

**INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION AND
EVERYDAY FORMS OF CLASS STRUGGLES:
A CASE STUDY OF ISITHEBE
(1988 - 1992)**

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Science

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL, DURBAN
1997

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of people. Firstly, I am most grateful to the workers, trade unionists and employers at Isithebe for patiently enduring my interviews, and for willingly sharing information. Thank you to Gilton Klerck for support, assistance and for providing me with valuable opportunities to debate and clarify my arguments. Thank you to my parents who have always supported and encouraged me during this period. Finally, I am most grateful to Professor Crothers for invaluable assistance which enabled me to complete and finalise this thesis. The financial assistance awarded to me by the Institute for Research Development of the Human Sciences Research Council is also hereby acknowledged.

The opinions expressed and the conclusions arrived at, however, are the sole responsibility of the author.

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1997

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------------|---|
| ACTWUSA | Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union of South Africa |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| BIC | Black Investment Corporation |
| CED | Corporation of Economic Development |
| COSATU | Congress of South African Trade Unions |
| CWIU | Chemical Workers' Industrial Union |
| FAWU | Food and Allied Workers' Union |
| ICMA | Isithebe Clothing Manufacturers' Association |
| IDC | Industrial Development Corporation |
| KDC | Kwa-Zulu Development Corporation |
| KFC | Kwa-Zulu Finance and Investment Corporation |
| NP | National Party |
| NUMSA | National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa |
| PPWAWU | Pulp, Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union |
| SACTWU | South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union |
| SEPC | Social and Economic Planning Council |
| UP | United Party |
| UWUSA | United Workers' Union of South Africa |

INTRODUCTION

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman - in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes ... The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones" (Marx, cited in McLellan, 1977: 222).

Resistance is an endemic part of capitalist society, arising out of the nature of its social division of labour and corresponding relations of production. Due to the contradictory relationship that develops out of the domination of dead labour (capital) over direct producers (labour), the social structure of accumulation under capitalism is characterised by conflicting class interests. Hence, the "analysis of capital cannot be separated from the analysis of class struggle, for the simple reason that capital is class struggle, a struggle in which we inescapably participate" (Holloway, 1988: 101).

The study of working class struggles is an enormous task and involves an explanation of a number of processes at work. The sociological concern in this research is with identifying the generative mechanisms and the various manifestations of working class struggle at the point of production within a particular spatial and temporal context. The focus of this study is with explaining the reasons for various forms of class struggle in the labour processes of an industrial decentralized area in Natal during the 1980s.

For an adequate explanation of working class resistance in a particular place and time, certain crucial factors must be addressed. Factors which are pertinent to the analysis of

worker struggles in newly industrialised areas which are discussed here include: the historical background of industrial dispersal and its impact on Isithebe; the labour market and labour process conditions which have emerged as a result of industrial development; the political conditions of capital accumulation and the influence such conditions have on the relations of production. Each one of these are discussed in detail in order to highlight the complexities of capitalist accumulation and class struggles in an industrial decentralized area. This study is an attempt to address the lacuna that persists, firstly, in theories of industrial decentralisation in South Africa and, secondly, in the explanations of working class resistance.

Theories of industrial decentralization have tended to focus almost exclusively on identifying the reasons for the policy of industrial decentralization. Writers who have concentrated on understanding the development of the policy may be divided into two broad camps. The first are those that argue that the policy was premised on meeting political objectives, and that due to these political considerations very little economic rationality is evident in the policy. Those who fall within this category and who stress narrow political considerations are Maasdorp (1985) and Hyslop and Tomlinson (1984). Maasdorp for example argues that:

“The real reason for industrial decentralization was not economic, but political: it was adopted as an instrument to facilitate segregation by increasing the proportion of the black population residing in the homelands” (Maasdorp 1985: 223).

According to Maasdorp the industrial decentralized policy was economically irrational, even with the introduction of the Good Hope Proposals. He argued that very little success will be achieved because of the manner in which industrial decentralization was implemented. To support his argument, Maasdorp suggests that too many growth points have been identified for assistance and that very few of these have developmental potential. Consequently Maasdorp concludes that: “The economic argument for large-scale and widespread decentralization of industry in South Africa are not convincing” (1985: 233)

Hyslop and Tomlinson also argue that the policy is largely the result of efforts which were aimed at satisfying political objectives: the strengthening of the Bantustan system and related structures were central to the National Party's 'reform' programme. They argue that the apartheid state intended for the Bantustans to form part of a federal political system. In order for them to play this role they needed to acquire the necessary credibility and support.

“This is where industrial decentralisation comes in. A stronger industrial base in the Bantustans fosters the growth of the dominant petty bourgeoisie, and gives the Bantustan greater credibility in the eyes of the international community and in those sections of their own population. It is in the light of these political needs that industrial decentralisation must be interpreted”
(Hyslop and Tomlinson, 1984: 116)

To argue that apartheid's decentralization policies were the product of the need to satisfy political objectives only, is to imply that political and economic relations operate in isolation from each other. Certain theorists have recognised this and have attempted to move away from explaining the policy in terms of narrow political objectives. In so doing writers such as Hirsch and Glaser (1987) have questioned the political determinist interpretation that the policy was economically irrational. The strength of Hirsch's and Glaser's explanation lies in their recognition of a more complex relationship between political and economic forces. Glaser (1987), for example, has tried to contextualise decentralization within the apartheid state's regional policy framework and the spatial accumulation of capital. He tries to point out the impact political, economic and social forces had on the state's regional policy and its implications for the dispersal of industry. Glaser, however, concludes that “political, rather than economic, factors constitute the primary determinants of the policy shifts” (1987: 48). This interpretation of industrial decentralization also assumes that economic and political forces can be untangled in the study of a concrete conjuncture.

Like the political determinist argument, this approach does not adequately acknowledge the racial character of South Africa's political-economy. I will argue that the industrial decentralization policy was developed and implemented in accordance with the dictates

of apartheid-capitalism. The primary objective of the policy at the time was the preservation of the apartheid-capitalist political economy. Its origins and manner of implementation have to be sought within this agenda. Industrial decentralization evolved in South Africa in a particular manner precisely because of conditions peculiar to its political economy.

In contrast to the above writers, others such as Bell (1973) advocate that capital movement to growth points was the result of a spontaneous relocation, hence laying emphasis on economic factors. Bell suggests that the movement of capital to areas in the bantustans stems from exclusively market forces, hence he argues for a 'spontaneous' relocation of capital. In emphasizing 'market forces' as the primary causal mechanism certain methodological dilemmas arise. These revolve around the conceptualization of the relationship between political and economic processes. From a Marxist perspective, political and economic relations cannot be conceptualised in isolation from each other.

"It is an ideological consequence of the fact that within capitalism, social relations of production do manifest themselves phenomenally in the form of ostensibly independent economic and non-economic 'spheres'" (Marx, cited in Sayer, 1987: 94).

This distinction between the different levels of society is the outcome of capitalist social relations of production operating under the ideological guise of the 'invisible hand of the market'. Industrial decentralisation is the outcome of a complex interaction of both economic and political processes. Capital has both economic and political motives to secure as regards relocation. Cheap labour zones in the bantustans must not only secure the economic conditions for valorisation, but also the necessary political and legal conditions. For example: unaccountable bantustan governments and the non-existence of labour legislation to protect workers' rights allow capital to tilt the balance of power in its favour. Hence it is not possible, except in very abstract terms, to conclude that the decentralisation policy stems exclusively from either political or economic imperatives. The origins of industrial decentralisation at both the policy-formulation level (i.e. the

state) and at the level of the capitalist enterprises cannot be isolated from the dynamics of racial capitalism in particular and the internationalization of capital in general.

By interpreting the dispersal of industries as occurring 'spontaneously' human beings are portrayed as mechanical and passive agents. The 'spontaneous' dispersal of industry is inconceivable since industrialists never act within a political or socio-economic vacuum. Their decisions and choices are always structured by the prevailing balance of class forces and objective conditions of accumulation and valorisation. When we are referring to the economic structure of society, it should never be forgotten that "we are talking of relations between living, acting, thinking and above all historical individuals; real men and women" (Sayer, 1987: 94). To speak of 'spontaneous' decentralisation, arising out of market forces, ignores capital's reason to move to a particular area (i.e. point A and not point B). Moreover, a view of capitalism as the untrammelled working of market forces cannot account for the central role of the state in the process of capitalist accumulation.

In all of these writings and works on the dispersal of industry none or very little attention was focused on the conditions and relations of production in decentralized areas. My research analyses labour market and labour process trends as well as the politics of production in Isithebe. In so doing some insight into the impact of industrialisation in the area is provided. More importantly, however, such trends enable the identification of the reasons for working class struggles at the time.

Before an explanation of working class struggle in Isithebe is provided it is necessary to trace the context of industrial dispersal. The first chapter provides a periodization of the policy of industrial decentralization. The chapter cannot focus on all details and variables which influence industrial decentralization. It merely provides a broad overview of the historical background to the development of the policy. It is necessary to outline these macro processes as they have implications for industrial growth and class struggles at a micro level. Nevertheless, instead of arguing that the policy is essentially a response to either political forces or economic forces, the approach adopted here places the development of the policy within the context of the South African

political economy as a whole.

In terms of industrial decentralization, it is argued that the struggle against racial capitalism and its interaction with other processes have been instrumental in shaping the development of the policy. The state did not display a coherent, clear and systematic approach towards the dispersal of industry. Attention on industrial decentralization gained momentum when tensions and conflicts threatened the stability of classic apartheid. The National Party attempted to use industrial relocation to the Bantustans as yet another tool to racially divide South Africa and to secure the homeland system. Contextualising the policy within South Africa's political economy enables one to steer away from both political and economic determinism.

The focus here goes beyond explaining the reasons for industrial relocation and the progression of capitalism to explain the impact of the relations of production that facilitates capitalist penetration in an area. Industrial dispersal does not occur in a social vacuum. Discriminatory labour practices such as racism and sexism, which formed part of the South African urban economy, are transported to decentralized points. An analysis of labour market and labour process conditions, as well as the relations of production in a newly industrialised region, contradicts the commonly held assumption in decentralisation theories that the working class is merely a source of cheap and easily exploitable labour. This research shows that through class struggle the working class in Isithebe made advances in securing certain rights and in shifting the frontier of control in some factories. This is not out of the ordinary.

Wherever and whenever capitalism has penetrated a particular social formation, it has been met with working class resistance. Capital and labour cannot be understood outside of each other. Capital as a social phenomenon has to be understood in terms of its relationship and interaction with labour.

"Capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence of each other; they reciprocally bring forth each other" (Marx, 1977: 258).

The spatial location of industry reflects a spatial division of labour. As a result of the differentiations within industries and labour markets, the geography of industry is characterised as an "uneven mosaic of industry" (Storper and Walker, 1983: 34). The differences within industries and labour markets have implications for the spatial component of working class struggles. In other words, the forms of working class struggles and the areas of conflict may differ between urban and established industrial areas and newly developing ones.

The narrow focus in the earlier literature on industrial decentralisation prevents an understanding of the complexity of capital's relationship with labour. For example, Zille (1983) notes that it is the hearts and minds of the working class in industrial decentralized points that would determine the outcome of capital's mobility. Her analysis (like others), however, does nothing to incorporate proletarian action and to show how the working class influences the pace and nature of capitalist development. Implicit in the writings on decentralisation is the assumption that human behaviour is mechanically determined by social structures. Human agents are treated as passive and as 'carriers' of structures.

Marx was able to overcome the separation between thought/reality and strategy/structure through his appropriation (as opposed to a simple inversion) of the Hegelian dialectic. Marx's conception of capital as a social relation brings to light the fact that it cannot be grasped adequately in isolation from its social and political determinations. Bourgeois economists, Marx argued, "do not conceive capital as a social relation. They cannot do so without at the same time conceiving it as a historically transitional, i.e. a relative - not an absolute - form of production" (cited in Sayer, 1987: 136). The relationship between strategy and structure is crucial for an understanding of the interaction between the structures of a capitalist economy and the actions of labour and capital. Capitalist reproduction is not a fateful necessity (i.e. structuralism), nor is it a wilful contingency dependent exclusively on intended action (i.e. voluntarism). In the former the impact of human agency is omitted, while in the latter the constraints imposed by social structures are overlooked. A way out of this dilemma, according to critical realists, is to conceive structures relationally and to conceptualize their relations

to human agency dialectically.

While a number of writers on industrial decentralisation acknowledge the role labour plays in capitalists' decision to relocate to growth points, no systematic analysis has been made of the nature of the labour force in such areas and its significance for location theory and the spatial division of labour. In Chapter Two I look at the aspects that contribute to the segmentation of the labour market in Isithebe. The exchange relationship between capital and labour is not based on equality as neo-classical theory assumes. It is influenced by wider political, ideological and social factors. Racism and sexism, for example, are crucial determinants in the allocation of jobs and rewards. These relations of domination are crucial determinants in the segmentation of labour markets.

In chapter two I focus on the labour market and labour process conditions in 22 factories. My concern is not with slotting these factories into neat categories such as primary or secondary labour market conditions. Indeed, this was impossible since firms displayed varying degrees of segmentation. For example: Co.1, Co.2, Co.3 and Co.4 (clothing firms) showed primary labour market status with regard to the strong market power of their products, their ability to remain competitive and the type of technology they used. However, the wages they offered, the conditions, organisation and control mechanisms in the factories fall into the secondary labour market category. Segmentation of labour markets are determined by (among others) the differences in nature of work, the social relations of production, firm and sectoral conditions.

More importantly, by seeking out the tendencies which sustain the various levels of segmentation it becomes possible to show that labour markets do not fit neatly into primary and secondary ideal types. Varying degrees of segmentation mean that workers are exposed to different conditions. That is, the forces, conditions and relations that generate working class struggles are themselves varied. Therefore, struggle is manifested in a variety of ways. Through struggle workers contribute to the structuring of the labour market as wages, conditions of service, etc. are altered. This is not to imply that struggles will always result in changes to wages and conditions of service. Working

class struggles can bring about positive changes in favour of workers in terms of higher wages, bonus schemes, etc. Or there may be negative effects for workers. Finally, there may be no changes at all.

The technical and social organisation of work not only contributes to the segmentation of labour markets, but will also determine: (a) whether the capital-labour relationship in a particular factory is one of conflict or consensus; (b) if the opportunity and space to engage in resistance exists; and (c) the forms of struggle that may be generated. In an effort to explain the causes of industrial conflict, various frameworks have developed. According to the unitary perspective there exists a common interest between members in the workplace. These common interests at the point of production are best organised and controlled by managers. Worker resistance is viewed as 'irrational', misguided and the result of 'troublemakers' or those who are politically motivated (cf. Watson, 1987: 214).¹ Due to the assumption of common goals and interests, the unitary framework denies any legitimacy to trade unions. Instead, it regards unions as redundant in the age of enlightenment and as agents of subversive political motives. It is wishful thinking in the extreme and rather naive to suppose that a factory or society at large can operate around common interests without conflicting and contradictory interests. Glaring social inequalities and an escalation in industrial conflict suggest that the causes of conflict cannot be adequately explained in individualistic terms. As a result of the recognition extended to opposing interest groups, the unitary perspective has lost significance among academics.

According to some, the pluralist framework offers a more plausible approach towards the understanding of conflict. Whilst the pluralist recognises that different interest groups exist in the labour process, it is believed that these differences are not irresolvable and can be accommodated. In terms of this framework, collaboration and a willingness to compromise are important and necessary to settle disputes to the benefit of all concerned. Collaboration at work is based on workers' willingness to give up their autonomy and to recognise managerial authority. Managers and employers, on the other hand, have to accept workers' rights to bargain and negotiate wages and rewards. Unlike the unitary paradigm, pluralism recognises trade unions and the mechanisms of

collective bargaining as necessary prerequisites for dispute resolution (Fox, 1977: 140; Watson, 1987: 215). The emphasis on collaboration and compromise in the pluralist perspective has been widely criticised for presenting a picture of industrial conflict as a process with no losers, only winners. Pluralism has also been accused of failing to comprehend that capitalist societies are based on inherent class conflicts, the regulation of which is as much a matter of force as it is of consent.

Due to the inadequacies of both the unitary and pluralist perspective, the approach adopted in this study of working class conflict is based on a Marxist approach. For Marxism, it is the exploitative relations of production under capitalism that provide the objective conditions for class struggles between capital and labour. As Marx writes, modern industry

"has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves to the bourgeois class, of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine; by the overlooker; and, above all by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful, and the more embittering it is" (cited in McLellan, 1977: 227).

Hence class struggles are inevitable and endemic under capitalism, precisely because of the manner in which production is organised: the alienating, dehumanizing, unfulfilling and thankless nature of work. In Chapter Three I discuss the nature and organisation of work, as well as the various forms of worker struggles in 28 production processes studied in Isithebe. The questions I will be addressing are:

- Why are certain labour processes conducive to working class struggles, while others inhibit resistance?

- What conditions are necessary for phenomena such as absenteeism, sabotage, coming late to work to be regarded as everyday class struggles and not simply workers' adjustments to capitalist work arrangements?

The manner in which workers are made to expend their labour power is a point of conflict between capital and labour. Hence the labour process is conceptualised in terms of a frontier of control and a contested terrain. I will show that - apart from the demands for higher wages, the fights against dismissals, the struggle to form trade unions and the like - the control mechanisms on the shop floor are also causal mechanisms for resistance. My concern with control and conflict is similar to those of Edwards (1977), Friedman (1977), Edwards and Scullion (1982), and Littler (1982) amongst others.

A Marxist approach to the notions of control and struggle have raised issues and questions which other approaches have ignored. Marxist analyses of work relations are more useful than the pluralist approach for the following reasons. The first reason has already been stated: conflict is built into the labour process given the nature of capitalist accumulation.

Second, to contain struggle and to maximize output capitalism evolves various methods of control. I argue, however, that due to the diversity in the technical and social divisions of labour and in firm and sector conditions, methods of control are also varied. Control mechanisms cannot always be cast as opposites like direct control and responsible autonomy, or technical and bureaucratic control. My research shows that within a single firm all these forms or elements thereof can operate. It is necessary to be clear about the variety in control methods since it allows us to appreciate the diversities in class struggle. For example, I show that unskilled workers doing labourer-type jobs and subject to direct control are more prone to restriction of output and/or absenteeism. In contrast, a machinist in a clothing firm has a greater tendency to also engage in sabotage of both product and machine. The positions people assume in the relations of production are crucial determinants of the forms of struggles they are likely to engage in. The strategies of employers are, in turn, influenced and modified by the different forms of class struggle.

Third, for Marxists, ideological moments such as racism, sexism, sectionalism, etc. are internal to the social division of labour and are used as methods of control and stratification of the working class.

Fourth, Marxists view working class struggle as rational and normal given the context of capitalist labour processes.

I would add two more crucial elements to the discussion on control and resistance. They are, the incorporation of spatial and temporal aspects to an understanding of working class struggle. The spatial component encompasses the labour market and labour process conditions pertaining to a specific geographical locality. Central to spatial/regional labour market conditions and labour processes is the nature of the political-economic and social make-up of a particular locality. Related to the spatial component are temporal conditions. What the latter refers to is the nature of the political, economic and social conditions existing within a particular conjuncture or period. The inclusion of temporal components alerts one to the necessity of contextualising struggles within particular periods of capitalist development. This enables one to steer away from the belief that working class struggle and its causes are ubiquitous and constant. In Chapter Four I show that working class struggle and some of its underlying causes are influenced by the nature of wider political, economic and social phenomena prevailing in particular spatial and temporal contexts. The discussion focuses on the balance of class forces and worker and employer strategies in exerting their hegemony.

The first attempts by workers to organise among themselves in their battle with capitalists is through combinations or trade unions.

"[T]hey club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for... occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots" (Marx, cited in McLellan, 1977: 228).

It is out of these class struggles that social classes are created. Social classes are

determined in the first instance by the social relations of production. As Poulantzas (1973) argues, the structural matrix of the capitalist mode of production defines the positions people occupy, as well as the forms or nature of their interaction. However, class practices and class power cannot be exclusively determined by the social relations of production. These can only be understood in relation to class struggles. Classes, then, are created only through class struggles. Class interests can thus only be secured through the class struggles in particular conjunctures. These conjunctures are not exhaustively dependant upon the structural limitations of a particular matrix of the capitalist mode of production. They are also dependant on the existing balance of class forces, and the specific forms of class representation and organisation (cf. Jessop, 1990: 154).²

Similarly, Shivji (1976: 83) argues that the development of classes and class struggles can only be elucidated tendentially in terms of concrete historical trends. An analysis of concrete material conditions and specific historical formations are imperative to an understanding of the nature and forms of working class resistance. This raises a number of questions regarding resistance. What kinds of resistance are found? How prevalent is resistance? How is it patterned? Against whom or what is resistance aimed at? How significant is it in shaping the relations of production? Which workers resist most and why?

It is commonly believed that industrial conflict is symbolised in strike action and other dramatic manifestations. As Kornhauser *et al* suggest:

"Complete work stoppages and outbreaks of violence due to industrial disputes are certainly the most dramatic expressions of industrial conflict. For the general public they are the most disturbing. In the minds of many industrial conflict has come to *mean* strikes ... But a true understanding of industrial strife ... demands consideration of related, less-spectacular manifestation as well. It may even be suggested that the general object of study is not the labour dispute, the strike or the lockout, but the total range of behaviour and attitudes that express opposition and divergent orientations between industrial owners and managers on the one hand and working people and their organizations on the other" (cited in Hyman,

Working class resistance is far more varied than strikes and political demonstrations. In Chapters Three and Four I show that the conflict between capital and labour is also manifested in (amongst others): the restriction of output, absenteeism, coming late to work, labour turnover or desertion, stealing or "stubborn" attitudes. These less dramatic forms of protest constitute what has been referred to as "everyday" class struggles. As Cohen (1980) argues, they are often the only effective means available to the working class in situations where trade unions and collective strike activities are impossible or difficult to engage in.

Those who recognise and accept the wide range of resistance present under capitalist social relations tend to view these day-to-day struggles as accommodating devices in response to alienating and unfulfilling work (Grint, 1991; Storey, 1983; Burawoy, 1985; Watson, 1987; Hyman, 1972). Burawoy goes a step further to argue that rules and games played at the point of production generate consent to capitalist work relations and minimizes the conflict between capital and labour. However, the persistence, cogency and pressurizing effect that day-to-day class conflict has on the relationship between capital and labour can only be appreciated under particular conjunctures, ie. under particular spatial and temporal contexts.

In social conditions, such as at Isithebe, where collective worker action, the right to organise into trade unions and the right to embark on strikes were hampered by capital, the state, UWUSA and INKATHA, these forms of struggles were more than just accommodating mechanisms. Under certain conditions these forms of struggle are in fact effective weapons used by workers to win and protect certain demands. Then there are those such as Cohen (1980) and Van Onselen (1980) who assert that such forms of resistance are "hidden" and are representative of hidden consciousness. Yet the case-studies in Isithebe bear testimony to the contrary: workers were fully aware of their actions and the consequences thereof. Workers engaged in day-to-day struggles in order to: win specific demands, show their dissatisfaction or direct their anger at managers, owners and supervisors. The notion of "hidden struggles" is therefore inappropriate

because it does not capture or reflect the level of consciousness and militancy of the working class in Isithebe. Since there was not always something hidden or covert about these forms of resistance, the concept of everyday class struggles (or day-to-day class struggles) is preferred.

Chapter Four examines the particular spatial and temporal context of capitalist accumulation and class struggle. Shop floor struggles in Isithebe at the time of this research can be classified as class struggles because of: (a) the political context within which workers engaged in battle; (b) the demands and issues that generated struggle (for example: the right to organize and join COSATU affiliates); and (c) management's hostile attitude towards these and other demands. It will be shown that everyday forms of struggle have been crucial in laying the basis for trade union recognition and worker consciousness. Far from being unconscious, narrow and economistic, these day-to-day conflicts assumed an overt political nature and direction. The move from everyday forms of struggles to more formalized trade union struggles does not involve an automatic click of a switch. My research shows that everyday forms of struggle do not diminish in the face of increased worker organisation, but rather exist in a symbiotic relationship with more formal trade union struggles.

No form of resistance, however, can be explained in terms of a single employment strategy since it will always have a number of unacknowledged and unintended conditions of existence. If human agents are not simply the carriers of structures, there can be no one-on-one relationship between structures and strategies. The structure/strategy dialectic does not isolate them superficially. On the contrary, it reveals the complex and contradictory interaction of struggle and structure. Structures exist prior to struggles in the sense that they always occur within specific conjunctures. The contradictory nature of structures are revealed by the fact that they are both constraining and permitting, and are themselves the outcome of past conflicts. Abstract, simple accounts of resistance at the point of production are indeterminate when reference is made to more concrete historical social formations, forces and events. Hence no general theory of working class resistance - in the sense of formulating models to explain all forms of struggles - is possible. To be sure, we cannot develop a determinate theory of

working class resistance in the abstract.

Methodological Approach

Any sociological study is implicitly or explicitly grounded within a particular methodological paradigm. The paradigm one adopts will inform the choice of research methods, the variables one looks for in explaining phenomena, and the conceptualization of the relationship between these variables. This research adopts a critical realist methodological framework. Realism proceeds from the assumption that there exists a material reality independent of our conceptions of it. But we can only know "things" through words. That is, we do not have any direct or privileged access to reality. For realists, social investigation and inquiry has to go beyond that which is immediately observable and seek out the "generative mechanisms" of social phenomena. This calls for a process of retrodution. The latter involves an analysis that moves from some empirically observable social phenomenon to the underlying social relations that must exist to explain this phenomenon (cf. Bhaskar, 1979). An adequate epistemology and ontology, it is argued, have to reveal the contradictory, uneven and diverse nature of social systems. It is not my intention to present a detailed account of the different research paradigms. I will merely point to the major criticisms levelled against idealism and positivism in constructing a case for critical realism. The three meta-theories - idealism, positivism and critical realism - cannot be viewed in isolation from each other. Rather they must be seen as being in dialogue with each other.

In contrast to the ability of natural scientists to construct 'closed systems', social scientists operate in 'open systems' where constant conjunctions of events (i.e. empirical, law-like, universal and predictable regularities) do not and cannot occur. Society, Bhaskar argues, is not spontaneously closed. Yet a considerable number of theories in the social sciences presuppose closed systems (Bhaskar, 1979: 57). Positivism pivots around a Humean theory of causation (if A, then B) and can at best provide an indeterminate account of the social phenomena it tries to make intelligible.

The commitment to a correspondence theory of truth (i.e. the belief that systematic

observation will either verify or falsify our theories) results in probabilistic generalizations about reality (Johnson et al, 1984: 20). For example, to analyse resistance solely in terms of strikes or any other overt and observable forms of struggles and to then correlate the nature and occurrence of strikes etc. to variables that are solely firm and sector based, would be 'forcing a closure' onto resistance. This approach assumes that society is a flux of particular, individual events with *no underlying order of reality* (cf. Johnson et al, 1984: 20). Critical realism's concern is with seeking out as many variables as possible which impact on working class struggles and to explain, rather than merely correlate, the relationship.

Basing its approach on Comte's declaration of the 'unity of the sciences', positivists have sought to extend natural scientific methods of inquiry to the social sciences.³ According to Bhaskar (1979), positivism is an anti-critical naturalism that views the social world as a composition of events and phenomena in the same way as the natural world consists of objects and processes. Positivism rejects the claim that human action is meaningful to both the participants and to the observer. Thus they assert that no distinction can be made between the social and the natural sciences. Social entities must, therefore, be studied in the same manner as the natural sciences. It can be argued, however, that the social and natural sciences do indeed differ, especially in terms of method. The chief epistemological break between the sciences, as critical realism points out, does not stem from the discursive nature of social scientific analysis. Rather, it arises out of the fact that social systems are reflected and manifested in open systems, where consistent empirical regularities do not pertain and where constant predicates are unattainable (Bhaskar, 1979: 57).

Positivism's declaration that the social sciences are 'immature' because they have failed to develop techniques that yield regularities is indicative of its failure to realise that the application of appropriate analytical methods are not responsible for the precision and regularities that are achieved in some of the natural sciences. On the contrary, it is the physical control over nature through experiments such as the Skinnerian technique⁴ that have yielded such predictive successes (Sayer, 1984: 113). The situation in the social sciences is much more complex, in that they do not have the advantages that some of

the natural sciences have: the possibility of achieving relatively closed systems. Furthermore, human beings have the potential to change things in ways that do not happen with non-social phenomena. To apply such methods to society would be to force a closure on society. Positivism and its attempts at scientism fail to take cognisance of people's capacity to reflect upon past and future events, nor does it take into account the interpretative process which is not directly amenable to such controlled observation. The fact that social scientists are faced with a pre-interpreted reality calls for a system of analysis called a "double hermeneutic".

Positivism dismisses the unobservable as unscientific and metaphysical. In this regard our example of resistance indicates positivism's ontological restriction to the observable - i.e. overt forms. The criticisms are not restricted to positivism's denial of a hidden reality, but also because its ontological position is based on events or experience (Keat and Urry, 1981: 233). This flat undifferentiated ontology has in fact grounded the positivist tradition in what Bhaskar calls the "epistemic fallacy", wherein "being is reduced to our knowledge of being" (1979: 12). Positivism's method of social scientific enquiry encourages the belief that we are passive recipients of a monolithic, ahistorical world. In this sense positivism has not transcended the subject/object dualism nor the material/ideal dualism.⁵

Nor can social phenomena - in this instance resistance - become intelligible by merely trying to understand how people interpretively construct them. Such an approach is an easy victim of voluntarism. This is what constitutes part of the criticism of the hermeneutical tradition: its rejection of the material basis of social reality. Generally idealism shares with empiricism (positivism) the belief that knowledge is founded in human experience. Its claim that the world does not consist of a set of objective material conditions which causes human behaviour, that such behaviour is dependant upon how individuals interpret their circumstances, distinguishes this paradigm from positivism.

Idealism rejects the positivist notion of scienticism, claiming that the natural and the social world are fundamentally different and thus they require different modes of

acquiring knowledge.⁶ The emphasis for the idealist is on the individual subjective interpretation of reality. This has become the starting point for phenomenologists such as Husserl, Schutz and the ethnomethodologists. Furthermore, idealists believe that the scientist has to step out of his/her 'scientific community' and into the community under analysis. For example: Winch believed that the researcher goes through 'three different communities' and asserted that social life has to be explained by comprehending that reality in the *same terms* as its agents do (Bhaskar, 1979). If we return to our example of resistance, this paradigm would require coming to terms with this phenomenon by asking each participant engaged in whatever form of struggle and those affected by it what it means to them at that point in time. For the realist, such knowledge is merely a necessary, but not sufficient condition for social scientific knowledge.

Bhaskar points out that the positivist belief in facts and data as being definitive and the scientist as passive and autonomized recur on a hermeneutical terrain. For the hermeneutical tradition the interpretation of people's account of reality is regarded as certain and the scientist enters the research project with a conceptual *tabula rasa* (Bhaskar, 1979: 191). This approach in effect reflects people's account of reality as incorrigible, which is tantamount to empiricism.

The attempts by idealists to construct reality through the interpretations of their subjects runs into fundamental tensions once it is realised that reality is not only composed of subjects and their interpretations. As such, idealism overlooks the extra-discursive dimension of social reality. All idealist theories are wedged in a compromise between rule-governed and creative interpretative processes. According to Johnson *et al* (1984), theoretical discourses of this sort are constituted by a tension that drifts towards either rationalism or solipsism (the belief that we can know nothing outside of ourselves). To argue that we can only know through words, does not mean we can only know words.

The failure of idealism to transcend the problem-field underlying positivism has open the way for a truly dialectical synthesis: i.e. critical realism. In other words, critical realism can account for all the strengths of idealism and positivism, while escaping their weaknesses. For critical realism society is materialist in its construction where

emphasis is on the primacy of existence over consciousness (Johnson *et al*, 1984: 114). In this respect critical realism shares with positivism the belief in the material composition of society. The two, however, differ on the nature of that materiality. Critical realism is opposed to the positivist notion of nominalism - the belief that knowledge is given in experience. Critical realism is opposed to the Humean theory of causation and rejects both the deductive-nomological and hypothetico-deductivist models of theory construction (cf. Bhaskar, 1979). Critical realists draw on the active part of idealism - i.e. the view the human beings produce and reproduce social reality - without succumbing to its conceptual realism. The difference stems from critical realism's rejection of the idealist belief that all knowledge is in the minds of the agents under analysis. In this sense the critical realist framework opposes the Hegelian notion of consciousness over being.

Critical realism is a complex, growing body of thought. It is not possible to provide a detailed discussion on all aspects of this paradigm. There are, nevertheless, certain themes of critical realism which are especially important and relevant to this study. These are briefly discussed below. Bhaskar's philosophy of the social sciences draws a distinction between the "transitive" and the "intransitive" dimensions. Our knowledge of the world as it exists in our theories at a particular time constitute the transitive objects of science. The intransitive object is that which exists independently of our theories. By conflating this distinction, positivism and idealism are guilty of the epistemic and ontic fallacies respectively (cf. Bhaskar, 1979). Realism overcomes these shortcomings by insisting on the stratified nature of social reality. For, as Marx noted, if the essence and appearance of social phenomena coincided, science itself would be superfluous!

Bhaskar's critical naturalism qualifies an uncritical, positivist naturalism in three ways: relational, ontology and epistemology. The relational conception of society is posed as an alternative to what he labels 'social atomism' and its epistemological manifestation of methodological individualism. Methodological individualists explain facts about societies solely in terms of facts about individuals. Popper argues that social phenomena and social institutions are to be explained in terms of the results of individuals' actions

(Bhaskar, 1979: 34). This reduces our knowledge of society to our knowledge of people. The rejection of methodological individualism, however, does not justify the adoption of methodological collectivism which treats groups as the bedrock of social explanations.

Bhaskar begins by first posing the ontological question of what properties do societies and people possess, before tackling the epistemological concern of how such properties make them possible objects of knowledge. According to critical realism, society is a necessary condition for and outcome of human agency, and human agency reproduces and transforms society. For this reason critical realism approaches society in terms of a relational model. Bhaskar points out that there is an alternative social ontology to methodological individualism. He argues that sociology

"is not concerned, as such, with large-scale, mass or group behaviour (conceived as the behaviour of large numbers, masses or groups of individuals). Rather it is concerned, at least paradigmatically, with the persistent *relations* between individuals (and groups), and with the relations between these relations (and between such relations and the nature and production of such relations)" (Bhaskar, 1979: 35-36).

On the relational model a person is a worker only because of his/her relation to an employer, a wife only because of one's relation to a husband, etc.

On the basis of the relational model of society Bhaskar develops the *Transformational Model of Social Activity* (TMSA). The TMSA lies at the core of his social ontology. The model has been developed as an alternative to two opposing conceptions of society, that of humanism and structuralism. The humanist views human agency as everything while the structuralist sees social structures as everything. The TMSA attempts to incorporate and accommodate both humanism and structuralism instead of following an either or model of social explanation. The TMSA recognises both purposive agency and structural causality as real - i.e. people make society and societies make people. Furthermore, the TMSA acknowledges that society is not created by unconditional

human action (voluntarism), nor does it exist independently of it (reification). Human beings neither entirely determine, nor are they entirely determined by, social structures.

"Now if, following Durkheim, one regards society as providing the material of human actions, and following Weber, one refuses to reify it, it is easy to see that both society and human praxis must possess a *dual character*. Society is both the ever-present *condition* (material cause) and the continually reproduced *outcome* of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is conscious production and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society" (Bhaskar, 1979: 43-44).

There are differences in the properties possessed by social structures and those possessed by people. Bhaskar argues that it is important for us to categorically distinguish between people and societies and between human actions and changes in society. He proposes that people in their conscious activity for the most part unconsciously reproduce and sometimes transform the structures determining their activities of production (Bhaskar, 1979: 44). Social structures place limits on the acts that we perform, but they do not determine our performances. Put differently, structures both enable and constrain human actions. This relates directly to the explanations of working class struggles in that the structure of labour processes and the employee-employer relationship either influences certain forms of class struggles or prevents/limits their occurrence. It will also be shown that daily forms of class struggles affected certain changes in the relationship between employers and employees, as well as bringing about changes in working conditions, rewards and benefits.

The critical realist ontology is opposed to both the positivist and idealist conception of social reality. Bhaskar rejects the following ontologies: (a) collectivist - associated with Durkheim; (b) individualist - Weber; and (c) dialectical - Berger and Kellner. He rejects these for the following reasons: in (a) there are actions but no conditions, in (b) conditions but no actions and in (c) there is no distinction between the two (Bhaskar, 1979: 41-46). Bhaskar summarizes the society/person connection as follows:

"people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce and transform, but would not exist unless they did so" (1979: 45).

The properties of social systems place some ontological limitations on a possible naturalism. The major ontological limits revolve around the activity-, concept-, space-, and time-dependence of social structures (Bhaskar, 1979: 57). In other words, social structures unlike natural structures, (a) "do not exist independently of the activities they govern; (b) do not exist independently of the agents' conceptions of what they are doing in their activity; (c) may be only relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time invariant)" (Bhaskar, 1979: 48-49). How then do the properties of society make it possible for us to acquire knowledge of it? Bhaskar argues strongly against the positivist notion that the techniques of the natural sciences can be applied unproblematically to the study of the social.

Apart from the activity-, concept-, space-, and time invariance Bhaskar adds two other types of limits which distinguish the social sciences from the natural sciences: relational and epistemological. The relational difference is that the social sciences are internal in regard to their field of inquiry in a way which does not pertain in the natural sciences. In general, the objects of knowledge in the natural sciences exist and act independently of the process of gaining knowledge about them. In the social sciences this is not the case (Bhaskar, 1979: 59-60). The chief epistemological limit on naturalism is the fact that the objects of social scientific study are manifested in open systems, where empirical regularities do not occur. Most social phenomena are conjuncturally determined. This means they have to be explained in terms of a multiplicity of causes (Bhaskar, 1979: 54-55). Social entities cannot be thoroughly and adequately explained by simply producing detailed "raw" descriptions or genealogies of specific events. Instead, attempts should be made to explain the contingent necessity of particular conjunctures and their outcomes in terms of their various determinations. Social scientific analysis attempts to reproduce the "real-concrete" as "concrete-in-thought". This is done through a complex synthesis, and not by the mere adding up of many

determinants.

For the realist, society is "irremediably discursive" (Callinicos 1982). Consequently, the concepts that we apply in the analysis of social phenomena must go beyond the immediate reality. This is achieved not through induction or deduction, but through *retroduction* - the mode of inference that attempts to seek out the 'generative' or 'casual' mechanism of an entity (Sayer, 1984; Bhaskar, 1979). Positivism and idealism fail to take cognisance of the often unobservable generative mechanisms of events. A realist's account of working class resistance moves beyond an analysis of the nature and occurrence of strikes or any other overt forms of struggle as correlated to the size of a factory, product manufactured, etc. whilst also recognising that peoples' interpretation of their actions are important. A critical realist approach would situate resistance within the structure of productive relations under capitalism in a particular place and time. These sow the seeds for different forms of resistance. Realism understands working class struggle as a social phenomenon occurring in open systems. It is, therefore, recognised that the historical and cultural influences between spatial locations which generate resistance will be different.

Critical realism, then, in attempting to formulate a scientific social enquiry takes cognisance of and endeavours to transcend both the material/ideal dualism and the subject/object dualism. In line with Marx, who rejected the passive materialism of Feuerbach and the rationalism of Hegel, and argued that material reality must be seen, not as a 'thing' external to and acting upon the lives of people, but as an objective activity that is composed through human interaction.

"Material reality is both the practical accomplishment of real men and women and a condition of their reality ... (For Marx) social reality is neither an external conditioning object nor a subjective projection: the dualism is dissolved" (Johnson *et al*, 1984: 125).

A crucial question for realism is that of validation. Whilst for the positivist and the idealist theories are seen as valid at the level of experience and convention respectively,

for Marx the validity of a theory is judged in relation to practice. However, as Johnson *et al* (1984) point out, this assumes that there is determinate relationship between thought and action. What then is the status of sociological theories and can they be said to be scientific? A scientific analysis of society involves much more than trying to seek out the empirically regular experiences to 'fit' our theories. In this sense Popper's theory of falsification and the way scientific theories progress is self-refuting for it presupposes that facts exist out there in a pristine form, just waiting to be discovered (Sayer, 1984; Johnson *et al*, 1984). The rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not in any way imply an acceptance of relativism: i.e. the belief that one theory is as good as another. Our theories are inescapably fallible. That is, our account of social reality is

"corrigible precisely because society... is an articulated ensemble of *tendencies* and *powers* which... exist only as long as they (or at least some of them) are being exercised; are exercised in the last instance via the intentional activity of people and very importantly are *not* necessarily space-time invariant" (Bhaskar, 1979: 49; emphasis added).

Further, given that social entities are susceptible to change and only relatively enduring, our theories are for ontological reasons (as distinct from epistemological ones) necessarily incomplete (Bhaskar, 1979). It follows then that no theory can claim to produce *the* theory of social reality. Here we can take heed of Lipietz's warning of casting a general network of labels over the world. Cognisance must be taken of the specific historical and social formations within specific geographical areas (Lipietz, 1987). Sociological accounts of social reality must be evaluated in terms of their explanatory powers and not in terms of their powers of prediction. We should accept a particular theory if it is capable of explaining more of reality, more consistently than its rivals.

Research Application

In order to explain the historical and cultural tendencies that influence resistance it is necessary for one to have access to in-depth empirical evidence. The politics of a

particular geographical area will influence the quality of information and how much employers and workers are prepared to divulge. It is not always possible to obtain clear and precise evidence, especially when social enquiry concerns shop floor struggles. At the time of conducting research in Isithebe, management and employers displayed a reluctance to participate fully in the interviews. It was a time of suspicion. Tension was running high between COSATU and its members and employers and UWUSA-INKATHA. As a result, it took me three years to acquire quality interviews. One common tactic among employers at the time was to stall my interviews. Appointments would be set up weeks in advance. On the day of the scheduled interview, the participant would have another meeting, or some other engagement. I was accused of not being a student at Natal University, that my research was sponsored by COSATU, and that the research was at the request of the union. Secondly, some employers contacted the HSRC (who supplied my bursary) saying that I said I am doing this research for the HSRC. Thirdly, UWUSA and INKATHA limited my access to workers, by attempting to intimidate both myself and potential participants.⁷ Nevertheless, I interviewed and spoke to a number of employers. It is, however, the 29 firms which feature here as case studies where quality information on labour market, labour process conditions and on industrial relations were obtained.

The sectoral break-down of my samples was as follows:

- 11 from the clothing sector;
- 4 from the textile sector;
- 9 from the engineering and metal sector;
- 3 from the paper and wood sector;
- 1 from the chemical sector; and
- 1 from the food sector.⁸

This sample is representative of the dominant sectors of industry in Isithebe. The clothing and textile sector dominated at the time, followed by the engineering and metal, paper and wood, chemical and food sectors. Firms from the clothing and textile sectors in this study are referred to numerically. The clothing firm referred to as Co.AM is the

parent company of Co.2 to Co.5, and is the only exception in terms of adopted format. Firms from all other sectors are referred to alphabetically. This form of reference was necessary in order to maintain the anonymity of participating firms. A large proportion of my interviews were conducted during 1989 to 1990. As my concern was to uncover and explain the multiplicity of variables that generate various forms of struggle, in-depth interviews were prepared on specific areas of enquiry. Detailed interviews were prepared for management and employers, trade union officials, and workers. For management, the interviews were conducted on labour market conditions, labour process, labour relations and shop floor struggle. This interview schedule is found in Appendix 1. As a result of the relationship that began to develop between myself and certain employers, it was possible for me to organise follow-up interviews.

There was a limit, however, to the quantity of information that management in the 29 firms was prepared to reveal. Employers were often reluctant to divulge detailed breakdowns of wages and other working conditions. This information is important because it would have enabled a more in-depth analysis of certain common trends in and the underlying causes of worker resistance in Isithebe. Employers were not keen to supply production score sheets, attendance registers, etc. This information would have enabled detailed comparisons of the different forms and intensity of shop floor struggles between firms and sectors.

I used the opportunities I got to interview trade union officials to gather as much of a general picture as possible around working conditions and benefits, labour relations, labour process, worker organisation, problems around organising, etc. Where possible, I was able to obtain information about the case studies that feature in the study. The interview schedule administered to trade unions appears in Appendix 2. In total I interviewed 5 COSATU officials: 3 from NUMSA, 2 from SACTWU, and 1 from PPWAWU. It was always a battle to get in contact with the unions, because they did not have a physical presence in Isithebe. It would often take me weeks before an interview could be confirmed. Of the three unions that participated in my research, I had more contact with SACTWU and NUMSA. Various attempts were made to contact INKATHA and UWUSA to schedule interviews. These efforts were in vain. Therefore

the inclusion of INKATHA and UWUSA's views on issues and events discussed in Chapter Four are, regrettably, not possible.

An additional set of questions was prepared specifically for workers which is presented in Appendix 3. Most of the information in the following chapters are based on discussions with management, COSATU trade union organizers and officials. Access to workers was very difficult. Employers generally refused me access to their employees. Employers in Co.8 and Co.9, however, allowed me to interview their supervisors. There is not an even spread of workers from the different sectors. I interviewed 42 workers in total between 1989 and 1991: 20 from the clothing industry, 20 from metal and engineering, and 2 from the chemical sector. A SACTWU official, Mr. E arranged for me to interview the 20 workers from the clothing sector. COSATU was not granted permanent offices in Isithebe. As a result, interviews had to be conducted in a minibus after work hours. Due to the awkward setting, detail probing during the interviews was not possible. This limited my access to workers' views on absenteeism, output regulation, sabotage, etc. My limited knowledge of Zulu further restricted both the quality and quantity of interviews. This was a general condition and was the case with workers from other sectors as well. Interviews with workers from the metal industry were conducted outside the factories during their half-an-hour lunch break, or when I got an opportunity to sneak into factories with the NUMSA organizer. Due to these conditions it was not possible to engage in detailed structured interviews with all workers. Therefore most of these were based on quick semi-structured interviews. I became quite friendly with some of the participants, which made it possible for me to have more detailed interviews with them. A number of the supervisors, who feature in Chapter Four, were interviewed at their homes, in Stanger, after work.

Due to these constraints, and because of the nature of the research, it was not possible for me to administer surveys. Rather, the nature of the study dictated the need for the use of case-studies or ethnographic studies. For this reason I used my interviews with employers and supervisors to acquire as much detail as possible about that particular business. As mentioned above, interviews with trade union officials were used to get as much of a broad and general understanding about labour conditions and relations in

Isithebe. The use of surveys in research enables one to arrive at broad generalisations and seldom probes or explores the opinions of those being interviewed. Consequently the use of surveys would have provided very little insight into the actual dynamics of the employment relationship as it is played out in a particular workplace. A survey would also not shed much light on the factors that influence the employment relationship.

Ethnographic studies, by contrast, allow for the exploration of causal mechanisms at work in a particular industry and can therefore construct *explanations* for working class struggles. Survey research can only establish certain correlations between variables thereby providing at best a *description* of these changes. As Edwards *et al* noted, it is

“to the workplace that one must look to consider what happens in practice: how the structures of law and agreements combine with workers’ and managers’ own goals to create a workplace regime that governs how work is actually performed” (1994: 4).

This calls for research techniques that attempt to move beyond appearances and descriptions to uncover and explain the casual mechanisms underlying labour relations in Isithebe. However, case-study work has become increasingly marginalised by a growing emphasis on quantification, the time and effort involved in such research, and the misplaced belief that it does not allow for the exploration of general trends. The conditions and the factors pertaining to a particular firm in this study may be generalised across others where the same or similar conditions prevailed. This was made increasingly clear through my interviews with trade unionists, and my discussions with workers and employers.

NOTES

1. Watson notes that "[t]he ideological value of such a perspective to the owner or manager of the work organisation is clear to see: the employee who questions the authority of the manager can readily be compared to a disloyal family member or to a footballer who challenges the captain of his own team. In this way the employee challenge is rendered dishonourable or misguided" (1987: 214).
2. Poulantzas rejects the distinction between "class-for-itself" and "class-in-itself" and argues that classes can only be defined in and through class struggle. To be sure, he attempted to synthesise the structural determination and class position of agents in capitalist production.
3. See Benton's (1977) discussion of Comte's declaration of the unity of the sciences for the preservation of 'social order' and 'scientific knowledge'.
4. For more information on this method see Johnson *et al* (1984: 34).
5. Firstly, the subject/object dualism arises when people are seen as active and acting upon the environment. Simultaneously people are treated as passively responding to their environment. The material/ideal dualism revolves around the tension that exists between (a) the belief that social reality exists independently of human action (reification), and (b) the belief that social reality is the interpretative construction of its subjects (voluntarism).
6. In this regard Weber uses two methodological differences to distinguish between the sciences. First, he distinguishes the two on the basis of the different properties in their subject-matter - inanimate objects belonging to the natural sciences on the one hand, and mental and spiritual life belonging to the social sciences on the other hand. For him the social sciences have an additional advantage in that they are able to go beyond historical events through an understanding of their meaning by establishing the human intention

behind such entities. Social and historical events are constituted of intentional human participants who are similar, thereby enhancing the process of understanding which Weber refers to as 'verstehen'. We are denied of such a process in our assessment of the natural world. The second differentiation that Weber makes is not directly related the natural/social science distinction, but is based on the frame of reference that is used in research. Weber draws a distinction between two types. One is individualising (stressing the unique, concrete aspects of reality) and two is generalising (aiming to construct the regular-law-like relationship between phenomena). Weber's construction of idealism, however, expresses a duality between idealism and empiricism (Johnson *et al* 1984).

