

A Policy Network Analysis of the Implementation of the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)
in Ethiopia

By

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Declaration

I, Geoffrey Paul Koma declare that:

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Dedication

To my late uncle, the late Lawrence Goboro (May his soul rest in peace), and my father and mother, Mr. & Mrs. Paul Abirigo.

Abstract

This study is a policy network analysis of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) in Ethiopia. The CAADP is a NEPAD initiative aimed at promoting policy interventions that will address the agricultural crisis in Africa.

This dissertation argues that policy networks are regarded as a tool for and a structure of public policy making and implementation, and assume such attributes as exchanges of resources, interdependence among stakeholders that can be formal or informal. Its formation arises from a realisation that single bureaucratic governments are ineffective hence the need to seek mutually beneficial solutions, share information, gain support and legitimacy through association with other agencies.

A policy network analysis of the CAADP has revealed that relationships among the CAADP policy network partners are typically collaborative, complex, reciprocal, and trust based. Therefore, the implementation of the CAADP take place through what would be termed ‘networked governance’ – where stakeholders share common policy objectives aimed at reducing hunger and starvation as well as increasing economic development through a range of collaborative efforts among government, private and civic organisations.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|-----------|---|
| ADLI | Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation |
| AU | African Union |
| BoARD | Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| BoFED | Bureau of Finance and Economic Development |
| CAADP | Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program |
| CBOs | Community Based Organisations |
| CSOs | Civil Service Organisations |
| EDRI | Ethiopia Development Research Institute |
| EIAR | Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research |
| ELALUDEP | Ethiopia Land Administration and Land Use Development Project |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| EU | European Union |
| FAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| FAFS | A Framework for African Food Security |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| FARA | Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa |
| FIMA | The Framework for Improving Rural Infrastructure and Trade Related Capacities for Market Access |
| FSP | Food Security Program |
| FTC | Farmers Training Centre |
| FYGTP | Five-Year Growth and Transformation Plan |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HABP | Household Asset Building Program |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| MoA | Ministry of Agriculture |
| MoARD | Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| MoFED | Ministry of Finance and Economic Development |
| NARS | National Agriculture Research System |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa Development |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| NPCA | NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency |
| PAP | Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral |
| PASDEP | Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty |
| PIF | Policy and Investment Framework |
| PM&E | Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PPD | Planning and Programming Directorate (of MoARD) |
| RARI | Regional Agriculture Research Institute |
| RED&FS | Rural Economic Development and Food Security |
| RED&FS WG | Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group |
| TPLE | Tigray People's Liberation Front |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| US | United States |
| WFP | World Food Program |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter will commence by offering a background to the study. It will also elaborate on the research problem, define the research question, and provide a justification for the study. It is deemed important to understand the political and socio-economic context of Ethiopia in order to understand some of the policy challenges of agricultural policies in alleviating poverty and food insecurity in the country, and identify CAADP as a program that seems to register relative success due to its network approach to policy making and implementation. The definition of the research question is particularly important because it helps contextualize the area of focus of the study. The chapter also aims to describe the research approach of the dissertation, identify key limitations and assumptions, and elaborates on the contribution to be made by this research.

1.2 Background

Ethiopia's image tends to one of an ancient but primitive people, paternalistically ruled by indomitable and striking Emperors. It has experienced debilitating economic and political turmoil, together with a protracted and devastating civil war. Over the years, the country has faced appalling droughts and famines. It has a population of about 65 million people, and Ezra (2003: 66) asserts that the country has become the second most populous country in Africa with it a population growth rated among the highest in the world. According to the Central Statistic Agency, Ethiopia's population has grown from 33.5 million in 1983 to 86.6 million in 2013).

The country's population is highly diverse, containing over 80 different ethnic groups.¹ According to the 1994 Census, 85 percent of the population lives in rural areas and depends on subsistence farming. The UNDP Report (2000) on Human Development ranks Ethiopia as low as 171 out of 174 countries in the world because of its low socio-economic status, excessive land degradation, and inadequate infrastructure. All this hampers agricultural

¹ The Oromo (34.4%) are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. Other major ethnic groups are the Amhara (27%), the Somali (6.22%), the Tigray (6%), the Sidama (4%), the Gurage (2.5%), the Welayta (2.3%), the Afar (1.7%), Hadiya (1.7%), Gamo (1.5%) and others (12.5%). (National Census of 2007).

growth and reduces the labour absorption potential of agriculture in the country – the primary sector on which it can rely on for development.

Figure 1: Map of Africa



(Source: NEPAD, CAADP 2003: iv)

Besides its environmental disasters and hardships, Aklilu (2005: 89) points out that Ethiopia has a long history of tumultuous political rule. Each regime brought with it its own radically

different ideology. Ethiopia has been ruled by Emperors, traditional monarchists, socialist military dictatorships, and now through a coalition government - the Tigray People's Liberation Front-Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF-EPRDF)². Each protecting the interest of their own ethnic groups. As a result, policy making and policy implementation in Ethiopia remains a daunting task.

This proposed study will focus on agricultural policy implementation in Ethiopia. A number of regional approaches on the African continent have been adopted to address issues pertaining to agriculture, poverty alleviation and food security. One such example is the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), which is a policy emanating from the New Partnerships for African Development (NEPAD), as well as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations supported by multilateral institutions such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Bank, and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).

CAADP has many goals, but chief among them is to promote African agriculture to eliminate hunger, enhance economic development and reduce poverty. (NEPAD, 2003: iii). To do this, African governments that have agreed to adopt the CAADP have undertaken to increase public investment in agriculture to minimum of 10% of their national budgets and aim to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6% (Dietvorst, 2009: 62). How they put this programme into action is up to individual countries.

This study aims to undertake an analysis of how the Ethiopian government has implemented the CAADP. Preliminary research has shown that the government of Ethiopia has opted to adopt an approach that includes civil society and other stakeholders outside of government. The literature on public policy would refer to this as a networked approach to governance. This proposed study therefore wishes to undertake a policy network analysis of the implementation of the CAADP in Ethiopia in order to illustrate the collaborative nature of this programme.

² The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (Amharic) is the ruling political coalition in Ethiopia. It is an alliance of four other groups: the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF) and the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF).

1.4 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked

The research problem pertains to the investigating the ongoing implementation failure of agriculture policies in promoting rural development, alleviating poverty and food security in countries such as Ethiopia. However, one programme – the CAADP, seems to have achieved relative success compared to other agricultural policies adopted in Ethiopia. This study considers whether this could be because it has adopted a more collaborative approach to policy making and implementation. This study aims to undertake a policy network analysis in order to understand how policies in a policy network setting are made and implemented, in order to highlight how this differs from the traditional forms of bureaucratic policy making.

The objective of this study are therefore:

- To conduct a policy network analysis of the CAADP by adopting deLeon and Varda's model of collaborative policy network. This entails:
 - identifying the members/stakeholders of the policy networks;
 - identifying reciprocity among stakeholders in policy networks;
 - identifying the different types of power structures in the policy network;
 - analysing the extent to which the different members/stakeholders are embedded in the policy network;
 - determining the significance of trust in policy network;
 - identifying participatory decision making opportunities presented by the policy network; and
 - identifying the role of collaborative leadership.
- To conceptualise the term policy networks.
- To determine the role of policy networks in the making and implementation of policy.
- To determine how policy networks differ from traditional policy making and implementation processes.
- To determine the value of policy networks for countries such as Ethiopia.

1.5 The policy analysis approach upon which the research project will be constructed

This study proposes to employ the policy network approach to policy analysis in order to see the pattern of linkages and levels of collaboration among stakeholders involved in the

implementation of the CAADP in Ethiopia. The policy network approach has many facets and can be looked at from the context in which it intends to execute its purpose. Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 139) argue that the network approach assumes that policy is made in complex interaction processes between a large numbers of actors which takes place within networks of interdependent actors. In this way, policy network theory is seen as a framework for the explanation, evaluation and improvement of public policy making and policy implementation.

In recent years, scholars have come to refer to inter-organisational policy networks in order to explain how relationships emerge, are sustained, and how they create value for the participants and, in some cases, for society. The actors in these policy networks are mutually dependent so policy can only be realised on the basis of co-operation. Policy networks, it is argued, emerge as a result of the failures of hierarchical, instrumentalist and formalist conceptions of politics which has its origin in the pluralist theory.

Policy network theory is “a way for the government to set up a platform for selecting and optimizing the use of policy instruments by generating various alternatives developed and put forward by the various policy actors...; strongly connected to ‘deliberative democracy’, where free and equal citizens can communicate with each other as well as select the best policy solutions together and improve the capacity to govern through policy learning” (Cai 2005; Yu and Liang 2006) cited in Zheng *et al.* (2010: 401). In this sense, policy network theory is envisioned to promote performance, interactive co-operation, dialogue, and policy learning among different policy actors, including government. This usually takes place during the policy process whereby public and private organisations form formal and voluntary informal relations as a result of resource interdependency and the wish to solve policy problems and interact in multi-centric rather than centralized ways.

From a resource dependence perspective, Börzel (1998: 254) conceives of policy networks as “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals.” In this, one can identify facets of policy networks where some relations revolve around interest groups and the state in which resources are exchanged and an analyses that interpret a specific form of public-private partnerships in public policy

governance that is less hierarchical and based on coordination. All these conceptions of policy network make resource exchange which, may over time become institutionalized into networks inevitable. In this way, policy actors only participate in the sort of interaction that characterizes policy networks if they think they can get something out of it. Compston (2009: 17) concludes that “public policy is largely determined by resource exchange involving actors and their resources, preferences, strategies and perceptions of problems and solutions, plus policy network-specific rules and norms.” It is apparent that the literature on policy networks is extensive. This study has chosen to adopt deLeon and deLeon’s model of collaborative policy networks in its analysis of the CAADP.

1.6 Research methodology and methods:

This is a non-empirical desktop study that relies predominantly on an analysis of secondary scholarly literature on policy networks as well as an analysis of various reports and documents written on the CAADP in general and on the CAADP in Ethiopia. The study commenced with a review of the literature on policy networks in order to establish the conceptual framework necessary to undertake the policy network analysis.

The study will undertake a social analysis, which according to Henriot and Holland (1983: 14) is an effort to obtain a more complete picture of a social situation being researched by exploring its historical and structural relationships. This critical social analysis brought to the fore an understanding of the dynamics among the different stakeholders in the CAADP policy network in Ethiopia and how they are implementing the policy. This study is based on an interpretivist paradigm which argues that meaning, truth or knowledge can be created through analysis. (Babbie & Mouton 2001).

This was a qualitative study, and examined existing data as a methodology of analysis. In this respect primary and secondary sources were gathered and analysed. Some of the key primary sources were the Report of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) 2010-2020 (Ethiopia’s fundamental agriculture policy document). Badiane’s 2007 Report prepared for NEPAD on *The Progress in Advancing the Implementation of the CAADP*. Torero’s (2007) document on the CAADP for the Pillar II Expert Reference Group; and Bwalya’s (2009) document on the CAADP for the Pillar I Expert Reference Group. NEPAD (2009) compiled a key

document outlining the Partnerships in Support of the CAADP entitled *A Framework for African Food Security (FAFS)*. As well as NEPAD's 2012 Implementation Report on the CAADP - *Sustaining the momentum into the next Decade*. In addition to these key reports, general primary documents detailing the progressing of the CAADP were analysed as they were reported upon in the media or by different stakeholders.

Brummer (2005: 342) argues that secondary sources consist of data and information that has previously been published, and therefore is supplied via data recovery method from intellectual sources, like published books, journal articles, magazines, newspapers. Thomas (2004)'s *Research Skills*, remarks that principal data has been made by the researcher in the framework of their own research project; and according to Welman, *et al* (2009: 6), secondary data have been made by others, who probably may or may not be fellow researchers, for intentions which may necessarily not be research. The usage of secondary data research helps a broad assortment of interpretive practices to bring together an improved understanding of the area under study. The secondary sources will cover the literature on policy networks, such as those by the authors Kickert, Klijn, Koppenjan, Agranoff, Brinkerhoff and Crossby. Against this general background on policy networks, deLeon and Varda's theory of collaborative policy networks was adopted as the framework for analysis of the CAADP in Ethiopia.

1.7 Structure of dissertation

This mini dissertation is divided into four main chapters.

Chapter One: Introduction.

The chapter introduces the study. It provides a background to the research problem; it defines the research question; provides the justification to the study; describes the research approach of the dissertation.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework - Policy Network Theory

This chapter will present the theory on policy networks and then establishes the conceptual framework for a policy network analysis based on deLeon and Varda's theory of collaborative policy networks.

Chapter Three: A Policy Network Analysis of the CAADP

This chapter will first present a brief background to the CAADP policy framework. It will then present the findings of the policy network analysis of the CAADP in Ethiopia.

Chapter Four: Summary and conclusions.

The main task of this chapter will be to reflect on the notion of policy networks and the value, if any, they have for countries such as Ethiopia.

Chapter 2: Policy Networks

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will conceptualise the term policy networks by locating it within the general debate on policy making and governance. It will define policy networks and identify some of its key concepts, unpack the theory on policy networks and presents deLeon and Varda's theory on collaborative policy network analysis and discuss its various hypotheses. This will constitute the theoretical framework for this study in order to enable an analysis of the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) in Ethiopia which will be undertaken in chapter three.

2.2 Background to Policy Networks

As societies across the world in general, and in Africa have moved towards democracy, many who were previously governed by a strict centralised bureaucratic regime, have had to change in order to adequately respond to the needs of societies. Changes in government and their public administration were in essence a response to the adverse effects of traditional bureaucratic forms of centralised governance. A shift away from governance solely by a central state towards governance through networks began to emerge. As a result, the boundaries between state and civil society began to blur. It became more and more evident that an independent bureaucratic agency could no longer single-handedly solve or provide for all public needs, but that public policies relied on multiple agencies collaborating with one another to solve ambiguous public issues. Kamarck (2001) refers to the term 'networked government'. She argues that it is a term used by a number of authors who see governing in the future taking on new forms. According to her "in networked government the formal state is but one actor in an informal network of organizations" The state may be the primary funder of the network, but its role thereafter is minimal. (Kamarck, 2001: 4).

The realisation that traditional bureaucratic governance lacked capacity to make and implement policy had become more widely accepted. Grindle (1997: 5) has written extensively on the need for capacity-building within government. This need, she says, is driven by call for more efficient, effective and responsive government. The underlying rationale for this is that even if there are enough officials in the government arena, these

actors often lack the skills that facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness. Capacity in itself is comprised of the knowledge and resources needed in an organisation to perform a function. This capacity might be lacking in one department of the public sector – but may be found in another part, or even in the private or civic sector. (Grindle, 1997).

