

The Impact of 1994 Rwandan Genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

By

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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work.

Clementine NYINAWUMUNTU

Place _____ **Date** _____

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ABSTRACT

This Thesis is an analytical investigation of the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. It focuses on the violent conflicts and instability that marked the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly the eastern DRC region since 1996-2006. The DRC hosted about 1.25 million Rwandan Hutu refugees (including the *ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises* and Hutu militiamen) following the hundred atrocious days of the 1994 genocide under Hutu-led government in Rwanda. This study assesses rigorously the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC conflicts.

The theoretical framework of this research is the Ervin Staub's *Basic Needs* perspective. This theoretical model provides an analytical tool to examine a myriad of factors underlying mass violence and genocide. Factors such as difficult life conditions, group cultural history, social psychological factors and context create an enhanced potential for movement along a path of violent conflicts with hallmarks including moral exclusion, stigmatization, dehumanization and impunity. The tool of qualitative textual analysis of relevant scholarly and non-scholarly documents in the subject area is used. A whole range of issues comprising the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC before and after the 1994 Rwanda genocide is assessed: ethnicity, ideologies, refugees, rebel groups in DRC conflicts, socio-economical contexts. In analyzing the data I have employed content analysis.

The results of this study point out that, factors such as difficult life conditions, ideologies of hatred, economical and political crises that marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa have created a climate conducive to conflicts. Furthermore, the research shows that the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, particularly the ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen, contributed in the escalation of violent conflicts in eastern DRC. This corroborates the scholars finding that refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict and the by-product of war; they are also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability (Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2). The study ends with recommendations for peace and sustainable stability and development in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: comprehending and addressing thoroughly the roots causes of conflicts, promoting and implementing policies and mechanisms for good governance, economic development, respect of human rights and justice, addressing effectively the issue of refugees and reconciliation.

KEY WORDS

Basic Needs Theory, Difficult life conditions, Psychological frustration, The 1994 Rwandan genocide, The Hutu-Tutsi antagonism, The Anti-Tutsi ideology, The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, ex-FAR, Interahamwe, Impuzamugambi, Banyamulenge, DRC conflicts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Title	i
Declaration	ii
Acknowledgments	iii
Abstract and Key Words	iv
Table of Contents	v
 Chapter One: INTRODUCTION	 1
1.1. Overview and Significance of the Study	1
1.2. Background to the Topic	3
• Hutu-Tutsi hatred in Rwanda	4
1.3. Principal theories upon which the Research is constructed	9
1.4. Research Methodology and Methods	12
1.5. Chapter layout	15
 Chapter Two: A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	 16
2.1. The eastern DRC region and issue of Refugees	19
2.2. The 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Great Lakes Region	21
2.3. Eastern DRC conflicts	24
 Chapter Three: THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES AND THE CHANGE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD TUTSI CONGOLESE IN THE EASTERN DRC	 29
3.0. Overview	29
3.1. Preliminary to the chapter: working definitions of attitude and ideology	30
3.2. Interethnic relationships in the eastern DRC region before 1994	32
3.3. The arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern DRC and its impact	37
3.3.(i) The 1994 Rwandan refugees and life conditions in eastern DRC	38
3.3.(ii) The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and interethnic relationships	40
3.4. The anti-Tutsi ideology of 1994 Rwandan genocide and the	47

Chapter Four:	THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES AND THE REBEL MOVEMENTS IN THE EASTERN DRC REGION	52
4.1.	October 1996 to May 1997 DRC Conflicts and main actors involved	53
4.2.	August 1998 to late 2001 DRC conflicts and armed groups involved	59
4.2.1.	RCD and its allies, Rwanda and Uganda	61
4.2.2.	MLC – Movement for the Liberation of Congo	64
4.2.3.	ALiR/FDLR (Rwandan Liberation Army/Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)	65
4.2.4.	Laurent Kabila’s camp and other regional participant in DRC conflicts	70
4.3.	The 2004 onward conflicts and key actors involved	73
4.3.1.	The CNDP (the National Congress for the Defence of the People)	73
Chapter Five:	THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES AND INSTABILITY IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA	77
5.1.	The regional response to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees	78
5.1.1.	Tanzania’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees’ crisis	79
5.1.2.	Uganda’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees’ crisis	81
5.1.3.	Burundi’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees’ crisis	81
5.1.4.	DRC’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees’ crisis	83
5.2.	The nature and extent of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees’ role in the instability of the post-genocide Great Lakes Region	85
5.2.1.	Violent conflicts in the post-genocide Great Lakes Region of Africa and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees	86
5.2.1.(i)	The 1996 DRC war and instability in the Great Lakes Region of Africa	87
5.2.1.(ii)	The 1998 DRC war and instability in the Great Lakes Region	89
5.2.2.	Insecurity beyond DRC soil and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees	90

5.2.2.(i)	Uganda	90
5.2.2.(ii)	Rwanda	91
5.2.2.(iii)	Burundi	92
Chapter Six:	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	94
6.1.	The impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the African Great Lakes Region: the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the insecurity in the region	95
6.1.1.	The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and interethnic attitudinal change in eastern DRC	95
6.1.2.	The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the rebel movements in eastern DRC	97
6.1.3.	The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the instability in the Great Lakes Region	99
6.2.	Conclusion and recommendations	100
List of References :		103
Appendices :	<i>Appendix 1: Map of DRC, 1998</i>	124
	<i>Appendix 2: Map of Areas held by MLC and RCD in 2003</i>	125
	<i>Appendix 3: Map of Armed groups (CNDP and FDLR) in North Kivu in 2009</i>	125
	<i>Appendix 4: Map of South Kivu region, DRC</i>	126
	<i>Appendix 5: Map of North Kivu region, DRC (2003)</i>	126
	<i>Appendix 6: Picture of Refugee camp in Goma in 1994</i>	128
	<i>Appendix 7: Picture of Kibumba Refugee camp in 1994</i>	128
	<i>Appendix 8: Picture of Ngara Refugee camp in Tanzania (1994)</i>	129
	<i>Appendix 9: Picture of Benaco Refugee camp in Tanzania (1994)</i>	129
	<i>Appendix 10: Some photos (Juvenal Habyarimana, Mobutu Sese Seko, Paul Kagame, Laurent Nkunda, etc.)</i>	130

Chapter One

Introduction

*“Genocide is part of history, it follows humanity like a dark shadow
from early antiquity to the present time.”*

Lemkin R (Malvern 2000:250)

1. OVERVIEW AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The history of antagonistic relationships between two significant ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi – the Hutu and Tutsi – is linked to a large extent to the instability that marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa, especially in the 1990s. Although the Great Lakes Region of Africa comprises nine countries, geographically – Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)¹ and Mozambique – the most affected states were Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC. In 1994, the apex of this Hutu–Tutsi antagonism was the genocide in Rwanda; and as Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005: 18) observes, all the countries of the Great Lakes Region felt the impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda at least in terms of refugee flows.

The present study intends to look at the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide² in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Moses and Knutsen (2007:132) suggest that studying a single case can yield reasonable hypotheses and/or theoretical outcome. This study focuses on the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (*Appendix 1*), especially the eastern DRC region, which experienced the most dreadful repercussions of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The latter, harboured a remarkable number of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (Adedeji 1999, Muggah & Mogire 2006). In this connection, my research hypothesis argues that “the mass migration of Rwandan Hutu population following the genocide of 1994 contributed to the escalation of ethnic violence in the eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006.”

¹ The Democratic Republic of Congo is the former Zaire (until 1997). The map of DRC: Appendix 1.

² The official term/expression used by the Rwandan Government is “The Genocide against the Tutsi” (www.gov.rw).

In order to assess the above hypothesis, this study seeks to address the following specific objectives:

- (i) To establish how the presence of Rwandan Hutu refugee population affected ethnic attitudes in eastern DRC;
- (ii) To investigate the role of migrations of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the formation of ethnic based rebel groups in eastern DRC;
- (iii) To explore the overall contribution of Rwandan Hutu refugee movements to the instability of the Great Lakes Region.

Drawing from those objectives, three main questions are used to guide this research:

- (i) To what extent did the 1994 migration of Rwandan Hutu refugees shape attitudes toward Tutsis in the eastern DRC region?
- (ii) To what extent did Rwandan Hutu migrations contribute to the formation of rebel groups based on ethnicity?
- (iii) To what extent did Rwandan Hutu refugee movements contribute to instability in the Great Lakes Region?

Thus, this introductory chapter will give a brief background to the topic, and will point out the principal theories upon which this research is constructed and the methodology adopted for the study. This research seeks to investigate and analyse the security problems in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, particularly in the eastern DRC from 1996 to 2006. It examines the role played by the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (after 1994 Rwandan genocide) in the instability that marked the eastern DRC region (mainly the Kivu provinces: South and North Kivu), it explores the exacerbation of ethnic problems and the spreading of the ideology of hatred. Therefore, this study hopes to make a contribution to political science, peace and conflict studies by investigating a possible link between the 1994 Rwandan refugee movements and the growth of ethnic intolerance in the eastern DRC. It is hoped that this will shed more light on the understanding of ethnic conflicts and on the refugees' potential contribution in destabilizing the host region or country.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE TOPIC

From April to July of 1994, hundred horrendous days of genocide took place in Rwanda under a Hutu-led government. It claimed the lives of about a million Rwandans made up mostly of Tutsis and reputedly ‘moderate’ Hutus. Generated at the state level (as confessed by Jean Kambanda³, the Prime Minister of Rwandan government in 1994)⁴ the genocide was mostly carried out by the *Interahamwe* militias (of the then ruling party, namely the *Mouvement Républicain National pour la démocratie et le développement*, National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development, MRND) and the *Impuzamugambi* (of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic party, CDR, an extremist ally of the MRND) working together with the Presidential Guard, certain elements in the army, various gendarmes, and civilian administrative authorities (Newbury 1995:12). By July 1994 the Tutsi-dominated *Rwanda Patriotic Front* (RPF), which had invaded Rwanda in 1990, overthrew the then Rwandan government and militarily controlled the whole country. The victory of RPF not only ended the genocide but also triggered the massive outflow of 1.72 to 2.1 million Hutu refugees to neighbouring countries: Burundi, DRC, Tanzania and Uganda⁵. Of this outflow, DRC hosted 1.1 to 1.25 million; among these were some *ex-Forces Armées*

³ Appendix 10

⁴ In the guilty plea at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) court, Jean Kambanda, Prime Minister and Head of Government of the Rwanda Interim Government in 1994, admits that the planning and execution of the genocide were acts of State (www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs). The 1994 government officials and state officials, particularly the extremist Hutus, put in place structural mechanisms to mobilize Hutu mass population against Tutsis. The anti-Tutsi propaganda was structurally launched from the top government officials. Within a few hours after the plane carrying Juvenal Habyarimana (then President of Rwanda: Appendix 10) was shot down, Presidential Guards set roadblocks in different parts of Kigali city, the then Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (a moderate Hutu) was killed. Officials such as Col. Theoneste Bagosora (the then Rwandan Ministry of Defence Cabinet Director: Appendix 10), the new Prime Minister Kambanda and others of the interim government of “*Abatabazi*” oversaw the killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Chretien 2000:281-5; Hintjens 1999: 246-7; US Defense Intelligence Report of 9th May 1994 on www.gwu.edu; US Department of State outgoing telegram to Col. Bagosora, April 1994 on www.gwu.edu; Madsen 1999).

⁵ A number of factors explain the reason why such large number of Hutus left the country as the RPF militarily advanced and took over the control of Rwanda: firstly, through the genocidal propaganda, the RPF and Tutsis were portrayed as the enemy of Rwanda (*Umwanzi w’u Rwanda*) whose plan was to kill, dominate and enslave Hutus. Secondly, a large number of Rwandan Hutu populations (including even the ordinary people) had participated in genocide activities in one way or the other, such as confiscating properties owned by Tutsis. Thus, the military victory of RPF triggered immense fear among millions of Rwandan Hutus. Furthermore, the “*Abatabazi*” government (the interim government that oversaw the genocide) played on this general fear to flee the country with a massively large number of populations as a protection (US Defense Intelligence Report of 9th May 1994 on www.gwu.edu; Hintjens 1999: 242-5; Prunier 1995: 78-80).

Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Hutu militiamen (*Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*) (Kisangani 2000:165).

Like all genocides, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was a complex phenomenon that emerged gradually out of a long-term multifaceted combination of factors such as poverty, exclusionary policies, effects of the history of colonial rule, and Hutu-Tutsi antagonism. In this spectrum of events, the Hutu-Tutsi bipolar ethnic set-up, the instrumentalization of which has claimed so many lives both in Rwanda and Burundi (Lemarchand 1997:3) stands out as the major force. Indeed, to analyze meaningfully the 1994 Rwanda genocide all the interconnected factors and circumstances – such as the introduction of multiparty politics, the start of 1990 war, and anti-Tutsi ideology, which made the context in which decisions were made – are to be taken into account (Human Right Watch 2006:2).

The presentation of a detailed study or analysis of the 1994 Rwanda genocide is beyond the scope of this research. It suffices to mention that there have been many detailed accounts of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and various attempts to explain some ideological and historical causes of the genocide. Among these are works by Prunier (1995), Reyntjens (1995), Newbury (1995), Chrétien (1995), Hintjens (1999) and Lemarchand (1998). And certainly, each type of explanation may have some basis in reality as well as some blind spots. However, all accounts do take due notice of the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic bipolarity that not only underscore the history of Rwanda and Burundi but also have generated hatred and deep-seated animosity. It is this ethnic hatred that has infected and destabilized the Great Lakes Region, particularly DRC (Lemarchand 1997).

- **Hutu–Tutsi hatred in Rwanda**

The detailed account of the history of Hutu-Tutsi confrontation in Rwanda is beyond the scope of this work, but it suffices to briefly look at some scholarly attempts at explaining the historical root of Hutu-Tutsi antagonism in Rwanda. Contradictions and disagreements exist in these theories, but all highlight the bipolarization of the two main ethnic groups that gradually created a fragile climate marked by exclusionary policies, ethnic hostilities and tensions.

Catharine Newbury, in her work *The Cohesion of oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda (1860-1960)* reassessed Maquet's theory. In his study '*Le système des relations sociales dans le Rwanda ancien*', Maquet argues that the social relations between the three groups: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were 'rigid' in character (in Newbury 1988:3). He says that

Tutsi minority pastoralists held all political power, controlled most wealth, and exploited the agriculturalist Hutu, and despite the imbalance in numbers and the evident inequality in the society the social and political cohesion was assured through the three mechanisms: value consensus, cattle clientship and a complex system of administrative arrangement (in Newbury 1988:3).

Newbury (1988:6) argues that Maquet's theory is partially correct in the sense that "cattle clientship could serve an integrative role but the ahistorical character of the model led to distortions". She goes on thus to observe that

political relations were more complex and identities less rigid. The structures of Tutsi domination were more recent and less extensive...and they were transformed in important ways during the European colonial period (Newbury 1988: 6).

Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) takes a different view from the one expounded above in that the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry, hatred, and hostilities are "neither natural nor a product of ancient enmities inherited from the pre-colonial past". He argues that Belgian colonial authorities, the Roman Catholic Church and colonially embedded anthropologists supported and promoted the ethnic identity construction into two separate and antagonistic groups in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC (the then colonial entity known as '*Congo Belge et Rwanda –Urundi*') (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). Chrétien also remarks:

the prejudices and disputes linked to Hutu-Tutsi cleavages took roots among the first modern Rwandan elites in the 1950s...notably those who graduated from Astrida (A secondary school founded and financed by Brothers of Charity) or from seminary (Chretien 2003: 300).

In Rwanda in 1950s (colonial era) schools were under Catholic Church missionaries 'who played a key role in moulding the elites' as Schlang states (in Scherrer 2002:27). Public service and education were reserved for the Tutsis while the majority of the Hutus were agriculturalists and menial task laborers. Chalk and Johassohn (1990: 385-6) wrote: "centuries of tradition made the Tutsi feel like a privileged, superior people....and scorned Hutus as no more than hard-working and dumb people. The Hutus tended to agree".⁶

⁶ Although pre-colonial Rwandans were consciously aware of their respective Hutu/Tutsi/Twa identities, the generalization about these identities should (like all generalizations) be tempered by the complexities of empirical reality. Alexis Kagame (1959:21) and Eller (1999: 202-3) observe that in pre-colonial Rwandan society Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were *achieved* statuses almost as much as they were *ascribed* ones. The social system (in pre-colonial Rwandan society) allowed for change in 'birth' status of an individual, and this 'social mobility' contributed in a way to strengthen the Rwandan Kingdom (Vuningoma 2009: 5). Scholars such

Under the colonial rule, the Rwandan social system was gradually transformed. The Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identities were firmly structured and used politically or socially (Castells 2003: 109).⁷ Belgian colonialists introduced the identity cards, which they wanted to use to facilitate census surveys that would shed more definitive light on the actual statistical distribution of Hutu and Tutsis. Until 1950, Tutsis were still a privileged class compared to the Hutus. However, when the anti-colonial movements started echoing around Africa and because of the colonial segregation imposed by Belgian colonialists, Tutsi intellectuals started anti-colonial activities both in Rwanda and Burundi. This angered the colonialists. Consequently in order to preserve and secure their rule, Belgian colonialists started promoting Hutus (Chrétien 2003:299-306, Scherrer 2002:28).

Chretien (2003:301) further observes that at this particular time the Tutsis and Hutus had divergent nationalist ideas. While Tutsis wanted independence from the Belgian colonial government, the Hutus pursued 'social justice' which they "emphasized, as a prerequisite [to] ending 'Tutsi feudalism', even if that meant delaying independence". Obviously the tension was mounting. The Tutsis, who in the first place were privileged by Belgian colonial administrators, were threatened by the impending loss of their political power. For their part, the Hutus were frustrated: "intellectuals among them (Hutu) aided by the White Fathers circulated a note they called "Manifesto of the Bahutu"....it denounced the 'Tutsi monopoly' and ethnicity on identity cards was demanded" Chrétien (2003:301). The few Hutu elites coalesced around political parties: "...they were able to gain the attention of European

as Kagame (1959:23), Akiba (2004:84), Nabudere (2000: 227), Castells (2003: 108), Ochwada (2004: 57) and Mamdani (1996: 10) report that in pre-German and pre-Belgium controlled Rwandan society, Tutsi was more an identity of wealth and of power than a 'birth' status. And if a Hutu acquired enough wealth to own a herd of cattle, rising through the socio-economic hierarchy, he could then go through a social ritual called *Kwihutura*. The latter was a social ritual by which a Hutu shed his 'Hutuness' and *became* a Tutsi. Similarly, poor Tutsi (who lost his wealth and power) socially deteriorating *became* a Hutu through a ritual called *Gucupira*. Kagame (1959:23) adds also that the social mobility, particularly the social promotion to a 'noble Tutsi' status, could be the result of fundamental acts such as the King's decision, the marriage with an 'important Tutsi' and the adoption by a noble Tutsi. This can be illustrated, for instance, by the case of a Twa named Busyete (who saved the King's life) who was promoted to noble Tutsi status by the King Cyirima Rujugira, married Rujugira's sister (Murangamirwa wa Yuhi Mazimpaka) and became chief of a province. Busyete's descendants became Tutsis known under the name of Basyete (Shyaka on www.grandslacs.net/doc, Scherrer 2002: 24). Furthermore, Eller (1999: 203-4) and Akiba (2004: 84-5) mention that the *Kwihutura* and *Gucupira* institutions prevented the hardening of differences that had the potential of giving rise to disaffection against the ruling of noble Tutsis.

⁷ Under Belgian rule the social mobility in pre-colonial Rwandan society (mentioned above) was abolished (Akiba 2004: 84, Castells 2003: 109).

colonial government to the extent that they could claim to represent the rural masses” (Newbury 1988:181).

In 1959 ethnic based political parties were formed. The first was PARMEHUTU (Party of the movement of the Emancipation of the Bahutu) which according to Newbury (1988:193) “stressed liberation of Hutu and took a strongly anti-Tutsi stance” and UNAR (Rwandan National Union) of the Batutsi. Thus “ethnicization and polarization fostered by colonialist....led to demonization and dehumanization of the respective opposing groups” Scherrer (2002:28). In the same year, (1959) as Destexhe (1995:42) describes, “a series of riots directed against the authority of the Tutsi chiefs were allowed by Belgians to escalate into a revolution accompanied by massacres which killed more than 200.000 Tutsi...and led more to the exile.” They left the country to settle in the neighbouring countries: Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and DRC.

In the host countries Tutsi refugee conditions were quite harsh (Newbury 1995:13, Lemarchand 2002:500-1, Luyt 2003:98-9). A number of violent attempts to return home were organized by Tutsis in 1963 and 1964 without success. These attacks put Tutsis who had remained in the country under risks of being killed and caused others to flee. The Tutsi refugees reorganized and supported by Uganda, launched attacks on Rwanda in October 1990 as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Tutsis in Rwanda were subsequently portrayed as RPF allies, “*abanzi b’igihuru*” (enemies of the country, Rwanda), persecuted and killed (Lemarchand 1997)⁸.

⁸ As discussed in the above paragraph, the Hutu-Tutsi bipolarization grew gradually stronger in the Rwandan society. The Juvenal Habyarimana’s regime (1973-1994) implemented policies of exclusion: Tutsis were excluded in different sectors (schools, public services, military services, etc.). At different occasions, Tutsi were killed: in Kibilira, Bugogwe and Bugesera (Hintjens 1999: 255-7). Lemarchand (2002: 510) and Verwimp (2000: 3-4) observe that under Habyarimana’s regime, plans and decisions were made to physically eliminate the Tutsi. In March 1992 a document (*Report of Rwanda Commission of Inquiry*) transmitted to the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Belgian Ambassador in Rwanda reads (in one of its paragraphs) : “*a secret military staff charged with the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda in order to solve forever, in their way, the ethnic problem in Rwanda and to destroy the domestic Hutu opposition*” (in Verwimp 2000: 3). The invasion of RPF (in 1990) offered the context and the occasion to execute the plans of eliminating the Tutsi. In the period of 1990-1992 thousands of Rwandan Tutsi civilians in the north and west of the country were massacred by youth groups acting under the supervision of communal authorities (Lemarchand 2002: 510).