7. An example of this is the following incident. In March 1990 I was interviewing workers from a metal company, outside the factory gates. It was lunch break. Their main concern and grievance, at the time, was management's attempts to force the workers to join UWUSA. We were interrupted by a young male (Mr.K), who approached, screaming and shouting for me to go away. Mr.K produced an identity card of some sort, alleging that he is a member of the ZP, and that he is organising for UWUSA in the factory across the road. As far as he was concerned I was related to Jay Naidoo, who was the general secretary of COSATU at the time. He refused to be interviewed, and said that I should not be interviewing any other person. In short, I was told "to get out and stay out" or else "you will be trouble". According to workers, who had by now increased to a small crowd, Mr.K was a member of INKATHA and UWUSA, and was also part of intimidating and harassing COSATU members and potential members. Comrades from Co.C, who watched the incident, warned me that Mr.K can be a potential threat and that I should be aware. It was not possible for me to carry out consistent interviews and empirical work, following Mr.K's threats. I did, however, return to Isithebe much later in the year.

8. Details of these companies are presented in Chapters Two and Three.

CHAPTER ONE

INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION AND THE RISE OF MANUFACTURING CAPITAL IN ISITHEBE (KWA-ZULU/NATAL)

Introduction

For us to comprehend working class resistance to capital at a particular time and place it is necessary to contextualise industrial development in that time and place. Capital's penetration into Isithebe must be viewed against the background of South Africa's political economy. Industrial decentralisation is not a mechanical process, nor does it occur in a social and political vacuum. The organisation of work, relations of production, and the nature of the labour market on a micro level are shaped by forces on a macro level. For critical realism, as outlined in the previous chapter, societies are characterised as open systems. All social phenomena are, therefore, conjuncturally determined and have to be explained in terms of a multiplicity of causes. Hence political and economic factors, as well as community-based and factory-based struggles (amongst others) have played a role in shaping the dispersal of industry. Theories which deal with the dispersal of industries have tended to treat political and economic factors as autonomous spheres existing in isolation (see pages 2-5). This chapter endeavours to show the dynamic interplay between political and economic forces in shaping both the decentralization policy and Isithebe's industrial development. By isolating the political and economic factors and focusing on the macro process, the intention is to present an alternative approach to the conceptualization of industrial decentralization. This does not amount to a denial of the impact of other variables which fall beyond the ambit of the present concerns.

A critical realist approach to industrial decentralisation would proceed as follows: what are the underlying conditions and relations which must exist in order to explain the particular

course industrial development and decentralisation assumed in South Africa? This Bhaskar calls "retroduction" and it involves the explanation of some identified phenomenon by constructing a model of "a mechanism, which *if* it were to exist and act in the postulated way, would account for the phenomenon in question... The reality of the postulated explanation must then, of course, be subject to empirical scrutiny" (1979: 15).

The South African economy has long been described as a combination of institutionalised racism and class exploitation (Legassick, 1974; Wolpe, 1975). Capital accumulation, for a variety of historical reasons, is based on the domination of white capital over black labour. Racial Fordism (Gelb, 1991) is the term used in this chapter to define the particular form that capitalist accumulation assumed in South Africa. This institutional frame work is structured by the combination of class exploitation and racial domination. Fundamental to the project of racial Fordism is the question of control of African political, economic and social activities. Attempts were made to restrict such activities to areas set aside especially for Africans. Various mechanisms such as the pass laws, influx controls, the homeland system and industrial decentralization were implemented to achieve this.

This chapter is divided into two broad sections. Section one provides a periodisation of the industrial decentralisation policy against the phases of capitalist expansion and crisis in South Africa. Section two deals broadly with capital (re)location to Isithebe. Section one consists of seven parts. Part one looks at the state's early attempts at decentralising production. Part two briefly discusses the role of the state in fostering the advance of a racial Fordist regime of accumulation. The third part examines the accumulation process and crisis of 1940 which brought the end of the United Party's rule. Part four looks at the National Party's approach to decentralization from 1948 to 1950 and points to the significance of the degradation in the Bantustans, the attempts by the National Party to advance white separate development, as well as the struggles which resulted from this racial expansion of capitalism. These are the central factors which influenced the development of the state's industrial decentralization policy. The breakdown in agriculture in the Bantustans and the political and economic struggles of the 1950s forced the state to consider the dispersal of industry as one way of curtailing African "unrest" in the urban areas. For this reason the Tomlinson Commission was set up. While the recommendations

that the Tomlinson Commission made were rejected, the state did make plans to implement the Border Industrial Programme.

The first comprehensive programme of industrial decentralization, however, had to wait until after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Border industrialisation and capital accumulation are discussed in the fifth part. Through out the repressive years of the 1960s bantustan poverty increased. This was a result of the racial Fordist structure of accumulation, in general, and influx controls, forced relocations and other repressive legislation in particular. The number of industries which relocated to areas in and around the Bantustans during this period were not, however, sufficient to absorb the large numbers of people who were dumped there.

As a result of the contradictions generated by apartheid-capitalism, indications of an economic crisis began to emerge in the 1970s. In part six the symptoms of this crisis and its impact on the manufacturing sector are briefly discussed. The section also deals with the reformulation strategy of the state and the question of control over African labour. It is not possible to discuss all the symptoms of the crisis and the factors which influenced the state's revised strategy. The intention is to point out that the South African political-economy reached a turning point which once again forced the state to reformulate its policies towards the African working class and the promotion of industry. The revised strategy of the 1980s is based on an "integrated" approach to African and white development. Industrial decentralization features prominently in this strategy. In the seventh and final part of the first section industrial decentralization in the 1980s is discussed.

The second section of this chapter focuses on industrial development in Isithebe. In this section some of the factors which encourage industrial investment, and some of the factors which place constraints on development in Isithebe are discussed. Capitalist relocation to the Bantustans and the effects of such penetration are uneven processes. Rather than saying decentralisation policies are a failure or success, it is more useful to explain the particular forms it assumes (i.e. spatial and regional dynamics). The lack of propulsive industries, limited backward and forward linkages between industries, etc. are not reflective of the

failures of the industrial decentralisation policy. They are reflections of the uneven geographical development of capitalist accumulation.

A PERIODISATION OF INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION - POLICY AND PRACTICE

1. Early Initiatives:

The history of the policy begins in the 1940s. Prior to this period no coherent policy was formulated, although the state at the time did express concern over the increasing rate of African urbanization. One cause of this movement was identified as the deterioration of agriculture in the Bantustans. Early in the 1930s the Native Economic Commission declared that the shortage of mine and farm labour was attributable to a decline in agriculture. The reserves, it concluded, were unable to provide a subsistence base for migrant labour. Again in 1932 the Commission warned that the migrant labour system was collapsing and suggested that it could only be stabilized if the reserves were preserved and expanded (Giliomee, 1985: 43). Although the Commission recommended that schemes for improving and developing the Bantustans should have top priority in national politics, the efforts to arrest the further breakdown of agriculture in the Bantustans were limited and lacked overall direction (Glaser, 1987). It was only in 1940 that efforts to encourage manufacturing in and around the Bantustans were seriously considered. With the setting up of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 1940 the first sustained and co-ordinate attempts at industrial dispersal began.

The IDC was established with the aim of encouraging national industrial development by financing a range of state and private sector investments. Despite these efforts, however, no systematic and coherent programme of industrial decentralisation emerged. The IDC did not, for example, limit metropolitan growth, nor did it attempt to develop the Bantustans. Most of its attention was directed at industries in the metropolises, while its outside projects were primarily in 'white' areas (Glaser, 1987). Two years after the formation of the IDC, the state set up the Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC) which took an early

interest in regional planning. Yet any ideas it proposed on the dispersal of industry remained, so to speak, on drawing board and no consolidated plan was formulated on decentralisation. That is, the 1940s saw a relative lack of industrial decentralisation as well as uncertainty over the exact role that the bantustan system was to play in the broader South African economy. These attempts at decentralising industry have to be seen in relation to the uneven development of capital accumulation and the class struggles of the 1940s which placed the question of African labour at the top of the state's agenda. It was only in the mid 1950s that industries began moving out of the urban centres, and only in 1960 was the first real formulations on the decentralisation of industry proposed. This spelt the start of a change in the role of the Bantustans.

2. South African Industrial Development:

The 1940s witnessed a period of rapid industrial development in South Africa. A fundamental aspect to this development was the inordinate impact of state intervention. The state's interventionist policies - stemming from the dynamics of a specific historical conjuncture - had an important bearing on the nature, scale and scope of industrial development. The growth of South Africa's economy and the expansion of its manufacturing sector from 1945 to the early 1970s was facilitated by four aspects of state policy:

- ➔ The policy of import substitution.
- ➔ Direct intervention in production through the creation of parastatal organs and the formation of the Industrial Development Corporation which is responsible for the promotion of industrial dispersal.
- ➔ The repression of working class political and economic struggles.
- ➔ The development of financial institutions and infrastructure (Black and Stanwix, 1986; Stanwix, 1987).

A further impetus for the development of industrial capital was the growth of mineral and agricultural exports. Their contribution to the economy paved the way for higher levels of manufacturing, whose contribution to the economy accounted for a quarter of the National

Income by 1950 (O'Meara, 1983: 226).

A further basis of South Africa's development has been, and continues to be, its valuable mineral resources combined with a vast reservoir of low-cost labour. These conditions also attracted the involvement of foreign based multi-national corporations and financial interests. These foreign firms - linked to Fordism in the advanced states - have often proved to be important world market outlets for South African mineral wealth. As capital-intensive technologies became a significant aspect of the production process, foreign aid provided the technological know-how, as well as the foreign exchange needed to acquire them. Foreign firms, then, have played an important role in the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector which has in recent decades made South Africa the most 'developed' nation on the African continent (Seidman and Seidman, 1976; Black and Stanwix, 1986).

As with Fordism in the advanced capitalist countries, accumulation in South Africa during the post-war era saw the correspondence of the extension of mass production with that of mass consumption. The "accumulation regime" that developed in South Africa was based on the combination of apartheid and import substitution industrialization (Gelb, 1987: 39). This combination led to the consolidation of a racially-distorted Fordist "mode of regulation".¹ The accumulation regime refers to a stabilization of the relationship between consumption and accumulation. It implies a correspondence between:

- the transformation of the conditions of production (i.e. changing technology and labour process associated with the principles of 'scientific management' and the flow-line principle of Henry Ford); and
- the changes in conditions necessary for the reproduction of the working class (Perrons, 1987).

The mode of regulation refers to the norms, habits, laws and regulating networks that sustain (in the short-term) the contingent unity of production and consumption. In other words, it "shapes the behaviour and expectations of economic agents" (Gelb, 1987: 36, see also Gelb, 1991).

Regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are not linked in a functionalist manner, nor are they presented as self-perpetuating. Changes to, and phases of integration and disintegration of, the two are not governed by an abstract 'logic' of capitalism or any 'universal' law of the capitalist mode of production. Rather the expanded reproduction of capitalist accumulation is dependent upon a specific institutional compromise between the contending classes.² As Jessop notes:

"objects of regulation do not pre-exist regulatory practices. Since the latter are never isolated from the class struggle ... it follows that the objects of regulation are always constituted in and through that struggle" (1990: 190).

The distorted version of Fordism that took root in South Africa is reflected in the nature of the social structures which sustained the country's industrial growth. To be sure, racial oppression is (in part) produced by and in turn (partly) reproduces the racial Fordist regime. This must not, however, be interpreted in functionalist terms. As Saul writes, "it need come as no surprise that this linkage between racial domination and class exploitation is as potentially contradictory as it has been mutually reinforcing" (1986: 211).

3. Class Struggle and Capital Accumulation in the 1940s:

Class exploitation based on racial domination was to lay the foundations for many political and economic struggles which, in turn, informed the nature of state policy towards the economic and political participation of South Africa's black people. These struggles - at the point of production and elsewhere - were shaped by the form of state intervention and highlight important characteristics of the apartheid-capitalist state. Firstly, when the capitalist state is studied in particular historical and spatial conditions it becomes clear that it cannot be conceptualised as a monolithic and autonomous entity. Secondly, the state's role involves much more than repression and ideological deception. It also carries the task of constituting and maintaining the relations of production and the social division of labour. The state, as Poulantzas argued, is actively involved in the reproduction of class domination and the organization of the hegemonic bloc (Poulantzas, 1978).³ In the case of South Africa, political class domination was reproduced and maintained by a white

minority government through policies based on a combination of class exploitation and racial subordination.

"The advent of capitalism in South Africa did not rely on the operation of 'invisible hands', rather the state in its racially exclusive policies from segregation to apartheid, facilitated the advent of capitalism through a system of migrancy and influx controls, through an interference in the labour market, to provide for a rightless and minimally paid black labour force" (Sitas *et al*, 1986: 4).

As a result of the form that South African capitalism assumed, political and economic struggles have been an endemic part of South African society. In order for us to appreciate the role of struggle in the transformation of the structure of accumulation in the post-1940 period, a brief sketch of the prevailing socio-economic conjuncture is necessary.

Apart from the contribution that mineral exports, agriculture and state assistance made to the development of secondary industry, a further impetus that facilitated the rapid process of manufacturing was the large-scale influx of Africans from the rural areas into the cities. Between the years 1940 to 1946 another 134 000 Africans entered the industrial labour market (O'Meara, 1983: 227). As a result the African urban population increased to 1.7 million in 1946, a significant increase from 1936 when the population figures stood at 1.1 million (Hindson, 1987). However no concerted efforts were made to curb the mass movement of Africans to the towns. As was mentioned earlier, SEPC in 1942 expressed an interest in decentralisation. Its fifth report argued that stemming the flow of Africans into the 'white' areas requires regions to develop in accordance with their productive capacity. Yet no such development occurred and urbanization continued. A number of factors coincided to produce a situation that was to lead to an intensification of the class struggle by 1948. They were broadly: (a) the breakdown in the subsistence economies of the reserves; (b) the pull factor towards the urban areas; (c) the exploitation and class struggles on the white farms; and (d) inadequate levels of social reproduction in the urban centres.

Conditions in the subsistence economies of the Bantustans at the time were progressively

declining. Due to the stipulations of the 1913 Land Act and its 1936 amendments, African ownership of farm land in South Africa was restricted to 13% of the country's total land area, 22% of which is available arable land. What has resulted is a land-person ratio in black rural areas which are much lower in ratios than in white controlled parts of the country (Nattrass, 1985: 19). A shortage of land and overcrowding in the areas set aside for Africans played an important role in the economic decline of subsistence economies, leading to their inability to subsidize wages. As a result, Africans in large numbers swelled the towns and they tended to remain there because of the demand for their labour. Due to the protectionist policies introduced between the first and second world wars, there occurred a rapid growth in the manufacturing sector which created this demand for African labour. This suggests that a pull factor was exerted from the urban centres as industrial capital expanded.

The rapid development of secondary industry was accompanied by changes to the labour process in manufacturing industry towards mechanization and larger production units. The increase in the organic composition of capital, particularly in large firms, resulted in changes to the racial composition of work with African workers being drawn into semi-skilled operations (Hindson, 1987: 57; O'Meara, 1983: 227), while white labour moved into supervisory and technical positions. Hindson, however, points out that the manufacturing sector generally was still dominated by small and medium size firms that depended largely on African unskilled labour. Both unskilled and semi-skilled African labour were paid considerably lower than whites, thereby reducing labour costs and reinforcing the racial structure of accumulation. As O'Meara notes, the state actively encouraged this rationalization and mechanization process with the use of low paid African labour.

Nevertheless, the rapidity with which African urban migration occurred presented an obstacle to the labour supply of agricultural capital causing severe tensions between the different factions of capital (i.e. urban and agricultural capitalists). In addition to this competition for labour, agricultural capital faced an added problem: rural protests contributed to the rate of African urbanization. The increasing concentration of agricultural capital during the 1940s sparked off intense rural struggles over the land tenure system

when farmers in the Transvaal and Orange Free State attempted to increase the length of African labour-service on the farms. African producers resisted this form of exploitation by fierce peasant uprisings (as in the Lydenburg example), or through desertion which was the major form of rural resistance (O'Meara, 1983). Those who deserted in order to escape the labour tenancy system found their way to the cities to sell their labour power.

The rapidity with which industrialization and urbanization occurred produced a volatile situation of intense protest over wages and living conditions. The pace of industrialisation, furthermore, escalated the dramatic rise of trade union organization and worker militancy. Trade union organisation and activity crossed the divide between migrant workers and those that had settled permanently in the urban areas. In contrast to "the political lethargy of the previous decade", the 1940s was "a period of ferment as political movements adjusted to the new pressures and opportunities created by the popular upheavals accompanying the massive wartime expansion of the African working class" (Lodge, 1983: 11).

The aim here is not to provide a detailed analysis and explanation of the struggles in this period, but to understand the enormous impact they had on the state and its approach to the future role of the Bantustans.⁴ Briefly, however, the issues that struggles revolved around were over low wages; the expensive and/or the chronic shortage of homes in the urban areas; high cost of transport and a range of community issues. The chronic lack of housing produced strong squatter movements, which at times became embroiled in open conflict with the state. Furthermore, there were protests over the pass system and transport fares, liquor raids and food shortages (Lodge, 1983; Stadler, 1983; Hirson, 1989). With these struggles came increasing class mobilisation and organisation: 40% of the urban African working-class was unionized by 1945.⁵

Unions at the time were affiliated to the Council for Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) which came into being as the result of an amalgamation between the Joint Committee of African Trade Unions and the African Clothing Workers Union (LACOM, 1986). Worker militancy and struggles culminated in the African mine workers' strike of 1946 when workers went on strike demanding union recognition, minimum wages and the

end of the migrant labour system. This industrial action was, however, violently suppressed. The course and development of racial capitalism in South Africa sparked off intense protests not only over economic issues, but also over social and political issues. African opposition to the segregationist policies of the 1940s was not confined to the working class or to farm workers. These struggles also encouraged growing political opposition on the part of the African petty bourgeoisie during the war. The demands flowing from the struggles of the working class fused with those of the African National Congress (ANC) for full political rights for all citizens.

In addition to this political instability that black opposition and struggle in the urban areas posed to the white government, the use of semi-skilled African labour posed a challenge to the positions that white workers (i.e. the electorate) held in the labour market. This situation raised serious questions for the government: the future of African urbanization, urban employment and the political control of Africans. Firm 'solutions' were needed to re-establish the conditions necessary for sustained accumulation. The volatile situation in the urban areas, however, contained the distinct potential of crippling the policy formulations of the ruling class. As O'Meara notes:

"Faced with a growing challenge from the oppressed classes and the steady withering away of ideological hegemony over the African population, the United Party (UP) government was able to neither defuse nor to re-impose ideological control. Its own ranks were riven with deep divisions" (1983: 229).

The growing militancy of the African population and increasing urbanization produced an intensification of the struggle amongst the capitalist class itself. Together, these conditions were to lay the basis for the National Party coming to power.

Within this context of growing class struggles in rural as well as the urban centres, and the crisis of political and ideological hegemony, two commissions were established in the late 1940s. The Fagan commission was established by the UP and the Nationalist Party (NP) commissioned the Sauer report. The reports were essentially concerned with the question of African urbanization, the very thorn in the side of the capitalist class. They expressed

divergent views on the African working class in the urban areas as well as those in the Bantustans. Hence the views expressed by the two commissions on urbanization had different implications, in the long-term, for the future of the Bantustans. Over and above the different views on the reproduction of African labour power (Hindson, 1987: 59), there is another important and related difference between the two reports: they expressed the different interests of capital at the time.

The Fagan commission reflected manufacturing capital's desire for a stable, semi-skilled African labour force and spoke loosely of ways of enmeshing them more closely into the capitalist system via modifications to the pass laws, better education and even trade union rights (Saul and Gelb, 1986: 68). The commission argued that a degree of urban unemployment was necessary to ensure a reserve army of labour for industry. This view took as its premise the inevitability of African urbanization, and predicted that Africans would become dependent on wage labour due to the dissolution of the pre-capitalist forms of reproduction. The commission concluded that the Bantustans did not have the ability to support the growing population. In line with the SEPC's fifth report, the Fagan commission recommended that industrial decentralisation should be encouraged to slow down, but not to halt, rural-urban migration.

The commission was, however, ambivalent on the question of political involvement for black people. As a result of the belief that African urbanization was inevitable, the UP "precluded any very large scale commitment to dispersing industries to areas in and around the reserves" (Glaser: 1987, 31). The UP lost to the NP in the 1948 general election precisely because of its policy towards African urbanization (as formulated by the Fagan report). By this time, the NP's policy of racial segregation had succeeded in consolidating a power base among Afrikaner capital and the white working class.

4. Decentralisation Under The National Party (1948 - 1960):

The NP manifesto upon assuming power in 1948 was based on the Sauer Report which favoured agricultural capital. As such strict controls to inhibit farm workers moving to the cities and to redirect the surplus population to white farms were advocated (Hindson: 1987,

59-61). In terms of white farmers' demands the NP moved to maintain labour on the white farms rather than in the reserves (Glaser, 1987). Hence its first years in power did not result in a concerted and explicit approach to industrial decentralisation. What it did introduce was "a hard solution - the freezing of segregation into institutions of Apartheid rather than its liberalization - to racial capitalism's crisis" (Saul and Gelb, 1986: 69). Tightened control over the movement and settlement of labour, rigid differentiation and segregation of races and vigorous political repression were implemented. This laid the basis for the merging of apartheid and capitalist development.

These forms of control were to satisfy the interests of the dominant classes at the time: (a) those of Afrikaner capital, by channelling African labour to the white farms; and (b) the white working class by reinforcing the 'job colour-bar', thereby protecting them against competition from the black working class. Preoccupied with such interests, the NP proceeded with the tightening up of pass laws, influx controls and labour bureaus. Through these means the white working class was placed in a far more favourable position in the labour market. This meant that the conditions for the social reproduction of white labour took an upward turn after 1948. The white workers' positions were

"institutionalized along very similar lines to those of the working classes of the western economies: an increased proportion of this group moved into skilled and supervisory positions in the labour process, with steady rises in real wages making possible the spread of mass consumption of housing and locally produced consumer durables... In this fashion, under consumption was made impossible while whites captured the lion's share of overall production gains" (Gelb, 1987: 39-40).

The NP's grand scheme of Apartheid merely displaced the question of urban Africans and the deteriorating conditions in the reserves without actually solving them. Some theorists, such as Wolpe, have argued that the intensification of racial repression after 1948 was a response to the crisis in the downward slide of subsistence production in the reserves at the time, which in turn led to a crisis in the reproduction of African labour. Against the background of the decline in the pre-capitalist modes of production, what was needed was repressive state intervention, so as to maintain a high rate of exploitation. If wages were

increased to compensate for the erosion of the subsistence economies, capitalism would experience a profitability crisis. To avoid this, influx control, pass laws and the bantustan system were implemented to preserve cheap labour by maintaining temporary migrant labour after the break down of the redistributive economies in the reserves.

This approach, however, suffers from a functionalist interpretation in that it reduces all these forms of control to the needs of capital. What is not explained is the reason for influx control and the Bantustans being maintained and restructured (Hindson, 1987: 8). Another aspect requiring clarification is the ability of the African working class to reproduce itself in the face of repression and the breakdown of pre-capitalist modes of production. By extension, this involves the issue of periodisation and the question of the onset of economic decline in subsistence economies.

In terms of the 'cheap labour' thesis, it is argued that the erosion of the bantustan economies started in the 1930s. Empirical evidence, however, shows the contrary. The Bantustans had increased their share of agricultural output from the mid- 1940s to the 1950s (Hindson, 1987: 8). Only in the late 1950s did the subsistence economies take a downward turn. Thus it may be argued that Wolpe's periodisation of bantustan economic erosion does not correspond with concrete reality. In this regard, the period between the late 1940s and the end of the 1950s is important for an understanding of urbanization and African workers' links with the Bantustans.

The urban work-force grew increasingly from the late 1940s to the end of 1950. Over time a distinction emerged within the ranks of this urban African work-force. One category was those who were fully drawn into wage labour and had settled permanently in the cities. The other category was the temporary migrants, of which a significant proportion still retained ties with rural subsistence economies. Hindson points out that Wolpe's argument and the cheap labour power thesis is congruent for this period - from the late 1940's to the end of the 1950's. It however holds true for only one part of the urbanized African work force - those workers dependent on migrant labour, especially those that worked on the mines.

If the intention behind increasing repression was to secure high rates of exploitation hence

profits, how then were migrant labour and permanent urban labour able to secure their conditions of reproduction? Answers to this may be sought in the developments of the 1950s. By this time the subsistence economies and the basis for cheap labour had eroded significantly. As a result of this temporary migration continued and an increasingly large number of these workers became wholly dependent on wages for their means of reproduction. The pre-capitalist forms of reproduction, then, had declined to such an extent that wages came to replace these subsistence sources of income. Urbanization was encouraged as a result of poor conditions in the reserves, and by 1951 the urban African population increased from 1.7 million in 1946 to 2.3 million (Hindson, 1987: 53; Stadler, 1987: 59). Due to the isolation after the war years, the post-war mining boom and the introduction of protective policies, the first stage of import substitution was by the late 1950's well advanced.

The development of the economy has not proceeded smoothly in that it has been accompanied by an increase in the struggle for liberation waged by the masses in their demands for a greater involvement in the politico-economic institutions of South Africa. The NP increasingly imposed repressive legislation which sparked off much more militant campaigns of resistance that took the forms of overt protests - defiance campaigns, general strikes, rent and bus boycotts and the campaigns against pass laws (Black and Stanwix, 1986: 15). In 1952, under the banner of the Defiance Campaign, people of all races participated in demonstrations against racial laws in accordance with Mahatma Gandhi's practice of *satyagraha* - i.e. passive resistance (Stadler, 1987: 17). In addition to this, trade union and industrial action gained momentum. For example: in Natal renewed worker militancy was launched, primarily through unions affiliated to SACTU. The drop in wages sharpened by the economic stagnation spurred on spontaneous strike activity on the one hand and trade union organization on the other.

Economic struggles such as the 'One-Pound-a-Day' campaign, as Sitas *et al* (1983: 15) point out, were supported by the ANC. These struggles fused with political struggles which sparked a new phase of political unionism that threatened capitalist development. "Such a demand", they continue, "was shocking to employers and for the South African state political trade unionism was an anathema". On a national level these overt forms of

resistance increasingly encouraged the formation of worker organizations and militancy as their struggles fused with broader political struggles. According to the apartheid state, the reason for the turbulence in South Africa at the time was the poverty and destitution in the Bantustans which led to the politicization of Africans. So by the 1950s the state showed a renewed interest in the decentralisation policy in an attempt to overcome the tensions within racial capitalism. To this end, the Tomlinson Commission was set up in the 1950s.

A systematic programme for the dispersal of industry only really emerged when the Tomlinson Commission reported in 1955. The report was largely a response to the agricultural crisis of the Bantustans. This commission, however, went beyond an attempt to reformulate the decline in agriculture. It explicitly sought to demonstrate the inter-dependence between bantustan development, racial segregation and "white survival" (Glaser, 1987: 31-32). It saw the increasing politicization of Africans in the urban areas as being the result of:

"the detribalisation of the Bantu and the breaking up of their organic tribal units; their urbanization, their contact with western culture and ways of life and the integration of a large portion of the Bantu into the political and economic life of the European" (Glaser, 1987: 31-32).

On this premise the commission's proposals to arrest African urbanization composed of broadly two parts: one comprising of mechanisms to deal with the deteriorating conditions in rural agriculture and, the other involving the question of industrial decentralisation as a means of absorbing the bantustan population.

The Tomlinson proposals were, however, rejected because the ruling class saw them as radical and as going against the segregationist policies at the time. The commission's recommendations on agriculture comprised of two components. One was the abolition of communal tenure and the differentiation of the bantustan population into 'two chief classes', one class engaged in agriculture and the other employed in industrial activity. In terms of industrial dispersal, it was proposed that white capital invest in the Bantustans. The government's 1956 white paper rejected, firstly, the land tenure proposals because they

were seen as possible means that would undermine the authority of the chiefs who depended on communal land tenure. Secondly, white investment and activity in the Bantustans would contradict the segregation policy of the NP and the belief that Bantustans should develop autonomously. The NP at the time preferred to direct capital to the 'white' areas on the outskirts of the Bantustans, rather than promoting industrialization within the Bantustans.

Recommendations for border industrialization were also expressed by the Viljoen Commission, which, in line with the Tomlinson report, emphasized that the increasing number of Africans in the 'white' urban areas posed as a political danger to the ruling class. In attempting to make the border industry programme attractive to capital, the Viljoen report identified cheap African labour as a prime advantage of border locations and advised that outlying areas continue to be exempted from wage rate stipulations (Glaser, 1987: 33).

While the 1956 White Paper rejected the Tomlinson proposals, it did however focus on mechanisms which would facilitate industrial decentralisation. Towards such an end, serious preparatory work began in 1958 when a committee was established to investigate the possibilities of border areas, as well as, to provide the ground work for the border industrial programme.⁶ Whilst the initial strategy of the NP was to prevent the emergence of an African bourgeoisie in the reserves so as to secure a pool of labour for white capitalists, concerted efforts were made in the 1950s to create an African elite in these areas.

"The deliberate nurturing of a Black aspirant bourgeoisie formed part of a broader strategic recognition of the necessity to let loose the forces of class stratification in the Bantustans. The Bantustan strategy of class polarization is to be distinguished from the Reserve strategy of class levelling" (Molteno, quoted in Saul and Gelb, 1986: 102).

For this reason the Bantu Investment Corporation was set up in 1959 with the task of buying up white-owned enterprises and selling them to African entrepreneurs (Glaser, 1987). The creation of an African privileged class was to serve as the political platform for

bantustan independence. In 1959 the legislative mechanisms for the political independence of the Bantustans were instituted with passing of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (Stadler, 1987:135). However, in terms of economic and industrial activity for the Bantustans, the final push towards a concerted dispersal of industry in terms of the state came after the Sharpeville uprising. The defiance campaigns of the 1950s culminated in the major anti-pass protest in 1960. The police opened fire on demonstrators in Sharpeville in March 1960, killing 69 and injuring 180. Following this the NP declared a state of emergency and banned the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress.

5. Border Industrialization in the 1960s:

The emergence of the border industry policy has to be contextualized against the economic and political repression that characterized the 1960s. Apart from the banning of African political organizations, Legassick argues that the only way the state could re-impose its hegemony - following the black opposition in the 1950s and the Sharpeville massacre - was to unleash

"a campaign of massive and ruthless repression and torture waged against an underground sabotage movement and isolated local outbursts of rural rebellion... For the moment blacks retreated to sullen apathy while the remnants of the cadres regrouped in exile to attempt guerrilla struggle" (1974: 278).

As Saul and Gelb (1986) point out, state repression, the fragmentation of the African working class and the maintenance of low wages in the short-term proved to be effective for economic growth. Such measures enhanced increases in profit levels thereby allowing for massive economic growth in the 1960s. Fundamental to the repression strategy during this period was the heightened and vigorous enforcing of the pass laws, forced resettlement and the erection of townships in the Bantustans. By the late 1960's onwards housing provision in the urban areas had declined, while the provision of new housing was restricted to the Bantustans. The state began to reverse African urbanization by relocating whole townships from the urban centres to the Bantustans (Hindson, 1987: 71).

A further crucial component of state strategy was the dispersal of industry to the borders of the Bantustans, which was seen as a mechanism to absorb the bantustan population. In this sense it corresponded with the extension of racial capitalism that marked the 1960's, precisely because it was intended to retard African urbanization, and to confine their political, economic and social activities within the Bantustans.

In June of 1960, when Dr. Verwoerd, then Prime Minister, presented the first comprehensive statement on industrial decentralisation, he emphasized the significance of decentralisation as a means of reversing the drift of Africans to 'white' areas. In addition, reserves were stabilized in terms of the betterment schemes that were established in the 1940's. A number of growth points were established while a range of incentives were introduced with the intention of enticing investment in these regions. The incentives offered were quite extensive and comprised of tax compensation for relocation, the construction and lease of factory buildings, railway tariffs and concessions, the provision of infrastructure and the provision of housing for whites, as well as exemptions from wage regulating measures (Glaser, 1987). The latter was justified by factors such as lower productivity of labour and the lower cost of living in the border areas.

With the exception of a small number of favourably located growth points, the border areas programme met with little success. Its failure lies in its inability to create the desired number of jobs that would absorb the bantustan population and thereby reduce the flow of African urbanization. The first decade of the programme saw the creation of 87 000 jobs in the border areas, which is a short-fall 50 000 jobs a year in terms of the target set by the Tomlinson commission.

As a result of this, the state adjusted two policies which influenced the first stages of industrial dispersal. In 1967, the government passed a law limiting the further development of certain industries in scheduled areas, which infuriated sections of capital. Section Three of the Physical Planning Act stipulated that ministerial consent was required for new factories or factory extension involving increased African employment in the main urban centres of three of South Africa's four provinces. Then again in 1968 the government allowed white private capital to invest in the Bantustans in terms of the 'agency system'.

In terms of this white investors were, in theory, merely agents of black development. The NP envisaged maintaining the links between the labour force from the Bantustans and urban industrial centres through long distance commuting. In cases where an industrial centre is close to the Bantustans, townships from the urban areas would be relocated and workers would commute daily to work. Where the Bantustans are a great distance away from an industrial centre, families would be relocated to the Bantustans while workers would live in urban hostels and would commute to their families.

The scale of industrial decentralisation, however, was insufficient in creating the number of jobs needed to absorb the bantustan surplus population. The growth rate of job creation in manufacture in the border and bantustan areas for the period 1967-1968 to 1979 was 5.3% per annum. As Glaser (1987) points out it was not significantly different from 1961-1962 to 1967-1968 when there was a 5.2% increase in the annual rate of registration. Nevertheless, the borders and Bantustans did increase their share of manufacturing employment in the late 1960s from 11.75% to 15.4% in the late 1970s. What then, made the growth points in the Bantustans favourable points for manufacture during this period? The impetus for the decentralisation of industry has to be conceptualized, firstly, within an understanding of the uneven progression of capitalism, and, secondly, against the background of certain concrete changes in capitalist production and reproduction. Capital's movement away from the major metropolitan centres during the 1960s was a reaction to the slow down in the economy on an international and national scale. From 1960 to 1970, the average annual rate of growth of manufacturing employment in the urban industrialized areas declined from 5.9% between 1961 and 1967 to 2.1% between 1967-1968 and 1979 (Bell, 1973). This may be explained in terms of the move towards an increase in the organic composition of capital and the decline in unskilled labour in the urban centres. The rise in labour costs in the urban areas, due to changes in the labour processes precipitated the relocation of certain types of industry. The slow-down of the economy, together with the increase in international competition that began in the late 1960s, heightened the tendency for labour-intensive industries like clothing and textiles to relocate to cheap labour zones in and around the Bantustans.

Industrial decentralisation, however, during the 1960s and 1970s - especially to relatively

distant growth points like Isithebe and Babelegi - was not viewed as much of a success by development planners or apartheid politicians (Glaser, 1987: 41). In short, not enough jobs were created to eradicate the high levels of poverty and destitution in the Bantustans. The Bantustans' level of poverty, landlessness and destitution accelerated throughout this period. As Hindson (1987) points out, the effects of influx control in the late 1960s did not retard urbanization. They did, however, displace the surplus African population to Bantustans on the peripheries of the urban industrial centres. Overcrowding and destitution continued to push people towards the urban centres and to strengthen their links, albeit unequally, with the national economy. Hence, they mitigated against the maintenance of a separation between the Bantustans and 'white' South Africa.

African workers now engaged in cross-border commuting between the Bantustans and the white areas, while their dependents came to rely more and more on wages for their means of reproduction (Glaser, 1987: 72). The growth in the bantustan population was in part the result of state relocation programmes. The policy of the apartheid state to dump the surplus population in the Bantustans exacerbated the divide between the levels of subsistence in urban and rural areas. At the time when influx control was implemented with rigour, urban wages rose relative to rural wages and this served to widen the gap between the rural and the urban work-force.

The state's policy to relocate Africans to the Bantustans merely deepened rural poverty and increased rural workers' decision to move to the metropolitan areas. However, the problems were much wider than bantustan degradation. Serious contradictions within the broader structure of the racial capitalist regime of accumulation began to emerge in the late 1960s, following the economic boom of the early 1960s. Furthermore, the urban centres experienced their own problems arising out of the nature of industrialisation under racial capitalism. Industry in the 1960s expanded rapidly and concentrated in the urban centres. In such areas the demand for labour power had surpassed the supply of a settled urban labour-force, especially that of semi-skilled labour. The late 1960s saw changes in the labour process of urban industries as unskilled work declined and semi-skilled and technical labour experienced a substantial growth. Simultaneously, unemployment grew faster than employment, due to the decline in agricultural employment and industry's

inability to generate enough jobs to absorb the unemployed.

The economic crisis of the late 1960s spilled over into the 1970s. This, in turn, placed further strains on the NP's attempts to pursue a policy of racially-divided industrialisation. The concept of "crisis" denotes a situation when the institutions and relations which maintain and regulate accumulation are no longer capable of ensuring sustained accumulation. A resolution of this crisis required the transformation of these institutions and processes. To be sure, a crisis represents a period of "heightened conflict in society, as social groups struggle to dominate this process of change" (Gelb, 1991: 10). The limits on the consumer market, the shortages of skilled labour and the poverty in the Bantustans coincided to produce a potentially threatening situation to the ruling class. In addition to this, organized industry and commerce called for the relaxation of influx control (to increase the settled urban population) as well as lifting the restrictions on the urban labour markets (to enhance worker mobility in the urban areas). The early 1970s also saw the development of independent African trade unions which led to growing struggles over union recognition, wages and work conditions. Trade union organization here again crossed the divide between urban/migrant workers as it revealed the hardships of proletarian migrant labour, and the myth of subsistence economies.

6. The Crisis of Racial Fordism:

By the late 1960s aspects of the state's repressive policies, such as the imposition of taxes, land restrictions, the compound system, the migrant labour system, all geared to maintain and extend a cheap supply of labour, stifled the growth of the economy. The limitations of the racial Fordist growth model and its contribution to the crisis is depicted in the manufacturing sector.⁷ The most important sector in the economy is the manufacturing sector. Its contribution to the economy exceeds that of the primary sectors - mining, quarrying, agriculture, forestry and fishing (Seidman and Seidman, 1977: 17). Statistics for 1985 reveal that it made the highest contribution to the total GDP (22.8%) and accounted for 27% of total non-agricultural employment. But its growth from the 1920s to the 1970s has never been hermetically sealed off from the underdevelopment and poverty by which it is surrounded (1977: 10). This is so because its development did not accompany a

significant increase in the living standards of the vast majority of the population. The average wage in all sectors of the economy for Africans remained below the poverty datum line. In the manufacturing sector, during the 1970s, Black wages averaged about 20.2% of those of whites. Such low wages had been maintained by a combination of the state's apartheid policies and "racial despotism" in the labour process.

The net result was a predominately low-wage economy which limited the scope for the expansion in the production of final consumer goods, intermediate and capital goods (Black and Stanwix, 1986: 9). Black and Stanwix (1986) highlight the various symptoms of the recession: employment growth rates for the sector had declined steadily and had been negative for a few years. A further reflection of this downward slide was the steadily declining GDP since the mid 1960s. Apart from this unemployment had increased to an alarming level, and while official statistics marked it at eight percent, unofficial estimates suggested that the rate was in the region of 30%. The rate of inflation remained high, having exceeded 10% since 1974. A further factor that compounded the economic crisis was South Africa's underdeveloped capital goods sector, which is reflected in the growing levels of imports of machinery in the 1960s. As a result, policy makers faced difficulties in maintaining a positive balance of payments. This required the imposition of temporary quantitative import controls as well as restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The crisis was also precipitated by the very weak competitive basis of the South African industry internationally due to its lack of economies of scale and its dependence on foreign investment/imports.

The crisis, then, revealed the contradictions within the racial Fordist regime of accumulation. In addition to its function as a regime of accumulation, having as its premise the fundamental restructuring of the labour process by incorporating workers' knowledge and skills into machinery and technologies, Fordism also functions as a mode of regulation. The latter is comprised of the social relations, institutions and norms necessary to sustain the continual adaptation of mass consumption to productivity gains. South Africa's apartheid-based mode of regulation secured relatively high standards of living among the white population. For instance, white workers were able to purchase cars, homes and other consumer goods. These levels of consumption, in turn, provided the impetus for higher

levels of production. This upsurge in the buying and spending power of the working class was precipitated by the growth in income levels with the increase in productivity levels. Due to the racial nature of Fordism in South Africa, this "success" was achieved at a great social cost. Racial Fordism is characterized by "an inherent structural paradox" of rapid industrialization in the midst of mass poverty (Seidman and Seidman, 1977: 10-15).

One area which reflects this problem, as has been mentioned, is the demand factor. Production of manufactured goods for the internal market had been geared primarily towards meeting the demands of a fairly narrow, but nonetheless dominant middle upper income group. Thus the size of the local market is constrained by the country's highly uneven and skewed income levels. The lack of educational and residential facilities for Africans in the urban areas hindered the development of a suitably skilled labour force. The state's policy of strict influx controls - although failing to curb the process of urbanization - did erode the economic potential of urbanization. These policies depressed the demand for housing, infrastructure and a wide range of related consumer commodities (Black and Stanwix, 1986: 14).

A second factor is the significant dependence on the export of primary materials and the growth in demand internationally. The South African economy has come to rely heavily upon the exports of agricultural and mining products in order: (a) to minimize the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments; and (b) to finance the imports of capital goods and foreign technology which constitutes the largest import item. A survey conducted in the 1980s shows that 84% of new technology embodied in machinery was imported (Black and Stanwix 1986: 17-22). The prices of mineral exports did not, however, keep pace with those of the manufactured products during the post-war period. The policy of import substitution in South Africa, as the regulation theorists argue, had to confront a declining balance of payments coupled with rising inflation.

In the late 1970s a sustained and deepening crisis of racial capitalism faced the ruling class. The heightened opposition of community and township struggles, deepening economic crisis and spreading international hostility to apartheid all contributed to the crisis of legitimacy that confronted both the state and capital. This stems directly from the manner

in which the development of capitalism fused with the development of apartheid ideology. The ruling class, during the apartheid period, had always sought to maintain real economic and political power in white hands. For any capitalist system to function it must not only control and exploit labour economically, it must also exert its political, cultural and social hegemony in society. As Marx argued, the ruling ideas in society are those of the ruling class. However, under racial capitalism the re-enforcing of political and economic domination through apartheid ideology is a complex issue. At the very centre of the relationship between the political and economic lies an added contradiction, over and above class exploitation, that of racial oppression.

Apartheid reinforced capital expansion in the 1960s through repressive measures such as the intensification of pass controls, relocations, etc. These mechanisms coincided with the second condition that contributed to capital expansion in the 1960s: a segmented labour market (Hindson, 1987). The processes that sustained the high levels of growth in the 1960s became dysfunctional to the process of capital accumulation by the 1970s. By the 1980s the racial oppression associated with the development of apartheid-capitalism resulted in rising levels of political mobilisation and struggle by African workers, with a considerable overlap between class consciousness and racial consciousness. Both the state and capital were confronted not only by the resistance to apartheid, but also by an opposition to the capitalist system itself. It is in this context that we should read the comments of Jan Steyn (executive director of the urban foundation) when he said: priority has to be given to "the maintenance of the free enterprise system" and the "survival of everything we hold dear" (cited in Zille, 1983: 62). Hence in the 1980s:

"The emphasis is increasingly upon the imperatives of integrated regional development and, as befits the renewed saliency of free market ideology, upon the need for a free run for the private sector across the line full sweep of South Africa in order to facilitate growth" (Saul and Gelb, 1986: 106).

In an effort to overcome the crisis the ruling class formulated an offensive by modifying aspects to the agenda. To this end, the Riekert commission on Manpower Utilization of 1979 was established. Its recommendations played a pivotal role in the formulation of the

new strategy which was based on making the divide between urban and rural Africans as salient as the divide between ethnic groupings (Zille, 1983: 62). Its primary focus was the urban labour market and the living conditions of urban Africans. It gave little attention to workers in the Bantustans, apart from recognizing the border industry programme. The report gave recognition to the existence of urban Africans and moved to secure employment opportunities by reducing the competition for jobs in the urban areas from the rural work force. In this respect the commission drew a distinction between insider Africans with residence rights under section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, and outsiders whose political claims are restricted to the Bantustans and who have temporary employment in white areas (Cobbett *et al*, 1987: 3). The report based its recommendations on a dualistic model of the division of the politico-economic into capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors: the white areas and the Bantustans.

"Pushing dualism to an extreme it was assumed that Bantustans could be turned into independent and viable economic entities, and their labour markets sealed off from the urban areas officially defined as white" (Hindson, 1987: 85).

A number of factors led to the breakdown of this conception. The Bantustans were increasingly integrated into the core economy, despite all the efforts to introduce territorial apartheid. According to Nattrass (1985: 23) the rural areas are linked to the other sectors of the economy through the export of labour power from the subsistence sector. Following Wolpe, she labels the Bantustans as labour reservoirs. However her analysis of rural poverty is spatially and temporally insensitive. As a result of this an inadequate account of the different forms of transformation in rural poverty is provided. While certain areas in the Bantustans may fit Nattrass' arguments, it is not true for all rural areas. This is so due to the functions that certain areas in the Bantustans now play as a result of industrial decentralisation. In addition to this kind of integration - i.e. the sale of labour power from rural areas - commodity markets and the monetary system also served to integrate the Bantustans into the national economy (Hindson, 1987: 85).

The transformation in the economic relationship between the Bantustans and the national economy from the late 1960s stems from the very problems in the political economy. That

is, the erosion of migrant labour's means of reproduction, capital's tendency to relocate to the borders of the Bantustans as well as to the breakdown of bureaucratic labour control measures. Another flaw in Nattrass' (1985) analysis is a failure to consider the pervasive nature of African urbanization, which by the 1970s resulted in significant increases in squatter settlements in and on the borders of the metropolitan centres. The increase in squatter settlements, together with the rise in cross-border commuting, made the commuter population indistinguishable from the urban insiders (Cobbett *et al*, 1987: 4). It also showed the weakening of labour control mechanisms, as regional and urban labour markets were in formation (Hindson, 1987: 86). The manner in which the Bantustans have come to be integrated into the national economy over time has resulted in the abandonment of: (a) the dualistic conception of capitalist and pre-capitalist; and (b) the notion that the bantustan can develop as autonomous political and economic entities. The reformulation of industrial decentralisation policies from the late 1970s onwards reflects the inextricable links between the Bantustans and the national economy.

7. Industrial Decentralisation in the 1980s - Towards a Regional Strategy:

Industrial dispersal is not unique to South Africa and has been pursued by industrialists in advanced western economies (Dewar, 1987: 154; Black and Stanwix, 1986: 32) as well in the developing countries (Lipietz, 1986; Southall, 1987; Storper and Scott, 1986; Rogerson, 1987). The dispersal of industries is not confined to inter-regional relocation because capitalists extend beyond national boundaries. Upheavals and crises in the valorisation process are resolved, at least for a while, by a variety of means. Industrial dispersal is one response to crises. In South Africa the form and manner in which the dispersal of industries have been implemented is in a sense unique. This is so because economic dispersal and economic exploitation had been linked to racial domination. The regional strategy of the 1980s was intended to preserve the racial and class domination as far as possible. This strategy was foreshadowed by the Carlton Conference of November 1979. The plan divided South Africa into eight and later nine regions according to development needs, development potential, functional relationships and physical characteristics. Within these regions there were eleven deconcentration points and forty nine industrial development

points. Of these twenty one were in the so called white areas and twenty eight in the Bantustans. The policy did not, however, deviate from the objective of the racial capitalist programme of creating independent Bantustans. The difference between the 1980s strategy and past efforts at industrial dispersal is the regional framework adopted in the former, wherein economic decentralisation is tied into the political decentralisation required to retain the ethnic basis of the Bantustans (Zille, 1983: 65). The strategy was unveiled at a conference attended by the state and big capital in 1981 and took effect in 1982.

The regional strategy contained a number of modifications which distinguished it from previous policies. First, the nature and level of the incentives were designed according to the development needs of the functional regions which cut across bantustan boundaries. Second, although the number of the growth points were increased, attention was to be directed to a limited number of growth points. Furthermore, the incentive package had been upgraded and was meant to render long-term assistance. In contrast, the short-term incentives were to be paid in cash (linked to the number of workers employed) and were no longer offered as tax concessions. A further introduction to the new scheme was the setting up of the Development Bank of Southern Africa. Lastly, indirect fiscal disincentives replaced direct controls on metropolitan centres (Wellings and Black, 1987: 186-187; Zille, 1983). The incentives differed across regions, between different growth points and between white areas and the Bantustans. They were structured into "a variety of distinct packages" that included wage subsidies, transport rebates, training grants, interest and rental subsidies, relocation subsidies and price preference on tenders (Wellings and Black, 1987).