Besides limits to capacity, citizens have always yearned for greater freedom from authority. In the late 17th century, Spinoza, in his *Tractatus Politicus* of 1677 noted that “men should be governed in such a way that they do not regard themselves as being governed, but as following their own bent and their own free choice in their manner of life; in such a way, then, that they are restrained only by love of freedom, desire to increase their possessions, and the hope of obtaining offices of state.” In other words, there is an inherent desire by those governed to be part and parcel of their own governance so that governmental programs reflect their daily needs and in their own varied contexts. In *Politics by Aristotle*, Bk IV (1912), Aristotle (cited in Kooiman, 1993: 30), the philosopher asserts that “that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these are larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the other...” As can be recalled, Aristotle tried as much as possible to avoid extremes and appraised the principle of moderation; that is, the ruling elites loosening their excessive power and the lower class rising above their poverty and coming to converge in the middle for common sharing of vision. The confluence of the two extreme parties in a middle ground explicitly depicts collaboration around life’s story hence, the modern concept - networks.

Kenis and Schneider (1991: 27) report that “in the literature on public policy making, the observation of network configurations can be traced back to the late 60s and early 70s, although the real take-off of network studies occurred only in the decade following.” This concept emerged as a result of the hierarchical, instrumentalist and formalist conceptions of politics which has its origin in the pluralist theory. Kenis and Schneider (1991:28) point out that it was Rokkan who first used the term network from a pluralist and neo-institutionalist perspective. According to these authors, Rokkan maintained that “bargaining networks between corporate bodies and the government were not adverse or antagonistic elements of political decision making structures but complementary channels to conventional structures which created stability by integrating potential veto power into the policy process.”

Bentley (1967: 261) became the first to coin the notion of government as a “network of activities.” All these notions emerged because of the serious shortcoming of pluralist thinking with its mystified image of world complexity; political life seemed to be fluid, vague and in constant change. Consistent with the thinking of these authors, the role of networks in policy making became an important issue on the research agenda in the late 1980s. What scholars were searching for, which gradually led to the notion of network theory, was a theoretically and empirically understanding of how networks between public, private and non-for-profit actors shape processes of policy-making and governance. Instead of trying to understand and improve policy planning and implementation processes through the state, scholars turned their attention to less centralized and more forms of governance. This ‘new’ shift as suggested by Kenis and Schneider is to become a mechanism that responds positively to the complexity and uncertainties of contemporary governance (1991:26).

Policy networks in this regard emanated as a result of the interactions between actors where a conflict of interests in the policy process and problem definitions are ambiguous. As Coleman has argued (1994: 651), “[P]rimordial social organization has depended on a vast supply of social capital, on normative structure which enforced obligations, guaranteed trustworthiness, induced efforts on behalf of others and on behalf of the primordial bodies themselves, and suppressed free riding.” Policy networks can be regarded as necessary than, not as a collaborator of dark forces that would undermine traditional society, but as an aid in the reconstructive task of filling the voids created by the corrosion of social capital and the mode of social organisation it supported.

According to Heclo (1978), Hjern and Porter (1981), Sabatier (1986), and Howlett (2002) (cited in Weible, 2008: 461), “policy networks have grown in importance, in part because single organizational affiliations are usually incapable of implementing policies.” Hajer and Wagenaar (2003: 2 & 29) noted that the emphasis on policy networks “also illustrates a widespread dissatisfaction with the limited reach of ‘set solutions’ to thorny political issues imposed through top-down government intervention...traditional policy science had failed to live up to its ambition: to contribute to an understanding, let alone amelioration, of the kind of wicked problems that confront modern society.” Bardach (1998) believes that implementing public programs cannot easily be achieved or is inadequate when management is pivoted on a single hub operating everything (1998: 117). “Because bureaucracy, as we know it ages with the railway and telegraph times due to the ever changing nature of

societies, it can no longer hold water. Instead, it is the relationships among specialized actors from multiple organizational affiliations in a policy network that, in principle, determine policy processes and outcomes in a policy subsystem.” (Bardach, 1998: 117)

From a governance point of view, the “new structures which relate society and government are evolving under modern conditions and that within such structures the institutions which deliver public services are permitted to assume some of the features of sub-governments and to enjoy a limited but increased degree of autonomy” (Kooiman, 1993: 235). The implication of this is that modern governments, in most cases, are moving away from a hierarchical form of governance to more collaborative governance. It is difficult today to deny the fact that the most appropriate forms of government-society relations ought to consider the variability of policy problems and environments. In this case therefore, complexity and societal dynamics appears to strengthen and foster governments’ efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and responsiveness to those they serve. It is against this background that the phrase, policy networks emerged.

2.3 Defining Policy Networks and their Key Concepts

Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 138) observe that “the use of the network concept in policy science dates back to the early 1970s.” They contend that in policy implementation studies, especially in what has become known as the ‘bottom-up’ approach to policy making and implementation (as opposed to the traditional bureaucratic ‘top-down’ approach to policy making and implementation), as well as in the literature on inter-organisational relations literature, the concept has been used to map inter-organisational relations and to assess the influence of these patterns on policy processes.

The term ‘policy network’ has conjured up several understandings, depending on the contexts from which it has emanated. As conceived by Raab and Kenis (2009: 198), a policy network is an amalgamated group of organisations glued together by their shared resource dependencies, and are intentionally formed groups of more than two interdependent organisations whose aim is to attain a shared interest and as a unit yield results. Policy networks should, however, not be seen as completely separate from the state but rather as, due to their formal and informal formation, governmental and non-governmental connections and other stakeholders pivoted around a common belief to which no single agency is superior

to the other. The mutuality of relationships animated by trust among members whether state or non-state spells out their dependency on each other for the sake of effecting public policies and their potential implementation.

Policy networks in general may be understood as: “structural elements of collaborative networks, documenting such components as reciprocity, equality, and representation” (deLeon and Varda, 2009: 62) suggesting that no definite leader is in control of its functioning. Both as a tool for and a structure of public policy implementation, policy networks assume such attributes as exchanges of resources, interdependence among stakeholders that can be formal or informal. Its composition arises from a realisation that single bureaucratic governments are ineffective hence the need to mutually benefit, share information, gain support and legitimacy through correlation with other agencies. (deLeon & Varda, 2009: 62).

From these definitions, the concept of policy networks revolves around one central element of interdependence. These definitions portray policy networks as networks of public, semi-public and private actors participating in policy programs and it also indicates the patterns of relations that exist between interdependent actors involved in processes of public policy making. Therefore, due to the confluence of many participants in policy networks such as the public, private and indeed citizens who affect policy implementation, it is proper to ascertain that by its structure and nature, governments (although this is dependent on different contexts) cannot exercise enough power to handle complex issues on its own hence, the emergence of policy network as a standpoint to governance or managing public policy.

In the modern context, Dahan *et al* (2006: 1578) argue that a policy network constitutes “a self-organizing group that coordinates a growing number of public (decision-makers) and private (interest groups) actors for the purpose of formulating and implementing public policies.” Policy network is a concept that can be understood basically in two perspectives: the network as a type of organization and the network as a perspective on organizing, but it can also be understood as a sub-category of inter-organisational networks, most often defined in terms of their structural characteristics and functions. Van der Krogt thinks of the network organisation as a mirror that is client-friendly where the process of decision making is devolved horizontally for a smooth flow of information among its members (Van der Krogt, 1998: 161-162) as opposed to the traditional hierarchical, bureaucratic and rigid form of

governance. Van der Krogt is of the opinion that because this alternative form of networked governance is flexible, open and integrated - policy networks serve as a model for future organisations that will confront highly changeable environments.

The policy network as a perspective on organising recognises that “the concept of the network can be employed as a frame of reference that can be used to analyze any type of organization. In this case, the concept refers to such characteristics as the interaction pattern, the exchange of information, and inter-organisational relationships” (Van der Krogt, 1998: 162). This particular understanding of the network concept assumes that policy networks are made up of strategically operating actors; that every organisation is a social network; that the environment of the organisation is a network; and that network structures come about as a result of the actors’ actions even if the structures influence those actors. The uniqueness of policy networks is that, unlike other forms of governance, they function to formulate and implement public policies in a collaborative cross-sectoral manner.

According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 139) policy is a result of complex interactive processes between a large numbers of actors which takes place within networks of actors. These actors are mutually interdependent so policy can only be realised on the basis of co-operation. In this way, policy network theory is seen as a framework for the explanation, evaluation and improvement of public policy and public management. In recent years, scholars have considered ways to analyse inter-organisational policy networks in order to explain how relationships surface, are sustained, and create value for the participants and, in return - for society.

Bardach has argued that policy networks are useful as a way to describe a certain kind of communications capacity (a set of relations among actors’ agencies or individuals) that facilitates efficient communication among them for some particular purpose-delivering services to citizens, organising for political advocacy, socialising with individuals of similar status and taste, seeking out partners with complementary assets for completing a production value chain from product discovery to marketplace (Bardach, 1998: 25). A policy network has complexity of relationships among actors as one of its defining features. Therefore, through the communications capacity, actors can easily identify other participants in the policy network whose creative capacities would likely be valuable to them; and actors who want their aptitude to be revealed, make use of the networks to have them unearthed.

Policy networks have many facets and can be looked at from the context in which it intends to execute its purpose. According to Law and Hassard (1999: 3-4) entities take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities (semiotics of materiality). This means that they are performed in, by, and through those relations (performativity). Conceiving of network theory in the former provides a dualistic view of networks in which entities have no inherent qualities but exist between before and after; knowledge and power; context and content; and materiality and sociality. The latter concerns itself with an effort to understand how it is that durability is achieved in these policy networks, or how it is that things get performed into relations that are relatively stable and stay in place. Law and Hassard (1999: 4) conclude that the two go together.

In the views of Cai (2005) and Yu and Liang (2006) (cited in Zheng *et al*, 2010: 401), policy networks provide “a way for the government to set up a platform for selecting and optimizing the use of policy instruments by generating various alternatives developed and put forward by the various policy actors...; strongly connected to ‘deliberative democracy’, where free and equal citizens can communicate with each other as well as select the best policy solutions together and improve the capacity to govern through policy learning” respectively. In this sense, policy network theory is envisioned to promote performance, interactive co-operation, dialogue, and policy learning among different policy actors, including government. This usually takes place during the policy process whereby public and private organizations form formal and informal relations as a result of resource interdependency and the wish to solve policy problems and interact in multi-centric rather than centralized ways.

From a resource dependence perspective, Börzel (1998: 254) conceives of policy networks as “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, (who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources) to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals.” As such, Börzel (1998: 254) identifies facets of policy networks where some relations revolve around interest groups and the state in which resources are exchanged and an analysis that interprets a specific form of public-private partnerships in public policy governance that is less hierarchical and based on coordination. Compston (2009: 17) concludes that “public policy is largely determined by resource exchange involving actors and their resources, preferences, strategies and perceptions of problems and solutions, plus policy network-specific rules and norms.”

Due to the structure and nature of policy networks that is uncertain, ambiguous, complex, and wicked, its formation presents a dilemma. To clarify this dilemma, some scholars argued for both formal and informal perspectives of policy networks. Raab and Kenis (2009: 199) noted that “most often, these networks as aggregates of dyadic relations were not consciously designed but were emergent social systems consisting of individual or corporate actors and their social bilateral interactions.” The corresponding effects of formal and informal relationships have the potential to boost policy effectiveness more cheaply than the authority-based structural changes arrived at through formal organization. This means that networks come in various forms and shapes, are governed quite differently, and despite being different from hierarchies nonetheless need a control function to be effective.

However, this line of thought is not shared by all scholars in this field. Dowding (1995) cited in deLeon and Varda (2009: 64; and deLeon and Varda, 2006: 63) for instance, argues that the only value of policy network emanates from a formal structure in which properties of the network are explained, but nothing more. For these scholars, the time for policy network to have a feasible analysis capacity is not ripe because it is inadequate in its theoretical scaffold; such things as a set of guiding principles by which to test the theory of collaborative policy networks over time. When multisectoral parties are blended together, they may fail because of the wide array of values, norms, power, trust, and experience might clash and produce undesirable conflict and tension. Undeniably, collaborative policy networks do not result explicitly in improved policy outcomes, especially when one considers the intricacies in stirring collaboration over time and assessing its outcomes. Therefore, policy networks may deter, rather than enhance effectiveness and efficiency.

Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) emphasize the relationship between policy networks, public policy making and governance. For them, the concept policy network “connects public policies with their strategic and institutionalized context: the network of public, semi-public, and private actors participating in certain policy fields”. (Kickert *et al*, 1997: 1). Kickert *et al* regard the policy network model as an alternative approach to governance. They define policy networks as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programs.” (Kickert *et al*, 1997: 6). Table 2.1 below describes in what ways they regard policy networks as different from more traditional forms of governance (such as the rational central rule perspective and the multi actor perspective).

Table 2.1 Three Perspectives on Public Policy Making and Governance

| | The rational central rule perspective | The multi-actor perspective | The network perspective |
|---|---|---|---|
| Object of analyses | Relation between central ruler and target groups | Relation between central ruler and local actors | Network of actors/no hierarchy |
| Perspective | Central ruler | Local actors | Interactions between actors |
| Characterisation of relations | Authoritative | Centralised versus autonomous | Interdependent |
| Characterisation of policy processes | Neutral implementation of <i>ex ante</i> formulated policy | Political processes of interest representation and informal use of guidelines and resources | Interaction process in which information, goals and resources are exchanged |
| Criterion of success | Attainment of the goals of the formal policy | Local discretionary power and obtaining resources in favour of local actors | Realisation of collective action |
| Causes of failure | Ambiguous goals; too many actors; lack of information and control | Rigid policies; lack of resources, non-participation of local actors | Lack of incentives for collective action or existing blockages |
| Recommendations for governance | Coordination and centralization | Retreat of central rule in favour of local actors | Management of policy networks: improving conditions under which actors interact |

(Source: Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997: 10)











According to the Table as depicted by Kickert *et al* (1997), success in a policy network is the realisation of collective action. Causes of failure point to, among other things, a lack of collaboration within the policy network. This study will explore the nature of inter-organisational relationships in the CAADP, and will do this by applying deLeon and Varda's theory of collaborative policy networks.