Newbury (1995:14) accounts that:

Following the October invasion Habyarimana pursued a two-track policy. On the one hand, responding to pressure from western donors, he permitted a gradual process of political liberalization and made concessions to an active internal pro-democracy movement. Simultaneously Habyarimana permitted (or pursued) a policy of internal repression as part of the war strategy, and he allowed (or encouraged) a proliferation of human rights abuses. The main targets were Tutsi – from 1990 to 1993 an estimated 2,000 Tutsi were killed in massacres and murders in several different regions. But outspoken critics of the regime and advocates of human rights were also targeted, regardless of ethnic categories. (...) these attacks were directed from the security services in the office of the President. The RPF invasion did not cause these to happen; the regime in power did that.

The climax of this Hutu-Tutsi confrontation in Rwanda was the 1994 genocide. As mentioned above, the genocide took place under a Hutu-led government, generated at the state level. This had tragic impacts on the Great Lakes Region of Africa in general and on DRC in particular: the refugee flow, instability, increased criminality, violent conflicts, ecological damage and infectious diseases. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) observes that although all the countries of the Great Lakes Region felt the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, at least in terms of refugee flow, the DRC has witnessed its most tragic repercussions, and these include the wars that ravaged DRC since 1996. Thus, in studying the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region, I will focus on DRC conflicts.

The two Kivu provinces in eastern DRC share borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The ethnic conflict and civil wars in these neighbouring countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) generated refugees who moved into eastern DRC region. The presence of these refugees together with the pre-existing local and national fragility of the social and political climate heightened tensions between groups, inhabitants of Kivu provinces. The presence of the 1994 Hutu refugees in the Kivu provinces that followed the Rwandan genocide became not ‘an add-on’ to the conflict scene, but a catalyst which reconfigured and exacerbated the scene (Pottier 2002:51).

The fact that the majority of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (i) had participated in the genocide against Tutsis (Hintjens 1999: 246-7, Lemarchand 1997), (ii) were still under the guidance and control of authorities responsible for organizing and coordinating the genocide against Tutsis (McNulty 1999:70-2, Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18) and (iii) fled together with armed soldiers and *Interahamwe* militias (Kisangani 2000:165-6) affected interethnic relations in Kivu as well as political and economic life: firstly by changing attitude toward Tutsi Congolese by other local groups; and secondly, it increased ethnic armed rebel groups’ formation which subsequently augmented instability in the region in general and in the Kivu

provinces in particular (Reyntjens 1999: 244; Clark 2003: 67; ICG 2007: 11-2; Vlassenroot 2002:508-9).

Different studies on DRC conflicts have shown that these conflicts have been multidimensional in character. Specifically, different local, national and regional factors rendered the conflicts more complex (Autesserre 2006:8-12). When looking at the impact of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in the Great Lakes Region, and particularly analyzing the DRC conflicts, most of these studies focus more on a range of casual factors such as the plunder of mineral resources, land scarcity, ethnicity, and regional security (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:16; Autesserre 2006:6; Reyntjens 1999: 243; Pottier 2002:9-15; Rutazibwa 1999:9). In Chapter Two, I will come back to these various scholarly analyses of the DRC conflicts. However, in these analyses, less attention is paid to the role of the 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees in the DRC conflicts and in the instability of the Great Lakes region. Yet, some scholars observe that refugees can become a source of insecurity (Havinga & Bocker in Muggah 2006:5; Collier in Furley 2006:2; Lemarchand 1997). It is especially in this last area that this dissertation makes a contribution by assessing the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the DRC conflicts and in the instability of the Great Lakes Region.

3. PRINCIPAL THEORIES UPON WHICH THE RESEARCH IS CONSTRUCTED

The theoretical foundation of my study is based on available literature on violent conflict in general and ethnic conflict in particular. However, from an anthropological view-point, human conflict is intrinsically complex. In Clinton Fink's view (1968:413), no social science discipline, by itself, can claim to have sufficient intellectual resources to provide an adequate theory on human conflict. But attempts to understand why groups and ethnic groups turn against each other have led over the years to a wave of theoretical and empirical researches which have contributed towards the better understanding of the causal determinants of ethnic conflict.

Three theories, the Primordial Theory, the Instrumental Theory, and the Conception presented in Ervin Staub's book *The Psychology of Good and Evil*, have captured my attention for this study. Geertz (in Kieh 2002:10) suggests descriptively that "[b]y a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' ... of social existence,

immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly...”. In this primordial perspective, identity is viewed as a fixed category and ethnic conflicts are subsequently understood as mere “tribal clashes” that occur solely by virtue of mutual dislike or even hatred rooted in old sources of ethnicity and memories of past atrocities that groups have experienced (Cone 2005:56; Sambanis 2001: 262-3). In the case of DRC, the Primordial Theory might assist in explaining interethnic ties that motivated members of different ethnic groups in the eastern region to fight each other. The theory allows one to understand that different ethnic groups necessarily fight because of hatred. But looking at the complexities involved in the eastern DRC’s conflict, the primordial perspective becomes inapplicable. It tends to overlook other factors that produced a synergy to give the conflict the character it manifested, while assuming that the conflict in eastern DRC was exclusively based on ethnic differences and traditional mutual hatred among ethnic groups.

Instrumental Theory basically assumes that group members rally around ethnic groups in order to achieve alternative goals. Cone (2005: 53-54) argues that conflict between different ethnic groups does not stem from a mutual dislike as the Primordial Theory suggests, but rather from competition for resources, power, wealth or other goals. In this regard, ethnicity is only an instrument of mobilization in the contest for control of power and resources. In the wave of democratization process in the DRC (then Zaire) in the 1990s for example, political parties used ethnicity to mobilize support, often through the establishment of local ethnic militias (Crisis Group Africa Report 2007: 23).

While the Instrumentalist Theory may have been able to explain to some extent the complexities surrounding the DRC conflict by showing how the manipulation of ethnicity in the DRC conflict was a factor, it fails to “explain how groups come to define certain interests as critical in the first place, and why ethnic conflicts attain an intensity and intransigence which many suggest are often not commensurate with the substantive interests the parties contend are at stake” (Ross 1995: 524). Moreover, it oversimplifies components like “security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation” which are also eligible to engender conflict in a society (Azar in Starr 1999:24). Agreeing totally with the Instrumentalist Theory is to assume that people are at all times manipulable by anyone and are “unidimensional creatures... [but] that human behaviour is characterized by mixed motives, of which economic advantage is one of several” (Esman 2004: 79). Furthermore, Esman (2004:33-4) indicates that the manipulation of ethnic group members is

possible “but only if such a manipulation appeals to and draws on a priori sentiments of collective identity and group solidarity.” Therefore, Instrumental Theory seems not to account for issues, such as culturally rooted social and psychological processes, dormant frustrations, external constraints, desires, deep-seated, threats to identity, security fears, which produce pre-dispositions for violent conflicts (Ross 1995:525).

An analytical tool therefore which addresses the psychological dispositions of the people involved in the DRC conflict and other social processes that played out in the conflict, becomes most useful. In his work, Staub (1989) identifies characteristics of a group and that of a society, which create an enhanced potential for a group(s) turning against another group(s). He states that difficult life conditions as well as group conflict in a society can frustrate basic material and psychological needs and can lead people not only to blame and stigmatise others as the cause of their problems but also to the creation of destructive ideologies and scapegoats as a means to satisfying those basic needs. Staub emphasizes that the intensification of the impact of life problems in a society and the way people try to deal with them are greatly affected by the predisposing cultural characteristics in a society (Staub 1989:14; 2003:293-99), which include cultural devaluation, strong respect for authority, and past victimization.

Mass violence and implicit threat of violence in DRC, as Vlassenroot (in Huggins 2005: 116) writes has become a continuous feature of Congolese life since 1995 (following the 1994 Rwandan genocide). There are different groups involved in the conflict in eastern parts of the country, mainly Banyamulenge, Hutu, Tutsi, Shi, Nande, Hema and Lendu. But as noted previously, the conflict was a result of a number of factors including the decay of the Congolese state in general, the deterioration of economy mixed with persistent conflicts among groups over land and resources, the brutal arrival of Rwandan Hutu refugees that submerged the east, as well as the intrusion of regional countries (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:11-21; Oyatambwe & Smis 2002: 413-4; McNulty 1999: 66-8; Reyntjens 1999: 241-2; Clark 2001: 261-2). All of these determinants combined and worsened the existing difficult life conditions thereby generating and intensifying mutual negative feelings among ethnic groups in the Kivus. This created a fertile ground to reinforce the discourse of and clamour for exclusion and divisions of Congolese along the lines of ‘foreigners’ and ‘natives.’

Each major ethnic group in eastern DRC mobilized its members and even created its own armed militia to protect itself from any threats to its survival, identity, dignity, security, connection, etc. For instance, General Laurent Nunda's rebels claim to protect Tutsis (Thakur 2007:59), the Mayi-Mayi, a militia said to represent 'indigenous' Congolese against Tutsi and foreign aggression (Morvan 2006:23). The pull towards own ethnic groupings was occasioned by the need to address the existing fears of ones' physical, political and economic security. Ethnic group leaders who emerged at this level tended to provide a ready solution (mostly in a destructive way) to satisfy those basic psychological and material needs. This was often associated with identifying a scapegoat designated as an enemy to get rid of and creating ideologies supportive to the elimination of the enemy.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

The methodology used in this study comprises of secondary data sources of information; and the qualitative research methods will be the key components of my methodology. As Moses and Knutsen (2007:132) suggest, studying a single case can yield reasonable hypotheses and/or theoretical outcome. Yin (1994: 123) defines a case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident, and in which the multiple source of evidence are used." Case study is an ideal methodology when an in-depth analysis and a holistic investigation are needed. The case study approach has proven to be suitable for studying complex social phenomena, measuring the impact of specific interventions on a certain group or a situation. Furthermore, case studies are designed to bring out the in-depth details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple sources of data (Tellis 1997:1 & 12 on www.nova.edu).

From a research strategy point of view, the advantages of case study approach include helping to establish relationships between interventions and their outcomes or impacts, incorporating various research techniques (qualitative or quantitative or both) which strengthens the credibility of results, providing strong evidence to support causal relations between specific interventions and specific outcomes or impacts. And the case study research can be single or multiple case studies. Case studies have been used in varied analysis and investigations, particularly in sociological studies. The limitation of the case study approach

is that the very fact that the latter focuses generally on only one causal relationship implies that other potential relationships may be left out (Lubbe 2009: 12 -13 on www.acm.org). Furthermore, one of the typical criticisms towards the case studies is that there is no basis for scientific generalization. Yin (in Tellis 1997:2-3 on www.nova.edu) argues that the purpose in case study approach is to generalize to theoretical propositions not to population as in statistical research.

Yin (in Tellis 1997:4 on www.nova.edu) identifies specific types of case studies: exploratory cases (considered as a prelude to social research), explanatory case studies (used for doing causal investigations) and descriptive cases (which require a descriptive theory to be developed before starting the project). And each of these three approaches can either be single or multiple-case studies, where the latter are replicatory, not sampled cases. Stake (in Denzin & Lincoln 2000: 437-8) also divides the case studies in three specific types: intrinsic – when the researcher has an interest in the case, instrumental – when the case is used to understand more than what is obvious to the observer, and collective – when a group of cases is studied. Yin, Stake and other scholars with wide insights in the case study methodological approach have developed rigorous procedures for case study research strategy.

Thus, in order to look at the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, I opted for a case study approach which allows for in-depth analysis and understanding, expanding the research findings to theoretical propositions. This study will focus on the case of the eastern DRC region to assess rigorously the role of the mass migration of Rwandan Hutu population, following the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in the conflicts that occurred in that region. Specifically, I will examine critically all possible factors linked to the 1996-2006 eastern DRC conflicts.

The main task of my research is to investigate the partial contribution of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees to eastern DRC conflicts in particular and to the Great Lakes Region's instability in general. In order to measure this, I will explore the inter-ethnic relationships in eastern DRC region before and after the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the region, examining the role they played in the attitudinal change towards the Tutsi Congolese, and in the formation of rebel groups involved in DRC conflicts.

To assess the attitudinal change, two variables will be analyzed. As Rokeach (1967:529) opines, attitude change occurs when attitude is activated. And for measuring whether attitude toward someone or something has changed Eagly and Chaiken (1993:63) note that indexes of behaviour aggregated over multiple acts are potential indicators of attitude change if the various actions have in common some degree of favourableness or unfavourableness toward the subject in question. Therefore, in order to elucidate the change of attitude by the “indigenous” groups (mainly Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, Bembe, Congolese Hutu, and Shi) toward the Congolese Tutsis, the most salient variables among others will be examined. Specifically, the study will attempt to assess rigorously: (a) The nature and extent of violent attacks against Congolese Tutsis; (b) The nature and extent of political exclusion and discrimination against Congolese Tutsi. Clearly, a range of other issues such as the mobilization of hostile groups and the use of hate speeches and propaganda by authorities against the Congolese Tutsis may provide useful insights about attitudinal shifts towards them. However, the paucity of relevant hard (non-anecdotal) data renders the use of such measures virtually untenable for this kind of academic exercise. As such, the thesis will look to focus on the narrower range of variables (as already outlined) to assess the extent and nature of the attitudinal changes towards the Congolese Tutsis.

In order to answer to the research question on rebel groups involved in conflicts and establish the link between the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the regional instability that ensued, I will examine closely the constituents of the rebel groups in terms of their ethnicity, their allies, and the motives behind the fighting that occurred in eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006, and the implication of regional intervention in the DRC conflicts.

The tool of qualitative textual analysis of relevant scholarly and non-scholarly documents in the subject area is used. These documents include books, pertinent journal articles, reports, records, magazines, published papers, electronic documents, political documents, and memoirs that deal with issues of politics, conflict, ethnicity, refugees, (migration), Great Lakes Region of Africa, security and peace. Furthermore, a whole range of issues comprising the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC before and after the 1994 Rwanda genocide is assessed. They include: ethnicity and its impact on political, social and economical layers in the three countries mentioned; an assessment of the roles and impact of refugees; rebel groups involved in DRC conflicts, their political and social *raison d’être*, their allies; and the ideologies that marked peace and security issues in the region, will be assessed. In analyzing

the data I have employed content analysis, which provides the tool to present synthesized studies of subject matters. And the classification of the documentary sources into primary, secondary and tertiary categories (Burnham, 2004:165-175) is taken into consideration. All data were ordered and reduced to relate to the objectives of the research in order to confirm (or not) the hypothesis of my study.

5. CHAPTER LAYOUT

This study comprises six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter is a brief review of different scholarly works that dealt with the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region, in general, and in DRC in particular. In the third chapter I investigate the role of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the change of attitudes towards Tutsi Congolese in the eastern DRC, by exploring the inter-ethnic relationships in the DRC before and after the 1994 Rwandan refugees arrived. This chapter examines also the role that ideology of Hutu-Tutsi hatred in Rwanda played in eastern DRC conflict. The fourth chapter comprises a critical analysis of the composition of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugee population and how this might have contributed to the formation of ethnic-based rebel groups in DRC. It also assesses different rebel armed groups involved in the conflict in the eastern DRC and the motivation behind their fight. And in order to assess the role of the 1994 Hutu refugee movements to the instability in the Great Lakes Region, I examine in the fifth chapter the responsibility of these Hutu refugees in the instability that occurred in each country of the Region particularly countries that not only share borders with Rwanda but also which serve as hosts to a considerable number of refugees. Furthermore, this chapter looks at the regional responses to the refugee crisis. A recapitulation of the findings of this research and some recommendations constitute the sixth, concluding chapter.

Chapter Two

A Review of Related Literature

*“Evil is no faceless stranger, living in a distant neighbourhood.
Evil has a wholesome, hometown face, with merry eyes and an open smile.
Evil walks among us wearing a mask which looks like all our faces.”*

--Dean Koontz, *The Book of Counted Sorrows*.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide was one of the greatest cataclysms that marked the world's history. Indeed, in the last two centuries the world has experienced violent conflicts such as the Great Wars, Holocaust, genocides (in Cambodia, Burundi, Bosnia, and recently in Rwanda), and terrorism. Throughout the world a total of 226 armed conflicts have been recorded for the period between 1946 and 2002 (Eriksson et al, 2003:593). Indeed, as Amadou (in Adedeji 1999:22) observes the post-Cold War era has been rendered unstable by crises and regional conflicts all over the world and the post-colonial Africa in particular, has been torn apart by intense and internal conflicts.

Looking therefore at Africa in particular the number of armed conflict increased in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. And at the beginning of the 21st century armed conflicts afflicted 16 of the 54 African countries (Huggins and Clover 2005:1). The four decades between 1960s-1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa was marked by interstate and intrastate conflicts and/or wars, internal strife. The cases of internal conflicts in Congo Brazzaville, DRC, Guinea Bissau, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, the Ethiopia-Eritrea interstate war, illustrate the point (Adedeji 1999:3).

Scholars from different disciplines have attempted to comprehend the post-colonial Africa's conflicts pointing out what could be their root causes. These include scarcity of land and resources, political upheavals, ethnicity and cultural diversities found in Africa among others. Huggins and Clover (2005:2) link conflicts to land scarcity in Africa. They observe that land is at the core of social, economic and political life in most Africa and the lack of clarity regarding property rights and land tenure is a potential cause of conflicts. Uzodike (2000:291)

argues on the other hand that “Africa’s cultural diversity –particularly its ethnic, racial, class (...) regional differences – has been the continent’s most abiding source of conflict in the post-colonial period.” Colonialism is seen to have strongly contributed to the ethnic polarization that marked conflicts in Africa (Pottier 2002:15; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18).

However, Adedeji (1999:7) remarks that “it [would be] ... simplistic to regard conflict, civil strife and political turmoil [in Africa] as merely post-colonial teething problems of independent states and to resort to stereotypic and facile analysis of dumping everything at the door of ethnicism and tribalism.” He goes further to note that Africa’s persistent economic crisis is a consequence of its political crisis and civil wars and strife are violent reactions to the lack of democracy, the denial of human rights, and bad governance. The complexities of the historical, social, economic, and political realities in each particular conflict case are to be critically and analytically considered as far as the African conflict studies are concerned. As Gentili (2005: 38-39) observes,

[w]hen investigating root causes one needs to be aware that each [conflict] case is unique and characterised by a different [or even complex] combination of causes. (...) Cultural differences alone [or ethnicity as such], are not sufficient to bring about violent group mobilization, neither is economic inequality, (...). [And] (...) in order to expose root causes one should start with an adequate understanding of the historical and structural antecedents that have shaped and polarized political identities in the process of state formation.

To achieve lasting peace, conflicts are certainly to be imperatively mastered. The latter requires axiomatically fully comprehending and addressing the root causes and complex factors and forces of conflicts (Adedeji 1999:7). Looking then at the Great Lakes Region of Africa (the focus of this study) various researches have shown that the region faced a dramatic change or even multi-dimensional crisis in post-colonial era: political, social, and economic (Hoyweghen & Smis 2002:575). Furthermore, the ethnicity has been one of the root causes in the conflicts that marked the Great Lakes Region⁹.

Adedeji (1999:9) points out that,

[In the Great Lakes Region] ethnicity has been exploited and manipulated by the societal elites and political leaders who have shown no restraint in manipulating the people through feeding them with prejudices against other ethnic groups...Personal interests and ambitions of those leaders are framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity are rung to rally group support even at the risk of developing animosity against another ethnic group which is considered the enemy.

Some scholars argue further that the instability in the region takes its major roots in the history of each country in the region: the decay of the state and its instruments of the rule in

⁹ In the same line of Gentili’s analysis, Lunn (2006: 67-72) observes that primary causal factors of conflicts that marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa are: ethnicity, state failure and greed.

the DRC (Former Zaire) and the crystallization of ethnic tensions which have characterized Rwanda and Burundi and subsequently resulted in the massive displacement of the population of those countries (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:214; Lemarchand 1994: 89; Mauceri 2004:111). And as Lemarchand (1997) adds, some of the forces that conspired to produce the collapse of the state in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire (currently DRC) are specific to the countries' history and socio-ethnic configurations and others to the complex pattern of interaction arising from the "kin-country" syndrome.

Indeed, the escalation of conflicts in the region (particularly in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) is due to a large extent, the presence in each country of a large population of refugees with searing memories of the violence they experienced or inflicted in their homelands. "... [I]t is in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire that the collapse of state systems is most patently traceable to insurgencies born of refugee flows." The phenomenon of transformation of refugee-generating conflicts into conflict-generating refugees marked these three states (Lemarchand 1997) Rwanda and Burundi's conflicts, the currently troubled eastern DRC region which hosted refugees mostly from Rwanda and Burundi provide a good illustration. Rwanda and Burundi have been characterized by Hutu-Tutsi confrontations, exclusionary policies, and the instrumentalization of Hutu-Tutsi bipolar ethnic set-up, genocides, and movements of refugees in neighbouring countries (Reyntjens 1999:242). And this impacted on the Great Lakes Region. Kabamba (1999:102) confirms also that "the ethnic confrontation which characterized the North and South Kivu region from the 1960s are the consequences of the dramas which Rwanda and Burundi have gone through."

