meetings. South Africa actively participated in the UN reform engagements but when came to decision making it usually followed its diplomatic route. South Africa’s second term of office started in 2011 and ended at the end of 2012 (Habib, 2010).

### **5.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that after joining SADC in 1994 South Africa became one of the major players in reviving and reforming it. South Africa was given a responsibility to coordinate both Peace and Security Council and Finance and Investment sector within the organization. South Africa’s relations towards Africa are based on principles of mutual partnership as opposed to hegemony. Equality also features as one of South Africa’s principles on which foreign policy rest. South Africa’s target is to develop and encourage local economic growth which leads to job creation in SADC member states. South Africa remains the biggest foreign investor in the SADC region. It is further committed to the execution of politics, defence and free trade protocols. It provided leadership in the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government; the very summit which saw the signing of several treaties and laid the foundation for the Free Trade Area. Nonetheless, South African foreign policy makers do not seem to consider SADC as an important medium for implementation of their regional agenda. They have raised a number of concerns relating to SADC’s bureaucratic obstacles and the wastefulness experienced within SADC administration. SADC’s lack of commitment has undermined the collective efforts to develop the entire continent.

This chapter further argued that SACU is generally seen as the most functional and organized body in the region, however, President Mandela lashed on it for embodying characteristics of the former colonial oppressors. President Mandela further condemned South Africa’s apartheid government for its attempt to economically dominate its relatively weaker neighbouring states. In 2010 most SACU members raised their dissatisfaction

relating to trade asymmetries in the region. They argued that the regional trade currently favours South Africa at their expense. This is because of South Africa's protectionist policies and bias trade tendencies. In addition to that, South Africa-SACU relations to a certain extent are seen as imperialist because of the newly integrated trade and financial proposals.

Some SACU member states have threatened to withdraw from the organization if South Africa continues with the status quo which "unfairly" benefits it. They do not consider South Africa as a mutual partner in the organization but considers it as an aggressive economic hegemon. They claim that South Africa's engagement in SACU is informed by past inconsistency and domination. South Africa in the past had acted as an imperialist "malevolent hegemonic power" while it considers itself as a "benign" regional hegemony.

In relation to the AU, South Africa has been careful that it engages its counterpart on the basis of "equals". It is committed to guarding against hegemonic aspirations on its side, thereby pursuing mutual partnership. It is committed to making strategic partnerships with all countries within the AU irrespective of size and power. On one hand South Africa is met with allegations of wanting to be the hegemony in Africa. On the other hand, it is expected by African states to champion the cause of Africa in particular and the South in general. The hegemonic aspiration allegations are fuelled by the country's business advancement in the continent.

The South African government under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki played a pivotal role in formulation of the AU's goals and objectives. Despite that, it was largely criticized for inconsistencies in the AU. It took other's interests into account while at the same time side-lines other states' interests. South Africa vow to strengthen the participation in peace related missions in the continent. It believes that all African states should shift from military to human defined state security and social justice. It further lobbied for the establishment of the Africa Standby Force and a Military Staff Committee as a clear indication of abandoning OAU's non-interventionist approach.

However, South Africa must guard against prejudiced support to NEPAD over the AU. South Africa is accused of focusing on NEPAD which is the functional unit as oppose to the bigger structure, the AU. The concern is that NEPAD remains the AU's project which should function under its auspice as it is not an independent project. This biasness by South Africa led to rivalries between the two concerned institutions and partially diminished the AU's reputation. Although NEPAD was a product of collective engagement by South African government and other African states, it highly embodies former President Thabo Mbeki's idea of development. It is clear that it was President Mbeki who lobbied other African countries like Egypt and Nigeria to actively advocate for the formation of NEPAD. Through the formation of NEPAD, President Mbeki aimed at closing the gap between the North and the South.

Using APRM South Africa played an important role in transforming African governments. South Africa inaugurated its annual APRM in 2005 under the leadership of President Mbeki. Prior to the review process, there were scepticisms from the civil society relating to the openness and transparency of the process. However, South Africa was applauded for conducting a review widely open for public participation. South Africa also promotes the idea of the African Renaissance which seeks to revive the African continent. It played a significant role in the revival of the concept and continues to keep it alive. The Mbeki presidency in particular was consistent in using inclusive words and phrases to refer to broader Africa as opposed to just South Africa. By doing that, it hoped to dismiss allegation of hegemonic aspirations levelled against it.

Having explored South Africa's multilateral engagements in SADC in particular and in Africa in general the following chapter will assess South Africa's foreign policy making and implementation in the SADC region, using Zimbabwe as a case study. This will be done in an attempt to test the extent to which South Africa acts as a partner or a hegemon in regional politics.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **6 SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SADC REGION: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe has deep roots. Ian Smith had strong relations with South Africa. Cecil John Rhodes, whose grave is in Zimbabwe, made a fortune in South Africa. During the struggle for liberation, liberation fighters from Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) fought side-by-side with Zimbabwe's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which later merged to form Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Recently, South Africa has played a mediating role in Zimbabwe when ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) could not see eye to eye leading to a volatile political situation in that country. All these events show that indeed the relationship between the two countries has deep roots. To be sure, there have been some turbulence every now and then but these have been addressed through diplomatic engagements. This chapter looks at South Africa's foreign policy on Zimbabwe over the years citing key episodes in Zimbabwe's eventful history.

The land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe in the form of forced removals of white farmers led to violence and economic crisis. Zimbabwe's crisis which started in the early 2000's attracted a lot of attention from the continent and the international community. However, it was South Africa's quiet diplomacy approach towards the crisis which fuelled the situation. President Mbeki insisted that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe while meeting with concerned parties behind closed doors in an attempt to resolve the crisis. His approach came to be known as "quiet diplomacy". The 'failure' of "quiet diplomacy" in Zimbabwe reflects the institutional and structural shortfalls embedded in quiet diplomacy as a mediation approach. It is also evidence of SADC's unwillingness to take a bold step towards finding solutions and maintaining lasting peace in Zimbabwe in particular and on the African continent in general. South Africa's choice of quiet diplomacy over megaphone diplomacy might be justified on many bases, but it does not seem to deliver the desired outcomes. This has a direct implication on South Africa's identity in the region. This



chapter seeks to assess the gravity of the Zimbabwean crisis and SADC's intervention through South Africa with the intention of establishing the country's (South Africa) identity. It will also reflect on the merits and demerits of South Africa's "quiet diplomacy".

## **6.2 The Genesis of Zimbabwe's crisis**

In the 'newly' independent Zimbabwe more funds were injected into the health and education sectors, respectively. However, colonial remnants were clearly visible especially when it came to land ownership. These colonial remnants were particularly visible in the politics of economy which remained the same as in the colonial era. For example, agriculture remained the driving force of the economy as had been the case under the colonial government (Mkhize, 2008). During the 1960s, 70% of land was in the hands of white Zimbabweans. In the early 1990s, 75% of agricultural land was still owned by white Zimbabweans despite the change of the regime; ownership had increased by 5% from what it was about three decades earlier. Land redistribution was not successful because of a number of reasons including lack of capacity from the native Zimbabweans to manage the farms. Due to historical this injustice, the land reform programme had to be put in place in order to reverse this situation.

A land reform programme aimed at bringing about just and equal land redistribution started. The programme itself was a product of the Lancaster House Agreement<sup>3</sup>. Initially the parties involved agreed on the willing buyer "willing seller principle"<sup>4</sup>. According to the then country's constitution the property rights were protected up to ten years and land could

---

<sup>3</sup> The negotiations which led to the Lancaster House Agreement brought recognised independence to Rhodesia following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Agreement (signed in December 1979) covered the Independence Constitution, pre-independence arrangements, and a ceasefire. The parties represented during the conference were: the British Government, the Patriotic Front led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, represented by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith. It was signed on 21 December 1979

<sup>4</sup> The concept of "willing buyer-willing seller principle" means a completely voluntary transaction between a buyer and a seller. In this regard, the principle accurately denotes the lack of compulsion on landowners". The underlying assumption is that there are willing buyers and willing sellers who are involved in transaction processes in the market place on an equal basis

only be acquired based on the willing buyer willing seller principle. The constitution further guaranteed twenty seats to the whites for a period of seven years in the county's hundred seats parliament. The white farmers who wanted to exit Zimbabwe immediately were bought out by government using funds provided by Britain. This move to redistribute land by President Robert Mugabe's government proved to be futile and fruitless due to the Lancaster House Agreement's failure (Mkhize, 2008). By 1999, everyone could tell that the Lancaster House Agreement had failed to deliver its desired outcomes which among others were to give support to emerging farmers. However, the major reason for that was not just Britain, but President Mugabe. There was a clear unjust and unequal redistribution of acquired land by the government. Land obtained was unfairly given to President Mugabe's allies. The initial agreement was amended to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation (Mkhize, 2008). In 1999, President Mugabe came with a more militant approach by amending the country's constitution to legitimize the above-mentioned changes. He was quite confident that this was the most effective strategy as it allowed him and his allies to remove white farmers by use of force. President Mugabe was confident that his strategy was going to be effective than the 1980's willing buyer willing seller strategy which failed dismally.


It can be argued that President Mugabe had long been annoyed by the inequality of land ownership in his country which seriously disadvantages the natives. Leading to the 1990 elections, President Mugabe articulated his concerns thus: "It makes absolute nonsense of our history as an African country that most of our arable and ranching land is still in the hands of our erstwhile colonisers, while the majority of our peasant community still live in squatters in their God-given land" (Meredith, 2002:121). Meredith (2002) also acknowledges that from the onset the 1990s land reform programme was unorganized and haphazard. There was no proper consultation of the concerned parties. According to Peron (2000), President Mugabe had always been saying that his decisions could never be deterred or ignored. What led to more hostility and sensitivity on the issue of land reform was President Mugabe's decision to politicize land reform. He galvanized his support for the June 2000 elections using the land reform programme. He portrayed land reform as the ultimate goal of the year 2000 elections. Kriger (2003) suggested that going towards the

2000 elections President Mugabe's regime was in trouble and this was evident in his decision to join forces with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA). President Mugabe's new allies practically led the actual invasion and removal of white farmers (Campbell, 2003). This move seemed to have instilled a certain level of fear among white farmers.

In the economic sphere, the removal of white farmers led to the breakdown of the Zimbabwean economy. As stated above, Zimbabwe's economy heavily relied on the agricultural sector. According to Campbell (2003) the economy in Zimbabwe is depended on agriculture, manufacturing and mining. Amid the economic collapse, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe warned of three major blows. Firstly, it was a withdrawal of Bretton Woods Institution's support. Secondly, it was the withdrawal and decline of foreign investments. And lastly, the farmers were to default their loans to banks leading to a financial catastrophe. Outside of the disastrous warnings of the Reserve Bank, the economy remained unstable. It was unstable to the degree that during the 2002 Presidential Elections the country could not afford to print new ballot papers. By that time, the inflation was going closer to 400% (Brown and Saunders, 2004).


Most of the industries including manufacturing and mining suffered and some had to close down and agricultural production suffered a major decline. This is demonstrated in the figures below. The decline in agricultural production was partly credited to the 'new' farm owners who had minimal or no experience at all of commercial farming. Responding to the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, Van Buuren (2004:123) stated that "While the rest of the celebrated the arrival of the new millennium, Zimbabweans was descending into the worst economic crisis of their country's 20 year history". In 2008, the inflation was more than 164, 900 % and still accelerating (Mkhize, 2008).

Table 6.1: Manufacturing output index from 1980 to 2005




Source: Coltart (2007)

Table 6.2: Gold production volume from 1997 to 2006



Source: Coltart (2007)

Figure: 6.3: Wheat Production from 1975 to 2007



**Source: Coltart (2007)**

In the political sphere, President Mugabe remained unshaken by allegations of being a dictator and that of rising political conflict (Meldrum, 2004). According to Chan (2003) President Mugabe, ZANU-PF and their allied war veterans were determined to do anything including the use of violence and intimidation to secure ZANU-PF victory. Violence, intimidation and state suppression continued which led to the government being labelled as authoritarian. Political debates were characterized by high level of intolerance and hostility between ZANU-PF and opposition parties. This drew the international community's attention toward Zimbabwe. Peron (2000) claimed that the intimidation and suppression marked the manifestations of President Mugabe's entrenched conviction that opposition parties' existence is pointless because ZANU-PF represents everyone. The environment was further worsened by ZANU-PF's alleged targeting of the opposition parties' membership. This was perpetrated by the arrest of opposition leaders including MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai. Campbell (2003) divulged that Tsvangirai had escaped a number of murder attempts. He was beaten by both the war veterans allied to ZANU-PF and police while other police officers were watching. Technically, it was alleged that Tsvangirai had been planning to forcefully remove President Mugabe from office (Campbell, 2003). MDC saw this move by ZANU-PF as a political strategy not only to rig elections but to eliminate the MDC.

President Mugabe embraces socialism as his preferred ideology. For Peron (2000), President Mugabe is deceived to believe that socialism amounts to treating people like infants and denying them their fundamental individual rights under the guise of public good. President Mugabe was indoctrinated with socialism when he studied at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa. In 1983, President Mugabe addressing his party rally said that the party will rule forever. He further urged party members and supporters to grow and strengthen it while preparing for its one party role (Peron, 2000). Due to the volatile political and economic environment, Zimbabwe attracted the attention of the international community. Campbell (2003) believes that various civil society stakeholders played a huge role in exposing political violence in Zimbabwe which led to mammoth political and

psychological damage to the society. The stakeholders included but were not limited to the independent media, NGOs and IGOs.