2.4 DeLeon and Varda's Theory of Collaborative Policy Networks

DeLeon and Varda propose a theory of collaborative policy networks that examines not only the stakeholder composition of a group or the partnerships between any two stakeholders but also the way these stakeholders are embedded in various degrees of institutionalised structure

and the discursive tendencies of exchange among them that leads to policy initiative, implementation, evaluation, and possibly termination. According to them, collaborative policy networks are characterized by properties such as representation/diversity; reciprocity, horizontal power structure; embeddedness; trust and formality: participatory decision making: and collaborative leadership. Analysing the extent of these in a policy network, deLeon and Varda (2009:59) argue, provide “structural signatures of collaborative policy networks that serve as stamps of the common nature of such networks that, if fostered, can inform and improve the attempt of networks of partners to achieve policy goals

Figure 2: DeLeon and Varda’s Theory of Collaborative Policy Networks

| Hypotheses | Assumed Pattern in Collaborative Policy Networks | Alternative Patterns |
|---|--|---|
| H ₁ : Representation/Diversity Shade of ○ = different type of organizations (e.g. public, private, nonprofit) |  |  |
| H ₂ : Reciprocity ↔ = reciprocal tie |  |  |
| H ₃ : Horizontal Power Structure |  |  |
| H ₄ : Embeddedness Thickness of ↔ = multiple types of relationships (multiplexity) |  |  |
| H ₅ : Trust & Formality | ↑ Trust ↑ Formality | ↑ Trust ↓ Formality |
| H ₆ : Participatory Decision Making | ↑ Transparency Throughout Network | ↓ Transparency Throughout Network |
| H ₇ : Collaborative Leadership Same color ■ = structural equivalent Square ■ = leadership positions |  |  |

(DeLeon and Varda, 2009:59)

Figure 2 above is a representation of the deLeon and Varda’s hypotheses on collaborative policy networks. The first column names the hypothesis; the second column illustrates the type of relationships expected in collaborative policy networks and the third column

illustrates the relationships found in traditional forms of bureaucratic governance. This model is envisioned to “lead to the knowledge of how to create, maintain, and sustain networks for such purposes (as well as general policy issues) over time to guide future research and practice to further improve discursive dialogue while maintaining its functional purpose (e.g., to prepare for, and respond to, emergencies)” (deLeon and Varda, 2009: 71). The hypotheses presented in this figure conjure up the main features of policy networks which are explained below.

Hypothesis 1 (H₁) - Representation/Diversity

This defining characteristic of a policy network refers to the extent to which different (diverse) types of organisations (whether public, private, or civic) are represented in the network. The breadth of representation and diversity in the second column is depicted by distinguishing shades of different types of organizations, whereas the third column depicts representatives as coming from one organization. The assumption is that the more diverse and representative the stakeholders are the more strategic, valuable and meaningful contribution they bring to a policy issue. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003: 40) for instance noted that “stakeholders in a policy dialogue must be diverse in order to take full advantage of the creativity that can come from trying to find actions that can respond to a wide set of competing interests.” The argument is that diversity adds value to organisational management - not merely to counteract an apparent problem but because it has become necessary and cannot be avoided and also because of its capacity to innovate within different contexts.

However, diversity has its challenges. Stakeholders from a variety of different cultures, worldviews, ideals and belief systems may complicate policy-making processes. Kooiman (1993: 7) assures us, however, that “instead of seeing complexity, dynamics and diversity as contributing to ungovernability, they can be seen as useful to enhance governability.” If diversity is accommodated in the policy network, it may assist with policy implementation in the future.

Hypothesis 2 (H₂) - Reciprocity

Reciprocity as a policy network feature refers to the patterns of exchange among the stakeholders in the policy network. The hypothesis is that stakeholders in a policy network are better able to realise their organisational goals if they opt to engage in a reciprocal relationships with other members of the policy networks. The assumption is that mutually reciprocal relationships will result in successful policy implementation. Reciprocity speaks to the nature of interdependence among the members of the policy network. The second column illustrates a two-way (reciprocal) relationships among the different representatives whereas in the third column, the arrows only point in one way- implying that the relationships are not reciprocal. Reciprocity makes stakeholders to value the bond they have with each other and sustain it for the purpose of maintaining the policy network functioning such that the success and failure of an organisational project is not lamented but shared among them.

Alexander (1995) noted that reciprocity connects agencies by the fact that what one agency produces adds an insight to another agency's functioning and vice versa (Alexander, 1995: 32). Reciprocity suggests a type of relationship whose input, by necessity, is equally important to the other as to enhance the sustainability and improvement of the other and vice versa. This tends to be more formal than informal especially if, for example, the type of interdependence is the interaction between a research institute and a pharmaceutical corporation.

According to Bardach (1998: 23) resource dependence theory holds that "although agencies in general value autonomy and therefore eschew cooperation, if a focal agency's resource base depends on some other agency, the focal agency will be willing to cooperate with the other agency. Thus cooperation is the *quid pro quo* for, say, service contracts or a stream of referrals that might bring payments or social legitimacy." Rhodes (2005: 431) argues that relationships are motivated by the exchange of resources; that is, insofar an organization needs another organization for resources in order to realize their goals. Stakeholders are interested in events that are fully or partially under the control of other stakeholders. (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 139).

Hajer and Wagenaar (cited in Schneider *et al*, 2003: 143-144) argued that "network-based structures are characterized by high levels of interdependence involving multiple

organizations, where formal lines of authority are blurred and where diverse policy actors are knitted together to focus on common problems”. For organizations to achieve their full potentials, they need insight into the needs and wants of other organizations – this allows for the exchange of resources. (Resources do refer to finances alone but includes expertise, time and human resources which organisations may be in short supply of).

Alexander (1995: 31) identified four types of interdependence (based on input/output relationships or transfer interactions between organizational units).

These are:

- (i) serial or sequential interdependence;
- (ii) reciprocal interdependence;
- (iii) pooled interdependence; and
- (iv) commensal interdependence.

Serial interdependence assumes that interdependence occurs in a situation where one entity’s output is the input for another to an extent that the longevity of their interdependence is determined by the continuity of this very output/input exchange. A simple example to demonstrate serial interdependence is the relationship between a shopkeeper and his customer. The medium of exchange that the customer uses to get what he needs from the shopkeeper is an output on one hand and an input on the other hand. Sequential interdependence is a word coined by O’Tool and Mountjoy (1984: 493-495) to refer to serial interdependence between separate organizations, mostly an interorganizational exchange that demands transaction specific investments or resources. Depending on the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the entities involved may have to implore other coordination mechanisms. “The relevant coordination process is spontaneous mutual adjustment through which the parties adapt their behavior to available information on supply, demand, and prices” (Alexander, 1995:31). The difference between serial and sequential interdependence is that the former tends to be smaller and within an organization while the latter is larger in scope and deals with large transactions.

Reciprocal interdependence is a type of interdependence that bonds organizations in such a way that “one unit’s output is an input for the other’s activities, and at the same time that unit’s product is the other unit’s input” (Alexander, 1995: 32). If for instance a research institute’s findings are the input for development of new products, that particular corporation’s product development needs may influence the institute’s research undertakings.

In such circumstances, interdependence is seen in the interaction between a research institute and a pharmaceutical corporation in which both entities mutually benefit from each other's input. Given this circumstance, simplicity and complexity of interorganizational interdependence does not determine coordination but rather, amalgamation of interdependence type and transaction features does.

Moving away from serial, sequential, and reciprocal, Alexander (1995: 33) contends that Pooled interdependence too is prevalent. According to his argument, this type of interdependence hinges at organizations that are mutually common in their activities and goals. It is a sphere where interorganizational competition is easily noticed especially when the respective organizations' efforts are on achieving a common goal. Pooled interdependence stretches further to other types that synonymous to it such as; symbiotic and commensal interdependence. Pooled interdependence therefore, is pivoted at organizational heterogeneity. Relationships in this are to be found between firms in the same industry or sector, which are not necessarily linked by their use of common technologies but rather by their competition in the same market. A typical example can be the interdependence between hardware and software manufacturers in the computer industry. Commensal interdependence by itself illustrates the relationship between organizations that depend on the same source of resources.

Alexander (1995: 34) distinguishes symbiotic and commensal interdependencies in regards to variations of resource dependency among organizations, identifying organizations that seek partners with complementary resources (potential symbiotic interdependence) vs. organizations which are dependent on resources from their environments (commensal interdependence). While the former approach leads to joint efforts, the latter assumes a transactional relationship, that is, buyer-seller relationships. With all its various types, pooled interdependence "have been classified as 'outcome interdependence', when results are the product of interdependent efforts" (Alexander, 1995: 34).

Hypothesis 3 (H₃) - Horizontal power structure

One of the defining characteristics of a policy network is that it is not one structured on traditional forms of bureaucratic hierarchy, but it is argued, in its more horizontal power structures (Agranoff, 2007). The hypothesis here is that collaborative policy making and

implementation is more forthcoming when power relations are less hierarchical. Decision-making takes place on an equal footing and is not a directive from above. According to column two, the presumed patterns of power in collaborative policy networks are indicated by arrows that go back-and-forth between the different organizations as opposed to being formally organized, hierarchically structured in column three. Even if the representation of the different organizations seems to portray a somewhat pyramidal or top-down model, the arrows indicate quite the opposite. In fact, a careful study of the organisational power structures flow horizontally and gradually influences all other organisations that may even seem to own bigger shares or seemingly powerful spots like indicated in both the second and third columns of the above figure in black spots and pyramid figure respectively.

In line with this discussion of power in policy networks, Agranoff (2007: 92) noted that “to look for power within the network, one must look beyond authority and procedures” because the exercise of power in the policy network is more participatory and decisions reached are joint. This form of power approach in policy networks, Klijn and Koppenjan suggest, does not pride in self-proclamation but rather assumes an invisible form of power that concerns itself with identifying and defining issues to which a capable network of actors commune to jointly solve it (2000: 147). A power vacuum may seem to appear in the network organization; that of having no one in charge or that there is no one with distinctive power to whom other network members can refer to for decision making, but indeed there is power in networks only that the way it is exercised is in the form of orchestration or having a charismatic leader to stir other members to act. This justifies the claim that other networks’ duties are not to decide but rather request some agencies to do something that can in turn aid their action. Therefore, just as a naval ship has a captain, so should a network organization, with what Agranoff calls “core-member-led technical subgroup” but the only difference being that in the network domain, authority is equally distributed (Agranoff, 2007: 94).

However, although stakeholders in a policy network are depicted as being interdependent, co-equal and having patterned bonds, power differential will continue to looms since different players in the policy network organization hold varied role positions and capacities. Those with such advantages create unequal opportunities for those who do not have such advantages – and have the potential to bring about program failures and mistrust among network members (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999: 19).

Agranoff and McGuire cautioned that sometimes it can be concealed under the pretense of trust and the escape-goat for collaboration while in reality it is intended to promote self-gratification through manipulation of and capitulations by weaker partners (1999: 32). It is pivotal to note that power *per se* is paramount in itself but it can be used to either hinder or enable action. If power is used to mobilize and organize, then it is actually enabling trust in policy network actors, but if power is used for vested interests and to control, then it overshadows trust. The bottom line is that power in a policy network set up concomitantly works together with trust because it shapes the rule of the game bargained by the policy network participants. For this reason Thompson (1967: 132) concludes “the all-powerful chief can maintain such control only to the extent that he is not dependent on others within his organization; and this is a situation of modest complexity, not one of a high degree of complexity.”

Rhodes counters this inherent weakness of policy networks by highlighting the resource-interdependences between members of the policy network. Rhodes argues that each stakeholder recognizes that it gains from participating in the policy network for a number of reasons – one of which is access to resources (whether financial, human or intellectual) from other stakeholders. Because of this, no single organization claims supremacy over the other (2005: 431).

Hypothesis 4 (H₄) - Embeddedness

In the context of policy networks embeddedness suggests that “people will make choices based on past interactions and will be particularly inclined to initiate network connections with those whom they can trust” (deLeon and Varda, 2009: 68). In addition, for relations between the different stakeholders to become ‘embedded’ or entrenched and trust to develop their needs be an element of frequent interaction between actors. These interactions are evaluated based on the experiences of the past. (The graphical depiction in Figure 1 indicates the degree of embeddedness by the thickness of the arrow – implying positive past collaborative experiences). In other words, the thickness of relationships illustrates the frequency with which actors have had positive past experiences with each other. The hypothesis is that this will continue to cement their interaction over and over again to an extent that they develop trust among themselves that brings about uniformity and mutual trust as indicated in the right hand side of the figure. This leads to cooperation among policy

network actors that flows freely without any external party or mediator to enforce cooperation because of the level of trust parties in question have attained, hence, internal problem solution becomes easier.

Zukin and Dimaggio (1990) argue that researchers have proposed four broad categories of embeddedness, namely cognitive, cultural, structural, and political. Cognitive embeddedness refers to the ways in which the structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of economic reasoning (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990: 15-16); cultural embeddedness refers to the role of shared collective understandings in shaping economic strategies and goals (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990: 17); structural embeddedness refers to the contextualization of economic exchange in the pattern of ongoing interpersonal relations (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990: 18); and political embeddedness refers to the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions, particularly the state and social classes (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990: 20).

Here, the term embeddedness captures the architecture of the ties that bind the members of the policy network together. It captures the extent to which an entity is entrenched in a network of relationships, assesses the extent to which an entity connects to other entities, and also appraises the extent to which an entity is connected with other structurally embedded entities. These are all strategically made possible by mental processes that limit the exercise of economic reasoning all put together into context. The assumption is that embeddedness results in predictable patterns of policy making and policy implementation - and that once relationships become entrenched- policy networks in other areas may emerge.

Hypothesis 5 (H₅) - Trust and Formality

The elements of trust and formality are integrally linked to that of embeddedness. However, deLeon and Varga regard trust and formality as a distinctive hypothesis. According to them, policy networks cannot achieve their objectives without substantial trust and a sense of formality among stakeholders – not only for policy making and implementation but also in the management and survival of the policy network.

Trust, however, is complex. Luhmann (1979 cited in Gilbert and Behnam, 2013: 143) argues that no institution, whether market or hierarchy can provide assurance sufficient enough to generate trust between parties. “[I]t is voluntary and associated with willing, instead of forced, collaboration between the trusting parties”. Trust does not easily resonate with formal and bureaucratic structures (as depicted on the left hand side of the column in Figure 1). In fact, the arrows run parallel to each other in the same direction simply because of the tragedy of obedience to rules exulted in bureaucracies. This means that as formality increases in an organization trust diminishes and as trust increases as shown in the right hand side of the column, formality vanishes. Succinctly put, “[A]s trust develops between partners, the level of formality decreases, leading to the assertion that familiarity breeds trust” (Gulati and Singh 1998, cited in deLeon and Varda, 2009: 69). The fact that policy networks have ‘flatter’ power structures – less hierarchy, therefore less formality – provides an environment conducive for trust.