According to the apartheid state, there was no deviation from the political goal of creating independent Bantustans. In this sense Zille (1983) points out that the policy contained political non-negotiables, that was the ethnically-based partition of South Africa. The reorganization of the political spectrum was fundamentally tied in with the economic reorganization of South Africa's political economy for the preservation of racial capitalism. To this end the ruling class, at the time, believed that "a more balanced development action in a regional context is necessary in order to carry the policy of separate development to its logical conclusions" (Zille, 1983: 63). Dr. Connie Mulder, in 1978, defined what is meant by 'logical conclusions', when he said:

"If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are concerned, there will not be one black man with South African citizenship... Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this parliament to accommodate these people politically" (cited in Zille, 1983: 63).

Central to this political partition was the preservation of the capitalist system. As Lombard noted:

"if an unqualified one-man-vote election was held today in the Republic a non-white leader with a communistic programme will probably attain an overall majority based on a pledge to confiscate and redistribute property of the privileged classes" (1983: 64).

To maintain the structure of accumulation the Bantustans were firmly drawn into the capitalist system and were seen as important tools for the preservation of capitalism. This is made evident in the following:

"all states involved in the action of regional development support the principles of the free market system, with its emphasis on private initiative and profit motive as the main driving force, is the best stimulation for attaining the desired economic level. In the new scheme of incentives for industrial development on a regional basis, full acknowledgement is given to the free market system and the key role which the private sector in particular has to play in this development" (Villiers, 1982: 2).

The private sector's involvement in the programme was to ensure the economic stability and viability of the Bantustans so that a political and constitutional objective, within either a confederal or federal framework, could succeed. The economic and political imperatives coincided with a broad conception of depoliticization. This refers to the removal of functions and services such as the provision of housing etc. from state sphere and placing such functions in the hands of the private sector. The basis of either model, however,

remained the ethnic fragmentation of the African population. In this sense economic decentralisation was indelibly linked with political decentralisation. The intention was to create a sound economic base in the Bantustans so as to prevent migration across the boundaries. To this end, economic decentralisation in the 1980s can be seen as a sophisticated form of influx control, with a shift away from the 1960s trend of direct coercion, to one where the control of African movement and settlement lied in economic incentives in the form of employment opportunities in the Bantustans.

The Bantustans, fragmented along ethnic lines, were envisaged to be the government of the African population, while for those residing in areas outside the Bantustans a municipal level based again on ethnicity and a central government made of coloureds, Indians and whites were introduced (Zille, 1983: 67; Cobbett et al, 1987). In the attempts at maintaining ethnic divisions, the ruling class's hegemonic project entrenched the fragmentation of the working class through the creation of spatial or regional labour markets. In the urban areas, where ethnic differences had been marginalized, the aim was to provide upward class mobility for the African working class, thereby integrating them into the apartheid-capitalist system. Such co-option, if successful, would have lent a certain amount of stability to the ruling class's programme of economic and political preservation.

THE UNEVEN PROCESSES OF INDUSTRIALISATION IN ISITHEBE

1. Spatial Context and Industrial Relocation:

Capitalism does not develop evenly on a "flat plain surface endowed with ubiquitous raw materials and homogeneous labour supply with equal transport and communication facilities in all directions" (Harvey; 1982; 415). Rather, as Harvey quoting Marx points out, capitalism is

"inserted, grows and spreads within a richly variegated geographical environment

which encompasses great diversity in the munificence of nature and in labour productivity, which is a gift, not of nature, but of a history embracing thousands of centuries" (416).

Industrial penetration into Isithebe, and the motives underpinning the designation of the area as a growth point, are attributable to the history of the South African political-economy and the desire to establish the legitimacy and viability of the Kwa-Zulu bantustan.

As a result of the uneven geographical development of capitalism, the changes brought to bear on the spatial make-up do not occur or progress evenly. When the first attempts to systematically implement the decentralisation scheme were made in the 1960s, Isithebe was a typical rural community. It was declared a growth point late in the 1960s. When the state introduced the agency system in 1968, permitting white capital to invest in the Bantustans, Isithebe was one of the first growth points to be developed. During the first stages of development the industrial area was administered by the Black Investment Corporation (BIC) which was established in 1959. In 1978 the Corporation of Economic Development (CED), which had taken over the tasks of the BIC, was responsible for the area. In 1984, the Kwa-Zulu Finance and Investment Corporation (KFC) assumed responsibility for the industrial centre. The industrial estate was owned by the KFC which was established by the CED. The KFC was constituted in terms of the Kwa-Zulu Corporations Act 14 of 1984 and was made to appear as an 'autonomous' body. Controlled by a ten person board of directors, the body reported to the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly via the minister of economic affairs, a portfolio held by the then Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu, M.G. Buthelezi.

The statutory objectives of the KFC may be summarized as the "promotion of economic development in Kwa-Zulu through investment in, and the provision of support services to all forms of enterprise within the region".⁸

According to the KFC publication, 'Development', marketing strategies and natural growth factors have worked together to impel development in Isithebe. The manner in which the

area attracted capital epitomizes the drive and initiative of capitalism and the number of networks and communication linkages at its disposal. Mr. A explained that this was achieved

"through advertising based on promotions, either by way of brochures and letters [or] personal contact. We derive information from market research sources and then we target our market on the information - we look at the nature of industries. But we also advertise on Radio South Africa and in the Financial Mail and other business periodicals. And added to this we also have two foreign agents, one in the Far East and the other in Europe, more specifically in the United Kingdom, to promote investment in the region" (Mr.A; KFC spokesperson: 1989).

Since the first factory, Skema Engineering, started its operations in Isithebe in 1971, the number of factories have increased steadily. A brief review indicates that in 1976 sixteen plants employing approximately 1336 people had been established in the area, with capital investment totalling R6.8 million. During the 1970s, however, industrial growth was still sluggish compared to that of the 1980s. The era that marked the Good Hope Proposals in 1982 witnessed the number of firms increase from sixteen to fifty eight. In 1983, the area accounted for seventy two firms and by 1985 ninety one companies were in operation. One hundred and twenty one firms were established by the end of 1986. By January 1988, one hundred and forty seven firms were reported to be operating in the area. During 1988, twenty two new plants were founded bringing the aggregate number to one hundred and sixty nine firms (Mr.A; KFC spokesperson: 1989).

The KFC regarded the industrial park as one of the most successful and biggest industrial growth point away from the four major metropolitan areas in South Africa. The intention here is not to compare Isithebe's economic performance with that of other decentralized or deconcentration points. Rather the task here is to seek out the underlying reasons for capitalists' decision to (re)locate to Isithebe. What has made Isithebe such a favourable point of location among capitalists? This is attributable to a number of factors which includes its physical make-up and its strategic location:

- Isithebe is one of the few sites in Kwa-Zulu which boasts enough flat land for industrial use;
- it is well supplied with water from the Tugela River;
- it is close to the national road and not too far (approximately 100 km) from both Durban and Richards Bay. Durban more so than Richards bay, offers major port and market facilities;
- the area offers extensive services such as refuse disposal; a fire service; gas-from-coal plant; and is the only growth point to have its own rail shunting facility. Furthermore, the increase in the number of industries coincided with the demand for a marshalling yard and approximately four kilometres of track railways were built.

What the above picture paints is the extent to which capitalist penetration has benefited from and affected the physical make-up of Isithebe. Carved out of an ordinary flat piece of rural land, the area can now be seen as a thoroughly burgeoning industrial region. Nevertheless, over and above its physical features, there are additional equally important factors that contributed to capitalist investment in the area. These are discussed below.

2. The Role of Buthelezi and INKATHA in Attracting Investment:

Any understanding of capitalist investment and regional development, during the apartheid era, would have to acknowledge the part played by homeland leaders in ensuring further investment in the Bantustans. Their role was directly tied to creating and maintaining the politico-social environment for the accumulation and regulation of capitalism on a regional level. Adequate recognition must be given to regional social dynamics. In the case of Isithebe these include the role that Buthelezi, INKATHA and the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) played in: (i) drawing investment to the region; and (ii) ensuring that the conditions for the favourable exploitation of labour exist. The large numbers of industries locating to Isithebe, at the time, was tied in closely with Buthelezi's advocacy for the 'free enterprise system' and against the application of sanctions. A strong protagonist of the capitalist system, he campaigned against disinvestment and sanctions at home and abroad. He tirelessly urged capitalists to invest in Kwa-Zulu, in the name of

development and upliftment of impoverished areas.

Buthelezi's support for the capitalist system did not go unnoticed by Isithebe factory owners and many referred to Buthelezi's belief in the system. He was praised for the amount of "upliftment" he brought to the area through new jobs created and his anti-disinvestment position. His efforts to meet the general requirements for capitalist accumulation and regulation is one of the strong factors that made Isithebe a favourable site for investment. This investment drive, together with the KFC's efforts abroad, resulted in a number of local as well as foreign⁹ firms establishing branch plants in Isithebe and other parts of Kwa-Zulu. The level of Isithebe's dependency on foreign investments was extensive as such investments totalled R64 million compared to the KFC's R36 million. In addition to this, 13% of the work-force in Isithebe were in the employ of foreign firms (Mr.A; KFC spokesperson: 1989) .

The mounting calls for sanctions in the 1980s were countered by Buthelezi through claims that disinvestment will cripple the economy, cause massive unemployment and culminate in dire poverty for Africans, making it difficult for a black government to take over power in the country. In order to encourage investment he formed close links with Western governments like Britain, Israel, West Germany and the United States. Clearly this fraternizing with foreign governments was "related in the short-term to the disinvestment/sanctions campaign, and in the long-term to the political and economic future these interests would like to see in South Africa" (Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 101). Buthelezi's own interests were thus closely related to capital's interests in securing political and social conditions conducive to a free market economy. Precisely because of this, his role in the political and economic development of Isithebe cannot be ignored. Yet regional social formations cannot be seen as fitting neatly and completely into all national and foreign political and economic programmes. A pessimistic functionalism must at all costs be avoided. As Lipietz warns:

"if we regard the dominant strata within dominated countries simply as puppets of foreign powers or if we make a broad distinction between the 'world bourgeoisie' and the 'peoples of the world', we will be unable to analyse the infinite number of

divergent interests which intellectually, we group into force-fields, but which are in actual fact simply pursuing local or locally materialized interests" (Lipietz, 1987).

This observation is also relevant to our task of making sense of Buthelezi's and INKATHA's role and interests in the political economy of KwaZulu-Natal during the 1980s.

The KFC is somewhat like a large monopoly corporation - a parent corporation with a number of subsidiaries.¹⁰ Apart from 'owning' and initiating development project in the four industrial sites in Kwa-Zulu, another project established by the KFC is the Ithala Bank. Its target groups are the small investors, small savers and migrants. The bank operates on two levels - on the one level it enables clients to accumulate wealth, and on another level it provides assistance to the KFC (P. Forsyth, 1990).¹¹ Other operations that the KFC is involved in include sorghum industries - the corporation has invested in sorghum malt plants at Isithebe, Sorghum Breweries at Mhadadene, Imbali and Ngwelezana. The Ondini Shopping Mall was set up in Ulundi at a cost of R8.5 million. Other business operations and subsidiaries of the KFC are: Ulundi Workshop and Filling Station; Amabele Malt Plant; Zululand Furniture Factory; Kwa-Zulu Housing Company; Kwa-Zulu Finance; Amabele Breweries. Finally INKATHA directly owns an investment holding company - Khulani Holding, who had as one of its directors, Simon Conco. Conco later became general secretary of UWUSA (Green, 1986; Mare and Hamilton, 1987).

INKATHA is structurally interwoven into the capitalist system in two ways. The first of this is capital's involvement with certain people in the Kwa-Zulu region, and secondly, the organization's fundamental role in participating and initiating projects (Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 106). The source of Buthelezi's power lay in his status within the KFC. The Kwa-Zulu Corporation Act (14 of 1984) conferred enormous power on the minister of economic affairs. This portfolio was held by Buthelezi. Through this position Buthelezi had the power to intervene and control the economic activities in the Kwa-Zulu region. In his capacity as minister of economic affairs, Buthelezi had the authority to appoint the KFC's board of directors, as well as to arrange for the shares of the South African Development

Trust to be transferred to the KFC. This enabled the KFC to operate as one of the economic appendages of the Kwa-Zulu state. As minister of economic affairs, Buthelezi had a significant amount of control and power over the economic involvement of the KFC. When the Kwa-Zulu government assumed control over the KFC's share holdings in 1987, Buthelezi's political control over the corporation became clearly evident.

Such projects, as well as the nature and level of KFC involvement, clearly spell out INKATHA and Buthelezi's keen and deep-seated interests in what was a fundamentally exploitative and oppressive social, economic and political system. INKATHA's involvement in and Buthelezi's support for the capitalist system provided investors with confidence to (re)locate to Isithebe. In addition, the establishment of the INKATHA aligned trade union - UWUSA - was used by many employers to prevent workers from organising with COSATU (see chapter four for more detail).

3. A Pool of Readily Available Labour:

The dispersal of industry has as one of its tenets the curbing of the African influx into the urban areas. Influx control measures had resulted in a population swell in the Bantustans, which in turn has proved to be a major incentive for employers. The 1982 revised decentralisation strategy emphasized the economic interdependence of the Bantustans and 'white' South Africa. In doing so the reformulated proposals saw a major shift away from the traditional Verwoerdian ideology, for reasons already discussed, as attention was drawn towards a more 'rational' economic development programme. According to some theorists (such as Cobbett *et al*, 1987) this re-organization of the policy is a mechanism for the creation of viable economic foundations to give legitimacy to political units of a future federal or confederal state. Selected areas with better growth potential were identified, while less emphasis was placed on remoter Bantustans. Industrial decentralisation and capital's penetration into the Bantustans were justified on the basis that such activity would provide employment for the masses of unemployed thereby generating growth. Wellings and Black (1987) argue that while the policy has directly and indirectly led to major job losses in the urban centres, it has had little success in absorbing the vast numbers of jobless people in the Bantustans. In Isithebe, for example, the number of those involved in wage

labour increased from 1 136 in 1976 to 20 850 in February 1988. In 1987 the KFC reported that 140 000 people resided in the immediate area and where available to sell their labour power (KFC publication: July 1987). Furthermore a newspaper article in November 1990 reported that in that year 189 industries employing approximately 23 000 workers were operating from Isithebe (Sunday Tribune; 18/11/1990)

The goal of any capitalist society is the accumulation of wealth through the exploitation of labour. Capitalists locate to industrial development points with the aim of enhancing profits and to this end a cheap and easily exploitable labour-force is always a welcoming invitation. Interviews with management confirmed this: "the labour is very cheap here - you can't do the same in Durban" (owner; Co.PL: 1990). Another manager had this to say: "I am in the area because of the incentives and the wage subsidy - I get paid to employ people. The reality here is that people can be paid, and are paid, below the poverty datum line" (Mr.B; Co.Am; 1990).

Low wages were a dominant and endemic feature of the area. This "super-exploitation", to use the words of a PPWAWU organiser, is the result of state policies and the actions of the KFC in maintaining a cheap supply of labour and in failing to provide any minimum wage stipulations. When questioned about this, Mr. A's prompt, but irritated reply was:

"No. No. No. KFC does not tell people what they must pay their employees. We do recommend that people refer to the SLL (modest low level standard of living), or to the HSL (lowest sum possible on what a household can live on). These are independent studies carried out by the bureau of market research. We tell people to refer to such studies and pay their workers according to those minimum levels".

When questioned further he admitted that there is "no follow up"- according to him "most people pay more than those minimum levels". Empirical research shows that this is far from the truth. During an informal discussion held with workers from the clothing sector - from the factory sweeper to a semi-skilled machine operator -all complained about "starvation wages". As a shop-steward said: "We know why the factories have come here. They come here because they can exploit us. They are running away from the high wages

in Pinetown and Durban".

Ardington (1984) reports that whilst it is true that industrial development has had 'dramatic' effects on household incomes (which in Isithebe averages R412 per month in comparison to R109 for nearby rural Nkandla), 45% of these households survive below the HSL stipulations that Mr. A referred to. A number of factors (discussed in following chapters), arising out of conditions in the labour market and the labour process in Isithebe, account for the low wages.

Generally the labour market in Isithebe displayed predominantly secondary features. These conditions resulted largely from the structural imbalances created by racial capitalism. Limited power in the processes of social reproduction and in the labour market translated into unskilled work and low wages at the point of production. The nature of the labour processes moving to Isithebe complemented these labour market conditions in the short to medium-term. That is, deskilled labour processes and low wages can be both facilitating and constraining in the expanded reproduction of capitalist accumulation.

Exponents of the decentralisation policy argue that the dispersal of industrial activity will create multiplier effects within the labour markets of the bantustan by raising the levels of skills to artisan levels "and by giving the local population the opportunity to practice professionally, develop managerial skills or set up their own business" (Wellings and Black, 1987: 198). Little evidence exists to substantiate these claims. The respondents that participated in the interviews - a fairly representative sample of the workforce in the area - either occupied unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.

The large presence of branch plants as the main form of industrial activity is a significant influential factor in this regard. The development of branch plants with labour-intensive processes was seen as an important mechanism for absorbing the rural unemployed, thereby reversing the flow of African urban migration. This development also contained important implications for managerial autonomy in Isithebe. Control over important decisions in terms of the production process, as well as the design and formulation of commodities, lies outside Isithebe. A manager of one the biggest clothing companies in the

area, Co.Am, noted that "all directives come from head office in Durban, [they are told] what to manufacture, how to manufacture and how much to manufacture" (Mr.B; Co.Am: 1990).

The creation of a massive supply of cheap and easily accessible labour under racial capitalism does to an extent satisfy the needs of capital. As one industrialist remarked:

"to get a large amount of labour, like we have in Isithebe, in Durban is very difficult... To train the labour here will be very expensive" (owner, Co.PI: 1990).

This is where the problem surfaces, for on the one hand an unskilled and cheap labour supply is beneficial. Labour processes and the organization of work, on the other hand, do not remain constant across time and the changes in the production processes places new demands on workers' education and training. The lack of skills in the labour force places obstacles to the accumulation process. The labour process and labour market are discussed in following chapters, suffice to say at this stage that conditions in the labour market and labour process have contradictory implications for industrial growth in Isithebe.

Certain managerial and worker practices and beliefs have reinforced the existence of a cheap pool of labour. First, the increasing employment of women has generated patriarchal forms of control. Women form a significant part of the local labour force. Their great numbers on the labour market arises out of the repressive and dehumanizing forms of control such as the pass laws, influx controls and the state's programmes of resettlement of women, children and the aged in the Bantustans. These measures actively prevented the proletarianisation of female labour in urban centres as they presented obstacles to their entry into the metropolitan labour markets. Of the fourteen clothing industrialists that I interviewed, six corroborated the finding that women form an attractive source of labour power because they are more "docile" than male workers, thereby easier to control. Management interviewees were of the opinion that it is the nature of their labour processes that necessitated the use of female labour. Whilst the rate of women's employment on the production line in the metal and engineering industry has been low, there is a growing tendency for companies in this sector to hire female labour in an effort to reduce wages.

In addition to the sexual division of labour and patriarchal forms of control, was the racial and in some instances sectarian composition of the labour force and the racial and sectarian ideologies that accompany such arrangements. All unskilled and semi-skilled jobs were filled by African labour who were compelled to produce under racial despotic forms of supervision. The nature of the labour processes locating to Isithebe and their accompanying forms of managerial control took advantage of an already impoverished working class and added to its plight and misery. It is these very conditions which produce contradictory tendencies for capital accumulation in Isithebe.

Theorists concerned with the dispersal of industries, such as Maasdorp (1983), Dewar (1987), Bell (1973) and others, do not pay sufficient attention to labour market and labour process conditions that contribute to the uneven development of the decentralized regions. The form and content of the incentive package, the lack of regional multiplier effects, and the lack of propulsive industries are emphasized over the ways in which the social relations of production contribute to the process of capitalist development. That is, a focus on the forces of production at the expense of an analysis of the ways in which people relate to each other in their productive activities and reproduce the social relations of production. Incentives and the like are important to capitalists, but we need to study their impact in the context of the prevailing socio-economic and political conjuncture.

4. The Incentive Scheme:

Incentives played an important, but controversial role in attracting capital to Isithebe. Its formulation and application had cast serious doubt on its ability to attract industry that would have a wider impact on the regional economy. The acceleration in the number of factories can be linked to the redesigning of incentive package as spelled out in the Good Hope proposals. Before 1982, the area was regulated by Schedule 2 concessions, based on income-tax incentives. The package was changed to include two sets of incentives: short-term and long-term finance. The short-term financial assistance consisted of:

- a maximum of R105 per employee, per month, or 95% of wage bill/salary applicable for seven years;

- a 70% interest subsidy for ten years;
- a 70% rental subsidy for ten years; and
- relocation allowance of a maximum of R600 000 for local firms and R1 000 000 for foreign firms.

According to the KFC the short-term incentives were "designed to alleviate financial problems in the initial years after establishment".

The long-term incentives included:

- a transport rebate of 50%;
- a housing subsidy for 'key' personnel of 50%;
- tender price preference; and
- a training grant of 75%.

For the KFC these long-term incentives were aimed at compensating industrialists for certain long-term cost disadvantages that might occur. For industrialists relocating to the area these incentives proved to be a major part of the decision to move to Isithebe.

In contrast to the analysis of Addleson and Tomlinson (1987), the role that incentives have played in the decision to relocate to a growth-point should not be viewed in isolation from other phenomena. To this end, most companies interviewed admitted that their decision to invest in Isithebe was based on a number of interrelated aspects. As the manager of a metal company put it:

"there were a number of issues that urged us to come to Isithebe - the current recession in the country, the cost of labour in the urban centres, and by coming here we have avoided investing in machinery because of the abundance of labour. But of course what made us choose Isithebe is the incentives - they have been a tremendous help" (manager; Co.C: 1990)

Industrialization of Isithebe cannot be said to be the outcome of a 'spontaneous' relocation, nor 'spontaneous' deconcentration on the part of capital. On the contrary, it would appear that such a decision is informed by a complex interplay of various aspects that cannot be

attributable entirely to market forces (pace Bell), nor entirely to incentives (pace Tomlinson and Addleson 1987). In other words, the profitability and long-term ability to sustain any decentralised industrial area depends on the contingent interaction of a number of determinants and can never be reduced to a single overriding causal mechanism. While the level of incentives has, according to a clothing manufacturer, "made the decision to invest here so much more easier", it is simply one 'moment' in a complex chain of causality.

The incentive scheme was designed to attract capital to decentralized points in accordance with the government's policy of "separate development". The aim was to stimulate some degree of rural economic growth. This, it was hoped, would stem the movement of African people into the urban areas. According to the agents of the industrial decentralisation policy, such as the KFC, the policy is important for economic development since the metropolitan areas are characterized by an unacceptably high concentration of industrial activity. Serious doubt has been cast on the efficacy of much of the decentralisation policy. Critics of the policy (such as Maasdorp and Dewar) have pointed out that there is no evidence to suggest that South African cities are large enough to experience diseconomies of scale. Others have argued that diseconomies of scale and congestion in the metropolis are a consequence of poor or negligent planning. That is, diseconomies of scale are not inevitable within urban areas, nor do they possess an inherent quality which demands that economic activity has to be decentralized with the aid of incentives.

Mr.A illustrated the necessity of incentives for the political economy of Isithebe:

"previous attempts at achieving a more equal distribution of secondary industry in Isithebe have not been entirely successful. It became clear that a new approach to promote development in the less developed areas was required and so with this in mind we have made available an attractive package of incentives for foreign and local firms wishing to decentralize to Isithebe".

In terms of this growth-pole conception, some form of economic incentive is necessary to attract "propulsive industries" (discussed below) to a particular growth point (Dewar, 1987: 164). Mr. A corroborated this view when asked how long industries are expected to remain

in the area? His reply:

"Hopefully forever! The concessions are available for a seven to ten year period. If a firm decides to expand then it qualifies for a further set of concessions. Some firms have stayed on, others have left. We are aware of the firms becoming too dependent on the concessions. These concessions are given basically because of the difficulty people experience in opening up a factory in a new area... finding new labour; linking up with suppliers... So there are lots of starting-up difficulties. So the concessions are there to draw people, to overcome upheavals right at the beginning" (Mr.A, KFC: 1989).

The nature of the incentives schemes and the industries that they were geared towards have raised questions as far as stimulating growth and creating regional multiplier effects. The application of incentives in this sense is quite different from general trends. The growth pole theory generally accepts that incentives are geared towards assisting propulsive industries, and further that they are not never-ending because they are withdrawn once development has been implemented (Dewar, 1987). Yet in Isithebe and elsewhere in South Africa, only the short-term incentives were withdrawn after a period of seven years, while companies continued to receive long-term incentives. In addition, the incentive package did not take into account the specific nature of different industries since they applied to all types of industry and all components of the production processes: labour, capital, transport and training. Incentives were also extensively applied in terms of relocation costs, housing, tenders and electricity. It seems as if the Decentralisation Board's aim had been to relocate as many industries as possible without any regard to their differences, and hence to their likelihood of success.

Dewar also points out that the indiscriminate incentive package invariably attracts branch plants, otherwise known as "lame ducks". Such firms have a minimum impact on the development and welfare of the relocation site: their production processes are routine, they lack administrative and research activities, the jobs they offer are mostly unskilled with low wages. The smaller branch plants tend to be more insecure and unstable with respect to fluctuations and instability at the macro-economic level since their headquarters tend to

reduce the numbers employed in the peripheries first. Their linkages stretch over greater distances, hence regional purchases are few, the ability to generate multiplier effects are small and they "contribute to leakage out of the region" (Dewar, 1987: 164-5).

Some of these general trends were evident Isithebe . According to Mr.A, in 1989 48% of the firms located in the area were listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. These were thus branch plants. Of the twenty nine firms that I interviewed, fourteen were subsidiaries of companies situated in the major cities. As a result, their administrative and skilled research activities were located outside Isithebe. Most of the firms were dependent on Durban and to a lesser extent Richards Bay for raw materials, transport, imports, exports and for the marketing of their products. What may be concluded from the above is that while incentives played an influential role in the decision to locate to Isithebe, the type of industries that such incentives appealed to had little impact on the region's economic growth.

5. The Lack of Regional Multiplier Effects:

A particular industrial growth point's potential to develop is influenced by its ability to attract propulsive industries. Such industries are large, modern, fast-growing, capital-intensive and form part of the advanced sectors of the economy with a high degree of backward and forward linkages. An industrial region is able to develop by means of propulsive industries, due to the nature of its labour-force, its ability to expand rapidly and the backward and forward linkages created. With the use of modern technology, growth in propulsive industries is sustained and this growth makes it possible for these industries to lower production costs. On the one hand, this encourages the development of forward linkages, i.e. links with industries that buy their products. On the other hand, the growth of backward linked industries is encouraged by an increase in demand from propulsive industries.

Therefore a growth pole's potential to grow is affected by, amongst other factors, the inter-relationship between development of backward and forward linkages. According to Mr. A (1989), companies purchased raw materials from nearby mills and foundries.

Backward and forward linkages were, however, very limited at the time of conducting interviews. For example, twenty eight companies that I interviewed obtained their services and raw materials from outside the area. Some textile and clothing companies purchased their materials from Durban, whilst others imported them from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Only three of the metal industries interviewed supplied some of the bigger metal and engineering companies with certain intermediary products. Of these two were small firms, completely dependent on these forward linkages for their survival. On the whole, the metal and engineering, plastics, chemicals and food companies who participated in this research, purchased all their raw materials from Durban, Johannesburg and Cape-Town. In order to comply with the economic and political imperatives of the decentralisation policy, growth points such as Isithebe would have to achieve a considerable level of self-sufficiency, with strong multiplier effects and local linkages. Isithebe's close proximity to Durban obstructed these developments because it enabled firms to retain urban linkages.

This is one indication of the limited impact that the dispersal of industries has had on Isithebe. Like other growth points, development is hampered by the limited regional multiplier effect that is available in the bantustan. Critics of the decentralisation policy have pointed out that this lack of multiplier effects is due to the absence of propulsive industries in the growth points. It is generally agreed that economic development is stimulated by propulsive industries and is dependent on the availability of natural resources (Dewar, 1987). According to Mr. A, "it obviously makes sense to be in Isithebe. If you look at the paper industry, ... the raw materials are right at their door-step". This potential is however negated by two factors. First, as Dewar points out, pulping does not constitute significant propulsive characteristics. Second, the paper industry in Isithebe had minimal local linkage since its presence was dwarfed by the clothing and wearing apparel sector. The clothing sector was followed by plastics, fabricated metal products, footwear and textile sectors, while the rest was divided between food, wood, paper, transport, equipment and chemicals (Mr. A, KFC: 1989).

The economic growth of an industrial area is stimulated by the availability of back-up services such as banking, repair and maintenance services, communication services, transport, an adequate supply of water and power, and a supply of reliable labour power.

My research found the contrary in Isithebe. Industrialists complained about the lack of adequate and sufficient banking services, as only the First National bank serviced the entire area. The larger firms employed labour that specialized in repair and maintenance, while smaller firms were still dependent on external services. The general complaint, however, was the delays with spares and parts. These delays were linked to the inadequate transportation system for emergency supplies, as well as raw materials and final products. To be sure, employers complained about the inadequacy of the road linkages that connect Isithebe to Durban. In addition many of the garment industries complained about the unreliable supply of water. Most complained that it is cut off without warning. An industrialist outlined the problem as follows:

"Our factory utilizes water for steam. It is used for pressing the garments. And due to the irregular supply of water we cannot meet deliveries on time to the large chain stores. Over the last few months we had to cancel several orders and we have lost thousands of rands in profits" (manager, Co.5: 1990)

There were also complaints about the KFC's delays in attending to problems.¹² These limitations point to much more than the failure of the industrial decentralisation policy. They are the product of the uneven development of capitalism within and between nations.

Conclusion

For a clearer explanation of working class struggles in decentralized points it is necessary to examine the historical and social terrain on which these take place. This is crucial for an understanding of the casual mechanisms of working class struggles and the forms such struggles assume. This chapter attempted to contextualize the evolution of industrial decentralization against the political-economy of South Africa. Central to the racial Fordist regime of accumulation were different mechanisms of control over the African population such as the pass laws, influx control and the Bantustans. These have to be situated within different historical periods so as to understand the progression of industrial dispersal. The various forms of control and repression served different purposes at different times. Their modifications were aimed at satisfying the different interests of capital at certain times.

Furthermore, these events help us to understand changes in the political economy of South Africa which gave rise to the prevailing spatial division of labour. From the 1940s to the 1970s a concerted effort was made to realise the dream of white development separated from African development.

Not much attention was paid to the welfare of the urban African working class, and even less attention was given to rural areas. State policy was aimed at consolidating the racial Fordist mode of regulation. It became quite clear that this mode of regulation placed limitations and constraints on sustained economic growth in the 1970s. This crisis forced the ruling class to restore conditions favourable for the expanded reproduction of the accumulation process. A part of this process was a revised industrial decentralisation policy. The context in which the policy changed highlighted a general trend regarding the state's approach to industrial dispersal: it was only after political and economic conflict which threatened the survival of racial Fordism that the state displayed renewed interest in decentralization of industry (eg: in the wake of Sharpeville and after the struggles in the 1970s).

The state and capital's interests in decentralisation cannot be seen outside of the development of racial Fordism and the contradictory social relations which give rise to class struggles and crisis in capitalist societies. Industrial decentralisation, as a regulative mechanism of capitalism, is best conceived as one element in an ensemble of social structures, practices and norms which sustain a particular regime of accumulation and regulate its inherent tendency towards crisis. This conception avoids the risk of perceiving and interpreting the social world as comprised of individualized, atomized and separate entities. Societies are characterised by open systems. For this reason the factors shaping social phenomena are numerous and varied.

"Most social phenomena, like most natural events, are *conjuncturally* determined. And as such in general have to be explained in terms of a multiplicity of causes. But, given the epistemic contingency of their relational character, the extent to which their explanation requires reference to a *totality* of aspects, bearing internal relations to one another, remains open... Although it is contingent whether we

require a phenomenon to be understood as an aspect of a totality..., it is not contingent whether it is such an aspect or not" (Bhaskar, 1979: 54-55).

If decentralisation is understood to be conjuncturally determined then its outcome cannot be attributed solely to political or economic forces. As well as providing a periodisation of the decentralization policy, this chapter also focused on industrialisation in Isithebe. An attempt was made to understand the reasons for the relocation of industry in terms of a number of variables. Due to the historical development of capitalism in South Africa, industrial development in the Bantustans is an uneven process. The repressive legislation governing African political, economic and social control during the racial Fordist regime of accumulation resulted in the unequal integration of decentralized points. The uneven development in the Bantustans should not be explained entirely in terms of narrow economic forces, such as the lack of multiplier effects, etc. Crucial to capitalist accumulation in the Bantustans was the nature of the relationship between capital and labour. It is an area which has thus far received little or no attention in the writings on decentralisation. Whether this relationship is one of accommodation or conflict will depend on the social relations of production as well as on the balance of class forces.

The geographical dispersal of industry creates a spatial division of labour. The uneven progression of capitalism is further influenced by segmentation and differentiations in labour market and labour process conditions. Labour markets and labour processes are not insulated from wider socio-political relations. As we noted, the sexual and racial differentiations which characterise South African industrial development on a macro- level prevail in labour markets and labour processes in Isithebe. Labour markets and labour processes are thus important terrains for shop floor struggles and central for determining the nature of capitalist development. In the next chapter we will examine the labour market in Isithebe as shaped by the forces of racial Fordism.

NOTES

1. "Regimes of accumulation" and "modes of regulation" are concepts developed by regulation theorists. Although the regulation approach is by no means a homogenous body of theory, it has four common features (Jessop, 1990). Of interest here are the substantive concerns of these features. Firstly, the concern with explaining the political economy of capitalism and the structure and operations of capitalist societies. Secondly, the concern with the social mechanisms through which the expanded reproduction of capitalist social relations are secured (Jessop, 1990: 154). Regulation theory's approach towards the development of capitalism and the internationalisation of production, finance and commodities is a major advance over both the theories of liberal economists (eg: Rostow) and those of the dependency camp (eg: Frank) (cf. Lipietz, 1987).

2. Clarke (1988) accuses regulation theory of adopting a structural-functionalist model in its analysis of social integration and disintegration. This, he argues, leads to a neglect of the important role of class struggles in influencing wages, productivity and inflationary expansion. To overcome this, he suggests that regimes of accumulation can best be understood as institutional forms of class struggle. By the same token, he argues, a crisis in the mode of regulation is not crisis of disproportionality, which he accuses Aglietta of suggesting (refer pgs 69-85), rather it is a crisis within the mechanisms of capitalist domination. Jessop is dismissive of Clarke's (1988) criticism that regulation theory neglects class struggle. He points out that regulation theory understands that the objects of regulation are the products of class struggle and that they are regulated through such struggle. Therefore regulation theory does not deny that modes of regulation are constituted in and through class struggle. In fact, this is the only consistent explanation for the "doubly tendential character" of capitalism (Jessop, 1990: 185-190).

3. In "State, Power, Socialism" (1978), Poulantzas departed from his earlier regional theory of state power and adopted a more relational approach. Hence he viewed power not as a fixed quantum which can be distributed in a zero-sum fashion so that losses and gains cancel each other out. In short, he recognised that class power depends on the balance of class forces. Poulantzas combined this relational conception of state power

with an analysis of, what he termed, the "institutional materiality" of the state. This enabled him to view political class domination as reflected in the organisation and institutions of the state (see also: Jessop, 1985).

4. The form and content of struggles, during this period and others, have been adequately dealt with by a number of writers, among them Lodge (1983), whose introduction shows up the class divide in African political interests between the middle class and petite bourgeoisie's interests and that of the working class. Others who have also written on African political and economic struggles during this period include Hirson (1989), Stadler (1987), LACOM (1986).

5. Hindson (1987) points out that through this organised resistance wages for African workers increased from R111 to R172 between 1940 and 1946.

6. This committee was established by the Natural Resource Development Council (NRCD). The NRCD was set up in 1947. Its primary role was to provide advice and research water resources and industrial decentralisation (Glaser, 1987: 30).

7. As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, this section cannot deal with all aspects of the crisis. This is not intended to reduce their significance in any way. The full effects and implications of the crisis are discussed elsewhere. For more details refer to Gelb (1991), Black and Stanwix (1986), Saul and Gelb (1986). The analysis of the crisis and its symptoms in this section are based on these writings. Gelb (1991) in particular offers a useful periodisation of the crisis and draws on a number of variables, both nationally and internationally. He situates his analysis of the crisis within the tensions and limitations of racial Fordism.

8. From the KFC publication entitled 'Industry in Kwa-Zulu: The Establishment Factors'.

9. From the newly industrialised countries of the Third World, the Far East and EEC members such as the United Kingdom.

10 . Within the KFC there are a number of different departments. Each department is responsible for setting up and monitoring projects. These different departments include: Housing; Finances; Development; Technical Services. The Technical Services department is responsible for Isithebe and the three other industrial estates in Kwa-Zulu (P. Forsyth). The projects outlined in the main texts are not categorised into their relevant departments, as our concerns are more on the general economic involvement of Buthelezi and the KFC.

11 . The rationale behind the creation of the bank is that the South African banking and savings institutions do not adequately provide for such a sector. The bank was created on such a basis, but based on the principles of the free market system. Hence the level and nature of assistance to its clients is debatable and questionable. Such an initiative together with the others are, however, representative of a much broader political strategy, that of fostering economic growth for political power.

12 . See also Wellings and Black (1987) who report similar complaints.

CHAPTER TWO

LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION IN ISITHEBE

Introduction

All capitalist societies experience periods of stability and growth followed by periods of crisis and decay. A particular social formation will experience sustained economic growth only for as long as the existing normative and institutional framework provide the mechanisms necessary to counter-act (temporarily) the crisis tendencies inherent in capitalist accumulation. The pressures that are brought to bear on the social structure of accumulation reach a point where the existing crisis-resolution mechanisms are no longer able to sustain the expanded reproduction of the capital relation (i.e. production, distribution and consumption). This has important implications for the labour market since it is one object of social regulation which may be restructured in ways that attempt to maintain the profitable extraction of labour power. This conception casts serious doubts on the neo-classical belief that the labour market is governed by the laws of supply and demand, is self-correcting and that rewards are based on the levels of investment in human capital. Labour markets are shaped by government intervention, trade union and employer strategies, existing hierarchies of subordination in society, and the cycles of accumulation/valorisation.

An important element in the restructuring of the racially-segmented labour market in South Africa during the 1970s was the process of industrial decentralisation. As we noted in the previous chapter, with the implementation of this policy the homelands expanded their role as providers of cheap migratory labour to include that of providing labour for relocated factories. Out of the state's policy of industrial decentralisation

there has emerged distinct regional labour markets.

This chapter attempts to show the varying degrees of secondary work conditions, and hence the diversity in a regional labour market such as Isithebe. The differentiation in working conditions means that the forms of working class resistance and their generative mechanisms will vary within and between firms and sectors. It is, therefore, necessary to have a clear understanding of the underlying causes for the diversity in labour market trends in Isithebe. This chapter consists of five sections. Section one deals with theories of the labour market. It points to the limitations of the neo-classical and early dual labour market theories, and argues for the adoption of the radical segmentation theory. Section two consists of two parts. Part one examines the nature and level of social reproduction in Isithebe and argues that due to pre-market conditions workers do not have free and equal access to skills and training. The section also points out the influence that social factors have in determining the racial and sexual segmentation of labour markets in the firms which participated in this study. The second part of section two deals with in-market segmentation. It attempts to show how pre-market segmentation shapes in-market segmentation through the racial and sexual structuring of firms internal markets. Attempts will also be made to show how firm and sector specific factors (product market, technology, etc.) inter-relate with social factors to produce segmented labour markets. Segmentation in labour markets within a particular geographical area, occurs at various levels as follows: (a) within a particular firm through the emergence of internal labour markets and in-market segmentation, (b) between firms, and (c) between sectors.

The sections dealing with the sexual and racial composition of labour markets cannot detail nor explore all aspects of such phenomena. For the purpose of this thesis their importance lies in outlining the positions different categories of workers occupied in the firms interviewed. These categories gave rise to various levels of segmentation. The stratification of the labour market implies that workers are exposed to different forms of managerial control and varying conditions of employment. The latter shapes the opportunities of workers to engage in struggle and influences the forms such struggles are most likely to assume. As such, the nature and intensity of worker resistance will

vary within and between firms and across sectors.

Section three of the chapter tries to show the complexities involved in classifying the labour market status of the firms who participated in this research, into either or categories. To what extent is Doeringer and Piore's (1971) neat categorization of firms into primary and secondary labour markets applicable to the case studies? Is worker behaviour a fair or true indication or basis to distinguish between primary and secondary segments? This section, using specific case studies, points out the existence of firms with elements of both primary and secondary labour market conditions. While firms may be cast as primary sectors because of product market power, level of technology etc, these firms still offered secondary work conditions. By the same token, this research also found evidence of the existence of firms with secondary labour market status in terms of product market power. These firms, however, offered certain working conditions which are viewed as being the domain of primary labour markets.

Section four provides evidence to refute the early dual labour market model's assertion that workers with stable work behaviour are present in primary labour markets only. A number of firms in this study did not have primary labour market conditions. Yet, they did not experience high rates of labour turn-over. There are a variety of reasons which can explain stable work behaviour in secondary labour markets. Section four looks at some of these areas. Using the example of two firms it is shown how paternalism was used by employers to win worker loyalty and reduce labour turn-over. Other factors which influence the low rates of labour turn-over in secondary labour markets are workers' positions in firms' internal labour markets and labour processes, skills which are unique to a firm and sector, thereby preventing workers from acquiring jobs elsewhere, and finally the high levels of unemployment in a particular region.

Workers occupying jobs in secondary segments are not passive carriers of bad working conditions and low rewards. The development of trade unions attempting to organise such workers is a wide spread phenomenon. The role that worker organisations and conflict played in shaping labour markets, in Isithebe, are discussed in section five. As is indicated above, degrees of segmentation means differentiated work conditions. The

differentiations in working conditions implies that the generative mechanisms, and the scope, opportunity and forms of working class struggles will differ within and between firms and across sectors. The manifestations of struggle are not dealt with in this section. This is a topic of discussion in the following two chapters. The concern here is with those aspects of working class organisation and conflict which directly affected labour market conditions.

Far from the human capital school's conception of the labour market as a lifeless mechanism devoid of conflict, this section argues that wages, rewards etc. are determined through a process of conflict and bargaining. The protection of jobs, the setting of wage rates, hiring and firing policies - factors which affect internal and external labour markets - are issues of contestation between workers and employers. Unlike the early dual labour market model which stresses employer initiatives in restructuring labour markets, it is argued that trade unions exert their influence on labour market processes in their attempts to secure and protect member's interests.

Section five begins with a discussion of the struggles that workers and trade unions confronted in organising the labour force. Following this is a discussion on the benefits workers in organised firms who were interviewed enjoyed. The final discussion focuses on the determination of wages and rewards through the process of collective bargaining. Whilst the importance of capital's attempts to control and stratify the labour-force is recognised, it is argued that an understanding of this control and the forces leading to segmentation, must be situated within the on-going struggle for control between the working class on the one hand and capitalists on the other. This approach enables the realisation that trade union activity in the fight to protect workers' interests also contributes to labour market segmentation.

THEORIES OF THE LABOUR MARKET

The constituent elements of spatial labour markets vary, but the standard characterization, according to Fischer and Nijkamp (1987), refers to:

- a region where there are clear labour market patterns defined by a spatial range of employment opportunities available to workers without a change in the place of residence; and
- from the perspective of the employer, spatial labour markets can be defined as areas that contain large pools of available labour.¹

This broad definition can be applied fruitfully with regard to Isithebe. A large part of its labour is drawn from the Sundumbile Township which is approximately one kilometre from the industrial site. The region contains a suitably large source of available labour.

The development and encouragement of regional labour markets are also characterized by the divisions which they reinforce within the working class, specifically between urban workers and those in deconcentrated and decentralized areas. Workers in metropolitan areas are relatively better off because they receive higher wages, enjoy promotional prospects and the protection of unions, unlike workers in decentralized points. The wage structure in such areas can be "more easily re-organized to take advantage of the greater supplies of unorganized and legislatively unprotected black labour" (Hindson, 1987b: 14). Due to concrete historical processes, as outlined in chapter one, regional labour markets such as Isithebe have far greater degrees of secondary (as opposed to primary) work conditions. This has reinforced the unequal integration of these areas into the national economy.

How should diversity, or segmentation, in regional labour markets such as Isithebe be conceptualised? Many different theories exist which attempt to explain labour markets. The radical segmentation theory is used in this study to explain differentiations in the labour market of Isithebe. This approach is adopted for the following reasons.

First, it is closer to critical realism than neo-classical or dual labour market theories. Labour markets are viewed as functioning in open systems. As social phenomena they are, therefore, conjuncturally determined and have to be explained in terms of a multiplicity of causes (Bhaskar, 1979: 54-55). Radical segmentation theory attempts to

seek out as many variables as possible which impact on labour market trends, rather than simply explaining such trends from a narrow supply-and-demand perspective. To enhance our understanding of the nature of segmentation in labour markets, the radical segmentation approach focuses on (among other variables): the differentiations in social reproduction, in-market segmentation, sector and firm peculiarities, class struggles at the point of production.

Second, these factors are not seen in isolation, rather a relational approach is employed to understand the impact that the family, state, class conflict, etc. have on labour markets.

Third, as a social phenomenon, labour markets occur in open systems where constant conjunctures and empirical law-like generalities do not pertain. It is therefore not possible to ascribe either/or categories - such as primary or secondary labour - to the complex set of divisions found in a regional labour market.

Fourth, central to the radical segmentation perspective is the role that worker struggles and trade unions have on labour markets and segmentation. In this regard, the *Transformational Model of Social Activity* becomes an important conceptual model for understanding how working class struggles can either transform or reproduce certain labour market conditions, and how social structures can both obstruct or facilitate conflict in the workplace.

Segmentation is suggestive of a process which invokes the atomization and isolation of different groups of people in the labour market. Labour market segmentation reveals its influence at various levels of the social formation. An important distinction can thus be made between pre-market segmentation (occurs before entry into the labour market) and in-market segmentation (occurs while in the market). Pre-market segmentation refers to the differences that exist in access to schooling, formal training, etc. as a result of gender, race, religion, etc. before starting a job. In-market segmentation highlights the further and subsequent segmentation that occurs in the production process itself. Segmentation in the one reinforces segmentation in the other. In order to appreciate the strengths of the segmentation approach, it is useful to contrast it with the neo-classical theory of labour markets.

The neo-classical approach is the most widely accepted framework used to analyse labour markets (Storper and Walker, 1983: 8). I will deal briefly with the human capital model of neo-classical theory. Whilst the neo-classical theory does have some strengths, it also has certain weaknesses and limitations which undermine its ability to fully explain labour markets. The orthodox neo-classical approach to the labour market is premised on the assumption of exchange. Underlining this notion of exchange is the principle of the effective and optimum use of scarce resources (Del Mercato, 1981: 195; Storper and Walker, 1983: 8). For the human capital school, labour markets are determined by supply and demand. According to this model workers sell their labour in order to earn a wage to satisfy their needs. Wages are determined by the hours of work and the level of skills. Workers can increase their wage rate by increasing their level of skills. This is achieved through investing in education and training. In terms of the demand aspect of labour markets, employers buy labour in order to produce commodities under conditions of perfect competition. Storper and Walker point out that the model is

"perfectly symmetrical: individuals invest in skills, or 'human capital' in the same way as firms invest in 'fixed capital'... And it is perfectly fair, because the market is a meritocratic allocator of rewards to individual performance; workers have as much discretion to adjust their training as capitalists have to adjust their production technique and input mix. Malfunctions can only occur through exogenous distortions of markets such as through unionization, minimum wage standards, sectoral monopoly, racism, etc." (1983: 9).

This explanation of labour markets provides little insight into the case studies in this research and into labour markets in general. Neo-classical theory has been criticized for being based on utilitarian philosophy (Wilkinson, 1981) and for its failure to recognise the role pre-market segmentation plays in structuring labour markets. A person's position in the labour market cannot be fully appreciated from an analysis of a pure supply and demand theory. Differences in the level of skills or in the amounts invested in education cannot adequately explain the origins, nor the persistence, of segmentation in the labour market. For example: this model cannot clearly explain the

low status jobs and/or wages that black, women, or contract workers earn.

This chapter will attempt to show that people entering the labour market in Isithebe face a differentiated job structure and that their position in the labour market is dependent not solely on industrial and commercial factors, but also on social and historical factors (Lonsdale, 1985). According to Lonsdale, these social factors include the attitudes towards women and black people and the beliefs about peoples' capabilities. These factors limit the jobs that are available to certain categories of people. To be sure, it is the social reproduction of labour that influences and determines in quantitative and qualitative terms the demand and supply of labour (see: Del Mercato, 1981; see also Wilkinson, 1981; Kenrick, 1981; Sengenberger, 1981; Ryan, 1981).