This chapter intends thus to highlight very briefly the impact of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in the Great Lakes Region in general. As mentioned above the present research is a case study focusing on the eastern DRC region. Hence this chapter also includes some assessments regarding DRC conflicts (before and after 1994 Rwandan genocide) from available literature. Firstly the chapter mentions very briefly the Rwandan and Burundian refugees' movement into the eastern DRC region.

2.1. THE EASTERN DRC REGION AND ISSUE OF REFUGEES

The eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo comprising both North and South Kivu provinces (*Appendices 4 and 5*) has accommodated both Hutu and Tutsi populations from Rwanda and Burundi since pre-colonial period. The region has been the most affected part by violence and insecurity that marked DRC since its independence in 1960. Morvan (2006:10) indicates that

From the time of its independence, the DRC has been a focal point for violence, particularly of a political nature. Examples include the mutiny of the public force in 1960, the Katangese secession from 1960 to 1963, the *Muleliste* insurrection in the Bas-Congo in 1964, the Simba rebellion in Kivu from 1964 to 1968, the Lumumbistes guerrillas in the 1970s in the eastern part of the country, and the Katangese police offensives in 1977 and 1978, in Shaba. (...), Kivu remained a place of refuge for smaller armed groups. With hills and abundant vegetation located far from the centre of power, this area is a preferred place of settlement for militia groups.

In 1993 the Kivu region was estimated to account for about 3.5 million people who included the Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) migrants. The other ethnic groups in the region were native ethnic groups comprising Banande, Bakonja, Banduda, Bakomo, Babira, Banyanga, Batembo, Bahunde and Balendu (Abdulai 1995:17; Lemarchand 1997). Throughout the history of the Great Lakes Region the Kivu provinces have been marked by different forms of migrations for political, economic or colonial reasons: cheap labour for tea/coffee growing or mining. Due to these migrations (from Rwanda and Burundi) more than 50 per cent of the population of the Kivu provinces has cultural linkages with Rwanda and Burundi (Abdulai 1995:17). Mamdani (2001:235) observes that the South Kivu province is populated mostly by Tutsis, whereas the North Kivu is dominated by Hutu migrants, autochthones and a few Tutsis.

A sizable number of these migrants from Rwanda and Burundi (both Hutus and Tutsis) migrated into Kivu region long before the advent of colonial rule. This is the case, for instance of the Banyamulenge a Tutsi sub-group of South Kivu. The 'Banyamulenge' labelling in its originality referred to the locality where they first settled *Mulenge* locality; hence they were called "the people of *Mulenge*", *Banya-mulenge*. They are said to have migrated into Kivu regions in the 1880s (Mamdani 2001:235). Another category of migrants are the so-called "transplantes", the thousands of workers (mostly Hutus) "who were brought to the Kivu at the request of the colonial administration to work on tea and coffee plantations [and mining]" (Lemarchand 1997; Mararo 1997:509). The Kivu regions hosted also Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsis) who had fled persistent drought in 1928, 1929 and 1943

and others who came to belong to the DRC during the annexation of some parts of Western Rwanda to the DRC after the Berlin Conference (Pottier 2002:11).

The history of Hutu-Tutsi confrontation both in Rwanda and Burundi has been accompanied by the movement of refugee populations also into eastern DRC region. Such historical events are: the 1959-1962 violent Hutu revolution in Rwanda that led thousands of Tutsis to flee their home; the Burundi 'genocide' of Hutu in 1972 accompanied by Hutu migrations into neighbouring countries (including Kivu regions), exodus of Burundian Hutus following the 'Ntega and Marangara' incidents in 1988, and the Ndadaye's assassination in 1993; then massive Rwandan Hutu refugee populations that followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Lemarchand 1997).

As abovementioned among these migrants from Rwanda and Burundi a sizable number of them happened to be long-time residents of the region many being born in Zaire or tracing their families' origins to pre-colonial migrations. However, the tendency among the native ethnic groups had been to label all Kinyarwanda-speaking communities as 'Banyarwanda', treating them as 'foreign intruders' and consequently are disqualified to claim citizenship rights. Disputes and violent conflicts occurred in 1990s between native tribes and the migrants in Kivu regions over landownership and citizenship rights (Morvan 2006:17). Pottier (2002) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) remark that until 1964 nationality was not an issue for Banyarwanda communities settled in eastern DRC. However, following the 1964 Constitution that reformed the nationality-right, the majority of Banyarwanda found themselves excluded which created tensions that gradually and occasionally led to conflicts.

Furthermore, Mobutu¹⁰ used ethnicity to secure his reign. In his strategic plan for eastern DRC (the then Zaire) Mobutu promoted "the political ascendancy of leaders whose ethnic groups could not possibly threaten central government either because they were numerically insignificant on the national scale or because they had an ambiguous status" (Pottier 2002:27). Banyarwanda were 'suitable' candidate in this region; and this opportunity helped them to regain the citizenship in 1972. Banyarwanda mainly Tutsi benefited from this Mobutu's political strategy: they acquired important new lands in Masisi and Rutshuru which resulted in landlessness for autochthones and Banyarwanda Hutu. However, the

¹⁰ *Appendix 10*

Banyarwanda peace did not last forever. After the fall of Mobutu's favourite Tutsi Bisengimana (nominated in 1969 to direct the Bureau of presidency of the Republic) in 1981 the 1972 citizenship linked law was annulled. The conflicts broke up: the autochthones against Banyarwanda (Hutus and Tutsis) (Pottier 2002:28).

The governance that marked Zaire after its independence shaped the political, social and economic life of the country and of Kivu region in particular. Baregu (in Khadiagala 2006:60) points out that "Mobutu's regime ... was marked by divisiveness ... economic and political crises, and exclusion of ethnic groups, especially in eastern Congo." During his early years in power Mobutu had made efforts to build a united country but paradoxically he failed to create a political consensus and a real economic development throughout the whole country: Mobutu developed a centralized state under which the provincial governments were just administrative expressions; a state in which reign lack of order maintenance, rampant corruption, weak judiciary, and lack of service delivery. Furthermore, the national economy declined remarkably, provinces being poorer, and by the early 1980s, public funds and resources were to a larger extent private gain property rather than national investment (Clark 2002: 42-3; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:13).

This state dysfunction and national impoverishment, particularly in provinces rich in natural resources especially Kivu region wherein the population could not enjoy economically the riches of their region created frustrations, anger and a fragile milieu susceptible to different forms of conflicts. It is this state of affaires that the massive Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, found in Kivu regions.

2.2. THE 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION

The 1994 Rwandan genocide is said to have played a crucial role in the overall instability of countries neighbouring Rwanda. First, the tragedy left the Rwandan society shaken in almost all the domains of life. The social and economic infrastructure were in total collapse the economy was in a disaster, and bank vaults had been emptied and transported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the 'defeated' regime authorities (Kagame 2005; Scherrer 2002:145). In addition to the great loss in human lives of about 1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed in genocide over 2 million fled in the neighbouring countries, observe Luyt (2003:101) and Shalom (1996:1:14). Furthermore the whole society was left profoundly

traumatised: genocide survivors, the perpetrators and their families (Butera *et al.* 1999:202; Whitman 2005:94). Soon after the flight of Hutu refugees' security in Rwanda became another new concern. The 'defeated' army (ex-FAR) and the militia (*Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*) responsible for the genocide took full control over the huge number of refugee camps in eastern DRC and posed a serious threat to Rwanda and to the region as a whole (Crisp and Tan 1998: vii; Reyntjens 1995:39).

Furthermore the Rwandan Hutu refugees became an additional 'burden' to DRC and Tanzania, which were already hosting Burundian refugees. The latter had fled killings in Burundi. As Scherrer (2002: 153) recalls insecurity and civil war was still covering Burundi "in almost every part of the country and the economic decline and collapse of the state continued." Part of the Rwandan Hutu refugees took refuge in the north of Burundi. A region mostly occupied by the Burundian Hutus. Nevertheless, these refugees could not feel at ease as their fellow compatriots in DRC. They feared the Tutsi- dominated Government and army in Burundi. And this might have been one among other reasons that led them to join and strengthen the Burundian Hutu rebels once they set their foot on the soil of Burundi (Scherrer 2002:153).

In the historical events that marked Burundi and which many writers liken to that of Rwanda were two major explosions of violence: the 1972 events when the Tutsi-dominated army perpetrated killings against Hutus and the October 1993 Hutu's 'partial' genocide that followed the death of the democratically elected president Ndadaye. After the death of Ndadaye (a Hutu) many Tutsis in the rural area were the first victims and else where in the country the army carried out the killings of Hutu. Many Burundian Hutus took exile in the south of Rwanda. They are said to have participated in the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda (Lemarchand 1997). Since 1959 events in Rwanda would have most probably repercussions in Burundi, and vice versa. Lemarchand (1997) remarks that the fate subjected to one ethnic group in either country would be followed by horrible consequences against the opposite group. Thus, although Hutu-Tutsi antagonism has marked the Burundian society, the Rwandan genocide aggravated the interethnic tension.

Although it hosted thousands of Rwandan refugees the impact of the genocide in Tanzania was not as tragic as in DRC or in Burundi. Whitaker (2003) observed that:

They [refugees] were settled in a dozen camps along the border. Suddenly, rural hinterlands were transformed into sprawling cities and sleepy towns became headquarters for hi-tech aid operations. Business and trade flourished, as agricultural production, employment, and capital flows all increased. At the same time, crime, environmental degradation, and inflation caused resentment among Tanzanian hosts.

Certainly, Tanzania did remain quite stable despite a caseload of Hutu refugees the country hosted from Burundi and Rwanda. This might be thanks to its political stability and social harmony of its multiethnic society. Generally the country did not know any ethnic hostility, violence or any other kind of serious instability (Whitaker 2000:218). However a sudden massive migration that produces a society within a society cannot leave the hosting society without any extra burden. Maina (1997:81) states that life in Ngara¹¹, Muleba and Karagwe (in Tanzania) was affected by the massive influx of 1994 Hutu refugees: such as an increase in crime and banditry especially in the hosting areas. And the government of the Republic of Tanzania which had to shoulder all the responsibility of dealing with the unexpected guests had to create and implement new refugee policies. In addition due to their proximity to Rwandan borders the refugee camps threatened the new regime in Rwanda and thus risked putting into jeopardy the diplomatic relations between both countries (Whitaker 2000:217).

The Democratic Republic of Congo, as already discussed, has witnessed the most tragic repercussions of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Kisangani (2000:165) observed that of the outflow of 2.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the genocide “Congo hosted 1.1 to 1.25 million, (...) among these were some 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers (ex-FAR) and 30,000 to 40,000 Hutu militiamen (*Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*) who had been responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.” This massive influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees particularly into eastern DRC impacted remarkably on the region: loss of human lives, ecological damage, infectious diseases, increased criminality, and long-lasting and destructive wars. McNulty (1999:56), Reyntjens (1999:242) and Kisangani (2000: 165) point out that the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen were involved in the killings of Tutsi in North Kivu. Soon after crossing the borders aiming at making Rwanda ungovernable the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen also started launching attacks into Rwanda from bases in refugee camps (Prunier 2001: 152; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18; Reyntjens 1999: 242). Rwanda responded to these attacks by invading DRC in 1996, and destroying the refugee camps in eastern DRC (Kisangani 2000: 168). It also militarily backed Kabila’s movement that overthrew Mobutu’s

¹¹ Appendix 8

regime in 1997 (Mararo 2002:52; Reyntjens 1999: 242). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) adds that “nearly 4 million Congolese have died as a result of the consequences of the war waged by Rwanda in the Congo since 1998 (...).”

Following the 1994 Rwanda genocide the DRC has fallen into brutal wars in which armed groups from the DRC and neighbouring countries committed horrible atrocities to civilians, observe Longombe *et al* (2008:132). As testified by the available literature, these post-genocide DRC conflicts have appeared to be multidimensional and complex in character.

The following section will briefly present some of the analyses of conflicts that ravaged DRC following the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

2.3. EASTERN DRC CONFLICTS

Various scholarly studies have been carried out to decode the complexities of eastern DRC conflicts. Different analytical views have emerged. Some studies classify the conflicts in eastern DRC as mainly “war economy” (Jackson 2002:520; Chabal and Gentili 2005:132; Scherrer 2002:256; Autesserre 2006:6-7). Others argue that conflicts rooted in Kivu regions were “wars of liberation” and regional security (Reyntjens 1999:243; McNulty 1999:54-56; Solomon 1997:3). Some other scholars also affirm that ethnicity is the major driving force behind these conflicts (Rutazibwa 1999:17; Pottier 2002:40-41; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004:397; International Crisis Group 2007:22-28). Some studies add that the military presence of Rwanda and Uganda on DRC soil since 1996 fuelled animosities and fear among ethnic groups and led to the escalation of conflicts. Rwanda and Uganda were seen as dominant powers with much control over the country natural resources and with intention to extend their regional ‘Tutsi-dominated’ hegemony (Reyntjens 1999:243-4, McNulty 1999:53-4 and the *International Crisis Group* (ICG) 2007:11).

Jackson (2002:520) argues that “[t]he long, slow rotting from within of Mobutu’s Zaire permitted the Kivus to build a degree of political and economic autonomy during the 1980s and 1990s.” The ethnic polarisation with the interethnic war in 1993 and the knock-on effects of the 1994 Rwanda genocide marked the region. Two national ‘wars of liberation’ emerged (in 1996 and 1998), both rooted in the Kivu region’s convoluted mixture of political machination, communal violence, borders sensitivity, and mainly the exploitation of mineral

and agricultural wealth of the region (Jackson 2002:520). Jackson observes further that before Kabila¹² (who led the Rwanda-backed AFDL that overthrew Mobutu in 1996/7) reached Kinshasa, “foreign mineral concerns concluded lucrative mining concessions with him, financing his climb to power and consolidating their position to profit from it” (Jackson 2002:520).

Trefon (in Chabal and Gentili, 2005: 132) opines that Western companies fuelled the conflicts with business and trade transactions involving minerals originating from the DRC particularly in the eastern region. Rwanda and Uganda¹³ as well as their Congolese allies fought for Kisangani because of its gold and diamonds, affirms Trefon (in Chabal and Gentili 2005: 137). As the DRC conflicts went on, the DRC was portioned. The Kivu region was ruled by the Rwanda-backed RCD (*Rassemblement Congolais Démocratique*)¹⁴. The latter became “the vehicle through which elite networks reap the harvest of Kivutien mineral wealth ...” maintains Jackson (2002:520).

Scherrer mentions also that “[for] Rwanda and Uganda [in DRC] their first war aim (to clear their border of domestic rebel groups) was followed (...) by far more ambitious aims that was (in 1996) to chase away dictator Mobutu and in 1998 to chase away the new dictator (Kabila) and to control large parts of the huge Congo including some of its mineral deposits” (Scherrer 2002:256). Autesserre (2006:6-7) remarks that the claim of Rwanda to secure its border by pursuing the *Interahamwe* and the *Forces Démocratique de Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR) was just a pretext to have a hand on Kivu region so to protect the Rwandaphones and to exploit the Congo’s resources. He argues that

[O]nly a small number of those responsible for the 1994 genocide [and *Interahamwe*] were in the Congo. Most of the FDLR were people who had arrived in the Congo when they were young, had grown up there as refugees, and used violence because they had no other means of subsistence. ... [And] Kagame¹⁵ knew that the FDLR was not a real threat to Rwanda, but he had several reasons to prefer either its extermination or continued roaming in the Congo (Autesserre, 2006:6-7).

¹² Appendix 10

¹³ Appendix 10

¹⁴ As it will be discussed in the following chapters, the 1996-2006 DRC conflicts that followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide can be divided into three phases: the first phase is the 1996-7 war that overthrew Mobutu’s regime, the second phase is the 1998 war that aimed at changing Laurent Kabila’s regime (RCD emerged at this stage), and the third phase consisted of violent conflicts that followed the death of Laurent Kabila. Throughout these conflicts, 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, the Rwanda were among the key players (Reyntjens 1999).

¹⁵ Appendix 10

Reyntjens (1999:243), McNulty (1999:56) and Solomon (1997:3) argue on the other hand, that the main reason of the alliance which backed the Kabila's *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation* (AFDL) that overthrew Mobutu – Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi – was intended to remove a major source of instability for those countries. Rebel movements: Uganda's Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Rwanda's former government army FAR (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*) and *Interahamwe* militia and Burundi's CNDD-FDD (*Conseil National pour la Defence de la Démocratie-Force pour la Defence de la Démocratie*) benefited from Congolese territory as bases for assault and retreat. Reyntjens (1999:243) states that the status of the Banyarwanda (and the Congolese Tutsi in particular) and the regional security were main factors in eastern DRC conflicts.

The 1994 Rwandan refugees' case – the defeated Rwandan regime (FAR, militia and government agents) and the panicked population – in eastern DRC served Mobutu purposes on both international and domestic fronts (Reed 1998:139) on the one hand, but it was also a cause of major alarm to the regional security. Additionally, McNulty (1999:54) observes that the context of the 1996 DRC conflicts was marked by a weakened Mobutu's state that later on crumbled subject to trilateral strain of: (a) implosion, given the non-functioning of the state, (b) revolution, born of the population's resultant alienation, anger and frustration, and (c) external sabotage. He maintains thus that the regional implication in the war within Zaire “should not be confused with the long-term goals of Congolese nationalism and its campaign against Mobutu which dates back to 1965” (McNulty 1999:55). McNulty (1999:7, 63, 71) brings up that for some political reasons the external key players (USA, but mainly France) distanced themselves gradually from Mobutu (their figure they had created during Cold War). This combined with the “fertile insurrectionary ground of popular discontent” together with the regional affairs – security – made possible Mobutu's overthrow leading the country into complex conflicts.

The literature above suggests generally that the key factors in DRC conflicts (since 1996) were: regional security, need of regime change in DRC and economic interests. The weakened Mobutu's state led to difficult life conditions in the country and frustration among Congolese populations (McNulty (1999:54). As mentioned in Chapter One and as observe Hulsizer and Woolf (2005: 104-110) difficult life conditions and crises increase the likelihood of violent conflicts. However, these analyses mention little about the possible role refugees had in DRC conflicts and regional insecurity.

Some other scholarly analysis of the eastern DRC conflicts points out that the latter is part of the big picture of the Great Lakes Region's ethnic conflicts. The argument maintains that although the post-genocide DRC conflicts are certainly too complex and multi-dimensional to be exclusively labelled ethnic conflicts ethnicity has been a crucial catalytic factor. Rutazibwa argues that "*la cause fondamentale de l'instabilité dans la région des Grands Lacs n'est autre que l'idéologie ethniste anti-Tutsi ...*" (the fundamental cause of the instability in the Great Lakes Region is merely the ethnic anti-Tutsi ideology ...) (Rutazibwa 1999: 9). He observes that the influx of the 1994 Rwandan refugees aggravated and changed the tune of the inter-ethnic conflict in the DRC Kivu region (Rutazibwa 1999:17).

Pottier (2002:40-41), Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004: 397) also note that different Congolese groups including Hutus and Tutsis were conflicting over the land since 1992 – 3. And these conflicts turned into ethnic confrontation: when the Hutus fought Bahunde and Banyanga, Tutsis joined in on the side of Bahunde. In mid July 1994 more than a million refugees allowed for further manipulation of ethnic groups. In Ituri (in Kivu region) an ethnic extremism which involved Congolese of the region (Lendu, Hema) and their outside supporters (mainly Rwanda and Uganda) grew stronger after the 1994 Rwanda genocide (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004:396-7). Kabamba (1999: 103) notes that the formation of the rebel groups which were engaged into armed conflict in eastern DRC since 1996 started in the context of a well-known ethnic kinship in the region between Rwandese and Zairians (Hutu or Tutsi origin). The *International Crisis Group* (2007:22-28) reports that "[t]he presence of Rwanda rebels in eastern Congo was a principle reason for the war against Mobutu and has remained an obstacle to lasting peace in the region." It maintains that although political and economic factors came into play in eastern DRC conflicts ethnicity was the major driving force.

Laurent Kabila's government encouraged divisive ideas between groups as a way to cement power (www.asyl.net/Magazin/docs). He created a state propaganda machine aimed at fuelling animosities against Tutsis. "[I]ncreasing numbers of the local militias, such as the *mai-mai* and the Bembe, lent [then] a helping hand to Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups" (Reyntjens 1999:243). Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi responded by encouraging and backing the Tutsi and other anti-Kabila forces to rebel in 1998, with aim of eliminating rebel problem in their border areas and to protect Tutsi in DRC. Angola,

Zimbabwe and Namibia backed Kabila with Angola and Namibia aiming at attacking the *National Union for the Total Independence of Angola* (UNITA) rebels.

Certainly a healthy scepticism is always to be maintained regarding these analyses and the like since there is a reasonable probability that any theoretical analysis particularly in its interpretation of empirical data and its speculations may be erroneous. However the very fact that the DRC conflicts are seen from different angles as presented above confirms the complexity of the conflicts in question. The three analytical approaches display different underlying factors that marked the DRC's conflicts, the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of these conflicts that ravage the country. Factors such as ethnicity, economic interest, regional security, Congolese's frustration and anger rising from the state's dysfunction, corruption and impoverishment and the unsolved issue of citizenship rights for the Congolese population of Rwandan origin have played significant catalyzing roles in shaping the DRC conflicts (*International Crisis Group* 2007:22-28).

In the analyses discussed above, less attention is given to the issue of refugees in the greater picture of DRC's conflicts. The question remains: can refugees become a source of insecurity? It seems this is the case according to Havinga and Bocker (in Muggah 2006:5), Collier (in Furley 2006:2) and Lemarchand (1997). As mentioned above the Great Lakes Region has been marked by movements of refugees, mainly conflict-generated refugees from one state into the other. Pottier (2002:41-42) and Lemarchand (1997) observe that refugee flows have been to a large extent, the vehicles through which emotions were unleashed, ethnic ties manipulated, and collective energies mobilized. They remark that the massive arrival of Hutu refugees including ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* from Rwanda in 1994 in the eastern DRC affected the interethnic relationships in the region. The Banyarwanda frame of reference dissolved into a rigid Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy that gradually infected the whole region. However questions touching the mechanisms, pathways, dispositions that render refugees a contributory factor in conflicts or source of insecurity are not fully explored and answered. It is in this line that I see this study making a contribution, by exploring closely and critically what might have been the role of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in the DRC's conflicts.