### **6.3 The 2008 Zimbabwe General Elections**

After all the intimidation and violence which characterized the 2002 elections ZANU-PF emerged victorious. However, the MDC did not receive the defeat well given the hostile political environment during the elections. Contrary to the 2002 elections, the 2008 elections were not characterized by high level of violence and intimidation. Instead the problem was caused by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission's (ZEC) failure to release all results on time. Parliamentary results were released showing that President Mugabe's ZANU-PF had lost to Tsvangirai's MDC by 97 to 99 seats, respectively. This presented a major challenge for President Mugabe, to be defeated by a seemingly weaker opposition party (Ofodile, 2009).

On the other hand, the Presidential results were not released. During that delay MDC supporters started claiming that they won the elections by 60% based on half votes counted. President Mugabe was following behind with 30%, the MDC claimed. The deferrals of releasing the results confirmed the allegations of the then imminent vote rigging. This was a cause for concern by the international community once again, especially SADC and the AU. ANC president, Jacob Zuma, raised his concerns regarding the delay of the results and the potential threat it posed to peace and stability. He argued that appropriate rules needed to be applied. Addressing the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, South Africa's President Zuma said "we once again register our apprehension about the situation in Zimbabwe" (Chinaka, 2008:1). Each day passing without the results worsened the anxiety. Zuma argued for SADC mechanisms and guidelines to be used to address the impasse.

Amid the midst, a cargo filled with weaponry was caught in the Durban harbour. The weapons varied from ammunition, mortar bombs and rocket grenades among other things. These weapons came from China destined for Zimbabwe (Ofodile, 2009). The then Head of South African Government Communications, Themba Maseko, said the government was

aware of the cargo but had no plans to stop it and they (government) were being careful on the issue. Meanwhile, the official opposition was concerned that should South Africa give a green light to the passage of the weapons, that would affirm the general notion that South Africa's government was losing grip on Zimbabwe issue (Daily Sun, 2008). Upon failing to off-load in South Africa it was believed that it was the same cargo which was off-loaded in Angola thereafter the weapons made their way to Zimbabwe. In addition to that, the ANC head, President Zuma, argued that SADC could not cope with the deteriorating situation given the cases of violence which started to be reported. At home in Zimbabwe the opposition party was certain that this was just another Mugabe dictatorial strategy to rig elections again. They pleaded with SADC and the AU to intervene.

At state level, the South African government had to respond to the crisis. Under Thabo Mbeki's presidency, South Africa chose to adopt a quiet diplomacy approach towards the Zimbabwean crisis. Quiet diplomacy is a soft approach since it lacks the use of force, but is based on dialogue. According to Mkhize (2008:15), "quiet diplomacy" includes "discussing problems with officials of another country in a calm way usually without informing a media about it". The former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair once adopted quiet diplomacy towards China regarding human rights issues. In 1998 Tony Blair, went to China to "quietly" talk to the Chinese government officials pleading for the release of Xu Wenli, a known pro-democracy activist. He did this without any fanfare (Mkhize, 2008). Graham (2006) suggests that President Mbeki's quiet diplomacy attracted lots of criticisms and speculations especially when contrasted with his notion of African renaissance and good governance in the continent. It generated a public outcry and became a contested terrain. In essence, President Mbeki's quiet diplomacy was aimed at bringing conflicting parties together to the discussion table.

#### **6.4 Quiet Diplomacy in Southern Africa**

The idea of quiet diplomacy came under the spotlight when South Africa adopted it as its preferred foreign policy approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. It is therefore within this context that it is discussed here. Quiet diplomacy as a concept refers to the amalgamation of



different soft diplomatic approaches which are conducted behind closed doors with an intention to reach a conciliatory deal. According to Mhango (2008:16):

In the case of Zimbabwe, these included bilateral meetings between heads of state and senior officials, South Africa's shielding of Zimbabwe from public criticism in international organizations, endorsement of questionable election results, persistent negotiations dubbed 'constructive engagement', and provision of economic packages with an aim of motivating change within Zimbabwe by Zimbabweans.

Here the idea is that being out of public domain increases the likelihoods of reaching an agreement through diplomatic avenues. This is contrary to Woodrow Wilson's doctrine that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view" (Graham, 2008:19). In some circles quiet diplomacy is labelled as 'softly- softly' approach. This is because of the way in which it is executed. South Africa treated Zimbabwe in this manner during its 'constructive engagement' (Graham, 2008). The process of engagement was characterized by patience relating to President Mugabe's nonconformity and renegade opposition. The parties involved believed that through consistent dialogue President Mugabe would crack and allow for amicable solutions to be found to the prevailing crises.

Theoretically, quiet diplomacy resembles preventive diplomacy. The idea of preventive diplomacy was conventionally attached to multilateralism. According to Stedman (1995:17) "Preventive diplomacy refers to *concerted* action designed to resolve, manage, or contain disputes before they become violent". A third party who must seem impartial is required to act as a mediator in solving the conflict. However, in order for it to be effectively executed, all conflicting parties need to agree on resolving the conflict through negotiations (Orth, 1997). Upon reaching an agreement, all concerned parties abide by the agreement and ought to implement it. Orth (1997) suggests that the merits of preventive diplomacy are that the results are measured by the commitment from all parties to implement it. This is the opposite of megaphone diplomacy whereby negotiations are conducted through the media and announcements between conflicting parties.

Accordingly, quiet diplomacy is an embodiment of a contextualized adaptation of preventive diplomacy efforts widely practiced in Southern Africa. It embraces and respects

the principle of state sovereignty and it is based on the political dynamics of the region which include a shared legacy of the politics of liberation. This sense of togetherness as a result of shared liberation experiences leads to the culture of tolerance among heads of states in the region (Kagwanja, 2009). In Southern Africa, there is a culture of brotherhood among heads of states. According to Kagwanja (2009: 29) “This molds a sense of solidarity which perpetuates the imperatives of fraternity and comradeship, underpinned by the unspoken rule that African governments do not openly criticize sovereign governments, even when they abuse the rights of their citizens”. In line with that, Tajudeem Abdul-Raheem wondered in Mhango (2008: 18) “Why can’t these Westerners understand that the more they shout about Mugabe the stronger such leaders become and the more difficult it is for an African leader to condemn him openly for fear of being seen as a Western puppet?” This further testifies to the deep rooted culture of brotherhood which is entrenched in the Southern African region.

In order to fully grasp this idea of quiet diplomacy, it is necessary to locate it within SADC’s peace-making mechanism. As a point of departure, the UN acknowledges the important role of regional bodies in the peace-making process (UN 1995: para. 4). Article 52 of the UN Charter entrusts regional bodies with the responsibility to find non-forceful means to resolve domestic conflicts. Regional bodies are seen as central in conflict resolution. This is mainly because they enhance communication among member-states, promote collective action and ensure alignment to general norms and standards on good governance and conflict resolution (UN 1998: para. 41). This is particularly true when a national conflict has a potential destabilizing effect beyond its borders. The regional body in question (in this case SADC and its peace keeping mission) is based on the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The history of peace-making in the Southern African region shows that there is a lack of consensus among SADC member-states. Due to lack of consensus among member-states, SADC has occasionally found itself trapped between two different approaches to conflict resolution. The two approaches are military intervention and the use of diplomatic avenues (Nathan, 2010 & Adelman, 2004). This situation has resulted into SADC assessing each case on its merit as opposed to having a uniform approach to all cases of conflict resolution.

Quiet diplomacy has been allowed in Southern Africa to the extent that it has started to show the lack of standards and values governing mediation. This is based on the fact that SADC has established institutions and a broader framework for conflict resolution but it is not clear how to actually mediate. There are no clear terms of reference for mediation and the method which mediation must be carried out is also not clearly defined. This leaves SADC with no formal approach. As such, mediation strategies often depend on personalities as opposed to institutions. The absence of a clear mediation framework leads to spontaneous mediation which is also excessively dependent on power politics (Ancas, 2011). This leaves the system open to exploitation. Some of the relatively powerful member-states have used a more personalized diplomatic approach. This can be used as a justification for South Africa's choice of quiet diplomacy in the Zimbabwean crisis even though other SADC member-states did not approve of this approach. A closer analysis of South Africa's mediation effort in Zimbabwe will reveal that South Africa's quiet diplomacy is not inconsistent with principles and norms of dispute resolution within SADC. It is just an additional evidence of the vacuum in SADC's peace-making mechanism.

Upon returning to the international system, South Africa emerged as a leader in terms of economy, political stability and military capabilities. This meant that other Southern African states relied on its role to lead in socioeconomic and political advancement. Due to this new development, many states were determined to enter into bilateral relations with South Africa, a trend which has continued unabated to-date. Mandela's main concern was the idea of universal human rights (Barber, 2005). His administration took a harsh position against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In 1996 Mandela, openly called for the sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria's Sani Abacha. This stance was a response to the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni nine (Vale and Maseko, 1998; Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of states. South Africa went on to withdraw its representative in Nigeria. In turn, South Africa suffered a blow when Western superpowers continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South Africa's call (Barber, 2005). South Africa has also been seen as a unilateral actor in pretence of high moral ground. According to Kebemba (2006), when Laurent Kabila in the DRC was attacked by opposing forces Southern African states intervened but South Africa isolated

itself and maintained neutrality. This non-participation in the collective intervention is usually contrasted with the country's military intervention in Lesotho to halt the 1998 military coup.

During Mbeki's tenure as president, South Africa took a conscious decision of being part of the continent. He consulted with other heads of states in the decision making process. This signalled a clear shift from unilateralism as embraced by Mandela's administration towards multilateral decision making (Buhlungu, et. al. 2007). It can be argued that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy towards the situation in Zimbabwe should be understood in this sense. South Africa openly pronounced that foreign policy decisions relating to the region and the continent will be taken within the mechanisms of SADC and AU, respectively.

### **6.5 Merits of South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy**

It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that South Africa's foreign policy among other things is based on the promotion of peace and security and respect for the international law. It is also based on the democratization and promotion and protection of human rights (Sachikonye, 2005). In line with these values President Mbeki pledged to join the fight against human rights abuse. Perhaps the human rights violations which came as a result of the land reform failure in Zimbabwe presents one of the most difficult human rights dilemmas post-apartheid South Africa had to face in the continent. When intervening, the South African government took quiet diplomacy as a preferred route. This meant that it had to rely on talks and dialogue, particularly between two major rivalries, the ZANU-PF and the MDC. Quiet diplomacy by its nature is not a codified policy but means to steer talks between opposing parties. The rationale behind it was to afford the Zimbabweans the opportunity to find solutions for themselves without outside influence. This is in line with the principle of state sovereignty as enshrined in the international law. In its classical definition, sovereignty refers to the ultimate legal and political authority of the state to govern its own affairs without any external interference. Due to South Africa's respect for international law, quiet diplomacy was adopted (Kagwanja, 2006). South Africa respected Zimbabwe's sovereignty.

Among those who came out and endorsed South Africa's quiet diplomacy approach was former President Mandela. In one of his interviews with the BBC Radio he reasoned: "an approach through diplomatic channels without much publicity is more likely to bring about a positive result. In fact, the major principle behind 'quiet diplomacy' is that it should be quiet. To achieve this, it should take place away from critical public and media scrutiny" (Mhango, 2014:19). Kagwanja (2006) claims that quiet diplomacy is informed by the African spirit as opposed to 'megaphone diplomacy' based on liberal values which demonize African values. Above that, South Africa chose quiet diplomacy partially because had it chosen economic leverages the consequences would have been dire for the Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe largely relies on South Africa for electricity supply. The most unfortunate part is that the consequences of any contrary approach would have been felt by ordinary citizenry as opposed to the executive who take decisions.

In line with that, Graham (2006) offers the rationale behind South Africa's choice of quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe as follows:

- South Africa's scepticism to apply harsher measures is based on historical bonds between the ruling ZANU-PF and the ANC as the liberation movements. ZANU-PF falls within the ambit of frontline states which supported ANC's liberation struggle for democracy. South Africa therefore has a sense of being indebted to Zimbabwe, particularly President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. These are sister organizations which confronted colonialism in their own respective countries.
- South Africa's primary objective to soft approach was to avoid complete crisis of authority in the troubled Zimbabwe. President Mbeki pointed out that "we cannot afford a complete breakdown. I don't know how we would cope with it". The hard approach would have had dire consequences to the already suffering Zimbabweans.

- The post-apartheid South Africa pledges to posture itself as a true African country. This is important especially because of the two previous experiences, apartheid and South Africa's position in Nigeria's Ogoni nine incidence. South Africa was characterized as un-African and inspiring bully for calling for sanctions against Nigeria. It is in that context that South Africa's choice for "quiet diplomacy" should be understood, the fear of being seen as a bully if taking or adopting punitive actions. The former DIRCO minister, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma reiterated that quiet diplomacy by its nature is an African style of conducting foreign relations. She also stated that she will never condemn President Mugabe's administration.
- President Mbeki had always been fascinated by an intra-African approach to Zimbabwe. While most of the international actors were disappointed by South Africa's reaction to the neighbouring Zimbabwe, President Mbeki remained convinced that the issue of Zimbabwe was an African issue to be resolved by Africans. He however acknowledged the need for the presence of the SADC or AU mediator.