Undeniably, a hierarchy is a hierarchy - and markets realize optimal benefits insofar as the rules guiding the means to achieving their goals are followed. As such, one need not trust in order to achieve organizational goals, but simply follow the prescribed rules. In policy networks however, trust is pivotal, meaning that where policy network relationships are high in trust, network partners are more willing to engage in social exchange in general, and in cooperative interaction in particular implying that trust lubricates cooperation in networks, and cooperation itself yields trust. This in particular, according to Fountain (1994) and Sabel (1992) (cited in Agranoff and McGuire) is to depict the vital role of trust in enhancing policy network cohesion as a hub that holds the network together (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999: 32). Through trust, stakeholders in a policy network are able to share and discuss information, have the taste of working with other networks for a longer term of relationship and also have the experience of rotation of leadership representing various firms. Through trust, stakeholders in a policy network build teamwork, develop skills to resolve issues together, and coordinate functions together. Trust may not essentially entail a unity of beliefs, but rather mutual commitment and expectation to achieving policy goals. Once trust is achieved, even national structures can be formalized into full-fledged NGOs because the conviction that potential political threat looms is not suspected. Mistrust comes as a result of actors being skeptical of each other’s motives and intentions but shared experience of collaboration can lead to a greater level of trust among parties which further enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of a policy network.

Due to the complex and multi-organisational nature of a policy network, management and implementation of policies is greatly hampered. Agranoff and McGuire (1999) argue that the effective management and implementation of a policy network relies on an element of trust. “Trust in collective behavior is linked to the obligation to attend broadly to the concerns of others in network, beyond the boundaries of specific measurable transaction” (Barber, 1993 cited in Agranoff and McGuire, 1999: 29). Hence, in the process of trying to build a lasting relationship with each other, members of public and private sector organisations have to invest a considerable amount in trust. In this regard, trust is considered as a prerequisite for the production of synergy. Levels of trust may be low during the initial stages of collaboration, but this can be strengthened through the actions of the stakeholders – i.e. through accountability and transparency.

Giddens (1990) identifies two types of trust: *personal* trust and *system* trust. “Personal trust is extended primarily to another human being, while system trust concerns trust in the steering mechanisms of social interaction and the functionality of so-called expert systems (e.g., money, power, companies, and networks).” (Giddens, 1990: 67). Just as the common saying ‘charity begins at home’, trust is first personal before it becomes communal or system even though for various reasons system trust can develop prior to personal trust mainly due to economic or political benefits. This simply means that when individuals in different sectors trust each other, it enhances system or interorganizational trust.

Sable (cited in Giddens, 1990: 67) argues that a government that is run by trusting actors creates prosperous institutional structures based on dialogue to realizing their (agents’) predicted goals and beliefs. Policy network management becomes simple in the atmosphere of trusting parties because trust tends to overshadow the wicked problem and leaves free flow of organizational activities where individual participants account to each other in their varying contexts of function.

Since the whole rationale of collaboration through a policy network is to ‘get things done’, trust helps “fine-tune policy plans in order to pin-point the real issue and translate them into action. Trust comes as a tranquilizer to complexity in organizations and as glue; it holds these network organizations together” (Hull and Hjern, 1987: 23). This implies that actors will trust only if they have reason to trust and the reason for actors to trust in networks, in Hindmoor’s view (1998: 35) is “because their relations are historically, socially and personally embedded

in an ongoing system that generates standards of behavior that not only obviate the need for but are superior to pure authority relations in discouraging malfeasance.” It follows then that in modern governance, in which, participants have to collaborate by contravening institutional limits, trust cannot be assumed since policymaking is not only focused on seeking remedies for problems but also about devising ways that allows mutually interdependent actors to trust each other.

The aspect of formality adds an interesting dimension to the management of policy networks. The controversy over the formal and informal nature of policy networks confronts policy network analysts with coming to terms with a deeper understanding of the policy network structure and especially with what holds policy networks together. “While a formal structure of interaction is often asserted (for example, a formal hierarchical reporting structure), informal network structure is inevitable” (deLeon and Varda, 2009: 65).

Hypothesis 6 (H₆) - Participatory Decision Making

The essence of a collaborative policy network is the prospect it offers for inclusive and participatory decision making. The value of a policy network lies in the participation of all the members of the network, and their ability to contribute to the aims and objectives of the policy network. Because issues around the policy arena are complex, uncertain, and sometimes have no clear solutions, participation of a greater number of actors is important because stakeholders are diverse and have different experiences. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003: 29; and Mandell, 2001:22) identified it as ‘wicked problem.’

Participatory decision making as a key feature of democracy upholds a considerable degree of accountability and transparency by those who have the capacity to decide among network members. Collaborative policy networks therefore, have the ability to stand as a stepping stone of common vision of policy networks. Once this level of common vision is attained, only then can the network inform and develop the desire of network partners to achieve policy goals. This is basically to say that the role of collaborative network is not only to examine the stakeholder composition of a group but also the way “these stakeholders are embedded in various degrees of institutionalized structure and the discursive tendencies of exchange among them that leads to policy initiative, implementation, evaluation, and possibly termination” (deLeon 1999) cited in (deLeon and Varda, 2009: 60).

Whether or not transparency of individuals who possess decision making roles as conceived by other network partners is an element to desire but, this model ultimately recognizes that members of a network that possess decision making tasks will associate with those whom their decision will affect in a more transparent manner. Hence, deLeon and Varda suggest that honest and transparent relationships in collaborative policy networks foster achievement of organizational goals, mission, and reason to participate in policy network agencies (2009: 70).

Hypothesis 7 (H₇) - Collaborative Leadership

Alongside the growing acknowledgement that public policy problems have become too complex to be addressed by individual government agencies, is a growing realisation that leadership needs to be less hierarchical and more collaborative.

Today's organisational management takes place habitually within or outside the borders of indigenous organisations - not in reaction to a problem, but as a constant interface with external partners seeking interconnectedness in a policy issue. Bardach (1998: 8) defined collaboration as "any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately." When agencies collaborate, they come to realise the variety of the types of work they do to which they seek enhancement of productivity which they jointly act upon to increase public value. Collaborative policy networks are purported to have discursive properties. "These include political support, mutuality of goals, reciprocity (shared resources), representation/diversity, flattened power structures, participatory decision making, collaborative leadership, shared experiences and norms, frequent interaction, the requirement of trust, and conflict resolution" (deLeon and Varda, 2009: 65). In this sense, interagency collaboration emerges as a type of administrative reform, similar to contracting out, empowering line-level employees to mention but a few. Leadership in this context is anything but conventional.

This hypothesis proposes that in a collaborative policy network, leadership needs to reflect impartiality and must timeously rotate among policy network members who hold similar positions in the network. It implies that leaders should not be chosen because of possible influence they may have as a result of, for instance, their financial status, but because of their ability to engage with all stakeholders in the policy network.

Leadership in this context is more about managing the policy network – someone takes on a leadership role to coordinate the workings of the policy network. This leadership role can be temporary; voluntary; and/or rotational. However, it cannot be a matter of one stakeholder telling the other members of the policy networks what to do. (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999) It requires a type of leadership that can facilitate consensus-orientated policy making and implementation. This is no easy feat – especially when government is one of the stakeholders in the policy network. The danger is that government representatives are quick to usurp positions of powers in a policy network – which in turn diminishes levels of trust among the other stakeholders of the policy network (Kickert *et al*, 1997).

2.5 Conclusion

The discussion above illustrates that policy networks depart fundamentally from traditional bureaucratic forms of governance. First and foremost, they ‘lack’ a formal sense of hierarchy as is associated with traditional bureaucratic forms of government, which may weaken its ability to enforce policy action. However, proponents of policy networks argue that this may actually be its strength because it allows for collaborative problem solving.

Policy networks are also inherently complex. Meier and Hill (2005: 61) observed that “networks range from simple dyads to bewilderingly complex arrays entailing dozens of units...Networks are generally designed to deal with ‘wicked problems’ that will not fit within a single jurisdiction or that for political reasons cannot be placed within a single bureaucracy.” The reason for this is that even participants in networks are often situated in bureaucracies that are in turn connected with other organizations outside the lines of formal authority. The agencies involved in networks are not only private agencies, rather some may include links among units of different governments; ties between profit and non-profit organizations and so forth. As Hindmoor (1998: 30) noted, “the use of contracts is more likely when complexity is minimal.” Therefore, the size of network agencies determine the degree of complexity suggesting that in order to have minimal complexity, the size of the network agencies need to be small. This in itself increases complexity because it becomes very difficult to determine the ideal number of what constitutes the network community.

Policy networks are not seen to replace government because it too, can produce adverse results. Raab and Kennis (2013: 198) confirmed this view in that “goal directed networks are not infallible and can also produce unfavourable outcomes.” Since series of interactions occur

around policy and other issues within networks, it has led to what Rhodes (1981) and Scharpf (1997) called ‘games’. According to them the policy network and the strategic action in the game determine the positions of the players, in which, during the game, actors operate within the established resource distribution and set rules, which are to a large extent framed by the network. Zheng *et al* (2010: 402) view the ‘games’ as a chain of interactions among participants that aims to evoke public decision making on impending societal issues with a view to devising a way to solving these issues and implement public policies. This means that actors have to work strategically in order to handle the given dependencies in the game so that they can attain their own objectives.

The literature on policy networks does not claim that individual actors are not able to act independently of the policy network, nor does it argue for the abolishment of traditional modes of ‘hierarchical’ governance. The argument is that collaborative policy networks offer additional policy making environments. A fundamental premise is that policy decisions reached and implemented in collaborative policy networks are more likely to succeed than actions taken by a single government authority. However, this chapter has shown that, according to deLeon and Varda – this is underpinned by a number of hypotheses. They identify some attributes of collaborative policy networks as follows: (i) representation/diversity; (ii) embeddedness; (iii) reciprocity; (iv) horizontal power structure; (v) trust and formality; (vi) participatory decision making; and (vii) collaborative leadership. The next chapter will consider to what extent these are evident in the collaborative policy initiative: the CAADP of Ethiopia in order to understand some of its policy dynamics and complexities.

Chapter 3

A Policy Network Analysis of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will commence with providing a brief background to agricultural policy in Ethiopia in order to conceptualise the governance and policy making environment in which programs, such as the CAADP, are located. This helps explain some of the intrinsic challenges facing policy implementation. This chapter will also provide a brief background to agricultural policy in Ethiopia. The objective is to provide the socio-economic context in which the CAADP is meant to be implemented. It also aims to explain some of the policy making challenges that have faced agricultural policies in Ethiopia prior to the establishment of the CAADP in order to contextualise this policy network analysis. A policy network analysis of CAADP will then be undertaken by first identifying the key characteristics of policy networks and secondly by determining to what extent these are evident in the policy activities of CAADP.

3.2 Socio-Economic and Political Background of Ethiopia

Ethiopia, is located in the Horn of Africa in the Eastern region of Africa. In Kendie's (2003: 179) observation, Ethiopia's ancient and modern history has been marked by the survival of a people who valued their identity through persistent conquest and reconquest of their neighbours or intruders, yet maintained to hold on to the essence of their culture throughout resulting in a culture which could be called their own. The country has been depicted as an 'ethnic museum' because of the diversity of other cultures, yet Ethiopians have tried and managed to keep much of their culture as pure as possible. As such, to understand Ethiopia in totality is much bigger and larger than the sum total of its contradictions.

Ethiopia is a densely populated country in Africa with a population of about 65 million people and a physical size of 1.115 million hectares according to Asefa (2003: 59). It is estimated that one in ten Africans originated from Ethiopia. Due to its diversity, Ethiopia can be regarded as a microcosm of Africa. Topographically its physical diversity ranges from about 200 meters below sea level to over 4000 meters above sea level. Asefa (2003) further

observes that the vast population of Ethiopia carries with it 85 different ethnic or linguistic groups.

Figure 3. Map of Ethiopia



(www.nationsonline.org/map)

This is a country however, that has been characterized by socio-economic and political conflicts for decades - experiencing numerous civil and cross-border wars, political experimentation, economic mismanagement and decline. It is a country diverse in ethnicity and religion. For example, according to Kendie (2003: 177) the major ethnic tribes, such as the Oromos and Amharas account for 66% of the population, the Tigreans and Somalis comprise 6% and 4% respectively and the remaining groups represent some 24% of the

country's population. While 59% of Ethiopians are Christians, 40% are Muslim and about 75% of the population speaks Amharic.

Historically, Ethiopia derived its origins from the Axumite civilization which took shape in the first millennium BC in what is now the northernmost province of Tigray. With the decline of Axum, however, the centre of power shifted to the south, and with it began a southern expansion. Ethiopia has for centuries been governed by kinship, which Kendie (2003: 180) traces its kingdom from the kingdoms of Lalibella (1137-1270), of Shoa (1300-1600), and Gondar (1632-1885) of which the latter became militant exponents of Axum's culture. Leaders such as Made Tsion (1313-1344), Negus Yeshaque (1414-1429), Zere Yacob (1434-1468), and Sere Dingil (1563-1597) could be described as leaders who laid down the foundations of the medieval Ethiopian state. These leaders consolidated Ethiopia's military stronghold and attracted travelers by the peoples' skills in the arts and architecture and by the piety and learning of its Churchmen. It was a vast country that extended as far as Massawa and Barka lowlands overlooking the Sudan plains. Kendie (2003: 181) notes that the foundations of Ethiopia as it is today was laid by Emperors such as Tewodors (1855-1868), Yohannes (1872-1889), Menelik II (1889-1913), and Haile Selassie (1930-1974).