Chapter Three

The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the change of attitudes toward Tutsi Congolese in the eastern DRC

*“There is no such thing as an inevitable war.
If war comes it will be from failure of human wisdom.”*

Andrew B. Law

3.0. OVERVIEW

While all the countries of the Great Lakes Region of Africa felt the impact of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in one way or another: particularly in terms of refugees flow, the Democratic Republic of Congo has witnessed the most disastrous repercussions of this genocide. Following the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (including ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) into the DRC the Congolese society particularly in the eastern region has been torn apart by complex and multidimensional chain of violent conflicts till today. The Congolese society in Kivu region has become more ethnically polarized and infected by an increasingly sharp anti-Tutsi sentiment. This chapter intends to discuss the shift in Congolese interethnic relationships, following the 1994 Rwanda genocide with specific focus on the change of attitudes toward Congolese Tutsi in the eastern Kivu provinces.

Eagly and Chaiken (1993:63) point out that indices of behaviour aggregated over multiple acts are potential indicators of attitude change if the various actions have in common some degree of favourableness or unfavourableness toward the subject in question. Hence, in order to elucidate the change of attitude by the other Congolese ethnic groups toward the Congolese Tutsis, the chapter attempts to assess rigorously two variables among others: the nature and extent of violent attacks against Congolese Tutsis; and the nature and extent of political exclusion and discriminations against Congolese Tutsis. And this assessment will be carried out by studying the interethnic relationships before and after 1994 in DRC society,

with a focus on Kivu provinces. The chapter is thus divided into three main sections. The first section examines some main characteristics of the interethnic relationships in eastern DRC region before 1994, i.e. before the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in the region. The second section analyses the interethnic relationships in eastern DRC region following the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the region. In both sections the above outlined variables are the key notes of the study. The last section argues that the hatred ideology used in 1994 Rwanda genocide played a crucial role in the eastern DRC conflict, particularly in the attitudinal change.

The chapter findings show that before 1994 there was no record of antagonism or any form of violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern DRC. Although in Kivu region an anti-Banyarwanda sentiment prevailed (Hutu and Tutsi collectively) before 1994, there was no anti-Tutsi feeling or violent attacks and political exclusion targeting exclusively the Congolese Tutsi (Mamdani 1999: 56-7; Mararo 1997: 506-8; Prunier 2001: 147-8; Lemarchand 1997). However, following the arrival of 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees (including the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) in Kivu region interethnic schisms erupted, the Congolese Tutsi became a target of violent attacks and socio-political exclusion (Reyntjens 1999: 242-4; Prunier 2001: 149-152). Certainly various factors contributed to this attitudinal change as underlined by this chapter. And as mentioned in Chapter One, this study is mainly constructed upon the Staub's theoretical perspective, 'Basic Needs'. Furthermore, with an intellectual humility, I should confess that the complexity and multidimensionality of the DRC conflicts have proved most of all currently published studies on these conflicts to be limited in one way or the other. Thus, an attentive discernment has been objectively and critically employed to focus on more balanced documentary data relevant to this research.

3.1. PRELIMINARY TO THE CHAPTER: WORKING DEFINITIONS OF ATTITUDE AND IDEOLOGY

The conceptual definition of attitude that is used in this chapter is that of Eagly and Chaiken (1993:1) stating that 'attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour'. *Psychological tendency* refers to a state that is internal to the person or group of people and *evaluating* refers to all classes of evaluative responding, affective or behavioural in our case. Thus elucidating any form of affective or behavioural change in interethnic relationships (focusing on Tutsi group mostly)

in eastern Kivu provinces of DRC linked to the arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees will permit the measurement of attitude change and assessment of the contribution of these refugees in this change of attitude. Furthermore, paraphrasing a political psychologist Lawrence Bobo (in Jost & Sidanius 2004:341) attitudinal forms in group conflict or tension and violent conflict among groups are not merely an inevitable outcome of structural inequality. But factors such as ideology are required to motivate attitudinal change or group conflict. Hence in the third section this chapter looks at the hatred of ideology linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

The meaning of the term ‘ideology’ has shifted throughout humankind history¹⁶. Definitions of ideology provided by a number of scholars present a common theme in what ideology is all about. As they suggest the latter is constructed as a response to ‘difficult life conditions’ in a society and aims at giving a vision of a better future. Baradat (1997:7-8) indicates that some scholars like Watkins Frederick argue that “ideologies are always opposed to the *status quo*... usually militant, revolutionary and violent. For Ingersoll ideologies assess the *status quo* and predict the future and the latter is always represented as something better than the present or the past.” Baradat (1997:9) then offers four main points or characteristics of an ideology stating that

Ideology is first and foremost a political term....Second, ideology consists of a view of the present and a vision of the future. The preferred future is presented as a materialistic improvement over the present. This desirable future condition is often attainable according to the ideology, within a single life time. As a result, one of the outstanding features of an ideology is its offer of hope. Third, ideology is action-oriented. It not only describes reality and offers a better future, but most important, it gives specific directions about the steps that must be taken to attain this goal. Fourth, ideology is directed towards the masses.”

The above Baradat’s characteristics of an ideology will thus constitute the framework for the conceptual meaning of the term ideology in this work. There are a number of societies in which ideologies have been used and led to the killings of part of population. Examples are in German under Hitler, in Italy under Mussolini, in Iraq under Saddam (Baradat 1997:255, 259

¹⁶ The word ‘ideology’ was first coined by a French philosopher Destutt de Tracy around the end of the 18th century and was initially dealing with the study of ideas (Institute of Research and dialogue for Peace 2006:20). However Baradat (1997:6-7) points out that throughout history after de Tracy the meaning of ‘ideology’ shifted from referring to ‘science of ideas’ to a concept or system of beliefs with a political connotation. Also the definition of ideology varies according to authors and their respective disciplines. ‘It may be used to describe the shared beliefs of a group of people for example a nation, a religious sect or a group of theorists’ <http://www.wisegeek.com>. For Madeleine Grawitz (in Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace 2006:21) a social scientist defines ideology as a ‘coherent system of ideas and beliefs justifying people’s attitude towards the society and leading to an action which is in accordance with these beliefs’.

& 301) and in Rwanda under Juvenal Habyarimana's rule¹⁷. Baradat (1997:252-5) mentions that ideologies that destroyed societies in German, Italy and in Iraq, emerged when these societies were undergoing social stress, economic and political turmoil.

3.2. INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE EASTERN DRC REGION BEFORE 1994

Before assessing the attitudinal change that might have been surfaced shortly after the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern Kivu provinces of DRC; a brief discussion of the most prominent societal features notably between Banyarwanda and Congolese natives of the region is needed to contextualize the subsequent discussion. Thus, this section intends to look at the interethnic relationships that marked the region before 1994 scrutinizing, if any, violent attacks or political exclusion targeting exclusively Congolese Tutsis. As presented in chapter two the eastern DRC region has accommodated both Hutu and Tutsi populations from Rwanda and Burundi since pre-colonial period. Throughout the history of the Great Lakes Region the Kivu provinces have been marked by

[D]ifferent forms of migrations for social, political, economic or colonial reasons for example: having cheap labour for tea or coffee or mining. [Subsequently] more than 50 per cent of the population of this region has cultural linkages with Rwanda and Burundi (Abdulai 1995:17)

The region counts also a number of different native ethnic groups that include Banande, Bakonja, Banduda, Bakomo, Bavira, Banyanga, Batembo, Babembe, Bahunde, Balendu, and Bafulero (Abdulai 1995:17; Lemarchand 1997). Those Kinyarwanda speaking migrants are categorised into five major groups: (a) the very first Rwandans migrated into eastern DRC since 17th century. Their presence in the region is as ancient as that of native ethnic groups such as Nande, Kumu, Nyanga, Hunde and Tembo.¹⁸ (b) Thousands of people from Rwanda and Burundi deported into eastern DRC for labour for tea, coffee or in mining during the colonial period. (c) Another category of migrants are the so-called '*transplantes*' who were deported into Kivu provinces by the colonial authorities under the *Mission d'immigration des Banyarwanda* (MIB) missioned to counteract demographic pressure in Rwanda. (d) The fourth category comprises Rwandan refugees of the 1959, exclusively Tutsis and the 1994's,

¹⁷ Appendix 10

¹⁸ Mugangu's analyses point out that this category occupied eastern DRC territories such as Jomba, Gisigari, Mushari, Masisi, Idjwi and Rutshuru since 17th century. These migrants inculturated into the local customs and become "native-like"

exclusively Hutus. (e) Lastly, the clandestine migrants who went into DRC in between 1970 and 1990 for various reasons including jobs, business, green pasturage and academics (Mugangu in Guichaoua 2004:667-9).

Correlating to Mugangu's analyses Huggins and Clover (2005:128-9) observe that Kivu provinces hosted Banyarwanda since pre-colonial period. They further add that Banyarwanda who settled in North Kivu were both Hutu and Tutsi whereas the Banyarwanda in South Kivu were exclusively Tutsis later on known as *Banyamulenge*. However, Mugangu (in Guichaoua 2004:638) remarks that the migrations that occurred in eastern DRC were not only from Rwanda and Burundi but also from within the DRC. Some native ethnic groups in eastern DRC came from other parts of Congo mainly in search of fertile lands. These include Havu, Hunde, Hinyi and Bembe, and so many others. The settlement of Banyarwanda (both Hutus and Tutsis) in eastern DRC occurred at different times in different locations with different causes and various circumstances. In other words, their occurrences were of different essential modalities: in pre-colonial period (conquest, free migrations), colonial period (forced and organised migrations) and post-colonial period (political violence, socio-economic migrations). In addition to their differences in the above elucidated aspects, the integration of these migrants into the hosting society (eastern DRC) was also hugely shaped by various factors. These include mainly societal organisation of both the migrants and that of the hosting society and institutions and political structures of the colonial administration. The integration of these migrants defined subsequently their later relationships with the native ethnic groups.

Mugangu (in Guichaoua 2004:646) indicates also that the integration of the pre-colonial migrants was generally smooth with no major problems to the local population. These migrants but mostly those of 17th century either settled in unoccupied areas in the region establishing themselves as a kingdom with a socio-economic and political network with the local kingdoms or subjected themselves to customary systems of local kingdoms. Nevertheless, the Banyamulenge's case has been different in this regard (Vlassenroot 2002:499-515).

An assessment of the migrations in colonial period reveals some of the various factors that handicapped the integration of immigrants. These include the tendency of the Banyarwanda to establish their own customary system of land control refusing to comply with the existing

local authorities. On the other hand, the native ethnic groups felt invaded by the immigrants (Mathieu & Tsongo 1998:392). The mechanisms of the colonial rule also did not permit a proper integration of these migrants creating structures that led later on to an ambiguous identity for the Banyarwanda in the eastern region. This is the case of the '*transplantes*' and those taken to DRC for labour. Consequently, the native ethnic groups always regarded these new immigrants as 'always-foreigners'. The Banyamulenge fell in this category despite their early settlement in the region (Vlassenroot 2002: 510-515, Prunier 2001:147-8, Lemarchand 1997).

The first Banyamulenge Rwandan migrants (Rwandan Tutsi pastoralists) arrived in South Kivu by the end of the 19th century. They established themselves around Lemera creating the Mulenge village named after the neighbouring mountain. As these Tutsi pastoralists started to settle in the region various socio-economical mechanisms impeded peaceful coexistence between them and their neighbouring local ethnic groups (Mamdani 2001:235). Vlassenroot comments that

Upon their arrival in Mulenge, the Tutsi settlers were confronted by local Kingdoms, which prevented them from establishing their own customary system of land control. Access to grazing lands was conditioned by their acceptance of the existing traditional order and their becoming subjects of the local traditional authorities. (...) the pastoral mode of life [of Tutsi pastoralists, new immigrants] seriously clashed with the original agrarian societies of Itombwe because of a different use of the available economic space ... and so seriously disrupted the existing mode of exchange (Vlassenroot 2002:499-515).

Another point worth emphasizing in this discussion is that since pre-colonial and early colonial period cattle tenure represented wealth in the region. And this provided Tutsi and Tutsi Banyamulenge (pastoralists) high economic status that developed into "an ideology of natural superiority in relation to the rest of the local population" (Muzuri 1983:35). This cultural and social isolation of the Banyamulenge provoked among local native ethnic groups a negative sentiment towards the Tutsi settlers. However, as all Kinyarwanda-speaking people were considered to be 'foreigner intruders' by native ethnic groups, this negative sentiment was later on dissolved into anti-Banyarwanda feeling (Mararo 1997: 506-517; Vlassenroot 2002:504; Prunier 2001: 149-150; Lemarchand 1997). Furthermore, as remarks Mugangu (in Guichaoua 2004:647-8) the colonial rule (Belgian) drastically changed the territorial socio-political organisation introducing new land policies and in some cases replacing the local traditional authorities by the new immigrants in the region. These colonial administrative structures hampered the relations between immigrants and local communities rendering a healthy integration far from being realised. Conflicts between Banyarwanda and

autochthones erupted in various occasions.¹⁹ In 1945 and 1957 the first conflict opposed ‘*transplantes*’ from Rwanda who settled in Masisi area to the customary chiefs. The former wanted autonomy of the area they populate. Nonetheless, the conflict did not result in physical violence but it did create a rift in their social interrelationship (Mararo 1997: 508-510).

The post-independence regimes in DRC failed to effectively deal with the issue of the ambiguous status (blamed to the colonial administration) of the immigrants; and different conflicts occurred between Banyarwanda and native ethnic groups over land and political claims. In 1962 and 1963 another conflict opposed the Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda) to the autochthones Hunde. Banyarwanda who had occupied political positions in the municipality were replaced by autochthones Hunde. During this period many Tutsi were fleeing from Rwanda toward the eastern Kivu provinces due to massacres against them. They joined in the conflict on the side of Hutu against autochthones. According to scholars such as Mararo (1997: 520-1), Prunier (2001:147-8) and Lemarchand (1997) this war called ‘*kanyarwanda*’ was largely linked to the question of land and that of nationality which was raised when the Banyarwanda wanted to participate in the provincial assembly elections. Pottier (2002:26) observes that the problems between who is ‘native’ and who is ‘non-native’ polarized the eastern DRC region. Hence “the more Banyarwanda and autochthonous elites jostled for political power, the more strongly the theme of ‘the foreigner’ – and that of ethnicity – emerged in political discourse.”

Mathieu & Tsongo (1998:397) maintain that following the 1962-5 ‘*kanyarwanda*’ conflict till 1990 a long calm prevailed in the Kivu region; only small scale violence would surface occasionally in the communities at a local level. According to the same authors; serious local violence started between 1990 and 1993. During this period Zaire’s (now DRC) politics was taking another shape: multiparty democracy was introduced. Congolese Hutu and Tutsi whose nationality was annulled in 1981 were now hoping that the new democratic system will effectively deal with their problem. The CNS (*Conference Nationale Souveraine*) was also introduced to discuss the future of the country. Banyarwanda representatives were

¹⁹ This observation is also made by Vlassenroot (2002:503), reporting that at the beginning of the 20th century, the Belgian colonial rule introduced in Kivu region the system of *petites chefferies*, with newly appointed chiefs. Banyamulenge were subsequently granted control over several of these *petites chefferies*. However, in 1933, the autonomous *chefferies* of Banyamulenge were abolished.

denied participation for the reason that they are not Congolese. The Banyarwanda, feeling isolated and threatened, resolved to take up arms against the autochthones. In 1993 the latter organized by local politicians retaliated and killed a number of Hutu and caused others to be displaced and to lose their land (Jackson 2002: 520, Mararo 1997: 510-20).

The point stressed in the above discussion is that the integration of Rwandan immigrants in Kivu region since pre-colonial period²⁰ did not proceed smoothly. Various factors such as economic, political and colonial administrative mechanisms created a climate that preconditioned different forms of conflicts between immigrants and native ethnic groups. Subsequently, the Banyarwanda both Hutus and Tutsis continued to be regarded as foreigners. A crucial feature for subsequent discussion is that both Hutus and Tutsis were collectively called by native ethnic groups Banyarwanda and foreign intruders. Lemarchand (1997) points out that,

...although neither Hutu nor Tutsi are a homogeneous lot, until recently the tendency among the “native tribes” has been to lump them together as “Banyarwanda” and to use the label as synonym for “foreign intruders”. That a sizable number of them happened to be long-time residents of the area, that many were born in Zaire, or traced the origins of their families to pre-colonial migrations, seemingly made no difference.

This part of this discourse suggests that before the 1994 no major antagonisms or forms of conflict occurred between Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern Kivu provinces. This was despite tensions and violent conflicts in neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Burundi) between Hutu and Tutsi since colonial period. Hutu-Tutsi interrelationships in Kivu region were not affected. Both Hutu and Tutsi in DRC were collectively called Banyarwanda by autochthones, and were also seen as foreigners and non-native, which disqualified them to claim any citizenship rights. This solidified a collective self-awareness among the Banyarwanda. It follows from above that in all the conflicts that would oppose the Banyarwanda and the autochthones whether in North Kivu or in South Kivu, the autochthones would fight ‘Banyarwanda’ collectively as or ‘foreigners’ not as Hutus or Tutsi or even Tutsi Banyamulenge. In other words, no anti-Tutsi sentiment or violent attack targeting exclusively Tutsi occurred in Kivu region before 1994.

²⁰ The 17th century immigrants are exceptions. Their presence in the region is as ancient as that of native tribes such as Nande, Kumu, Nyanga, Hunde and Tembo.

3. 3. THE ARRIVAL OF 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES IN EASTERN DRC AND ITS IMPACT

As mentioned in Chapter Two of the outflow of 2.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the genocide Congo hosted about 1.5 million among these were some 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers (ex-FAR) and 30,000 to 40,000 Hutu militiamen (*Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*) and high political officials of the overthrown Rwandan government (ministers and parliamentarians) most of them were responsible for the genocide in Rwanda (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18; Kambanda ICTR case 97-23; Hintjens 1999: 254 & 264-6; Mamdani 1999: 57; Odora 2007: 6-7). About 850 thousands of these refugees went to Northern Kivu (Goma) and about 630 thousands to Southern Kivu (Kisangani 2000:165; Tegelen in Scherrer 2002: xiv; Scherrer 2002:145).

This huge number of Rwandan Hutu refugees chose to move toward the DRC not only because of its border-proximity with Rwanda but also because of the longstanding good diplomatic relationships and ‘personal’ friendship between Habyarimana and Mobutu. With a background that in 1994 the collapse of Mobutu’s Zaire was taking a momentum, McNulty (1997:70) observes further that the relocation of the 1994 ‘defeated’ Rwandan regime comprising the ex-FAR, the short-lived interim government that oversaw the genocide, militias and ordinary people, into the DRC territory served Mobutu’s purposes on international and domestic fronts. Reed (in McNulty 1997:71) remarks that,

By hosting a movement which threatened to perpetuate regional instability, Zaire became a key player in any attempt to achieve an internationally backed settlement to the crisis. Within Zaire’s domestic political realm, the FGR [former government of Rwanda] ... represented a strong authority which had a long pattern of cooperation with the central government of Zaire and which, because of its status as a foreign power on Zairean territory, was likely to strengthen rather than weaken the influence of Kinshasa.

Arriving in the DRC and in eastern Kivu provinces in particular, the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees reorganised themselves politically, socially and economically establishing relationships with the local authorities. Royer (in Guichaoua 2004:432-5) wrote that as they started crossing the Rwandan borders seeking refuge into the DRC the 1994 Rwandan refugees were dispersed in Kivu regions forming small communities wherever they could find viable space for their survival. He further adds that UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations in order to attend to their needs had regrouped these refugees into camps in Kivu regions by end of 1994. The then Zairean authority failed to control and organise the influx of these refugees. Clapham (1998:138), Murison (in Clark 2003:226) and Nzongola-

Ntalaja (2002:337) report that these refugees were settled in camps in Kivu regions (North and South) stretching along the borders of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda; some other refugees camps were established in lake Kivu's islands.

However with RPF's victory the power structure changed in the region and the presence of these Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC became the unbearable threat to regional security. This factor contributed to the complete fall of the Mobutu's regime. Two national 'war of liberation' (in 1996 and 1998) erupted from Kivu region, and the latter became more ethnically polarized: anti-Tutsi sentiment emerged as one of the key notes in the complex chain of conflicts since 1996 (McNulty 1997:71). And in order to properly grasp this knock-on effect of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in the DRC, especially the abrupt reconfiguration of interethnic relationships in the region, the discussion that follows assess the life conditions that prevailed in the region.

(i) The 1994 Rwandan refugees and life conditions in the eastern DRC

Prior to the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in eastern Kivu provinces the political social and economic conditions were shaken and deteriorating to a certain extent. The non development that has become like a 'signal feature' of the nation, the political chaos and disorder, the longstanding dysfunction of the state, national economic decline, destruction of public infrastructures, corruption and injustice had created alienation, anger and frustration among the Congolese people (McNulty 1997:54). The Kivu region in particular experienced significantly a progressive retreat of the state authority under Mobutu, this affected economic and political life of the region. The latter developed self-governance mechanisms which were ineffective in many aspects: security, public service delivery and economic development (Autesserre 2006:9).