For Lodge (n.d), South Africa's choice for quiet diplomacy over economic leverages against Zimbabwe is highly justifiable. He suggests that economic sanctions would have had boomerang effects as they would have ensured concurrent collapse of economy and political authority. Poverty, high rate of unemployment and high inflation are the key indicators of Zimbabwe's economic crises. Landsberg (2007) concurs that South Africa's approach based on hard power would have worsened the already volatile environment. From the British and other westerners' point of view, a failed Zimbabwean state would have hit hard on South Africa. There would have been a dramatic increase of refugee influx and general disorder in South Africa-Zimbabwe border. Kagwanja (2006) agrees with Lodge (n.d). He suggests that South Africa chose to compromise democracy in favour of stability. This was informed by South Africa's lack of political will to have a totally failed state as its neighbouring state. However, it seems as if by 2008 Zimbabwe was already a failed and collapsed state. Taking into account the high inflation rate, human rights

violations and political violence one might suggest that it was a failed state long before South Africa's intervention. Hard or soft diplomacy made not much significant change. The currency was already too weak to suffer any significant decline. Violence was widespread to get any worse. Almost everything had gone out of control.

An additional element which explains South Africa's position towards Zimbabwe is President Mbeki's Africanist posture. Throughout his tenure, South African foreign policy was informed by the idea of reconstruction and reform of the continental institutions. Such institutional reconfigurations were aimed at enhancing regional economic cooperation and democratization (Graham, 2006). Some of the achievements in this area include President Mbeki's successful lobby of the G8 to put funds in the African Renaissance programme (Lodge, n.d). More pro-"quiet diplomacy" advocates include the International Crisis Group which holds that President Mugabe was the centre of the conflict because of his mismanagement of the economy, structured violence and deliberate undermining of democratic principles (Dube, 2003). However, according to Loge (n.d) the only positive result of South Africa's quiet diplomacy was the meetings between ZANU-PF and the MDC as organized by South African officials – something which could have not happened had hard power been preferred to soft power epitomised by quiet diplomacy.

## **6.6 Demerits of South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy**

Criticisms were levelled against South Africa as the reaction to its adoption of quiet diplomacy as an approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. Quiet diplomacy detractors complained that it was not addressing important issues like President Mugabe's dictatorial government and violation of human rights. As a result, it could not bring about any tangible change. Critics claimed that after South Africa's intervention with its quiet diplomacy the situation became worse than it was before. South Africa's quiet diplomacy became the subject of ridicule inside Zimbabwe, in Africa and in the international arena. The policy moves from the premise that President Mugabe has undermined democratic principles and institutions and therefore needs to be softly engaged in order to alter his behaviour. In

Zimbabwe, President Mbeki was heavily criticised by the independent media for utterly failing to resolve the crisis (Graham, 2006).

As a result of a number of criticisms, South Africa was pressured to alter its approach towards Zimbabwe. In the media for example, the ANC as the ruling party was pressured to distance itself from President Mbeki's quiet diplomacy. Unfortunately the ANC itself had been careful not to openly confront abusive regimes. It must be taken into account that it had suffered a blow for doing that during President Mandela's tenure (Lavery, 2008). As mentioned earlier, President Mandela had called for sanctions against Nigeria but his call was not accepted by other African countries. Instead, South Africa was labelled as an un-African bully. Taking into account President Mbeki's commitment to NEPAD South Africa was not prepared to be isolated again (Lavery, 2008). South Africa as a perceived regional and continental leader had to avoid any bullish or hegemonic tendencies. At the same time economic sanctions against Zimbabwe would have intensified the suffering of the general citizenry. Sanction would have had no significant effect to the country which had the inflation running very high and high unemployment rate (Soko & Balchin, 2009). More drastic intervention would certainly have had unintended consequences. The only effective solution than quiet diplomacy would have been an early intervention. Failure of quit quiet diplomacy in this sense painted a negative image for South Africa as it was widely expected by the international community to provide leadership in the region. South Africa was expected to lead mainly because of its high moral standing and its economic muscle. It was these high expectations which made South Africa's quiet diplomacy a dismal failure (Soko & Balchin, 2009).

By all means, South Africa's failure was directly based on the pointless insistence in attempting to get President Mugabe to change his behaviour. President Mbeki was perpetually met with stubbornness and resistance but never changed the strategy (Nathan, 2010). President Mugabe and his cronies would simply deny any agreements they reached or deliberately default them and easily get away with it due to the secretive nature of their meetings. Seemingly South Africa had no alternative approach to the Zimbabwean crisis as it had ruled out any confrontational approach stating that it would hurt the general citizenry.



At the same time, South Africa's approach dented both President Mbeki's and South Africa's image as a leader in the region and economic power-house (Nathan, 2010).

Perhaps outside of quiet diplomacy South Africa should have opted for targeted sanctions. Targeted sanctions as the word suggests are only directed to specific individuals not the country. These can include travel bans and freezing of bank accounts. In this case the targeted individuals would have been President Mugabe and his cronies. However, this might prove to be difficult to distinguish between President Mugabe's supporters and MDC's supporters. Maybe all the actors who expected President Mbeki to act harshly on President Mugabe were over ambitious. The first step should have been for him (President Mbeki) to accept that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe. Acknowledging the crisis would have served as hope that real solutions were coming. The denial of the crisis was despite the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai's withdrawal in the Presidential re-run elections due to violence, unlawful arrests and intimidation directed to MDC's supporters.

### **6.7 The 2013 Zimbabwean Elections**

In the route leading up to the 31 July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe, South Africa played a crucial role as a SADC facilitator, a role none wished for. Although President Zuma and his delegates acted under the auspices of SADC, the whole African continent and the general international community had their trust and faith on them. They were entrusted with a difficult responsibility to revive democracy in a "broken" democratic society (Lalbahadur, 2014). South Africa was widely trusted because other attempts had failed. Previous unsuccessful attempts include the Commonwealth initiative, the US-EU targeted sanctions which had minimal effects and other western orientated attempts. South Africa was to provide African solutions for African problems as earlier envisioned by President Mbeki. Beside the international community's expectations, South Africa as a country had to intervene due to a number of domestic issues. The increasing migration rate of Zimbabweans to South Africa was unbearable. The strategic location of Zimbabwe especially when it comes to trade and integration is very important to South Africa (Lalbahadur, 2014). Additionally, a seemingly stabilized neighbouring Zimbabwe was crucial for South Africa's attainment of North- South Corridor infrastructure development.

South Africa had already been applauded for brokering a deal which saw the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections. With that, South Africa had cemented its role as a leader in the SADC region. The deal facilitated by South Africa saw ZANU-PF and two separate factions of the MDC forming the GNU. It was this arrangement which broke political stalemate in the country (Muzondidya, 2013). Further to that it came with sort of a relief to the tumbling economy which started in early 2000's. This process was to end with the drawing up and adoption of the country's new constitution and subsequently the revival of democracy. South Africa injected large resources to ensure a proper implementation of this process a decision for which South Africa was commended.

Leading to the July 2013 elections, President Zuma personally led the team facilitating in Zimbabwe (Hengari, 2014). The team did an impressive groundwork putting in place a support base for their initiative. It is worth noting that this operation was initiated and executed in the office of the president and not DIRCO as some would have expected. This was contrary to his (the president's) usual practice where he heavily relied on diplomats, ambassadors and relevant government departments for policy making and implementation. In the case of Zimbabwe, he personally led the team. Therefore, Zimbabwe can be taken as an exceptional case (Hengari, 2014). President Zuma's approach was different to that of his predecessor, President Mbeki. After the elections which were relatively quiet compared to the 2008 elections, South Africa through President Zuma was among the first to endorse both the process and the results. The SADC community quickly joined in and declared the elections as free and fair. The AU followed suit and President Mugabe was returned to the helm of his country. The welcoming back of President Mugabe was evident when SADC awarded him with chairpersonship in August the same year (Hengari, 2014 & SADC, 2014). The AU could not be left out, it awarded him the Vice-Chairman seat in January 2014 and subsequently the Chairmanship. It seemed as if South Africa together with its SADC fellow member states with an exception of Botswana were relieved of a huge burden. Botswana was clearly not happy with the outcomes of the July 2013 elections but became a lone voice (Hengari, 2014).

## **6.8 Security a Priority for South Africa**

Upon entering the presidency in May 2009, President Zuma caused a stir of opinions from different actors both domestically and internationally relating to South Africa's approach to foreign policy making and implementation. A dominant assumption was that President Zuma was going to be more domestically focused compared to the outgoing President Mbeki (Vickers, 2010). This assumption was against the fact that President Zuma had prior experience on African issues taking into account his role as a mediator even under President Mandela. He was never seen as a person who would be an active advocate of the pan-Africanist agenda. Later, the assumptions against President Zuma proved to be inaccurate as he continued to advance the pan-Africanist agenda and gave Africa priority in South Africa's foreign policy (Vickers, 2010).

In relation to Zimbabwe there was an expectation from the SADC region and Zimbabweans themselves that President Zuma would be an impartial mediator compared to his predecessor President Mbeki. President Mbeki was seen as biased towards ZANU-PF in his mediation efforts (Gruzd, 2009). He did not have much respect for the opposition party the MDC. Moreover, Mbeki's perception of the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was mainly described as 'disdainful'. In addition, President Mbeki believed in ZANU-PF's populist stance that the MDC was nothing but a western imperialist mouthpiece in Africa. Certainly, President Mbeki, the man of the African renaissance, would have not allowed such sentiments to pass unscrutinised. Contrary to President Mbeki, President Zuma showed a certain level of sympathy towards the opposition and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai (Gruzd, 2009). This gesture suggested that there would be a great deal of impartiality on his side compared to his predecessor.

Contrary to the above, South Africa's decision together with other SADC member-states to give a go-ahead to the July 2013 elections and the subsequent approval of results raised eyebrows in some circles (Tensi, 2013). There were general concerns relating to not following the SADC road-map to the fullest and the failure to take stronger measures in addressing the reported irregularities. It remains unclear why the two issues were just put under the carpet. However, as articulated above, South Africa in particular and SADC in

general had a sense of relief. The amounting pressure to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis was over (Tensi, 2013). However, this alone does not really give a sense of South Africa's position. It is understood that South Africa's immediate response to the July 2013 elections was informed by South Africa's quest to restore security and stability in the neighbouring Zimbabwe (Munyaka, 2013). South Africa's policy choices seem to be largely based on intelligence and security related issues. This is evident in South Africa's quest to minimize the plethora of migrants flowing from Zimbabwe and also its commitment in eliminating any possibility of military confrontation in Zimbabwe.

However, it is not easy to assess the legitimacy of South Africa's position regarding the security issue in Zimbabwe. According to Munyaka (2013), some of the military officers of the Zimbabwean army had reportedly pronounced that they would not acknowledge any victory other than that of the ZANU-PF. This alone might be interpreted as an indication of potential military takeover in case the MDC won the elections. This may have been a cause for greater concern for South Africa. However, it can be argued that this view was only held by few senior military officers not the entire army. A military takeover in Zimbabwe would require the participation of low ranking officers too to ensure that the base was solid. In addition to that, during the July 2013 elections not much of violence and intimidation was reported compared to the past elections. Therefore, no real security threat was imminent which would have been a great concern for South Africa (Munyaka, 2013 & Makokera, 2015).

Perhaps South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe can possibly be credited to security concerns and to a certain extent to political stability. Not much of the attention has been given to the economic component of the situation facing Zimbabwe and the entire SADC (Kisiangani, 2012). With the GNU at the helm, a certain degree of economic stability was achieved in the country. Tandai Biti who headed the Ministry of Finance scrapped the country's currency and initiated a staff-monitored programme with the IMF. A number of finance institutions like the African Development Bank and other western funders started to have interests to support Zimbabwe's socio-economic programmes (Kisiangani, 2012). However, his tenure of office came to an end before his initiatives could

fully mature. In line with the July 2013 elections results, any hope to continue with the economic recovery in Zimbabwe vanished. The emergence of ZANU-PF as the winner of the elections meant discontinuation of the past administration of the government of national unity (Maroleng, 2014). On the economic point of view, ZANU-PF's victory was the worst possible result the business fraternity had wanted to avoid. Reintroducing a Mugabe government was equal to reintroducing a government which lacked international legitimacy, especially with the country's 'new' friend China which was not seen to be in par. The noticeable setback with the GNU was that it was mainly the MDC through Tandai Biti which was responsible for economic policy, so the ZANU-PF easily sabotaged or undermined the policies Biti had put forth (Maroleng, 2014).

The current ZANU-PF administration will have a difficult task trying to redress the financial crisis. It needs all the support but its reputation will make this difficult. Zimbabwe is under serious liquidation with fiscal pressure increasing on the country's budget. The major part of the budget itself is reserved for paying salaries of public servants. For a long time President Mugabe has used patronage to cling onto power and mobilise support (Maroleng, 2014). President Mugabe's cronies and loyal ZANU-PF members have been rewarded with high positions in government and state parastatals in the same manner that President Daniel arap Moi did in Kenya when he rewarded his KANU cronies. The party's ability to strike a balance between holding political power and having at least a semi-functional economy proves to be getting weaker every day. The consequences of this are not different to those of the popular uprising and military coup (Maroleng, 2014). The only difference is that for the latter two they are immediate. Unfortunately the consequences will be bad for the region but dire for South Africa both as a neighbour and a regional leader and facilitator.