Contrary to the human capital school, labour markets do not reward workers solely on the basis of skill (Storper and Walker, 1983). Integral aspects of social reproduction such as the family, state and social conflict affect to a very significant extent the supply and demand of labour. For radical segmentation theory, an adequate explanation of labour markets must take cognizance of the inter-related nature of the family, state and social conflict. For the human capital school, these institutions are isolated and separate entities, the state is presented as a distortion in the labour market, and social inequalities are reduced to rigidities and imperfections in an otherwise competitive market (Wilkinson, 1981; Del Mercato, 1981).

The inequalities in social reproduction are replicated in the market resulting in in-market segmentation. Ryan defines in-market as follows:

"It occurs when individuals of similar achieved productive potential receive markedly different access to employment or job rewards, including both pay rates and opportunities for training, experience and pay increases" (Ryan, 1981: 5).

For the human capital school, discrimination in the market is viewed as temporary deviations from an essentially competitive market. The significance that discriminatory

social factors play in influencing in-market segmentation cannot not be adequately accounted for. These issues are peripheral to the model's general acceptance of differences in individuals' ability as the main source of difference in workers' earning-capacity (Ryan, 1981: 5). Systemic inequalities and discrimination in the labour market cannot not be presented as the result of individual innate abilities and the extent of expenditure on education, etc. The persistence of these inequalities is evidence of the fact that they are deeply imbedded in the social relations of production.

The neo-classical human capital model, however, is not the only theory which emphasises individual abilities at the expense of social relations. Certain trends within segmentation theory are also guilty of prioritising individual characteristics and worker behaviour to explain segmentation in labour markets. The early dual labour market theory, as developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971), distinguishes between primary and secondary labour markets. The model associates the emergence of internal labour markets with the consolidation of a primary sector. This is explained in terms of employers' initiatives and their demand for a particular type of worker behaviour - that of stability. It is therefore assumed that only workers with stable work patterns will staff the primary sector of labour market, while those who do not have these characteristics will form part of the secondary sector.

The early dual labour market theory cannot adequately explain labour market segmentation and the role that pre-market segmentation plays in shaping in-market segmentation. Kenrick (1981) accuses the basic dual labour market model of being inherently sexist, hence discriminatory, because it explains women's secondary positions in labour markets as resulting from their unstable work behaviour patterns. In reality, adult males who are more often white occupy jobs in the primary sectors. This is used to define the proper work norm. Worker behaviour in secondary sectors are viewed as deviating from the norm established in primary sectors (Kenrick, 1981: 167-169).

The emergence of internal labour markets are not confined exclusively to primary labour markets. This research shows that even in firms with strong secondary characteristics there existed evidence of the emergence of internal labour markets through internal

recruiting and promotions. This is not a generalised process and was confined to firms of a particular nature where it was a recent introduction. The variables used to point out and explain in-market segmentation are occupation; rewards and benefits; wages; economic power of firms and other firm and sector specific characteristics; the existence of trade unions on the shop-floor and training and promotional prospects for the different types of labour.

Primary and secondary labour market conditions are not mutually exclusive and often co-exist. Segmentation should not be cast into two polar opposites as in primary and secondary labour markets. Instead, segmentation should be seen as having various degrees. In other words, it is more useful to conceive segmentation in regional labour markets as occurring along a continuum. On the one hand there exists the primary sector and on the other hand the secondary sector. In between the two ideal types exist various levels of segmentation which reflect to a greater or lesser extent features of the two.

Labour markets are influenced by a number of factors. Historical, social, political, ideological and economic factors impact on labour markets, thereby giving rise to highly diversified markets. An adequate account of segmentation must take cognizance of a multiplicity of factors which influence differentiation in labour markets. The chapter begins with an examination of the level of social reproduction and pre-market preparation in Isithebe.

THE SOCIAL REPRODUCTION OF LABOUR IN ISITHEBE

1. Pre-Market Segmentation:

Segmentation theory will have no real meaning and theoretical validity if it does not adequately explain and incorporate an analysis of the social reproduction of labour, under particular historical conditions. Social reproduction is necessary for a clear analysis of labour markets because

"it determines the position of individuals within the labour market, provides the basis for standards of living (and thus the reference point for wage bargaining), structures inter-and-intra-class relationships and the distribution of the product" (Del Mercato, 1981: 194).

Social reproduction is by no means homogeneous; it is segmented along class, race and gender lines, and because of this the market is a composition of pre and in-market segmentation (Ryan, 1981: 9). Pre-market segmentation, then, prevails in the initial differentiation of people's access to jobs. Pre-market segmentation, or segmentation in social reproduction, and in-market segmentation act and react upon each other.

In terms of the pre-market segmentation, most people in Isithebe entered the labour market with very real disadvantages as far as the knowledge and skills involved in the labour process are concerned. Such skills and their development are closely linked with the family, schools and tertiary institutions which prepare people for certain jobs. Out of the total number of workers interviewed, 65% completed std. 6; 20% completed std. 5; 10% completed std. 8 and 5% completed std. 10. Most workers interviewed said they were forced to leave school as a result of their lack of finance. Workers mentioned the problems associated with high educational costs such as purchasing text-books; exercise books; school uniforms; school fees. Most stated that given the opportunity they would go back to school, but added that this was highly unlikely to occur due to their financial position. A worker in one of the clothing industries said that:

"I could only finish standard five because my family had no money to send me to school. I would like to go back to school... but I don't have enough money. How can I go back to school when I am earning R60 a week? I want to learn English and everything else I do not know. I want to learn English because every time we go to the boss we have to talk English".

All workers stressed the importance of higher education in acquiring better paid jobs and expressed the hope that their children would be able to acquire more than their achievements. "The more education you have, the more money you get" (tool maker,

Co.D: 1990).

The nature and level of education available to people in Isithebe immediately placed them at a disadvantage and consigned them to low pay and secondary-status jobs. Therefore, we cannot see the labour market as operating within 'perfect competition' wherein every single worker has equal opportunity in acquiring skills and education, as the neo-classical theory assumes. Ardington (1983), in an empirical study of the Sundumbili area, (where Isithebe draws its labour from) reported that in 1983 there were five schools within the township, with seven established in that part of the peri-urban area which the survey covered. However, the furthest a person could go was the junior secondary level in both the areas. There was a single industrial training school that accommodated about 40 people, while the only post-school education was attained at the Isithebe Industrial School which fell under the administration of the then KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture. The industrial school did not, however, prepare people for artisan status as it focused entirely on practical work. As Ardington notes "there is no book work" in either of the four courses offered which included welding; carpentry; plumbing; metalwork and bricklaying. The school could accommodate a small number of 10 people.

These institutions do not alter the position of the vast majority of workers in Isithebe who enter the labour market with no skills and low education. Consequently, workers were dependent upon employers, who received a training subsidy as part of the decentralisation incentive (see chapter one), to provide workers with training. This training often involved job specific tasks only, for example constructing just the sleeve in a garment or just making boxes in a pharmaceutical company. As a result of the general lack of skills among the local population, the industrialists operating in Isithebe experienced a number of problems in acquiring and maintaining skilled labour (more detail below). However,

"There is plenty of labour - unskilled labour. I keep on getting people coming to my door looking for work. But for the skilled labour there is a definitely a problem, and on top of this there is no housing. There are no artisans ... it is

impossible. There are not enough throughout Isithebe and you got to have them to run a factory. It is a critical problem unless the black labour is upgraded. But that will take years. There are few of them who go to tech and get a skill ... but the Indians are OK" (owner, Co.E: 1989).

The low standards of living, inadequate education facilities and the minimum provision of skill training reinforced African workers' unskilled and semi-skilled positions in Isithebe.

Other aspects related to the standard of living and its influence on the positions people hold on the labour market, are the availability of housing, water, sanitation and medical aid for a particular region. The industrial area drew its labour from two co-existing regions, one a formal urban township that was administrated by the then KwaZulu Department of Interior, and a peri-urban area which was governed by the local chief and his indunas (Ardington, 1983: 14). Although Isithebe was first announced as an industrial point in 1968, no new houses catering for the new labour force was provided until 1978. In 1983 when 7500 workers were absorbed into wage employment in Isithebe there were only 1800 houses in the Sundumbili township. As a result of the short supply of homes, the development of squatter settlements around Sundumbili increased considerably. Organisers and even a few industrialists, spoke out at the shortage of houses and "disgraceful living conditions of workers" (Mr.S, PPAWU organiser: 1989), particularly in the peri-urban area.

The chronic shortage of housing in the area is reflective of the unco-ordinated development of the industrial site, on the one hand, and the provision of housing, education, etc., on the other. The KwaZulu Development Corporation (KDC) was responsible for the development of the industrial area only and any development of the surrounding areas fell outside its jurisdiction. A number of other government departments assumed responsibility for the provision of housing, health, roads, education etc. The delivery of these services, however, did not match the pace at which industrial development occurred in Isithebe.

"Housing is totally disgusting. Isithebe is getting too big and the housing is not growing as quickly as industry ... The government must do something about the situation, it's ridiculous - I have got some Indians who live in the same conditions as the blacks" (manager Co.1: 1990).

Claims made by certain industrialists and by Buthelezi, that industrial development in Isithebe had the welfare of the local population at heart is highly questionable in the light of the incongruent development of the people's basic needs with that of capital's needs.

An understanding of people's position within the labour market has to be grounded in an understanding of their position within the social reproduction of labour. This is so because access to education, formal training, etc. differ markedly according to class, race and sex. This becomes clearer when we consider that segmentation in the market and segmentation in the social reproduction of labour significantly inform the demand and supply of labour. From the supply aspect, those people confined to secondary-status jobs do so because the nature of their entry and access to the labour market is materially grounded in their socialization process. In the same vein, the family, state and school are influential determinants in this socialization process, hence in wage labour. The nature of the social reproduction of labour in Isithebe, characterized in terms of low educational opportunities; the lack of proper housing and other basic needs - in short characterized by structured low living standards - contributed to the supply of so-called secondary workers. It is for this reason that "segmentation in the labour market and segmentation in social reproduction are mutually reinforcing and cannot be considered separately" (Del Mercato, 1981: 194).

Another set of determinants of labour markets is the demand aspect. In this regard, the neo-classical approach assumes that employers have perfect knowledge about the market environment within which they operate. They are aware of, for instance, the rewards that other firms offer for certain jobs and what each worker is capable of offering in terms of total productive ability. Yet interviews conducted with management in Isithebe proved the converse. Managers and directors of companies were unable to

furnish clear and precise information on various aspects of other firms. Even those managers belonging to the Isithebe Clothing Manufactures Association (ICMA) were not entirely certain about employment conditions in member firms. Although most agreed that low wages was a predominant feature throughout the region, all employers interviewed said that they paid higher wages than any firm within that sector. Yet no concrete responses were obtainable when asked to stipulate wage levels and job rewards of other companies. The owner of Co.8, a jersey manufacturer, came out in defence of the wages he is paying his workers:

"I can't tell you that. But I know that the factories here employ Hitler tactics ... it is the Taiwanese people. You know, they don't pay properly, they don't treat their staff right. It's real Hitler methods" (owner, Co.8: 1989).

The neo-classical theory can be further criticized for its assumption that employers act individually and not through associations, in establishing wage structures, rewards and benefits and in engaging with trade unions. The formation of the ICMA, however, is a direct refutation of the above notion. For example it is important to consider what one industrialist said:

"The reason behind the formation of the association is to set and maintain a standard of wages. You would find that there is a disparity in wages. Some of them (industrialists) are paying too high - some too low - way below the rate. Now we in the association want to keep a certain standard and the members have come to an agreement - you don't steal my staff and I don't steal your staff" (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990).²

Over and above this, however, the employers' association proved to be a major problem for, and an effective strategy, against the role of the South African Clothing and Textiles Workers Union (SACTWU) in organizing and negotiating on behalf of workers. As Mr.B continued: "it is much easier to deal with the unions through the association because there are so many of us - you don't fight alone" (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990).

In most of the firms labour recruitment occurred through informal channels, although an employment agency was in operation in the area. With the exception of two metal companies, most companies studied selected their labour force from work-seekers outside their factory gates. "Most of our labour arrives at the gate. Everyday there are people outside the factory. If we need somebody we make our pick" (manager, Co.D: 1990). In most instances workers learnt of their present employment through a relative or friend or by waiting at the gates. This is how a worker described the process:

"It was easy for me to get this job at this factory because I am a machinist. You know if you are machinist then it is easy to get a job ... I waited at the gate of the factory and then management came to us and asked for someone who knows how to work the machines. There were lots of people at the gates. I said I was a machinist, the supervisor asked how long I worked on the machine I said three years and then I got the job" (machinist, Co.I: 1990).

The impact of pre-market segmentation was evident in the different criteria management employed for the different race groups, when they hired workers. In most of the clothing and textile firms, when they employed African labour, employers "... don't look for anything" (manager, Co.4: 1990). Management in two of the firms for this sector said, that, when they employed labour it depended on the type of labour required, and on some experience and a certain standard of education. This however, pertained only for semi-skilled jobs.

"We go to the gate ... (with) the labour requisition form that I get from the departmental manager ... On the form it will state the labour that is required and the standard requirement say for example standard six. So I have to go out to the gate and get someone with these qualifications and maybe we need some experience in a particular area like with the machine operators we expect people to have some kind of experience" (personnel manager, Co.II: 1990).

The manager of Co.6 said that his workers:

"Must be right handed because of the sewing machine and they must have at least a standard eight, then they can understand what is required of them in the training school" (manager, Co.6: 1990).

Artisans and administration staff, who were mostly Indian and white, were employed primarily on the basis of their level of skill and work experience.

Different forms of employment criteria were present for the metal and engineering sector. Here again:

"When we employ someone (it) depends on what you are looking for. Artisan level again depends what you looking for. Are you looking for a fitter or turner for the maintenance section, or a mechanic on the shop-floor. There are different criteria ... we have different categories. If you are talking black (African) labour; are you looking for some-one who can weld, a machine operator, an ordinary labourer or a sweeper. We look for what is required for the job. For the skilled jobs we look for some experience ... in the job" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

The racial composition of the labour process in the firms interviewed for this sector were similar to clothing and textiles. On the one hand, low levels of job requirements pertained to African workers who were concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. Job requirements and specifications for Indian and white labour on the other hand were much higher than African workers. Hence, peoples' positions on the labour market and the jobs they are employed in are grounded in their pre-market conditions. Sexual, racial and ethnic structuring of labour markets deepens the appreciation of the crucial role that social reproduction plays in explaining people's positions on the labour market. We now focus on these issues.

■ The Racial Composition of the Labour Market

From the discussion above it can be seen that most firms that participated in the interviews had labour markets and labour processes structured according to race. There

were certain differences in terms of white owned-capital and Indian-owned capital. In the metal sector 6 of 8 firms, and, in clothing and textiles 6 of the 14 firms had management positions filled entirely of whites, skilled labour consisting a mixture of Indian and white labour, the latter invariably in supervisory positions. In Indian owned companies, different tendencies emerged. In Co.2, Co.3 and Co.5 management positions were held by whites, while Co.4 had an Indian manager. This makes an interesting case in that it exemplifies a deliberate attempt by capital to impose control measures through structuring the labour market along racial lines. Mr.B, of the parent company, (Co.Am), said:

"Whites can control the blacks very well. The black man has a fear for the white man. My Indian staff are a bit scared. When there is a strike, they are hesitant to come to work. But my white managers will turn up. They are not afraid" (Mr.B, Co.AM: 1990).

A white manager in the company earned R7 500 a month while the Indian manager earned R4 000 per month. Both qualified for the same fringe benefits.

"We have to pay the whites much higher because we need them - you know they can plan the factory, organize things and also control the Africans here. I don't mind getting lower than them ... the company knows I will stay ... I've been with them for 12 years, from Durban. With the whites you don't know ... we need to pay them higher to keep them [for] their skills" (manager, Co.4: 1990).

In all companies African workers who speak English occupied lower supervisory positions. This arose as a result of the language problem - management's inability to communicate in Zulu, and workers low command of English. Such workers facilitated the communication of instructions to the rest of the labour force, over and above their task of controlling workers and making certain that production was maintained. Labour markets do not operate within equal market forces, pace neo-classical theory. On the contrary, the race, sex and age of participants stratifies the labour market into a complex and dynamic phenomenon.

Working conditions, wages and fringe benefits are not isolated from the politico-ideological and ethnic beliefs of employers. Most managers expressed the view that their African labour was slow, backward and lazy. This is reflected in the following sentiments:

"This is not the Third World ... this is the tenth world. Indians here don't work like Indians are supposed to and the Africans as soon as they get a job they think it is an opportunity to steal ... They don't think that they can earn money" (manager, Co.4: 1990).

Or:

"They could train and better themselves ... get an education. A lot of them are not educated to the level that you think they are ... They are generally slow to learn and pick up things" (manageress, Co.G: 1990).

A further basis for segmentation is the classification of jobs: not only by their content or nature, but also in terms of the allocation of workers to different tasks. Distinct labour market segments provide labour for particular job categories. Work conditions and "jobs are secondary because they are performed by workers who are generally considered secondary" (Craig *et al*, 1982). The belief that secondary workers are not worth much or do not require much can be construed as justifications for low pay and bad working conditions. This belief is reflected in the following "... I think they (workers) are happy with their simple life, their bread, water (and) hut" (production manager, Co. ID: 1990). Workers in Isithebe were seen as secondary workers because of the historical, political and social factors governing the supply of their labour power. Racist ideologies were thus directly implicated in the reproduction of labour market segmentation.

Ideological and political beliefs, such as racism, also contributed to the conflictual relationship that existed between management and workers. On the one hand, they negatively influenced employers' perceptions of and attitudes towards their labour force. On the other hand, these employer attitudes encouraged worker hostility and resistance.

Workers interviewed related how racism operated in their companies. For example:

"There are lots of problems with management. The first problem is that they have the colour-bar. Indians, African and whites do not get the same money. If you are a quality controller and I (am) a controller we don't get the same money ... You will get more than me because I am an African. And the whites they get higher wages. The Indian and white - they get a dining hall where they sit and drink their tea and have their lunch. Me, I am an African, we have to sit outside in the sun and drink out of dirty plastics cups. Its just too much problem. The Indian and me we are the same. The Africans are working just as hard ... besides this I don't care - if they treat me the same as the Indians and whites then things will come right" (machinist, Co.1: 1991).³

Mr. M, who worked in Co.D had this to say:

"I do electrical maintenance on all the machines and installations. The previous person who did this job was a white and he did not have a supervisor, fuck all ... and he got much more than I am getting plus a company car and company housing. I knew much more than he did. As far as Indians and Africans are concerned the pay is fuckin' lousy ... there is no housing, transport - nothing. Increases in the company are terrible. As far as Africans are concerned, regardless of the time they worked there, their increases ranged from a lousy fuckin' 5 cents to 25 cents and as far as the Indians go it went from 50 cents to a rand and this is after a year - two years or what-ever and this is normal increase in this company" (Mr.M, Co.D: 1991).

Apart from the racial discrimination, workers were subjected to ethnic and religious discrimination.

"I have been working for this company for two years. My starting salary was R35 a week ... but when they employed the Muslim speaking lady they gave her R65 a week as starting salary. I am working here for two years and only now I

am getting R60 a week. She is getting higher wages plus free transport right to Stanger because she is their 'jhath' ... That is why now I sit and do nothing" (Mrs M, Co.5: 1991).⁴

The Indian supervisor and "floor manageress", as she called herself, in Co.8 said:

"Yusuf (owner) employed Salim as (the) manager because he is a Muslim. Salim does not know anything about jersey production. He used to work in a shop, selling clothes before he came here. Muslims trust their own kind" (Mrs S, Co.8: 1991).⁵

Political and ethnic sentiments, in certain instances, can play an important role in influencing people's positions on the labour market.

■ Social Reproduction, Segmentation and Gender

It is important to recognise the complexities of the social reproduction of labour in that it prepares people for the jobs that they take on. Nowhere is this more clearer than the positions women assume in wage-labour and the rewards and benefits that they accrue. As Del Mercato aptly writes:

"The central role that women play in the process of reproduction of labour, and the basic role that this plays in the reproduction of the whole economic system, gives to housework rather than to wage work a higher weight in determining the location of women's work in the reproduction of the system" (Del Mercato, 1981: 201).

Women's roles and position within the family would be a reason why

"It is too much to expect a woman to carry and stack boxes. That is the men's job. Women are more adaptable to the quick hands job and they are also good at the cleaning jobs... you know... they are much more cleaner than men. So it

is just asking too much of a woman do to his job - I think it is just too much for the women to do" (manager, Co.ID: 1990).⁶

It is the 'common sense' beliefs, the sexist attitude towards women, that inform their position in the labour process and in the labour market. As the personnel manager of Co.11 put it:

"Men do men's jobs, like operators, they are dangerous jobs because it involves heavy work and you have to be safety conscious. Most of the women are careless some how... piecing and doafing - that is a woman's job" (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990).

Women worker's secondary positions are reinforced further in the following beliefs: "To work with a man is much easier" (Mr.B: Co.Am: 1990). Or "It is disruptive to have men and women working together. I haven't given it much thought as to why women are not employed here" (manager, Co.C: 1990).

Patriarchal political forces that go far back in history, and which have subsequently been reinforced have had a major influence on the conditions and situations under which women have sold their labour. Consequently, women are regarded as "crucially weaker" members of the labour force than male workers. This is where women's employment in secondary status jobs has its basis (Kenrick, 1981: 188), and where the low-pay that is accorded to women originates. An example from the clothing industry will illustrate this point:

"I have worked 11 years as a machinist. I worked first in Durban. My wages there was R120 a week... now in Isithebe I get R45 a week starting salary as machinist. I am getting too low wages as machinist here" (semi-skilled machinist, Co.1: 1989).

Some clarification is required - the highest wage for women in the clothing industry was R57 plus a R3 attendant bonus which equals to R60 a week. So if a woman was absent

for a single day in a week she received R57 for that week. However, the interviews showed that female workers attached to a company for three years and more were still receiving the R57 plus R3 attendant bonus. The position in terms of wages and promotional prospects (which was negligible on a general scale for both male and female workers) for a male machinist fresh out of the training course offered by management was, however, slightly different. A male worker stated that he started off with a R65 a week salary as a machinist while the women, "they got R30 a week. After a year I was promoted to a supervisor and now I am earning R85 a week" (semi-skilled supervisor, 1988).

Women's entry into the metal industry, was generally restricted to the position of 'the cleaners'. Co.D and Co.G were the only two of the participants who employed women on the production process. Co.D:

"Hardly had women in the olden days. It is only in the last two years we said lets employ women... we just found it was easier than having all males, why? because we can pay them less. We had big financial problems. One of the reason was bad organization and bad controls of the work-force... We have re-organized certain functions, for example, we have reduced our weekly paid staff in the last six months from 250 to 190 that is about 25% of the total and we have employed women... the only work they don't do is the heavy manual work... but other than that it does not matter whether it is men or women. The welders and the machine operators are men... women are the material handlers, you know, take this from here and put it there, sweepers, they also operate the powder coating guns" (owner, Co.D: 1990).

Interviews with a skilled electrician who worked in Co.D reveal that these jobs were previously performed by men who earned between R75 and R95 a week, while women employed in such positions:

"Are earning much lower. I know of some who are getting R35 a week and who are doing grinding, painting and even powder coating. When it comes to small

things that [do] not require welding then women do them like doing a braai stand, putting the bolts in... putting it together" (Mr.M, Co.D: 1991).

Women are often viewed as weaker than male workers. As a result of this, their secondary positions in the labour market, their low status and wages are maintained and reinforced.

This research also found that women and young people often formed part of casual or temporary labour when a firm underwent reorganization and restructuring, or, when a company experienced an increase in product demand for a particular month. For example, in a paper company, Co.TP the manager explained that:

"On the handline we employed temporary labour which was female. We were having problems with our machines and could not produce enough bags. So we took on about 60 women. We had them for 6 months and after they were finished we paid them off" (manager, Co.TP: 1990).

Interviews with management show that age can play an important role in the choice of labour, thereby contributing to the degrees of segmentation in the labour market. The manager of Co.C prefers "to get a guy who is over 30, is married and who has a few kids. It gives the guy a sense of responsibility" (manager, Co.C: 1990). Generally for the metal and engineering sector married males were seen by employers to have the desired work characteristics. Similar views were expressed about female workers in the textile sector. The owner of Co.14 said he would:

"Rather have a more reliable mature person. There is less chance of [her] falling pregnant. If they fall pregnant then I will have to find casual workers. These are the hassles with the young girls" (owner, Co.14: 1990).

In Co.PL. an engineering company:

"Last Christmas we had school boys here. We re-organized one section

over-night and we tripled our out-put. We used school boys for that period [only]. Never mind the normal guys who used to run the machines - we actually tripled our out-put just by putting up black boards and every-time they made an item they had to put their mark there. We used to check it hourly and what have you, now, one day a week we do without night-shift" (production manager, Co.PL: 1990).

The level and extent of wages, rewards, benefits and job security, were differentiated along gender and age lines, among others. These, in turn, contributed to the segmented nature of the labour market in Isithebe.

2. In-Market Segmentation:

The effects of pre-market segmentation are carried through into the market for jobs, rewards, wages etc.⁷ Over and above the determinants of pre-market factors, in-market segmentation also encompasses aspects that directly relate to the production process such as levels of technology, nature and variation of jobs, access to training and promotion and the strength of the working-class. In-market segmentation, in other words refers to the internal labour market within firms. These factors considered in conjunction with social factors and upbringing produce dynamic labour markets as opposed to wholly and perfectly competitive ones. Of the 29 firms which were interviewed the labour market conditions of 23 are discussed here. Analysis of labour market and labour process conditions in these firms reveal, that in-market segmentation was present in firms, as well as, within and between sectors of industry in Isithebe. The trends of in-market segmentation in and between the sectors are discussed in terms of: occupation, wages, rewards and benefits, access to further training and promotional prospects for the different types of labour. This facilitates an appreciation for the varying degrees of segmentation in the labour market, and the close connection of firm and industry specifications with levels of segmentation.

(a) Clothing and Textiles

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the clothing companies and the products they manufacture.

Table 1: Clothing companies and the products manufactured

| Company Name | Product Manufactured |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| Co.1 | Women, men and children's clothing |
| Co.2 | Women's garments |
| Co.3 | Men's clothing |
| Co.4 | Baby wear |
| Co.5 | Underwear |
| Co.6 | Work overalls |
| Co.7 | Children's clothes |
| Co.8 | Jerseys and knit wear |
| Co.9 | Jerseys and knit wear |
| Co.10 | Jerseys and knit wear |

As is shown in Table 2, five clothing firms had fairly stable demands for their products. The workforce in six of the firms were unionised with SACTWU. Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, and Co.5 had the largest number of African workers in their employ (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990). Four firms reported that they were operating, at the time, within fluctuating and or declining product markets. "There is too much competition in the jersey trade. This competition (is) no good for my business" (manager, Co.9: 1990). Co.7, Co.8 and Co.10 attributed their unstable product market position, at the time, to the general economic decline of the national economy. These four were not unionized.

Table 2: Clothing and textile companies' product market conditions, number of employees and worker organisation

| Company | Product market conditions | Number of employees | Union presence |
|----------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Co.1 | Fluctuating | 500 | SACTWU |
| Co.2 | Fairly stable | 2 200 | SACTWU |
| Co.3 | Fairly stable | 2 200 | SACTWU |
| Co.4 | Fairly stable | 2 200 | SACTWU |
| Co.5 | Fairly stable | 2 200 | SACTWU |
| Co.6 | Stable | 475 | SACTWU |
| Co.7 | Fluctuating | 415 | no union |
| Co.8 | Fluctuating | 80 | no union |
| Co.9 | Fluctuating | 300 | no union |
| Co.10 | Fluctuating | 254 | no union |

Apart from the social division of labour, other factors which include the labour process, a firm's product market, the size of its' labour-force and whether the workers are unionized or not, also contribute to the perpetuation of labour market segmentation. Hence, it is necessary to point out these trends in the different companies, as they crucially influenced working conditions, benefits and the balance of power in the labour markets and the labour processes.

■ Labour Composition, Wages and Rewards

Table 3 depicts the structure of labour in the companies. The composition of labour and the distribution of wages and rewards reflected two aspects: (a) segmentation based on sex, (b) segmentation based on race. African labour was pre-dominantly employed in unskilled, and in different degrees of semi-skilled labour.

Table 3: Labour composition in Co.1 to Co.8

| Race | Sex | Occupation | Skill |
|-------------|------------|---------------------|--------------|
| African | Women | Machinist | Semi-skilled |
| | | Score-taker | Semi-skilled |
| | | Supervisor | Semi-skilled |
| | | Quality controller | Semi-skilled |
| | | Button-hole maker | Semi-skilled |
| Indian | Women | Senior supervisor | Skilled |
| | | Quality controller | Skilled |
| African | Male | Loader | Unskilled |
| | | Sorter | Unskilled |
| | | Heavy manual labour | Unskilled |
| | | Technician | Semi-skilled |
| | | Mechanic | Semi-skilled |
| Indian | Male | Owner | Skilled |
| | | Manager | Skilled |
| | | Technician | Skilled |
| | | Mechanic | Skilled |
| | | Administrator | Skilled |
| White | Male | Owner | Skilled |
| | | Manager | Skilled |

The labour force was largely female, a characteristic feature of the clothing sector. The majority of the women in these companies were employed as semi-skilled machinists. In Co.1, Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, Co.6, Co.8, however, women were also employed as supervisors, score takers, quality controllers and button-hole makers. In all clothing companies, senior supervisory staff were filled by predominately Indian females. Indian females were also employed as quality controllers. Nevertheless, certain jobs in these firms were reserved for men, such as loading, storing and other heavy manual work. Men were also employed as supervisors, charge-hands or formed part of the technical

and mechanical staff. Whites and Indians males were owners, or managers. Indians males were also employed as technicians and machine mechanics, and in administrative positions.

Managers and owners interviewed were reluctant to divulge clear information on wages. As a result detailed wage structures for the sector are not available. Nevertheless, interviews with firms, revealed broad wage trends. Most companies in the study started their unskilled female labour with R30 a week, (except in Co.8 where female labour started at R28 a week) while an experienced semi-skilled machinist earned R57 a week, plus a R3 attendance bonus. Co.1, Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, paid their African semi-skilled supervisor R128 a week, while skilled Indian supervisors earned R140 a week.

These companies belonged to the ICMA, whose one function, among others, was to regulate the wage structure, worker benefits and rewards for the industry. "In the ICMA we have a structure which we follow: wage structure, holiday pay, 15 days annual leave, bonus and presents" (manager, Co.1: 1990). Annual wage increases were negotiated with SACTWU. Workers were entitled to sick leave, maternity leave and they were also provided with first aid services in these factories (manager, Co.5: 1990). There were also production output rewards in such companies, for "best machinist of the month" who received R100 including a trophy and cakes. Top quality controllers and supervisors for the month received a braai, "because they are higher than the machinists" (manager Co.3: 1989). Those employed in management positions received housing subsidies, (in Co.1 managers get up to R60 000 as a housing subsidy), travelling allowance, while in Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, managers were entitled to a share of "hupla money" (manager, Co.4: 1990).⁸ In Co.7, Co.8, Co.9 and Co.10, because of their low product market, and the fact that the workforce was not unionized, benefits and wage increases were non-existent.

All ten clothing companies offered training programmes for workers employed, for the first time. However, these training programmes equipped people with semi-skills. Larger companies with stable markets for their products - Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, Co.6

and to an extent Co.1 - had their own training school. When employing somebody for the first time:

"We don't look for anything, we take the raw labour, train them up. We have a training school, we train this raw labour and then we put them in the factory. They are trained on how to use the machines, productivity, an awareness course, how to save money...." (manager, Co.2: 1989).

Further training was available for supervisory staff. Managers were entitled to business management and industrial relations courses, in Co.1, Co.2, Co.3, Co.4 and Co.5. Generally however, workers recruited in semi-skilled and unskilled labour faced little promotional prospects. On an overall scale promotion within the clothing industry was not significant and was a fairly young practice. At the time of conducting interviews, the trend was emerging in Co.2, Co.3, Co.4 and Co.5. "Promotion", said the manager of Co.4:

"Is still quite new to us, but now we try and promote within the company... It was the National Productivity Institute (NPI)⁹ who advised us to promote within the company rather than taking (labour) from outside. They selected a few people from the production floor and asked us to promote them to supervisors. There were about four men and two women... The necessary training was given to them by the NPI (which) monitors their performance after they have been promoted to supervisors. Workers will have to show the ability to work hard and reach a certain standard, then they are promoted" (manager, Co.4, 1990).

For the garment industry, in-market segmentation was clearly evident in the differentiation of wages, benefits and rewards, as well as access to further training. These were structured according to race, sex, and ethnicity and produced in-market segmentation in and between the clothing companies that feature in this research. Segmentation between companies reveal the following: companies that were large, had relative market power in terms of the demand for their products, and had the resources to match the demands of their unionized work-force, offered relatively better working

conditions and benefits than those firms that lacked these attributes. Non-unionised companies - Co.7, Co.8, Co.9 and Co.10 - did not offer benefits that workers in organised firms enjoyed, such as annual increase, maternity and sick leave. Therefore, segmentation within the labour market is reproduced within a specific industrial sector.

The case studies support the argument that, the positions and benefits that unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled workers and managers accrue are dependent on their position in the social and technical division of labour. The positions that workers hold, the strength of the labour force in the factories and the product market of a firm, in turn, govern wage levels, benefits and the like.

Table 4: Textile companies and the products manufactured

| Company | Product Manufactured |
|---------|----------------------|
| Co.11 | Carpets |
| Co.12 | Hand woven carpets |
| Co.13 | Yarn |
| Co.14 | Braids and beading |

Similar trends of segmentation, as in the clothing sector, were present in the four textile firms interviewed. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the firms and what they produced. Of these firms, only Co.11 had a stable product market (refer to table 5). The starting wage here was R30. Its work-force was composed of 50% males who were semi-skilled machine operators, and 50% females who occupied a variety of semi-skilled jobs. Women were employed in the piecing, doafing and sorting-out sections. Co.12 workforce comprised of semi-skilled hand weavers and unskilled yarn spinners. In Co.13 most of 80 workers were females who attended to the machines that spin yarn. At the time of this research, Co.13 had been operating in Isithebe for a year, and the owner was still paying his machine-minders R50 a week, the wages they started off with. According to the owner "I am not fully operational, therefore there are no increases and other benefits." Co.14, the smallest in the sector, employed 3 female workers who were machine-minders. "They just switch the machine on, make certain that it is running, and then switch it off" (owner, Co.14: 1990).

Table 5: Textile companies' product market conditions, number of employees and worker organisation

| Company | Product Market Conditions | Number of Employees | Union |
|---------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------|
| Co.11 | Stable | 275 | SACTWU |
| Co.12 | Fluctuating | 115 | No union |
| Co.13 | Fluctuating | 80 | No union |
| Co.14 | Fluctuating | 3 | No union |

Co.11 was the only company whose workers were organised. It was also the only company from the sample that offered annual increases and maternity leave. These were negotiated with SACTWU. Workers were also provided with first aid facilities. Co.12, however, had a nurse on duty in the factory. Nevertheless, the benefits that Co.11 awarded its workers were dependent on their grades.

"Skilled labour, like the supervisors and team-leaders fall into grade 9. Most of these people are whites, in management. They get a company house, company car, travelling allowance, pension and medical aid. Indians and coloureds are clerical and administration staff. Transport is provided for them and medical aid." (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990).

Clerical and administrative workers also received a housing subsidy, medical and job security. Co.11 was also the only textile firm from the sample that has its own training centre and that offered promotional prospects. As the personnel manager explained:

"Workers have been promoted in the past. At the moment we've got three trainee supervisors, who have been promoted from machine-operator (positions). I write a memo and put it up on the notice board, so that any employee in the company (may) apply for the job" (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990).

Co.11 with its stable product market position and its unionized work-force, lends support to the observations made earlier in terms of the larger clothing companies. Firms

that are large, with stable product markets and where there are worker organizations tend to offer much more to workers, than those firms where such conditions are not present.

Internal recruiting and training programmes, which existed in some of the firms in the different sectors interviewed, contributed to the development of internal labour markets. The development of internal labour markets reduces the firm's dependence on the external labour markets (Sengenberger, 1981: 248). These programmes are often conscious efforts on the part of managements, in their attempt to create worker attachment and loyalty to the firm as well as to stratify the work-force. These managerial initiatives coincide with worker interest in job security, stable employment relationships and increased opportunities for promotion and upward mobility. Workers' acceptance of internal recruitment and internal training also facilitates the consolidation of the internal labour markets, thereby decreasing the employer's dependence on the external labour market.¹⁰

(b) Metal and Engineering Sector

The labour market conditions for eight firms in this sector are discussed below. Table 6 provides details on these companies and the products they specialised in.

Table 6: Metal and engineering companies and the products manufactured.

| Name of Company | Product Manufactured |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| Co.A | Vehicle trailers |
| Co.B | Lead smelters |
| Co.C | Air conditioners and lockers |
| Co.D | Steel products and components |
| Co.E | Metal components |
| Co.F | Parts for the motor industry |
| Co.G | Steel units and cupboards |
| Co.H | Cut, bent and shaped lead |

Table 7: Metal and engineering companies' product market conditions, number of employees and worker organisation.

| Company | Product market conditions | Number of employees | Union presence |
|---------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Co.A | Unstable | 150 | NUMSA |
| Co.B | Unstable | 130 | NUMSA |
| Co.C | Unstable | 54 | NUMSA |
| Co.D | Unstable | 195 | No Union |
| Co.E | Unstable | 4 | No Union |
| Co.F | Stable | 68 | NUMSA |
| Co.G | Stable | 250 | No Union |
| Co.H | Stable | 80 | No Union |

As is indicated in Table 7, the workforce in four of the eight firms were unionised. Management in five firms stated that they were, at the time, experiencing an economic slump or unstable product demand. For some the decrease in demand was due to national economic and political trends at the time. "We are experiencing an economic decline, because of this sanctions, we can't get any parts and spares" (production manager, Co.A: 1990). And: "This is a slack economic period for us, because of the economy as a whole. The demand has dropped" (production manager, Co.B: 1990). In other companies, it was the nature of the product or problems encountered with work re-organization, that were responsible for fluctuating demands for products. The manager of Co.C said that:

"At the moment we are in a slump, which is typical of the air-cooling industry. In the winter people don't buy air-conditioners, even though you drop the price. In the summer it a boom period" (manger, Co.C: 1990).

In the case of Co.D, management attributed its unstable product market decline to the conversion of the labour process from a jobbing environment to a manufacturing one (manager, Co.D: 1990). Finally, Co.E had

"Just started - 6 months to be precise... This is a small company, I employ only 4 workers. I have to compete with the other larger companies, who have been here for much longer than I have. It is not easy being in Isithebe." (owner, Co.E: 1989).

For the other 3 firms: "Business is alright, we're managing" (owner, Co.F: 1990), or "Oh, no complaints" (manageress, Co.G: 1990) and "We have a set number of clients, so I would say we are fairly stable" (manager, Co.H: 1990).

■ Labour Composition, Wages and Rewards

African labour in these firms was composed predominantly of unskilled labour. As one of the managers said: "Majority of the workers are unskilled. After a while they acquire a skill. But he does not have any formal training... [H]e is skilled to do a particular job" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

The production manager in Co.B explained that 75% of the workers were unskilled while "the others are semi-skilled in the sense that they learnt several skills in our factory" (production manager, Co.B: 1990). Similar trends in terms of skill composition were evident in the other companies. The work-force was also dominated by men. In most firms females were employed only as the 'cleaning-lady'. This job also involved making tea for management. However, Co.D and Co.G were the exception in that women were employed in sections of the manufacturing process. Table 8 provides a general breakdown of labour composition for the metal and engineering firms. As is indicated below the composition of labour was differentiated according to race and sex.

Table 8: Labour composition in Co.A to Co.H according to race and sex.

| Race | Sex | Occupation | Skill |
|-------------|------------|---------------------|--------------|
| African | Male | Manual labour | Unskilled |
| | | Casual labour | Unskilled |
| | | Welders | Semi-skilled |
| | | Machine operators | Semi-skilled |
| | | Drivers | Skilled |
| | | Supervisors | Semi-skilled |
| | | Technicians | Semi-skilled |
| | | Maintenance crew | Semi-skilled |
| | Female | *Epoxy coating | Semi-skilled |
| | | *Powder coating | Semi-skilled |
| | | *Finishing section | Semi-skilled |
| | | Cleaners | Unskilled |
| Indian | Male | Artisans | Skilled |
| | | Admin. staff | Skilled |
| | | Production managers | Skilled |
| | | Supervisors | Skilled |
| White | Male | Owners | Skilled |
| | | Artisans | Skilled |
| | | Production managers | Skilled |
| | | Supervisors | Skilled |
| | Female | *Manageress | Skilled |

* In Co.D women were employed in the "epoxy coating plant or in the powder-coating department" (manager, Co.D: 1990), while in Co.G women were employed in the "finishing sections" (manageress, Co.G: 1990). Of all the firms interviewed, Co.G was the only company that had a manageress.

Unskilled heavy manual work involved loading, or "fetch this, carry that type jobs" (manager, Co.H: 1990) were performed by African males. As Table 9 shows, African males occupied a variety of semi-skilled jobs, such as welders, machine operators, etc. Co.A, Co.B, Co.C and Co.F made use of casual labour when there was a bigger than usual order, or when workers went on annual leave. In all cases casual labour was employed in unskilled, labourer type jobs. All skilled positions, such as managers, artisan jobs, supervisors etc were occupied by Indian and whites. White males were also owners of firms.

Here, again, no detailed wage structure is available for the sector due to managements' reluctance to disclose figures. Employers in this sector, however, did provided broad wage trends in their factories. Table 9 indicates the differentiated distribution of wages, benefits and rewards, based on skill or work and race.

Table 9: Wages and benefits according to skill or occupation and race in the metal and engineering sector

| Company | Skill or Occupation | Race | Wages | Benefits and Rewards |
|---------|-------------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|
| Co.B | Unskilled | African | *R2:25c | **SL; AL; B; AI |
| | Semi-skilled | | R2:44c -R3:36c | SL; AL; B; AI |
| | Unskilled casual labour | | R1:95c | None |
| | Skilled | Indian and white | R2:94c - R4:44c | CC; TS; MA; P; AL; B, AI, SL |
| Co.C | Unskilled | African | R1:80c | AL; SL; AL; AI; B |
| | Semi-skilled | | R2:50c - R4:00 | AL; SL; AI; B |
| Co.D | Unskilled | African | R1:11c - R1:33c | None |

Table 9 (continued)

| Company | Skill or Occupation | Race | Wages | Benefits and Rewards |
|----------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| Co.E | Unskilled | African | R1:50c | None |
| | Apprentice | Indian | R1:80c | None |
| | Cleaner\ Tea lady | African | R1:24c | None |
| Co.F | Grade A1 | African | R3:75c | SL; AL; AI; B |
| | Grade C3 | | R9:87c | SL; AI; AL; B |
| Co.G | Unskilled | African | 70c | None |
| | Semi-skilled indunas | | R15:00 | HS; TS |
| Co.H | Unskilled | African | R2:00 | None |
| | Semi-skilled | | R3:00 - R4:00 | None |

* Wages in all firms, for all jobs, are reflected for a hourly basis, except for the indunas in Co.D.

* The following abbreviations have been used to indicate benefits and rewards:

SL - Sick leave; AL - Annual leave; AI - Annual increase; B - Bonus (holiday pay); P - Pension; MA - Medical aid; HS - Housing subsidy; TS - Travel subsidy; WL - water and light subsidies; CC - Company car.

From the above table, it is clear that in-market segmentation occurs within and between firms. A good example of labour market segmentation within firms is Co.B. The starting wage rate for permanent workers in unskilled jobs was R2-25c an hour, semi-skilled labour ranged from R2-44c to R3-36c an hour, and depending on the type of skill and the service with the company, skilled labour ranged from R2-94c to R4-45c an hour. Casual labour was paid R1-95c an hour. Wages were negotiated with NUMSA twice a year. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers were entitled to two weeks paid sick leave, annual increases, as well as holiday pay. Those employed at the level of management also received company cars, travelling allowance, medical and pension schemes. Benefits were determined by the company's grading structure, which for management was reflective of the level of skill, "...the 14th grade is the highest and the 16th is the

lowest" (production manager, Co.B: 1990). The company's use of a grading system reflects the development of its internal labour market, which regulated the distribution of jobs, wages and benefits. In the process in-market segmentation was reinforced.

In Co.C wages were also negotiated with NUMSA, twice a year. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers in Co.C and Co.A enjoyed the same sort of benefits as those in Co.B. The unstable product market conditions of these companies (see Table 7) did not preclude them from offering benefits to their labour-force. In the case of Co.A and Co.B a factor that ensured worker benefits and rewards was the presence of the union. The small numbers in the work-force and the presence of the union in Co.C can be used to explain the existence of the benefits that workers received.

Segmentation within the sector becomes clear when comparisons are made between firms like Co.A, Co.B and Co.C with firms like Co.D and Co.E. Only the indunas in Co.D, who were in charge of supervision and hiring and firing, received perks; "We subsidize their homes, water and lights" (manager, Co.D: 1990). For the majority, there were no benefits and rewards. Women workers did not receive maternity leave either. In addition to this management vehemently opposed trade unions on the shop-floor. "We won't tolerate unions here. We don't hire the wrong blokes (so) we don't have worker militancy..." said the manager. Co.E was the smallest of all the firms interviewed for this sector. Here again no other benefits accrued to these workers.

All five firms responded that they were experiencing an economic decline. Yet in Co.A, Co.B. and Co.C workers received higher wages and other benefits, which was not the case in Co.D and Co.E. The presence or absence of such benefits and the level of wages may be explained using factors that were peculiar to these firms themselves. As was explained earlier, Co.D had just been through a re-organization process and a change-over of production process. Its unstable product market position influenced its anti-union stand. Yet, the indunas in the factory were entitled to relatively higher wages and other benefits that secured their reproduction of labour (housing, lights, water subsidies). They were seen as core workers, and generally it is to such workers that more rewards and benefits are awarded. Co.E was a fairly new and small firm. In Co.A,

Co.B and Co.C the presence of the union and the particular type of employer-employee relationship ensured that workers received a higher wage rate.

Co.F was the highest paying firm among those that participated in the survey. Grade A1 was the lowest paying at R3-75c an hour and those who were on grade C3 earned R9-87c an hour. Wages were negotiated twice a year with NUMSA, and workers received various benefits (owner, Co.F: 1990). Co.F's product market power and the unionization of the work-force were strong determinants for the existence of higher levels of wages and benefits. Stable product markets of companies, however, does not always mean that firms would pay their workers higher wages or will provide for worker benefits.

This was the case for Co.G and Co.H. These companies highlight further the various levels of labour market segmentation within the metal and engineering sectors. In Co.G, wages for unskilled labour was 70c an hour and skilled labour was paid R15 an hour. Semi-skilled 'Boss boys' qualified for a housing subsidy and were provided with transport (manageress, Co.G: 1990). In Co.H unskilled labour was paid R2 an hour and semi-skilled workers got between R3 and R4 an hour. No other benefits prevailed. Both firms were anti-union, "I will fight the union's entry with everything. I will pick them up with my body and chuck them out" (manageress, Co.G: 1990), and, "Should I have the unions here? We have a good relationship with our guys and we don't want the unions and we don't need them" (manager, Co.H: 1990). Low wages and the lack of worker benefits and rewards in such firms are attributable to the capital-wage relationship at the time - the strength of management and the weak bargaining position of the labour-force in these factories.

The trends in the differential wage structure, rewards and benefits in the metal sector point to the presence of in-market segmentation within firms and within the sector. The demand aspect of the labour market in Isithebe supports the view that the advantaged segments are often filled by people of a higher labour quality, which stems from their positions within the social division of labour. Compared to clothing and textiles, workers in the metal sector received relatively higher wages. This is due to the nature

of the sector itself, the smaller numbers in the labour-force compared to the more labour-intensive production processes in clothing and textiles. Segmentation in the labour market is influenced by a number of inter-related pre- and in-market variables. Precisely because the neo-classical view is unable to explain the complexities of the labour market within Isithebe, analysis of the market calls for a labour market segmentation approach.

Segmentation requires various multi-casual explanations based on "the structure of technology, product markets, control over the labour process and labour supply conditions" (Rubery and Wilkinson, 1981). The incorporation of these factors in the analysis of segmentation in the labour market, enables a deeper appreciation of the varying degrees in which secondary jobs and positions occur. The above examples from the clothing and textiles and the metal sectors point to the heterogeneous nature of the labour market in Isithebe. On an overall scale labour market conditions in firms and within and between sectors reflected the secondary status of its participants, and the reality that there are different levels of secondary workers and jobs. Put differently, segmentation and secondary work conditions occur in varying degrees, depending on a firm's market power, the balance of class forces on the factory floor, the nature of the production process and the nature and level of skill of the labour force.

An analysis of the labour market must be situated within an analysis of the labour process. This will reveal the difficulty and danger in a general acceptance and application of the dual labour market theory's analysis of segmentation as manifesting itself in two poles - that of primary segments and secondary segments - each with their own exclusive features. This research shows that, firms with elements of primary labour market conditions, as far as product markets are concerned, and which offer secondary work conditions, can and do exist. Such issues are dealt with below.