In additional, the Kivu society has been characterised by a history of conflicts between Banyarwanda and 'natives' and unsolved issue of citizenship rights of Banyarwanda who were consistently regarded as 'foreigners' (Autesserre 2006:9; Jackson 2002:520). The massive arrival of 1994 Rwandan refugees in eastern Kivu provinces of the DRC aggravated disorder in the region and in the country as whole. Bukavu and Goma became overpopulated and life conditions became difficult to both refugees and local communities. Increase of food shortage, poor sanitation, promiscuity, spread of cholera and other infectious diseases,

ecological damage, insecurity and economic deterioration led to a humanitarian catastrophe (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005: 18; Royer in Gichaoua 2003:453-457).

The Congolese for instance were to endure a very high inflation rates and could not afford to purchase basic necessities needed for everyday life (Koyame in Clark 2003:208). Security in both Kivu provinces deteriorated due to the presence of armed groups: ex-FAR and militia Interahamwe, and uncontrolled groups of FAZ. In their letters to then Primer minister of the DRC and to Misereor's representative; GRAPES²¹ and Archbishop of Bukavu Mgr Munzihirwa Christophe (in de Dorlodot 1996: 137 & 139) expressed the alarming increase of insecurity and panic in Bukavu due the presence of 'uncontrolled' and 'undisciplined' FAZ and armed ex-FAR. The issue of land tenure and Banyarwanda citizenship rights had hampered the peaceful coexistence among the different ethnic groups in the region. As detailed in chapter two and the previous section unsolved tension and violent conflicts over land between Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) and autochthones had become a sensitive characteristic of the Kivu regions and weakened the social realm.

Studies have shown that such political social and economic hardships as those outlined above may create an environment conducive to violent conflict. For instance, Staub (2003: 369) observes that difficult life conditions²² (which include severe economic problems, political disorganisation and upheaval, persistent conflict between groups in a society or their combination) are primary starting points of violence in a society. Indeed, as all these conditions hinder the country's social, political and economic security so they affect individual persons and group members. In such a milieu as the political psychologists Jost and Banaji (in Jost & Sidanius 2004:294-5) opine people seek explanation or justification for the prevailing social conditions and their situation.

When people are facing difficult life conditions not only their material needs (such as food, shelter, and clothing) are frustrated but also beyond that their 'universal psychological needs' (for feeling secure, for feeling effective, for a positive identity, for positive connection to other people, for a comprehension of reality and of one's own place in the world) are

²¹ GRAPES: *Groupe de Reflexion et d'Analyse Politique, Economique et Sociale de l'Archidiocese de Bukavu*. The group is composed of priests and ordinary Christians. The aim of the group is to reflect on and analyse the political, economic and social issues of the region and Zaire and that of the neighbouring countries.

²² *Appendices 6 to 9*

affected. In a way to deal with those difficulties people will often tend to respond in destructive ways. For instance, economic crises, political crises or the effects of war were present in the immediate years prior to or concomitant with the following genocides: the Holocaust at the hands of the Nazis, the genocide in Bangladesh, the genocide of the Armenians by the Young Turks, the Cambodian genocide and the Rwandan genocide (Hulsizer and Woolf 2005: 104-105). Furthermore Staub (2000:370) adds that,

To satisfy needs for identity and connection, people often turn to a group...They scapegoat another group for life problems, which protects their identity, strengthens connection within the group, and provides a psychologically useful ... understanding of events. As part of the process leading to violence, the group usually creates or adopts an ideology.

Certainly, the above described conditions that prevailed in DRC and in eastern Kivu province in particular have psychologically impacted on both the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the host population (both natives and Banyarwanda) framing subsequently the society and relationships among ethnic groups in the region. Based on Staub's theoretical perspective these conditions frustrated and paralyzed people's ability to protect themselves, to control their lives' circumstances, threatening deeply their identity or psychological self, values, beliefs and adequate views of reality.

Such conditions coupled with cultural-societal characteristics (history of aggressiveness and unhealed wounds from past conflicts) created to a larger extent predispositions for attitude change and group violence in eastern DRC. In the face of persistent difficult life conditions the group (s) that is designated as an 'enemy', 'out-group' or as a 'scapegoat' is likely to face violent actions against it (Staub 2003:295-9). The section that follows examines the occurrence and development of such a phenomenon in Kivu provinces.

(ii) The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and interethnic relationships in eastern DRC

The presence of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees mainly ex-FAR and militia *Interahamwe* perpetrated to a larger extent terror, criminality and drove a permanent wedge into the Banyarwanda community in the eastern region (Kisangani 2000: 167-8; Pottier 2002:41; Scherrer 2002:145). The ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* soon after crossing the Rwandan border reorganized, rearmed and started launching attacks into Rwanda (Dunn in Clark 2003:55; Nzungola-Ntalaja 2005:18). They controlled the camps in full view of the UN agencies; and they altered interethnic relations in Kivu by initially mobilizing the Zairean Hutu militants

(mostly the displaced in 1993) and spreading anti-Tutsi propaganda. Zairean Tutsis were attacked and killed in many occasions. Kisangani (2000: 167) remarks that,

The influx of refugees and the presence of the ex-FAR in refugee camps altered interethnic relations in Kivu. In North Kivu this broke an old alliance within the Banyarwanda, who, until July 1994, had fought together against local Hunde and Nyanga groups even when the Hutu and the Tutsi were involved in ethnic conflict in Rwanda. Second, the arrival of Hutu refugees, including ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen, also fuelled ethnic hatred towards the Banyamulenge in South Kivu over the land and nationality issues. ... local politicians used the Hutu refugees to exploit rivalry over nationality rights in the two provinces.

With the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees new alliances were formed and gradually the Tutsi became a target and a common enemy. Vlassenroot (in Kaarsholm 2006:57-8), Mwanasali (in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59) and Kennes (in Arnson and Zartman 2005:144-7) mention that a new coalition in North Kivu region of local Hutu-Banyarwanda, the newcomers (the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugee, their leadership and militias) altered local antagonism between Banyarwanda communities and Congolese natives. In early 1995 the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* joined by the local Hunde and local Hutu people launched attacks on Masisi to disperse and destroy Tutsi. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (mainly ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) aimed at obtaining a viable space near Rwanda, land to cultivate and bases to launch attacks into Rwanda. Hunde on their side were to benefit from these attacks by getting their land back supposedly given to Tutsi by the colonial administration and local Hutu to retake the land they lost in 1993 at the expense of Hunde. After Masisi the next area to expulse Tutsi from was Rutshuru (North Kivu) as a way of consolidating their hold in eastern DRC. The Tutsis were thus singled out gradually as 'out-group' population. And as Staub (2003:299) highlights in persistently difficult life conditions alliances are formed and a group is scapegoated so to provide an explanation to problems and hope to find solutions.

Abdulai (1995:19) and Mwanasali (in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59) report further that not later the Southern part of eastern DRC got infected. A handful of Zairian authorities started harassing Congolese Tutsi and the scene of new ethnic division began to emerge. Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji the then Deputy Governor of South Kivu called upon all non-Tutsi Congolese to launch attacks against Banyamulenge confiscating their property and to send them back to Rwanda and Burundi. Other alliances were born between Rwandan Hutu refugees, Bashi and Barega and later on Babembe. Pottier (2002:41-3) writes that the Hutu refugees succeeded to mobilize these autochthones using the anti-Tutsi ideology²³ which

²³ All Tutsis were portrayed to be the 'enemy' of Bantu population. I will come back on this point in the following sections.

extended the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism into a much broader ideology of ‘Hamitic’ against ‘Bantu’. A new concept of ‘Hutu-land’ in Kivu region surfaced; local and Rwandan Hutu militias campaigning to hunt down the local Tutsi population.

These facts suggest that following the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, the Tutsi became gradually a target of attacks, an enemy to hunt down. The anti-Tutsi ideology (used in the 1994 Rwanda genocide) contributed therefore to the sudden attacks against the Tutsi Congolese in Kivu region (from North up to South Provinces) by the coalition of Hutu Congolese, autochthones (local ethnic groups) and 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees.²⁴

Indeed as Staub (2003:303-5) remarks perpetrators are likely to continuously devalue and kill the group of people they themselves have harmed. The perpetrators exclude their victims from the moral universe, so that killing their ‘enemy’ becomes the right thing to do. In this perspective since quite a good number of the Hutu refugees particularly ex-FAR and Hutu militias had played a role in killing Tutsi during the Rwandan genocide likely they would continue hunting down their ‘enemy’ wherever they are. By the same token, in difficult life conditions, after members of groups have identified their enemy they adopt an ideology that unites them against the perceived enemy (Staub 2003:299). Furthermore, the psychological state of refugees (especially in conditions as those of Kivu region in 1994) may explain also why massive 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees were easily drawn into the ‘*genocidaires*’ plan and campaign of hunting down the Tutsi in Kivu region. Research has shown that after arrival in the new environment, refugees are highly concerned with basic needs; they increasingly become aware of their losses and idealize the past. They (refugees) indicate a more pronounced anxiety, depression, anger and a severe trauma with tendencies of paranoid reactions, hyper-reactive and over-accepting behavioural patterns. In harsh conditions refugees are hence likely to become a threat to peace, reverse the morality and can be drawn into criminal acts (Bariagaber 1999: 604; Cohon 1981:257-8).

Responding to the violent attacks, both the Congolese Tutsis and the Kigali government sought out alternative strategies for their own survival by supporting and contributing to the formation of the rising *Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la liberation du Congo* (AFDL) that toppled Mobutu in May 1997 and installed Laurent Kabila (*Appendix 10*) as the

²⁴ I will come back on this point on ideology in the following section of this chapter

new *Chef d'Etat* (Vlassenroot in Kaarsholm 2006:57; Mwanasali in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59) among others. Since 1996 Congolese Tutsis joined AFDL to secure their survival. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) backed and helped militarily AFDL to secure its borders by pursuing the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* incursions and destroying the refugee camps in Kivu regions. Many refugees were subsequently killed and others fled into jungles of Central Africa. One of the consequences of these attacks on refugees' camps in Kivu region was a deepening of the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism that was already developing in the region. An anti-Tutsi sentiment became strong among Congolese Hutus and other local ethnic groups (Kisangani 2000:163-170).

Following the 1996-7 'war of liberation' that toppled Mobutu's regime and installed Laurent Kabila as the new *Chef d'Etat* several Congolese Tutsi were assigned to influential positions in the new regime (national and provincial) and in the army. Although they were given full access to the administration, the Congolese Tutsis were still waiting for their citizenship rights. In his visit to Bukavu in February 1998, Kabila promised Banyamulenge Congolese citizenship, but no official document confirmed this intention (Vlassenroot 2002:509-510). However, as early as end of 1997, the Congolese Tutsis became once again the target for violent attacks and were gradually excluded politically.²⁵

Scherrer (2003:252) points out that Kabila became gradually autocratic and the new vision of broad-based governance representing all social groups never materialized. The presence of RPA soldiers in DRC and in higher positions in the army and the privileges enjoyed by Congolese Tutsi shortly after the 1996-7 war, led many Congolese (from other ethnic groups) to become discontent with an antipathy against Tutsi population. They saw the 'liberation' as an occupation and Kabila as a puppet of Rwanda. Reyntjens (1999: 244) remarks that in Kivu region in 1997 different movements emerged campaigning the liberation of the 'Bantu people' from the 'Tutsi-hegemony'²⁶. Kabila encouraged these feelings as a way to cement his own

²⁵ To some extent, this was due to the active presence of RPA on Congo soil. Reyntjens (1999: 244) writes that "[i]n October 1997, a Mouvement National pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie (MNSD), ... claimed that 'the abuses of the Tutsi military ... have caused antipathy or even hatred among ethnic groups in the region (Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo,...) against the Tutsi populations'".

²⁶ Some of those movements are CRLK (*Conseil de la Résistance et de la Libération du Kivu*), MNSD (*Mouvement National pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie*). And these movements appeared to be linked to the Mai-Mai and ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* (Reyntjens 1999:244)

power. Congolese Tutsis in high positions (in army or in governmental administration) were gradually either removed or mistreated (ICG 1998:6-7).

In 1998 Kabila ordered the expulsion of the Rwandan-Ugandan troops and created a state of propaganda machine aimed at fuelling animosities against Tutsis. In a speech he delivered on the national radio and television Laurent Kabila urged listeners to use “a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire...to kill the Rwandan Tutsi”(Clark2003:67). The result, following this speech was a witch-hunt against all eastern Congolese and foreigners, often judged exclusively by facial appearances. Similar speeches resonated from Congolese authorities against Congolese Tutsis. The International Crisis Group report, ICG (2007:11-2) observes that political leaders openly used anti-Tutsi rhetoric threatening Congolese Tutsi and mobilizing people against Tutsi. The Amnesty International report (1998:4) points out that,

[Since August 1998 propaganda against Tutsi were launched and spread across the country]. Some DRC senior Congolese government officials and media have incited civilians to take up arms and attack Tutsi. For example, on 8 August [1998] an official made a statement on the Congolese radio from Bunia in eastern DRC calling on listeners to “... *jump on the people with long noses, who are tall and slim* [reference to Tutsi] *and want to dominate us ... Wake up, be aware of our destiny so as to defeat the enemy.*”

The ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* (under ALiR: Rwandan Liberation Army²⁷) approached by Laurent Kabila, contributed actively and significantly in the spread of anti-Tutsi feeling; cooperating with FAC (*Forces Armées Congolaises*) and mobilizing many groups, especially Mai-Mai in hunting and killing Tutsis: in 1998, thousands of Congolese Tutsis were massacred in Kinshasa and Kivu region (Scherrer 2003:254-5; Clark 2003:67).

In August 1998 an anti-Kabila rebellion was launched from Kivu region by the Rwanda-Uganda backed RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy).²⁸ The point to mention here is that under the new regime of Laurent Kabila (*Appendix 10*), the Congolese Tutsis were still denied citizenship rights. The Tutsi faced continuously political exclusion and violent attacks. The HRW (Human Right Watch’s report) (2007: 10) notes that the ordinary Tutsi soldiers were targeted and attacked in many occasions by soldiers from other Congolese ethnic groups; the Tutsi officers were harassed that for not being Congolese. The report mentions

²⁷ ALiR later on became FDLR (*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*). I shall come back on this point in Chapter Four.

²⁸ I shall come back on this point in Chapter Four.

further that the moral and physical torture against Congolese Tutsi soldiers led to the dissolution of 51st Battalion. Tutsi who would want to join in other battalions were also pushed away and others were subjects of harsh treatment (torture, imprisonment or beating even death).

The Congolese from other ethnic groups in cooperation with the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*, continued to hunt down the Tutsi. For instance, in May 2004 the Congolese army attacked Banyamulenge civilians in the town of Bukavu. These attacks led thousands to flee to Burundi. They settled in Gatumba camp, in rural Bujumbura. In the night of 13 August of the same year their camp was attacked and more than a hundred Banyamulenge were killed mostly women and children. Those who attempted to return home were stoned by an angry mob of Congolese while others (Banyamulenge refugees) chose to camp in the neutral zone. These massacres were carried out by a well-organized force from the Congo that combined Congolese Mai-Mai, ALiR combatants (ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) and the Burundian Hutu rebel, FNL (*Forces pour la Liberation Nationale*) (HRW report 2004:1-5).

Another wave of Tutsi exclusion and anti-Tutsi campaign was intensified in the run up to national and provincial election, from 2002 to 2006. During the electoral campaign anti-Tutsi rhetoric was used by many politicians. In Goma (Capital of North Kivu province) during a rally the primer Minister of Joseph Kabila, Abdulai Yerodia, holding a spear in one hand (www.kivupeace.org) called upon people to get rid of Tutsi from DRC

These people we will tell them to leave our territory. You who stay here, you must go back where you come from. If you do not want to go back where you come from, we will put sticks into your backsides to make sure you go back (Human Right Watch 2007:11-12)

The riots against Tutsis in many parts of the country also increased. The political balance shifted away from the RCD (Seen as representing Tutsi Congolese in the transitional government) towards the Nande, Hunde, Nyanga and Hutu communities allied to Kabila. In Kivu region the RCD officers were being replaced by Kabila's officers. The appointment in Bukavu of the pro-Kabila, General Nabyolwa (an FAC officer) in 2004 as the military region commander (ICG 2007: 3) illustrates this point. In South Kivu, the government refused to recognize Minembwe region (populated mostly by Banyamulenge) as a territory. This decision was perceived by Banyamulenge as a way to limit them from participating in the national political life (HRW 2007: 12). In North Kivu the Congolese Tutsi almost lost

elections and representation at the provincial level mainly because a great number had fled to Rwanda and could not come back for voting (ICG 2007:5-6).

Certainly the weakening of the Congolese Tutsi political positions at the local and national level, the growing hatred and marginalisation by other ethnic communities (Vlassenroot2002:508-509) and mostly the unsolved issue of their citizenship rights increased fears and frustrations among Tutsis in the DRC. And the failure of the Congolese government to recognize the Congolese Tutsis as Congolese citizens has obviously increased the feeling among the indigenous of seeing them as an ‘out-group’, and confirming the propagated idea of Tutsi “foreignness²⁹” in the Great Lakes Region. Rutazibwa (1999:21) quotes one of the speeches of the *commissaire* of the Zone of Uvira (South Kivu) when he was calling people to ‘crush snakes which are amongst them’. When members of a group in a society are seen as the ‘out-group’ and, as such, devalued, dehumanized and scapegoated it becomes easier to harm them.

The above paragraphs therefore suggest that, with the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees particularly with the subsequent actions of ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* hunting down the Tutsis, campaigning that the latter were the only true enemy of Bantu people various, ethnic groups (in DRC) distanced themselves from the Congolese Tutsis. Obviously the conflicts that unfolded since 1996 in Kivu region worsened the situation. The interethnic relationships changed gradually as new shifting alliances emerged. As the above discourse shows the old collective Banyarwanda was gradually dissolved into two separate and antagonistic Hutu and Tutsi camps (Reyntjens 1999: 242-244; Lemarchand 1997; Prunier 2001: 152-155; ICG 2007: 4-5).

On many occasions the local autochthones mobilized by ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* joined in the Hutu camp perceived as the really ‘Bantu’ people to be liberated from the ‘Tutsi hegemony’. The Congolese Tutsis were singled out as ‘out-group’ and scapegoated. And as Dutton *et al* (2005:458) observe “to remain [a] member of in-group, individuals move away physically and attitudinally from the identified out-group” promoting subsequently social polarization and eventual hostility. The Tutsi being turned into an out-group, the other local

²⁹ One of the Core ideas of the genocide ideology against Tutsi in Rwanda was that they are foreign to Rwanda, they came from Ethiopia.

ethnic groups particularly Bashi, Barega and Babembe (in South Kivu) and Hunde, Nyanga and Nande (in North) changed their behavioural attitudes towards Tutsis by siding with ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* in hunting down the local Tutsi population. The above described instances of violent attacks and political exclusion (nationally and provincially) targeting the Congolese Tutsis provide utterly tangible insights about attitudinal shifts towards the Tutsis. The anti-Tutsi ideology played a crucial role in conflicts that ravaged DRC, and particularly in attitudinal change discussed above. As argued in the above section, the ideology used in DRC with the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees was similar to anti-Tutsi ideology used in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The '*genocidaires*' (ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) contributed actively in the expansion and spread of this anti-Tutsi ideology in DRC and in Kivu region in particular. Hence, in the following last section of this chapter, I would like to argue that the anti-Tutsi ideology played a crucial role in attitudinal change discussed previously. I will look very briefly at this ideology in the context of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and then assess its usage and impact in the DRC and in Kivu provinces in particular.

3. 4. THE ANTI-TUTSI IDEOLOGY OF 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE EASTERN DRC CONFLICTS

The preliminary to this chapter defines the term 'ideology' and points out that politicians or social leaders use an ideology to technically present a future that is better than the one prevailing in a society in question³⁰. However, the history of humankind societies has unambiguously taught us that some ideologies tend to be destructive, igniting violent conflicts. Instances such as in Germany under Hitler, in Italy under Mussolini, in Iraq under Saddam (Baradat 1997:255, 259 & 301) substantiate this argument.

In the case of Rwanda the ideology that led to the 1994 genocide against Tutsis the Rwandan society was facing many problems at different levels. Between 1990 and 1991 the multiparty system was adopted and from then on many political parties were created. Those political parties initially appeared to be in opposition to ruling party MRND (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*). The latter had been the unique ruling party

³⁰ Baradat (1997:9) notes that 'ideology' as a political term consists of views that present a future materialistically improved over the present. And this desirable future is attainable according to the ideology. This description of 'ideology' suggests that the latter often emerges when a society faces difficulties and life challenges in many of its aspects. Staub agrees (2003:299).

since 1973 to 1991 and governing the country ‘unchallenged’. The new formed political parties had differing political programs. They were born in a climate of deep antagonism and rivalry. Many of them were afflicted with discriminatory ideas. It is during this difficult time that the war of liberation was launched in 1990 started by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

From 1991 there was an increasingly sharp political tension in Rwanda. Economically Rwanda was scarcely any better. In provinces like Butare, Gikongoro and Kibuye there was a famine. The national currency had experienced a sharp drop. What was called: the structural adjustment program was badly applied and this reinforced the economic downturn. Moreover the price of coffee which used to be the principal country’s main export sharply fell on the international market. Briefly there was a deep economic crisis (*Commission Episcopale “Justice et Paix”* 2004:142-145). All these factors combined with many other had paralyzed all domains of life of Rwandans by making them feel confused and hopeless. It is in such a social and political environment that the society became vulnerable. Rwanda of the 1990s sunk into deep political discords that generated political chaos coupled with conflicts between groups. An ideology was needed to offer a new comprehension of reality with promises of a better future and hope. The ‘Tutsi’ identified with RPF were gradually described as the ‘enemy’, scapegoated for the prevailing life problems and excluded from the moral realm (Staub 2003:299).