## **6.9 South Africa's Economic Diplomacy**

Zimbabwe is a good example of South Africa's policy choices when it comes to economic diplomacy and its position in continental relations. For both Zimbabwe and South Africa, economic diplomacy comes second after security and political issues (Nye, 2009). For South Africa, this is evident in its scepticism to apply its economic muscle within the region

to enhance the development of its neighbours. In most cases South Africa chooses to operate within regional institutions. It does that even in cases where it has deviant national interests or where it would have had more leverage at its disposal should it choose bilateral relations (Nye, 2009). According to Makokera (2015), Zimbabwe provides an example of this. South Africa-Zimbabwe trade relations' rate is high coupled by huge investment in Zimbabwe by South African businesses and parastatals. Zimbabwe is also important for South Africa for its strategic geographic location. It links South Africa and other areas in the region, which are important markets for South Africa's increasing export. For some time, South Africa has been using different measures of economic diplomacy on its engagement with Zimbabwe. They include the promotion of trade and investment and invoking discussion around SADC Protocol of Trade. Despite the large amount of South Africa's businesses in Zimbabwe, South Africa's initiatives to Zimbabwe are not a wider strategy jointly drafted by the government and the business community (Makokera, 2015). This is a gap that needs to be filled. According to Makokera (2015:4):

Mistrust continues to exist between these stakeholders and, as a result, the overall approach South Africa takes on issues such as Zimbabwe does not benefit from information on the broader picture, especially the likely economic impact of its approach. To be a true regional power, South Africa needs to first look internally at its ability to leverage its own resources (including those of the private sector) for mutually agreed regional development objectives (Makokera, 2015:4).

This is an indication of the lack of interaction between policy makers and the private sector in foreign policy making and implementation processes. For South Africa to be a true hegemon it needs to demonstrate its willingness to lead, this proves difficult because it confines itself within the collective efforts.

## **6.10 Conclusion**

Despite everything which has happened between South Africa and Zimbabwe there are strong signals indicating long deep history and years of cooperation and working together.

The history of the liberation movements like Umkhonto we Sizwe and APLA which fought side-by-side with ZAPU and ZANU which later merged to form ZANU-PF cannot be ignored or swiped away. This is one of the major reasons South Africa is now prioritizing party to party engagements with Africa's liberation movements like ZANU-PF.

Zimbabwe's crisis which started in the early 2000's attracted a lot of attention from the international community. However, it was South Africa's quiet diplomacy approach towards the crisis which fuelled the situation. The idea of finding an African solution to African problems proves to be problematic and ineffective in the absence of vigorous peace-making mechanism. The 'failure' of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe reflects the institutional and structural shortfalls embedded in quiet diplomacy as a mediation approach. It also serves as evidence of SADC's unwillingness to take a bold step towards finding solutions and maintaining lasting peace. South Africa's choice of quiet diplomacy over megaphone diplomacy might be justified on many bases but it does not seem to deliver the desired outcomes. Instead it is a manifestation of the existing gap relating to mediation and peace-making mechanism in the region. As a perceived leader in the region, South Africa failed to take a bold decision against Zimbabwe as expected of a leader. Its hegemonic status remains unclear due to its failure to take a lead role. What transpires is that South Africa's long relations with Zimbabwe makes it difficult for South Africa to discharge its hegemonic powers against its neighbour. This makes it to be a hesitant hegemony as opposed to real hegemon.

However, drawing from the comparison of Presidents Mandela and Mbeki's approach to South Africa's position on continental matters, the context within which quiet diplomacy was adopted becomes clear. We could say that President Mbeki was trying to avoid a repeat of the 1996 incident when President Mandela took a firm stance against Sani Abacha's activities in Nigeria only to be blamed by his fellow African leaders. The truth of the matter is that given the different perceptions Africans and the international community have about South Africa, no foreign policy position will satisfy everyone. It is in cases like these where national interests should guide foreign policy making. South Africa has to understand this.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **7 DATA PRESENTATION**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The interviews conducted for the purpose of data collection for this study included both South African and non-South African academics working in South Africa. The other people interviewed included civil society representatives, NGOs and the ruling party in South Africa the African National Congress. The interviews enabled the researcher to get first-hand information directly from the scholars and practitioners relevant to the field. This methodology also attests to Neuman's (1997) assertion that structured open-ended interviews have better success. The interviews allowed the interviewees the opportunity to expand on the point being made, which gave the researcher a clear insight on South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa. In order to get adequate information and for the purpose of consistency the researcher divided the questions into five standard questions which were asked to all informants in the same order in which they were arranged. It was these questions which served as a guiding framework during the interviews.

The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse data as collected from the informants. The presentation of data is as per the sequence of standard questions which guided the interviews. The standard questions are as follows: How would you characterize South Africa's relations with Southern Africa?; Assess South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa; How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?; Who are the major actors in South Africa's foreign policy making? Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in the multilateral setting? This seek to complement the literature in this project in understanding South Africa's foreign policy position towards Southern African region.



## **7.2 Data Presentation**

### **Q.1** *How would you characterize South Africa's relations with Southern Africa?*

The diversity of responses came as no surprise given the diversity of the respondents and the general controversy surrounding South Africa's foreign policy making and implementation. As indicated in the chat below, 55% of the respondents thought that South Africa is a regional hegemony while 27% thought that it has both hegemonic and partnership tendencies. The remaining 18% felt that South Africa has the characteristics of being a partner in its interaction with other Southern African countries.

#### **Interview Excerpts:**

One ANC official working with the party's international relations sub-committee responded by saying that the country's foreign policy making is complex, therefore have no single identity. He articulated:

Our foreign policy is multifaceted, it can be seen as partner in certain circles and as a hegemon in others. It really depend on which angle you coming from. Take for example the Zimbabwe's crisis, South Africa fully supported ZANU-PF's call for the west to back-off with its pressure. However, the opposition complained that while the crisis was continuing South African business interests were catered for. I think the soil is fertile for South Africa to discharge some hegemonic tendencies. It cannot be blamed for it, the soil is fertile (Ruling Party Official).

Another informant suggested that South Africa is a regional hegemony not only in terms of the economy but its dominance extends to other aspects of life. He claimed that South Africa's presence is clearly visible in the day to day life of its neighbours. He said:

If you have been in some of SADC countries' capitals, you could swear you are still in South Africa. In parts of Mozambique for example you can use South African currency to purchase. Indeed South Africa is a regional hegemony. It has long been a political and economic hegemony, its dominant (NGO Senior Researcher, a Foreign National).

He added:

South Africa is definitely a hegemon, anyone who ever attended a SADC meeting you will get what I mean. South Africa is always on a mission to shape the direction of the meeting to suit its preferences. What I know is that Botswana has a long memory. It can never forget that SADC is the product of SADCC which was always an obstacle to South Africa's dominance (NGO Senior Researcher, a Foreign National).

Other informants responded as follows:


I doubt it can be characterized as partnership; if it is, then it is a partnership of the select few. South Africa interferes in the domestic issues of its neighbours. It is busy supporting PUDEMO by housing it and through its solidarity support of its (PUDEMO) protests. These are just hegemonic tendencies (Academic, a Foreign National).

From here, enter the nearest Shoprite store and look for expired goods. You will not get them because they are not sold to South Africans. Ask me if I have seen expired goods at Shoprite stores back in Zambia, yes every shelf has one. Double standards for South Africa are very high, hegemonic or not, South Africa is not good (Think Tank organization researcher, Zambian National).

South Africa has complicated relations with its neighbours because of its past and it has a leading role to play in order to make up for its wrong past deeds. Being partners does not mean equality in all aspects, it means working together. South Africa is very popular in the international community, it represents the continent very well. Take (2010 FIFA) World Cup for example, it was not a South Africa's World Cup but Africa's World Cup. (Think Tank organization researcher).

We are just more than partners, we are brothers and sisters take the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho for example. We are a one big extended family (South African academic).

**Figure: 7.1: Characterisation of South Africa's relations with Southern Africa**



**Source: Author's compilation**

**Q.2** *Assess South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa.*

There is a general agreement among the respondents both South Africans and foreign nationals that South Africa has two reasonable foreign policy options: selfish hegemon and partnership respectively. These response further re-affirms South Africa's confined conceptualization role in the region. Although many people, the respondents and in the literature are sceptical of South Africa's role in Southern African region they rather have it playing the current role than having it as an observer or bystander.

### **Interview Excerpts:**


It all makes sense that partnership is the way to go. Look at the world we living in it is becoming one. The world is globalizing and the continent is going towards regional integration (South African academic).

An exploiter and selfish giant nothing more nothing less (Think Tank organization researcher, Zambian National).

Our country has never been well placed to lead the regional integration programme than it is today. South Africa is pursuing and should continue to pursue partnership with a big brother role (Ruling Party Executive Member)

Looking at the political and economic power it possess, it had to be a hegemony. You can't forget South Africa's military strength, it has a big military capacity. It is relatively stronger than us, it is up to it how it uses its power. It can be selfish if it want to be. Remember power corrupt. The level of partnership is determined by South Africa because of its power. You can't expect its partnership with Zimbabwe to be the same as with Malawi (Academic, a Foreign National).

**Figure: 7.2: Assessment of South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa**



**Source: Author's compilation**

**Q.3** *How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?*

It is a reality that partnering with foreign players can enhance development but their national interests are not likely to allow for transformative development. A clear divide between relatively weaker economies and stronger economies is visible. South Africa is seen as important to the development of the region by small economies like Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Refer to the interviews excerpts below.

**Interview Excerpts:**

Its undeniable, South Africa is the key voice for the region in global arena but when it comes to regional integration it is equally important as Swaziland or Zimbabwe (Academic Foreign National).


South Africa is the superpower in the region, Angola, Botswana and Zimbabwe are following the lead. It is central in the implementation of the African Agenda, we definitely need it towards achieving central developmental goals. South Africa's contribution to SADC is immersed (South African academic)

Important? What importance? All states are important, they all have their own contribution to make. South Africa is no exception, Angola for example is an emerging key player (Think Tank organization researcher).

South Africa is a leader not only in the SADC region but continental wide. But its dominance is relative to its regional counterparts. In the new global order the country is as powerful as its weakest link (Think Tank organization researcher (Zambian National)).

...Why South Africa? Its neighbours Botswana is acknowledged as the country with stable economy in the SADC region. Check World Bank Human Development Report 2009, Botswana comes before South Africa (NGO Senior Researcher Foreign National).

**Figure: 7.3: South Africa's importance for the development of the region**



**Source: Author's compilation**

**Q.4** *Who are the major actors in South Africa's foreign policy making?*

Notably the parliament has slim or no direct role to play in foreign policy making. It participates in foreign policy making discussions mainly through the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. The committee is responsible for DIRCO related affairs in parliament. It is responsible for discussing policy related issues long before they can be considered for passing into law. It also performs an oversight function on DIRCO. The parliament's participation on foreign policy formulation and execution is thus very limited.

**Interview Excerpts:**

Almost all the informants credits the President as the most important player even those who seem not to be happy with that. The testimony of this lies on the literature and the following interviews excerpts.

The president of the country is privatizing this process. This is supposed to be the organization's (the ANC) responsibility. We are losing grip over government, no one can even explain government's decision regarding Libya's invasion (Ruling Party Official).

The president, DIRCO, DTI and DoD are the foremost actors in foreign policy making and implementation. For example, the president after consultation with DIRCO can decide to send peace keepers anywhere and the DoD will have to implement. Before such decision can be taken trade relations are taken into account and it is where DTI pictures in (South African academic).


By its nature foreign affairs ministry deals with foreign policy issues. No other department is solely responsible for this function. (Think Tank organization researcher).

It is not the sole mandate of certain individuals but government as a whole. Don't be confused by the media, the president and DIRCO are merely leading the process (Ruling Party Executive Member).

It's a quasi-democracy, parliament have no say, the president decides for himself. Even interim presidents takes bold decisions in the presence of democratic institutions. The Zulu Prince invaded Lesotho and it was business as usual (referring to South Africa's deployment of troops in Lesotho under the SADC umbrella (NGO Senior Researcher Foreign National)).



**Figure: 7.4: South Africa's foreign policy actors**



**Source: Author's compilation**

**Q.5** *Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in the multilateral setting?*

South Africa's future ambitions remain unclear as its current identity. However, there is a huge possibility that it would pursue its hegemonic interests. The major contributing factor to the quasi identity is the country's rhetoric on the need to form a united region based on African cooperation while it wants to be a regional leader. This is in line with the informants' respondents below.

**Interview Excerpts:**

...Yes South Africa is ready and prepared to be the regional hegemon. It just the matter of time before Angola and Zimbabwe realises this too. Look how active you (referring to South Africa) are in peace initiatives in


the continent. Ramaphosa just stabilized the situation in Lesotho (NGO Senior Researcher, Foreign National).

Post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy is purely based on partnership and cooperation. This is exactly what the country seem to be maintaining. Thabo Mbeki's quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe says it all, doesn't it? (Ruling Party Executive Member).

It has all the required traits of being a hegemon but followership (South African academic).

It is guided by principles of equality, communal partnership and non-hegemonic tendencies as the means for foreign policy implementation (Think Tank organization researcher).

**Figure: 7.5: South Africa's future, partner of hegemon**



**Source: Author's compilation**

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **8 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

#### **8.1 An Allison–model Assessment of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Making**

The above data presentation clearly reveals the contradictions and ambiguities embedded in South Africa’s foreign policy making towards the Southern African region. It shows that neighbouring countries have different perceptions about the country’s foreign policy making and implementation. The various perceptions are not only shared by neighbouring states’ respondents but even South Africans have no common understanding of the country’s identity in relation to foreign policy making. Due to current inconsistencies in the foreign policy agenda, it is difficult to predict the future path for the country in relation to foreign policy making and implementation.

After realizing that foreign policy making is a complex process with a number of different players, Allison (1971) came up with a method to simplify it. This model seeks to understand the level in which choice, routine and content shape foreign policy making. There is a view that “By using the Allison models, foreign policy decision-making processes can be ‘mapped’ or framed in three ways to explain what happens when groups in a government meet, deliberate and recommend options” (Naidoo, 2010: 189). The three Allison’s models are the rational actor model, the organizational process model and the bureaucratic politics model. These three are crucial and have to be understood by foreign policy makers as they simplify a complex foreign policy making process. This is not to suggest that the Allison models offer comprehensive answers on foreign policy related issues but to say they are helpful tools of analysis.