Being and Amhara from Shoa province, King Menelik II developed a land incorporation policy by which he sought to restore the land that was believed to be traditionally belonging to Ethiopia but formally taken away by the Oromos through plunder and conquest before the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, and even before the Muslim plunder and destruction of the country led by Ahmed-Ibn-Ibrahim or Grange (1527), and before the Oromo migration from the Bale province of southern Ethiopia, to central, western, eastern and northern Ethiopia, Kendie (2003: 181). The Oromo is a tribe that is believed to have spread everywhere stretching from the Tigray province of Northern Ethiopia to Kenya and from the Sudan border to the Somalia border occupying the most fertile land of the country. This all the more brewed a lot of insurrections in the country such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, the Tigray nobility and students' revolt against the Dergs that kept the persistence of conflicts in Ethiopia. According to Young (1998: 191), the Axumite and subsequent Amhara empires expanded and vanished for the next 2000 years. In the late 19th century and early 20th century however, the Amhara emperor Menelik II from the central province of Shoa incorporated the lands and peoples of the South, East and West into an Empire which became the modern state of Ethiopia. The nobility and elite particularly those from Shoa, which Menelik II originated

from were the primary beneficiaries of this expansion, whereas those from the Tigray were deemed subservient. The Tigray nobility fought an unsuccessful struggle with their Amhara counterparts to earn status and positions within the empire, while the peasants constantly felt the pinch of the state centralisation in the deteriorating authority of their regional rulers and the imposition of the Amharigna. (Young, 1998: 191)

Consequently, the Tigrayans blamed the general fall or decline of their region on the Amhara and particularly on the rise of Menelik II to power. As though this was not enough, Haile Selassie, the 'ost 'adored and successor of Menelik II', who Silbermann (1960: 142) claims was portrayed by his countrymen as universally popular as is possible in so diverse a country. He was known as a 'good' man yet continued the process of oppression and marginalisation of the non-Amharan majority by reducing the power of the regional nobility through a system of bureaucratic forms of administration to such an extent that the uneducated, powerless and thus resentful class of teachers, students and state functionaries would eventually prove the undoing of Haile Selassie's regime and the empire on which it was built in 1974. Young (1998: 192) adds that there was a contradiction between the dominant position of a Shoan Amhara elite and the political, economic and social marginalization of the non-Amhara majority of the population. This motivated the revolt in Eritrea that Haile Selassie precipitated by arbitrarily ending the system of federalism after the second world war led to Eritrea's subsequent call for independence. (Young, 1998: 191).

The Emperor, Haile Selassie was credited for helping liberate Ethiopia from Italian facism, and for establishing the educational system of the country, as well as for bringing an end to the isolation of Ethiopia by making it a member of the League of Nations (in 1923), the United Nations (in 1945), the Non-Aligned Movement (in 1961), and for making Addis Ababa the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (in 1958), and the Organization of African Unity (in 1963). These achievements, however did not make a difference for the average Ethiopians. Kendie (2003: 184) reported that in Haile Selassie's fifty years of leadership, there was nothing tangible in terms of social, economic, and political development to the Ethiopian people besides the creation of some Western bureaucratic administrative structures and a strong military organisation. Although he introduced Western elements of education, the United Nations study based on 1965 data showed that Ethiopia's ratio of primary school pupils total was only 1.68%; the healthcare

ratio was 0.34% hospital beds per 1000 populations; and life expectancy at birth was 34 years in 1960 and 38 years in 1975 (Kendie, 2003: 184).

As a result of the political and economic antagonism, the Emperor was ousted out of power in 1974 and replaced by a leftist military power junta, which, according to Kendie (2003: 185) in turn established a tightly organised monopolistic party structure which did not tolerate other social forces nor accommodated political pluralism. This new post 1974 regime simply consolidated a communist model of governance characterised by a single central command to enforce socialism. This authoritarian regime was also overthrown by its citizens, but only to be replaced by yet another socialist state that banned, but it too banned the formation of political parties and made tenant/landlord relationships impossible. Since it was called 'socialist' Kendie proceeds, the major means of production, including rural land and urban houses, became state controlled.

The regime lacked even a semblance of legitimacy because it controlled all social, economic and political issues. In order to this, however, it relied increasingly on substantial military resources and expenditures. For example, "in 1974, Ethiopia's defense budget was \$51 million. By 1988, it reached a level of U.S. \$724 million-a fourteen-fold increase. Debt servicing was \$24.8 million in 1974. However, by 1988 it had increased to \$256 million- a ten-fold increase- making it almost impossible for the country to accumulate capital. During the same period, agricultural production dropped by 16.3%" (Kendie, 2003: 186).

A cursory review of governance in Ethiopia illustrates how the different regimes have found themselves directing state funds at trying to stay in power, predominantly through military expenditure - but this was at the cost of development and service delivery. Asefa (2003: 81) for instance observed that within a period of nearly three decades, Ethiopia suffered two major revolutions and several experiments with rural development. Both the 1974 and 1991 revolutions resulted from the inability and unwillingness by the then governments to undertake the necessary institutional reforms to uplift the rural economy upon which most of the population relied to make their livelihoods. Throughout these three decades, governance was top-down or the elite-driven and utilised by those in power to stay in power. It is no surprise then that the policy making processes during these times had no room for civil society, or that the policy decisions reached did not aim to reduce levels of poverty, redress recurring famines or food insecurity in the country.

The eventual overthrow of this dictatorship by a protracted people's struggle in May 1991 sprung a hope of peace, democracy and economic development in the country. Kendie (2003: 179) describes how people felt that this new government could genuinely be democratic and make the law institutional rather than personal. The future government, argued Kendie (2003:179) would be based on the devolution of powers, accountability, a bill of rights, state secularism, political and economic pluralism, and respect for human rights, and that, individuals and groups would be free to differ, and to organize themselves around differing ideas to enhance their legitimate individual and collective interests, and that land and urban housing would be returned to the rightful owners.

This coalition regime – coming into power through the Tigray People's Liberation Front-Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF-EPRDF)³ – made ethnicity the constitutive basis of the state. It proclaimed a sort of market-oriented economic policy and introduced a federal system of government. It vowed to promote democracy, the rule of law and equal opportunities for all by establishing a system of ethnic federalism. The federal system strove to empower and integrate the ethnic groups within the state. This was in view of trying to deal with the country's long-term economic, social and political problems. However, rather than helping Ethiopia's smaller groups to feel more secure, the system of 'ethnic federalism' in Ethiopia, argues Belcher (cited in Kendie, 2003: 202) threatened "to balkanize the economy". To the dismay of the people of Ethiopia, their hopes had been dashed because this new government that promised commitment to human rights and democratic government turned out more rhetorical than real. The American Association for the International Commission of Jurists cited in Kendie (2003: 198) for instance reported that opposition to basic government policies were highly prohibited and that opponents who have been in exile are categorized as war-mongers and any representative who dared to return to Ethiopia does so at his own peril. It became obvious that the promise of human rights was rhetoric to simply placate and tranquilize donor governments, while in reality only those loyal to the ruling government were granted protection. In essence, Ethiopia remains an authoritarian regime and a *de facto* one-party state.

³ The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (Amharic) is the ruling political coalition in Ethiopia. It is an alliance of four other groups: the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF) and the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF).

In addition to general problems of governance, Ethiopia's population faces grave problems of poverty, hunger and food insecurity. Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Madeley, 2000:28) lamented: "Poverty is an insult; poverty stinks. It demeans, dehumanizes, and destroys the body and the mind...if not the soul. It is the deadliest form of violence. People go hungry because they are too poor to grow enough or to buy enough food; they do not have the money to exercise effective demand in a free market." Despite the fact that Ethiopia is blessed with abundant land as a source of their livelihood and power, and its peasantry having historically enjoyed greater access to land, and its diverse communities more inter-communal peaceful than nearly all of its counterpart countries, its agrarian, political, and social sectors have become increasingly fragile. (Abegaz, 2004: 317). The need for an agricultural policy intervention is therefore not exaggerated.

3.3 The CAADP in Ethiopia

Besides its weak track record with democratic governance, Ethiopia also faces the most basic and urgent problem of poverty, hunger and food insecurity. Most leaders who ruled (and currently rule) the country, promised to eradicate poverty from the face of Ethiopia, yet year in and out the country's appalling living standards remain or become increasingly grim. To date, Ethiopia still remains amongst the world's poorest countries with more than half of the population below internationally recognized poverty levels, and dependent on foreign aid every year to combat famine, malnutrition and rampant diseases. Asefa (2003: 60) rightly noted that Ethiopia's economic development depends on agriculture, which accounts for 50% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs about 85% of the labour force. Agriculture accounts for 90% of total foreign exchange earnings with coffee contributing about 60% of the total value of exports. However, the fertile agricultural land is either underused or snatched by some government officials as Kendie (2003: 198) pointed out, almost 40% of farm households have less than 0.5 hectares of land, and beyond 60% have less than one hectare from which to support a family of six or eight people, and the rest of the land owned by the government. Coupled with having little if any or no land at all, these smallholder farmers have to pay more tax and other inputs, while receiving lower prices for their crops (Kendie, 2003: 198).

In spite of its vast agricultural potential, Ethiopia has been trapped in a state of food insecurity and utter poverty especially its rural communities. The average yield for food crops

is about 11 quintals per hectare, and has been growing only about 0.6% and lags behind the population growth of about 3%. This results in an annual per capital decline of 2.4% in domestic food production. The average yield in food crops cannot hold and sustain the ever growing population which was estimated at 23 million people in 1960 but has grown to 65 million in 2001, Asefa's (2003: 60). Food insecurity is attributed to reasons such as production fluctuations, non-farm employment, low income, regional fragmentation of markets, high rate of natural degradation, low level of farm technology, high level of illiteracy, poor health and sanitation, poor governance, and interstate and intrastate military conflicts and wars (Asefa, 2003: 60).

Ethiopia has a federal system of government comprising nine regional states and two administrative cities. Chanyalew, *et al.* (2010: 2) report that when the current Ethiopian government assumed power in 1991, it inherited a country with a weak economy characterised by fiscal and current account deficits amounting to 8.7 percent and 6.9 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively, in addition to an external debt burden equivalent to 33 percent of GDP. To avert this situation, it undertook a massive reform process aimed at achieving broad-based economic growth and a stable economy. For example the government embarked on removing price controls and subsidies, devaluing the exchange rate by 250 percent, opening the financial services sector to competition from the private sector, and making changes in the civil services to remove all impediments that hinder pro-poor policies and investment programs (Chanyalew, *et al.* 2010: 2).

Ethiopia has a long history of food insecurity but has yet to eradicate this problem. In 1991, it established the Agriculture Development-led Industrialization (ADLI) aimed at improving food security. Despite some contributions made by ADLI, such as improved human development, the program failed to achieve its full objectives due to inadequate level of collaboration and congruence between vertical and horizontal power structures. Chanyalew, *et al* (2010) concluded that previous agricultural policies have failed because they all suffered from a lack of communication among and between ministries, CSOs and parastatals; inadequate vertical and horizontal collaboration among research institutes; weak research-extension-farmer linkages; a lack of communication and coordination among and between ministries, CSOs and parastatals. There is no collaboration between government and civil society groups. They found that the linkages between research-extension-farmers were weak and that there was a need for the research institutions to scale up improved agricultural

technologies. There was a general lack of communication and collaboration with the private sector. They also concluded that there was a need to coordinate issues, including budget allocations amongst the various institutions. The recommendation was that new policy proposals had to promote better collaboration among the different stakeholders (Chanyalew, *et al*, 2010: 7).

Chanyalew *et al*, (2010: 29) highlight other challenges facing Ethiopia in the implementation process as related to (i) limited capacity in government institutions; (ii) an underdeveloped private sector and lack of private investment, especially in the input-supply chain; (iii) the possibility that economic growth targets will not be met - leading to further deterioration in the fiscal position, resurgent inflation and/or loss of budget support from donors; (iv) the ever-present threat of natural disasters, principally drought; and (v) the country's geopolitical context which presents risks of regional conflict such as Somalia and Eritrea. The implication of their conclusion is that a country may have a great policy - but with such constraints, policy initiatives need to find ways to circumvent these. With regards to policies aimed at alleviating poverty and food insecurity, Ethiopia ventured into adopting the CAADP. Its fundamental attribute is that it regards itself as a continental, regional and national multi-sector agricultural network – comprised of public and private sector participants – where the objective is to improve food security, nutrition, and the overall levels of incomes for the people of Ethiopia.

The Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) 2010-2020 is Ethiopia's main policy framework for agriculture specifically designed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, (MoARD). It is also meant to provide the legislative framework to operationalise the CAADP in Ethiopia and, as per the mandate of NEPAD, envisages (at least on paper) a collaborative endeavour by the government and its development allies. The PIF also sets the ambitious target that by 2020, Ethiopia would have achieved a middle income status as well as have sustainably increased rural incomes and national food security.

However, Ethiopia's agricultural policy interventions had failed to achieve any of their previous targets. In many of their previous attempts to find concrete and lasting policy strategies to reduce poverty, hunger and increase food security, the current government of Ethiopia had already adopted a series of agricultural policies none of which had succeeded. Reports claimed that this was possibly due to the political and economic problems and the

cultural, social, and religious diversity of the peoples of Ethiopia. It was doubtful therefore that CAADP would be any different.

After nearly a decade, the CAADP, which is an initiative of NEPAD in partnership with the AU and other international agencies and development partners, is taking root in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. The CAADP has been prepared specifically to promote interventions that best address the problem of food insecurity, poverty and hunger in the continent through, according to NEPAD (2003: 12-17) three broad and mutually reinforcing pillars: land and water management; rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for improved market access; increasing food supply and reducing hunger; and a fourth that deals with agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption. The CAADP is a broad and all-encompassing agricultural policy, and given Ethiopia's poor policy implementation track record, it seemed doomed to fail before it even began. In order to assess this, this study now undertakes a policy network analysis. However, on the contrary – reports concluded that – compared to other policy interventions in Ethiopia, the CAADP had to date performed better, and seemed to have the potential to sustain itself despite the political and economic problems and the cultural, social, and religious diversity of the peoples of Ethiopia. (Chanyalew, *et al*, 2010).

3.4 A Policy Network Analysis of the CAADP

DeLeon and Varda's analytical model will now be applied on the CAADP. This model constitutes their theory on collaborative policy networks and is comprised of seven hypotheses pertaining to (i) representation/diversity; (ii) reciprocity; (iii) horizontal power structure; (iv) embeddedness; (v) trust and formality; (vi) participatory decision making; and (vii) collaborative leadership.

i. Representation/diversity in the CAADP

This characteristic of a policy network aims to identify the breadth and types of organisations which are represented in the policy network. DeLeon and Varda hypothesize that the more diverse and representative the stakeholders are, the more value, strategic and meaningful their contribution is to a policy issue. Table 3.4.1 identifies the participants in the CAADP.

Table 3.4.1 Participants in the CAADP

| Government | Farmers | Civil Society | International Organisations | International Donors |
|-------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| MoFED | Subsistence farmers | | NEPAD | IMF |
| BoARD | Smallholder farmers | | AU | World Bank |
| PPD | Household Asset Building Program (HABP) | EIAR, NARS, RARIs | FAO | FAD |
| BoFED | Farmers Training Centre (FTC) | CSOs, NGOs participating in the RED&FS WG, EDRI | | WFP |
| MoARD | Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) | Consultants participating in the RED&FS WG, Universities and Colleges | | FARA |

The table above illustrates that there is a diverse range of participants in the CAADP encompassing representatives from the public sector, private sector and civil society⁴. The participants are not limited to Ethiopia, but include representatives from major international organisations. At first, seeking out partners for the CAADP was not easily forthcoming. On the contrary, it was initially met with a lot of reluctance, especially by some government officials. The NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (2012: 13) reported that its call for broad-based stakeholder involvement in policy making and implementation went against the general *modus operandi* in Ethiopia - where policy making is often undertaken behind closed doors, and excludes civil society and think-tanks.