However the anti-Tutsi ideology was not a new phenomenon or a new social construct. As discussed in Chapter One scholars point out that the anti-Tutsi ideology used in 1994 Rwanda genocide is rooted in Hutu-Tutsi polarization that marked the post-colonial history of Rwanda. Human Rights watch briefing paper (2006:6) reports that some of the ideas that formed the core of the anti-Tutsi ideology were:

- Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there.
- Despite the 1959 revolution, Tutsi continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than Hutu and were in some way responsible for continuing Hutu poverty.
- Tutsi posed a danger to Hutu, who were always the victims, whether of Tutsi military power or of Tutsi cunning and so Hutu had a right and a duty to defend themselves.

This anti-Tutsi ideology, propagated gradually under Habyarimana’s regime, promoted the exclusion and physical elimination of the Tutsi (Hintjens 1999: 255-7, Lemarchand 2002: 510, and Verwimp 2000: 3-4).³¹ A detailed analysis of the anti-Tutsi ideology and the 1994

³¹ As discussed in Chapter One, the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism marked the Rwandan society since colonial period, and became gradually stronger in post-colonial era. Under Habyarimana’s regime social structures and

Rwanda genocide is beyond the scope of this study. Hence it may suffice here to emphasize that the anti-Tutsi ideology of 1994 Rwandan genocide underlined that the Tutsis were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there and they posed a danger to the Hutu population. The disseminated propaganda dehumanized the Tutsi and equated them to bad animals that should be killed. This created a new morality that proclaimed the correctness of killing Tutsis (Melvern 2000:61-63).

From the above discussion following the 1994 Rwanda genocide the Tutsi-population in DRC was also portrayed as ‘out-group’ and scapegoated. This anti-Tutsi sentiment took different forms as the DRC conflicts developed and changed its tune.³² Various factors contributed to the sharpening and remodelling of this anti-Tutsi ideology in the DRC conflicts. A close analysis of different documents (scholars and non scholars) on DRC conflicts shows that the above described anti-Tutsi ideology has been used in DRC conflicts in general and in Kivu region in particular. (Chretien2003:344) articulates that one of the major Great Lakes Region’s political failures after the 1994 Rwandan genocide is the continuation and expansion of the ideology that inspired the genocide: “hatred of the Tutsi perceived as invaders has taken over Congo.” However what might be the nuance is that this ideology has been used at different levels and phases of the DRC conflicts bearing thus different tones. With the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in Kivu region the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* disseminated the anti-Tutsi ideology seeking to establish themselves in “ an ethnically cleansed sanctuary” (Arnson and Zartman 2005:126; Kabamba

mechanisms were put in place to exclude the Tutsi. Mass Hutu population were mobilized so as to see the Tutsi as their enemy. In schools it was taught (from Rwandan History textbooks) that Tutsis were, dishonest, actually ‘foreigners’ and have mistreated Hutus (Verwimp 2000: 21-6; Lemarchand 2002: 509-5110; Hintjens 1999: 254-9). Media played a big role in portraying the Tutsi as the enemy of the Hutu even before the 1994: for instance the Journal *Kangura* (wake them up). The Journal published the ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ (*Kangura*, No.6, December 1990). These ‘commandments’ called upon Hutus to hate Tutsis: statements such as “*Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi*” (8th commandment), “*Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi*” (9th commandment) (on: www.trumanwebdesign.com). At different occasions, Tutsi were killed: in Kibilira, Bugogwe and Bugesera (Hintjens 1999: 255-7). Lemarchand (2002: 510) and Verwimp (2000: 3-4) observe that under Habyarimana’s regime, plans and decisions were made to physically eliminate the Tutsi. In March 1992 a document (*Report of Rwanda Commission of Inquiry*) transmitted to the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Belgian Ambassador in Rwanda reads (in on of its paragraphs): “*a secret military staff charged with the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda in order to solve forever, in their way, the ethnic problem in Rwanda and to destroy the domestic Hutu opposition*” (in Verwimp 2000: 3).

³² The detailed study of the development of DCR conflicts in all its aspects is beyond the scope of this chapter. Hence this section intends to simply focus on the extent to which the ideology of hatred among Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda contributed to the exacerbation of the eastern DRC conflict.

1999:123). After the fall of Mobutu's regime the Congolese authority propagated the anti-Tutsi ideology for a massive reactionary mobilisation against the presence of Rwandan army on DRC soil. Furthermore, the anti-Tutsi propaganda was used by the FDLR rebel group following the demolition of the refugees' camps in Kivu region by the RPA/ADFL.

Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) also observes that as they found refuge into DRC, the *genocidaires* enjoyed freedom of movement and more to that they imported their genocide ideology unleashing a reign of terror and ethnic cleansing against the Congolese Tutsi in North Kivu. Melvern (2000: 223) reports that

Hutu power remained a threat, its adherents determined to continue their genocidal policies (...) In the refugee camps, aid workers saw at first hand how local officials and militia established their authority and control. (...) some 4000 murders took place in Goma in the first months of the exodus. Killings, threats, extortions, rape (...) were common. The Hutu power ideology was as entrenched as ever with people openly expressing the view that it was correct to kill Tutsi.

Since 1998 Laurent Kabila created a state of propaganda machine spreading an anti-Tutsi ideology, portraying that Uganda-Rwanda intention was to establish Tutsi hegemony in the Great Lakes Region³³ (Reyntjens 1999:243-4). In Kivu region a theme of struggle between Bantus and Hamites evolved gradually as different propaganda were pronounced. In his introduction to a publication of the Zairian Ministry of Information and the Press Professor Kabuya-Lumuna Sando declared that "in the face of the hegemonic doctrine of the Tutsi, it evokes a sort of objective alliance between the people of Zaire and the Hutu" (Reyntjens 1998:12). The propaganda against Tutsi fostered by the anti-Tutsi ideological ideas used in 1994 Rwanda genocide divided the eastern DRC society into two camps of friends and enemies. "Hutu-Tutsi polarities became the basic referential frame among a large segment of the Congolese population for identifying friends and enemies" (Lemarchand 2002:393). And the actual ethnic identities needed not to correspond to these labels only certain cultural or physical markers were sufficient as indicators of 'Tutsiness' or 'Hutuness'. The Congolese Tutsi were threatened with expulsion from the region for they were labelled 'out-group', 'invaders', 'foreigners', 'oppressors' or 'population of doubtful citizenship'.

³³ Scholars have argued differently about the thesis of Tutsi hegemony in Great Lakes region. Was this a reality or a mere campaign against the Tutsi? Reyntjens (1998:12) opens up a discussion on the issue, but from different angles, mentioning that Hutu from Rwanda and Burundi have claimed the existence of a "plan of Tutsi colonization in Kivu and in the central region of Africa". Reyntjens points out different incidences that stimulated such claim: in October 1996 the then President of Rwanda, Pasteur Bizimungu "evoked the frontiers of former Rwanda, which included parts of Zaire adding that if Zaire wants to expel the Banyamulenge, it should also abandon their territory to Rwanda." Would this imply Tutsi hegemony?

The hate propaganda coupled with acts of violence polarised the eastern DRC society and disrupted its ethnic balance. Inter-groups schisms developed gradually as the situation deteriorated with despair among refugees and lack of a clear political, social and economical direction on DRC society's side. In such situation of social, political chaos and conflicts, ideology is developed to offer a new comprehension of the world and direction to life (Staub 2002:50). A developed-ideology in such circumstances usually seeks to designate a group to blame for the ills of a society whether social, political, economic or even conflicts between groups; an enemy standing in a way of achieving a better society. For instance when asked about the causes of conflicts in Congo a number of local Congolese said "wherever there are Tutsis, there are problems" (The Economist on www.Colorado.edu/geography 2006). Such ideology leads to devaluation and scapegoating the group defined as 'out-group', the 'enemy'. The tendency is the reversal of morality, killing the 'enemy' becomes the right thing to do (Staub 2003:299-305). The Congolese Tutsis experienced this reality as discussed in the previous section.

Thus, the above paragraphs argue that following the arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC (especially the '*genocidaires*') an anti-Tutsi ideology infected the Kivu region and contributed significantly in the attitudinal shift. The 'Tutsi' became the 'enemy'. Certainly the group identified as the 'enemy' by other groups would feel threatened and seek measures for security and survival. Violent conflicts are most likely to erupt, with formation of armed groups and alliances. In DRC, the 'Tutsi' facing exclusion and violent attack resolved in taking up arms. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the DRC fell into violent conflicts. Interethnic hatred grew stronger and became one of the key factors in the DRC conflicts. In 1996 a 'war of liberation' was launched from Kivu region opening up a complex chain of violent conflicts involving various actors and alliances: internal armed groups and regional states. It is this point I turn to in the following chapter.

Chapter Four

The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees And the rebel movements in the eastern DRC region

Chapter three highlighted that the ethnic polarization in Kivu region with the interethnic war in 1993 and the knock-on effects of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which significantly marked the region³⁴. Two national ‘wars of liberation’ emerged (in 1996 and 1998), both rooted in the Kivu region’s convoluted mixture of political machination, communal violence, border sensitivity, and the exploitation of mineral and agricultural wealth of the region (Jackson, 2002:520)³⁵. The 1996-7 struggle that toppled Mobutu’s regime put in motion a complex chain of conflicts that have characterized the DRC since then, involving various powers and different alliances including internal rebel groups and regional states.

This chapter will assess the contribution or link of the 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees in the rebel movements’ formation involved in the DRC conflicts since 1996, focusing mainly on the country’s eastern Kivu provinces. The chapter divides the DRC conflicts into three main phases, which correspond to the chapter’s main sections: (i) the October 1996 to May 1997; (ii) the August 1998 to late 2001; and (iii) the 2004 onwards conflicts. Each section looks at the main actors in the conflicts; assessing their constituency and *raison d’être*; and elucidating any link to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees: i.e. examining the nature and extent of these refugees’ involvement in the DRC conflicts. Staub’s Basic Needs framework provides a theoretical structure for this study. As pointed out in chapter two the DRC conflicts are complex and multidimensional in nature. Various factors and forces (ethnicity, economics

³⁴ As indicated in previous chapters, of the outflow of 2.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 Rwanda genocide, DRC hosted 1.1 to 1.25 million and among these were thousands of ex-FAR and 30,000 to 40,000 Hutu militiamen (*Interahamwe*) responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. This massive influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees particularly into eastern DRC impacted on the region in terms of loss of human lives, ecological damage, increased criminality and long-lasting destructive wars (Kisangani 2002:165).

³⁵ “The long, slow rotting from within of Mobutu’s Zaire permitted the Kivus to build a degree of political and economic autonomy during the 1980s and 1990s” notes Jackson (2002:520).

and politics) have driven the conflicts from the roots. However, in this chapter, a focus is put on the link between the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) and the main players in conflicts that occurred in DRC.

The chapter shows that the presence of ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* on DRC territory has been one of the factors that led to the launching of the two ‘wars of liberation’ from Kivu, i.e. the 1996 anti-Mobutu and the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellions. The ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* in Kivu region had become a threat to both the Congolese Tutsi and the Kigali government; and they contributed significantly in anti-Tutsi propaganda that marked the DRC conflicts. Some elements from previous chapters will be referred to in order to contextualize the subsequent chapter’s discussion.

4.1. OCTOBER 1996 TO MAY 1997 DRC CONFLICTS AND MAIN ACTORS INVOLVED

In October 1996 a ‘war of liberation’ was launched from Kivu against Mobutu’s regime (*Appendix 10*). Through this phase of DRC conflicts, Mobutu led the government side with the unpaid, demoralized Zairean army (*Forces Armées Zairoises*, FAZ), which collapsed swiftly. During this 1996-7 phase of the DRC conflict, Mobutu had no external direct military assistance. The West, particularly USA (United States of America), France and Belgium, who had sustained Mobutu during the Cold war period as their strong arm in the Central Africa, had gradually turned their back against him since the end of cold war (Lemarchand, 2002:390-1; McNulty, 1999:69-73). Thus, in this first phase of the conflict, Mobutu with his army (FAZ) in the bad shape, cooperated militarily with the rebel groups that were fighting neighbouring countries from bases on DRC soil, i.e. Uganda rebel groups, the Rwandan Hutu rebel group ALiR, the Burundian CNDD-FDD rebel group and the Angolan rebel movement UNITA.

The main rebellion that launched the war and toppled Mobutu in May 1997 was **AFDL** (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre*), an alliance of several anti-Mobutu forces. The foundations of the AFDL were laid in South Kivu and the four primary revolutionary movements made up initially the alliance: Laurent Kabila’s PRP (Peoples’ Revolutionary Party), the CRD (*Conseil de la Résistance pour la Démocratie*) led by Andre Kissage Ngandu, the PDA (Peoples’ Democratic Alliance) led by Deogratias

Bugera, a Masisi Tutsi, and the MRLZ (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la libération du Zaïre*) led by Masasu Ningaba, a member of one of the main ethnic groups in South Kivu, the Bashi. The **Banyamulenge** joined the AFDL and **regional states** including Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi to a less extent played a vital role in forming and backing militarily the AFDL (McNulty 1999:54-5, 72-4; Reyntjens 1999:241-2; and Dunn in Clark 2003:56-7).

Recalling from chapter three, the Banyarwanda collectively (both Hutu and Tutsi) in Kivu provinces had faced the victimization and denaturalization under Mobutu's regime. With the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, including ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*, an anti-Tutsi propaganda was spread, in North Kivu, violent attacks were launched against Congolese Tutsi (Mwanasali in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59; Zartman 2005:126-7), and in South Kivu, Banyamulenge faced the same fate (Abdulai 1995:19; Gnamo in Adelman & Suhrke 2000:327). Thus, for their own survival the Congolese Tutsis (both from North and South Kivu provinces) responded by supporting and contributing to the formation of AFDL, with an objective that a new regime in Kinshasa would recognize their citizenship rights and address effectively the security issue in Kivu region. Vlassenroot (2002:509) remarks that hundreds of young Banyamulenge joined in the formation of AFDL to reclaim their nationality rights and to save and protect their families from violent persecution.

The swift military advance and success of the AFDL depended immensely on the external supports. Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) officers planned and directed many of AFDL military operations, participated in the capture of many cities including Lubumbashi, Kenge, Kisangani and Kinshasa (McNulty 1999: 55, Clark 2001: 268). Rwanda and Uganda trained and organized the AFDL's army and the Angola provided tanks and heavy artillery. As previously noted, a key reason for the regional support to the 1996 AFDL's 'war of liberation' against Mobutu's regime was related to regional security. **Rwanda** assisted AFDL aiming to both uproot the ex-FAR and Hutu militia (*Interahamwe*) operating from Zairian soil and to topple Mobutu's regime that supported the previous Habyarimana's regime and supported the Hutu militia (Kisangani 2000:168; McNulty 1999:55, 72-7 and Dunn in Clark 2003:57-8).

As mentioned in the previous chapters, as soon as they crossed the border into Kivu region, the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* reorganized and started launching incursions into Rwanda from Zaire's soil to destabilize Kigali's newly established government; and Mobutu's generals

helped this rebellion militarily (Pottier 2002:41-3; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). Rafti (2006:9-10) reports that by the end of 1996 in Kivu region, helped by Mobutu and some of the then FAZ's officers, the former Governor of Kigali, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho and ex-FAR Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rwarakabije (*Appendix 10*) started a rebellion, **ALiR (Rwandan liberation Army)**. The ALiR was composed of ex-FAR (both *genocidaires* and non-*genocidaires*) and *Interahamwe* and young recruits from the 1994 Rwandan refugee population. ALiR infiltrated north-western Rwanda killing mainly Tutsi genocide survivors, Hutu seen as RPF collaborators, forcing young Hutus to join them in the forest, destroying infrastructure, and trying to interrupt foreign aid to the new Rwandan regime. This was a threat to Rwandan security, and the new government in Kigali had made several appeals to International community and to Kinshasa government to intervene, but no actions were taken. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) reports that,

(...) The international community failed to heed the request of Rwanda, and even that of the Kinshasa authorities under Prime Minister Leon Kengo wa Dondo, to stop these [Rwandan Hutu] rebel activities. When Kengo tried to expel the refugees, he was prevented from doing so by President Mobutu and the international community.

The then Rwandan Vice-president and chief commander of army Paul Kagame (*Appendix 10*) expressed "since 1995 his determination to sort out the security problem himself if the international community was unable to do so" McNulty (1999:76). Thus, the new regime in Kigali supporting AFDL hoped to solve once and for all the security problem on Rwanda western borders with the DRC.

Other regional states that played a vital role in the formation of AFDL and supporting this rebellion that toppled Mobutu's regime in May 1997 were **Uganda, Angola** and **Burundi**; and all aiming to solve the security problem they were facing from the DRC. Uganda's government supported militarily the AFDL in this first phase of conflict so as to destroy the bases of the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces), the LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) and the WBNF (West Bank Nile Front) who used DRC soil to destabilize Uganda. Angola on the other side, was actively involved in the 1996-1997 DRC conflict, militarily backing AFDL so as to oust Mobutu, the longtime benefactor of the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) rebels, hoping to drive the latter out of their Zairian rear bases. Burundi was involved also in the 1996-1997 DRC conflict on AFDL side, so to neutralize the Burundian rebels namely the *Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie* (CNDD-

FDD), and the *Forces Nationales de Liberation* (FNL) that used Zairian territory as their bases (Reyntjens 1999:241 and Clark 2001:265-7).

The outlined data suggested that the formation of the coalition AFDL and its supporters (regional states: Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi) was paradoxically ignited by converging and diverging objectives. The regime of Mobutu and the rebel groups operating from DRC's soil (Ugandan rebels, UNITA and CNDD-FDD but particularly the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) were the target for the 1996-7 AFDL and its supporters: the elements and threats to be liberated from. The 'defeated' 1994 Rwandan regime (that had committed the genocide against the Tutsi) contemplated the possibility of regaining power in Rwanda in the hope of finding a way of rationalizing and justifying the crime of genocide committed (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18, Eriksen 2005: 1100, Reyntjens 1999: 241, Lemarchand 1997). Hence it would not be irrational to speculate that one of the ways for their survival (the defeated Rwandan regime, the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) was to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda in Kivu provinces at all cost so to gain support and a 'friendly' environment from which to launch attacks into Rwanda. As detailed in Chapter Three following the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees the Congolese Tutsi became a target of violent attacks.

These attitude and behaviours of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees as they arrived in DRC may be analyzed and interpreted differently. However, the main argument here based on the outlined data and on Staub's framework (2003:305) is that since the Hutu refugees particularly ex-FAR and Hutu militias had played a role in killing Tutsi during the Rwandan genocide likely they would continue hunting down their 'enemy' (the Tutsi) wherever they are. In the same line of discussion, Dutton *et al* (2005:458) observes that "a common perception of *genocidaires* is that their target is virus- or cancer-like"; thus the Tutsi (wherever he/she is) was an intolerable element to be eradicated. Additionally, the psychological state of these refugees: severe fear and anxiety of their future, uncertainty and unknown, depression, anger, severe trauma, aggressiveness (Cohon 1981:257-8) and shame to be defeated (humiliation) with no complete success in their '*genocidaire*' plan provides a rationale behind such behaviours.³⁶ The ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* became thus a threat to both the Congolese Tutsi and the new regime in Kigali.

³⁶ Certainly the analysis presented here does not undermine the complexity of the history of Hutu-Tutsi antagonism in Rwanda and its consequences (politically, socially and economically). However, as mentioned in Chapter One, a focus on the psychological dispositions of those involved in DRC conflicts may provide useful

An anti-Mobutu rebellion appears to have provided an opportunity for both Rwanda and Congolese Tutsis to end the intolerable situation. Furthermore, as described in previous chapters under Mobutu's regime life conditions in DRC had practically deteriorated and Mobutu had become a threat to a healthier life (politically, socially and economically) for the majority of Congolese people. There was a need for change, and as Staub (2003:293) suggests difficult life conditions and persistent life problems in a society are conducive to conflict. In addition, Mobutu, cooperating with and supporting the above mentioned rebel groups operating from DRC's territory, was to a larger extent a threat to the security of the directly concerned regional states (particularly Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola) as presented above. There were no effective domestic mechanisms to redress the situation and the international community was almost silent in this regard. This may thus explain the formation and victory of AFDL and the vital regional support it received: the threatened parties brought their forces together. Paraphrasing Dutton *et al* (2005:457), the perceived threat inspires the requisite initial avoidance and alliance formation to end the unbearable situation.

However, as it progressed the AFDL was gradually marked with internal schisms that progressively grew stronger. And as the AFDL made contact with the Kivu population recruiting young people from all parts of the provinces as it advanced, the anti-Tutsi feeling infected gradually the movement (ICG Congo Report 1998:14-5)³⁷. Despite these internal clashes and schisms the AFDL constituents tried to keep together for the sake of winning the war they had launched against Mobutu's regime for it was in each one's interest (McNulty 1999: 55-7).

Another type of actor also involved in the 1996-7 DRC conflict was the **Mai-Mai** (or Mayi-Mayi) militias. In the beginning of the conflict the Mai-Mai groups sided with Mobutu but after the AFDL made an approach and appeal to the militias many of the Mai-Mai groups

insights for understanding more these complex and multidimensional conflicts that have ravaged the DRC till today.

³⁷ As from early 1997 internal clashes (some of them were violent) occurred between Tutsi (both Congolese and Rwandan) and Congolese "non-Tutsi". With the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, particularly the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* the Kivu society was more ethnically polarized and the anti-Tutsi sentiment had grown stronger (previous chapters)

sided with AFDL.³⁸ The Mai-Mai movement emerged in the 1960s during the Muleliste rebellion. And later on in 1990s, the Mai-Mai movement emerged as the result of violent political and economic rivalries and frustration. The term Mai-Mai refers to all community-based fighters who initially fought to defend the politically and economically marginalized local people. The Mai-Mai movement is heterogeneous and divided for it includes different groups that vary in their relative level of organization: group of General Padiri, group of General Dunia, FRDKI (*Front de resistance et de defense du Kivu*), FURNAC (*Forces unies de resistance nationale contre l'agression du Congo*). Initially, the Mai-Mai groups allied together to protect their respective regions, specifically with respect to the security of both their people and resources (Morvan 2006:10-15; the April 2002 United Nations Security Council-UNSC report).