#### **8.2 An Allison–model Assessment of country’s Foreign Policy Formulation**

##### **8.2.1 The rational actor model**

The rational actor model holds that the foreign policy making process involves identifiable actors. These actors have their own predetermined goals to achieve and have already

adopted a certain approach to be used to achieve such goals. There are a number of assumptions underlying the rational actor model. and they are: There exist a government with a centralized authority which seeks to maximize its value; actors' behaviour are as a result of well knowledgeable and thoughtful leaders and governments' actions emanate from opportunities at their disposal or threats from the global system. If South Africa is a principal player with thoughtful and knowledgeable leaders who make rational choices then it is confronted with a pretty easy scenario. South Africa's foreign policy makers have to deliberate on four scenarios: Fragmentation, Exploitation, Partnership and Strategic Autarky. These scenarios are detailed in chapter two. Upon making a choice from these options, policy makers need to take into account the consequences of all possible options. Nonetheless, South Africa's foreign policy is still identified as ambiguous and inconsistent. This suggests that policy makers hesitate to pick or adopt one position among many. In such a situation, it would be rather imprecise to generalize that policy makers are knowledgeable and they act out of rationality.

One assumption of the rational choice model is that leaders are rational and well informed. This excludes personalized foreign policy which dominated South Africa's foreign policy making during President Mandela's tenure. There is nothing rational about personality when it comes to foreign policy making as ascribed by the rational choice model. The popularized rhetoric famously known as the Madiba Magic created a false impression that everything would go well just because President Mandela was involved. In reality, the participation of President Mandela meant maximum pressure for other actors to deliver desirable outcomes. This was the advantage of having him, not the magic that most commentators referred to.

The final findings revealed that "Western media have grown particularly intolerant of President Mbeki and the country's foreign policy in relation to Zimbabwe, and they are increasingly linking crime, xenophobia and the power outages to a crisis of leadership in the government as well as the ANC" (Naidoo, 2010:58). It is worth noting that the removal of President Mbeki from office by his party in September 2008 caused panic among certain neighbouring heads of state. This was informed by uncertainties pertaining to the country's

future foreign policy. The then AU Chairman Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania noted “It is a big loss for Africa to lose such a prominent leader... [who has] strong commitment to Africa's development...the New Partnership for Africa's Development was his brainchild” (Heitman, 2008:54). When South Africa started leading peace making and peace keeping operations in the region, President Mbeki was already in the presidency serving as President Mandela’s deputy. With President Zuma taking the highest office, there were various concerns that a popular leader might limit South Africa’s commitment to the region to focus on domestic issues to satisfy his left wing cronies who helped him in toppling President Mbeki. There was a general consensus in certain circles that with the departure of President Mbeki there would be ‘depersonalization’ of the country’s foreign policy.

According to Kegley and Wittkopf (2001:40) a “...rational decision-making is more of an idealized standard against which policy decision-making is made, rather than an accurate descriptor of behaviour in the real world. In reality, foreign policy making takes place in circumstances that are far from ideal”. This model does not accommodate the view that foreign policy might be formulated on the basis of advancing certain beliefs and values which falls outside of national interests. For example, NEPAD and the African Renaissance are the dominant ideas which influence South Africa’s foreign policy formulation. In retrospect, we can confidently say that the sceptics and pessimists were proved wrong twice. In the first instance, Kgalema Motlanthe who served as ‘caretaker President’ following President Mbeki’s removal from office carried out his predecessor’s foreign policy agenda. Secondly, when President Zuma took office in 2009, South Africa’s foreign policy direction did not change as some had anticipated. These developments ensured continuity and no change.

### **8.2.2 The organizational process model**

The organizational process model holds that foreign policy formulation is a product of the routine behaviour of the institution concerned with foreign policy making. This model holds that the government is not the only actor in foreign policy formulation, instead government has a number of loosely associated actors. This model matches the complex relations of the

tripartite alliance which the ANC's policies rest upon. This is mostly important in the South African context because of the lack of a clear distinction between the ANC and the state. It is clear that the post-apartheid government's approach to policies reflects the nature and the experiences of the ANC. This model gives life to the shift from the militarized foreign policy of the apartheid era to the current civilian's foreign policy.

The organizational process is accommodative to various interests including those who fall outside of the state ambit like the independent media and corporations. According to Naidu (2010:208) "The impact of business interests on foreign policy in South Africa is particularly visible with regard to post-apartheid corporate expansion on the continent". The media has usually been side-lined mainly due to its perpetual commitment to contradict the government. This is evident from the ANC's decision to 'regulate' the media in what came to be famously known as the Secrecy Bill. Another example of such, although not related to foreign policy, is the attempt by parliament to jam signal during the State of the Nations Address in February 2015.

However, one thing in common between this and the rational actor model is that they both do not accommodate the influence of personality in the foreign policy making process. This is regardless of President Zuma's own words that "there is no difference in policy. Mbeki does not have a policy of his own. Zuma does not have a policy of his own, we all belong to the ANC, we all subscribe to the ANC policy" (Zuma, 2008:20). A number of key resolutions relating to South Africa's foreign policy were taken in the ANC's 2007 Polokwane watershed conference. They include the

[re-affirmation of] the ANC's commitment to progressive internationalism as a response to the challenge of imperialism (where the system of capitalism is seen to be dominated by one 'hyper-power'; support for the establishment of an AU government via processes of regional integration, for example, following a developmental approach to SADC's consolidation; support for India, Brazil and China as strategic

partners; the 'intensification' of economic diplomacy; and a name change from DFA to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (Van Nieuwkerk, 2010: 102).

This model clearly acknowledges the role and influence of political parties in foreign policy making. It must be noted that it does not only acknowledge the roles of the ruling party but also the opposition parties. For example, the opposition parties were very vocal on issues pertaining to President Mbeki's quiet diplomacy, the Dalai Lama visa saga and the 'unauthorized' landing of the commercial flight at the Waterkloof Military Base carrying the Gupta family and friends. However, this does not mean that the opposition parties have any meaningful influence in South Africa's foreign policy making since the role of parliament is limited as discussed in chapter four of this dissertation.

### **8.2.3 The bureaucratic politics model**

The bureaucratic politics model is centred on the conflict and cooperation among actors responsible for the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy. There is an understanding that all actors have their own specific interests and powers vested in them. And that policy formulation is about power relations and bargaining. In the South African context, DIRCO and DTI are competing for being the most influential players after the presidency. However it is the issue at hand which dictates which department should be at the forefront. On issues pertaining to peace-keeping the DoD is likely to be at the forefront. As reflected in chapter four, the role of the intelligence services is gaining prominence in President Zuma's administration; it therefore cannot be left out. According to Pfister (2005), different apartheid administrations depended on different departments for foreign policy direction. Verwoerd heavily depended on the specialist from the Foreign Affairs Department; Vorster relied on intelligence services; with Botha relied on the military; while de Klerk heavily relied on Foreign Affairs senior staffers for advice relating to foreign policy formulation.

The post-apartheid system is organized in clusters, and is therefore different from the old regime. The cluster model forces different departments to work as a collective. Different

national departments like DTI, DoD, State Security, Department of Home Affairs, DIRCO and the Presidency collectively form International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster (IRPS). This emphasis on cooperation does not mean the absence of conflicting interests. Each department within the collective has its own interests and powers. As much as this model accommodates the interests of different departments, it does not deal with different interests within one department. For example, on its conception DIRCO had ideological differences. This brought about major divisions in the department and nearly brought it into collapse. The major rival groups were the “neo-mercantilists” against the “internationalists”, respectively (Van der Westhuizen, 1998).

According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004), the former group was mainly the holdovers who believed heavily on the past regime’s trade and self-interest. This was based on the neo-realism and new diplomacy values. The latter group constituted mainly of the ANC members who had just returned from exile. This group was of the view that South Africa should show a large degree of solidarity with African developing countries (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). According to Van der Westhuizen (1998), this group further pursued pro- human rights foreign policy taking into account the country’s human rights history. It is these competing interests which resulted to the ambiguous and inconsistent foreign policy making in South Africa. Thankfully, this situation was remedied and things became calm.

### **8.3 Conclusion**

This chapter presented and analysed the data collected. As seen above the data was collected through open ended semi-structured interviews. The respondents included both South African and non-South African academics working in South Africa. The other people interviewed included civil society representatives, NGOs and the ruling party in South Africa i.e. the African National Congress. The interviews enabled the researcher to get first-hand information directly from the scholars and practitioners relevant to the field. The questions were divided to five standard questions which were asked to all informants in the same order as they appear above. It is these questions which served as a guiding framework



during the interviews. These interviews served as an additional information to the literature in the preceding chapters.

## **9 Concluding Remarks**

The major motivation for this study has been to engage the controversy relating to South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa, particularly its role in the sub-continent. For the purpose of the study the research problem was demarcated as follows: Firstly, it is a conceptual demarcation. This relates to the characterization of South Africa, whether it suits the concept of partner or that of hegemon. Secondly, it is a geopolitical demarcation. This relates to South Africa's role in Southern Africa. Lastly, it is a temporal demarcation. This relates to the period to be covered which is from 1994 when South Africa became a democratic country to 2014 which marked 20 years of South Africa's democracy. However, a reference to South Africa's pre 1994 foreign policy decisions was made for background purposes and to provide the context within which the study could be understood. In pursuit of this, a number of questions guided the study. These were as follows: How would you characterize South Africa's relations with Southern Africa?; Assess South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa; How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?; Who are the major actors in South Africa's foreign policy making? , Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in a multilateral setting?

Mills (2000:299) recalls Hans Morgenthau's words that "The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power...What others think of us is as important as what we actually are". Morgenthau's words better describe South Africa's foreign policy dilemma in the region.

Both the policy and the practice in the last twenty years of South Africa's foreign policy have not been able to construct a new perception for the country. Hence many regional actors still have an old perception which was created by the apartheid regime. From this, it can be inferred that the country's failure to effectively put into practice its developmental agenda is due to its failure to persuade their regional counterparts that it is necessary for their own development.

During the interviews one respondent compared South Africa in the Southern African region with an owner of a big and luxurious house who is neighboured by less attractive houses. The owner of the big house pays for the security company which patrols the streets while the neighbours do not pay. Despite the fact that the neighbours do not pay, they benefit from the security company's services. The comparison could be used to illustrate covert regional dislike for South Africa which arises from the country's dilemma on regional foreign policy. The Southern African states in this comparison are presented as neighbours who envy the owner of the big house and see his security system as an indication over power above them. Some of the relatively powerful countries like Angola and Zimbabwe do not want to be seen as so unexceptional in the region. According to Marais (1999), President Mugabe once alluded to the fact that South Africa is treating its neighbours as its own provinces. In essence, South Africa's failure to reconcile the region's perception towards the country and the real intentions of the country renders the country's foreign policy towards the region problematic.

Upon fully returning to international politics South Africa gained a lot of respect from the region, the continent and the entire world. Indeed such respect was likely to attract more

foreign investors and aid compared to its neighbours. This alone can be a source of dislike and hatred. So it came as no surprise that South Africa's dominance has attracted political tensions from regional counterparts. According to Barber (2005:1085), "A major source of the tension stems not from the trade imbalance per se, but from a perception within the region that South Africa's economic dominance is being achieved on the back of unfair trade practices". South Africa is notorious for reneging liberalization policies which could put South Africa's business at the comparative disadvantage. President Mugabe once alluded that "South Africa cherishes the notion that because it is the most developed country in the region it can use other SADC countries as receptacles for its goods while protecting its own industries" (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:173). Seemingly, it is not only Zimbabwe which shares President Mugabe's sentiments, countries like Namibia and Botswana too feel the same. They believe that South Africa is a selfish hegemon which is out to constraint their small economies and dominate them. However, they still need South Africa for their own survival and functionality. South Africa is also accused by other regional players of being the 'puppet of the west'. This is a major concern for other regional actors which forces them not to accept South Africa as a leader despite its political, economic and military capabilities.

Given the manner in which South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy attracts criticisms relating to its ambiguity, a number of reviews and self-introspections became necessary. Due to these reviews a number of academics and policy makers have started to point out what can be seen as errors. For example, Muller (2000) refers to the overlapping responsibilities between DIRCO and DTI and appeals for the establishment of a well-

coordinated and integrated economic diplomacy. This issue of overlapping duties is well addressed in chapter four.

In the current interdependent world, states in the form of governments are no longer the only important actors in the international system. The role of non-state actors like civil society and the business sector is becoming equally important. It must not be taken lightly that even non-state actors have their own foreign missions based on their policies, hence they have their own foreign policies. They also put efforts to ensure that they are properly implemented just like states do. For example, the South African retailer Shoprite Checkers has its own domestic and its own foreign policy towards Southern African. This retailer is quite dominant in the region. As a result, it is safe to assume that it has a policy guiding its operations in the region. Shoprite Checkers' foreign policy towards the Southern African region is different from South Africa's foreign policy but they operate alongside each other. This leads to serious exploitative tendencies.

South African companies are a primary agent of regional perceptions in host countries and as such post-apartheid South African investors influence the way that host countries perceive South Africa's regional role. Like business anywhere, the South African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests – profit, market share, elimination of competition, the urge to dominate and or monopolize.

Due to this, it can be inferred that South Africa is not well positioned to lobby for progressive development in the Southern African region. It cannot be treated as a trustworthy partner who can bring about mutual development. The country's neo-liberal

economic policies and practices largely hinder South Africa's developmental agenda. In order for South Africa to make any meaningful contribution towards the developmental agenda it will need to gain confidence of its regional counterparts. This is a test South Africa has to pass.