According to the Policy and Investment Framework (PIF), key government institutions were established which included line ministries and bureaus at the federal and regional levels respectively. Line ministries were tasked with the responsibility to oversee the design and implementation of public strategies and policies by involving the *Woreda* (district) and *Kebel* (local administrative government units). At the federal level, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) was to oversee economic policies and strategies. This

⁴ The NEPAD planning and Coordinating Agency (2012: 16).

institutional structure which has been decentralized corresponded with the principles of the Board of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD) that made it easier for various development agents to reach down to the *Kebele* level (Chanyalew, *et al*, 2010: 8).

Following the formal endorsement of the CAADP Compact, Chanyalew *et al* (2010: 1) explain that MoARD engaged a team of consultants to spearhead the design of the PIF. The PIF formulation process was overseen by the PIF Steering Committee comprising key representatives of the Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group (RED&FS WG) headed and directed by the MoARD Planning and Programming Directorate (PPD). A crisscross of stakeholder consultations ranged from government, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), consultants in Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray Regional States; and a national consultation workshop to review the draft report in which all stakeholders took part, including representatives of the private sector and farming communities such as the Household Asset Building Program (HABP), Subsistence farmers, smallholder farmers, and the Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) group.

As a result, the private sector, civil society, and individual agencies have been identified as the key drivers for change during the implementation of the CAADP in Ethiopia (NPCA 2012: 36).

The table above shows diverse representation within the CAADP policy network. While the literature on diversity states that this can lead to disagreement and stagnation in policy making and implementation, in the case of the CAADP, its diversity is its strength. The various participants share a common vision and made a commitment upfront that they would: (i) share and reflect on the changing roles and relative importance among the network; (ii) pull their resources and groups together; and (iii) confront issues that no group can single-handedly resolve. (Chanyalew, *et al*, 2010: 8).

The members of the CAADP further set out to identify more stakeholders in the agricultural sector in terms of institutions that it believed can hasten or act as a catalyst to the implementation of the program. These included: “government (at federal, regional, and Woreda level); mass organizations CBOs; private institutions; civil society organizations (CSOs), including cooperatives and farmer organizations; and donors (bilateral/multilateral);

and UN and CGIAR-affiliated institutions” (Chanyalew, *et al*, 2010: 8). The multiplicity of such representation produce diverse results which is actually the essence of network communities since the network community is not strengthened by uniformity but rather by diversity. In other words, the more diverse and representative the stakeholders are, the more inclusive the policy outcome will be. The CAADP is proving to be a diverse and representative policy network with the potential for inclusive policy decisions.

Although the CAADP stakeholders in Ethiopia involved participants from different sectors as shown in the analysis above, there still remain some challenges. While Ethiopia is shifting attention to strengthening and encouraging smallholder farmers, the NEPAD document (2003: 10) noted that “the smallholder of today may be private but lacks education; has severely limited access to communications or physical infrastructure; suffers poor health and nutrition; lacks remunerative markets and access to yield-enhancing inputs; and faces competition with products from abroad that have been subsidized by more money than s/he can ever dream of.” This is to mean that as a structure, there is the private sector but this sector is weak because it has no power or capacity to influence policy in its mainstay activities at a higher level.

ii. Reciprocity in policy networks

Reciprocity is a fundamental feature of a policy network because it relates to the patterns of exchange among the stakeholders and the nature of interdependence among the members of the policy network. DeLeon and Varda hypothesize that stakeholders participate in policy networks because they believe that they will be better able to realize their goals and objectives if they engage with other members of the policy networks. Table 3.4.2 summarises the nature of the relationships between the respective network participants of the CAADP.

Table 3.4.2: Reciprocity in the CAADP

| | Government | Farmers | Civil Society | International Organisations | International Donors |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Government | Sequential reciprocal pooled | Sequential | sequential | Sequential | Sequential |
| Farmers | Sequential | Sequential Reciprocal Pooled Symbiotic | Sequential Reciprocal Pooled Symbiotic | Sequential | Sequential |
| Civil Society | Sequential | Sequential Reciprocal Pooled Symbiotic | Sequential Reciprocal Pooled Symbiotic | Sequential | Sequential |
| International Organisations | Sequential | Sequential | Sequential | Sequential Reciprocal Pooled Symbiotic | Sequential Reciprocal Pooled Symbiotic |
| International Donors | Sequential | Sequential | Sequential | Pooled Sequential Reciprocal | Pooled Reciprocal |

The table above illustrates that the overall experience in the CAADP is sequential. Most of the stakeholders converge to share knowledge and information as a way to achieving their intended goal. There are strong interdependent relationships through which formal patterns of authority diffuse and diverse policy players interconnect to face a common problem. The CAADP has initiated a sense of creativity in public-private and private-private partnerships leaving an increased willingness by other participants to finance agriculture. This in turn provides a technically and politically sound and vigorous basis on which Ethiopia could engage the international community of an Ethiopian-led agriculture development agenda, thereby compelling even stronger coalitions and harmonization in development partnerships. It further embraces an inclusiveness and broad consultative approach, thereby consistent and supportive to the NEPAD-CAADP principles of local ownership, collective responsibility and mutual accountability around a shared vision. There is also an element of reciprocal interdependence evidenced by the mutual interactions of Universities and colleges, research institutions, peasant associations, and government line ministries.

Sequential, reciprocal, and pooled interdependence emanated from an awareness by the respective stakeholders that they cannot on their own adequately implement all the projects consistent with the CAADP objectives. Symbiosis equips communities with necessary skills derived from their patterns of relationships to diagnose public problems and jointly define such problems and agree on some practical solutions to solve them. In the Ethiopian context,

the CAADP emerged as the long awaited initiative in mobilizing a common vision and mutual and collective efforts to define the country's policy agenda on agriculture and agriculture-led development. As such, the NPCA (2012: 12) indicated that the program is evolving into strong lobbying and policy harmonization mechanisms, an important step in making the CAADP operate as an agricultural policy framework that responds to the contexts and needs of the society by enhancing crisscross campaign in regional, national, and international might. The aim is to lead the country into an economically competitive and dependent nation.

As represented in Table 3.4.2 above, sequential interdependence defines the type of relationship between government, international donors, and international organisations because of transaction specific investments or resources exchanges between these entities. If today the World Bank, IMF and other international agencies continue to fund and support the CAADP in Ethiopia, it is because of the input/output exchanges they have realised in this program.

Conversely, civil service organisations and farmer organisations engage in pooled interdependence because they are heterogeneous and share mutual and common activities and goals. The community-based organizations, smallholder farmers, and even large scale farmers on the other hand need international organisations, international donors, and government resources if their involvement in carrying out the program is to succeed without the latter necessarily having to reciprocate since funds reach the farmers or other sectors through the government branch, hence it being a sequential relationship. Examples are that, the government acknowledged that by itself it cannot achieve the objectives of the CAADP and as a result called on CSOs and the community to help them share responsibilities through which they can mutually benefit. It is clear that there are a multitude of types of relationships among the different stakeholders – highlighting the interdependencies among them.

iii. Horizontal power structures in policy networks

DeLeon and Varda hypothesized that in a collaborative policy network, it is likely that the actors prefer that the overall network centralisation is low, meaning that few actors hold highly central positions, hence 'decreasing bridges and structural holes'. In their view network centralisation shows how close-knit together the members of the network are

collectively. While lower centralisation indicates that fewer network members hold high positions for brokerage and information sharing, greater centralisation indicates that members are more equally interconnected, which in turn increases their willingness to support the collective good. Table 3.4.3 below summarises the types of power structures and whether decisions in the CAADP in Ethiopia are made in a participatory, hierarchical, and/or consultative manner.

Table 3.4.3: Horizontal power structures in the CAADP

| | Government | Farmers | Civil Society | International Organisations | International Donors |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Government | hierarchical | hierarchical consultative | hierarchical consultative | Consultative | Hierarchical |
| Farmers | hierarchical consultative | Participatory | Participatory | Consultative | Hierarchical |
| Civil Society | hierarchical consultative | Participatory | Participatory | consultative | Hierarchical |
| International Organisations | consultative | Consultative | Consultative | consultative | Hierarchical |
| International Donors | hierarchical | Hierarchical | Hierarchical | hierarchical | Consultative |

The CAADP policy network at times displays traditional hierarchical forms of power, but in a very significant manner also adopts participatory and consultative approaches. The Ethiopian government is the custodian of the program and therefore, understandably, takes on a hierarchical approach to decision making. However, it has decentralised itself by establishing departments at lower levels of government. Government has also called on the domestic business sector to participate in the policy agenda setting processes and articulation of policy gaps through a decentralised power structure. In addition, the participation of farmers is considered crucial to the CAADP's policy which aims at the expansion of commercial agriculture to under-utilized areas. In this regard relations between government, farmers and civil society are consultative and participatory. The CAADP framework provides an avenue for the translation of internationally agreed principles on aid and development effectiveness.

Due to some international humanitarian concerns and inadequate funding, the government finds itself having to follow the dictates of international donors and UN/AU from whom they gain support and legitimacy. In this sense, the power relation between the international

donors and the Ethiopian government is hierarchical – with the international organisations dictating the rules of the game. Chanyalew, *et al*, (2010: 11) observed that there were institutional gaps related to sector-wide linkages, relationships and synergies. Specifically issues related to lack of communication between ministries and CSOs and parastatals; derisory and horizontal collaboration among stakeholders; feeble research-extension-farmer linkages; and lack of communication and collaboration with the private sector. In the case of the CAADP in Ethiopia, many actors holding high positions include government ministers and other stakeholders with great influence, which in turn posed some barricades to interconnectedness, decreasing the willingness to support the collective interest. Only farmers, NGOs, CBOs, and CSOs underwent real participatory decision making processes.

From this description, it is apparent that power is dispersed in different ways throughout the policy network. In some respects, the international donors and UN/AU have the upperhand in influencing the Ethiopian national government, who in turn exert their authority over respective ministries and departments. They, however, have notably decentralised authority and established less hierarchical structures enabling more horizontal power structures for participatory and consultative relations between government and NGOs, CBOs, CSOs, large- and small scale farmers, and the private sector. The NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (2012: 26) reported that the government devised an approach to strengthening both political and technical leadership, transforming leadership structures, and investing in capacities to learn and solve problems individually and collectively. Through this approach, the central government implemented a consultative policymaking and decision making process which was never before experienced in Ethiopia.

iv. Embeddedness in policy networks

DeLeon and Varda (2010: 68) argue that for relations between the different stakeholders to become embedded, there needs to be an element of frequent interaction. They hypothesized that embeddedness will cement their action again and again. Once stakeholders are ‘embedded’ this embeddedness may be carried forth onto new policy issues in the future which may require collaborative problem solving.

Table 3.4.4: Embeddedness in the CAADP

| | Government | Farmers | Civil Society | International Organisations | International Donors |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Government | structural | Structural Political | structural political | Structural | Structural |
| Farmers | Structural Political | cognitive cultural political | cognitive cultural political | Structural | Structural |
| Civil Society | Structural Political | Cognitive cultural political | cognitive cultural political | Structural | Structural |
| International Organisations | Structural | Structural | Structural | Structural | Structural |
| International Donors | Structural | structural | structural | structural | Structural |

DeLeon and Varda point out that embeddedness is integrally tied up in their fifth hypothesis, namely trust and formality, hence some reference may be made here.

Table 3.4.4 uses Zukin *et al's* typology of the four types of embeddedness to illustrate the type of imbeddedness among the different stakeholders. As pointed out by Zukin *et al* (cited in deLeon and Varda, 2009: 18) stakeholders may be embedded because of structural (patterns of economic exchange); cognitive (mental association); cultural (shared collective understanding); or political (shared struggle over power) ties.

Of interest in this case study was a cognitive, political and cultural embeddedness that arise and cemented relations instantaneously among civil society and farmers – regardless of ethnicity. Farmers, CBOs and NGOs entrusted each other immediately by virtue of their shared history of government oppression (political embeddedness); mental association with each other (cognitive embeddedness) and a shared collective understanding of the challenges of food insecurity and poverty (cultural embeddedness).

Embeddedness is complex. When the CAADP was put into effect, the government established specific regional departments and set up departments and forums providing an enabling environment for nurturing structural embeddedness. However, this was initially experienced among government itself – structural embeddedness did not extend to farmers or civil society. In other words, farmers and civil society were in strong embedded relationships of their own, and government departments had their structural embedded relationship. Only over time, as the relationships matured – as trust developed among the participants - did the

farmers and civil society become willing participants in the structural configuration of the CAADP. One needs to keep in mind that civil society was never before part of the public policy making process in Ethiopia, so being part of the CAADP meant becoming ‘embedded’ in a structural relationship with government. In this sense, the CAADP resulted in changing the relationship between farmers, civil society and government from being politically adversarial to structurally embedded.

The different levels of government ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group (RED&FS WG), civil service organizations, the private sector and even the farming communities began to trust in each other’s efforts to realizing a good agricultural input when the CAADP was launched.

Cultural embeddedness almost always happened automatically because it is based on a shared ethnicity or common ritual and a belief or value system. Despite the diverse ethnic formation of the Ethiopian people for instance, Kendie (2003: 178) observed that Ethiopians share similar cultural traditions and a common national heritage. When communities are bound by a common cultural and national heritage, it would almost become impossible for any one of these members to defy any of their cultural links. For this reason, respect for and protection of cultural and national heritage made embeddedness civil society organizations and farmers at the *Woreda* and *Kebele* levels easy. However, because of political experiences of past regimes these same organizations did not share this same inherent trust with either international organizations, donors or their own government. This structural embeddedness developed only once the CAADP started producing visible results. This then generates trust, which in turn ties/embeds them into structural and political relations with government and other members of the policy network.

Recent work has privileged, as Crummey (1990: 105) observed, class and class relations, the economy and its effects on society, and located political institutions within the domain of a social context. This has created an awareness for the need to incorporate ethnic groups, especially the Oromo beyond the then iron-hand mode of relations. Even if institutions or organizations such as the Agriculture Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) and the Policy and Implementation Framework (PIF) have their pitfalls, specifically, their failure to

adequately address issues of land policy, actors in these institutions are embedded by the virtue of belonging to any of the institutions.

v. Trust and formality in polity networks

DeLeon and Varda (2009: 69) observed that “network ties can exhibit varying degrees of formality, including contractual agreements, regulatory guidelines, procedural processes, and informal exchanges.” The degree to which an organization is formal/informal affects or influences the amount of trust within relating partners in a collaborative network at varying capacities. Table 3.4.5 below summarises the nature of trust and formality in the CAADP.