The Mai-Mai are known to shift alliances to achieve their interests. The constituents of these groups under the umbrella of Mai-Mai are mainly from the Hunde, Tembo, Nyanga and Nande ethnic groups. The ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* trained militarily and armed the Mai-Mai groups which used to carry traditional weapons: arrows and alike. The 2002 UNSC report states further that since the rise of the 1996 DRC conflict the highest concentration of Mai-Mai groups are found in North Kivu (Walikale and Masisi), in South Kivu (Walungu and Bunyakiri), at the northern end of Lake Tanganyika (Uvira and Mwenga) then in Fizi and in Kindu.³⁹

To sum up the above analysis and in the theoretical perspective of this study I would like to emphasize that the survival (political, social and economical) of either party involved in the 1996-7 violent conflicts in DRC and in Kivu provinces in particular was the main driving forces behind these conflicts. When the group's survival is threatened politically, socially and economically the need for connection becomes powerful (Staub 2002:16); hence the formation of alliance (AFDL and its allies, and ALiR) observed during the first phase of DRC conflicts. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly the defeated regime and ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) facing fear of uncertainty for their future survival became a dangerous

³⁸ This is reported also on the Mai-Mai website: www.congo-mai-mai.net

³⁹ The total number of Mai-Mai active in the Kivu region was estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 in 2002, when the UNSC report was compiled

threat to both Congolese Tutsis and Rwanda. They played a crucial role in polarizing ethnically the Congolese society.

4.2. AUGUST 1998 TO LATE 2001 DRC CONFLICTS AND ARMED GROUPS INVOLVED

In August 1998, about a year after Mobutu's fall in May 1997 and installation of Laurent Kabila's government in Kinshasa a new armed movement in Kivu region launched another "war of liberation" against the new regime. This latest new "war of liberation" launched from the eastern province of Kivu was essentially different from the 1996-7 AFDL's war in three aspects: firstly, the anti-Kinshasa camp was made up by various forces with no common agenda and often competing objectives; secondly the anti-Kinshasa forces had relatively limited logistical capacities than in the case of the 1996 "war of liberation"; thirdly, the guerrilla groups in eastern DRC i.e. the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* (ALiR and later became FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and the Mai-Mai were more strengthened than before (The ICG Kivu report n°1 1998:1). Reyntjens (1999:242-4) and Afoaku (in Clark 2003:109-110) report that some of the main roots of this new "war of liberation" were the differences between the founder members of the AFDL the coalition that installed Kabila as the Head of State in May 1997. As mentioned in the previous section the disagreement and opposition on various issues and Tutsi antipathy had plagued the movement from its inception.⁴⁰ Furthermore, contrary to the expectations of Kabila's supporters and sponsors his regime proved unable and unwilling to solve effectively two of the main problems at the origin of the 1996-7 liberation war, i.e. the security of the eastern neighbours (Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda) and the status (citizenship rights) of the Congolese Tutsi. Reyntjens (1999:243) writes further that,

⁴⁰ The 1998 Amnesty International report on DRC conflicts mentions that, General Andre Kissage Ngandu, a leader of one of the armed groups in the AFDL and the chief commander of AFDL was killed in January 1997. He was opposed to the dominant presence of Rwanda (RPA) and Tutsi in the AFDL's war of liberation. After his death some of his supporters left the AFDL to join or reform armed groups opposed to AFDL. After the death of Andre Kissage Ngandu, Laurent Kabila, who as the then spokesman of the coalition became the AFDL's leader. Although initially Kabila had no troops, he was known for his long and determined opposition to Mobutu's regime and he had a political programme. Another leader of the AFDL coalition Anselm Masasu Nindaga was arrested in November 1997, sentenced in May 1998 to 20 years' imprisonment, accused of endangering the security of the state, treason and forming a private militia. At start of August 1998, unhappy with Kabila policies, Deogratias Bugera, a third leader of the AFDL coalition, and President Kabila's Foreign Minister Bizima Karaha, joined the new emerging anti-Kabila movement, RCD (*Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie* / Congolese Rally for Democracy) in eastern Kivu.

Although security arrangements were signed by the Kabila regime with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the Congo remained a source of insecurity and the launching ground of attacks against these neighbours. Frustrated by what they perceived as 'Tutsi hegemony' in the region, increasing numbers of the local militias, such as the mai-mai and the Bembe, lent a helping hand to Uganda, Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups; on a number of occasions, even elements of the new Congolese army Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) gave support to insurgents, e.g. by escorting them to the Rwandan border on their commando raids.

The Congolese Tutsi's participation in the 1996-7 AFDL war of liberation did not significantly improve their standing within Congo. Despite the victory of AFDL and promises made by Kabila to the Banyamulenge community the latter was disappointed and the sense of insecurity grew stronger: they were still denied nationality rights, and had strained relations with other ethnic groups in the region.

As presented in chapter three the Congolese Tutsis were gradually isolated from the high political positions and most of the Banyamulenge soldiers were frustrated by the fact that they were only allowed access to inferior positions within the new Congolese Forces (FAC). With the continued hostile presence of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* in Kivu region the Kabila's anti-Tutsi campaign worsened the Banyamulenge's situation and they resolved to anti-Kabila rebellion (Vlassenroot 2002:510-1 and ICG Kivu 1998:1). Laurent Kabila created a state propaganda machine and launched an anti-Tutsi ideology that claimed Ugandan-Rwandan intention to establish Tutsi hegemony in the Great Lakes region. In Kivu region as reported by Reyntjens (1998:12) a theme of struggle between Bantus and Hamites evolved gradually as different propaganda were pronounced. The ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* to whom Kabila had made appeal proved their usefulness and contributed significantly in anti-Tutsi propaganda and killings of Tutsi in different parts of the country.

Thus, in this climate of complex unresolved issues: Congolese Tutsi security and nationality rights, regional security, anti-Tutsi feeling and antipathy that grew deeper in DRC and people's unhappiness for Kabila's administration⁴¹, the new 'war of liberation' was launched

⁴¹ Afoaku (in Clark 2003:112-50) observes that since the early stage of the 1996-7 war of liberation, Laurent Kabila showed an autocratic style of governance. Although the AFDL and Kabila got some credit and popularity due to the victory toppling Mobutu regime, Congolese people expected a symbiotic relationship between the armed and nonviolent oppositions against Mobutu; 86% of respondents expected co-working relationship between Kabila and the leaders of nonviolent opposition, such as Tshisekedi, the leader of the largest of the nonviolent opposition groups, the UDPS (*Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* / Union for Democracy and Social Progress). Disappointingly, Kabila showed no sign and no interest in sharing power. After the death of his co-leader Kiasse Ngandu early in the rebellion in January 1997, Kabila promoted himself from spokesperson to uncontested leader of the AFDL; and at the end of the rebellion, he proclaimed himself transitional president of Congo without serious consultation with political leaders and organisations involved in the movement (Afoaku in Clark 2003: 112-50). As the self-proclaimed president of the country, Kabila spread terror inside the AFDL and dismissed the Sovereign National Conference, which sought to re-establish the basis

from the eastern Kivu provinces in August 1998 against Kinshasa government by the Rwanda-Uganda backed RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy). However, as mentioned above this new 'war of liberation' was more complex in its nature than the 1996-7's war. The war became increasingly complicated as a large number of African countries got involved both at government level and in relation to the rebel groups. During this phase of conflicts the anti-Tutsi factor played a key role in defining the enemy. The following paragraphs intend to look at the main different players in this new 'war of liberation'.

4.2.1. RCD (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* / Rally for Congolese Democracy) and its allies, Rwanda and Uganda⁴²

On 5th of August 1998, from Kivu provinces the military wing of RCD was officially formed and launched the 'war of liberation' against Kabila's government. This military wing of RCD was initially formed by four main key actors: (i) the Congolese Tutsi who felt isolated, betrayed and in danger⁴³; (ii), the former AFDL soldiers who felt pushed out by Kabila autocratic style; (iii) the former Mobutu generals who were unhappy with how they were treated by Kabila (iv) the regional states, Rwanda and Uganda, former AFDL's vital supporters in the 1996-7 war whose security on their borders with DRC was still a major problem which Kabila failed to solve as promised.

Reyntjens (1999:246-7) and Afoaku (in Clark 2003:115-6) mention that as early as on 2nd of August 1998 following Laurent Kabila's decision ordering Rwandan and Ugandan troops out of the DRC⁴⁴ fighting had started in Kinshasa, (Congolese Tutsi soldiers against FAC loyal to

of national participation and citizenship. His regime alienated its supporters at home as well as Western governments and NGOs. His credibility plummeted (Afoaku in Clark 2003: 112-50, Lemarchand 1997).

⁴² Appendix 2

⁴³ The Congolese Tutsi supported the 1996-7 war that toppled Mobutu regime with the hope of gaining nationality rights and a protection against the anti-Tutsi campaign that was growing in Kivu region with the arrival of the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* in the region. However, as scholars such as Reyntjens (1999:242-4) and Vlassenroot (2002:509) point out, after the 1996-7 rebellion Kabila looked away from the nationality rights issue of the Congolese Tutsi, and the latter were persecuted as foreigners and enemy. And Kabila to regain popularity and credibility he resolved to propagate an anti-Tutsi campaign. This campaign was also catalyzed by the attitude and behaviour of a number of Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi, civilians and military: some Tutsis benefited from the 1996-7 situation to accumulate wealth at the expense of others, some of the non-Tutsi local populations were harassed and humiliated by Congolese Tutsi soldiers; and the RPA soldiers behaved as if they were operating in occupied territory, exploiting the mineral resources of the region.

⁴⁴ After the military victory of AFDL, Rwanda remained shortly a favoured ally of Laurent Kabila. General James Kabarebe (*Appendix 10*), a Rwandan army officer and the current Chief of Staff of Rwandan national

Kabila) in the Eastern areas of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, where Rwandan troops, former army officers of FAC and Banyamulenge troops attempted to seize military camps of Tshatshi and Kokolo. Sylvain Mbuki, the commander of the 10th battalion of the FAC (one of the best units in the new Congolese army) stationed in Goma declared on Goma-based radio, '*Voix du Peuple*' that 'We, the army of the Democratic Republic of Congo have taken the decision to remove President Laurent-Desire Kabila from power'. He was soon joined by the 12th brigade in Bukavu; and the Rwandan and Ugandan army units supported the rebellion. Many of the former army officers (ex-Mobutu generals) who were reintegrated in the new FAC were unhappy and were mobilized by Jean-Pierre Ondekane (*Appendix 10*) to join the rebellion in 1998. Some of the three Mobutu generals who joined the anti-Kabila rebellion are Barimoto, Nzimbi and Mavhe.⁴⁵

army, was appointed military commander in Kinshasa and then Chief of Staff. In May 1997 the regional leaders gave the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) the task to structure and organize a new Congolese national army, for according to Julius Nyerere, it was a regional project (Scherrer 2002: 265).

⁴⁵ The rise of the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion was part of the empirical complexities of the DRC conflicts. Recalling from Chapter Two of this work, various studies have been conducted on DRC conflicts presenting different analyses. Certainly these different accounts on DRC conflicts reflect the complexities of these conflicts: there have been indeed, regional, internal wars being fought simultaneously on the DRC soil. And all the participants seemed to have their own agendas, sometimes conflicting with alliances and agreements made (Oyatambwe & Smis 2002: 414, Reyntjens 1999: 231-3). The investigation of the role of regional countries in DRC conflicts led to different conclusions. Jackson (2002: 520-522) and Autesserre (2006: 5-6) observe that the Rwandan-Ugandan intention in intervening in DRC conflicts was not merely a regional security, but also an economic interest. Jackson (2002: 520) reports that "[e]ven before [Laurent] Kabila [who was backed militarily by Rwanda and Uganda in 1996/1997] reached Kinshasa, foreign mineral concerns concluded lucrative mining concessions with him, financing his climb to power and consolidating their position to profit from it." He further adds that the RCD rebel movement (against Laurent Kabila in 1998), which was backed militarily by Rwanda, was "the vehicle through which elite networks reap the harvest of Kivutien mineral wealth unhindered" (Jackson 2002: 520). Autesserre (2006: 5) argues that Kagame (*Appendix 10*) and his ally, the RCD-Goma "presented many obstacles to the U.N. program that was organizing the pacific repatriation of the [Hutu militias] FDLR." Autesserre (2006: 5) adds also that "the FDLR presence in the Congo provided Kigali with a pretext for coming back into the Kivus and pursuing what Rwanda was truly interested in: protecting the Rwandaphones and exploiting the Congo's resources." Would this be entirely true? There are other accounts that report that actually the FDLR and other regional rebel groups (Ugandan and Burundian) were a real threat to the regional security (Reyntjens 1999: 242, Eriksen 2005: 1099, Rafti 2006: 8-12, Oyatambwe & Smis 2002: 415-6, Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005: 18, Lemarchand 1997 and ICG 2007). The regional countries (particularly Rwanda and Uganda) backed militarily Laurent Kabila (1996/1997) and RCD (1998) so to secure their borders (McNulty 1999: 56-7, Reyntjens 1999: 241-3). Furthermore, since 1998 the FDLR soldiers had become extremely and highly skilled in guerrilla warfare. This led the MONUC's military leadership fearfully resistant to use force against the FDLR. "We don't want to send our soldiers home in body bags"; a MONUC commander confessed to the Crisis Group in an interview in Goma in July 2007 (Rafti 2006: 11-12; ICG 2007: 28). Without underestimating the possible credibility of the above accounts, I would like to emphasize here that the focus of my research is to investigate the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in these conflicts. Hence I shall try to narrow my discussion (as objectively as possible) on this core point of my research.

The 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion got a rising momentum as more troops joined the enterprise and within few days the RCD had captured a number of towns and the Inga hydroelectric dam where the rebellion was able to cut off electricity supplies to Kinshasa as well as Katanga. However, with Angola and ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* (ALiR) backing militarily Kabila the RCD advancement was slowed down in late August 1998 (ICG Kivu Report 1998:6).

The political wing of RCD was formed as late as 20th of August 1998 by a group of Congolese politicians for a wide variety of reasons; some from the Kabila's regime and other from Mobutu's regime. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (*Appendix 10*) was the president of RCD and Jean-Pierre Ondekane (*Appendix 10*) was the military chief commander of the rebellion (ICG report 1998: 6).⁴⁶ Although the RCD initially claimed that its aim was to end Kabila dictatorship and lack of leadership, thus to rebuild the country and promote peace in the region the movement proved to be endemically factious. Early in the 1998 war a new dynamic of conflict emerged within the movement, RCD. A major battle that took place in Kisangani between the UPDF (Ugandan People's Defense Forces) and RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army) mid-1999 was a clear sign of the already existing differences between these long-time allies over the objectives and strategies of the war in the DRC (Afoaku in Clark 2003:117-8). Afoaku reports that,

While Uganda showed some interest in encouraging the Congolese people to develop an alternative leadership, the Rwandan government was particularly interested in overthrowing Kabila, who was arming the radical Hutu enemy. The Rwandans were also more sceptical about the capacity of the Congolese people to work out an internal political settlement. The Rwandans' first priority was to establish a secure border with the DRC (Afoaku in Clark 2003:118).

These differences were reflected in conflicts and shifting alliances within the RCD. In May 1999 the RCD was split into two rival factions: Wamba dia Wamba and his supporters formed one faction the RCD-ML (RCD-Movement de Liberation); and a second one, RCD-Goma was formed by the militarist core of the coalition comprising Congolese Tutsi, FAC officers, and former Mobutists. The RCD-ML was backed by Uganda, and the RCD-Goma was supported by Rwanda. The RCD-ML emphasized the need to legitimize the rebellion, while the Rwandan backed RCD-Goma aimed at the physical removal of Kabila from office.

⁴⁶ ICG Congo report N°2, 17 November, 1998 (pp6-7) lists some of the politicians that joined forces in the formation of RCD: Bizima Karaha (a Congolese Tutsi from South Kivu), who was Minister of Foreign Affaires under Kabila; Shambuyi Kalala (a Kasai), Emile Ilunga (a Katangan), Moise Nyarugabo (a Congolese Tutsi from South Kivu) formerly Kabila's private secretary and became Vice-President of the RCD; Deogratias Bugera (a Congolese Tutsi from North Kivu), formerly Secretary-General of the AFDL; Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, the first coordinator of the RCD, Wamba Dia Wamba, professor of history, and he was elected to head the RCD.

Furthermore, the two RCD factions also disagreed over the political and administrative control and resource exploitation in the territory controlled by RCD⁴⁷. Following this RCD schism, further splits have occurred within the RCD factions producing smaller factions like RCD-Original, RCD-Populaire, RCD-National and RCD-K-ML. (ICG 2007: 24, Clark 2001: 271-2, Afoaku in Clark 2003: 117-9, Collins 2002: 608-9).

4.2.2. MLC – Movement for the Liberation of Congo⁴⁸

The second Congolese rebel movement that emerged in the 1998 anti-Kabila war was the MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo). The MLC was created and headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba (*Appendix 10*) in September 1998 and launched its rebellion in November 1998. The MLC was fighting for regime change in Kinshasa. The Movement for the Liberation of Congo was based in Equateur province, and enjoyed strong popular support in that area. It is reported that the MLC could be linked to Mobutuism for Bemba's father was an important baron of the Mobutu regime. Thus, Bemba's political background and experience was different from that of Wamba dia Wamba who was an opponent to Mobutu regime (Afoaku in Clark 2003:118).

The differences within the two MLC and RCD movements weakened the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion and rendered the war more complex. These differences resulted in intra-rebel conflicts and divisions making difficult to legitimize the rebellion. The MLC and RCD groups were located in different regions and they had different political perspectives: the MLC stressed more broadened national goals while the RCD generally and initially aimed at physical removal of Kabila from office. The above pointed out differences between the Rwanda and Uganda that backed RCD affected the anti-Kabila rebellion as a whole: differences over the objectives and strategies of the war, the differences over the political and administrative control and resource exploitation in the territory controlled by the rebellion. Attempts were made to bring together the MLC and RCD but with a very slim success.

⁴⁷ As mentioned in chapter two of this work, some scholars have argued that although Rwanda and Uganda backed AFDL in the 1996-7 DRC war aiming at securing their borders with DRC, in the 1998, the Rwanda and Uganda's involvement in DRC conflict had economic interest: both countries had ambitious aims to control large parts of DRC including some of its mineral deposits (Scherrer 2002:256; Autesserre 2006:6-7; Jackson 2002:520).

⁴⁸ *Appendix 2*

Furthermore, the anti-Tutsi propaganda that was being spread in the country and particularly in the Kivu region affected the anti-Kabila rebellion: the RCD was being portrayed as a Nilotc Tutsi-Hima channel to implement the Tutsi hegemony in the region. This rendered the rebellion as a whole unpopular and less legitimate (Jackson 2006: 97-107; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004:385-410).

4.2.3. ALiR / FDLR (Rwandan Liberation Army /Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)⁴⁹

The FDLR descended from the ALiR. As mentioned above, the latter was composed of ex-FAR (both *genocidaires* and non-*genocidaires*) and *Interahamwe* and young recruits from the 1994 Rwandan refugee population. The ALiR was created by the former Governor of Kigali Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho⁵⁰ and ex-FAR Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rwarakabije (*Appendix 10*). They were helped by Mobutu and some of the then FAZ's officers. By mid-1998, the Rwandan army had tried to destroy the ALiR killing and capturing key ALiR commanders and combatants (Rafti 2006:9).

With the rise of anti-Kabila rebellion since early 1998 Laurent Kabila allied with the ALiR and helped the later to be restructured into two separate branches: ALiR I was based in Masisi (North Kivu) and Shabunda (South Kivu) and ALiR II was based in Kinshasa. The ALiR fought along side with the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) against the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion. The ALiR played a key role in propagating the anti-Tutsi ideology in DRC and particularly in Kivu region. In 2002 ALiR I and ALiR II came together under the politico-military movement the FDLR with Paul Rwarakabije as commander-in-Chief of the military wing of the movement (Rafti 2006:9). Both Laurent Kabila and his son Joseph Kabila supported (financially and militarily) and collaborated closely with the FDLR which contributed in spreading the anti-Tutsi hatred and fighting the Rwandan backed RCD. At the

⁴⁹ Appendices 3 and 5

⁵⁰ Col. Tharcisse Renzaho was arrested in 2002 in DRC and turned over the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Tanzania. According to the ICTR prosecutor, Col Renzaho is alleged to have contributed to the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda (in 1994) in numerous ways. In July 2009, ICTR sentenced Col. Renzaho to life in prison (www.icttr.org).

rise of the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion many FDLR high ranking officers⁵¹ and its best soldiers were deployed in Kinshasa to back militarily Kabila's forces. Since late 1998 the ALiR (which became FDLR) had become gradually the strongest single fighting force on the DRC government side (Scherrer2002:255-269).