PRIMARY PRODUCT MARKETS AND SECONDARY WORKING CONDITIONS

Piore's definition of primary industrial sectors are those firms that are large, utilise modern technology and with stable product markets and market power. Such firms are associated with strong trade union organizations and high pay. On the other end of the spectrum, are the secondary industries which are small firms, make use of traditional technology, and operate within competitive and/or declining product markets. Such firms act as subcontractors to the primary sector and their labour force has a relatively low bargaining position and low pay. The dual labour market theory's definition of secondary firms does apply to certain companies. A significant number of the firms presented above qualified as secondary firms. In the clothing and textile they were: Co.7, Co.8, Co.9, Co.10, Co.12, Co.13 and Co.14. The metal and engineering sector included Co.D, Co.E, Co.G and Co.H. That is, most of these companies operated within declining or unstable product markets (with the exception of Co.G and Co.H), paid their workers lower than the rest of the firms interviewed, the bargaining position of their work-force was low, there were no annual increases, nor were there worker benefits and rewards.

Nevertheless, an equally significant number of companies displayed primary labour market conditions, but offered secondary working conditions. Firms in the different sectors qualified as primary companies, only in so far as they enjoyed stable product market conditions; were large and utilized modern technology. Yet wages were low compared to urban rates; the work-force laboured under direct forms of control, especially in clothing and textiles and certain sections in the metal sector. Furthermore, it was class struggles, waged by workers in these companies, that secured for them minimum forms of benefits and trade union rights. Firms which qualified as primary companies, but which have secondary working conditions, from clothing and textiles were: Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, Co.6 and Co.11 and Co.F from metal and engineering.

A few empirical examples are now presented in order to support the argument that firms can have primary labour market qualities along-side secondary labour market features. Co.2, Co.3, Co.4 and Co.5, as established, had the same parent company. The parent company was the third largest privately owned company nationally. It had five different branches in Isithebe alone and at the time of the empirical research a sixth was shortly to open. This made the company one of the largest employer in the industrial area, employing in the region of 6800 to 7000 workers. Over and above this the company also subcontracted to a smaller firm in Isithebe (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990). The branch firms of Co.Am were major suppliers to leading fashion stores throughout the country, for example Edgars, Truworths, O.K. Bazaars. In addition, the company exported its products to USA and Italy. It had the franchise to manufacture 'Calvin Klein', 'Next' and other so-called top name brands. "Last year" (1989), said the manager of Co.4, "this company made R125 million in Isithebe and this year our target is R150 million". The company was strongly unionized with SACTWU. However, before the signing of the recognition agreement with the company, workers staged a hard and strong battle that took the form of strikes, to be unionized. Concomitant with these strikes for union recognition were demands for higher wages.

Why would a company such as this, which had power over its product market, pay its workers low wages (starting salary R35, semi-skilled machinist R57 per week) and deny them certain worker benefits? The answer can be sought in the nature of the labour-process, which "is more labour-intensive. It is workers who produce the garments, not machines" said Mr.B. According to him, they utilized "modern and up-to-date machines" in the five branches, with the sixth one more mechanized. The production process also involved the manufacture of "less sophisticated garments...it is simple production...in Durban we manufacture more complex garments" (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990). Thus the nature of the skills involved, and more pertinent, the ratio of workers to machines, increases a firm's keen and vested interest in keeping wages to a minimum. This is reflected in these firms' involvement with the ICMA., wherein negotiations occur at the level of the employers association and not at the level of the plant.

Features which are unique to the firm and sector combined with politico-ideological

factors and pre-market segmentation to reinforce the disadvantaged positions that workers occupied in companies' labour markets. The differentiations in people's social reproduction of labour informed capital's views and attitudes towards the African working class. These often acted as justifications by employers for secondary wages and work conditions. Such sentiments are reflected in the following:

"If you think about it these people don't need a lot of money because they don't have a lot of expenses, like they just see a flat piece of land and, boom, they build a shack - just like that...They don't have electricity or water or phone bills to pay. Now I have to pay rates on my house, and then we want things like T.V.s and M-net decoders and other items which these people don't have to worry about" (manager, Co.5: 1990).

The belief that workers in Isithebe do not require much, because of their standards of living, was used to justify low wages. How would one classify this company in terms of primary and secondary definitions? Is it possible to categorize firms of this nature into rigid classifications? The example above does not fit neatly into the dual labour market segmentation model and its characterizations of firms in the labour market. This is so because a company can achieve primary product market status with secondary work conditions, hence, "...dualism (segmentation) in product market structures need not coincide with dualism (segmentation) in employment conditions" (Lawson, 1981: 47). This argument is reinforced further when consideration is given to firms such as Co.1, where the same type of wage scale and worker benefits prevailed; yet it was experiencing an economic downturn.

Empirical research has shown further that a firm can manufacture sophisticated products, enjoy a stable market position, yet, pay its labour-force well below that of urban rates. Co.F, from metal and engineering, was for a time one of two companies world-wide that manufactured CAF permanite jointing to special order in 3 meter square sheets. These are used in the manufacture of gaskets for sealing flanks and mechanical joints. It was supplier to Mercedes Benz, as well as, exported to a wide-range of overseas markets. The owner described the labour process as being

capital-intensive (owner, Co.F: 1990). The lowest wage rate here is R3-75c an hour, while the highest is R9-87c an hour. A shop-steward in the company said

"The wages for the African workers are very low, here. The union showed us the figures...(for) factories in Durban. They (factories in Durban) pay more for similar work" (Mr. Z, Co.F: 1990).

Cognizance must be taken of the influence of broader political and ideological moments and the influence that the state had in creating and securing favourable conditions of exploitation and profitability in industrial deconcentrated and decentralized zones during the apartheid era. Companies which were able to maintain profitability were able to maintain low wages, rewards and benefits despite the presence of trade unions because of the historical development of industrialisation in South Africa and the role and perceptions of African labour.

These influences were evident in all companies interviewed. Broader historical, political and ideological factors are seen as being equally important as product market power, level of technology etc., in shaping internal labour markets, in Co.G and Co.H, (metal sector); and in Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, Co.6 and Co.11 (clothing and textile sectors). Where legislation governing and making compulsory basic wage stipulations and the right for workers to organize are absent in a region, the balance of class forces are immediately in capital's favour. These regional dynamics and the effect of ideological and political influences make it difficult to make assumptions of primary and secondary firms only on the basis of product market power, level of technology etc., because, companies do indeed achieve primary product market features with relatively secondary work conditions.

It is also possible to find the co-existence of secondary product market features with elements of primary working conditions. Companies such as Co.A, Co.B and Co.C had secondary product market status, but had characteristics of primary labour market conditions. In these companies worker benefits and training programmes, as well as trade union rights were present. Yet these companies were operating within fluctuating

or declining product market conditions. The argument that segmentation in product market positions does not always coincide with segmentation of work conditions, is given more weight when a firm such as Co.SB is considered. Co.SB was a malt factory manufacturing for the sorghum brewery. It operated within an unstable product market. Its labour process was capital-intensive and it employed more semi-skilled than skilled and unskilled staff. The company offered training programmes for its semi-skilled workers. The company was controlled by the KFC.¹¹

"The sorghum beer depends on the political situation which has an indirect influence on the sales of sorghum beer... We supply the sorghum beer industries - it is a fluctuating, but not [a] stagnated industry" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

The company operated with machines that were "not too old... 8 years old", and a total labour force of 52. Out of this number, seven were whites who were departmental managers, the rest were African workers employed in semi-skilled and unskilled labour as follows: 15 labourers; 12 on the production process and 18 as plant maintainers, machine mechanics, fitters and electricians. Their wages, however, were

"Unlimited - but averaged around R625 p.m. It depends on the grades, we work on the Patterson grading system. We work from [grade] A1 to D1. I am the only person with D1 in the factory" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Wages in the company were negotiated with the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) on a yearly basis, but "there is no fixed percentage...it depends on the market". Precisely because the company did not have any control over its product market situation, wages had to be kept as low as possible to maintain its profitability. This example fits the description of a secondary sector firm closely, yet the work-force was strongly organized, and the company offered extensive in-training to their semi-skilled staff. Secondary and primary labour market conditions co-exist thereby producing dynamic labour markets, which do not fit neatly into ideal types. This is illustrated further when consideration is given to the presence of worker loyalty and low labour turn-over in secondary labour markets.

LABOUR TURN-OVER AND SECONDARY LABOUR MARKETS

Rational economic behaviour, for the dual labour market model and the human capital school is premised on worker's individual efficiency. It is work behaviour that determines which workers fill which jobs. The chief distinguishing qualification of primary and secondary markets, in terms of the early dual labour market theory, is the behaviour of the work force. Workers in the secondary sector are shut out of the primary sector due to their unstable work habits and high labour turn-over. There is, however, evidence that supports the converse. A number of companies that failed to develop primary conditions experienced low levels of labour turn-over. A number of factors exist which reinforce stable work patterns in secondary labour markets.

In firms where paternalistic relations of production¹² existed the labour force displayed a high degree of job attachment and firm loyalty, although pay and working conditions were relatively poor (see also Lawson, 1981). Paternalism can be a formidable force on the labour force in that paternal employers attempt to fuse familial relations and work, with themselves in authority. This is achieved by making a conscious effort to align workers' interests with that of the firm, and by creating the impression that management has the welfare of their workers at heart, or that "business efficiency and the welfare of the employees are but different sides of the same problem" (Lawson, 1981: 52).

A good example of a paternalistic firm is Co.ID, a pharmaceutical company with a capital-intensive production process. The company used old technology and had an unstable product market structure. The labour-force was not unionized, and attempts by the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) to organize in the factory resulted in dismissals. A factor that contributed to the stability of the work-force was the extent of paternalistic relations in the company. As the manager related:

"We try very much to be a family company. We got people doing part-time

selling in the week-ends. We instruct them what the products are for, we give them a bag and they sell the products in the township for the company. Some of them make a lot of money in the week-ends. Oh, and they just love it... it's fantastic... the opportunity is there, they make more money. So we are a very people company... We don't show any bias to any-one. There is no apartheid here, there is no race group getting preference over another. Every month we give away samples of our products - hampers to the girls. When the children get sick we give them tablets" (production manager, Co.ID: 1990).

Another company where paternalism was also actively encouraged by management is Co.SF, a furniture company. A partner in the firm, referred to as Mr.D explained:

"On Eid day we closed officially but we asked the workers to come to work. We brought all the sheep to the factory and we slaughtered them here, with the workers. We got them involved with us, because we earn money out of them, we try to treat them like a family. We slaughtered 3 sheep and 90% of the meat we gave to them (workers). We felt we owed it to them. We (have) a certain level of involvement with our staff ... we find that we have a fairly good relationship with our staff. That is why we try to create a family sort of thing. Everybody must be content, that is what it is all about" (Mr.D, Co.SF: 1991).

This form of control, which constituted an integral part of the relations of production, in the above examples, can also be seen as an anti-union strategy. This is so because paternalistic employers adopt the role of judge or protector of workers' interests, as well as, securing 'stable' work habits among employees. For example:

"I have fired 2 people because of intimidation. We found out who was at the head of it. We heard that it was this COSATU people...they were intimidating all the others - saying you must not do this - you must not do that. We don't have apartheid here, we just want work done. We have a very good relationship with our staff here and we felt this intimidation creeping in. Supervisors could not tell workers what to do. They just would not listen. They would tell me to tell the

workers because they don't listen or they threaten them in the township. That is why now we have adopted a policy to employ only Indian girls as the supervisors. We decided that we are not going to be intimidated by any-body. If the union thinks that they can intimidate my staff they must be bloody mistaken" (production manager, Co.ID: 1990).

Mr.D, from Co.SF said:

"If we can give our workers a fair deal, then we don't need the unions...The problem is between the employer and employee" (Mr.D, Co.SF: 1991).

This paternalism has worked for management. Mr.D went on to say that:

"We have had no strikes, no problem. We must be doing something right... Whatever we are doing right is our achievement. You must be thinking that we have a rope in our hands to keep workers in line. We don't do that; or you think that we are using the Kwa-Zulu police or the Gestapo... Its our attitude towards our staff".

Management's paternalistic attitude in Co.ID also appeared to have paid off. A supervisor said:

"No. I don't like the unions... My boss... gives me all that I want. He says we must be one family... I can go to him and ask him anything that I want... I don't need the unions" (Ms. Y, Co.ID: 1990).

This brings us to another important aspect of paternalism and the reasons for its acceptance by the working-class. In other words, before the establishment of paternalistic structures certain conditions have to be satisfied, which depend largely on the nature and conditions of the local labour-force, including the source of the labour supply (Lawson, 1981: 54).

For workers in Isithebe, given the nature and level of their positions in the social division of labour, as discussed above, it is not too difficult to identify a few reasons for their dependence upon their employers. In Co.ID workers received hampers, medicine, etc. which entrenched paternalistic relations. There was another important reason for this dependence. That is workers were dependent on their employers for a job where conditions were slightly better than in other sectors, eg clothing and textiles. In Co.ID the lowest pay was R45, paid to labourers making boxes; packers earned between R50 - R55 a week; machine operators earned R60 a week, supervisors wages ranged from R75 to 80 a week and the Indian supervisors earned R100 a week (production manager, Co.ID: 1990). The company paid for Ms.Y's (supervisor) driving lessons and test (Ms.Y, Co.ID: 1990). Relatively high wages and certain fringe benefits help to explain the labour-force's high degree of job attachment and firm loyalty. They also enable the workforce to accept the paternalistic relations at work. Co.SF also had worker loyalty and attachment. "You know I can't remember when last we recruited labour both skilled and unskilled... they pitch regularly to work" (manager, Co.SF: 1991).

The level of job attachment and firm loyalty, in firms which are not characterized by paternalistic relations, corresponded closely with workers' positions in the labour process. In firms from the engineering sector, management reported that it was their semi-skilled African workers who showed much more loyalty compared to unskilled. Semi-skilled labourers received higher wages, benefits and rewards than unskilled workers. Low rates of labour turn-over and job attachment must also be seen in terms of the nature of the labour process and the jobs that people do, because their position in the labour process influences their position in the labour market (and vice versa). The differences in the production process across sectors and within a particular sector rendered the skills and training of workers incompatible especially in the metal and engineering sector. Labour-turnover was thereby limited or reduced. For example:

"He (the owner) has got workers here for 15 years, some from the time the factory started. But only a few are getting an okay pay that are sticking the shit, like the indunas". For the rest of us, we can't get another job...there are too few of our types of jobs...it is welding that we do...we are forced to work here. In the

clothing industry you can't find this job. If I can find another job I'll be out long time" (welder, Co.D: 1991).

Workers' behaviour and attitudes towards work, are influenced by their own positions in the labour market and labour process, factors specific to the firm, to the level of unemployment in a particular region and the availability of other jobs. In this sense such a situation contradicts the common notion of the early dual labour market theory, which sees workers in the secondary segment as having "unproper" work habits coupled with a high degree of labour turn-over.

A further contributing factor to low levels of labour turn-over was the high level of unemployment in Isithebe. Due to the way in which the social relations of production were structured in the past, a vast pool of cheap labour came to exist across the deconcentrated and decentralized regions. The reserve army of labour in Isithebe, which conservative estimates set at 750 000 (KFC Phamplet: no date), has assisted in reinforcing the prevalence of low-wages, management's hostility towards unions, the lack of worker benefits. The reserve army of labour, in short, maintains workers' secondary positions and secondary work conditions. Apart from reducing labour turn-over and desertion it also helps in regulating the flow of labour. Consequently workers are forced to accept bad working conditions and low pay. Worker stability and firm loyalty can exist in secondary labour markets, whether workers readily accept this or not. Low rates of labour turn-over in firms must be viewed against the objective conditions that the working class finds itself in. The low rate of labour turn-over in companies was reinforced by the fact that jobs are hard to come by.

WORKER RESISTANCE AND THE LABOUR MARKET

Analysis of the labour market is pertinent to an understanding of resistance because it is one of the areas wherein the generative mechanisms of resistance are rooted. An explanation of labour market conditions gives us an insight into the nature of segmentation of regional markets, thereby enabling us to explain the reasons why workers in low-paying jobs respond and seek out various means of resistance. The

varying degrees of segmentation in the firms' labour markets in Isithebe, helps to explain why workers situated at the bottom end of the labour market: desert, steal, engage in go-slows, sabotage the labour process, and are the ones who, more often than not, stage sit-ins or strikes - various forms of resistance that affect the production process in one way or another. The struggles waged by workers against capital and which affected the labour market in Isithebe revolved around union recognition, solidarity action for dismissed workers and demands for higher wages.

This section will focus on workers' struggles to organise and have their trade unions recognised by employers. As is indicated above, wages, rewards and benefits are not determined by skill and commercial factors only. Nor are they determined solely by employer initiatives. These issues are often sites of struggles and are determined or negotiated collectively between management and workers. Segmentation in labour markets are shaped by the strength of workers and the extent to which they exert control in the labour market and labour process.

Marx's view on the proletariat's ability to resist capital was pessimistic. He saw the reserve army of labour as playing a fundamental role in maintaining cheap wages. In this sense the reserve army of labour posed a continual threat to the employed, hence disciplining and controlling them, thereby facilitating the capitalist system of exploitation. What Marx saw was the withering away of differences and divisions within the labour market arising out of worker organizations. The creation of the industrial reserve army of labour was to accompany this homogenization of the labour force.¹³ However, Marx's views in this regard have not been entirely correct. But, present day events are still encapsulated within a dialectical relationship. The dialectic here is the attempts by capital, on the one hand, and, trade unions on the other hand, to exert their control in the labour market. However, the formation and recognition of trade unions in Isithebe was not an easy task during the 1980s.

In terms of union recognition in Isithebe, affiliating to COSATU structures often involved a long and bitter battle for union recognition. These struggles reflected, on the one hand, capital's initiatives to maintain control in the labour market so as to ensure the

smooth running of the valorization process. On the other hand, it reflected labour's ability to challenge capital and to disrupt the process of profit accumulation. For example, a NUMSA organiser, in reference to a company that manufactured household appliance, noted that:

"After we wrote to the company telling them we wanted to negotiate about representing our members, the company started to harass union members - giving them warnings. They issued notices to 150 union members, saying that due to 'economic reasons' they will be retrenched the following Friday... But there were sympathetic supervisors who told the workers that the company's target were union members. This angered the workers who downed tools. Our members then approached Mr.P, the managing director, asking him if this information was true. Mr.P did not want to discuss (this) - he said that they all had attended an illegal gathering. He then closed the factory saying that he would only re-employ within seven days. It was only after a tremendous amount of pressure from the union, the company re-employed selectively. But they started to retrench, using the same story, and they were going for the union members. Out of 25 shop stewards, 19 were dismissed. All negotiations with the company have been futile, because Mr.P is one of those persons who is not prepared to talk to the unions" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

Co.D is another example where union activity is strongly resented by management. A few hours before my second interview with the manager, workers in Co.D went on strike. According to the manager, a few workers went on strike demanding union recognition with NUMSA. They refused to go back to work, unless management discussed the issue. Management was not prepared to do so, and, instead, called in the Kwa-Zulu police, whose presence put an end to the strike (manager, Co.D: 1990).

Achieving this union recognition, then, entailed numerous problems for workers as employers implemented a series of tactics to undermine or forestall it. Another tactic of employers was to employ supporters of UWUSA as supervisors to encourage COSATU supporters to join the former. The paper and wood union (PPWAWU) experienced such

a problem in a stationery factory which it started organizing soon after the formation of UWUSA. The organiser takes up the story:

"Supervisors in the factory started employing UWUSA supporters for the sole purpose of destroying PPWAWU structures in the factory. Management also refused to believe that we had the majority in the factory, saying that it is UWUSA who has the majority...We agreed to have a secret ballot to confirm this...and in July 1988, PPWAWU won the ballot over UWUSA" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

Despite the hostile environment that trade unions found themselves in, they managed to secure recognition agreements with firms in Isithebe. The clothing and textile firms that participated in this research and which were unionized are Co.1, Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, CO.5, Co.6 and Co.11. In metal and engineering they were Co.A, Co.B, Co.C and CO.F. Due to a number of factors the presence of the unions being one important aspect, these companies offered relatively higher wages and benefits to their workers. Unionization also had other advantages.

In those factories that were organized with COSATU structures, workers were protected from arbitrary dismissals, unlike the plight that many others in unorganized factories experienced. The manager of CO.3 stated:

"With the unions coming in here its a problem for management in terms of finance. Before we could just tell a person to get out any-time. Now with the unions - we got to give them a first warning, then a second warning, third warning - then dismiss them...and on top of that they can still take you to court - now all that is money" (manager, Co.3: 1989).

At times dismissals were over small and petty issues, for example, a worker in a paper factory was dismissed because her card was clocked in, but not out, for two days while she was absent from work. The rest of the labour force saw this as an unfair dismissal and so staged a work-stoppage, demanding her reinstatement. Management was forced

to re-employ the worker on the same day (worker, paper firm: 1990). Union activity, strikes over unfair dismissals, wage bargaining and the like, reflect the attempts by worker organizations to alter labour market conditions in their favour.

The dual labour market theory has been criticized for its over-emphasis on employer initiatives in the restructuring process of the labour market. Indeed, recent critics of the model have pointed to the unions involvement in the course of structuring jobs and hiring policies (Kenrick, 1985: 172). Labour market segmentation, to some degree, results from the efforts of trade unions to control the supply of labour. Due to changes in economic growth, or during periods of fluctuating demand for products, the supply and demand for labour are never stable. Capitalists, in their attempt to gain control of the labour market, will always seek to acquire high flexibility to stabilize the numbers in the firms. These changes, which alter the relationship of output to employment, have their origins in the reaction of firms to periods of crisis. Nevertheless, this instability is transferred onto employer and employee strategies to maintain and or exert control in the labour market (Gabriel et al, 1981; Sengenberger, 1981). The hiring and firing of workers is one of the areas trade unions attempt to influence. In Co.A and Co.C the hiring of labour was done with NUMSA.

"Labour is recruited with a committee made up of management and NUMSA. They would come along and say, right, you want two or more men and then we will bring the men in. We will have an interview with one of the union representatives present and a selection will then be made" (manager, CO.A: 1990).

In Co.C:

"We have an agreement with union which says that if we want to recruit workers, we have to go to the shop-steward who will then look for someone who has been retrenched" (manager, Co.C: 1990).

Organized resistance in the labour market suggests that trade unions control over much

of the process of selective hiring and firing is the only means at their disposal for the maintenance of their bargaining power during times of low labour demand (Kenrick, 1981: 173).

According to the neoclassical human capital paradigm wages and employment are based on equal exchange relationships between employer and employee.¹⁴ A clear example of such an approach is the following:

"We don't need trade unions - UWUSA or COSATU. Workers don't need them either they are happy here. We are not interested in them and we don't want them in our business... If workers decide they want unions then we can decide what we want to do. I will say sell and close shop - easy. We feel strongly about it... we not going to have it... What is the purpose of the unions? Forget about the political role which is not a union role anyway... What they are supposed to do is to look after the workers' interests, make sure that they get a decent wage and good working conditions. This is their role. Now we believe strongly that we have these conditions 'cause this is a free company... There is freedom of association - I don't force anyone to work for me. If they want to work for me it is a case of demand and supply - this is what I am prepared to pay for that job. I don't force anybody to work for me. They work here because they know they are getting what their labour is worth. So, ja we feel strongly against unions. If some-one has a problem we try and accommodate it - that is as far as it goes" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

Reality and the operations of labour markets are, however, not as simple and clear-cut as suggested by this crude supply and demand view. Wages are external to supply and demand market forces, because standards of living are influenced by complex historical and social factors. Wages and standards of living in the final instance are determined by conflict and bargaining between workers and bosses, even in competitive markets (Del Mercato, 1981: 197)

This was true for more than 50% of the firms that participated in the interviews, where

wages were negotiated with either NUMSA, PPAWU, FAWU and SACTWU. The argument that wages are determined by supply and demand falls short in light of the number of sometimes bitter and violent struggles over wages. Wages are determined by a process of social conflict or bargaining between workers and employers. As Del Mercato notes, "real wages are determined by social historical habits, techniques of production of wage goods, forms of organization and power relationships among and within classes" (Del Mercato, 1981: 197). Neither the neo-classical nor early dual labour market theory take cognizance of these facts. Furthermore, the point that wages are exogenous to supply and demand gains added support from the examples presented above on the ideological and political tendencies that influenced differential wage structures and segmentation in a regional labour market, such as Isithebe. At the very centre of labour markets lies the conflict of interests and the class struggles, as capitalists attempt to stratify and fragment the working-class, on the one hand. On the other hand, workers strive towards enhancing their positions by securing higher wages, achieving stable job positions as well as other fringe benefits.

Therefore, it is necessary to formulate an approach to segmentation in labour markets which considers the interrelated features of the standard of living; class conflict; the family the state, and firm and sector specifications, as opposed to the neoclassical view of the labour market which is based on equal exchange. Even the critics of the neo-classical model build on segmentation theory within a framework of wages and employment as being simultaneously determined by supply and demand. For instance, according to Doeringer and Piore (1971) the foundation of certain rigidities in demand are sought in technologies and training. And those who apply class analysis to the labour market, perceive it as a rigidity in competition whether they see its control as being in the hands of capitalists, or when organisations of the working class determine the supply of labour (Del Mercato, 1981: 194). There is, however, nothing rigid or monolithic in the way the labour market functions and the way in which real wages are fixed.

What do these struggles tell us about workers in labour markets? They point to the limitations of the neo-classical and dual labour market theorists, including Braverman (1974), for ignoring the role that worker organization plays in structuring both the

labour market and the labour process. Furthermore, it shows that the working class is not merely an inert object of capital. Its mobilization into progressive union structures is a process in improving workers' positions in the labour market. Through working class organs such as trade unions and worker councils, the proletariat generally have presented a challenge to the capitalist class and have forced the state to legalize trade unions and legislate certain conditions in the factories, etc.

Worker organizations, however, have not been complete and all encompassing. Put differently, the working class is not homogeneous. There is always dissent and differing tendencies. One of the ways in which this is reflected is in the organization of certain sections of the labour force into certain created privilege strata, thereby leaving other sectors more vulnerable and less privileged, eg. female workers, casual workers and young workers. Further evidence of the heterogeneity of working class organization is manifested in workers' tendencies to belong to different unions, for example some workers joining UWUSA, not COSATU.

The course of social conflict under capitalism, therefore, is characterized by contradictory interests. While trade unions attempt to defend working class interests, capitalists move to counter such endeavours in the search for flexibility in the external and internal labour market. In Isithebe, this process was reflected in trade unions attempts to organize in the factories, and managements' efforts to abort or slow the recognition of unions. Under such circumstances labour market segmentation may be viewed as the result of employment strategies followed by capital and labour (Sengenberger, 1981: 254).

However, trade union involvement in the labour market during periods of retrenchments and dismissals consolidates and enhances the segmentation between the employed and the unemployed. While trade unions protect those that are employed by exerting protection against dismissals and increasing the cost management has to pay out to those being retrenched, such measures have no immediate benefit for the unemployed. This serves to stratify and dampen worker solidarity. Segmentation as a means of control used by employers to prevent the homogenization of workers, is a reflection of the

differences between workers and the benefits they themselves enjoy from discriminatory practices (Kenrick, 1981). Thus segmentation cannot be seen as exclusively the attempts of capitalists to control and divide the labouring class, because worker efforts to secure certain benefits also result in segmentation of the labour market.

Conclusion

Labour markets are in a constant and dynamic process of change. A number of variables influence this process. Hence it is difficult to talk about perfectly competitive labour markets, or to reduce the important effect that discriminatory practices have on the market. Discriminatory practices, such as racism, sexism, sectarianism, which are rooted in broader political and ideological processes, crucially inform pre-market segmentation, and, the types of jobs, wages, benefits etc that people get. Hence, segmentation in the social reproduction of labour and segmentation in the labour market are mutually reinforcing and cannot be construed as isolated from each other. As a result of the positions they occupied within the social reproduction of labour, workers in this study, were confined to secondary positions in the labour market.

Contrary to the neo-classical approach, the market is not neutral, because exchange between workers and capitalists is not equal. In-market segmentation bears testimony to this. However, the market cannot be blamed for the discriminations and inequalities because "the market does no more than produce at the end of the period a reflection of the circumstances of market participants at the beginning of the period". Put differently, the market "merely reproduces the inequality which is brought to it, without being in any way part of its creation" (Ryan, 1981: 6). In the light of workers not being rewarded solely on the basis of their productive potential, "a segmented market acquires an active role in the generation of inequality and low pay". For this reason, "in-market segmentation raises social and ideological issues apart from the narrowly economic ones of market functioning" (Ryan, 1981).

The labour market is far from homogeneous, in that segmentation occurs along a continuum. In other words, there are varying degrees of segmentation and secondary

work conditions. Hence labour markets are not always characterized by a stark dichotomy of primary or secondary conditions, pace Doeringer and Piore. As the this study shows, companies can achieve primary product market structures, and offer secondary work conditions. General categories such as primary and secondary segments need to be qualified by specific and concrete reality. In Isithebe variations in: aspects pertaining to firm and sector, pre-and in-market differentiations, and, the balance of class forces contributed to a highly diversified and segmented labour market.

The inequalities and discrimination that inform segmentation raises important questions for the future of a coherent and unified working class politics. In this sense sectarianism, sexism and racism fragments the working-class even further as those privileged workers align themselves with the interest of capital, unless they are challenged. This may be done through trade union structures, whereby unions and workers demand equality of pay that supersede the divisions that satisfy capital's desires. Craig et al (1981) argue that inequalities will be eliminated through appropriate policy. Here, however, I would disagree with them, and agree with Lonsdale who argues that policies aimed at overcoming discrimination are by themselves insufficient. A more effective strategy would be to combine these policies with other areas of struggle that create changes in the family and other social institutions which could positively influence the supply of labour. This is an important aspect in that institutions such as the family have produced specific roles for men and women which in turn have direct consequences on their employment opportunities. So merely introducing or outlining policies that attempt to overcome inequalities will not suffice, unless, changes are brought to those very institutions that uphold discriminations and the capitalist social relations of production. Nevertheless, segmentation in the labour market is better appreciated when contextualized within the different labour processes, and the nature of work in the companies interviewed. I now examine this area.

NOTES

1. Fisher and Nijkamp (1987) offer four useful criteria towards the formation of a general definition of regional labour markets. Firstly, the distance that the labour force has to travel to work across the region is insignificant. Secondly, the travelling and migration costs within regional boundaries are significantly less than those between a particular region and any other region of the economy. Thirdly, firms are located so that they can obtain a major proportion of their potential labour supply within the boundary. And fourthly, the costs incurred by the labour force seeking employment within the region are much less than those searching in an alternative region.

2. The person referred to as Mr.B is a director for the parent group of four of the clothing firms which formed part of the empirical research. These firms in Isithebe are his responsibility.

3. Mrs. D is employed as a semi-skilled machinist in Co.1.

4. The person referred to as Mrs M works in the "packing and sorting department" in Co.5.

5. Mrs. S and Mrs. M both practice Hinduism.

6. Co.ID is a pharmaceutical firm.

7. The identification of in-market segmentation remains empirically inaccessible, because it is not always possible to compare labour quality of comparable standards as a result of initial differentiations, and, it is difficult to make comparisons between labour quality and productivity between different segments in the labour market. Labour quality and outputs of production vary across the market, depending on the job and the industry. A great vantage point towards an identification of in-market segmentation is to view these factors in relation to pre-market segmentation; as well as to variables such as occupation and industry features (Ryan, 1981).

8. 'Hupla' money is the term this manager used to define money that evades taxation.

9. The NPI (discussed below) is a state-subsidised body that monitors the development, arrangement and general economic planning of factories in decentralized areas.

10. In his discussion of labour markets in Germany, Sengenberger makes clear the role of trade unions and worker struggles in attempting to gain control on the labour market. He asserts that through these efforts workers may have unintentionally furthered the segmentation of labour markets. He raises important questions about the unemployed, whose plight is enhanced through worker efforts to secure and protect certain benefits.
11. This factory that the KFC has interests vested and that which was referred to by Mr A. See chapter one for more details.
12. "Paternal firms adopt the role of judge and protector acting in the workers 'best interests'. In this way they seek employee attachment, attempting to create a communal cohesion and stability from which to obtain higher productivity. Essentially paternal employers attempt to join family and work symbolically with themselves as the authority" (Lawson, 1981: 48).
13. Cognizance here should be taken of the complementary nature of the relationship between the destruction of the labour process and the restructuring of the labour market, as capitalists aim to maintain capitalist hegemony and keep wages down (cf. Wilkinson; 1981).
14. For neo-classical theory struggles between the work-force and capitalists are seen as problems between trade unions and capitalists that stem from monopoly relations (cf. Del Mercato, 1981).

CHAPTER THREE

THE LABOUR PROCESS IN ISITHEBE

Introduction

The organization of production under capitalism is fused from the beginning within the mutual interaction of economic, political and ideological determinants. The totality of these moments are inscribed within the relations of production and are fundamental to its reproduction. Ideology and political forces become important tools for the arrangement of production and the search for valorisation. The organization of work in Isithebe revolves around a complex hierarchy of authority, wherein racist and sexist ideologies of broader society impinge directly at the point of production. Marx, therefore argued that there is nothing natural about the way production occurs under capitalism. This chapter begins with a brief theoretical outline of Marx's understanding of the labour process because this approach provides the foundations for a criticism of the development and reproduction of capitalist forces and relations of production. The approach adopted to explain labour processes in Isithebe, here, is informed by critical realism. The relevance of critical realism for explaining labour processes will be made clearer as the issues are introduced below.

Following the outline of Marx's understanding of the labour process is a discussion of Braverman's interpretation of the influence and implementation of Taylorism and scientific management. The section focuses on two of the major criticisms made against Braverman's analysis of changes in the labour process. The first is his emphasis on the deskilling of craft work. The second is his acceptance of the unproblematic implementation of Taylorism and his inadequate account of worker resistance to its

implementation.

Braverman's analysis of changes in the labour process and the introduction of Taylorism is not sensitive to specific historical and cultural factors within different social formations. This allows Braverman to make generalizations regarding the introduction and use of Taylorism. Informed by critical realism's stress on the space-time invariant, section three discusses some of the socio-historical and ideological forces such as race, sex and sect; each of which shaped the organisation of work and structuring of authority in the firms interviewed. Ideological and political factors, operating in a particular place at a particular time, are crucial to maintaining valorisation. Their use in the organisation of work reflect the variations and unevenness in the implementation of Taylorism and scientific management.

The fourth section examines the impact of Taylorism on the nature of work in Isithebe. To what extent is Braverman's conceptual framework useful to an analysis of production in firms based in Isithebe? The reader is introduced to the nature of work in those firms which participated in this research, the types of jobs workers performed and how they performed them. The labour processes in the different firms were broken down into specific tasks. As a result of this workers performed tasks which were related to a single aspect of the entire production process. The major trends in Braverman's analysis of deskilling - as an outcome of the detailed division of labour - were clearly evident in these firms. However, as was shown in the previous chapter most workers entered the labour market with very little or no skills at all. Braverman's conception of deskilling fails to clearly distinguish between the job and the worker.

While workers in Isithebe engaged in deskilled labour processes they had often not been deskilled. It can be argued plausibly that a certain level of skilling does occur even in the context of scientific management. A few examples, largely from the clothing sector, are presented to demonstrate how managerial practices themselves contributed to this process of skilling. This process, however, should not be exaggerated because the skills

workers acquired were simple. The section concludes with a brief discussion of workers' attitudes to work and the organisation of production. It is precisely because of the organisation of production and the nature of work under capitalism that conflict exists between capital and labour. In order to curb resistance and to increase profits employers are compelled to implement control mechanisms.

The fifth section begins to examine control mechanisms in the firms which participated in this research. This section focuses on Taylorism and direct forms of control. Direct forms of control were in operation in all the labour processes studied. However, not **all** workers were directly controlled. Direct forms of control were found through out the factory floor in all of the clothing companies interviewed. Such forms of control were selectively applied in the labour processes of the remaining sectors. The relational approach of critical realism was used to determine the variety of control mechanisms in factories. Factors such as: a firm's product market power the nature of its production process and work-force, the actual jobs that workers perform, and the employer-employee relationship are inter-related and are influential in determining the form and extent of control. The case studies reveal that direct forms of control were in operation, more often than not, in the following circumstances: (a) firms which had labour intensive production processes, where a group of workers performed the same task as in clothing and (b) in the labour intensive parts of the production processes in the other sectors studied. This research shows that workers who are involved in labour intensive jobs, who work in groups and who are subject to direct forms of control are most likely to engage in daily forms of struggles.

The capitalist organization of work, around the creation of surplus value, expresses the conflict between workers and owners of the means of production. Class struggles and the daily forms of coming to terms with the nature of work, are crucial to an understanding of developments in labour processes. Worker resistance is ever present in the labour process in some form or another. Control over the rate and intensity of production are issues of contestation between capital and labour. Shop floor struggles, therefore, move

beyond merely bargaining for wages and other benefits that affect workers' labour market positions. Section six examines working class struggles on the factory floor. Based on the case studies, it explores the conflict that arose between workers and management for control over the way work was performed and how much was produced. It is argued that apart from the particular employer-employee relationship the scope to resist and the form/s of resistance are dependent on the nature of the production process and the job. The TMSA of critical realism is again important for an understanding of how structures will either limit or stimulate daily class struggles, and how workers through struggle are able to effect changes in the workplace. Not all workers in the secondary jobs studied had the opportunity to engage in daily forms of struggles. In addition, certain daily forms of resistance were easier to engage in certain types of firm.

The struggle for control over aspects of the production process raises questions about the extent to which the real subordination of capital has impacted on the working class. Empirical evidence presented below supports Friedman's (1977) claims that real subordination cannot be viewed as a complete process. The diversity in shop floor struggles points to workers' ability to challenge capital and its demands. Empirical evidence, furthermore, proves that workers employed in secondary work conditions have the ability to organise themselves into trade unions and to engage in daily forms of struggles. In order to curb worker resistance and to maintain the rate of production, management in the firms interviewed, were forced to introduce incentive and bonus systems. In addition, employers sought out alternative methods of structuring authority and work. This was done through the development of firms' internal labour markets and the stratification of the work-force. Direct forms of control, therefore, were not the only methods of control in operation in these firms.

This research provides examples of the co-existence of a variety of control mechanisms in a single factory. In the clothing industry the development of the internal market was accompanied by the emergence of bureaucratic forms of control. Similarly, an analysis of the structuring of internal labour markets and jobs in the

metal, engineering, and in other sectors reveal the existence of responsible autonomy along side direct forms of control. The final section provides examples of the various alternatives to direct forms of control that were in operation in secondary labour segments. This section examines the conditions which determined the use of technical control and responsible autonomy in jobs and firms which are broadly classified as secondary. The use of such forms of control is largely influenced by the nature of the job itself. It is argued that the introduction and use of alternatives to direct forms of control do not mark a break from Taylorism, as Friedman and Edwards assume. Rather, such methods are rooted in Taylorist work principles. They represent the variety of Taylorism as a strategy.

Friedman's distinct separation between direct forms of control and responsible autonomy were not entirely applicable to the case studies in this research. According to Friedman, direct forms of control are found in firms which have secondary labour market status. This may have been the case for a few firms in this study. For example, those firms which operated within declining or fluctuating markets where the labour force was non-unionised. Firms which fit this description and where direct and constant control were applied are Co.7 to Co.10. What about firms like Co.2 to Co.5? These firms enjoyed favourable demand for their products, yet they offered secondary jobs and work conditions, and, used direct forms of control on the shop-floor. The nature of control is not only dependant on firm and sector specific factors. It is argued that the application of particular control mechanisms in firms and sectors are also influenced by the socio-political relations within a specific spatial and temporal context. Labour processes, as social phenomena occur in open systems. As such empirical law-like generalisations do not often pertain. Therefore, the generalisations on control made by Friedman and Edwards cannot be uniformly applied to all the firms.

MARX AND THE LABOUR PROCESS UNDER CAPITALISM

For Marx, there are three components of the labour process that are independent of any particular social formation: (a) the purposeful activity of people directed to work; (b) the subject on which work is performed - raw materials, etc.; and (c) the instruments used - tools and machinery. According to Marx, human beings shape the means and instruments of production. Hence the first thing we learn from Marx is that there is nothing natural or eternal about the way work is organized under capitalism. The means of production and the instruments of labour indicate the level of development of labour power, but, they also reflect the social relations under which people labour. What is specific to the capitalist system is that labour power is bought and work is organized with the sole aim of extracting surplus value. So capitalist production processes involve both a labour process and simultaneously a valorisation process, wherein the process of surplus value or profits are created.

However, it is only living labour power, or variable capital that can create value, because capital "is dead labour, that, vampire like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more, labour it sucks" (Marx, 1967: 233). It is only through the sale of their labour power that workers under capitalism can subsist. In this process labour power as a commodity is made to work on other commodities or raw materials, together with the instruments of labour to produce more commodities of much greater value. Commodities become the sole property of the capitalist. Commodities produced under capitalism contain a portion of value that costs the capitalist nothing and which is realised through the sale of products. Therefore, Marx argued that the absolute law of the capitalist mode of production is the production of surplus value.

The production of goods does not occur in an a-social mechanical manner, because capital is not a thing, but, a social relationship where people are treated as

commodities. As Marx wrote:

"It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on" (Marx, 1967: 180).

The application of science and technology to the labour process does not assume a neutral function, because they are directly concerned with creating surplus value and maintaining capitalist control over the labour process. Hence, the technical relations or forces of production are inextricably bound with the social relations of production in maintaining and enhancing valorisation. An important dimension to this process is worker subordination to the capitalist.

Capitalist control over the labour process assumes various forms, beginning with what Marx identified as the formal subordination of labour. The formal subordination of labour is expressed in methods such as increasing the length and period of the working day. As a result of the lack of technological innovations, capitalist rely on such means to remain profitable. The progression to the real subordination of labour involves the development of the instruments of production, as well as the use of machinery, the development of science and the expansion of production associated with large-scale industry. The real subordination of labour is based on the increase in the intensity and pace of the labour process, through the incorporation and application of science and technology. Out of large-scale workshops that replaced domestic production, developed the factory system. Collective labour is produced as a result of co-operation, division of labour, the use of machinery and the conscious application of scientific management. The advent of modern industry makes it possible for the labour process to be revolutionized and together with the factory system, strict discipline was imposed on workers as they were compelled to engage in continuous

and monotonous tasks.

BRAVERMAN AND THE LABOUR PROCESS

Braverman's (1974) 'Labour and Monopoly Capital' marks the re-opening of labour process studies from a Marxist perspective. It represents a return and renewal of Marx's theory of the labour process under monopoly capitalism.¹ Braverman's reliance on the conceptual framework of "formal" and "real" subordination of labour, however, sets limitations on the generalizations and conclusions of the deskilling thesis (Herman, 1982: 7). Debates around the labour process have focused increasingly on managerial control and deskilling, with emphasis on the nature and impact on the degradation of work. For Braverman technical transformations affect the labour process as scientific management is applied to the re-organization of work. Changes to labour processes, in terms of deskilling, are the outcomes of the incorporation and interconnection of science, technology and Taylorism.

Braverman lays emphasis on capital's strive to convert labour power to labour under social relations designed by the capitalist. Management control of the labour process and of workers is acquired through the process of deskilling, which is the result of the implementation of Taylorist principles of scientific management. For Braverman, Taylorism and its work principles are aimed at essentially controlling and subordinating labour to the capitalist need for accumulation. This is achieved through deskilling, and the separation of workers' mental knowledge from execution. Through the application of time and motion studies management is provided with the basis to control labour power.

Deskilling and the implementation of scientific management is a generalized, necessary and common feature of the labour process. In the process of deskilling, general skills are reduced to job specific ones. Deskilling craft-based work by

mechanization and scientific management is identified as the transition from formal to real subordination of labour. For Braverman as well as the Brighton Labour Process Group the real subordination of labour is expressed in deskilling.²

Braverman views the decline of skill essentially from a craft perspective (Edwards, 1979; Thompson, 1983; Wood and Kelly, 1982; Littler, 1982). The emphasis on craft deskilling has led critics to argue that Braverman has an idealized conception of traditional craft workers. In addition, Braverman postulates a simple transition from worker control to Taylorism and capitalist control of the labour process (Littler, 1982: 122). This forms one of two major criticisms made against Braverman - the significance given to craft workers has been questioned. In this regard Thompson writes that:

"[b]y elevating craft workers to such importance, there is a danger that an analysis is constructed which unduly separates them from non-craft workers, many of whom were subject to similar pressures from capital concerning their skill, rewards and working conditions" (Thompson, 1983: 97).

Although craft and non-craft workers might have experienced the same forms of misery, Littler (1982) shows that the issues or factors that produced such effects and which influenced the changes in the labour process were, indeed different. A distinction must be drawn between deskilling from a craft base and deskilling from a non-craft base. Braverman's pre-occupation with craft workers ignores those differences between craft and non-craft workers in the work shops. "It was the employment relationship rather than the division of labour that stratified the labour force" in the case of non-craft work (Littler, 1982: 123). Such economic relationships, which involved the issues of casualization and employment security, led to differences within the working class itself, that even if, "...technological changes did not affect employment, they would fail to achieve collective salience" (Littler, 1982: 129).

According to Braverman, the combined tendencies of deskilling and increased managerial control will occur and continue through the changes in technology and work organization. Once management gains the knowledge of the production process, workers skill and control are lost and never to be regained. "Yet knowledge is not a commodity that can be 'lost' in this manner" (Wood and Kelly, 1982: 79). In this sense Wood and Kelly point out that craft workers continue to possess their knowledge - "they 'simply' lose the advantage of management ignorance". This leads to the second major criticism made against Braverman's account of deskilling; that is, his lack of recognition of craft workers struggles against the introduction of various forms of Taylorism.

Braverman writes, "no attempt will be made to deal with the modern working class on the level of its consciousness, organization or activities. This is a book about the working class as a class in itself, not as a class for itself" (Braverman, 1974: 26-27). Worker resistance has, however, proved to be a major determinant in halting or altering the process of deskilling. Furthermore, an analysis of craft deskilling is incomplete if such an analysis does not consider the role that craft organizations played in regulating the relationship between changes in the labour process. Studies show a high level of craft resistance to mechanization in the building, engineering and textile industry. It is on such a basis that craft workers continued to resist deskilling and have retained many important positions in a number of branches of the labour process. Critics have thus questioned Braverman's account of the extent and consequences of deskilling.

Braverman does, however, recognize that Taylorism and deskilling, as a system of control were subject to a number of constraints, one of them being the surge of protest amongst trade unions. Nevertheless, worker resistance is only momentarily mentioned, and is seen as resulting from the effects of scientific management and not as an element that inhibits and results in its uneven implementation. Implicit in the deskilling thesis is the assumption, argue Elger and Schwarz, that the concentration

of capital simply made it possible for management to succeed in its objective of producing detailed control of workers (Elger and Schwarz, 1980: 361).³ Braverman's interpretation of Taylorism and its impact is couched within a structuralist understanding of capitalism as being law-determined. Problems with such laws are overcome without contradictions (Elger and Schwarz, 1980; Wood and Kelly, 1982). A major consequence of the omission of an adequate account of struggles that impinge on the labour process is the assumption that workers are passive, inert and subordinated to the needs and dictum of the capitalist. In turn, capitalists are portrayed as virtually omniscient, while the implementation of scientific management is regarded as being unproblematic and free of contradictions under monopoly capitalism (Elger and Schwarz, 1980; Wood and Kelly, 1982; Littler, 1982; Elger, 1979; Thompson, 1983).

The exclusion of struggles in the deskilling thesis and the acceptance of the objective conditions of deskilling allows Braverman to collapse the working class into one class, thereby, adopting Marx's version of class formation and the development of a homogeneous working class. For Marx, the trends of mass deskilling and fragmentation create the objective conditions for a unified working class. This in turn provided the preconditions for the transformation of society by the proletariat. Braverman's acceptance of this traditional Marxian perspective on class formation, together with his failure to recognize the impact of working class struggle in the labour process, prevents him from adequately acknowledging the subjective determinations of class. Yet, it is precisely these subjective elements which act against the formation of a homogeneous working class, as they contribute to the stratification of the proletariat. Capitalist control, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation from these subjective components (Thompson, 1983: 88).

Braverman's acceptance of the unproblematic implementation of Taylorism prevents him from making a distinction between, Taylorism as a strategy, as opposed to a technique. Failure to do so, results in the lack of appreciation for the varied number

of strategic frameworks where Taylorist techniques have been implemented in accordance with specific historical and social formations (Wood and Kelly, 1982: 80). Wood and Kelly point out a few instances to illustrate these differences. For example, in Japan the introduction of Taylorist principles of control coincided with Japanese paternalistic relations of production. Taylorism's popularity began to decline during the Depression, having existed in Japan through out the 1920s. Its decline stems from worker resistance to it, as well as, workers' identification of Taylorism as a foreign ideology. In Britain, the implementation of time and motion studies met with strong union opposition and was introduced in gradual stages. The introduction of Taylorism in certain branches of industry often became a bargaining point for unions. By the same token then, Isithebe will have its own distinctive forms of scientific management that are in varying degrees conducive to certain historical, social and cultural formations. Braverman's approach does not pay adequate attention to the historical and uneven implementation of scientific management. The introduction of scientific management has to be elucidated within the phases of capital accumulation and class struggles within a specific and concrete spatial and temporal context. Scientific management and the implementation of Taylorism can and does assume many different forms. How, then, was Taylorism applied in Isithebe during the 1980s and early 1990s?

IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LABOUR PROCESS

Poulantzas argues that relations of ideological and political domination and subordination are reproduced in the labour process (Poulantzas, 1978: 25-27). Politico-ideological are fundamental to the reproduction of the relations of production, and for the establishment of conflict between capital and labour. Furthermore, it is these factors (among others) which differentiate the implementation and use of Taylorism in various social formations. In the case of Isithebe, ideological and

political moments of racism, sexism and to an extent sectarianism, proved to be influential mechanisms for the organisation of work and for the control of labour. The implementation of Taylorism and scientific management in the labour processes studied reflected the use of socio-historical and cultural factors which are peculiar to South Africa and its process of industrial development.

Capitalism does not create racism, sexism or sectarianism. Rather, employers use such ideological oppression to maintain and enhance valorisation. Such practices have existed even before the onset/penetration of capitalism. Ideological and political determinations such as racism and sexism constitute major instruments for the organization of work, for the division of labour and for the segmentation of the working-class.

The previous chapter dealt with the influence that ideological and political moments have in informing the racist and sexist beliefs in the buying and selling of labour in Isithebe. Capitalists benefit from pre-market segmentation and the unequal access to training, education etc in terms of sex and race. Pre-market segmentation is reflected in the labour process, in the types of jobs people perform, their wages, benefits and working conditions. In terms of the case studies, control in the labour process was arranged hierarchically along race, ethnic and gender lines. The previous chapter outlined how these factors impinged on the labour process. For example, in terms of the racist organization of work, Indians and most whites held management posts and supervisory positions.

Ideological and political domination operated in different ways, in the case-studies. An example is the way labour was hired and fired.

"Touch wood it is our black staff that does the hiring and firing. They got to work with them - they must just make certain that they hire the right blokes. They are in a better position to do so - they know them, *they are part of their*

people, a chap can come here [and] he can tell me many stories - I would not know whether he is telling the truth. But they won't tell the indunas any lies, easily.... because they know them. It's just not on for a white to hire a darkie. *It is their own kind to do it* because they know and understand each other. There is no bull-shit in this factory" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

African workers who occupied departmental head and supervisory positions, did so with a specific reason - that of maintaining capitalist relations of production. As the manager of Co.1 said: "It is their people who must control them, who must supervise them" (manager Co.1: 1990). Nevertheless, although Co.D created a black middle management, in that African workers were responsible for five sections in this factory - the press shop and guillotine, boiler making section, the first stud repair section, condenser section and at transport and dispatch - they did not receive the same wages as skilled white labour. The manager explained that:

"They are heads of department in that they are on the same level as whites. But the salary structures are different - blacks are semi-skilled, where as my white guys, like a toolmaker - he is a qualified artisan, but he is reporting to semi-skilled blacks. *Whites are employed for their skill, blacks are employed for control and motivation of other staff* " (manager, Co.D: 1990).

As was outlined earlier, the creation of African supervisory positions, reflects an attempt to infuse and inspire the capitalist work ethic among workers.

An additional factor which necessitates such systems of hierarchy, where African workers are employed "to control and motivate" other African workers, is that of language. Indian and white supervisory and management staff did not speak Zulu, while African workers did not have a great command of English or of Taiwanese. So "[w]e had communication problems. They [management] mainly talk Taiwanese - their own language... (Our boss) does not talk English, or Zulu. Every time things have

to be translated to him" (quality controller, Co.9: 1990). Hence, "we have to have these people on the line because of the language problem" (manager, Co.2: 1989). Arising out of the particular cultural differences between labour and capital, African labour was employed in lower supervisory positions, in the factories interviewed for two primary reasons: a) to facilitate the flow of work instructions, b) to maintain and exert control over workers. Their presence in these factories was aimed at the legitimization of the capitalist relations of production, through the fragmentation and segmentation of the working-class. These external factors to the labour process, therefore, have considerable influence on the organization of work (contrary to Burawoy). They cannot be construed as minor differences between workers and workers and management at the point of production.

Let us consider what this supervisor had to say in relation to such differences:

"Because they are Taiwanese, they think they are white. They dominate all the African and Indian workers, we are always dominated. I am doing the same work as the Taiwanese personnel - [yet] they have a kombi that picks them up right (at) their flats to bring them to work. And in the evenings they will have supper and then go home. For me it is different - they give me R60 petrol money a month, no lunch, no supper - nothing. And if there is anything to be discussed between me and a Twainese...they will listen to her in private, they will always listen to her first" (supervisor, Co.10: 1991).

A member of the maintenance crew in the same factory corroborated this:

"Working with the Taiwanese is completely different... In the first place they do not think like us and our ideas are not considered, they do not respect our ideas, they do what they want. They always put the Indians behind, priority is always given to their own kind of people. (They) are entitled to breakfast, lunch and supper. I have a senior position in the factory, but I am not entitled

to those as such" (technician, Co.10: 1991).

To argue that external factors such as racism, sexism, etc. have no relevance:

"is to deny the persistent segmentation in the labour process concerning the distribution of skills, authority and rewards and the reproduction of those divisions in the course of industrial conflict itself" (Thompson, 1983: 172).

Another level on which ideology operates as a discriminatory, as well as, a control mechanism at the point of production is through patriarchal political forces. A woman's position at the point of production is influenced by her status in the family and in similar manner she is often subject to male domination: "We have men supervisors. We have to have hard stern people to push the job, otherwise you won't get the job done. Men control very well" (manager Co.1: 1990). Sex proves to be an important mechanism in the allocation of jobs and rewards. The ideology governing the differences in gender-roles, where women are thought to be 'delicate' is important in assigning jobs to women. Women are seen to be "careless some-how", to use the words of the personnel manager in Co.11. Female labour is employed in 'feminized' jobs: jobs that require "quick, nibble fingers", like weaving, piecing, doafing, spinning and stitching. For this reason they are predominately employed in clothing and textiles because, "I don't think the guys are very much interested in textiles, this is a woman's job, it is simple, unskilled work" (owner, Co.14: 1990).

However, it is not only capitalists who are active agents in the reproduction of differentiation between male and female workers. Workers themselves are often guilty of such practices. The trends in Co.TR which manufactured paper bags, bears testimony to this. The production manager takes up the story:

"Men and women do the same type of jobs, and funny enough a difference in pay was stipulated by the workers. They wanted it, they actually proposed it.

It was at the wage negotiation, management did not suggest it, we did not even think about it. I think it is their tradition, the Zulu being proud and all, the females were new... and they felt that they wanted this difference in pay. The union UWUSA was involved, they actually negotiated it. There was even a female shop steward present at the meeting" (production manager, Co.TR: 1990).

Broader societal views are often brought into the work place. Job distinctions and rewards are influenced by prior sexual divisions.

Therefore the feminization of work cannot be adequately understood by mere reference to deskilling, pace Braverman. According to Braverman the deskilling process provides employers with the opportunity to employ cheaper female labour. The struggles of male workers to retain certain types of jobs, authority and rewards mitigate against a straight forward deskilling process and the homogenization of the working-class. For example, male workers in Co.TR, refused to work with females on the hand line, as the production manager of the company elaborated:

"On the hand-line it either had to be male or female. We found it cannot be a mixed crew. There are problems between the workers, I don't know why, maybe it has something to do with the Zulu himself, he can't work with women. We tried it in couple of places in the past, but it did not work. So when we introduced the hand-line, we decided that it must be all females - males just won't work here" (production manager, Co.TR: 1990).

An understanding of women workers' positions in wage-labour has to be situated within an understanding of their positions in the family, and the role that this institution plays in supplying female labour to capital (Beechey, 1982: 70). Precisely because a woman worker has a distinctive and specific relationship to house-work and child-rearing, her position within wage-labour is much more insecure than male

workers. For capitalists this poses a problem: "Female workers up here are a problem. They come and go, every-year they are off to have a baby" (manager, Co.D: 1990), and, "Sometimes I prefer the older ones, they have less chance of falling pregnant" (owner, Co.14: 1990). As a result of her 'duty' to the family women are unable to work over-time. "On Saturdays if I want my men to work, no problem, they are there. With women, they have all sorts of excuses: house-work, children, this and that" (Mr.B Co.AM: 1990).

In non- unionized firms, when employers were asked about maternity and paternity leave, most replied: "There is no such thing in Isithebe" (manager, Co.ID: 1990), or, "I have not heard anything about that" (owner, Co.8: 1990), and:

"We don't have maternity benefits. *If that is a demand we won't employ women anymore*, otherwise we will be paying maternity benefits every-time. Large organizations... can do it, they have the financial resources to do it. But if I employ 50 women out of a staff of 200 and if each of these women are absent for 4 months to a year, because she does not want to practice birth control, which is not my problem, must I now pay each of these women extra pay? Even if I wanted to I would be out of business. It becomes a matter of economics" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

According to Beechey (1982), capitalism reinforces the tendencies that bring women as wage labourers under the direct domination of capital relations of production. Women's employment, more so that of married women, is situated within the context of Marx's theory of capital accumulation. Marx argued that capitalists find it necessary to search out new ways to lower the value of labour power to compensate for the pressures on the rate of profit. Tied to this notion is the social assumption that women are reliant upon their husbands wages, therefore, they can be paid at a lower rate and can return into the family when they are no longer needed for wage-labour. In addition to this, patriarchy can form a close relationship with paternalism.

The relationship between paternalism and patriarchy is also bound up with employers attempts to foster the capitalist work ethic within the female work-force. The manager of this company claimed that there was:

"No apartheid here, there is no one group getting preference over another... I have a good relationship with my girls (sic). I encourage them by telling them that you like the clothes, the television and the videos and if you want all the nice things of the modern world, you must obey the rules in the factory, but you want to obey tribal customs. You either work in a modern day environment or you go. The girls are just not trained and educated enough in industrial relations" (manager Co.ID: 1990).

Nevertheless the over-all picture that can be drawn is that external ideological and political moments shape the behaviour and beliefs of workers and employers at the point of production. External factors such as racism, sexism and sectarianism are incorporated in the structures of control within production processes. Central to the progression and evolution of scientific management, principles of Taylorism and forms of control in Isithebe are, precisely such factors. How these interact with elements of Taylorism, enables an understanding of the uneven and historically specific implementation of scientific management.

The implementation of Taylorist work principles does not universally and uniformly mean deskilling. As regards Isithebe the specific implementation of Taylorism and scientific management made use of and attempted to compensate for particular conditions within the labour force. Central to this has been the utilization of wider political and ideological relations.

THE NATURE OF WORK IN ISITHEBE

The labour processes covered in my research were structured around the manufacture of a variety of different products. Empirical work shows that a significant portion of industries across the sectors were involved in the manufacture of not single commodities, but a range of different products. Instead of routinized mass production of one product, some companies in the clothing sector were involved in the mass production of a variety of garments. Of the total clothing companies interviewed, Co. 1 was the most:

"Versatile plant. We manufacture anything - shirts, karkie sets, four piece sets, waist coats, ties, ladies skirts and blouses, and there are hundreds of different patterns for these garments - there is no one style. In the machine room we have five lines and each of these lines can sew something - they are versatile - it can be a track suit or T-shirt or top. You name it, they sew it" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

The manager explained that the company had a design centre in Durban. A skilled designer was employed there to make up the garments. Upon completion the sample designs were passed on to travellers whose job was to market the patterns. Once the extent of the demand for garments are established, the orders were passed on to the factory in Isithebe for production. Where:

"The factory manager... issues the job out - first, the material goes to the fabric department, then it goes to the cutting department, from cutting it goes to the stamping department. The layers and the sorters are in this department - there are about 30 people in all here. The fabric then goes to the machine room. Five lines here, each line can sew something - they are all versatile. The factory manager gets the supervisors together, [he] tells them that this is the garment,

it is a so minute garment and we need so many an hour... He then does one complete garment himself to show them how it is done. Each operation is timed - how long to do a sleeve, collar, button-hole... He then sets up the lines - he says this is the prep-line, we need so many people here. People in this section are advanced, they have more skills. They prepare the garments for the finishing lines. From here it goes to the clearing department - 50 people here who clean the garment. Here they also take score and then it goes to pressing, packing and then dispatch - to hawkers, chain stores or our own factory shops" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

Co.6 was the only company that manufactured a single type of garment, work-overalls. The rest of the companies manufactured different styles of a particular garment.⁴

"We make only jerseys, but we have different patterns. Every year we design thirty to forty different patterns of jerseys. Everything is different in each pattern - the jersey gage, collars, sleeves - they change from pattern to pattern." (manager, Co.9: 1990).

Co.9 had five different sections.

"The material goes first to the hand-knitting section. After hand-knitting it goes to the piece-by-piece section... The rest of the section is hand-sewing - the pockets and collars. The jersey then goes to the washing section, then ironing and lastly packing (manager, Co.9: 1990).

In Co.11, "We have a spray-dying section, a cone-dying one, open-end, twisting, spinning, piecing, doafing, weaving and finishing" [sections] (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990). As can be gleaned from the above examples, workers were involved in specific and detailed aspects of the labour processes.

Now, the manufacture of different types of products and various patterns or models refers to 'flexible specialization' in product strategy. Flexible specialization, refers to the production of a variety of goods, utilizing machinery that is not for a specific product, but is of a general purpose (Hyman, 1988: 49). As the manager of Co.9 put it: "we use the same machines - but we fit in different parts... Workers are always learning new styles. Every year in our quiet periods we train them in the new line of production". Flexibility in products manufactured was also present in the metal, wood and paper, furniture and pharmaceutical companies interviewed.

The manager at Co.D said:

"We make so many different products. We have a ... flow of products. Some might go to this department, others go to that department. We have various departments with a departmental head. So each employee has one boss and that boss has another boss and so on" (manager, Co.D: 1990).⁵

Another example was Co.A which "Tackles anything that goes on the road. We have five different departments and each has its own work" (production manager, Co.A: 1990). A similar product market strategy was in operation in three other metal plants - Co.B, Co.F and Co.H. Co.G produced different models of steel kitchen units, while Co.C made various types of lockers in the winter. Co.BR manufactured a range of different wooden furniture, like benches, chairs, tables and cupboards (production manager, Co.BR: 1990), while Co.SF. produced "different styles and models of lounge-suits" (Partner, Co.SF: 1990). Co.ID manufactured different types of cosmetics and medicinal products. Co.SB was the only company that manufactured just one routinized product, sorghum.

Variations in products manufactured reflect elements of flexible specialization as a product market strategy or as a business strategy. This has been combined with Taylorist and Fordist methods of work organization and control (cf. Hyman: 1988).

The effects of Taylorism with its principles of the separation of conception from execution and the detailed division of labour were reflected in the way production processes are arranged. The manufacture of products were designed around different and separate departments, based on the assembly line principle. The manager of Co.D explained that:

"Most products originate from the press-shop and then we have the receiving stores. Products get issued from the press-shop and guillotines - that is where products are cut, pressed, formed and what have you. From here it will go, say to the welding sections, or it might go the machine shops where it might go through different machine processes and then go out. Or it might go to the powder coating plant, or it might go to the grinding section, or the galvanizing section. These are all different departments, specialized only in that job. But we do many different jobs - for example, we may do just galvanizing for a particular company. So the product will come from the press shop go to galvanizing and then go out" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

Similar tendencies were present in other firms. In Co.A:

"We have the cutting section where the guys cut the product, then the notching section. Here the material is notched to different sizes. From here we move to bending where the product is bent to specific requirements. Then comes the assembly line where the welding is done. After this the product is cleaned and then dispatched" (production manager, Co.A: 1990).

Or:

"When the raw material comes it firstly gets smelted in furnaces. The next stage is refining, where the impurities in the led are removed... At this stage we can sell the product in its intermediary state to other manufacturers, or it can go through to the manufacturing department. In the manufacturing plant

we have a pipe extrusion section; press section; then the GPO seal-press, which is also extrusion; the caste steel section and then the breaking department which treats the alloys" (production manager, Co.B: 1990).

In Co.SB:

"We have various departments and sections. We have a workshop, where we have artisans, labourers and artisan aids. Then we have a dispatch department where it is mostly filling bags, loading bags on to trucks or off loading grain. And then we have the actual production process itself, most work here is done by machines, people work on the machines" (production manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Whilst workers were involved in deskilled jobs, a certain level of horizontal skilling and multi-skilling, in firm specific jobs occurred. As the previous chapter showed, the majority of the potential labour-force in Isithebe was unskilled, or, inadequately equipped to perform skilled work. Thirty-seven semi-skilled workers participated in the interviews; only two said that they had performed the same type of job previously - a welder and a machinist. The rest had no level of industrial skill, before they were employed. While workers were required to labour in deskilled labour processes, they had acquired various semi-skills, especially as machinists, welders, machine operators and maintenance crew.

In addition, a certain level of 'multi-semi-skilling' was underway in the clothing sector. Out of the need to maintain the scale and the rate of production, and to compensate for absenteeism, employers in the clothing industry "change the machinist around very often. When some-one is sick, they take a machinist from some-where else and put her there" (Mr E, SACTWU: 1990). Machinists who were interviewed spoke of the various tasks that were delegated to them. For example:

"I do all jobs. Sometimes it is top-stitching, sometimes it is hemming or putting labels on packets, or fitting collars. If some-one is absent on a line they [management] put me on that line" (machinist, Co.4: 1989).

Another person said:

"Workers are always swopped around. When someone is absent on a line, and production is coming out on another line, then they [management] will take one worker to replace the absent one" (machinist, Co.6: 1989).

This tendency was also prevalent in Co.B and Co.BR.⁶ The production manager of Co.B noted that:

"There are times when one plant is slack, where we don't have orders for that particular product and if there is no maintenance to be done on the machines, we move them [workers] into another department, for 3 or 4 days. For example from extruding pipe to packing steel or strapping ingots or making boxes" (production manager, Co.B: 1990).

Workers in Co.BR were "taken from one department and placed in another, for example from carving or cutting department to making boxes (production manager, Co.BR: 1990).

It is necessary, then, to distinguish deskilling on two levels: (1) in terms of the job undergoing deskilling, and, (2) in terms of workers being deskilled. In terms of this research, the majority of the workers interviewed cannot be described as deskilled, although, they were involved in jobs which have been deskilled.

If one applies Braverman's deskilling thesis to workers' positions in Isithebe, one would merely be stating that fragmented and simplified labour processes requiring no

skill are a common feature in the area. Such a perspective does not take account of the nature of work and the knowledge that certain labour processes demand. For example, critics of the deskilling thesis point out that in certain sectors, such as chemicals, the labour process demands alert and knowledgeable reactions to the controls of machinery (cf. Thompson, 1983: 81-82). Co.ID was a good example. The production manager explained that:

"An important part of the job is to make certain that you have the right chemicals. Then you got to be certain that you have the right quantities and that you are putting the right mixtures. There has to be concentration because we are dealing with chemicals - anything can go wrong" (production manager, Co.ID: 1990)

This was also the case for machine operators in the capital-intensive sectors of certain factories. The manager of Co.SB explained that:

"The production process has a lot to do with knowing what controls are involved. Workers have to be awake because they must monitor the controls - they have to know when and how to adjust the temperatures when the machines are going off... it does need skill and concentration" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Therefore, there are degrees to deskilling and to the degradation of work. Whilst it is true that workers are not given the opportunity of being involved in mental work, they do need to use their brains (Thompson, 1983).

Now, the perceptions of workers from clothing to the deskilled and monotonous nature of their work were not unambiguous or undifferentiated. A machinist at Co.4, for example, said: "It is an interesting job, because it is the only job I know. It does not bring me happiness because it does not [pay] enough money" (machinist, Co.4: 1989).

Or "I like the job because I have been doing it for a long time" (stamper, Co.5: 1989). Another machinist said: "[f]or me it is not an interesting job because I do only one part of the garment. I do not know how to stitch the whole garment. I just stitch the collar or sleeve on. My knowledge does not go further than that" (machinist, Co.1: 1989). Another said, "As a supervisor I do not have complete control. I am always told what to do. I feel like I am programmed" (supervisor: Co.6: 1989). On a broader level, workers in the clothing and textile sectors have questioned the division and fragmented nature of their work. "In the beginning", explained Mr. E:

"Workers did not mind this. Workers always like to know more. But this clashes with employers desires, because [they] would like one to sew just the buttons... Now workers want to know how the whole shirt is constructed, rather than putting only the buttons or the collars" (Mr.E, SACTWU: 1990).

The fact that workers questioned the arrangement of work arose directly from their experiences of being moved around in the labour process.

"So most workers know how a garment is started and finished... But it is difficult to challenge this, because employers don't want to be tied down with workers starting and finishing a garment. Management wants workers to specialize in sewing only sleeves. They call workers machinists when they are only sewing one part" (Mr. E, SACTWU: 1990).

Nevertheless, the lack of direct and observable challenges to the nature of work does not mean that workers readily and passively accept such conditions, as the example reveals. Even in Co.BR workers

"Are not to happy about this [performing different tasks]. They don't like moving from cutting to making boxes. They say it is not their job to make boxes, that they were not employed to that, and that if they make boxes they

must get paid for it" (manager, Co.BR: 1990).

Empirical work has shown that workers often react to their job and the working environment in ways that impact negatively on productivity and profit levels. As such, employers are compelled to implement mechanisms which would ensure the most efficient methods of work arrangement and means of control.

TAYLORISM AND DIRECT CONTROL

The nature and forms of control and the way work is organized under capitalism stems from the imperative of maximizing profits and reproducing capitalist social relations of production.

"The directing motive, the end aim of capitalist production, is to extract the greatest possible amount of surplus value, and consequently to exploit labour-power to the greatest possible extent. As the number of the co-operating labourers increases, so to does their resistance to the domination of capital, and with it, the necessity for capital to overcome this resistance by counter-pressure. The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function, due to the nature of the social labour process, and peculiar to that process, but it is, at the same time, a function of the exploitation of a social labour process, and is consequently rooted in the unavoidable antagonism between the exploiter and the living and labouring raw material he exploits" (Marx, 1967: 331).

The antagonism between employers and workers is expressed in the labour process, when the former and the latter attempt to exert their control over the production process. The labour process is therefore a contested terrain (cf. Edwards: 1979) between capitalists' need to increase the rate of exploitation and workers' attempts to

resist this. The labour process cannot be conceived as a simple transition from worker control to employer control under monopoly capitalism, pace Braverman. Empirical work in Isithebe bears testimony to the fact that, unskilled and semi-skilled workers do possess the ability to control certain aspects of the labour process, through the various methods of resistance at their disposal. What then were the control mechanisms in operation in the firms studies, and did they in any way contribute towards worker resistance?

■ Clothing Sector

The case-studies in this research showed that, the rate and level of direct forms of control, and, the implementation of time and motion studies, was most prevalent on the shop-floor in the clothing sector. Eight of the ten firms interviewed had implemented time and motion studies. The introduction of such studies did not arouse worker hostility and resistance in any company except in Co.1. The manager takes up the story.

"We had a special guy [who] came in to do the work study. In the beginning the people did not like him at all. He has his papers for every machine. He put these counters on every machine and workers had to write down how many garments are completed every half an hour or fifteen minutes. They did not like that. *They threw all those cards away, and went on strike.* They did not want the time study man in the factory. According to them, if he remains here, he must do the scores"

Management was then forced to accommodate workers' grievances, as such, a sort of a compromise was arrived at where:

"He [work study man] took the papers off the machines and employed score girls now to do the counting. It is costing the factory more money because

every line has 2 score girls who count every 15 minutes. The machinists don't want the papers in front of them. They don't want to do the counting, they don't care who does, but they are not going to do it" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

Workers' reactions to the implementation of elements of scientific management and Taylorism are far from homogeneous. As the case-studies show, not all workers resist their application on the shop-floor. Where there has been resistance, as in Co.1, such resistance was not against the time and motion study itself. Rather, workers resisted against their involvement in the programme. The time and motion study was implemented in the factory, although it had assumed a different form.

Whilst time and motion studies were not applied throughout the clothing sector, other aspects of Taylorism, like direct forms of control, were ubiquitous. Management in all ten clothing companies emphasized the need for constant and direct monitoring of work:

"Otherwise they [workers] will have their own damn way. If they make a mistake, they will just carry on. They won't worry about the mistake. The supervisor has to be there all the time. The quality controller must check the garments. Once you stop checking, you don't know what they are sewing. And if the guy in the chain store picks up the mistake, then you are in trouble. The whole batch will come back. The supervisor has to check all the time" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

The manager of Co.5 said:

"You got to be behind their [workers'] backs. We are going for targets. If one person on the production line does not perform, it affects all the other workers. So you got to check on the hour" (manager, Co.5: 1990).

A worker said that:

"Management is *always fighting* with workers to push the score. All they want is the score. Scores are changing all the time. Today they will ask for 110, next week they will ask for 150 or 200 an hour" (machinist, Co.4: 1989).

Another said:

"They [management] always need more than a 100 [score] per hour. Our scores sometimes are 120 per hour, or 180. But it must always be more than a 100." (machinist, Co.4: 1989).

A SACTWU shop-steward and machinist in Co.1 said that:

"Besides wages there are many problems with the job. Management and the supervisors always say to us, 'you like talking but you don't like working'... I am working very hard. My target an hour sometimes is 150 per hour. If you do skirts it is a 110 an hour. I am not happy. Book-keeper and management always come around and check that we [are] pushing production" (machinist, Co.1: 1989).

These sentiments reflect workers' discontent and dissatisfaction with managerial control. Therefore, the utilization of direct and constant methods of control does not mean that workers automatically adhere to capital's goals of achieving maximum productivity. How work is organized and monitored, as well as the rate and pace of production are issues of conflict between workers and capitalists.

SACTWU members showed an awareness of the contradiction between their interests and those of their employers. For example:

"It is not fair for management to rush workers. It is fair to [them], but for us it is not fair because they earn more money and we earn less. Quality controllers always check the quality of the job. The supervisors are always taking scores. Sometimes they say in 15 minutes, you must make 40, in 30 minutes 80. This is not fair" (machinist, Co.2: 1989).

Another said:

"Supervisors and management are the same for workers. They always tell us to work harder. Management says 'look, I want 110 an hour. If you don't give me that, then you better clock your card and go'. We tell management, we can't clock our cards. If we give 90 an hour it is right. If we give 80 per hour it is right. Then management says 'oh, it's alright ladies, take it easy, take it easy'. They must not rush us" (machinist, Co.1: 1989).

Workers challenging and resisting the rate and intensity of production, as is illustrated in the above examples, is known as output regulation. In an attempt to eliminate this kind of resistance and to increase productivity and efficiency, employers introduced various incentives schemes, one of which was the productivity bonus.⁷

In this regard, the production manager of Co.1 said that:

"Lines get a bonus when production is good. They also finish at 1.30 p.m. and collect their bonus. We give them trophies and a R50 voucher. They were not happy with trophies, but the money they want. When one line gets a bonus the whole factory gets happy. They clap for them" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

In Co.1 to Co.5, those companies belonging to the ICMA, the best machinist and best worker received trophies and R100. "This happens every month to motivate them. Supervisors get a braai. Workers get cakes, because they are lower than the

supervisors" (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990). Productivity bonuses varied in their form and application in the different factories. In Co.6:

"Each operation in the factory is analysed according to certain time specifications. In so many minutes a particular product must be completed. We work according to an international time-study method. If workers achieve 70% of their production, they get a bonus. If she [machinist] is running at a 100% productivity rate, she gets 15% of her wage pack" (production manager, Co.6: 1990).

Productivity bonus in Co.9 worked:

"According to the quantity a worker produces per day. We give them a basic quantity. This quantity is decided by the team leaders and the supervisors. Before this is implemented, this figure is negotiated with workers. The basic quantities must match the basic wages... [T]his basic amount is not high. The workers easily reach it. But after this basic quantity, workers get a production bonus, according to how many pieces they are over that basic quantity. At the end of the week, before we pay the wages we check these records, and then we make a bonus for them" (manager, Co.9: 1990).

Workers in Co.8 Were required to "produce 10 pieces a day, for which they get R30. For every other 10 they produce they get R1 bonus" (owner, Co.8: 1989).

However, even with the introduction of productivity bonuses management in most companies complained about workers reluctance to increase production. Worker reluctance and resistance to the rate and scale of production is manifested in output regulation. This and other related issues, as they relate to this research, will be discussed below in the section on resistance. For now, it is important to understand why employers in clothing found it necessary to use direct forms of control and

productivity bonus systems in order to subordinate workers to the demands of capital. Factors which are responsible for direct forms of control are multiple, one of which is a firm's product market operation.

It is imperative for capital to meet production deadlines, because, firms produce according to client specifications and requirements. Companies are also required to deliver at expected times. Companies operating within this system found it necessary to constantly monitor work because:

"We supply the big chain stores. They place an order a few months ahead and they tell you, right deliver on such and such a day. Now if there is a strike or go-slow or work-stoppage, how are we going to meet the targets? And if the chain stores get their orders late, they cancel. When they hit you, they hit very hard. We have to be on time with what the chain stores ordered" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

Similarly, Mr.B said:

"We have to check them all the time because stores like Edgars, Truworths expect us to deliver on time. If we do not we are seen as unreliable, our orders get cancelled and selling the products now becomes our baby. No-body else will buy it because they did not request that. This is just not on" (Mr.B, Co.AM: 1990).

Apart from the necessity of ensuring that deliveries are on time, there are other reasons which necessitated direct forms of control in the clothing sector. Additional pertinent factors include: the large number of people employed, due to the labour-intensiveness of the production processes (see previous chapter); labour-power made to work at a common pace; and production processes that involved more or less similar patterns of work. The fact that workers were compelled to work at a common pace, and

engaged in similar tasks on the factory floor created a work-force with more or less similar skills. This was further enhanced by employers' practice of swapping workers around the factory floor. As a result of this worker solidarity was encouraged. As Edwards (1979) points out this provides the objective material conditions for conflict between capital and labour to spread to a plant wide level.

In order to counter workers' resistance and "to push production", as the manager at Co.1 expressed it, capitalists attempted to increase bureaucratic control. This was achieved through the promotion of African workers to lower supervisory positions, in order to make capitalist relations of production more acceptable.

"We have to have their (African workers) own kind to control them. They don't like Indians telling them what to do... We need the African workers for control. When they see that their own kind is a supervisor or quality controller, they may get motivated to work harder" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

In an attempt to counteract worker resistance to employers' demands for higher rates of production, there emerged a strengthening of bureaucratic control which in turn stratified the labour-force. The development of internal labour markets and the tightening of bureaucratic control, as was discussed in the previous chapter, occurred through promotions and internal recruiting, grading structures, job descriptions and differential payment and reward systems (cf. Edwards, 1979: 131). Concomitant with bureaucratic control was the transfer of levels of authority to African semi-skilled supervisors. The development of bureaucratic forms of control with its structured hierarchy of power, authority and grading structures, existed, as is revealed by the case-studies, along side pre-dominantly direct forms of control. In essence, the structured hierarchy of control in the firms in this research, enhanced direct control as supervisors, quality controllers and score girls were constantly patrolling the shop-floor. Therefore, a variety of control mechanisms can, and did, co-exist within a single firm.

According to Friedman (1977a, b) direct control, is more predominant in peripheral workers, working in peripheral industries, which are large with unstable product market, and where the work-force is poorly organized. However, these trends cannot be generalized throughout the firms interviewed in this research. As was discussed in the previous chapter, a firm's labour market position cannot be cast in either or categories as in primary or secondary segments. What was shown was a firm's ability to incorporate elements of both types of labour segments. Precisely because it is impossible to always isolate the labour market position of firms into exclusively secondary and primary status, it is problematic to conclude that direct forms of control will only be applied in secondary firms. Friedman's conception of direct forms of control occurring within secondary jobs is correct to an extent. Evidence of this was found in Co.7, Co.8, Co.9 and Co.10; but, direct forms were not limited in their application to firms with unstable product demand with a poorly organised work force. Firms such as Co.6 and those belonging to Co.AM provide good examples of firms which made use of direct forms of control, when there was a stable demand for their products and when the work-force was strongly unionised. The analysis of control mechanisms in the clothing sector, therefore, must be sensitive to a variety of variables which influence the type of control present on the shop floor. Firm and sector specific factors must be understood within the broader socio-political relations in a particular time and geographical location. The interaction of such forces shapes the methods of control in labour processes.

■ Textile Sector

Of the four textiles firms who were interviewed, two made use of direct forms of control. They were Co.11 and Co.12. Neither firm had implemented time and motion studies. The level of direct supervision was not found through-out the shop floor in both cases. Direct forms of control were applied to workers who were employed in unskilled jobs, invariably the first and last stages of production like carding, dying, spinning, piecing, doafing and packing. The production manager of Co.12 explained

that:

"There are supervisors in each section who check that things are getting done. In the night plant, on the dying section, there is a record of what is being done for the 8 hours. I get a report of this from the supervisors every day. In the spinning section records are taken on the hour - with these records we can see that workers are keeping up the standards. In the carding section we use visual methods, we can see the numbers being produced. If there is a slow down here it means that the spinners do not have any work, because from carding it goes to spinning. If the carders do not have enough to supply the spinners, we have to find out what went wrong and we use visual methods to ensure that the maximum is produced in each section to distribute work. We don't like to see these people just sitting around - they set back production. We have to check them often because they get slack, their motivation gets lost, that every now and again we have to go behind them, jack them up and bring their standards up" (production manager, Co.12: 1990).

Likewise the personnel manager in Co.11 said that:

"We always have to check what workers are doing. If we do not they will do what they please, like sitting around and talking. They think that because the union is in, they can just sit and do nothing" (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990).

In Co.12 bringing 'their standards up' was important because of its unstable product market structure, at the time. Nevertheless, 'loafing' and the 'loss of motivation' on the job, in this company as in Co.11, was enhanced by the fact that workers were required to produce the same or similar products at a constant and monotonous pace, as in the clothing sector. While Co.12 was completely reliant on direct forms of control, Co.11 had alongside this, the co-existence of bureaucratic forms of control, through the

development of its internal labour market. Friedman's conception of direct forms of control and the nature of the firm which implements them applied to Co.12. It operated within an unstable product market, its production process was labour intensive and its labour force was not unionised. Co.11 like some of the examples from the clothing sector departed from this classification. Its production process was labour intensive, it had a fairly stable demand for its products, its workers were strongly unionised with SACTWU, and, yet it utilised direct forms of control in certain parts of the labour process.

■ Metal, Engineering and Other Sectors

Of all the metal and engineering plants interviewed, only Co.D and Co.H had conducted time and motion studies. The production manager of Co.A claimed that he will not have time and motion studies because "workers are not like the conveyors which you can time" (production manager, Co.A:1990). The production manager at Co.B said that:

"With our operations, like smelting and refining, time specifications are very difficult. This depends largely on the type and grades of the raw materials we use. And it [raw material] varies. For example, a battery plate - for the battery plate to go from the smelter to the refiner is very different, to say dross which is also a raw material... That is the reason we can't have this [time and motion studies] in these sections. We may consider it in the future for the manufacturing side" (production manager, Co.B: 1990).

The implementation of Taylorism does not necessarily mean the implementation of time and motion studies. Employer attitudes and the nature of work determine the use of time and motion studies.

Co.SB, from the food sector:

"Had it (time and motion studies) and we set it more or less to the productivity norms - 80% of full capacity. We did it ourselves, it did not influence (workers) in any way because we did not openly go-around and examine each one of them. We did not do it so, *we did not want to alarm them*. We worked it out our-selves and we set a norm which is fair - I think - they keep up easily with the norm. These time and motion studies are on the distribution side... We know [that] to load a truck of grain with bags takes 3 hours; and to bag off so many bags of malt takes so many per minute. So we have worked out [that] a person can do so much per minute or so much in a day" (production manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Braverman's conception of the implementation of Taylorist principles as unproblematic is not entirely true. As the above example shows, it is very possible for employers to be wary and exercise caution in introducing these methods, so as not to arouse the suspicion and anger of the labour-force.

Furthermore the implementation of elements of scientific management, and in this case time and motion studies was not a generalized and uniform phenomenon. Simply because the nature of work within certain companies were not uniform, time and motion studies had been applied very selectively. The production manager of Co.SB explained that:

"On the production side there are no time and motion studies. We work on three shifts and we have enough time to do all shifts, so there is no need... The whole process here is more monitoring than working because the whole operation is done by machines. It is more monitoring the time settings, standards and setting temperatures than anything else" (production manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Two other companies from paper and wood sector conducted time and motion studies,

Co.BR and Co.SF.

Nevertheless, most employers emphasized the need for constant and direct control of workers who were involved in "labourer type jobs", "fetch this, carry that" or packers.

"Workers don't need supervision - they need control. There has to be control for some of them, particularly the labourers. They basically carry out instructions, that is their job. If you want a job to move faster we have to constantly check them. When the labourer has finished that particular job, he must be told what to do next" (production manager, Co.A: 1990).

In similar vein, the manager of Co.H noted that:

"It is always a battle to get workers to work harder. We try to get as much productivity as possible. We have ways of measuring work and we know which way we are going... We measure the man hours in the yard and the various productivity processes. We find that we have to be constantly down in the yard, be vigilant and keep them on their toes. If we do not do that productivity goes backwards and we will never get the output from them as we can when we constantly sit on their backs" (manager, Co.H: 1990).

In Co.D:

"We have proved that x amount can be produced in some many hours, or a job can be done in so many minutes. What we have done is tightened controls, we have blackboards with items on them that are ticked off as time goes, supervisors are in charge of this. It works logically... everybody can see what numbers we are looking at; how much they have produced; and how much they still have to produce to meet the target. But it is still difficult, it is still difficult to get workers to work hard and meet targets - it is a problem that we

have" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

Similar trends were also present in the other sectors. In Co.SB:

"On the dispatch department we have to always check them, we have problems here. We have tight programmes to meet deadlines, and we have supervisors in the bagging and dispatch section who make sure that our deadlines are being met. If we don't do this they will carry on in their own time. We always experience this problem. You know if no one is supervising them they will take two hours to load a truck and when there is supervision they will take one hour. And if you tell them they can go home as soon as they finish loading they will take half an hour" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Another production manager said that:

"There are places where you have to check... Like things that they have been doing for three years, they still slip up, by talking and putting the wrong labels on, not checking that it is the proper label. For example this is a five self or that is a five draw. So they must have label five. It's those things we have to check... These are the ones who do the funniest of things when you don't always check - simply because they don't concentrate. They are here and there in the factory... So now we put the supervisors on them - to check" (production manager, Co.BR: 1990).

In Co.ID direct and simple forms of control (cf. Edwards, 1979) found expression on the shop floor, among those employed in unskilled positions - packers, sweepers and those making boxes. The manager claimed that:

"These Zulu workers are not versed in industrial relations, they don't understand too much. I must always check on their work. I have my

supervisors, but I make a point of going to every girl, checking on their work, see if they understand or if there are any problems" (manager, Co.ID: 1990).

According to him, if this is not the case workers attempt to define their own methods of doing a particular job. For example, he said that:

"when they sweep the factory, they start on one side of the floor with a sweeping brush and they sweep the dirt right around the factory - never once do they pick the dirt up. I say to them, you sweep this section and you pick up the dirt, throw it away and then start the next section. No, they will still take the dirt through-out the factory - even if its clean, if you do not stop them. So you see I have to be behind them".

The degree and extent of direct forms of control for metal and engineering and other sectors was similar to the textile sector, in that, direct and constant checking of work was not distributed throughout the shop-floor. Direct forms of control in metal and engineering and other sectors were prevalent in jobs that are unskilled and/or which were dependent on the performance of human beings more than machines.

A number of factors, either individually or collectively, determined the nature and extent of control, in the different firms interviewed. However, irrespective of firms' product market power and the existence of trade unions, direct control mechanisms were in operation in the factories which participated in this study. This is attributable to the nature of the job itself, as well as to the socio-political relations governing production in a particular time and place. As the case-studies show, those who were employed in labour-intensive production processes - those who worked in groups and/or in large numbers and who shared the same experiences and exploitation in the factories and outside; workers who performed monotonous repetitive jobs, where the pace was the same, were subject to direct and constant forms of control. There is a definite corollary between the nature and conditions of work and the occurrence of

daily forms resistance among workers. This study shows that workers who were subjected to direct forms of control, and whose jobs were most unstimulating, monotonous and repetitive engaged in high levels of daily class struggles. The forms of daily class struggles, and the ways in which they affected the relations of production are discussed next.

CLASS STRUGGLES AND THE LABOUR PROCESS

The objective conditions of ideological and political domination and subordination do not escape the subjective components of the working class. By calling labour-power variable capital, Marx saw that surplus value is not created in an a-social and mechanical way. At the core of this process lies the struggle between capital's attempts to increase valorisation, and workers' attempt to resist them. As Nichols argues:

"If powerful enough... employers can vary the surplus created. And if they are strong enough workers can vary this too. The term 'variable' draws attention to the relative strength of the combatants within the production process" (Nichols, 1970: 35).

The fact that conflict between workers and capitalists is at the very heart of the labour process raises questions about the 'completeness' of the real subordination of capital. The transition to the real subordination of labour cannot simply be understood or equated with the complete breakdown of crafts and skills. Elger emphasizes that the "tendencies for the degradation of work must be related to the specific obstacles to valorisation confronted by capital, and to the forms of political and economic domination of labour by capital" (Elger, 1979: 77). Braverman's conception of the nature of the capitalist relations of production, allows him to see its development and increased control over the working class, as formidable and through-going. The determining role that worker resistance plays in the implementation of scientific

management, according to Friedman, renders the significance attached to the distinction between formal and real subordination superfluous (Friedman, 1977: 100).

In Isithebe, during the 1980s and early 1990s, certain aspects of Taylorism, which entrench the degradation of work, such as direct forms of control and capital's coercive attempts to intensify the rate of production were challenged by workers. The existence of class conflict at the point of production, raises crucial questions on the extent to which real subordination has resulted in a passive and inert working class. As Friedman (1977) argues it is erroneous to suggest that the material basis for worker resistance erodes in the process of scientific management and the erosion of skills. New situations can and do, in fact, create conditions for organized and unorganized resistance of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

Resistance at the point of production takes on various forms. It is, therefore, important to understand the diversity and complexity of working class resistance which affect the labour process in different ways. A distinction can be drawn between: (a) those forms of resistance which are more dramatic, observable but which nevertheless tend to be less frequent such as strikes and lock outs; and (b) those forms which are less spectacular, but which nonetheless occur on a more frequent, often daily basis. Hence they are referred to as everyday or daily class struggles. The case-studies show that struggles which fall into the second category, also often have an adverse impact on the rate and scale of capitalist production and valorisation, as well as on employer-employee relationships under particular historical conditions.

Daily forms of class struggle, in terms of this research, were most prevalent among those employed in more secondary working conditions, like those in the clothing and textiles sectors and those who were employed in labour intensive, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the metal and engineering sector. A common and widespread form of everyday protest was output regulation. Output regulation by workers, as defined here, refers to their refusal to maintain the rate and pace of production, as well as,

workers' tendency to 'take it easy' on the job. This tendency was strongly prevalent in the clothing sector even after the introduction of productivity bonuses. For example:

"These people have a don't care attitude, they won't push production. In every line this is the problem. A machinist in the front might be a good machinist. She can sew a hundred collars an hour. The normal score might be 84. But she can push that extra because she needs job. But lots of them they can't or they won't push production. These are the ones who go slow, the loafers. They say 'hey, why are you pushing production. You are stupid to push production'. They talk to each other, you can see it on the factory floor. We called the unions to speak to their people. We told them to ask the workers if they wanted us to stay here and survive. Or if they wanted us to close and move to another area. You know...on some days they run away with the scores. They give you fantastic scores, its unbelievable. But the next day they will give you a quarter of that score. Why? I can't understand it" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

In Co.12:

"Workers are always on a go slow. They just work slowly. They take their time about things. If you do not watch them, they will loaf around. You will find them in this corner or that corner" (production manager, Co.12: 1990).

In Co.8:

"We want workers to give us ten pieces a day. We give a production bonus of R1 for every additional ten pieces a worker produces. Look at the scores. They are one and three, four. If we lucky we may get seven from someone" (owner, Co.8: 1989).

Another manager said that:

"You can't tell them to push production. They feel that now that the unions are in we [management] can't rush them or push them around. They go on strike or go slow when they are pushed around" (manager, Co.3: 1989).

The introduction of trade unionism, in these firms, contributed to worker resistance, although output regulation was also prevalent in non-unionized firms. The personnel manager of Co.11 explained:

"The union is still new to people. They still have a lot to learn because a number of employees... are just sitting down and loafing and the percentage of absenteeism is very high. They expect the unions and the shop stewards to defend them. They don't understand the concept of trade-unionism. They think that the union is going to do their jobs while they are sitting down and doing nothing" (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990).

To add to this:

"If there is a small mistake on the admin side - possibly there is underpayment to a worker...all of a sudden the whole factory just stops working. They will just sit in front of the machines. We have a lot of disruptions. When the union story came about, people refused to work - we could not push them any longer. We require certain targets to break even, but we can no longer push them to reach our targets. The only way we can achieve this is if we give them incentives - say to them if you produce so much I will give you this amount" (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990).

Output regulation as a daily form of resistance was also common in the other sectors, pre-dominantly among unskilled workers. The production manager in Co.B explained that:

"When there is no senior personnel around, workers tend to relax on the job. If they are required to pack twenty bags of steel, they will only do ten. I get lots of complaints from supervisors. Another example is the furnace. We did some test and found out that the furnace can be loaded in one and half hours. There are times when the supervisors find that the furnace is only half loaded in two hours. We have such problems" (production manager, Co.B: 1990).

Output regulation is a conscious effort on the part of workers to direct the pace and rate of production, which is contrary to the interests of capital.

Whilst output regulation was most prevalent among clothing and textile workers and unskilled labour in the other sectors, absenteeism and coming late to work were ubiquitous.

"Workers have a negative attitude towards work. Maybe it is the political climate. There is no feeling of job satisfaction. I can see it [in] their work. A number of them come late to work practically everyday. Some come drunk everyday. And absenteeism is so high, especially on a Monday. We have work rules which we lay down. But the workers they don't care" (production manager, Co.B: 1990).

Management in Co.A and in Co.F to Co.H also experienced high rates of absenteeism and late coming. Similarly, in the clothing sector "Coming late is so high. That is how we loose production", said the manager of Co.1. In order to combat arriving late at work management introduced a further bonus - the attendance bonus. The manager explained:

"We give R3 attendance bonus. Just for them to come to work on time, we give them this bonus for nothing. They are not worried about it, *why?* R3 is R3 to me. You can give them R10 too, it is still not worth it. They still won't come

early to work. We in the ICMA met up with the Taxi Association, to see if the taxis were late. The taxi drivers told us to come at six in the morning to see if there are problems with the taxis. We went, [and] we saw the taxis standing empty at six in the morning. People only come to the rank at twenty two or quarter to seven. Now you tell me how are they going to make it on time for work?" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

Mr.B of Co.AM said that:

"We don't force people to work on a Saturday. But if we are in a push, we work over-time. But then what happens when the workers come in on a Saturday, then on a Monday absenteeism is very high. They prefer to work on a Saturday to cover up for the Monday because they are getting time and half rates. On Mondays they get ordinary rates. Sundays it's double pay. When they work on Sunday, they take two days off" (Mr.B, Co.AM: 1990).

Another common and consistent problem for employers in the clothing sector was the high levels of 'rejects', or what I refer to as sabotage of products, where garments are wrongly stitched.

"Rejects is one of the most serious problems. Say for example we have an order of 2000 units. Of this 1500 will come out o.k. The other 400 will be rejects and the 100 will be lost or stolen. We have lots of types of rejects - fabric damage, fading, shading, needle damage, in all our factories." (Mr.B, Co.AM: 1990).

In Co.1:

"We must get rejects. We get plenty of rejects. They know how to sew the garments. They know. Although we have quality controllers, we somehow get

these rejects" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

Another example is Co.11 where there are:

"Lots of rejects. Its because people... don't listen to their training instructors, or to their supervisor, whenever he is giving them instructions. They feel that the supervisor is their opponent, since they joined the union. Once someone is an opponent workers don't want to listen" (personnel manager, Co.11: 1990).

In addition to the sabotage of products management in Co.1 to Co.5 were confronted with high incidents of machine sabotage.

"Breaking machines is a normal thing in the factory now. Everyday machines get broken. You change the machine, they break the machine. You can't stop them. How can you stop them? They know that if they...put something into the machines anyhow, if they use force, the machine must break. They are clever they don't have to push it, but they will to break the machines. You can't do anything then. We can only tell them not to break the machines, that it costs money" (production manager Co.1: 1990).

Mr.B explained that:

"Many times we find parts missing. In the morning workers will say that there is something wrong with the machines. You ask them where is that part, they say they don't know. Who is sabotaging the machines, we don't know. It happens quite often. Our maintenance on machines is very high. For each factory, it costs us R80 000 a year" (Mr.B, Co.Am: 1990).

Sabotage of product and of machinery, as an expression of every-day class struggle,

was not common in the other sectors. This is a consequence of the nature and organization of the labour process. For example in some companies like Co.SB, production spread over days which enabled management to detect and rectify problems. As a result:

"There are no rejects. We are quite flexible that way. We can adjust all the way. We monitor as production carries on... We make adjustments when things go wrong" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

Co.D, however, was the only company from the metal and engineering sector that experienced machine breakdowns. "Machines are breaking all the time. We don't know when it is sabotage or not. Again, we try and prevent this through controls and regular check ups" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

Sabotage of machinery represents attempts by workers to make time for themselves on the job. It is one of the ways workers can escape the horror of their work, for a couple of hours, while the machine gets fixed or is replaced. Together with absenteeism and coming late to work it reflects daily forms of resistance, where workers attempt to control some aspects of their working life.