Table 3.4.5 Trust and formality in the CAADP

| | Government | Farmers | Civil Society | International Organisations | International Donors |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Government | regulatory | Regulatory Procedural Informal Contractual | Regulatory Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal contractual | Contractual |
| Farmers | Regulatory Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal Contractual | Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal Contractual | Contractual |
| Civil Society | Regulatory Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal Contractual | Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal Contractual | Contractual |
| International Organisations | Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal Contractual | Procedural Informal contractual | Procedural Informal Contractual | Contractual |
| International Donors | Contractual | Contractual | Contractual | Contractual | |

Table 3.4.5 above illustrates the contractual, regulatory, procedural, and informal exchanges in the implementation of the CAADP in Ethiopia. At the launch of the CAADP, contracts/formality dominated the patterns of relationship among government, international donors and CSOs. Some relationships were formalized between government and farmers; farmers and civil society, government and international organizations and donors through contracts because of the need of accountability to meet public reporting requirements. When the CAADP took shape in 2003 the level of trust was not forthcoming because the central government was suspicious of the intentions of international donors. But incrementally and because of the trust NEPAD and AU believe in the capacity of the government to implement the CAADP, the level of trust increased. The central government itself trusted in the

capacities of the private sectors to realize this dream. For example, the CAADP experienced a number of coordinating committees for pastoral affairs, including in the House of Representatives, Ministry of Federal Affairs and the special coordination offices of the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral (PAP) areas, but with none of these having a formal mandate and responsibilities for development of the sector. These committees all exhibited some degrees of regulatory, procedural, informal and contractual interactions among all stakeholders.

This is an important milestone in the country CAADP implementation process demonstrating a collectively multi-stakeholder agreement to collaborate in defining/reviewing the country's national agriculture strategies and programs along commonly contacted or agreed broad priority areas. As organizations, groups and individuals interact both at a formal and informal levels, trust is presumed derived from the longevity of their relationship and the fact that what they aim to achieve gets done. Since it is common vision that unites all these stakeholders together, trust grows beyond the confines of formal setting, that is, when trust develops among stakeholders, the need for formality decreases because of the believe that individuals and groups develop in the capacities of other stakeholders in other organizations. The NPCA (2012: 12) report envisions that coordination and participation among various actors facilitates trust among stakeholders at both governmental and private agency levels through contracts, procedures, regulations, and informal settings. As a concrete example, the report (2012: 14) assures us that this has resulted to an overall agricultural growth for Africa during 2003-2009 to 4.5 percent in which case Ethiopia stood as the main influencing country for Eastern Africa.

While civil society organizations, farmers, and international organizations deal at procedural, informal and contractual levels, their level of relationship with government adds another element, that is, regulatory. For this reason, stakeholders at the street-level bureaucracy found it easy to believe in each other because they are faced by the incursion of hunger and poverty directly and everyday calling for a need to act immediately. To some extent, the level of trust among government and AU in particular is quite complicated because the government had to respond to other state priorities slowing down their involvement in the CAADP while at the same time the AU mounts pressure on them to act faster. Sometimes resources allocated to agricultural development had to be diverted to other sectors such as health, education and politics. This all the more makes trust to be blurred and complicated among these actors because at some point the sponsoring agency needs some report on the contract they got into.

The CAADP has exhibited that as trust develops between partners, the level of formality decreases, leading to the assertion that familiarity breeds trust.

vi. Participatory decision making in policy networks

In essence, deLeon and Varda claim that collaborative policy networks offer a forum for inclusive and participatory decision-making. They argue that transparency in decision-making activities is a fundamental requirement for the longevity of the policy networks. As such it deepens trust among participants and results in better policy outcomes.

Table 3.4.6: Participatory decision making in the CAADP

| Participatory Decision-making in CAADP | Collaborative Leadership |
|---|---|
| Civil Society: Universities and Colleges, Research Institutions, Private and public tributary agrarians | Headed by researchers specializing in food security |
| Farmers: Peasant associations, Subsidized producer cooperatives, Small owner-operated farms and small tenant-operated farms, pastoral or semi-sedentary organizations, large-scale commercial farms | Headed by government and farmers associations directly involved in agricultural improvement |
| International organizations: UN, NEPAD, AU, UNDP. | Headed by key members of the various organizations |
| International donors: World Bank, IMF, FAO | Under the leadership of these donors' executive members |
| Government: Regional and Line Ministries, Industrial and peasant communities, State, Church, private and communal organizations and land owners, State and private commercial farms, marketing organizations | Headed by government agricultural departments especially the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) |

The CAADP has established a series of institutions to enable local participation. For example, it has established and subsidised peasant associations, producer cooperatives, pastoral or semi-sedentary organizations, state and private commercial organizations, and marketing organizations. This is in line with the CAADP vision which encourages agricultural policy and investment to be based at the local level. This, in turn, has resulted in creating a clear comparative advantage in facilitating state activity, for example, by establishing world class networks of national and local public institutions of agricultural research, education and extension, liberalization of the inter and intra-state domestic and external trade, with uniform tariffs, and trade policies (Abegaz, 2004: 328).

There are divergences of opinions among participants but this does not mean that other interest groups are acting on their own selfish interests. In fact, interest groups and pressure groups have as their main aim the influencing of government policies through negotiation or other means, such as organized community resistance. Abegaz (2004: 328) held that the current debate in the country and especially in reference to the CAADP is characterized by the public/private dichotomy and suggests a rather communal holding of responsibilities and decision making. Resistance may at some point occur but this depends so much on the Ethiopian historical nature of relationship that exists between a public and private agencies. In short, interest and pressure groups provide a means for citizen participation in decision making that befits the interests of their members and that of the region or a country as a whole. At the core of it all, participation presupposes a collective decision making process that is representative of the interests and needs of multiple stakeholders related to the policy issue, a concept that is synonymous to democratic governance. A collective decision reached by various stakeholders principally or in theory implies a transparent account and that in a network those who hold positions to influence decision making do it in a way that correlate with other network members' perception.

Participation by the private sector appears to be limited in the process of the CAADP in Ethiopia. The reasons remain unclear. Perhaps it stems from the state and Ethiopia's long history of despotic leadership that is still inherent in its current style of governance. That is, some government officials still dictate upon and intimidate non-governmental agencies making it hard for the private sector to actively participate in some of the decision making processes. The same applies to low levels of participation among the livestock sub-sector in MoARD because of the lack of a formal mandate and responsibilities for development of the sector. In some cases, citizen participation activities did not necessarily lead to greater participation. Low level of citizen participation is a reality and, unless people have the necessary motivation and resources, participation may be low. Unwillingness to participate is many times anticipated and is more frequent than the frustrated desire to do so. For example, despite the fact that the CAADP study identified 36 major programs at Federal level compared to the 56 cost-centered programs listed in the budget registry, in Chanyalew, *et al*, (2010: 23) view, the Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) system requires strengthening in order to improve coordination, planning, monitoring and evaluation suggesting that the participation level is lower than expected. However, as in the case with

the lack of private sector participation, one is left wondering whether some still distrust government and refrain from participating.

vii. Collaborative leadership in policy networks

DeLeon and Varda (2009: 70) hypothesize that in a collaborative policy network, leadership needs to reflect impartiality and must timeously rotate among network members. Table 3.4.7 below discusses the extent to which CAADP has realised collaborative leadership in its implementation process as opposed to it being dominated by central government.

Table 3.4.7: Collaborative leadership in the CAADP

| Collaborative forums in the CAADP | Leadership |
|--|---|
| Government: Line ministries, MoA, BoFED, BoARD, PIF Steering Committee | Headed by the bureau of regional states, federal ministries and <i>woreda</i> and <i>Kebele</i> administrative units. |
| Farmers: Peasant associations, Subsidized producer cooperatives, Small owner-operated farms and small tenant-operated farms, pastoral or semi-sedentary organizations, large-scale commercial farms | Under the auspices of the Framework for African Food Security (FAFS). |
| Civil Society: The National Agriculture Research System (NARS), Regional Agriculture Research Institutes (RARIs), Household Asset Building Program (HABP), and Universities and Colleges. | Headed by Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research (EIAR), and researchers specializing in food security. |
| International Organizations: NEPAD, FAO, WFP, The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) | Facilitated by FAO in collaboration with NEPAD Secretariat. |
| International Donors: International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAD), the World Bank, and IMF. | Led by FAO Regional Conference for Africa. |

The Table above indicates that many forums for collaborative decision making have been established by government. This is to be expected. Despite this fact, many policy decisions are made at a governmental level because the government funds some programs. Of significance here is that the government of Ethiopia created forums for collaborative leadership. The CAADP has identified the Framework for African Food Security (FAFS) at a continental level to spearhead all CAADP agricultural programs and disseminated the

(FAFS) to regional or national levels to lead individual countries' programs which Ethiopia is part. The FAFS works collaboratively with the Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research (EIAR) and other researchers specializing in food security.

These committees meet regularly to deliberate on key agricultural and food security related policy issues indicating efforts to share leadership in the course of implementing the CAADP pillar programs. Chanyalew, *et al*, (2010: 11) observed that the EIAR was mandated to coordinate a CAADP-specific activity which was later to be handed over to the National Agricultural Research System (NARS) when EIAR was challenged by unclear coordination roles and the ambiguity of responsibilities between EIAR and the Regional Agriculture Research Institutes (RARIs). Chanyalew, *et al*, (2010: 22) explicitly noted that the government delineated itself from direct involvement in these associations' programs unless results are not forthcoming but with the intention to withdraw as soon as the private sector was on track to fill the gap. This was feasible through ensuring the protection of the whole community and insisting on complete transparency in the deals that are done, and ensuring informed engagement of stakeholders. For example, when EIAR was on the brink of collapse, the government under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) and international donors devised a programmatic/sector approach with pooled funding system and jointly mobilized funds to develop and implement monitoring and evaluation. Because of this campaign, the program received the support it needed from development partners and cemented the gains realized under ADLI strategy and promoted civil service and judicial reforms, capacity building, good governance, and decentralisation and empowerment of the local communities.

It is interesting to note that the level of collaboration between government and other agencies in the implementation process of the CAADP in Ethiopia even included partnering with Universities and Colleges in different regions and agro-ecological zones in order to boost capacity for agricultural research Chanyalew, *et al*, 2010: 8. These were all under the exchange of leadership between the Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research (EIAR) and researchers specializing in food security.

3.5 Conclusion

The policy network analysis of the CAADP in Ethiopia has identified a number of key characteristics of the strengths and weaknesses of the CAADP. Firstly, it has shown that the CAADP has a diverse membership of stakeholders which is its strength in that it has pooled expertise and created a forum for policy learning. Therefore, as DeLeon and Varda hypothesized, its diversity and representativeness has brought strategic value to the program.

Secondly, the policy network analysis has illustrated a series of patterns of exchange among the different stakeholders and as DeLeon and Varda posit, reciprocal relationships between the different members result in successful policy implementation. It helps stakeholders value the bond they have with each other and sustain it for the purpose of maintain the policy network functioning such that the success and failure of an organizational project is not lamented but shared among them.

Thirdly, the policy network analysis showed that though the government is the custodian of programs and therefore, takes on hierarchical approach to decision making, it has over time decentralized itself by establishing departments at lower levels of the government and has called on the domestic business sector to participate in policy making processes. DeLeon and Varda hypothesized that the greater the decentralization of the network indicates that members are more equally interconnected, which in turn increases their willingness to support the collective good. As a result, the CAADP has experienced a collaborative policy making and implementation only when power relations became less hierarchical.

Fourthly, the analysis has also identified patterns of embeddedness ranging from structural to political, cognitive and cultural. As DeLeon and Varda argued embeddedness continued to cement interaction among stakeholders over and over again to an extent that they developed trust among themselves that eventually brought about uniformity. This means that people made choices based on past interactions and they will be particularly inclined to initiate network connections with those whom they can trust in the future.

Fifthly, the study on the analysis of the CAADP has shown that the policy network exhibited varying degrees of trust and formality, including contractual agreements, regulatory guidelines, procedural processes, and informal exchanges. According to DeLeon and Varda,

as trust develops between partners, the level of formality decreases, which is exactly the finding of the analysis of the CAADP in Ethiopia.

Sixthly, the policy network analysis has identified a number of participatory decision making forums which, in the case of the CAADP sustained the running of the program and enhanced trust among its participants. In a collaborative policy network therefore, DeLeon and Varda propose that members of a network that possess decision making roles will correlate with the network member's perception of those decision makers as being transparent and promoting equality. This transparent correlation, according to the analysis of the program has been one of the driving forces and success of the program.

Finally, because public policy problems have become complex and cannot single-handedly be solved by one agency, there is a growing realisation that leadership needs to be less hierarchical and more collaborative. Therefore, as DeLeon and Varda hypothesized, the flattened power structure and collaborative leadership in the CAADP has brought significant value to the program.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

Policy Networks: Do they Matter?

The emergence of policy networks as an approach to governance poses a puzzle as to whether it can replace traditional bureaucracies as the implementing organisation of choice or whether it is just a supplement to bureaucracy considering that a large number of programs (such as the national defense forces) are still consistently operated via traditional bureaucratic practices. The question is then: why policy networks or if policy networks matter at all.

Many thinkers see policy networks as an organisational form or tool that can do what bureaucracies fail to do, and cement or even improve what bureaucracies have offered successively in the past. Fenwick and Edwards (2010: 12) argue that a policy network “is an assemblage of materials brought together and linked through processes of translation that perform a particular function. A network can continue to extend itself as more entities become connected to it. It often stabilizes dynamic events and negotiations into a black box that becomes durable.” The more allies and connections, the stronger the network becomes. Law (1997: 7) explains that in a policy network “elements retain their spatial integrity by virtue of their position in a set of links or relations. Policy networks have the capacity to hold actors together and when actors are held together, it is possible that common goals and objectives can be pursued collaboratively, efficiently and effectively.

Alter and Hage (cited in Schneider *et al*, 2003: 1440) further stresses that policy networks offer avenues for the dissemination of information among several organised entities and disciplines, nurturing a culture of trust as inter-organisational stakeholders learn to work together. As such participants in the policy network can mutually develop management/policy/program platforms to reach their objectives through capacity building. This is in stark contrast to the traditional bureaucratic form of governance where rules come from above. The information sharing in policy networks helps increase the expertise of all participants as policy networks provide a forum where expertise is shared, resulting in a growing knowledge base which in turn increases the likelihood of solving complicated and intricate policy problems. Given the Ethiopian’s government history and lack of internal expertise, policy networks offer it the opportunity to cross ethnic and cultural barriers, beginning as organizational interdependence and gradually leading to creating tribal and cultural union. In other words, activities carried out within network set up is purported to be a

result of information that has been well thought; reflecting on who, how, when, and where the activities have been done. Such consideration has a high possibility of achieving organisational goals and building unity and peace in societies.