South Africa is characterized as a hegemony because of different reasons offered by the respondents. South Africa's 'hostile' relations with renegade Botswana came out on numerous accessions. Botswana under the leadership of Ian Khama seems to be problematic to South Africa's vision for the attainment of one solid regional policy. This is evident in Botswana's disruptive behaviour in SADC-EU summits. Botswana and its sympathisers accused South Africa of wanting to dominate the SADC agenda. This was clearly visible when South Africa endorsed Zimbabwe's 2013 Elections. All other SADC member states followed suit except Botswana.

South Africa is characterized as a hegemon because it takes interest on the domestic affairs of other countries. In Swaziland, for an example, South Africa was accused of interfering with domestic affairs by supporting the anti- Monarch groups. The support for PUDEMO and other pro-democracy groups by mainly COSATU is evidence of such behaviour. The respondents argue that now that South Africa has been democratized it now wants to export its idea of democracy to its neighbours and the continent at large. For the Zimbabweans, especially, South Africa is a partner with hegemonic tendencies. This is largely informed by the two countries' aspirations to lead the region. During the apartheid era in South Africa, Zimbabwe played a seemingly leading role in the SADC region. This started to fade away

with the re-emergence of South Africa in the international and regional politics in the post-1994 period.

This contestation is also evident between South Africa and Angola, the long partners and ‘brothers in arms’. Angola is slowly seen as positioning itself to take a leading role in the SADC region. However, due to strong relations between the two countries especially with President Zuma at helm there is a sense of partnership. The ANC also has renewed party to party bi-lateral relations with other liberation movements in Africa in order to strengthen their partnership in many areas. Only few perceived South Africa’s relations with its neighbours as a pure partnership. South Africa’s characterization of its relations with its neighbouring state in the Southern African region cannot be understood as having a single identity. This is mainly because of the need to pursue its national interests and leadership aspirations while attempting to posture itself as a ‘new-born’ player free of any of the past regime’s remnants.

It is important to note that South Africa is not seen as a benign hegemon. Respondents clearly viewed partnership and hegemony as mutually exclusive. This alone has shed light on the reasons for South Africa’s perceived willingness to retain the current inconsistent world order as opposed to transforming it. Any country which is identified as a selfish hegemony is likely to maintain the system that works for it. The responses here are contradicting South Africa’s perceived benign hegemony which was mainly created by the country’s quiet diplomacy approach towards Zimbabwe as discussed in chapter six. The responses suggest that hegemonies cannot use partnership as a tool to pursue their selfish national interests.

South Africa believes that its importance to the Southern African region is informed by the fact that Southern Africa is the priority in the country's foreign policy making and implementation. However, a number of states in the region hold a contradictory view. Instead external partners like the USA and lately China are perceived as important developmental partners by these states. Unfortunately even a simple look at the two aforementioned countries' foreign policy reveals that Southern Africa is not really a priority. This alone contributes to the broader difficulty South Africa is faced with in the region. The reliance on external developmental partners over South Africa can be seen as the after effects of the apartheid regime in South Africa.

As for Zimbabwe and Angola these countries are important to South Africa mainly because it views them as its strategic partners. South Africa's foreign policy choices towards these countries reiterate the view that they are equally important as South Africa in advancing the regional agenda. The responses suggest that South Africa has a difficult task to assure its neighbours that its interests are in line with those of the region. This alone suggest that South Africa needs to acknowledge that it needs the region. In making such acknowledgement South Africa should then align its foreign policy with regional integration goals.

The president is seen as the most important actor in South Africa's foreign policy making and implementation followed by DIRCO. It is mainly because traditionally in most countries the head of state is the integral part of foreign policy making and implementation. This, by no means, suggests that the president is the only actor responsible for foreign

policy making. The presidency is followed by DIRCO and DTI. DIRCO plays a very important role in the execution of South Africa's foreign policy through diplomatic means. Diplomacy is the *modus operandi* adopted by the South African government in communicating and relating to its neighbours in the SADC region. This (diplomacy) is the unit within DIRCO which is directly responsible for pursuing the country's national interests. South Africa's representatives abroad play a crucial part during implementation. The officials include ambassadors, consular officials and other diplomats. As for the DTI, it has been seen as the major overseer of South Africa's bilateral and multilateral trade and investment relations

South Africa has the potential and desire of being a hegemon but it is not accepted by other actors as a hegemon in the region. It is acceptable that it outplays its neighbours, militarily and economic wise. South Africa's capabilities in relation to the enforcement of rules are undisputable. The country has worked hard towards the establishment of multilateral institutions like NEPAD and the AU. Despite this, it is a contested hegemon. It is worth noting that being a hegemon does not necessarily mean having absolute and incontestable power. It still relies on other states to accept or reject the hegemonic status depending on the kind of that particular hegemon and their own national interests. As long as South Africa's neighbours such as Zimbabwe and Angola have ambitions of leadership, South Africa will not be able to affirm its regional leadership status.



## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A**

#### **STANDARD INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

Question 1: How would you characterize South Africa's relations with Southern Africa?

Question 2: Assess South Africa's foreign policy options in Southern Africa.

Question 3: How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?

Question 4: What role is South Africa expected to play regionally and continentally by its neighbours?

Question 5: Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in the multilateral setting?

## APPENDIX B

### INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT

Dear Participant,

My name is Sakhile Hadebe (207514570). I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: Partner or Hegemon? The aim of the study is to assess South Africa's political profile and its foreign policy towards Southern Africa. It also seeks to address the "hot" contested academic subject of whether South Africa is a team player or hegemon in the region. I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about an hour.
- The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to me and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures)

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg. Email: [hadebes2@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:hadebes2@ukzn.ac.za); Cell: 0742183227.

My supervisor is Dr. Bhekithemba Mngomezulu who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email [Mngomezulub@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:Mngomezulub@ukzn.ac.za); P h o n e number: 0312603848.

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: [ximbap@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ximbap@ukzn.ac.za), Phone number +27312603587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

## DECLARATION

I..... (*full names of participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

.....

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### *Books*

Adebajo, A. (2007). *South Africa in Africa. The post – apartheid era*. Centre for Conflict Resolution. KwaZulu- Natal: University of KwaZulu- Natal Press.

Allison, G.T. (1971). *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown.

Ayittey, G. (1999). *Africa in Chaos*. London: Macmillan.

Babbie, E and Mouton, J. (2003). *The Practice of Social Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Baregu and Landsberg C. eds., (2003). *From Cape to Congo, Southern Africa's evolving security challenges*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner publishers.

Brown, M.E., Lynn-Jones, S.N. and Miller, S.E. (1996). *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge: MIT.

Buhlungu , (2007). *State of the Nation*. Cape Town: HRSC Press.

Brown, R. and C. Saunders. (2004). *Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara 2004, "Zimbabwe: Recent History"*. London: Europa Publications

Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.

Campbell, H. (2003). *Reclaiming Zimbabwe the Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*. Johannesburg: David Phillip Publishers

Cardoso, F.H. and Faletto, E. (1979). *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chan, S. (2003). *Robert Mugabe A Life of Power and Violence*. New York: University of Michigan Press

Chhabra, H. S. (1997). *South African Foreign Policy: Principles, Options, Dilemmas*. New Delhi: Africa Publishing.

Collins, R. (1986). *Weberian Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cooper, A.; Higgot, R.; and Nossal, K. (1993). *Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Cox, R.W. (1995). Critical Political Economy, in Hettne, B. (ed.) *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*. London: Zed Books.

Creswell, W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method approaches*. California: Sage Publications.

Doyle, M. W. (1997). *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. Norton: New York.

Dunn, K. C. and Shaw, T. (2001). *Africa's challenge to international relations theory*. Palgrave Publishers, Ltd. New York.

Draper, P. (2005). Consultation Dilemmas: Transparency versus Effectiveness in South Africa's Trade Policy. In: Draper, P. (ed.). *Reconfiguring the Compass: South Africa's African Diplomacy*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Evans, G and Newnham, J. (1998). *Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin.

- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Frank, A.G. (1978) *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Frankel, J. (1963). *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decisionmaking*. London: Oxford University Press.
- GCIS (Government Communications and Information Systems), 2009a. *SA Yearbook 2008/09: Foreign Relations*.
- Gilpin, R. (1987). *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Graaff, J. (2007). *Introduction to Sociology: Poverty and Development*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Hill, C. (2003). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave.
- Holsti, K.J. (1995). *International Politics: A Framework of Analysis*. 7th ed. Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Hornby, A.S. (2005). *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary: International Student's Edition*. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hornby, A.S. (2010). *Oxford advanced learner's dictionary of current English 8<sup>th</sup>* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. (2003). *Introduction to international relations. Theories and approaches* (2nd eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Kegley, C.W Jr and Wittkopf, E. (2001). *World politics: Trends and Transformation*, 8<sup>th</sup> edition, New York: St Martin Press.

Kennedy, P. (1987). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House.

Keohane, R.O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kindleberger, C. (1973). *The World in Depression, 1929-39*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kissinger, H. (1994) *Diplomacy*. New York: Touchstone.

Kegley, C.W. (1995). *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Change*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Keohane, R.O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy; towards a radical democratic politics*. London: Verso.

Landsberg, C. in (Khadiagala, G. M., eds. 2006). *Security dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*. The project of the International Peace Academy. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J. (2005). *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Cambridge: MIT.

McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (2006). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 3rd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York 2001: Norton.

Meldrum, A. (2004). *Where We Have Hope A Memoir of Zimbabwe*. London: John Murray Publishers

Meredith, M. (2002). *Robert Mugabe Power, Plunder and Tyranny in Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers

Mills, G. (2000). *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy and Globalisation*. Johannesburg and Cape Town: South African Institute of International Affairs and Tafelberg Publishers.

Morgenthau, H.J. (1978). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th (revised) ed. New York: Norton

Myrdal, G. (1957). *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*. London: Duckworth.

Nel, P. and van der Westhuizen, J. eds., (2004). *Democratising foreign policy? Lessons from South Africa*. USA: Lexington Books.

Neuman, W.L. (1997). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Third edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Neuman, W.L. (2000). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Second edition. Boston: Ally and Bacon.



Ojo, O., Orwa, D.K. & Utete, C.M.B. (1985). *African International Relations*. Lagos: Longman Group.

Peron, J. (2000). *Zimbabwe the Death of a Dream*. Johannesburg: Amagi Books

Pfister, R. (2005). *Apartheid South Africa and African states. From pariah to middle power, 1961 1994*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Pfister, R. (2005). *Apartheid South Africa and African states. From pariah to middle power, 1961 1994*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Rostow, W.W. (1960). *The stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rostow, W.W. and Hatch, R. (1955). *An American Policy in Asia*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Russet, B. & Starr, H. (1996). *World Politics: The Menu for Choice. 5th ed.* New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.

Sabine and Thorson (1973). *A history of political theory*. (4th ed.). Tokyo: Dryden Press.

Taylor, I. (2001). *Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Turner, B.S. (1988). *Status*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Waltz, K.N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison: Wesley Reading

Wendt, A. (1999). *A Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wohlforth, W.C. (2004). The Transatlantic Dimension in Dannreuther, R. (ed) (2004). *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighborhood Strategy*. New York: Routledge.

Wolcott, H. 1990. *Writing up qualitative research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

### ***Chapters in Books***

Adar, K.G. (2002). States and the Inter-state System. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press.

Adar, K.G. (2006). States and the Inter-state System. In: McGowan, P.J., Cornelissen, S. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 3rd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press.

Adebajo, A. (2007). South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: An Axis of Virtue? In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *South Africa in Africa: The Post-apartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.

Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (2007). Introduction. In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *South Africa in Africa: The Postapartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.

Black, D. (1997). Addressing Apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian and Swedish Policies in Southern Africa' in Cooper, A. (ed.) *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Power Diplomacy after the Cold War*. London: Macmillan.

Carlsnaes, W. (2008). Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis. In: Smith, S., Hadfield, A. & Dunne, T. (eds.). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cheru, F. (1996) 'Africa and the New World Order: Rethinking Development Planning in the Age of Globalization' in Adedeji, A. *South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart?* Cape Town: Sadri books; London and New Jersey: Zed Books.

Cox, R.W. (1995). Critical Political Economy, in Hettne, B. (ed.) *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*. London: Zed Books.

Curtis, D. (2007). South Africa: "Exporting Peace" to the Great Lakes Region? In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *South Africa in Africa: The Post-apartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, pp. 253-273.

Du Plessis, A. (2002). Analysing and Evaluating Foreign Policy. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 2nd ed. Cape Town: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press.

Gill, B.K. (1993). Hegemonic Transitions in the World System, in Frank, A.G. and Gill, B.K. (eds), *The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* London: Routledge.

Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. (2004). South Africa's Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African Century in Sidiropoulos, E. (ed) *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future. South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994-2004*. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. (2004). South Africa's Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African Century in Sidiropoulos, E. (ed) *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future. South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994-2004*. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. (2006). Constraining the unconstrained: civil society and South Africa's hegemonic obligations in Africa' in Carlsnaes, W. and Nel, P. (eds.), *In Full Flight South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.

Hamill, J. (2001). South Africa's Regional Security Dilemmas. In: Broderick, J., Burford, G. & Freer, G. (eds.). *South Africa's Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 29-54.

Higgott, R.A., Underhill, G.R.D. & Bieler, A. (2001). Introduction: Globalisation and Non-State Actors. In: Higgott, R.A., Underhill, G.R.D. & Bieler, A. (eds.). *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System*. London: Routledge.