Yet another form of resistance, that also directly affected production in Co.2 to Co.5 and Co.12 was malingering or getting sick on the job.

"African females just start screaming. For no reason they... start screaming. It happens often. We take them to the sick room, slap them around a couple of times. They get up after a while" (production manager, Co.12: 1990).

The same process was in operation in firms belonging to Co.Am.

"Getting sick on the job is very common among the females. There are many

times with the females - something happens to them. It is like a fit. They [workers] call it 'fifiyan'. A woman will just stop work and she will start screaming... This happens when a supervisor tells the worker 'your machine is not right', or 'you are not on target'. Any instruction you give them. As soon as they feel we are pushing them, they go out of control and start screaming. And once one person starts, the next will start and the next, until the whole factory is screaming. So now as soon as a person starts this, we take her out of the factory, and let the work carry on" (Mr.B, Co.AM: 1990).

The forms of daily resistance discussed thus far, were often irregular, unorganized, and they tend to be both individual and collective, depending on the circumstances. As the examples show, these represented conscious efforts by workers to resist managerial authority and the capitalist work ethic on a daily basis. In addition, they presented major stumbling blocks to the valorisation process, as they either brought production to a halt or slowed it down.

There are other forms of resistance, such as stealing, which do not directly affect production, but which nevertheless reflect workers disregard for the concept of private property. All companies complained about the frequent rate of stealing. "They steal anything. All kinds of tools just walk out of the factory" (manager, Co.A: 1990). "Stealing is very high. They steal whole kitchen units and equipment, and they sell them (manageress, Co.G: 1989). Most of these firms resorted to employing contract security guards, as a measure to curb the rate of stealing. In some companies:

"We got an internal and an outside security [system]. But if anyone reports a thief, they will get an incentive -R10 ranging up to R20 per thief. If someone reports ten people stealing, then that worker will get R100. But this has not deterred stealing. Many times we will start a line say with 2000. At the end of the line we find 1900. So 100 was stolen somewhere along the line. And that is quit a high percentage" (MR.B, Co.AM: 1990).

Employers further related other instances where workers attempted to exert their control over certain conditions of work. For example:

"Workers think that the union is God. They are now making unnecessary demands. Before they used to wash their plates and cups. Now they want us to employ some-body to especially wash them. And now they are also demanding uniforms" (manager, Co.2: 1989).

And:

"I have quite a few instances of go slows. When they want increases they will go slow. We tell them we are paying better than anyone else in the area. So how can we give you increases. As soon as one person gets an increase, the whole factory wants an increase" (manager, Co.4: 1989).

Likewise in Co.1:

"One or two rotten ones will also create the problems. They always looking for trouble. They say the work study man is asking for too much, that he must also work on the machines. Or if they want an increase, in a sly way, they will start. They will ask 'why is this person getting so much, and we are not. Then they will go slow. They know how to do it. They are too good for those things' (manager, Co.1: 1990).

These examples provide evidence for the existence of everyday forms of class struggles which often directly affected the production processes. Daily forms of resistance, such as output regulation, absenteeism, arriving late at work often led to modifications within the labour process and the relations of production. These changes were reflected in the various incentives and bonus schemes, introduced by management and aimed at reducing/eliminating various forms of daily class struggle. Workers do not necessary have to retain or possess high levels of skill to exert control in the labour process.

The confusion, as Thompson (1983) points out, arises in terms of workers' ability to retain skill and job control. Workers, as the case-studies reveal, are capable of and do often exercise control over working conditions and rewards, after the process of deskilling. Friedman argues that because the word 'control' in labour process studies, has been used both, in an absolute and a relative sense, confusion and ambiguity over the word results (Friedman, 1977: 45).⁸ To avoid confusion it is useful to view the labour process as a 'frontier of control' which can shift in workers' favour as a result of daily class struggles or in management's favour as a result of counter-pressure. Worker and management control of the labour process is relative and is dependent on particular historical, temporal and material conditions. In view of the fact that daily forms of class struggle impinge directly on labour processes capitalist control of labour processes and the real subordination of labour cannot be seen as absolute and complete.

Nevertheless, this study shows that, the existence of and space for daily forms of resistance are dependent largely on the nature of labour processes, the type of work people engage in and their working conditions. Precisely because of the break down of the production process into distinct tasks, the nature of work is not uniformed throughout the factory floor. Therefore a variety of control mechanisms will be applied, which influence the use of certain daily forms of struggle. It is clear from my research that, where a certain level of responsibility and lesser degrees of direct control and supervision apply, the occurrence of daily forms of class struggle is minimal or non-existent. We now turn to a discussion of elements of responsible autonomy and the conditions which give rise to it.

TAYLORSIM AND RESPONSIBLE AUTONOMY

For Friedman (1977a, b) the development of responsible autonomy is the result of managerial attempts to accommodate and counter working class resistance found

under direct control. Whilst this might be the case in some instances, in the firms I interviewed where a certain degree of responsible autonomy prevailed, different tendencies emerged. Elements of responsible autonomy were not the result of worker resistance, but, of the nature and the type of labour process, in such companies. For example, where the pace of work was determined by machines, together with the small numbers employed, supervision and control was not as stringent and direct as in clothing sector or the unskilled aspects of the labour processes in metal and engineering sectors. In Co.13 and Co.14 (from the textile sector) technical control was dominant, where, workers' actions and work itself were determined by the pace of the machines. The owner of Co.13 explained that:

"The machine has much more control over work than workers... We set the pattern on the machine and it runs at a constant speed - the machine does the production. I only need machine minders as opposed to machine operators - there is nothing to operate on the machines, it is just looking after the machines. When the machine stops workers must press the right buttons and when the yarn is finished they must replace it with a new one and carry on, that is all, they just sit and watch the machines" (owner, Co.13: 1990)

Similarly:

"I don't have to check the girls all the time, it is relaxed here. I occasionally check on them and see them reading. That is not a problem because they know what is to be done - it is just watching the machines" (owner, Co.14: 1990).

Workers in these two firms required less supervision and control, simply because the pace and rate of work was set on the machines, by management.

Unlike Co.11 and Co.12, workers in Co.13 and Co.14 did not have much control over their work. They had no space to determine their level of output and rate of

production. Their control over the levels of output and the rate of production was considerably weakened by technical control and the power of the machine. The inability to exert control over aspects of the job, denied these workers major criteria for resistance. Therefore, the existence of resistance and the form it assumes are also strongly influenced by the nature and organization of production, and, the form/s of control in the factory.

In Co. SB trends of technical control co-existed with aspects of responsible autonomy. Management said that:

"We don't have to constantly check on them...not on the production site. Here the plant is fully automatic. Workers in this department monitor the machines themselves. There is no supervision here" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

The concept responsible autonomy as identified by Friedman (1977a, b) refers to control mechanisms which shift away from Taylorist principles. Under such conditions workers act 'responsibly' with a minimum amount of supervision. Co.C was a close example. The company had:

"No foreman. I believe each person can handle themselves to the best of their ability... I believe in giving each guy the maximum of authority. We do not put one person over another. Each guy does what he has to. They have a sense of responsibility. They know that they are here to do a days job and they must get on with it. The majority of my workers are like this. My responsible guys motivate the lazy ones... My responsible guys are the machine operators. They have been promoted because of their interest in the job. My lazy ones are the labourers" (manager, Co.C: 1990).

Of all the metal and engineering companies that participated in this research, Co.C was the only company where levels of responsible autonomy prevailed throughout the

factory.

An aspect of responsible autonomy is management's attempts to incorporate workers' ideas into the production process. As the manager continued:

"I believe in explaining to the guy what the end result of a product should look like. Then I leave him to find his own way, [in] that way he is comfortable. I find that with this way the guys do become more productive. I will be there to help and offer advice, but he [worker] must do it in the way [he sees] fit" (manager, Co.C: 1990).

The fact that workers do have some control and decision making power over how they work does not result in them having absolute control, because, fundamental aspects of the labour process are in the hands of capitalists. However, the fact that workers do exercise control means that there is relative control. According to Friedman, however, responsible autonomy pertains to workers and firms that operate within primary labour markets. This is so because, apart from elements of worker discretion, in terms of the immediate production process, and their commitment to capitalist objectives, there are also concession of improved material benefits - high wages, incentives, job security, good fringe benefits and working conditions. Yet Co.C, Co.13 and Co.14 are good examples of the complexities involving methods of control. These examples revealed the existence of in-direct control mechanisms and responsible autonomy in operation within secondary labour markets. Apart from this they point to the fact that firms employ a variety of control mechanisms, depending on the type of job, the type of technology and the capital-labour relationship.

Workers with responsible autonomy, nevertheless, were regarded by managers as the core employees, who showed loyalty to the company's aim.

"My semi-skilled and skilled workers are much more loyal to me. I would say

so because they got more responsibilities. They are responsible for more things than the labourers. We are not nailing the labourers when the work is not finished, we go straight to the supervisory staff. These are the people who are much more loyal to the time setting and production deadlines" (manager, Co.SB: 1990).

African semi-skilled supervisors and team leaders in the case-studies were bestowed with a great deal of responsibilities and power. For example:

"On the battery breaking section we have an African supervisor. He is not as skilled as the shift supervisor, but he is responsible for organizing and supervising his section. The extrusion plant has a team leader with five men under him, he supervises them. He comes in, in the morning and he knows what is to be done. The shift supervisor gives him instructions. The job might take three days. The team leader must know this, he understands this. He must make sure that there is job for three days. He is responsible for checking that work is getting done in his section" (production manager, Co.B: 1990).

The production manager of Co.A explained that:

"We know how long it takes to build our units. We give the supervisors a list of what is to be done. On that are the times specified and he works according to that. They [workers] clock into work, that is the power they get paid on... This is the job chart system and it is controlled by the supervisor. At the end of the day he marks off which jobs went around. If a guy worked on six different jobs, the supervisor must identify these areas. These records are sent to the time clerk and from here it goes into the computer. Every month we get a computer print out, where we check the hours worked, the mistakes made, or two people doing the same job. Our supervisors play a major role because of these responsibilities. They are the ones who control the job" (production

manager, Co.A: 1990).

Similarly in Co.D:

"Although our indunas are unskilled in the strict sense of the word... [t]hey are skilled in doing their particular job. They have acquired these skills over the years. My indunas are highly skilled in our work environment. They know every in and out of this factory. The factory runs on their steam" (manager, Co.D: 1990).

The development of responsible autonomy for these firms complemented and strengthened their hierarchy, thereby extending bureaucratic control.

Braverman's strong association of Taylorism with monopoly capitalism, precludes an analysis of these post-Taylorist strategies. The above examples support Friedman's (1977a, b) and Edwards (1979) arguments that alternatives to the Taylorist organization of production do exist and are themselves important in the comprehension of capitalist social relations. However, alternate conceptions to Braverman's thesis on the labour process do not adequately acknowledge the multi-varied nature and co-existence of different control mechanisms. Friedman (1977a, b) for example, casts forms of control into two exclusive categories - direct control and responsible autonomy. Management in this research, however, did not adhere to any one form of control and method of discipline. In fact within a single industry methods of control varied from elements of direct control to elements of bureaucratic control and responsible autonomy. Friedman collapses managements' wide ranging tactics into essentially two forms which are not clearly outlined (Wood and Kelly, 1982: 82). The case-studies in this thesis support Wood and Kelly's position that while direct control and responsible autonomy may coincide empirically, there are many instances where such neat categorizations do not exist, and so "it is important to be clear about the components of the posited strategy or even tactics, in terms of

techniques" (Wood and Kelly, 1982: 83).

In addition, Friedman fails to examine the link between direct control and responsible autonomy. He also fails to recognize that responsible autonomy does in fact contain elements of Taylorism which enable its efficiency. The ambiguity in the concepts stems from Friedman's conception of the role of pay and pay incentives. In terms of Friedman's analysis a distinction is drawn between (a) money piecework (where work methods remain unspecified and payment is by the piece) and between (b) time piecework (where methods are specified and payment is by the time saved).

Now, as Wood and Kelly point out, many contemporary wage-labour relations in terms of payment systems fall between these two extremes. Again, in casting attention to Isithebe, it was found that even with firms that reflected degrees of responsible autonomy and those that manifested more signs of direct control, pay systems combined both methods, reflecting attempts to control output through the pay system. A more plausible manner in which to define forms of control, in terms of direct control and responsible autonomy, based on these two pay systems would be, to see forms of control and payment systems as occurring along a continuum with direct forms of control on the one hand and responsible autonomy on the other hand. Such an approach facilitates a deeper appreciation of the fact that employers utilize different forms of control for different segments of the work-force. These strategies of control are encompassed within the broad principles of Taylorism and scientific management.

In view of the fact that alternate forms of control, to Taylorism, such as responsible autonomy and bureaucratic control do exist, critics of Braverman have questioned the extent and impact of the implementation of Taylorism on the shop-floor. As a result a distinction is drawn between Taylorism as an ideology on the one hand, and practice on the other hand. Burawoy for one, believes that it operated more on an ideological level, as a means of legitimizing the emerging forms of scientific management, rather than as a means of labour process organizing (Burawoy, 1978: 276-81). However, Taylorism

operates both at an ideological and practical level in that it has been a long term tool for re-arranging work. The ideology governing Taylorism is strongly incorporated alongside responsible autonomy, technical and bureaucratic means of control. The evidence from the examination of labour processes in Isithebe showed that time and motion studies; the recording of products manufactured; the detailed division of labour remain essential components to the labour process. Burawoy (1978) and Edwards (1979) in arguing for forms of control that move away from Taylorism believe that it has failed and has limited use.

According to Edwards (1979) worker resistance and managers own hesitancy in introducing such principles to the work environment, acted as barriers to its significance. Thompson points out that because Braverman has such a broad definition of Taylorism, it is easy for others to argue that it is a "failure by defining it in narrow terms - as efforts that are specific to Taylor, rather than as a movement towards 'scientific' management generally" (Thompson, 1983: 130). Hence the claim that only a small number of firms ever introduced these work methods are not entirely true, and one based on a narrow definition of Taylorist experiments. Control mechanisms such as responsible autonomy and other job-enrichment programmes do not mark a fundamental or radical break with the broad principles of Taylorism. Rather it creates the stimulus for the development of "alternative and additional methods of control" (Thompson, 1983: 132).

Conclusion

Labour processes do not develop in a linear fashion. At the very source of the capitalist mode of production lies the contradictory relations of domination and exploitation. The alienating and dehumanizing effects of the labour process form the generative mechanisms for the various forms of resistance. Worker resistance at the point of production has a major determining effect on control mechanisms and on the nature of

work. Hence the deskilled nature of capitalist labour process does not seal capitalist authority and control permanently, nor does it impact negatively on unskilled and semi-skilled workers' ability to exercise control over elements of their job.

However the forms of worker resistance and the rate and level at which they occur, are strongly determined by multiple factors. These include type of industry, workers' positions within labour markets and production processes and the nature of their job and working conditions. This research shows that those who had some degree of autonomy and responsibility are less likely to engage in every-day forms of struggle. It was found that those who were employed in secondary positions, and those employed in jobs where greater degrees of secondary work conditions prevailed were often the ones most likely to engage in various daily forms of resistance. However, responsible autonomy and less supervision and control did not preclude workers from conducting daily forms of resistance. Such workers daily working conditions and benefits were relatively better than those who worked under direct control, like, labourers in the same firm or, clothing and certain textile workers. The cause/s to engage in every-day forms of struggles may have been limited; but during periods of conflict with management (eg. the struggle for unionisation) these workers did not hesitate to follow some form of daily struggle or another.

How then are we to conceptualise these forms of struggles like absenteeism, coming late to work, output regulation, etc.; are they reinforced by the socio-political relations governing a particular area during a particular period; why are such forms of struggle significant; and what do they say about working class resistance? Did the introduction of trade unionism, in the firms interviewed, affect the occurrence of these less observable forms of resistance? Are such struggles reflective of a 'primitive' consciousness on the part of the working class. These are the concerns of the following chapter.

NOTES

1. The return to studies focusing on work was stimulated by the heightened industrial conflict and the breakdown of industrial consensus in western capitalist societies. The demands emanating from these workplace struggles were much broader, in that, they marked a shift away from the narrow, economic wage demands to encompass qualitative demands surrounding the nature and control of work. These issues were dealt with prior to Braverman, especially in France where analyses focused on the emergence of a new vanguard consisting of highly skilled technical workers. The technological changes that affected work were seen as reversing the trends of fragmentation. In addition to this, these studies did not take adequate account of changes in the labour process and the impact these had on working class consciousness. A detailed analysis of the labour process was required in order to understand these new developments. Braverman (1974) was the first to address the changes in the labour process by examining the processes of deskilling in America from a Marxist perspective.

2. The Brighton Labour Process Group also argue that deskilling is an inherent and all encompassing tendency of capitalism, arising out of capital's search for maximum speed, cheapness, replaceability and standardisation. However, unlike Braverman they attempt to situate deskilling within a wider framework. They argue that the particular effects of different phases of accumulation as well as working class struggles have an important role in influencing the changes deskilling has on labour processes.

3. According to Braverman scientific management is the absolute and only form the labour process assumes with the onslaught of monopoly capitalism. But his strong association of scientific management with monopoly capitalism does not provide a clear understanding of the link between them. On the one hand Taylorism is seen as "functional", as Elger and Schwarz (1980) and Elger (1979) to the new era of capitalist expansion, while on the other hand Taylorism appears to be contingent to monopoly capitalism.

4. For more detail on what these companies produce, refer to the previous chapter.
5. To emphasize the diversity in the products manufactured, this particular company produces a variety of metal products, as well as condensers for one of the larger metal factory in the region, KIC. Condensers are used in the manufacture of fridges - they are the black unit or frames with pipings. The pipings are imported from overseas. Over and above these, the company also manufactures hinges for containers for another larger company in Isithebe, Alusaf.
6. Co.BR manufactures wooden furniture.
7. Of the ten clothing companies interviewed, two, Co.7 and Co.10, have no productivity bonus schemes or other production rewards. Management in both firms said that they will be looking at such a scheme in the future.
8. Absolute control is a reference to those who control, while relative control refers to workers' power to control aspects of their work (Friedman, 1977).

CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF WORKING CLASS STRUGGLES IN ISITHEBE

Introduction

The previous chapters attempted to show how tendencies in the labour market and labour process, and, the social relations of production influence the rate and forms that class struggles assume. As was discussed, certain methods of control like direct control and other secondary work conditions result in worker dissatisfaction. This is expressed through daily forms of class struggle. The day-to-day conflict manifested in absenteeism, output regulation, sabotage, stealing, etc. are not only determined by economic relations between worker and capitalist and factors which are internal to the firm. Class struggles at the point of production encompasses and reflects wider social, political, economic and ideological relations of domination under capitalism. They point to the important fact that work relations and relations between employer and employee are never stable and harmonious. In fact, a study of the nature of labour processes in Isithebe shows that day-to-day forms of struggle express normal actions and responses to abnormal, alienating and dehumanizing work and working conditions.

Edwards and Scullion pose the issue in a useful way. They ask:

"Instead of asking whether absenteeism is an alternative to strikes we ask how

absenteeism gains significance in particular settings, how far it can be seen as a form of conflict in one situation and not in another, and why this is so" (Edwards and Scullion, 1982: 2).

Edwards and Scullion's work is important because of their emphasis on specifying labour processes in an attempt to explain and conceptualize working class struggle and behaviour. For a deeper appreciation of working class resistance, however, analysis must account for the particular political conditions in specific geographical locations under which valorisation occurs. These factors will shed light on the nature of day-to-day struggles, i.e. whether such struggles manifest class struggle or are forms of accommodation.

Struggles are thus to a large extent conjuncturally determined. The process and content of struggles, are to a large extent, determined by specific and concrete relations and conditions of capitalist development within a particular locality. The use of every-day struggles to effect changes in work and working conditions are influenced by the levels of repression and accommodation of the working class. That is to say, for us to adequately explain the underlying causes of absenteeism, sabotage, etc., and, to categorize these forms of struggles as class struggle, as opposed to methods of accommodation, they have to be contextualized within particular socio-historical settings. Put differently, arriving late to work, output regulation and the like constitute everyday forms of class struggle, within specific spatial and temporal contexts. For example, when the space to resist openly and indiscreetly is limited and repressed, day-to-day forms of struggle have been cogently implemented to alter certain conditions.

This chapter shows the influence that broader political conditions, in a particular place and time, have on the occurrence of daily forms of struggles. How do spatial and temporal conditions influence the process and content of class struggle? It will be argued that: (a) under repressive political conditions the working class actively engages

in every-day struggles to challenge such conditions; and (b) political conditions influence the rate and intensity of struggle. Everyday forms of struggles reveal firstly, the dehumanizing and alienating character of capitalist work relations. Secondly, they reveal the extent to which the working class can push the balance of class forces in its favour, in order to exert its interests over aspects of the production process. Thirdly, by moving beyond and penetrating the level of formalized trade union and collective struggles, it is possible to find the existence of more varied and pervasive forms of resistance and consciousness (cf. Beynon, 1973; Cohen, 1982; Munck, 1988).

The study of daily forms of conflict has largely been confined to rural labour processes; while such forms of resistance have been neglected in studies on factory based struggles. Forms of class struggles such as output regulation, sabotage, absenteeism have not received adequate attention from industrial sociologists. Where such forms of struggles have been examined, they are treated generally as hidden and backward, or as a means of accommodation as opposed to conflict. Precisely because there is not enough recognition and acknowledgment of everyday forms of conflict the working class in Isithebe is seen as an easily exploitable work force. A few gaps, then, need to be filled in relation to the conceptualisation of the working class in Isithebe. Furthermore, the use of certain conceptions as regards working class resistance in Isithebe specifically and working class resistance in general need to be carefully considered.

Firstly, as the previous chapters point out, workers in Isithebe did challenge and oppose management. Workers are not passive and inert who easily accept employers' decisions. As was shown earlier, daily forms of struggles such as output regulation and sabotage affected the rate and intensity of production. Daily forms of struggle, generally, play an important role in shaping employee-employer relations and in influencing remuneration, benefits and wages.

Secondly, working class resistance cannot be narrowly defined as strikes, demonstrations and other more observable forms.

Thirdly, and related to the second, a stark and precise distinction cannot always be

drawn between the context and conditions in which so called hidden and overt struggles occur.

Fourthly, the concept hidden forms of struggle needs to be tested under specific socio-historical formations before it is accepted and applied. In this study the use of terms such as daily forms of struggle, day-to-day struggles and everyday forms of struggle have been used to define class struggle in Isithebe.

These issues are discussed in the first section of this chapter. This section begins with a definition and description of everyday class conflict in Isithebe. The discussions on resistance in the previous chapters dealt largely with organised workers. It will be shown that daily forms of struggles also exist in unorganised firms, thereby lending support to the view that such forms of struggles are weapons of the weak. However, daily forms of resistance are not restricted to unorganised workers. The previous chapter pointed out the existence of such forms of struggle in firms which were organised and the specific conditions under which they occurred. This section provides further examples for the occurrence of everyday forms of struggle in organised firms. Therefore, Cohen's analysis of the conditions which give rise to daily forms of struggles is restrictive and cannot be consistently applied across the case studies.

The existence of everyday forms of class struggles in organised firms has implications for the manner in which such struggles are conceived. Cohen conceives of them as hidden; as displaying a lower level of consciousness. This was not always the case in the firms I interviewed. Even in the unorganised firms where daily forms of struggle prevailed, they were often used with the intention of getting back at the supervisor. In firms which were organised, employers' recognition of trade unions was often the result of worker go-slows, sabotage etc. Careful consideration, then, must be given to the use of the term hidden forms of resistance in the analysis of class struggle in Isithebe.

This is further highlighted in the second section which deals with workers' use of everyday forms of class struggle to secure trade union recognition. It is argued that the

difficulties and obstacles faced by workers and COSATU to organise freely led to high instances of day-to-day struggles. At the time of conducting interviews labour relations in Isithebe were characterised by sharp divisions between workers and employers over the issue of unions, more specifically COSATU structures. In most firms workers fought hard with management before unions were recognised. Part of employers' anti-union position was the result of the lack of proper labour legislation which could have facilitated less of a brutal and bloody battle for workers and unions. Whilst the industrial decentralization policy provided for certain employer benefits it was largely silent on issues pertaining to workers' interests such as basic wage stipulations, the right to organise and join trades unions of their choice etc. This contributed to the hostility and conflict in the area, and had encouraged the high level of certain forms of daily struggle.

A further factor which influenced conflict between workers and employers was the image that the latter had of COSATU. Employers saw COSATU as inciting violence, encouraging strikes and the congress was closely associated with communism. Therefore, when UWUSA was launched employers saw it as an alternative to COSATU and a solution to the question of unionisation. These issues are discussed in section three. After COSATU unions arrived at agreements on unionisation employers encouraged the presence of UWUSA-INKATHA members in the factories to prevent support for COSATU. It is argued that employers union bashing tactics led to the occurrence of daily forms of struggle. Workers engaged in go-slows, sabotage, work stoppages and the like to express their anger at employers for favouring UWUSA and preventing COSATU from organising freely. As will be shown the battle between COSATU and UWUSA for control led to violence and bloodshed in Isithebe and the surrounding area.

EVERYDAY FORMS OF CLASS STRUGGLES

Everyday class struggles refers to the day-to-day struggles of workers (as discussed in the previous chapter). The term everyday class struggles is borrowed from Scott's (1983) study of daily peasant resistance in Malaysia. His interest is particularly with struggles such as "foot dragging; dissimulation; false compliance; pilfering; sabotage; character assassination, and other forms of struggles short of outright collective defiance" (Scott, 1983: 538). Scott's work is based on the changes brought about by the Green Revolution in Sunghi Buhur, Malaysia. With the introduction of double-cropping, new tenure systems and combined harvesting the nature of labour processes changed and the new social relations of production eroded the traditional client-patron relations. The changes in the labour processes and in the relations of production caused severe class tensions between the rich and poor in Sunghi Bujur. Hence, the development of various forms of daily class struggles.

Likewise, Beinart and Bundy's analysis of struggles in rural Transkei and Eastern Cape, stems from the "admonition to identify 'day-to-day' struggles and not to restrict the notion of resistance to its larger, more organized forms" (Beinart and Bundy, 1987: 29). The study of the less dramatic forms of resistance has largely been based on rural labour processes and in peasant resistance. The analysis of factory based resistance has placed greater emphasis on strikes and more dramatic forms of protest.

An analysis of working class resistance in the factories in Isithebe during the 1980s and early 1990s has to recognize the importance of daily and less dramatic forms of class struggles. Forms of resistance such as absenteeism; stealing; output regulation; sabotage are, as was argued in the previous chapter, a reaction to the antagonistic social relations of production under capitalism. These forms of resistance are often not viewed as resistance, or are interpreted as backward and indicative of a low consciousness. They are rarely given much consideration in the writings on worker struggles. In the main,

work on African labour issues have tended to concentrate on the more overt and dramatic issues and forms of protest. As a result, the more typical acts of resistance are overlooked or ignored. The notion of resistance, however, has to be less narrowly defined in terms of strikes, demonstrations, etc. to encompass the "total range of behaviour and attitudes that express opposition and divergent orientations between industrial owners and managers on the one hand and working people and their organizations on the other hand" (Hyman, 1975: 186).

Empirical work in Isithebe shows that, what managers and supervisors described as 'stubborn' or 'lazy' behaviour and attitudes of workers, were reflections of daily struggles such as output regulation, absenteeism, sabotage, getting sick on the job. It is commonly believed that such forms of resistance are largely weapons of the weak and unorganized sections of the working class (Cohen, 1982). To be sure, certain manifestations of day-to-day conflict are prevalent in those firms that were not unionized. They also often tended to be individual rather than collective. Worker defiance and opposition in the unorganized factories from my sample, were often aimed at supervisors and foremen whose only function was to maintain control. As Marx argued:

"An industrial army of workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires, like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants (foremen, overlookers), who, while the work is being done command in the name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function" (Marx, 1967: 332).

In certain instances day-to-day struggles were representative of worker opposition to supervisors. When I asked a male supervisor in Co.7 if it was easy to work with female workers, he replied:

"These ones [workers], I don't understand them. They are always sewing

something wrong and they hide it away in places that are hard to find. I think they like it when I have to run around looking for the piece. When it is found and I shout at them for sewing it wrong, they just laugh. I don't know what is wrong [with] them" (supervisor, Co.7: 1990).

The same supervisor also related further incidents of worker non-compliance:

"To irritate me, a female will suddenly put her head down, in front of the machine. I will go to her and ask her over and over what is wrong. I will try and make...her work. She gives me no reply. A man, it is very frustrating. After a while she will say 'I am tired, leave me alone. You are also tired, but you don't want to say' (supervisor, Co.7: 1990).

Another example is Co.9:

"These workers... make lots of trouble for you. If you have to reach a target say a 100 pieces at a time, and if there is a breakdown in a machine, they will never, ever report it to you... [Y]ou will have to go and see for yourself, why the production is not coming out smoothly on the line. They don't listen. The thing is that they don't listen and they hold up production. [Workers] are so stubborn... We tell the machinists that they must come at once to tell us when the machines breakdown. Do you think they do this? They won't. I will tell the machine mechanic to please come check the machine, there is a machine breakdown. He will tell me 'I fixed it in the morning. Undiyse, I don't know. I don't have a mechanical breakdown'. But I can see that the machine is not working. The mechanic will tell me to go talk to the machinist. I go to the machinist and she will say 'undiyse, I don't know why the machine is not running'. They make it difficult to work sometimes" (supervisor, Co.9: 1991).

These forms of resistance epitomize workers' abilities to exert the predominance of

their interests over those of management, in the attempts to create breaks away from the monotonous, tedious and alienating character of their work. They are also a clear demonstration that everyday forms of struggles, under certain conditions, have well intended aims even among non-unionised workers. Furthermore, they are crucial manifestations of the underlying currents of tension and conflict between capitalists and workers, embodied within the contradictory social relations of production.

In Co.12, female workers feign illness and according to the production manager are on 'a permanent go-slow', while much the same process of output regulation prevails in Co.8 and Co.10. In Co.13 and Co.14 daily class struggles are non-existent. In Co.13, however, "workers sometimes take their time when they have to change the yarn" (supervisor, Co.13: 1990). The lack of every-day forms of resistance is influenced by the type of labour processes and the nature of the employer-employee relationships in these companies (refer previous chapter).

It is, however, grossly misleading to assume that the recognition of trade unions is concomitant with the decline of daily class struggles. Contrary to Cohen's notion of hidden struggles as tools of the weak and unorganized, the case-studies in this research show, that daily class struggles were actively engaged in by workers who were very strongly unionized and with a strong and militant trade union consciousness. Management in a number of firms that feature in this work corroborated the view that worker militancy had increased upon being unionized and that absenteeism; sabotage; coming late to work; stealing, persisted and in some instances had increased. Empirical work, in fact, reflects the widespread occurrence and variety of daily class conflict in unionized firms, as opposed to un-unionized firms. It was also not uncommon to find collective daily conflict in the former. Skilled workers, for example line supervisors, team leaders or indunas, who are not union members had a somewhat strained relationship with the rest of the work-force. For example:

"You know, they fool around with you. It is very, very difficult. They make

absolute fools of you. Nobody will listen to you in the factory. Not one girl... from the operator to the cleaning girl. If you ask them why is this section not clean?, it is your job to clean the factory in the mornings. She will tell you 'it is cold', and she will go and sit down in a corner" (supervisor, Co.4: 1991).

A supervisor from Co.2 also said that:

"Workers always try to make us look stupid. When you talk to them, they look here and there, they ignore the supervisor. Some operators don't talk to you. They say that they don't understand English. They pretend that they don't know what you are saying. But when you meet them outside the factory they will talk to you in English. And they know when we swear them. You just have to swear one and the whole section will stop work" (supervisor, Co.2: 1991).

Rebellious and challenging behaviour, involving collective action were utilized to alter certain conditions in the factory. Consider the following incident at Co.4.

"We have a tea-break at 9:30 and a lunch-break at 12-30 to 1 pm From 1 pm to 5 pm workers don't have any break, nothing. But the supervisors and the quality controllers always go from 3 pm to have tea... We don't like that. We don't want anybody to have tea from 3p.m. because we don't get that break. Management said that it was the law, that supervisors and quality controllers must get a tea-break. I told them that we are not worried about that law. If it is a law then you must accept that everyone in the factory must get a tea-break. He (line supervisor) refused. I then said to him that we must now take legal steps. He said 'no, no, don't take legal steps. Wait for me I shall solve the problem'. He called all the supervisors and told them 'because you joined the union, the union said that you must not have tea at 3'. I went to him and said 'it is not the union that said that. It is *us, the workers*'".

According to the shop-steward, the line supervisor gave workers the assurance that all afternoon tea-breaks for supervisory staff will be terminated.

"But, he talks lies. The supervisors and the quality controllers used to go into the managers office and have tea. I saw this and told the workers. The workers stood up. They said 'we only want tea'. *We stopped work for the rest of the afternoon.* Now the whole factory works from 1p.m. to 5p.m. - no break" (shop-steward, Co.4: 1989).

Managers in the clothing sector complained the most about "troublesome workers" (manager, Co.6, 1990), and:

"Couple of rotten ones, who always like to start trouble. You know, in a sly way they will start. Why is this one getting more [wages] than me. Then they will go-slow and they won't want to push production" (manager, Co.4: 1990).

In Co.1 workers:

"Are never satisfied. They must complain - Oh! the work-study man is asking for too much. Why can't he do it. They make all kinds of unnecessary demands. They want telephones and they want their mail delivered to the factory. They must complain about something" (manager, Co.1: 1990).

In addition, to the above, there existed everyday struggles that directly effected production such as, output regulation, late-coming, absenteeism sabotage of machines and feigning illness, as in 'fifiyan' (see previous chapter).¹ The nature of the labour processes in clothing and textiles; the fact that large segments of the work-force are compelled to work at the same pace and intensity, under direct supervision, and, where a certain level of homogeneity in skills prevails; determined and influenced the high incidents of daily class conflict.

Output regulation, late-coming and absenteeism were also characteristic features of mainly, although not exclusively, unskilled worker opposition in the metal, engineering, food, chemical, wood and paper sectors. Those employed as semi-skilled labour, and where the pace of work was determined by machines, resorted to sabotage as well as other forms described above. Absenteeism in these sectors, as in clothing, was also high and widespread across the firms interviewed. A NUMSA organiser admitted that in fact:

"It has increased. For example at [Co.A], the management called me in to show me the attendance chart. Only 10% come to work on Mondays and Fridays, because they get paid on Thursday. The problem there is with the new employer. The old one has been transferred. The new one does not have any industrial relations. He handles matters in his own way... He told me to speak to the workers about this. When I approached workers with this matter, they became very angry. They told me to get out of the factory - 'voetsek, you can't tell us that. That is what management is saying'" (Mr.I, NUMSA: 1990).

A closely related pattern of resistance is the maximum utilization of sick-leave, or what managers argue is the abuse of sick-leave. Mr. Z, another NUMSA organiser said:

"Workers are entitled to two weeks sick leave. Workers in many of the factories take the sick-leave, even if they are not sick. The employers say that workers are abusing the sick-leave. Now when we try to explain it from management's point of view, the workers will simply tell you that 'we have a right to that, there is nothing to discuss. Finish!'" (Mr.Z, NUMSA: 1990).

Managers were forced to seek out mechanisms, sometimes being quite creative, in order to decrease absenteeism. The manager in Co.TP, for example, explained that:

"We have a big problem with absenteeism. Suddenly we will have a high rate of absenteeism. Workers use their sick leave... We find that in the first half of

the year absenteeism is very high. Much more than in the second half of the year. Now they feel that even if they are not sick they are entitled to sick-leave... We started a sort of a raffle. Those people with 100% attendance, their names go into a hat. Out of this hat a name will be drawn and prize awarded. The prize works out to R5 a person of the number of people who had 100% attendance for the month. So If we had 60 people who attended work every-day, it [prize] will be R300" (manager, Co.TP: 1990).²

A considerable number of employers in organized and unorganized firms advanced that heavy drinking over week-ends was largely responsible for absenteeism on a Monday. As one remarked: "These fellows, they drink themselves to death on the week-ends" (production manager, KIC: 1987). Closely related to alcohol consumption was dagga smoking. Almost invariably drug use reflects a form of psychological resistance, and a form of escapism from unrewarding work experiences. During lunch-breaks at Co.SI, "workers will jump the fences to buy zol" (owner, Co.SI: 1990). The manageress at Co.G said that workers smoke on the factory floor.

"All the African workers smoke zol. They bring it to work. [During] lunch-breaks they will make a cigarette, then they will go around the steel, make a fire and smoke it" (Mr.A, Apex Foundry: 1991).

Another firm where dagga-smoking is pervasive is Lenings.

"There [are] drugs. Workers do it discreetly in the toilets. Management is not so hard. But if they see people smoking they will dismiss them. Lots of African workers, especially, smoke it up. I don't blame them with that fuckin dust in the foundry; at least they got something to keep them going" (Mr.I, Lenings: 1991).

Drug-related forms of resistance, predominated among men, just as 'fifiyan' among women in clothing and textile. In Co.8, smoking while at work is seen as one of the

reasons for machines breaking (Mr.C, Co.8: 1991). Nevertheless, certain forms of everyday class struggles permeated a number of firms in the different sectors. The most common forms of resistance were output regulation, absenteeism, drug consumption and sabotage. Each one of these, together with the other weapons of struggle discussed earlier, relate and manifest the experiences of the contradictions of capitalist relations of productions and the drudgery of work embodied therein. However, sabotage and machine breakages are symptomatic of the alienating and overwhelming force of the machine. The destruction of machines has a history of resistance that goes far back to the Luddites, the English weavers, who destroyed looms during the second decade of the nineteenth century.

Machine breakages associated with Luddism was at the time viewed with disdain and regarded as senseless violence (Wasserstrom, 1987: 680-681).³ Similarly in Isithebe, employers "Just cannot understand why they have to break the machines and needles" (Mr.B, Co.AM: 1990). The works of Wasserstrom, Hobsbawm and E.P. Thompson have defended Luddism, referring to it as "collective bargaining by riot". Luddism cannot be easily dismissed as undirected random attacks on machinery. Both old and new machinery of employers' who were seen as unjust were attacked. In addition to this machine breakage was one of the most effective ways of collective worker action before the advent of unions. Although in Isithebe, machine destruction did not assume the 'collective bargain by riot' form, elements of Luddism were most commonly reflected in the individual acts of machine sabotage, at the point of production. The working class in a number of different industries and nations have begun to uncover the technique of machine breaking, and to view it as a useful tool for "waking up apathetic union leaders, meeting threats posed by technological innovations implemented without their approval, gaining concessions from management, expressing anger or some combination of the above" (Wasserstrom, 1987: 692).

In certain firms in Isithebe "Machines break down a lot. You need a little pressure to release the machines. Often the guys will use so much force that the machines break"

(Mr. A, Apex Foundry: 1991). Class conflict of such a nature, represents an unconscious questioning of and opposition to the technical relations of production; although in many instances, the immediate act of sabotage has well intended aims. Various acts of machine destruction as a form of everyday class conflict are crucial precisely because they have opened questions on the purpose of machines and the extent to which they serve human needs. What the Luddites challenged and questioned in the first industrial revolution, has gained popularity with the coming of the "second industrial revolution. At the centre of such a debate, are doubts over the innate goodness of uncontrolled technological advance" (Wasserstrom, 1987: 691).⁴ As Wasserstrom argues, for us to regain the ability of machines serving human needs, we have to recover the ability of the Luddites of "treating both new and existing technologies as things we have the power and the right to dismantle depending on whether they will serve those needs" (Wasserstrom, 1987: 698).

What then do everyday class struggles say about worker consciousness? Do they represent a hidden level of consciousness and if so is it easily and precisely distinguishable from overt consciousness? For Cohen hidden struggles reflect a subterranean consciousness. Hidden forms of consciousness are different from overt consciousness in that the latter "represents an extant, readily observed, open and self-aware form of consciousness... This is what the proletariat thinks, believes - imagines - to be its aim" (Cohen, 1982: 257). As was argued in chapter three and as the above examples reflect, day-to-day struggles, whether of an individual or collective nature, often stemmed from a conscious effort on the part of workers to resist managerial/supervisory control and demands. Daily struggles need not be reflective of a subterranean consciousness. They have well intended purposes and aims - to get back at the supervisor or to take a break. Workers in Isithebe were well aware of the consequences of their actions - the halting or disruption of production.

THE ARTICULATION OF EVERYDAY CLASS STRUGGLES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR UNION RECOGNITION

That everyday struggles are symbolic of concrete aims and demands is vindicated by the fact that they have been implemented in order to achieve union recognition, to settle wage disputes and to protect union recognitions. As was argued earlier, an examination of the context within which COSATU trade unions emerged in Isithebe, and the obstacles therein, are crucial for a deeper appreciation of the determination, cogency and escalation of everyday forms of class struggles in Isithebe, during the 1980s. From its earliest inception, COSATU had sustained a series of harassments, as well as, brutal and violent attacks from an alliance of capital, INKATHA and UWUSA and the state. Union bashing strategies and the assault on the working class had formed the basis for an intensification of day-to-day class conflict and worker militancy on the shop-floor in Isithebe.

A number of inter-related factors account for employers anti-union sentiments, more especially towards COSATU. Fundamental to the union bashing process was the role of the South African state, as it actively constitutes and reproduces the dominant relations of production. The state "concentrates, condenses, materialises and incarnates politico-ideological relations in a form specific to the given mode of production" (Poulantzas, 1978: 27). As Poulantzas argues, understanding the state as a social relation, and situating it within the relations of production, allows for an appreciation of its presence in the class struggle. The state's role in attempting to secure and maintain exploitative relations of production in Isithebe was embodied in the non-existence of South African labour legislation, which legitimized the existence and the right for unions to operate. Nor did it make provisions for basic wage stipulations and other

worker benefits, which have been fought for and established in urban areas. In fact the Decentralisation Policy, as formulated by the NP and implemented jointly with INKATHA had created the impression that Isithebe "is an open field" as Mr. M, a NUMSA representative put it.

Mr. M explained that:

"In 1981 the Kwa-Zulu government accepted the amendments that have been made to the labour relations act, after Wiehahn. They accepted the amendments but not the act itself. This was very stupid, because they were sitting with the amendments but no legislation... They could do nothing with the amendments. Apart from this there is also the 1956 Bantu Legislation which was provided. [It stipulated] that blacks were not allowed to become members of unions. They could not take any case to court. The only case that can be taken to court are victimizations. Even then it was so very difficult, because the courts did not know whether they had jurisdiction in the area. So the situation was... completely difficult" (Mr. M, NUMSA: 1990).

In 1982, regional representatives of COSATU, had asked the Kwa-Zulu government to extend South African legislation to Isithebe. An added impetus were fears that the then Kwa-Zulu government might introduce clauses in its own legislation, compelling the registration of unions in the area, as in Bophuthatswana (Green, 1986: 86). In February 1988 such fears were justified, when the Kwa-Zulu government passed an act which was promulgated on April 1st 1989.

The COSATU affiliates found this legislation and registration problematic in terms of its constitution. Section 12.4 (a) of the act, for example, stipulated that for unions to operate in the Isithebe, they must have their office in Kwa-Zulu. Mr. M elaborates that registration entailed:

"Recognition of the home-land system, which the democratic unions oppose. It would also require that COSATU changes its constitution. Further, it means that those COSATU unions operating in South Africa and those in Isithebe would be functioning separately from each other" (Mr. M, NUMSA: 1989).

The other major problem embodied in the act was the racial composition of trade unions, which were repealed after the Wiehahn commission. In terms of the Kwa-Zulu Labour Relations Act

"Each race group must form its own trade union. Only in cases where the race is small, will they be allowed to inter-link with another race group. So this labour relations act prevents non racial trade unions, which we think is a grave mistake" (Mr. M, NUMSA: 1989).

However the implications of non-registration, in terms of section 83.4(a) of the legislation, meant that the collection of stop-order deductions from factories would be a violation of the act. An additional implication of non-registration was that unions were not able to make use of section 39 of the legislation. This meant that unions were not in position to make applications to the Minister to set up conciliation boards, nor were they able to get the court to make orders concerning unfair labour practices.

It is clear that this legislation was a direct attack on COSATU by INKATHA, and was intended to frustrate progressive unions attempts to organize the working class. As we discussed in the first chapter INKATHA's ardent support of the 'free enterprise' system, is an active and direct stimulant of its anti-COSATU position. The inception of progressive trade unions in Isithebe in 1982, then under FOSATU, presented a major challenge to INKATHA's legitimization of "super-exploitative" (Mr.S, PPAWU: 1989) relations of production, and Buthelezi's guarantee to employers of a cheap and docile pool of labour. The first union to start organising in Isithebe was NUMSA, then MAWU (Metal and Allied Workers Union). The other unions, ACTWUSA, now SACTWU;

PPAWU; FAWU; CAWU and CWIU (Chemical Workers Industrial Union) began operating in the area between 1986 and 1987.

The promulgation of the Kwa-Zulu Labour Legislation, resulted in the difficult and hard line attitudes adopted by employers, in that they were equipped to delay and in some instances prevent the recognition of COSATU and its efforts to organize in the factories. According to Mr. M:

"When we started organizing under MAWU, it was never easy. The situation in Isithebe at that point in time was so difficult because it is a decentralized point, where employers are allowed to go in and exploit in whatever way they liked" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

In addition:

"Employers argued that the unions had no right to operate... The basis was that they were going to get a stable work-force in Isithebe. The Zulus they were told are a stable work-force" (Mr.S, PPAWU: 1989).

Hence for workers in Isithebe, getting involved within COSATU structures meant becoming embroiled in a long bitter battle for union recognition and concomitant wage increases, with capital and the state.

An example of this difficult battle is the case of Co.BR. In May 1987 the company dismissed eight NUMSA shop stewards. They were accused of intimidating non-union members and supervisors. Co.BR. refused to discuss the dismissals with the union, thereby ignoring a preliminary agreement reached with NUMSA. The company "Was saying that because it was not signed it was not legally binding on both parties" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1989). However, management's hard attitude clashed with the solidarity and comradeship of the rest of the work-force, who staged a thirty minute work-stoppage,

to protest against the unfair dismissals and Co.BR.'s refusal to talk with the union. Management reacted by:

"Removing... workers from the factory with the aid of the police. Workers were told that they are going to be dismissed for taking part in an illegal gathering. Workers were then selectively re-employed,... the active union members were not" (Mr.M, NUMSA:1989).

After years of struggle NUMSA finally concluded the recognition agreement in 1990 with Co.BR. Lennings Manganese is another company that gave NUMSA endless problems. The union started organizing in the company in 1985, but was able to conclude the recognition agreement only in 1989. Mr.T, a machine operator in Lennings takes up the story.

"We joined MAWU. Management had a tactic of ducking and diving. They said that they can see that the forms have been signed by workers, but that they were threatened to do so. They said the best thing is for workers to sign in front of him. He thought we would be afraid to sign in front of him. We knew what we wanted. We wanted an end to unfair dismissals. Management just can't hire and fire. We did not know how many warnings a worker must get before being fired. The foremen, those people who are not educated, not civilized, always shout at workers; telling us 'kom, kom, kom'... When we are tired, at the end of the day between 4 and 5, we get sluggish, but we work. These were the problems. So we joined the union" (Mr.T, Lennings: 1991).

Mr.T recalls how they:

"Forced management to accept the union. They refused in the beginning, but we had work-stoppages. Our lunch breaks are from 12 am to 12.30 am We used to take 12 am to 1.00 pm. We used to force the general manager to come out of his

office and face the workers. We used to say, 'you make us listen to you. Now you must listen to us. You must recognize our union'. Management turned a deaf ear to our grievances, so we went on go-slows and sabotaged production. Once for the whole day nothing was produced, except in the finishing department, where they handle products from the previous day. Workers added water in the chemicals and that fucked up production. When production started nothing came out. Management realized something was wrong. They sent the chemicals to the lab, and then they realized something was wrong with it. They had to drain all the chemicals and buy new ones. The go-slows were well planned by a group of workers. In the morning we tell few people what is going on and what to do. We could not tell everyone, because of being betrayed. And sabotaging the machines was very high in 1989". (Mr.T, Lennings: 1991)

The increase in sabotage arose from a wage dispute which took five months to settle. Mr.M said that:

"In 1988 we reached an agreement with the company that the union will negotiate wages. Our members were demanding a R1 across the board increase. The company made an unacceptable offer of 17c for the lowest paid; 28c, 30c, according to grades. But these figures were terrible. We reached a deadlock" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

Hence:

"There were so many work-stoppages and [incidents of] of sabotage, I can't tell you how many, [while] workers in the maintenance department conducted go-slows. When workers sabotaged the machines, they [maintenance department] used to take time on the machine, so that production is slow. Management used to jack up the maintenance department head; saying to him 'You must pull up your socks, most of these machines are broken'. Management

did not know that it was our intention to fuck them up" (Mr.T, Lennings: 1991).