Policy networks, in contrast to the traditional mode of governance “take complexity, dynamics and diversity much more seriously than their predecessors who often regarded these characteristics as nasty side effects, which unfortunately did not fit in the applied models” (Kooiman, 1993: 35). Such conception of governance seems to suggest that issues in societies are best understood within the contexts of the evolving modern milieu. Complexity is important in networks because it is a platform through which policy problems are diagnosed, defined, and solutions sought for them. Because of this, Nohria and Eccles (1992: 398) proposed a policy network organisation that can flexibly construct an exceptional set of connections both internally and externally for each unique project. As opposed to traditional bureaucracies, and its rigid set of relationships for dispensing all problems, policy networks organise around a specific policy issue. In addition, policy networks adjust themselves not by top-management but by the interactions of problems, people, and resources; within the broad precincts of corporate approach, organisational members automatically work out relationships. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003: 10) for instance argued that the only best alternative to solve concrete problems and get things done is through honest learning-based networks of organisations.

Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) point out that policy networks create spaces for politics. “There are no *apriori* rules that determine who is responsible, who has authority over whom, what sort of accountability is to be expected. Yet as politics takes place between organisations, all people bring their own institutional expectations and routines with them” (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 9). Not knowing who is in charge in policy networks is reconciled through managing the complexity of interactions among network actors, specifically by developing common social capital and trust. This diffuses the indeterminate and uncertain information actors come with about the problem at hand, preferences and means of resources into a resource for strengthening the network. As such, exchange in policy networks “is made possible not by the use of contracts or authority but by the development of trust, and trust is most likely to develop when relations are embedded: that is when the number of participants is small, some groups are consciously excluded and there is frequent and high quality interaction” (Hindmoor 1998: 40).

This study concludes and argues that in the CAADP policy network, as implemented in Ethiopia, policy networks do matter because of the collaborative spirit it has initiated among the diverse set of stakeholders. The CAADP policy network has provided a unique forum for policy deliberations in a country where public participation is foreign. It has exposed the different participants to different ideas, environments, and has provided access to resources (especially human) of other organisations. It has widened the participants' horizons for understanding forces that affect policy making and management. Their interactions have brought to the fore their organisational interdependencies and potential for collaboration in a context where policy making and policy implementation were never part of the public domain.

Agranoff (2007: 23) believes that policy networks assimilate human capital into collaborative problem activities. Agranoff (2007: 23-24) argues that policy networks shift governmental roles from direct operations toward steering, partnering, and contracting because governmental structures are increasingly becoming less hierarchical and more flexible. The transformation alluded to above does not come on its own account but rather on account of a collaborative, committed and concerted effort by its partners who are always on the look-out for what needs to be redressed and how to do it. By so doing, they are carrying out what the government would not/could not have done on their own. Policy networks are characterized by their ability to practically or actively respond to issues within specific contexts in which they function; they are proactive agencies whose existence is defined by their capacity and willingness to get things done. (Agranoff, 2007: 23-24)

However, this study does not suggest that policy networks should replace traditional bureaucracies. Rhodes (cited in Raab and Kenis, 2013: 202) points out, for example, that the emergence of policy networks is not a dead end to bureaucracy but the redefinition of it, with its defining features being open-mindedness in allowing for diversity and experimentation. Instead of viewing these two models as rivals, they should rather be seen as two government tools that look at governance from different angles.

What the policy network analysis of the CAADP has illustrated is that there are indicators of wider representation, participation, collaboration, and learning in the making and implementation of agricultural policy in Ethiopia. Due to this, even rigid institutional and governmental structures have transformed themselves in order to respond to the many voices

that previously challenged these institutions leading to incremental steps towards a democratic system of governance through the decentralization of powers. Examples of these are, for example, the central government's establishment of the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFEDs) (which are the decentralised institutional structure that corresponds to *Woreda* level counterparts). The Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARDs) (which were further decentralised down to the *Kebele* level) where there are at least three development agents working with farmers, (Chanyalew, *et al.*, 2010: 8). This provides an avenue for civil society organisations in rural areas to participate in public policy activities which was previously unheard of without fear or coercion of state institutions.

This study concludes that increased community participation at the levels of *Woreda* and *Kebele* can be mainly attributed to the activities of the CAADP. The regional and local level participants are now able to make some autonomous decisions in tackling problems that face them directly. The CAADP, they have joined forces with CBOs, civil society organizations and other stakeholders and jointly combine forces to address it. When communities are able to participate in such a broad-based program, it is an indication that there is a window opening up for democratic governance. The notion of democracy is new to Ethiopia. The policy network analysis of the CAADP has illustrated that there are elements that point towards the country becoming or incrementally adopting democratic decision making processes. It is posited here that such small gestures will allow multi-agency interaction and relationships, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability is gradually being appreciated.

The policy network analysis of the CAADP has also identified a number of collaborative efforts among various stakeholders, which engage actively with different government ministries responsible for agriculture policy and implementation. This collaboration has gradually permeated and encouraged inter-ministerial relationships manifested in ministries depending on each other in order to carry out a particular mandate. The CAADP network has already played a vital role for improving coordination and dialogue among government ministries and its development partners. For example, the CAADP provided a platform for the Ethiopian government to lobby international development partners for support. As a result, they have increased their bilateral allocations of aid to agriculture especially to those

regions that have shown a kind of determination to carry and implement the CAADP in their specific locations. (NPCA 2012: 24).

The CAADP policy network provided an official forum and therefore gave participants the official right to participate: stakeholders in the CAADP were equally able to get their policy issues onto the decision-making agenda, deliberated upon and translated into national sector policy decisions and strategies. Examples of these were: (i) the exploitation of regional complementarities and cooperation to boost growth; (ii) the principles of policy efficiency, dialogue, review, and accountability; (iii) the principles of partnerships and alliances to include farmers, agribusiness, and civil society communities; and assigning responsibility for program implementation to individual regions; that of coordination to designated Regional Economic Communities; (iv) and that of facilitation to the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) Secretariat. Encouraged by the desire to build future strategies for value-chain development for instance, The Framework for Improving Rural Infrastructure and Trade Related Capacities for Market Access (FIMA) conceded that small farmers have, under favourable conditions, participated in fast-growing value chains as individual entrepreneurs, contract farmers, members of out-grower schemes, and participants in other contractual arrangements.

Participatory decision making within the policy network stirred in communities and government officials the desire to nurture autonomy and good governance which is not yet fully realised but so far, has been evident in the policy network activities. For example, the CAADP implementation realised a growing appreciation and effort being put into evidence-based analysis and planning, inclusiveness driven by increasingly objective intentions of translating collective responsibilities into mutual collaborative arrangements and partnerships. This has increased the integration of multi-sectoral strategies and building towards a more coherent approach for the country to develop. The NPCA (2012: 28) for instance acknowledged that the CAADP in Ethiopia has assimilated and furthered knowledge and knowledge support strategies and actions in building and aligning citizenry responsibility and voice as an integral part to building an inclusive social capital, local ownership and responsibility of Ethiopia's development agenda.

As a result of the policy network, which emerged originally as a political initiative and process providing for the emergence of what could be considered as the complementary flip-

side in terms of business-based institutional and technological capacity and motivation, many stakeholders and other actors who were not well capacitated got trained in various skills accounting for improved human resources. As a result, capacity building has improved leadership and performance among most stakeholders involved in the implementation process of the CAADP offering more avenues for education in focused fields hence strengthening the drive for results and sustainable impact. The capacity alluded to above ranges from human, technological and institutional upon which the priority investment pillars approach can be based. For example, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) of 2005-06 to 2009-10 showed that there was an 11 percent GDP growth and a relative share of agriculture within the economy decreased from 47 percent to 41 percent due to improved implementation capacity and increased human development among other extraneous confounding factors. (Chanyalew *et al*, 2010: 4). This has resulted in solving the problem of institutional ineffectiveness, shortage of qualified and experienced staff, lack of facilities and equipment, and poor communications.

Knowledge determines largely how one views the world. Davenport and Prusak (cited in Agranoff, 2007: 126) define knowledge as “a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers.” This definition depicts the innate nature of knowledge that is always there within people as they face their daily life experiences. Therefore, knowledge is broader and richer than data or information which, are simply sources of knowledge since it is, according to Polanyi, (cited in Agranoff, 2007: 127) “a formulae which have a bearing on experience in the sense that knowledge is personal, ranging from map reading to piano playing to bicycle riding to scientific work that requires skillful action.” In this regard, knowledge is seen as an individual understanding of something emanating from the context in which they subsist. Therefore, one can say that no knowledge is communal unless the knower shares the information he or she got. Even if explicit and tacit knowledge are two sides of the same coin, knowledge is first experienced by an individual before it is formalized or codified. Therefore, tacit knowledge can be manifested in social interaction - which is what policy networks in essence provide the CAADP stakeholders in Ethiopia through their social interactions in the policy network.

Among policy network partners who deal with uncertain and mostly non structured systems, knowledge becomes an important ingredient since agencies network mainly to confront or react to a situation commonly facing the societies in which they live. The members of the CAADP policy networks gained expertise during the course of the programme. The acquisition, adaptation and application of knowledge are vital elements in any community. Knowledge is acquired through experience as well as through information sharing which turns out to be a central function of policy networks. Agranoff (2007: 29) identified explicit and tacit knowledge as an important element for public managers. While explicit knowledge is written and codified, tacit knowledge is less formally transmitted in that it is embedded in sense, perceptions, intuition, and experiences that are hard to express and less frequently codified because tacit knowledge involves conferences, workshops, informal and formal mentoring, and apprenticeships.

While the policy network analysis of the CAADP concluded that the private sector did not participate much in the activities of the network, what had transpired is that many of the CAADP's projects are being implemented through public-private partnerships. Agricultural research extension institutions have become fundamental and critical in the implementation of agriculture policies and strategies at both federal and regional levels. For instance, Ethiopia has invested a considerable amount of efforts in development of the National Agricultural Research System (NARS), including Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research (EIAR), Regional research Institutes (RARIs), and even the partnerships with Universities and Colleges in the different regions. (NPCA, 2012: 13) A fundamental outcome of the CAADP's policy network activities has been the development of partnerships which is a paradigm shift for agricultural development policy in Ethiopia.

Any assessment of the CAADP must bear in mind that the government in Ethiopia continues to face challenges such as a lack of state capacity; a lack of private investment; natural disasters; inadequate investments in infrastructure (especially those related to rural roads, energy, and water development); and limited human resources; and the general manifestation of poverty, food insecurity, environmental degradation and a global economic meltdown. So while the outcomes may be modest, given the stark Ethiopian context and its history of authoritarian rule, these minor outcomes are encouraging for democratic progress.

When a meeting was called in May 2012 in Nairobi, the NPCA (2012: 26) identified a number of challenges facing the implementation of the CAADP in general and Ethiopia in particular. These limitations and challenges included: a) uneven political commitment and stakeholders participation; b) inadequate mechanisms and strategies to attract private sector investments; and c) limited mutual exchange opportunities or knowledge sharing and learning from each other.

There are a number of PIF-specific risks mainly related to implementation capacity in MoARD and the BoARDS and the capacity to engage with the private sector. MoARD's capacity to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate the programs and projects embodied in the PIF resides in the context of the limited human resources with skills in these areas, Chanyalew, *et al*, (2010: 29). Although Ethiopia has allocated about 10 percent of its annual budget to agriculture, other sectors that need to be improved may suffer a great deal. The risk that the required funding will not be forthcoming becomes a reality because of a shortfall in reaching the ambitious economic growth targets of the FYGTP leading to: lower than anticipated budgetary allocations; and lower levels of support from the international community. The aspect of political and financial accountability, responsibility, and effectiveness has not yet been fully developed and assimilated in Ethiopia and this presents a threat to international support and even local support of national programs for fear of funds embezzlement. These are challenges/problems which policy networks may address.

For national programs such as the CAADP to be sustained and succeed, there is need for infrastructure development, such as good road networks, advance technology, energy and water development, which Ethiopia lacks. NEPAD's document on the CAADP program of (2003: 10) identifies Africa's technological stagnation as a major factor for retardation of implementation processes of many African projects. This is, to a greater extent attributed to poor education level of rural communities. Unless investment is made in educational sector for rural communities and research institutions, this problem will always remain taking into account the fickle weather condition of African in general and Ethiopia in particular. This study has shown that policy networks can alleviate or circumvent these challenges through collaborative policy making and implementation.

Governance in Ethiopia, just as many other African countries is a great impediment to implementing many community programs. For instance, poor political and economic

governance are twin root causes of much of the malaise that afflicts Ethiopia. Poor governance creates political and economic uncertainty, an unpredictable atmosphere for business, political unrest especially with Eritrea and, sometimes, even war that jointly impedes the pursuit of economic development. This limits citizen participation in such projects as the CAADP. In the NEPAD document (2003: 10) for instance, IFAD noted that the poor people in most part of Africa have little or no voice in many major decisions affecting their livelihoods due to poor governance because leaders feel that they can decide on behalf of the masses.

It is posited here that the policy network activities (such as those demonstrated in the CAADP) will assist Ethiopia in their transition towards democracy. It is through collaborative efforts and patterns of reciprocity among the public, private and civic sector that stability and trust in one another is created. This generates legitimacy. The policy network analysis of CAADP in Ethiopia has illustrated that as a policy network, the CAADP has the potential to foster regional integration of its diverse ethnic communities around their shared pressing issues of hunger, poverty, and food insecurity – to such an extent that communities are willing to pool together their time, efforts and resources to address it. This was, in fact, one of the underlying assumptions of the CAADP when it was first conceived of: “that regional integration provides an important catalyst to stir wealth creation, jobs creation, food security, and resilience and vulnerability readiness” (NPCA 2012: 24).

Inevitably, networks comprise the new social morphology of our societies, and “the diffusion of network logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture” (Castells, 1996: 468). The proliferation of the notion of democracy throughout the world, undoubtedly gives rise to the need for policy networks. Therefore, as societies move towards devolution and democratisation, people also grow in awareness of what they need and how they feel the need to participate in this system. In a nutshell, policy networks are forms of the new social change in societies that cannot be ignored, societies want to be part of what they live.

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