Howarth, D. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). Introducing discourse theory and political Analysis in Howarth, D.; Norval, A. and Stavrakakis, Y. *Discourse theory and political analysis; identities, hegemonies and social change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hudson, J. (2007). South Africa's Economic Expansion into Africa: Neocolonialism or Development? In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *South Africa in Africa: The Post-apartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.

Kabemba, C. (2006) in Buhlungu, Daniel, Southall and Lutchman eds., (2007). *The state of the nation*. Cape Town: HRSC Press.

Keohane, R.O. (1989). The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977' in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder.

Keohane, R. (2001). Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society in Broderick, et al (2001). *South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemmas of a New Democracy*. New York: Palgrave

Landsberg, C. (2006). Security dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region. in Khadiagala, G. M., eds. (2006). *The project of the International Peace Academy*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Landsberg, C. (2006). Foreign Policy-making and Implementation in Postsettlement South Africa. In: Venter, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *Government and Politics in the New South Africa*. 3rd ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Landsberg, C. (2007). South Africa and the making of the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki's "Progressive African Agenda". In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *South Africa in Africa: Post-apartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, pp. 195-212.

Le Pere, G. and van Nieuwkerk, A. (2002). The evolution of South Africa's foreign policy, 1994 – 2000' in McGowan, P.J. and Nel, P. (eds.) *Power, Wealth and Global Equity. An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. (second edition) University of Cape Town Press: Institute for Global Dialogue.

Le Pere, G. & Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2004). Who Made and Makes Foreign Policy? In: Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.). *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Matlosa, K. (2007). South Africa and Regional Security in Africa. In: Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). *South Africa in Africa: The Post- Apartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, pp. 105-127.

McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (2002). The Study of International Relations. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press.

McKay, J. (2004). Punching above its weight? New Directions in Australian foreign policy since 1996. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2003/4* Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Muller, M. (1997). The Institutional Dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions. In: Carlsnaes, W. & Muller, M. (eds.). *Change and South African External Relations*. Halfway House: International Thomson Publishing.

Murphy, C.N. & Smith, K. (2002). International Institutions. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press, pp. 130-146.

Muzondidya, J. (2013). The Opposition dilemma in Zimbabwe: A Critical Review of the Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change Parties under the GPA Government Framework, 2009-2012, in Raftapolous, B, *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement*. Harare: Weaver Press

Naidu, S. (2004). 'South Africa and Africa: Mixed Messages?' in Sidiropoulos, E. *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future. South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994-2004*. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Nel, P; Taylor, I; van der Westhuizen, J. (2001). South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy: A Framework for Understanding in Nel, P; Taylor, I; van der Westhuizen, J (eds.) *South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change. The limits of reformism*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Olonisakin, F. (2002). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 231-247.

Schoeman, M. (2002). Africa's International Relations in McGowan, P.J. and Nel, P.(eds.) *Power, Wealth and Global Equity. An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. (second edition) University of Cape Town Press: Institute for Global Dialogue.

Schoeman, M. (2003). South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994-2003 in Daniel, J.; Habib, A. and Southall, R. (eds.) *State of the Nation, 2003-2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Schoeman, M. (2007). South Africa in Africa: behemoth, hegemon, partner or “just another kid on the block”? in Adebajo, A.; Adedeji, A.; and Landsberg, C (eds) *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu Natal Press.

Simon, D. (1998). Reflections: Writing (on) the Region in Simon, D. (ed.) (1998) *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region*. Oxford: James Currey.

Spence, J. (2004). South Africa's Foreign Policy: Vision and Reality in *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future. South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994-2004*. Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.) Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Van der Westhuizen, J.; Taylor, I.; and Nel, P.; (2001). Of Rogues, Rebels, Renegades and Reformers: South African Multilateralism in Context’ in Nel, P; Taylor, I; van der Westhuizen, J (eds.) *South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change. The limits of reformism*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Venter, D. (1997). South Africa and Africa: Relations in a Time of Change. In: Carlsnaes, W. & Muller, M. (eds.). *Change and South African External Relations*. Halfway House: International Thomson Publishing.

Vincent, L. (2002). Non-State Actors in International Relations. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 2nd ed*. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press.

Wedgwood, R. (2002). Unilateral Action in a Multilateral World. In: Patrick, S. & Forman, S. (eds.). *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienne.

## ***Journals Articles***

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations* vol.3 (3).

Ajulu, R. (2001). Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a globalizing economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent. *28/ 87 Review of the African Political Economy*, pp.27-42.

Alden, C. & Le Pere, G. (2004). South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity? *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(100): pp. 283-297.

Alden, C. & Soko, M. (2005). South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 43 (3), pp. 367-392.

Alden, C. & Soko, M. (2005). South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 43 (3), pp. 367-392.

Alden, C. and Veira, M.A. (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism' in *Third World Quarterly*. 26 (7).

Barber, J. (2005). The New South Africa's foreign policy: principles and practice. *International Affairs* 81, 5, pp. 1079- 1096.

Bischoff, P-H. (2003). External and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Ambiguity: South African Foreign Policy and the Projection of Pluralist Middle Power. *Politikon*, 30(2): 183-201.

Chase, R.S., Hill, E., and Kennedy, P. (1996). Pivotal states and US strategy. *Foreign Affairs*. 75 (1).



Cox, R.W. (1989). Middlepowermanship Japan and the future world order. *International Journal*. xliv.

Davies, R. (1992) 'Economic growth in a post-apartheid South Africa: its significance for relations with other African countries' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 11 (1).

Dos Santos, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependency. *American Economic Review*. 60 (2).

Graham, V. (2006). How firm the handshake? South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006. *African Security Review* 15.4

Hughes, T. (eds., 2006). The politics of Africa's resources. *The South African Institute of International Affairs*. Vol. 10, Issue 2.

Iheduru, O. (1996). Post-apartheid South Africa and its neighbors: A Maritime Transport Perspective. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 34 (1).

Kahler, M. (1992). Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers. *International Organization*. 46(3): 681-708.

Krasner, S.D. (1976). State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics*. 28(3).

Lake, D. (1993). Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy. *International Studies Quarterly* (winter).

Landsberg, C. (2012). The Jacob Zuma Government's Foreign Policy: Association or Dissociation?. *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. 1 (1)

Landsberg, C. & Kondlo, K. (2007). South African and the "African Agenda". *Policy Issues and Actors*, 20(13): 1-10.

Landsberg, C. & Masiza, Z. (1995). Strategic Ambiguity or Ambitious Strategy? Foreign Policy since the 1994 Election. *Policy Issues and Actors*, 8(11): pp. 7-34.

Maloka, T. (2001). "African Renaissance" Debate: A Critique. *Polis R.C.S.P* Vol 8 special

Mandela, N. (1993). South Africa's Future Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72, No. 5. Pp 86-97

McGowan, P. J. (1993). The "New" South Africa: Ascent or Descent in the World System? *South African Journal of International Affairs*.1 (1).

McGowan, P. & Ahwireng-Obeng, F. (1998). Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa: Part Two. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 16:2,pp 165-195.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions.19 (3) *International Security*, 19 (3).pp 5–49.

Mhango, G. (2014). Is Quiet Diplomacy in Consonance with Meaningful Peace-making in SADC? *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* Vol 1 (1)

Moravcsik, A. (1999). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization* 15 (3).pp 513–553.

Myint, H. (1954). The Gains from International Trade and the Backward Countries. *The Review of Economic Studies*. 22 (2).

Obonye Jonas, O. (2012). The Quest to Achieve African Renaissance: Reflections on NEPAD. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.5, no.3.

Ofodile, U. (2009). Trade, Aid and Human Rights: China's Africa Policy in Perspective. *Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology* Vol. 4, Issue 2

Okumu, W.A. (2003). The African Renaissance: History, Significance and Strategy. *Journal of the African International Institute* 73(3). p480- 482

Prys, M. (2009). Regional Hegemon or Regional Bystander: South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy 2000-2005. *Politikon*, 36(2): 193-218.

Schraeder, P.J. (2001). South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance. *The Round Table*, 90(359): 229-243.

Soko, M. and Balchin, N. (2009). South Africa's Policy towards Zimbabwe: A Nexus between Foreign Policy and Commercial Interests? *South African Journal of International Affairs* 16(1): 33-48.

Solomon, H. and Cilliers, J.K. (1997). Southern Africa and the Quest for Collective Security. *Security Dialogue*. 28(2).

Spence, J. (2004). South Africa's Foreign Policy: Vision and Reality. In: Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.). *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, pp. 35-48.

Spies, Y.K. (2008). The Multilateral Maze and (South) Africa's Quest for Permanent United Nations Security Council Representation. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, xxx (1):96-123.

Swatuk, L. (2000). South Africa in the region: Botha would be proud. *Southern Africa Report. SAR, Vol. 15, No. 3*

Taylor, I. (2011). South African 'imperialism' in a region lacking regionalism: A critique. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(7), 1233–1253.

Taylor, I. & Williams, P. (2001). South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Meets Vagabondage Politique? *African Affairs*, 100: 265-286.

Vale, P. (1991) 'Points of Re-entry: Prospects for a post-apartheid foreign policy. *South African International*. 21 (4).

Vale, P. (1995). Prisoner of the Past? The New South Africa Abroad.  
<http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=3937>. (accessed 21. 10. 2013).

Vale, P. and Maseko, S. (1998). South Africa and the African Renaissance. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 74, No. 2. pp271- 287.

Van der Westhuizen, J. (1998). South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power. *Third World Quarterly*, 19(3): pp. 435-455.

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (1994). South Africa's National Interest. *African Security Review*, 13(2): pp. 89-101.

Vines, A. (2010). South Africa's Politics of Peace and Security in Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 17(1):53-63.

### ***Reports/Discussion papers***

ANC (1994) Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa. Johannesburg:  
African National Congress, Department of International Affairs  
<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign.html> (accessed 15. 05. 2014).

Bertelsmann-Scott, T. (2010) *SACU - One Hundred Not Out: What future for the Customs Union?*. SAIIA Occasional Paper No 68, September 2010

Davies, R. (1995). *South African Foreign Policy in a Changing Global Context in Southern African Perspectives*. Working Paper Series no. 40. University of Western Cape: Center for Southern African Studies.

Dube, K. (2003). *Overview of South Africa's Foreign Policy in Africa*. Johannesburg: AISA Electronic Monograph

Du Plessis, A. (2009). *The Military and Foreign Policy: From Final Arbiter to Statecraft*. Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory on 11-12 June 2009. Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch University.

Ezeoha, A. and Uche, C. (2005). *South Africa. NEPAD, and the African Renaissance*. Department of Banking and Finance. University of Nigeria. ASC Working Paper 64/2005. African Studies Centre. Leiden: Netherlands.

Flatters, F. and M. Stern (2006). *SACU Revenue Sharing: Issues and Options*". Policy Brief. Washington, DC: USAID/SEGA.

Games, D (2003). *The Experience of South African Firms Doing Business in Africa*. SAIIA's Business in Africa Project is sponsored by the Royal Danish Embassy, Pretoria Report No. 37 in September 2003

Games, D. (2010). *Emerging Commercial Rivalries in Africa: A View from South Africa*. SAIIA: Policy Briefing15, Johannesburg.

Grant, C. and Chapman, G. (2011) *Southern African Customs Union: Myths and Reality*.

Gruzd, S. (2009). Foreign Policy under Zuma: Change of Style or Substance. *Growth Magazine*, South African Institute of International Affairs.

Gruzd, S. (2014). *Where is the African Peer Review Mechanism Heading?*. South African Institute for International Affairs.

Grynberg, R. and Motswapong, M. (2010) *SACU Revenue Sharing Formula: The History of an Equation*. Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis

Hagg, P and Nyamnjoh. (2013) *State of the nation: South Africa 2012-2013*

Hengari, A. (2014). *South Africa's Regional Policy: The Link between Normative Anchors and Economic Diplomacy in SADC*. Occasional Paper No 186. South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme

Hichert, T., Draper, P. and Bertelsmann-Scott, T. (2010) *What Does the Future Hold for SACU? From Own Goal to Laduma! Scenarios for the Future of the Southern African Customs Union*. SAIIA Occasional Paper, No 63, July 2010

Hudson, H. (2007). *South African Foreign Policy: The Politics of Pan-Africanism and Pragmatism*. Inaugural address, 1 August 2007. Department of Political Science, University of the Free State.

Hughes, T. (2004). *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African Foreign Policy Making*. Occasional Papers. Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung: Johannesburg.

Interview: Jacob Zuma with Patrick Smith in *The Africa Report* (June-July 2008) no.11.

Kagwanja, P. (2006). *South Africa: Breathing New Life into "Quiet Diplomacy"*, Electronic Briefing Paper by Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria

Kisiangani, E. (2012). *Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government*. Global Insight, Institute for Global Dialogue, Issue 89.

Kotze, D. (2012) South Africa's foreign policy and international relations during 2012

Knecht, T. & Weatherford, M.S. (2004). *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision-making*. Paper presented at the Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association held in Chicago on 15-18 April 2004 (published as conference proceedings).

Lalbahadur, A. (2014). *South Africa's Economic Statecraft in Southern Africa: Non-existent or Nascent? An Examination of Relations with Zimbabwe and Swaziland*. Occasional Paper No 187. South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme

Le Pere, G. & Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2004). Who Made and Makes Foreign Policy? In: Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.). *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Lodge, T. (n.d). *Quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe: a case study of South Africa in Africa*

Makokera, G. (2015). *Zimbabwe and South Africa: Security Takes Precedence over Economy*. Economic Diplomacy Programme. Policy Briefing 126, February 2015

Maraais, H. (1998). *Reinforcing the Mould: The Character of Regional Integration in Southern Africa*. Regionalization study for Third World Forum and Foundation for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg.