These everyday forms of class conflict were a result of Lennings delaying tactics to recognize NUMSA and the company's attitude towards the wage negotiations. Now a very similar process was at work in Henred Freuhauf.

"We had a big problem in this company. They had the record number of work stoppages, some lasting more than 24 hours. The company said at the time that because of this, they were not prepared to talk to the union. The work stoppages are a result of a number of issues, but the main one was provocation from management. You would find that an individual would be provoked into a fight by a member of management and afterwards the company will dismiss our union member. This was the kind of situation workers were exposed to. Due to the militancy of the workers there were a number of work stoppages... The GM of the company, Mr. Matthews is one of those tough guys, who is not prepared to talk or listen to the shop stewards" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

Related to this was also the issue of wage increases. Mr.S, who is employed as a welder and who is also a NUMSA shop steward explained that:

"During that time we approached management. As shop stewards we were always sent to management to discuss the recognition of NUMSA, wages and working conditions. He [Matthews] used to say he is not well; or he is going to Jo'burg, or town or abroad. He was trying to avoid us. The workers got tired of sending us [shop stewards] to him. They were saying that it is better for him to meet them in the canteen to discuss our grievances. But he kept on running away. So we went on go-slows and sit-ins for couple of hours. Supervisors used to tell us to chase the scores. *To make a hundred cast irons in 2 hours. We will only give them two instead of hundred.* At last they realized that they had to deal with us, they had to speak to the union, because most of the orders were not

going out. Matthews had to face us even though it was hard for him" (Mr.S, Henred Freuhauf: 1991).

Yet again at the KIC plant (where NUMSA, at the time of conducting interviews, was battling for union recognition) workers staged a work stoppage early 1989 precisely because of management's hard line towards shop stewards in the factory. Organisers explained that

"After we wrote to the company telling them that we have membership in the factory and that we wanted to negotiate with them about representing those workers, the company started to harass union members - giving them warnings" (Mr.Z, NUMSA: 1990).

In this respect the company issued retrenchment notices to 150 union members, stating that due to "economic reasons" they would be retrenched the following Friday. Sympathetic supervisors in the plant had however informed NUMSA members that the company's targets were union members. This angered the membership who then downed tools. According to Mr.M:

"Our members then approached Mr. Palmer the managing director, asking him if this information was correct, and if this is the way the company would like to retrench workers for economic reasons. Mr. Palmer did not want to discuss the issue - in fact he said that they had all committed an illegal gathering, after which he closed the factory saying that he would only re-employ within 7 days" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1989).

Workers at KIC were demanding: (a) their union NUMSA must be recognized by the company; and (b) that the company stops its intimidatory actions against shop stewards and union members. After a tremendous amount of pressure from the union, the company re-employed people, selectively. But, as Mr.M stressed:

"They started to retrench, using the same, old story and they were going for the union members. Out of 25 shop stewards, 19 were dismissed with only 6 left. All negotiations with the company have been futile, because Mr. Palmer is one of those people who is not prepared to talk to the union" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1989).

A meeting was then chaired by Mr. Palmer. "It was held in his private club - the Mandini Country club. At this meeting he explained why he does not want any meeting with NUMSA" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1989). According to Mr.M, Mr. Palmer asserted that:

"We (union) are one of the terrorist organizations who threaten the lives of people. NUMSA has intimidated a number of his managers and line supervisors. So he does not believe talking to us is worth while".

He had apparently dismissed other employers who advised him that he could be causing severe problems for the area, retorting that: "He does not care - if problems arise they will be sorted out then" added a shop steward. It is alleged that this meeting was attended by an unknown group, carrying guns, which raised the concern of industries where NUMSA had recognition agreements. Mr.M takes up the story:

"The pro-COSATU industries walked out in protest because of the hostility towards the union. They immediately informed us about the nature of this meeting, warning that the unknown group was in fact members of the special branch. These people in fact re-iterated Mr. Palmer's views, saying that the unions are going to make this place totally and completely uncontrollable. They further stated that they suspect the occurrence of terror actions in the future".

Subsequently KIC refused to talk to the union.

Precisely as a result of the non-existence of a proper and acceptable Labour Relations

Act, together with the capitalists' hatred for COSATU, the unions had:

"To devise certain strategies to organize in the area, which [are] different from other areas. We had to come up with a strategy to suit the particular conditions" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

This was also prompted by the loss NUMSA suffered in 1984 when companies such as Mintex, Kempar, Co.E, Co.F, Castle Lead, Unitex, Inkuzi Foundry and others withdrew their membership with NUMSA. According to Mr.M, the primary reason for this loss was:

"The high speed in which we first started organizing. We showed management workers' strength and the fact the unions were becoming a dangerous weapon. We must remember that most of these companies ran away from the urban areas to the decentralized points like Isithebe, in order to avoid paying higher wages, in order to avoid paying wages that are prescribed in industrial council agreements... So what happened is this: with the high level of organizing and the speed at which we were running, we were organizing a number of factories at the same time; all this created the opportunity for employers to meet and strategise on how they can smash the unions " (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

A much slower and cautious organizing strategy with the use of collective worker action was implemented. The aim was to target each and every company, starting with those who are bigger and more strategic; concluding recognition agreements with one company at a time because:

"We will lessen the chances of those employers who are strategizing against us. It would be very difficult to target us if we are dealing with one firm at a time... We also had to rely on workers strength. Mainly because there was no labour protection, we were very unsure, we had to depend on our members' strength.

That strength was to say that, if we've got a problem in a particular factory, then we will mobilize all members in other factories [that are] organized. To take action and to apply pressure on their employers, who will then apply pressure on the particular factory where we are having problems. Employers have to get pressure from other employers if we are to solve anything. This was the only way" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

Class conflict assumed the form of regular collective work stoppages and strikes in order to apply pressure on problematic employers. According to Mr.M these work stoppages were organized in the following manner:

"We used to have meetings with shop stewards every afternoon. When we wanted to organize a form of action we will call a meeting of all factories the day before the intended day of action. At that time we were using the Roman Catholic Church hall... We were able to get our members together. We were able to take common decisions and agree on what forms of action, how they should be implemented and at what time... The work stoppages were a well co-ordinated [form of action]".

An example of the planning and co-ordination that went into class action is manifested in the following:

"The Kempar strike was well organized. Before the strike there was pressure on management. However the employer was really pig-headed, so it became really difficult. Workers had work stoppages and go-slows, and then they went on strike. Immediately after workers went on strike , we got members from other factories to strike on one day in April 1984. Management at Kempar was forced to sit down and talk to the union". (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

These examples represent the intense class conflict in Isithebe which arose out of certain

conditions that INKATHA and certain capitalists hoped to maintain and safe-guard. Hence the promulgation of the Kwa-Zulu Labour Legislation and the non-registration of COSATU gave employers the space and justification to evade and frustrate the unions. Employer attitude, together with labour market and labour process conditions were the main basis for the high level of worker militancy and solidarity. They had also been fundamental in raising worker consciousness and sharpening the divide between labour and capital.

Much the same tendencies prevailed in the clothing sector, prior to the signing of recognition agreements with SACTWU. Like their comrades in the metal sector, workers in clothing forced the issue of SACTWU's recognition and wage negotiations onto employers. Pressure on employers was applied through the use of work stoppages, go-slows, sabotage and strikes. As Mr.E said:

"It was the only way we could get managers to sit down and talk to us. Workers were militant as ever because of managers delaying tactics and their refusal to deal with the union" (Mr.E, SACTWU: 1990).

An example is the struggle of workers at Co.2. Production stopped at the beginning of 1988, over an issue that happened at the end of 1987. Workers in the factory refused to work unless they were paid an entire week's wages, and unless SACTWU, then ACTWUSA, was recognized by management. Mr. N, SACTWU organiser relates the events.

"Workers were to have gone on their Christmas holiday on Friday the fifteenth - they were to have gone to work on Friday, get paid for that day as well, before their year-ending party. Management then decided to change the closing day to Thursday the fourteenth, without mentioning anything in a change of pay. Only when workers received their pay did they realize that had been paid only until Thursday. When they went back to the factory in 1988, they refused to work"

(Mr.N, SACTWU: 1989).

Management's initial response was to fire all workers. ACTWUSA however managed to

"Track down the owner of the company, who was holidaying in Singapore at the time. The issue made headlines in the newspapers overseas, and he was confronted by foreign journalists" (Mr.N, SACTWU: 1989).

This compelled management to rehire, although selectively, and they also agreed to meet workers' demands.

However management made it compulsory for workers to sign a contract in order to qualify for employment. The contract was intended to control, bind and curb worker militancy and resistance. For example, in terms of the grievance procedure, workers space to protest is limited to the confines of the factory. A problem in terms of the contract, must first be taken to the supervisor. If the person is still not satisfied, he/she can take the case to the chief supervisor "until the problem has been solved". In addition to this the contract compelled workers into agreeing to be ordered to do anything that the supervisor wants done, working overtime, agreeing not to steal, not to negotiate wages increases, to accept working conditions and working hours. The contract serves none other than the needs of capital to stamp out opposition and enhance control over workers. Management with the use of this contract, had declared solidarity strike action, or any other action that deviates from the stipulated procedures as illegal. In a very real sense these stipulations negated the role and functions of trade unions by undermining their space for collective bargaining. It marked an attempt to render the purpose of SACTWU as null and void. When management was questioned about this I was told that "we do not worry about that now" (manager, Co.2: 1990). Precisely because of worker militancy and the cogency of daily struggles, this contract has been disregarded.

SACTWU's battle with the clothing employers assumed a slightly different course from that of NUMSA. Whereas in the metal sector, employers actively used the non-registration of unions as a weapon against NUMSA, clothing manufacturers banded together to form the ICMA. The ICMA presented a huge obstacle to ACTWUSA's ability to conclude any recognition agreements with its members. The association insisted that the:

"Union gets a 50 plus 1% majority within the association. It was an impossible task in the beginning because, employers belonging to the association refused to disclose the numbers of workers employed" (Mr.E, SACTWU: 1990).

ACTWUSA, however, continued to apply pressure on these employers primarily through work stoppages, go-slows and strikes. Management responded by calling for a meeting with KFC. Five industrialists representing the ICMA, met with the KFC, who apparently paid for their chartered flight to Ulundi. The ICMA threatened to withdraw from the area, if the KFC did not get rid of COSATU. Consequently the KFC sent COSATU a letter evicting them from the Apex building. In addition, the use of the Kajee building in Stanger, which NUMSA and PPWAWU used as offices, had been withdrawn in June 1988. Nevertheless, ACTWUSA continued to pressurize employers in the association. After a series of delaying tactics the union managed to secure an industrial wide recognition agreement with the association, early in 1989. "What this really means", Mr.E insisted:

"Is that we will be able to bargain collectively on wages in the industry for the entire work-force, employed by members of the ICMA - provided we can get a majority membership within the industry. Only if we can demonstrate a majority at the factory level, will they offer us organization facilities - stop order deductions and so on. But it still does not mean that we can negotiate for wages on a plant level" (Mr.E, SACTWU: 1990).

SACTWU has subsequently been able to organize and recruit in these factories and in those outside of the association.

Workers in the paper and wood factories have also had to wage a formidable battle with employers. Mr.S said "We have to deal with employers that do not understand anything about how we function, and what our aims are". An example is Ply Products. The company said that:

"They are not interested in talking to the unions, because they cannot expose their workers to COSATU, which intimidates workers and organizes strikes, which result in job losses" (Mr, S, PPWAWU: 1989).

What followed was a lengthy struggle, culminating in a strike. Workers demanded the recognition of PPWAWU, and, the dismissal of an UWUSA supporter, employed as a supervisor, who encouraged UWUSA members to attack members of PPWAWU. Management's response was typical - mass dismissal. The following day they re-employed selectively. Nevertheless, after a long drawn out battle PPWAWU emerged victorious on October twenty-six 1988, when the union won an out of court settlement, reinstating all the dismissed workers. In addition: "Management now know the strength of workers. They know the workers are prepared to fight for the union. So they are now prepared to talk to us" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

It can be said that the pervasive and high level of daily class conflict discussed earlier on, were the result of workers' experiences of clashing and struggling with employers, sometimes over three or four years, for primarily union recognition and wages. Day-to-day class struggles have been used to pressurize employers to confront and concede to fundamental and basic worker demands, thereby, epitomizing power and effectiveness. The militancy gained and developed during this period of struggle, did not disappear in cases where COSATU had established itself on the shop-floor. In fact it is out of this struggle that daily class conflict in the form of output regulation;

absenteeism, stealing, sabotage of production and machines, arose. Certain daily class struggles such as go-slows, work stoppages, sabotage etc. had been effectively used in dealing with employers who attempted to use UWUSA supporters to destroy COSATU in the factories. We now turn to such a discussion.

THE BATTLE WITH A "TOOTHLESS DOG"

When UWUSA was launched, some employers felt that it would be a solution to their problems in the area. If there must unions in Isithebe, UWUSA can be used to replace COSATU structures.

"Where UWUSA does not have a presence, the existing COSATU structure must be destroyed in order to establish UWUSA in the factory" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

This is exactly what happened at Silver Ray Stationery. PPWU started organizing the factory soon after UWUSA's inception. The latter's presence was soon felt in the factory, when the supervisor started "employing UWUSA supporters, for the sole purpose of destroying the support we had in the factory", said Mr.S. Management rejected PPWAWU's claims of having a majority support, insisting that UWUSA had the majority. In July 1988, PPWAWU won a secret ballot, thereby forcing management to acknowledge and recognize the union's presence in the factory. Mr.S explained that the union secured this majority:

"When shop stewards in the factory approached the biggest UWUSA agitator in the factory and won her over onto our side. She was the very same person who beat people up and painted them in the name of UWUSA... [W]e were accused of dirty tactics, but this member had her COSATU T-shirt on days before the ballot" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

The belief that UWUSA was the solution to capital's problems as regards COSATU, was purely a managerial one. The actions management followed in executing this idea contributed significantly to the violence and intimidation in Sundumbili and Isithebe.

In December 1986:

"INKATHA and UWUSA seriously attacked NUMSA members in the area. The trouble started in Match Tube Systems [company]. Some individuals, about four of them, were recruited from Lindalani to come and organize for UWUSA in the factory. They attended a NUMSA meeting with tape recorders. Workers were very upset. They [said to] management: 'you know we are NUMSA members. We have a right to have this meeting. So we do not understand why these people have to bring tape recorders to our meeting'. We were recognized in the company, although at the time we were in the process of signing the [recognition] agreement. Workers in the factory were militant. They were demanding that those UWUSA people be fired. The company refused. Then there was a work stoppage. The mayor of Sundumbile, senior councillors and a senior guy from INKATHA... Mr. Gideon Zulu came to the factory. They said that our members in the factory were swearing at mtwana [leader] and that this was very serious. That is a direct insult to Buthelezi, who is mtwana. Workers ended the work stoppage, when management agreed that nobody will be allowed to carry tape recorders, and, they also agreed to give those UWUSA people final warnings. But afterwards a large batch of INKATHA impis were brought in from other areas to harass our members after work. On the seventh of December 1986, they started going in the township, beating people up, anybody and everybody they came across wearing a COSATU T-shirt... Many people were brought in from the Lindalani camp, the Amutikulu Youth Camp, from the Mandini Camp to beat up COSATU people" (Mr.M, NUMSA: 1990).

Co.B, Co.D and Co.I of the firms who were interviewed, also have on various occasions

used UWUSA supporters and or INKATHA warlords' presence directly in the factory to suppress worker militancy and to rid the factory of COSATU's presence. One very clear example is the case of Mr. Tshabala, who called himself a 'labour consultant' operating under the name of 'Amandla Usiswe Labour Consultant'. He was in fact a notorious INKATHA warlord, posing as a labour relations officer, who was deployed in Isithebe, to draw support away from COSATU and into UWUSA. He had arrived in Isithebe, in mid 1990, on the very day when workers in Co.D went on strike to demand recognition with NUMSA; and:

"He opened an office in the company. He told the workers that if they wanted to join to COSATU, they must look at what happened in Sebokeng. [That] there will be bloodshed here, just like there" (Mr.I, NUMSA: 1991).

I arrived at Co.D just after the strike, in the hope of acquiring a follow-up interview. I was met by a clearly livid production manager. "I have just had a strike, right now", he said.

"I just don't believe it. If that is the case we have to close up and go to Swaziland or Haiti or some place where the unions don't operate. Where people are prepared to work for what they get paid. Not like here. We are operating in third world labour conditions, and with a third world labour-force, who are demanding first world wages. I just can't do it... I called in the police and a member of INKATHA to sort the strikers out. It was a few of them, mostly the young ones. Most of them did not want to strike. The women were crying. They said they were forced to strike" (production manager, Co.D: 1990).

The INKATHA member called in to deal with the strikers was Tshabala, who in fact "intimidated workers with his preaching and their spirit deteriorated after this" according to Mr.I.

Tshabala, nevertheless continued with his mission. His next target was workers at Co.B. Mr.I traces the developments:

"He went to the works director in that factory and told him that because of his association with NUMSA, which is an unregistered trade union in Kwa-Zulu, the company must pay R10 000 to the Kwa-Zulu government, because there is a clause which states that an unregistered trade union cannot collect union dues... We [NUMSA] were then told by management that they will stop making stop-order deduction for the union. Marshall, the works director said that he will have to close the factory down, if he continued to make stop-order deductions... He was refusing to make the stop order deductions. Tshabala was even invited to address the workers and to open an office to recruit workers. On the first day, workers frustrated him. They kept on challenging him on who is going to represent them if they leave NUMSA... He could not answer them, and he suggested that he will come the next day. [However on the following day], nobody went to listen to him. But Tshabala kept on going to the factory".

Workers by this time had quite enough of Tshabala, so they restricted their output of production. Mr.I continued:

"We were called in by management to look at the computer printout of production scores. *It showed a drop from 80% to 5%.* Marshall gave us a copy of the printout to show the workers. He wanted us to ask the workers where the problem [lies]. Workers said they do not know what the problem is. They...[said] that Marshall bought the wrong type of [raw] material that is taking long to produce. Marshall was very confused. He asked us if there is such a thing as a 'technical' go-slow. He said supervisors are around the workers, they can see that they are busy, but at the end of the day nothing has been produced... Workers simply dropped the production from 80 to 5%. Marshall threatened to close the factory, workers told him to go ahead and close. He said he was going to

retrench, worker said 'go ahead and do it'. Then he said they were going on short-time, and workers said 'do it'. Workers were so very angry, because Marshall brought Tshabala to preach to them for more than four hours of production time; something which not even us as the recognized union in company has ever had. They were so angry. One night a group of workers... attacked Marshall in the factory. They sprayed him with tear-gas, and pushed him into the toilet. He cried like a baby. But he learnt the strength of workers" (Mr.I, NUMSA: 1990).

Where the working class is strongly unionized and where a high level of militancy exists, as was the case in Co.B, workers have used the power of daily conflict to effect changes in the factory. In Co.D on the other hand, workers were poorly organized. In addition, the level of repression and control revolved around the induna system (see chapter on labour process). The occurrence of everyday class conflict was, therefore, limited to output regulation and stealing, compared to Co.B where workers made use of these, and other forms with greater militancy.

Nevertheless, Tshabala represented one example of the union bashing strategy of UWUSA, INKATHA and employers towards progressive unions. In addition to this, INKATHA and UWUSA launched a series of violent attacks on COSATU and ANC members and organisers in the locations, in the efforts to exert their hegemony in Isithebe. The first of these assaults was INKATHA-UWUSA's role in the termination of COSATU's use of the Catholic Church hall in 1986. The unions were forced to relocate to another office after receiving anonymous calls threatening to burn the church down, if the unions remained on the premises. COSATU then operated from a shopping complex, whose owner received similar calls threatening to burn the complex down. As a result of this, COSATU at the time of conducting interviews had no offices in Isithebe. According to organisers, in 1986 a group of COSATU supporters:

"Were painted and sjamboked in Sundumbili and in the same year a NUMSA

member was shot dead. We think it could be INKATHA that did it. Workers who wear their COSATU T-shirts have them ripped off and most of these attacks occur in the township. We report these attacks to the Kwa-Zulu police, but nothing is done about them" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

People went on to say that the security police made regular visits to the union offices and had detained organisers in the past.

In April 1988, a pamphlet was distributed through out Sundumbili and Isithebe, entitled "We, COSATU, ANC, UDF and MAYCO are on the battle for the taxi fares of Mandini". It declared that all people belonging to these organizations call for the taxi-fares to be 30 cents and not 40 cents per trip, as was decided at a meeting between the workers and the Sundumbili Taxi Association. This pamphlet, a NUMSA organiser explained:

"Also condemned the Zulu chiefs and called for the downfall and overthrow of the Zulu nation. It claimed to have been issued by COSATU, the ANC, the UDF and MAYCO, but it did not have our logo; we were not responsible for such nonsense. This was an attempt to cause more trouble for COSATU and to discolour our image in Isithebe. We immediately responded by coming out with our own one, bearing our logo, and stating the truth about the matter" (Mr.Z, NUMSA: 1990).

Not long after this incident, on Sunday, May twenty-nine 1988, ACTWUSA, NUMSA and PPWAWU members were about to board a bus, which was to have taken them to Empangeni for a meeting. They were, however, surrounded by the chairperson of the Sundumbili Taxi Association, INKATHA, and UWUSA members, who it is alleged, refused to allow the COSATU members to get onto the bus. The owner of the bus, who is now the ex-chairperson of the taxi association was also threatened, and was warned not to provide transport to people belonging to COSATU. I was told that, this person,

during his service to the taxi association, had sustained tremendous pressure and harassment from INKATHA and UWUSA because of his association with the progressive unions, As a result of this he resigned. He does not operate taxis anymore due to this harassment.

The most violent attack on COSATU members started towards the end of 1988 and had its origins in the COPAK factory, which PPWAWU was organizing. The violence later spilled into the Sundumbile location. On November twenty-one 1988, workers in this factory challenged the company's decision to fire one of the workers, simply because her card was clocked in but not out, for two days while she was absent from work. The rest of the labour force saw this as an unfair dismissal and so staged a work stoppage, demanding her re-instatement. Management then re-employed the worker on the very same day. Mr.S elaborated:

"The UWUSA supervisor, seeing this as a victory for PPWAWU organized for some of her members from the nearby Ceramics factory to attack our members after work. Our members were, however, escorted home by the South African police who were informed about the attack, as well as by other COSATU members, who waited for workers from COPAK to finish work. On the same evening PPWAWU members were harassed by UWUSA in the township" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

The following day, Tuesday twenty-second, PPWAWU shop stewards were confronted by, it is alleged, the UWUSA organiser who apparently said: "I have heard about you people - you are the ones who are intimidating my members - I am going to shoot you one by one". After work UWUSA members confronted workers at the gate, attempting to rip their PPWAWU T-shirts off. The violence then sparked off throughout Sundumbile on Tuesday night. People were beaten up simply because of the incidents at COPAK. "Wednesday morning", Mr.S continued:

"Workers staged a work stoppage in order to get management to address the situation. Management then issued a warning stating that if they don't go back to work, they will all be dismissed. Workers were, however, holding their ground. They were demanding that the UWUSA supervisor be dismissed as she is a threat to the workers' safety. Management however refused to budge, saying that she (UWUSA supervisor) has been with the company for a long time now and she is a 'loyal' worker. At 8.40 a.m. the second warning was issued, after which workers were dismissed. The SAP intervened. They removed everybody from the factory and dispersed them with tear gas outside the factory gates. The violence continued in the location the same evening, but this time many peoples' shacks were burnt down" (Mr.S, PPWAWU: 1989).

Upon subsequent inquiry, it was established that some people had been arrested by the Eshowe police in connection with the violence. Other than this no further information was available on the outcome of the COPAK dispute. Attempts to establish contact with management bore fruitless results, as no one was available, nor were PPWAWU organisers available, simply because of the office problem.

Then again in 1990:

"When we were going to the rally in Stanger, to be addressed by comrade Nelson Mandela, INKATHA and UWUSA members slept at the station waiting for us. When we arrived at the station they attacked us... Six of our members were seriously injured... INKATHA and UWUSA used knives, assegais, pangas and uqhasha⁵" (Mr.Z, NUMSA: 1990).

According to Mr.I:

"The hatred between INKATHA and COSATU seems to gain new momentum. I thought that the violence will [decrease], but it seems to be increasing. Even

those who are not ANC or COSATU activists are now being attacked. INKATHA embarks on gorilla combat. They target certain homes, and at night they attack them. With COSATU gaining strength, the feud seems to carry on" (Mr.I, NUMSA: 1990).

INKATHA and UWUSA's atrocious programme of intimidation and harassment had in fact been very forceful in increasing COSATU's membership. As Mr.Z explained:

"A rallying point for us in the fight with UWUSA, is workers own questioning of the organization. Workers ask if UWUSA stands for peace, why are they attacking us in the factories and township" (Mr.Z, NUMSA: 1990).

How much support does UWUSA really have? Mr.I answered:

"About 15% support in the area. It has only managed to organize about 3% of factories in the metal sector. But they are strong because they get support from the ZPs. At night the ZPs raid and invade our homes. When they leave they take everything... The ZPs clean up your home before the vigilantes attack you, and burn your house down" (Mr.I, NUMSA: 1990).

Workers I spoke with showed no interest in joining UWUSA. As a worker said:

"UWUSA is like a toothless dog. It tells us that the chief minister introduced factories here to create job opportunities. But the factories are coming from areas where they pay high wages - R75 - starting wage, like Pinetown. They come here to exploit us, not to create jobs. It is better to go the urban areas, instead of the factories coming here".

A welder in Hendred Frehauf said:

"I think fuck all for UWUSA; nothing! They can't negotiate wages, holidays or dismissals. There is nothing to talk about UWUSA... I don't like Buthelezi too. He says that the factories are here to give us jobs. If they give us jobs then everything else must be right. There is no pay here. UWUSA people, they don't like money. They like Gatsha Buthelezi".

The formation of UWUSA, its role in working class politics and its support for capitalists helped tremendously in cementing the COSATU/ANC support amongst workers. More importantly, it together with the particular employer-employee relationship, and the nature of labour processes influenced the level of working class consciousness, as well as, the high level of militancy and everyday class conflict.

Conclusion

The various forms of day-to-day conflict and their pervasiveness in Isithebe, express much more than anger and dissatisfaction against 'starvation wages'. These struggles are significant in that they reveal the fundamental contradictions at the source of capitalist production. Unlike strikes which often reveal particular aspects of working class struggles, everyday class conflict are reflective of the more complex and broader exploitative relations of production. Working class resistance in Isithebe, during the 1980s and early 1990s, in so far as the demands for wages and trade union recognition were concerned, had assumed more clandestine operations, rather than strikes. An understanding of resistance in Isithebe, during this period, has to acknowledge and recognize the co-existence of everyday forms of conflict and overt struggles.

The intensification of everyday forms of resistance is the outcome of the particular conditions in the area. The high level of repression, intimidation and harassment from a number of quarters, and the fact that strikes and the overt expression of political preferences are dangerous, are crucial determinants for the escalation of day-to-day

struggles. The ways in which struggles are waged is dependent upon a terrain which is often determined by the enemies, employers and the state.

The various forms of resistance should not be viewed as stages through which labour follows in any chronological sequence (cf. Geary, 1988). The outcome of working class radicalism and militancy is not only dependent on the political power of trade unions and the intelligentsia. The working class's interpretation and perceptions of radical and revolutionary ideas are influenced considerably by their material conditions under particular stages in the development of capitalism; their standards of living and the nature of the state. Working class radicalism and forms of struggle have more to do with specific economic conjunctions and concrete historical experiences.

NOTES

1. Munck (1988), reports on similar trends among female workers in the factories in South East Asia.
2. This strategy may be quite effective from management's perspective, that, unlike clothing, where attendance bonuses are based on individual attendance, here the bonus is determined by the numbers of workers who pitch to work. Workers can therefore apply pressure on each other to attend regularly.
3. Wasserstrom points out that various writers, novelists (for example Charollet Bronte) and even so-called friends of the working class equated Luddism with senseless mob violence. The concept Luddism was then used in the 1830's as a way to discourage what appeared as stopping or blocking progress. Even in the twentieth century management could use Luddism to block protest which is seen as 'unprogressive'. However, the meaning of Luddism has over time transformed from having derogatory connotations, to a more healthy and positive interpretation. The debates over the meaning of Luddism have important consequences for present day political struggles. Currently, the debate raging over the Luddites are whether they were a quasi-revolutionary force, and not whether they were lunatics.
4. With the advent of computers and the development of powerful high tech weaponry, many quarters in the West have raised doubts, as Luddism has, on the validity and purpose of progress and scientific advance (Wasserstrom, 1987: 691).
5. Refers to a home-made gun which takes a single bullet.

CONCLUSION

The central questions this thesis sought to address are (a) what conditions must exist in a decentralised point for workers to engage in daily forms of class struggle?; and (b) what forms do these struggles assume? The critical realist methodology was used to address these issues. The crucial elements of critical realism which have been adopted in each chapter are:

- Critical realism's stress on social phenomena occurring in open systems, where empirical, law-like generalisations do not occur.

For the critical realist social phenomena are conjuncturally determined and have to be explained in terms of multiple causes. Efforts have been made to seek out as many variables in the labour market, the labour process and the socio-political conditions, which influenced the nature, rate and intensity of class struggles in a decentralised area during the 1980s.

- The labour market, labour process and the socio-political context have been conceptualised within a relational approach in order to determine the generative mechanisms of daily forms of class struggle.
- The TMSA has been instrumental in determining how daily forms of class struggle have transformed certain conditions or structures in the workplace. The TMSA further enables an appreciation of how structures can both prevent and facilitate conflict at work.

For an adequate explanation of the nature, level and forms of shop floor struggles, our analysis must be contextualized within concrete historical settings. I have tried to

to explain the generative mechanisms of working class struggle in a newly developing region. In Chapter One, I tried to point out the variables that shaped the form and content of industrial dispersal. I argued for a relational approach to the analysis of industrial relocation and its underlying causes. That is to say, the dispersal of industry cannot be narrowly attributed to only economic or political factors. It has to be contextualised within a broader scheme of events and tendencies. The form and content of industrial decentralization is informed by particular structures of accumulation and particular phases of capitalist accumulation. I have argued that the relocation of industry in South Africa is the outcome of tensions and problems embodied in racial capitalist social relations and conditions of accumulation.

Our conceptualization of the uneven geographical movement of industry is crucial to the explanation and analysis of shop floor struggles in decentralized points. Industrial relocation from developed urban areas to decentralized points does not occur in a social vacuum. With the dispersal of industry elements of the social relations and structures which characterises production processes are imported into developing regions. This is enhanced by conditions which are specific to different social formations. The organisation of work, then, is governed by a particular structure of capitalist accumulation, which is historically, spatially and temporally determined. The racial and sexist composition of labour markets and processes which characterises urban labour processes in South Africa are replicated in growth points. As a result of state policies of population relocation and separate development large pools of African unskilled labour reside in areas close to decentralized points. Due to this labour markets and labour processes are structured in particular ways. In Chapters Two and Three, I tried to point out the racial and sexual organisation of both the labour market and labour processes in Isithebe.

The incorporation of labour markets and labour process conditions are central to the identification of the generative mechanisms of working class struggle, and informs an appreciation for its variety. In Chapter Two I argued that internal and external labour markets in Isithebe are segmented along a number of lines: race, sex, caste, employer-employee relationships, nature of production process, product market

power of firm, type of technology, etc. The labour markets in Isithebe do not fall unproblematically into ideal-types like primary and/or secondary labour markets. I have tried to point out that the emerging regional labour markets often contain elements of both primary and secondary conditions. Some examples are Co.2, Co.3, Co.4, Co.5, from the clothing sector and Co.C from the metal sector. There are various degrees to segmentation. However, due to socio-historical processes specific to the accumulation of capital in South Africa, regional labour markets reflect more secondary conditions than primary.

Segmentation in the labour market points to the heterogeneity in the working class and in the conditions under which they work. Precisely because of this, shop floor struggles, their casual mechanisms and manifestations are not ubiquitous. Changes to workers' labour market status are not only informed by economic factors facing firms, but also through the process of shop floor struggles. Contrary to the belief that only workers in primary labour markets are unionised, I show that secondary workers in Isithebe also have the ability and space to organise and challenge capital. I point out the concessions and gains the labour force in Isithebe has made in terms of wages, union recognition, bonus schemes, etc. An analysis of labour market conditions in Isithebe reveals that the working class is not weak, unorganized and docile. Through the process of struggle, the working class actively participates in the structuring of external and internal labour markets, thereby contributing to segmentation. I have shown that through the process of unionisation, unfair dismissals, selected hiring and firing of workers have been challenged and won. In this way, worker protection of jobs and benefits distinguishes and separates the employed from the unemployed and permanent from temporary workers.

Labour market segmentation also stems from the nature of production processes, firm and sector specific factors and the nature of the employer-employee relationships. In Chapter Three, I discussed the nature of the labour process in 28 firms and the various types of control used. I tried to highlight the complexities around labour segments and control mechanisms in labour processes. For example, I showed that there is no one-on-one relationship between secondary work conditions and a firm's secondary

status with direct forms of control. For instance: Co.13 and Co.14 from the textile industry are secondary firms in terms of their product market power and the wages and benefits that their labour force accrues. Yet, control methods in these two examples are much more relaxed than in some of the clothing and metal factories, where the unions had a strong base and where workers had made relative advances in securing certain benefits. It is therefore useful to ground analysis in concrete situations, and the type of production process before claiming that workers in secondary labour markets are always subjected to direct forms of control.

Firms are not restricted to one form of control, but in fact make use of a variety of different forms. The difference in jobs, grades, etc. within a single firm fosters the need for several forms of control. For example, in the metal and engineering sector, workers employed in unskilled labourer type jobs are subjected to direct forms of control, whereas those employed as machine operators are less supervised and controlled. My research concludes that within a particular firm direct, technical, bureaucratic and responsible autonomy co-exist with each other.

Apart from qualities peculiar to firms these exists sector differentiations. I found that female workers in the clothing and textile sectors were mostly controlled through direct forms, whilst semi-skilled male workers in metal, engineering and the food sectors were exposed to elements of responsible autonomy. Hence any explanation of control mechanisms must account for firm and sector dynamics. Broad classifications which restrict the notion of control to direct control and responsible autonomy and which ascribes these two with secondary and primary labour markets respectively, do not also coincide with empirical trends. Control mechanisms are rooted in the type of labour process, technology, firm and sector market power and the balance of class forces at a particular time.

Of greater importance, however, is the need to link the following processes: the segmentation of labour markets, different social and technical forms of control, and the diversity in working class struggles. As Storper and Walker (1983) assert:

"[I]labour markets are segmented based on the conflicting demands for technical performance and managerial control. In other words, the labour exchange is not based simply on a struggle over rewards for jobs of a given skill... It includes manoeuvring over job control in light of the often contradictory need for high performance" (21).

I have shown that, control over the rate and level of production is often a point of conflict between managers and workers, more especially in the clothing sector and those employed in unskilled jobs in metal, engineering and other sectors. Resistance does not revolve only around wages but is also shaped by the type of production processes and the ideological and political moments which influence the relationship between capital and labour.

In my examination of different labour processes in Isithebe, I attempted to show that sections of the working class respond differently to the diversities in the labour market and labour process. Those who are exposed the most to direct forms of control and who are always being told to maximize production engage the most in output regulation, absenteeism, coming late to work, and where possible, sabotage of machine and product - forms of struggle which directly affect the production process. Hence, resistance is much broader and complex than strikes and demonstrations. Output regulation, absenteeism, coming late to work and sabotage of product and machine have proved to be successful weapons in challenging and transforming elements of production process and relations.

In most of the firms studied, particularly from the metal, engineering and clothing sectors, I found that daily forms of class struggle forced management to recognise the strength of the working class, and their ability to determine production levels and intensity. What constitutes the application and understanding of the terminology daily class struggles or everyday forms of class struggle is not confined to elements and relations within the labour market and labour process. I have argued for the incorporation of spatial and temporal components to an analysis and classification of shop floor struggles in decentralized regions.

For an adequate conceptual understanding of class struggles in Isithebe, account must be made of the particular phase of capital accumulation, and the political and ideological relations pertaining to the area of capitalist penetration. I tried to point out that the particular period of capitalist accumulation and regional/spatial dynamics shed much light on the general relationship between capital and labour. In Chapter Four, I have shown that because capitalist penetration into Isithebe is relatively recent employees and employers differed markedly around the issue of unionisation and worker rights. The fact that industrially developing regions were exempted from proper labour legislation protecting workers' rights, the relationship between capital and labour was characterised by an intense battle to exert power in the labour market and labour process.

The issues which shaped the class struggle in Isithebe revolves around the advancement and protection of certain class interests. In the case of workers it was with winning trade union recognition agreements with COSATU and with certain forms of control. With management it was resisting COSATU's presence in the factories and with ensuring maximization of profits. Precisely because of intimidation from management, UWUSA and INKATHA, the difficulties for COSATU to openly organise, and for workers to strike, class struggles in Isithebe assumed less observable forms. Output regulation, 'insolent' attitudes, and different acts of sabotage have been used to successfully gain recognition agreements with COSATU affiliates, and to challenge UWUSA and INKATHA's presence in the factories. I have pointed out examples where managements' use of INKATHA and UWUSA in COSATU-bashing strategies have added impetus to the rate and intensity of daily forms of class struggle.

Everyday forms of conflict, therefore characterised the everyday relationship between capital and labour in Isithebe during 1989 to 1991. Far from being 'irrational', 'misguided' and unconscious these forms of struggle have proved to be effective weapons for the working class in their battle with capital, INKATHA and UWUSA. For this reason they cannot be seen as negative working class responses. As Seidman (1988) argues, the manifestations of such resistance to work in revolutionary and reformist situations cannot be dismissed as "false consciousness" or as "primitive".

The continuation and persistence of the various forms of refusal to work, point to the long term hardships of workers' everyday life. That is to say, these forms of struggles are reflective of the day-to-day tensions and contradictions of capitalist social relations of production.

A number of labour historians view strike action as the most positive expression of working class discontent. Yet strikes evolve around particular and specific demands, while everyday struggles bring the entire capital-labour relationship into question. Engaging in these methods of conflict are a natural response to work under capitalism. To explain working class resistance only in terms of strikes and other more spectacular forms and to ignore or marginalize the less dramatic forms, is to assume that everyday relations between capital and labour are harmonious and tension free. Hence strikes are no more positive than day-to-day struggles. In fact the latter say much more about work under capitalism than the lock-out or the strike.

Lenin (1977) in fact argues that the working class cannot rely on strikes alone to advance the working class's struggle against capital. In this sense the proletariat needs to muster all resources at their disposal in order to express anger and discontent towards the capitalist system. The leaders of the working class must recognise day-to-day protest as significant and effective tools in advancing the class struggle against capital, and that such struggles are reflective of the spontaneity within the working class.

Trade union organisation does not automatically mean the termination of everyday forms of resistance. In fact trends in Isithebe point to the co-existence of daily forms of struggles with formal trade unions forms of struggle. Everyday forms of protest then, reflect a healthy scepticism on the part of workers towards leaders claiming to represent the working class. As Rosa Luxembourg argues:

"men do not make history of their own free will, but they do make their own history. The proletariat is dependent in its action on the given degree of maturity in social development existing at the time, but social development

does not proceed independently of and apart from the proletariat, and the proletariat is as much its cause and mainspring as it is its product and consequence. The action of the proletariat is a determining factor in history, and although we can no more jump over stages of historical development than a man can jump over his own shadow, still, we can accelerate or retard that development" (cited in Cliff, 1986: 41).

Hence, all aspects of working class struggles must be recognised as effective weapons for the termination of exploitative relations of production and reproduction.

My research has attempted to identify and explain the underlying casual mechanism of working class struggle and to point out its various forms. Much more work, however, needs to be undertaken before a deeper understanding and appreciation of working class resistance in both developed and developing regions will emerge. The fact that resistance is not confined exclusively to strikes and other dramatic forms of protest means that class struggles and their underlying causes are much more complex, rich and varied than we are often made to believe. We need to develop adequate theoretical tools and concepts in order for us to understand the complexity of everyday forms of struggles, its relationship with institutionalised trade union struggles and the way such forms of struggles may advance the cause for socialism.

APPENDIX I

MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

A. General Background:

1. What factors influenced the Company's decision to locate or relocate to Isithebe in particular?
2. Where was the firm originally based?
3. Is the firm a branch plant - where are your head offices?
4. What decentralization incentives does the company qualify for?
5. How long have been in Isithebe?
6. Ever since you established here have the incentives changed? How and why do you think so?
7. If there were no incentives would you have moved to this area?
8. To what extent does the company enjoy (a) proximity to main markets and (b) proximity to suppliers?
9. What is the quality of the infrastructure and services - telephone service; transport; maintenance; repair; suppliers?
10. What do you manufacture?
11. What is exported and to where?
12. Where do you buy your raw materials?
13. Which industry/s in Isithebe do you have inter-firm relations with?
14. What are the main advantages and disadvantages of being in Isithebe?
15. Do you experience any problems with the KFC?

B. Labour Market Conditions:

16. When you employ what criteria and qualifications do you specify and for which jobs?
17. How do you recruit your skilled, unskilled and semi-skilled labour force?
18. Is the production process capital-intensive or labour-intensive?
19. Are the majority of your workers unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled?
20. What work do: males; females; Indians; coloureds; whites; and Africans typically do?
21. What do workers earn? (women; men; Indian, coloured; white; African; unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled).
22. What benefits do they enjoy? (Questions focused around the different racial and skill categories).
23. Do all workers come from Isithebe?
24. How often are workers promoted and during which period is this likely to occur?
25. Have workers been promoted from unskilled to semi-skilled or skilled positions?
26. Do you think that every worker has equal opportunities for promotion?
27. Have workers been demoted - when and why?
28. Has there been retrenchments in the factory? When? Why? Who were the workers?
29. Are there any problems with acquiring your labour force? Skilled, unskilled and semi-skilled?
31. What is the labour turn-over among skilled; unskilled; semi-skilled; Indian; white; coloured; African; male; female?
32. If incentives on training programmes were removed would you still hire and fire; or would you stabilize your labour force through internal methods?
33. Are men and women trained differently and separately?

34. How many African skilled workers do you have?

C. Labour Process Conditions:

35. What forms of control do you use on your workforce?

36. How is work organised?

37. How many different departments do you have, and who controls each department?

38. How long do you specify for a particular product/component to be manufactured?

39. How do your workers feel about the work arrangements?

40. Have you re-organised the factory or part of the factory? If yes - which sections; how; why; when; workers' reactions?

41. Can you elaborate on the necessity for improving efficiency in the factory. How is this done? How do workers feel about this? Do you have any problems in implementing such programmes?

42. Have you carried out time-and-motion studies? Why? What form/s did it take? Workers' reaction?

43. How much say do workers have in determining their work load and conditions?

44. Are there any job enrichments schemes in the factory?

45. Are there workers who do not require supervision? Which section/s? How many workers?

46. How is work monitored/controlled?

47. How many unskilled; semi-skilled and skilled workers do you employ?

48. Do you offer any training programmes? How long do they last? What is taught?

49. Are there grading schemes in the factory? How do they work?

50. Are workers expected to perform many different tasks or are they required to produce many different products instead of routine work; was your labour process always like this?

51. What economic period is the company experiencing - a slump or a boom?
What are the reasons for this?
52. How does this affect the way work is done and organised?
53. Are you thinking of changing the present work arrangements? Why?
54. Do you employ Indunas? What is their role? Are they important to the company? What skills do they have? Have they been promoted to their particular positions?
55. How old is the machinery in your factory?
56. Are there any conflicts between sections of your workforce? If yes, which ones? What are the issues? How are they resolved?
57. Is your whole factory unionised?
58. Do you use casual or temporary labour? If yes, which periods? What do they do? Are they male or female? Young or old? How long are they employed for? What do they earn?
59. Do you contract out some of your work?
61. Do wages reflect level of skill? How do you set wages?
62. Are workers involved in departmental meetings? If yes, what is discussed at these meetings?

D. Shop floor struggles:

63. Are your skilled workers more loyal to the company than semi-skilled and unskilled? Why?
64. Does the company experience any forms of worker militancy?
65. Since you set up business have there been any strikes and work stoppages? When? What were the issues? How many workers? How long did it last? How was it resolved? Who was involved in negotiations?
66. What forms of worker organisations exist in the factory? Are skilled workers organised separately?
67. Is the union a threat to the smooth running of the factory?
68. Do you think your workers are militant or non-militant? Why?

69. Do you have any ways and means whereby you discourage strikes; work stoppages; etc? Can you elaborate?
70. To what extent does the company experience the following:
- desertion
 - rejects
 - sabotage of machines
 - the use of drugs and alcohol during work
 - theft
 - absenteeism
 - coming late to work
 - insubordination
 - output regulation
 - indifference?
71. Which workers engage in the above and why?
72. How often do accidents and sicknesses occur on the factory floor? Why do you think this happens?
73. What does the above say about workers' lives and attitudes towards work?
74. What problems do you experience with male workers? And female workers?
75. Are supervisors UWUSA or COSATU supporters?
76. Do you associate COSATU with communism?
77. Did you expect the unions to organise in Isithebe?

APPENDIX II

WORKERS' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Why do you work in Isithebe?
2. Which company do you work for?
3. Describe the work you do.
4. Is it interesting or boring? Do you get any joy or happiness out of it? Why?
5. Do you decide for yourself what work is to be done and how it is done? Or does somebody tell you what is to be done? If so, who?
6. What are your views on supervisors? Can you tell me what kind of relationship you have with your supervisor? Is the supervisor male or female? Indian? African?
7. Does your boss tell you to work harder? Why do you think s/he does this? How do they tell you this? How do you feel about this?
8. Do you work on a machine? Where did you learn to use the machine? How long did it take?
9. How long have you worked for the company?
10. Have you had further training? Can you specify what and when?
11. Is this the only job you do in the factory?
12. What time do you start work and finish?
13. Can you tell me what you earn? What do you think of these wages?
14. Have you been to school? Did you complete matric? If no, given the chance would you go back to school? Why?
15. Can you remember what you were paid when you first started working for the company?
16. Do you get regular increases? How often? How do they come about?

17. Were you ever promoted? If yes, can you explain in more detail?
18. Have you always worked in Isithebe in a factory?
19. What did you do before the factories came to Isithebe?
20. Why do you think the factories are coming to Isithebe?
21. Was it easy to get this job? How did you come to know of it?
22. Can you say whether the machinery or work have changed in the time you worked for the company? What do you think about this?
23. What kinds of benefits does the company offer?
24. What kinds of problems do you experience with your work and management?
25. How do you deal with these problems? How often do they occur?
26. Were there any work stoppages, strikes, go-slows? What were the issues? Were you involved? How many were involved? How long did it last? How was it resolved? Who was involved in negotiations? Were you happy with the outcome?
27. Do you know of any workers who:
 - stay away from work often or come late to work
 - sabotage machines and products
 - steal
 - use drugs and/or alcohol during working hours
 - deserted the company?
28. Why do you think workers do these things?
29. Are go-slows, strikes, sabotage, etc. effective in acquiring workers' demands? How are they organised? Can you give me examples of when and how workers used them?
30. Do you belong to a union? If so, when did you join? Was it a battle to join the union? Can you explain?
31. Ever since you joined the union, how have your working conditions improved?
32. How far do you have to travel to work; by what means?
33. Are there any divisions within the work force? Can you explain them?

34. Does UWUSA have a presence in the factory? What positions do its members hold? Were they employed after COSATU started organising? Why do you think so?

35. What do you think about UWUSA and INKATHA?

APPENDIX III

TRADE UNION ORGANISERS' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. When did COSATU first start organising in Isithebe?
2. What kind of problems did you encounter from workers and capitalists?
3. What kinds of problems does Isithebe have in terms of union activity?
4. How are workers recruited?
5. Does management contact the unions often? For what reasons?
6. What is the level of retrenchments, hiring and firing? Can you offer any reasons for this?
7. Which segments of the work force are most affected by the above?
8. Does management contact the unions on issues like hiring and firing?
9. How does the union handle retrenchments and firing?
10. What is the attitude of Indian, coloured, and white workers towards COSATU? What are their attitudes towards African workers?
11. What is the attitude of male workers towards female workers?
12. Can you describe the working conditions of labour?
13. What is the level of worker benefits?
14. What means are available to set up a basic wage?
15. How has COSATU handled the labour relations issue?
16. Can you explain some of the major struggles, strikes, etc.? What were the issues? The numbers involved? How long did they last? How were they resolved?
17. What does the union think of the following:

- pilfering
- output regulation
- sabotage of product and machines
- desertion
- absenteeism
- coming late to work?

18. Can you tell me about the factories you organise in? What are the product market status? Are they making a profit in Isithebe?
19. Do you have to deal with workers who attempt to determine their own output or do not obey management? How often does this happen?
20. On a general level, has there been changes in the way work is done (eg: new machinery)? Can you give examples? How do workers feel about this? Are these changes to the benefit of workers? What are their reactions to such changes? What is the unions response?
21. Do workers have more control over the labour process or management?
22. How often are wages negotiated?
23. What is the rate of promotions?
24. What strategies have the unions developed to organise in an area like Isithebe? Explain in detail.
25. Explain the problems you have with UWUSA, INKATHA, KFC, management. Can you give examples?

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