Maraais, H. (2002). The Logic of Expediency: Post-apartheid Shifts in Macroeconomic Policy in Jacobs, S. and Calland, R. (eds.) *Thabo Mbeki's World: Thee Politics and Ideology of the South African President*. Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press.

Maroleng, (2014). *Bound to Succeed? The Ambiguities of the Zimbabwean Unity Government*. ISS Seminar, Pretoria, February 19, 2009.

Mavimbela, V. (1998). *The African Renaissance: a Workable Dream*. Foundation for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper, no. 17, October 1998.

Miller, D. (2003) *South African Multinational Corporations and Regional Claim making in Post-apartheid Southern Africa: a case study of retail workers at Shoprite-Checkers in Zambia*. Paper presented at the North East Workshop on Southern Africa, Vermont, USA.

Muller, M. (2000). *Some observations on South Africa's economic diplomacy and the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs in IGD* Occasional Paper no. 27 (Series Editors: Garth le Pere & Noelle Lawson). South Africa: The Institute for Global Dialogue.

Mbeki, T.M. (1996). *I am an African*. Speech delivered in May 1996 on the occasion of the adoption of a new constitution for South Africa.

Naidu, S. and Roberts, B. (2004). *Confronting the Region: A profile of Southern Africa. Integrated Rural and Regional Development Research Programme*, Occasional Paper 8. Cape Town: HSRC Publishers.

Nathan, L. (2010). *The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations*. Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper 81, October.

Nossal, R., K. (1998). *The patterns of world politics*. Mc Master University. Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada. Scanborough, Ontario.21

Prys, M. (2007). *Regions, Power and Hegemony: South Africa's Role in Southern Africa*. Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference held in Turin on 12-15 September.

Nye, J. (2009). *Impact of power on the developmental and stabilisation agenda of South Africa*. Paper presented at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation Annual Conference entitled Closing the Gap between Domestic and Foreign Policies, Southern Africa, Pretoria, November 5-6, 2009.

Prys, M. (2007). *Regions, Power and Hegemony: South Africa's Role in Southern Africa*. Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference held in Turin on 12-15 September (published as conference proceedings).

Prys, M. (2008). Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and “Quite Diplomacy”. In: *GIGA Research Programme: Violence, Power and Security*, No. 77. Published by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Rabobank, (2009). *Country Report: South Africa*



SAGI (South African Government Information), 1996. South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document. <http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm>. (accessed 21.02.15)

Schmitz, G.J. (2005). *Foreign Policy White Papers and the Role of Canada's Parliament: Paradoxical but not without Potential*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association on 3 June 2005. London, University of Western Ontario.

Seme, P. (1906). The Regeneration of Africa. Speech delivered Columbia University in New York in 1906

Tensi, N. (2013). *Zimbabwe's 2013 general elections: A genuine wind of change?*. Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies. Quick Policy Insight

Van der Westhuizen, J. (2010). Still a Twinkling Little Star? Identity and Change in South Africa's Foreign Policy. in Zondi, S. and Masters, L. compilation of symposium papers. (September 2010) *The Future of South Africa's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change*. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue.

Verdier, D. (2005). *Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Unilateralism in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*. Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association on 1-4 September 2005. Washington, D.C.

Vickers, B. (2010). *South Africa's economic diplomacy: trade and investment promotion*. Report prepared for The Presidency's Fifteen Year Review. Institute for Global Dialogue

Zondi, S. (2010). *South Africa*. Working Paper 40. The Brookings Global Economy and Development.

### ***Unpublished materials***

Borer, T. A. & Mills, K. (2009). *South Africa and International Responsibilities: Unsettled Identity and Unclear Interests*. (Unpublished paper). Paper prepared for the International Studies Association 2009 Annual Meeting on 15-18 February.

Duncan, G.A. (2007). *Partnership in Mission: A Critical Historical Evaluation of the Relationship between "Older" and "Younger" Churches with Special Reference to the World Mission Cancel Policy of the Church of Scotland*. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

Hicks, C. (2004). *State Actor, Class Representative, or Interest Group? Subnational Government Organizations in National Policy Domains*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association held in San Francisco in 14 August 2004. Hilton San Francisco & Renaissance Parc 55 Hotel, San Francisco (conference paper/unpublished manuscript).

Inglis, J.L. (2008). *Post-Apartheid South Africa at the United Nations: Patterns and Implications*. Unpublished M.A. dissertation. University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch.

Kent-Brown, D. (2002). *The Relationship between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China: A Model for Public Policy Analysis*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

Mkhize, M. (2008). *Assessing South Africa's "Quiet Diplomacy" Towards Zimbabwe: Strengths and Weaknesses*. Masters Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Naidoo, V. (2010). *Between Scylla and Charybdis: South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemma in Southern Africa*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, UKZN.

Ogunnubi, O. 2013. *"Hegemonic order and regional stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A comparative study of South Africa and Nigeria"*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, UKZN.

Olivier, L. (2009). *Pursuing Human Security in Africa through Developmental Peace Missions: Ambitious Construct or Feasible Ideal?* Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch unpublished Master's dissertation.

Slobodchikoff, M.O. (2009). *The Troika Option: When neither Multilateralism nor Bilateralism is the Appropriate Choice*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference on 02 April 2009. The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois (conference paper/unpublished manuscript).

Tjemolane, T. (2001). *South Africa's Foreign Policy towards Africa, 1994-2010: Partner or Hegemon*. (Masters Dissertation) University of the Free State.

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2006). *South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy decision making on African crises*. PHD Thesis: Wits University.

### ***Electronic/Internet Sources***

Adebajo, A. (11 April 2006). *Does South Africa's foreign policy advance a human rights agenda? South Africa in Africa: Messiah or mercantilist?* Paper presented at HSRC Seminar: Democracy and Governance. <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Document-549.phtml> (accessed 28 .03. 2014).

Alden, C. and Schoeman, M. (2004). *The Hegemon That Wasn't: South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards Zimbabwe*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p74433\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p74433_index.html). (accessed 18. 04. 2014).

ANC 'NEC subcommittee 8 members and the Teams of Deployees' <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10017> (accessed 30 January 2013).

Bullard, M. (2006). Analysis of China's National Interests. <http://rwxy.tsinghua.edu.cn/xisup/institute/english/production/yxt/book/interests%20analysis/ch1.htm>. Accessed: (14. 02. 2014)

Chinaka, C. (2008). *Zuma widens gap with Mbeki over Zimbabwe*.

<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71627?oid=88212&sn=Detail>. (accessed 02. 03. 15)

Cilliers, J. (1999). *An Emerging South African Foreign Policy Identity*. Occasional Paper no.39. Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/39/Paper39.html> (accessed 26. 02. 2014).

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 2005. *Fundamental Principles and Guidelines for South Africa's Foreign Policy in the Strategic Foreign Policy Document*. <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005pq/pq1817.htm>. (accessed 05. 10. 2013)

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 2007. President Mbeki Responds to the APRM Country Review Report – Statement from Office of the Presidency, 4 July 2007. <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2007/aprm0705.htm>. (accessed: 13.11.2014).

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 2009a. *About the Department*. <http://www.dfa.gov.za/departments/index.html>. (accessed 05. 10. 2013).

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 2009b. *Strategic Plan 2009-2012*. <http://www.dfa.gov.za/departments/stratpla2009-2012/strategicplan2009%20%202012.pdf>. (accessed 06. 10. 2013).

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 2009c. 2008-2009 Annual Report. [http://www.dfa.gov.za/departments/report\\_2008-2009/part%20i.pdf](http://www.dfa.gov.za/departments/report_2008-2009/part%20i.pdf). (accessed 03. 08. 13)

GCIS (Government Communications and Information Systems), 2009a. SA Yearbook 2008/09: Foreign Relations.

GCIS (Government Communications and Information Systems), 2009a. SA Yearbook 2008/09: Foreign Relations.

Gelb, S. (2002). *South Africa, Africa the New Partnership for Africa's Development*. [www.idfresearch.org/pdf/Stephen.pdf](http://www.idfresearch.org/pdf/Stephen.pdf). (accessed: 02. 01. 2015)

Gelb, S. (2001). *South Africa's Role and Importance in Africa and for the Development of the African Agenda*. [http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000577/P467\\_RSA\\_role.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000577/P467_RSA_role.pdf). (accessed: 05. 02. 2015).

Gumede, W.M. (2006). *Thabo Mbeki and the Idea of an 'African Renaissance'*. <http://www.africultures.com/php/index.php?nav=article&no=5740>.(accessed: 06. 06. 2014).

Goodrich, B. (2004). The Unitary Actor Assumption in International Relations. [http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~goodrich/IRnotes/week04/Ben\\_response\\_A1.pdf](http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~goodrich/IRnotes/week04/Ben_response_A1.pdf). accessed: (22. 11. 2013)

Habib, A. (2010). *SA has much to Prove at UN Top Table*. <http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article710887.ece/SA-has-muchto-prove-at-UN-top-table>. (accessed: 21. 01. 2015).

Habib, A. (2003). *Hegemon or Pivot: Debating South Africa's role in Africa*. Debate hosted by Centre for Policy Studies. Sheraton Hotel, Pretoria, 20 August 2003. <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000620/page1.php>. (accessed 05. 11. 2013).

Heitman, H (2008). *Concerns over South African foreign policy in wake of Mbeki coup* 295. [http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080926\\_2\\_n.shtml](http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080926_2_n.shtml). (accessed 15. 04. 15)

Hattingh, S. (2007). *South Africa's role in Nigeria and the Nigerian elections*.  
<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/42251/>- (Accessed 13. 06. 2014).

Landsberg, C. (2000). *Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine*.  
[http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\\_of\\_democracy/v011/11.3landsberg.p](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v011/11.3landsberg.pdf)  
df. (accessed 16. 06. 2014)

Landsberg, C. (2003). *Hegemon or Pivot: debating South Africa's role in Africa*. Debate hosted by Centre for Policy Studies. Sheraton Hotel, Pretoria, 20 August 2003.  
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000620/page2.php>(accessed 05 .9. 2014).

Laverty, A. (2008). *How the Policy of Quiet Diplomacy Impacts South Africa's Democratic Consolidation*. <http://theafricanfile.com/politicshistory/south-africa/> (accessed 09. 02.15)

Lotter, K. (20007). *African Renaissance: the renewal and rebirth of a continent*.  
<http://karenlotter.suite101.com/african-renaissance-a31918> (accessed 29. 08.2013).

Maluwa, T. (2000). Human Rights Comparative Foreign Policy: Foundations of Peace. <http://www.ciaonet.org/coursepack/cp05/cp05ak.html>. (accessed 17. 01. 2014)

Munyaka, T. (2013). *MDC prepared for coup if it wins Zim election*. Mail & Guardian, 2 August 2013, <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-02-00-mdc-prepared-forpossible-army-coup>. (accessed 02. 03. 15)

Mills, G. (1997). *Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-so-new South Africa's Foreign Policy*.  
<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No13/Mills.html>. (accessed 16. 06. 2014).

Milner, H. (1998) *International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability*. Foreign Policy, No. 110, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/milner.htm> (accessed 16 .11. 2013).

Ncana, N. (2010). *Renaissance man is Back Thabo Mbeki is back in the Limelight to make sure that Africa Rises from the Ashes.*

<http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article710259.ece/Renaissanceman-is-back>. (accessed:

18.08. 2014) Rabobank, (2009). *Country Report: South Africa.*

[http://www.overons.rabobank.com/.../South%20Africa%2009\\_tcm64-85847.pdf](http://www.overons.rabobank.com/.../South%20Africa%2009_tcm64-85847.pdf). (accessed 21. 10. 2013).

SAGI (South African Government Information), 1998. *South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document*. <http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm>. (accessed 04. 09. 2013)

Rabobank, (2009). *Country Report: South Africa.*

[http://www.overons.rabobank.com/.../South%20Africa%2009\\_tcm64-85847.pdf](http://www.overons.rabobank.com/.../South%20Africa%2009_tcm64-85847.pdf). (accessed: 21.01.2015).

Sachikonye, L. (2005). *South Africa's diplomacy: the case of Zimbabwe*, available at: [www.hsrepress.ac.za](http://www.hsrepress.ac.za) (accessed 29.02.15).

Schoeman, M. (2000). *South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power.*

<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/9No3/SAMiddlePower.html>. (accessed: 07. 10. 2014)

Selby, J.(No date). *Beyond Hydro-Hegemony: Gramsci, the National, and the Trans-National.*

<http://www.soas.ac.uk/waterissues/papers/file39697.pdf>. Accessed: (10. 10. 2013).

Suttner, R. (1996). *A Brief Review of South African Foreign Policy since April 1994.*

<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulo1.html>. (accessed 17. 01. 14).

Southern African Development Community, (2014). *Preliminary statement of the SADC electionobservermission*.[http://www.sadc.int/files/4313/7545/6616/FINAL\\_Preliminary\\_Statement\\_of\\_the\\_SADC\\_Election\\_Observer\\_Mission\\_to\\_the\\_July\\_31\\_2013\\_Zimbabwe\\_Harmonised\\_Elections\\_as\\_at1148\\_on](http://www.sadc.int/files/4313/7545/6616/FINAL_Preliminary_Statement_of_the_SADC_Election_Observer_Mission_to_the_July_31_2013_Zimbabwe_Harmonised_Elections_as_at1148_on). (accessed 02. 03. 15).

The Economist, 2008. *The See-No-Evil Foreign Policy*.

[http://www.economist.com./world/mideast- Africa/displaystory/.cfm?story\\_id=12607346](http://www.economist.com./world/mideast-Africa/displaystory/.cfm?story_id=12607346).

(Accessed 25. 01. 2014)