As previously mentioned, arriving in DRC in 1994 the *Interahamwe* and ex-FAR launched anti-Tutsi propaganda, killing Tutsis in the Kivu region and mobilizing local populations (Hutu and other tribes) so to implement a "Bantu culture" that would stand "Tutsi hegemony" (Reyntjens 1999:244). They contributed in ethnically polarizing the Kivu population and militarizing various local groups especially Mai-Mai. To make its voice heard and forcing its cause to local population the FDLR used and still uses terror and violence particularly in Kivu region where it is mainly based. "Doctors throughout Kivus report that most brutal rapes they treat have been committed by FDLR" (ICG 2007:28). UN and other human rights associations have reported thousands of FDLR rapes, killings and terror spread in Kivu region. Throughout the DRC conflict the rough treatment of the Kivu population by FDLR combatants had led the latter to be considered extremely violent. It has introduced an excessively violent culture in Kivu provinces.⁵² In south Kivu, the FDLR has remarkably contributed to social and demographic change: spread of anti-Tutsi hatred, pillage, violent attacks against the population has caused the ethnic-polarization of the society, the internal displacement, destitution, the fall of food self-subsistence, death of local civilians, and a high state of insecurity in the province (Rafti 2006: 18, Mararo 2002: 35).

The FDLR ideology hinges on revisionist history, stressing the pre-independence Tutsi rule as oppressive to Hutu population. FDLR downplays the 1994 Rwandan genocide and claims and stresses rather that the RPF committed genocide against Hutu in Rwanda in 1994 and against Hutu refugees in DRC between 1996 and 1997; a discourse referred to as a "double-genocide". Rafti (2006:10) writes further that,

⁵¹ These high ranking FDLR officers include General Paul Rwarakabije, former FDLR commander-in-chief till November 2003, and the current FDLR commander-in-chief General Sylvestre Mudacumura, a known Hutu extremist and former commander of President Habyarimana's guard (ICG 2007:27-8).

⁵² Rafti (2006:14-8) and Scherrer (2002:262-5) among others observe that the FDLR expropriate locals' land, taking also their harvest and cattle. The FDLR combatants use also sexual violence, infecting their victims with HIV which results in the spread of HIV/AIDS in the Kivu region. The victims of rape and their families are often stigmatized, humiliated and socially marginalized. In some parts of Kivu region, civilians claim that they are forced to find a way of cohabitating with the FDLR so to survival.

FDLR ideology stems from a hardening of the Hutu identity (...) due to a sense of victimization that was fed by myths of oppression and was cultivated through life in exile. Many Rwandan Hutu refugees perceive their hardships in terms of Tutsi malice and any traces of guilt pertaining to crimes they may have committed during the genocide are replaced by feelings of injustice, which in turn give way to a radical view of their ethnic “rivals”.

The FDLR’s main political objective is supposedly to change the post-genocide regime in Rwanda and the FDLR military wing proclaims itself protector of Rwandan Hutu refugees and has declared the use of force to achieve the movement’s political objectives. FDLR emphasizes the predicament of the Hutu and defines the RPF as the “first enemy” and the RPF is identified as the Tutsi population. FDLR combatants confess that they have killed or will kill “the Tutsi enemy” (Rafti 2006:10). The ICG (2007:27) reports that the FDLR soldiers, especially those who were young when they left Rwanda in 1994 are indoctrinated to believe that their enemy are Tutsi population since pre-colonial period and that the current regime in Rwanda is a Tutsi led government that seeks to oppress all Hutu and as soon as they [Hutus] cross the border returning into Rwanda the current Rwandan regime will inject them with HIV.⁵³

The FDLR commanders have sustained a recruitment network recruiting their combatants from young Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC; and they have extended their recruitment from Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and local population. Following their FDLR ethnic ideology, expressed in what they call “Hutu culture” the FDLR commanders emphasize that the recruitment be confined to Hutu only. Currently the FDLR is reported to have strength of an estimated 7,000 – 15,000 troops of which 3,000 to 4,000 are deployed in South Kivu.⁵⁴ The FDLR has received support from the Government of the DRC and although this support has been officially terminated since the Lusaka agreement the informal support has been reported

⁵³ Scholars such as Rafti (2006:9-12), Mararo (2002:35.78) and Lemarchand (2006:1-20) argue that although the FDLR combatants (especially young ones) were raised in adverse conditions in refugee camps and in the Congolese bush under the extremists who installed anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi sentiments in them, the RPF public denial of crimes perpetrated against refugees in eastern Congo in 1996-7 deepened the mutual antagonisms and catalyzed the anti-Tutsi attitude among Hutu population in DRC.

⁵⁴ According to 2002 UNSC report, these figures are just estimates. Some sources report 4,000 to 6,000 FDLR troops operating from DRC soil and RPA estimations are around 13,000 to 15,000 FDLR troops. The strength of the FDLR military wing was also weakened when FDLR commander-in-chief General Paul Rwarakabije (*Appendix 10*) and other 100 combatants, among them high-ranking FDLR officers defected to Rwanda in November 2003. The known Hutu extremist Colonel Sylvestre Mudacumura (who later became General) succeeded Rwarakabije as commander-in-chief of the FDLR. The internal organisation of the FDLR have also been slightly destabilized by the internal regional tensions between FDLR commanders from the south of Rwanda and those from the north (who were associated with Habyarimana’s clique) and two prominent deaths of the deputy force commander, General Kanyandekwe and the secretary general, Colonel Nubaha (Rafti 2006:20; ICG 2007:27).

(Rafti 2006:13, ICG 2003: 2, ICG 2007:27-8). Furthermore, apart from the DRC's government support and close cooperation with the FARDC (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*), the FDLR, employing the anti-Tutsi ideology, has succeeded in mobilizing and cooperating militarily with the Mai-Mai, the Burundian Hutu rebels FDD and FNL, and the local Hutu population (The 2002 UNSC report on armed groups in DRC, Rafti 2006: 12).

Certainly as the above paragraphs underline; for Hutu extremists to solidify the existence of the FDLR and subsequently the safety of their survival a motivational beliefs system was and is a *sine qua non* condition. Paraphrasing political psychologists Tajfel and Turner (in Jost and Sidanius 2004:279), one of the functional aims of a beliefs system is to keep and increase the members of the constructed 'in-group', Hutu movement (FDLR) in this case. The new recruits were gradually to make the beliefs system, the views and objectives of the FDLR theirs. Indoctrination process was one way to mobilize the young Hutu to adhere to a beliefs system. And engaging the young Hutus in violent conflicts and in the killings affected certainly the psychology of these young people turning them into 'killers': in their view of reality morality is reversed. In this regards, Darley (in Jost and Sidanius 2004:391-2) states that situations can be created in which a person is drawn in the commission of evil, and in the process the participant is gradually transformed into an individual capable of autonomously and knowledgeably committing evil actions.

Furthermore, according to Staub's line of thought (2003:293-5) the persistent difficult life conditions and the experience of aggressiveness or violence are also 'activator' for an individual or group of people to develop violent behaviours. Ross (1995:537) adds that historical traumas, suffering inflicted may lead individuals or a group to see themselves as having been hurt and suffered that they can attend to their own needs and pursue their objectives feeling little or no empathy for the hurt and harm they inflict upon others. Harsh living conditions and the experience of violent conflicts had certainly affected the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC: refugee camps destroyed violently in 1996-7, forced and harsh life conditions in eastern DRC jungles, etc. (Kisangani 2002: 163-202). These factors might have contributed psychologically in drawing many young Hutus into the FDLR and its actions (Rafti 2006: 12-15).

The military and political headquarters of the FDLR in DRC are based in Kalonge and Kibua respectively in the jungle of Walikale. Thanks to the ex-FAR officers the military organization of the FDLR unlike that of typical rebel forces is well structured like a conventional army. It has an ordered bureaucratic structure and a high command with decentralized military departments: personnel (G₁); intelligence (G₂); operations (G₃); logistics (G₄) and civil affairs (G₅). Furthermore, according to MONUC sources, the FDLR is well armed and equipped. Its troops in Kivu provinces are profuse in remote areas that are difficult to reach by land or aircraft. They are militarily trained on regular basis and have become extremely and highly skilled in guerrilla warfare. This has led the MONUC's military leadership fearfully resistant to use force against the FDLR. "We don't want to send our soldiers home in body bags"; a MONUC commander confessed to the Crisis Group in an interview in Goma in July 2007 (Rafti 2006:11-12; ICG 2007:28).⁵⁵ Apart from cash payment from the DRC government the FDLR's financial survival is mainly based on land cultivation in Kivu provinces, extortion and selling minerals. The FDLR controls important cassiterite, gold and coltan mines in Kilungu (Walikale), Birala, Masisi (Fizi) and Ziralo (Kalehe), taxing the miners and controlling important trade routes. In south Kivu, many of the FDLR combatants are embedded with the civilian population, where they cultivate plots of lands. Many of them are mixed with the Rwandan refugees and some of them are married to local women.

The solid highly trained and well structured military organization of the FDLR had made the latter a very powerful armed group in DRC difficult to crash down; very active and effective in spreading anti-Tutsi hatred; and a source of insecurity in region. Reporting about the DRC conflicts, the International Crisis Group (ICG) African report (2007:27) writes,

The presence of Rwandan rebels in eastern Congo was a [principal] reason for the war against Mobutu and has remained an obstacle to lasting peace in the region. (...) [The Rwandan rebels] prey on locals and prevent the displaced population, in particular the Tutsi community, from returning. They regularly ally with local militia and the national army, thus forming a serious obstacle to reconciliation between local communities, as well as between Kinshasa and Kigali.

⁵⁵ This solid and well structured and trained military organization of the FDLR has made the latter a very powerful armed group in DRC

Various agreements have been signed by the concerned parties (the initially agreement between Laurent Kabila (*Appendix 10*) and Kigali to deal with ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*⁵⁶ and later on the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the 2002 Pretoria Accords and others alike) articulating that the disarmament and disbandment of “negative forces”⁵⁷ operating within and from DRC soil as one of the imperatives to regional peace however effective actions up to now are yet to be seen in this regard. Although in 2003 Joseph Kabila (*Appendix 10*)⁵⁸ officially cut off most support to the FDLR from DRC government the FDLR has continuously benefited military support and collaboration from FAC based on the strong ties formed during the 1998 war between its military officers and the FAC officers and is still established in DRC forests.

4.2.4. Laurent Kabila’s camp and other regional participant in DRC conflicts

In this second phase of DRC conflicts, Laurent Kabila led the new established DRC government army. However, at the outbreak of the anti-Kinshasa rebellion in the August 1998, the DRC government forces showed a setback and were defeated in many areas in the first weeks of the 1998 war (Afoaku in Clark 2003: 115-6). The inefficiency and weakness of the Congolese government troops were due to different factors including their number and organization.⁵⁹ In 1998 Congolese government troops numbered only 40,000 men; and by the end of 1998 about 10,000 men most of them Banyamulenge left the national army and joined the RCD. The formation of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) along ethnic and regional lines had also interfered with its effectiveness especially in Kivu region where troops are highly polarized according to ethnicity; and its contact with the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* has sharpened this ethnic polarization. Subsequently, after Mobutu’s regime the FAC instead of

⁵⁶ In the outbreak of the 1996-7 “war of liberation” that toppled Mobutu, Kabila made an agreement with his allies (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) to secure DRC eastern border with these neighbouring countries against rebel groups.

⁵⁷ “Negative forces” is a term used in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to describe armed groups other than the signatories of the Agreement (government forces and RCD-MLC rebels) in DRC. And these “negative forces” include the FDLR, the FDD (Burundian rebel group), UNITA (Angola rebel group), the Ugandan rebel groups (ADF, LRA, WNB, and FUNA) and internal militias (Scherrer 2002:290).

⁵⁸ Joseph Kabila is the son of Laurent Kabila. He became the President of DRC in 2001 when his father, Laurent Kabila, was assassinated.

⁵⁹ For instance, the only official troops supposed to control the North Kivu region are the Congolese government troops, but because of their number and bad organization, the DRC army has in many occasions permitted the other armed groups such as Ugandan rebels, Mai-Mai and the FDLR to police the province, and in some cases conducting joint patrol activities with these armed groups (ICG Kivu Report 1998:8-9).

being national army in character is rather dominated by an ethnic group of Kabila's home province of Shaba. Another factor that severely limited the efficiency of the FAC is the lack of a proper mechanism for the salary payment of its regular soldiers and junior officers. Hence the latter often resort to illegal means of earning a living, which leads to acts of indiscipline. These factors and the low morale have contributed to the inability of the FAC to respond effectively to the rise of RCD against Kinshasa government in August 1998 (ICG Kivu Report 1998: 9-8).

As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, as the AFDL progressed in its 1996-7 war against Mobutu it gradually got infected by the anti-Tutsi propaganda; and Laurent Kabila had then began initiating contact with various armed groups in the east Congo including the ALiR (which later became the FDLR), the Mai-Mai and Ugandan rebel groups. And after being installed in Kinshasa as the new *Chef d'Etat* Laurent Kabila became autocratic and gradually distanced himself from his former allies, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, and officially made a call to the population for lynching Tutsis. Thus, as the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion (Rwanda-Uganda backed RCD-MLC) launched its attacks, the FAC got vital military support from all these armed groups Kabila had formed relationships with (about 40,000 men from ALiR/FDLR; 12,000 men from Mai-Mai; 14,000 men from FDD-FNL and ADF). These groups contributed also in spreading the anti-Tutsi hatred and carried out the killings and atrocities against Tutsi and Tutsi-like population in various parts of DRC (Scherrer 2002: 258; ICG 1998:1, Lemarchand 2006).

As the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion rose from Kivu region, Kabila did also a lot travelling seeking and calling for outside support. Some countries, fellow-members of the SADC (Southern African Development Community) including Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola responded by sending their heavily armed troops (Kisangani in Bradshaw & Butts 2002:10, Reyntjens 1999: 247, Lemarchand 2002:389). Later Libya, Chad and Sudan followed suit by either sending troops or making financial contributions to support Kabila. It was thanks to these various support (from the militias and these other African states) that Kabila and his FAC were able to stop the advancement of the Rwanda-Uganda backed RCD-MLC; and some Congolese citizens responding to anti-Tutsi propaganda and Kabila's call to kill the Tutsi, joined in the conflict to fight the enemy, the "Tutsi invaders". In 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement were signed by the government forces and RCD-MLC (Reyntjens 2005:5). However, the realities on the ground were that the immediate cessation of hostilities

by the Lusaka Agreement signatories was not materializing till early 2001. The 2000-2001 battle of Pweto became another turn in DRC war for it was one of the factors that led to Laurent Kabila's assassination in 2001; and he was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila, the current DRC president (Afoaku in Clark 2003:115-6, Scherrer 2002:258-283)⁶⁰.

These brief analytical descriptions of the rise of anti-Kabila rebellion suggest that the 1998-2001 DRC conflicts emerged in a more complex fashion. Following the fall of Mobutu there was again a lack of a solid leadership in Kinshasa that would address effectively some of the key factors of the 1996-7 war: citizenship rights of Congolese Tutsis, regional security and DRC domestic life (political, social and economical). The Congolese society was once again susceptible to violent conflicts as shown by the above data.

Without oversimplification of the 1998-2001 conflicts I would like to argue that the frustration of the 'universal' psychological needs to use Staub's terminology (2003:293-4) was the rationale behind the conflicts: threat of one's identity, inability to control or address life problems (in all aspects) and to satisfy material basic needs. Drawing from the above analysis it appears that the parties that launched the 1998 rebellion felt betrayed by Kabila. Congolese Tutsis (deprived of citizenship rights) were once again threatened; their survival was at risk as the anti-Tutsi feeling increasingly sharpened and actively expressed in DRC and in Kivu provinces particularly. The regional states (Rwanda and Uganda)'s security was still unsolved.⁶¹ With the experience of the refugees' camps destruction by RPA/AFDL, the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees felt a necessity to reorganize solidly and fight for their survival hunting down and killing the 'Tutsi'. The anti-Tutsi campaign became a survival mechanism (Staub 2003:299) for both Laurent Kabila and his allies (FDLR, FDD and Mai-Mai). The ex-

⁶⁰ In mid-October 2000 FAC units jointly with ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*, the FDD, the local Mai-Mai as well as Zimbabwean and Namibian troops launched a major offensive in north-eastern Katanga province aimed to destroy the RCD-RPA bases. They captured RCD positions including the town of Pepa. Early December, RCD-RPA heavily counter attacked and heavy fighting occurred in the vicinity of Pweto, on Lake Mweru; and Kabila's camp was humiliated and lost thousands of men in the battle. The RCD-RPA captured Pweto on 6th December 2000. Pweto was a strategic point in Katanga and was Kabila's Katanga-based power elite. The loss of Pweto to RCD-RPA created great tensions within and between the government and its allies. On 16th January 2001, Laurent Kabila outraged by the humiliating defeat in Pweto had an argument with his generals and was shot by his own people (Scherrer 2003: 288-290, Talbot 2001). Different rumours and conspiracy theories have been made about the shooting of Kabila, and some of the AFDL leaders have been accused. However, following the Kabila's assassination, a staggering change took place: the Lusaka agreement was revived and all parties respected the ceasefire, Rwanda and four other states withdrew their troops, and MONUC was deployed (Scherrer 2003:288-290).

⁶¹ As mentioned above, some literatures argue that the economic ambitions were one of the main factors in DRC conflicts and regional states intervention.

FAR/*Interahamwe* proved their usefulness on DRC soil in this regard. In the 1998-2001 DRC conflicts, deep-seated threats to identity and security fears served as powerful tools for armed groups formation and alliances (Ross 1995:525). The created “out-group” and “in-group” became a frame of alliances formation.

4.3. THE 2004 ONWARD CONFLICTS AND KEY ACTORS INVOLVED

The third phase involved some of the actors above mentioned; mainly the FDLR, a Hutu-Mai Mai coalition called PARECO and certainly the FAC. However, the new and main actor in this phase was the CNDP (the National Congress for the Defense of the People). As troops from all actors in the 1998-2001 conflicts started their process of integration in the new Congolese national army FARDC, a former RCD commander, General Laurent Nkunda from Banyamulenge felt betrayed. Followed by many of his men, General Nkunda left the newly formed FARDC in 2004 and launched attacks in Bukavu, a Kivu city to stop an ongoing killing of Banyamulenge (ICG 2007:1-4, 7; Schimmel 2006: 310-313), and in August 2005 General Nkunda officially launched the Military Counsel for the People’s Defense (CMDP) with the goal of establishing an “inclusive and conflict-free government, capable of restoring peace and security of all in our republic”. The CMDP was later renamed CNDP (*Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple*) (ICG 2007:7).

4.3.1. The CNDP (the National Congress for the Defense of the People)

To reinforce the 1999 Lusaka Agreement in 2003 another peace agreement was signed at Sun City in South Africa and a three-year transition period was agreed up and an imperative appeal was made to all concerned parties to implement the elements of Lusaka agreement. Although the three year transition period following the Sun City peace agreement managed to improve significantly the security situation in most parts of DRC, preparing and creating conditions for peaceful elections in July and October 2006, the transitional government failed in many aspects to accomplish various necessary tasks before holding elections: army integration, “*brassage*”⁶², in Kivu region tensions remained high, no serious progress was

⁶² Army integration was the central issue for the stabilisation of Kivu region because of its implications: the RCD’s political and economic survival and the physical security of its core Tutsi constituency depended to its military leverage. The Sun City agreement failed to define clear modalities ensuring the success of this army integration. The 2003 Congo’s peace agreement treated army integration as a mere technical process consisting of shuffling of command positions between former belligerents, without taking into consideration the

made with disarming the “negative forces” on DRC territory, resentment between local communities over land security and mass human rights abuses remained deep, ethnic hatred continued to divide the society (ICG 2007:1).

Clearly in the climate of ethnic hatred, mistrust, fear and unhealed wound from the past conflicts the army integration was a crucial element particularly in Kivu region. The appointment of new army commanders, especially the FAC commanders, all over the Kivu provinces exacerbated inter-communal tensions. The continued anti-Tutsi propaganda and the presence of FDLR in Kivu region and its continuous ties and cooperation, though unofficial, with FAC officers were a threat to Tutsi community in the region. And during the *brassage* process the RCD dominated by Tutsi felt betrayed. Ordinary Tutsi soldiers have been attacked, mistreated and pushed away on different occasion by soldiers of other ethnic groups. HRW (2007:10) reports that,

[During the *brassage* process] in 2004, the 51st battalion (8th brigade) was disbanded after its officers, who were Tutsi, were told by their superiors that they were not Congolese. (...) soldiers [Tutsi] who joined other units were beaten, imprisoned, and tortured, and four were killed. (...) at a training camp in Bas-Congo province in February 2006, a soldier of Banyamulenge origin was blamed for the death of a fellow combatant of another group, and he and other Banyamulenge soldiers were attacked and several injured.

The new army officers from Kinshasa appointed in Kivu region looked down the RCD soldiers and contributed in deepening the anti-Tutsi propaganda. Many of them continued to collaborate with the FDLR. Furthermore, in the run-up to national and provincial elections, different politicians also stepped up anti-Tutsi rhetoric, and the RCD-Goma and its constituency (Tutsi) gradually faced the risk to lose their political and economic survival. The new army commander in South Kivu province, a pro-Kabila General Nabyolwa mistreated Tutsi soldiers, and in May 2004, the national army under his command rounded up and killed fifteen Tutsi and forcing about 3,000 Tutsi civilians to flee the town (ICG 2007: 3). Faced with such unsecure situation and conditions, many of RCD officers led by General Laurent Nkunda (*Appendix 10*)⁶³ refused and withdrew from the army integration process

implications on the ground and all aspects could be involved. The army integration process (which was called *brassage*) required soldiers from all concerned belligerents to be trained for 45 days and then to be deployed in a region other than in which they had previously fought; and during this process, soldiers could choose to be demobilized (HRW 2007:10).

⁶³ General Laurent Nkunda is a Congolese Tutsi who was in command of the RCD's 81st and 83rd brigades based north of Goma in Masisi.

stating that they had no confidence in the army due to the fate, including death, many Tutsi soldiers faced in army formed under *brassage* process (HRW 2007:10-11).

General Laurent Nkunda and his men launched the CNDP to protect themselves and the Tutsi community. Many Tutsi businessmen supported the rise of the Nkunda rebellion for their protection and survival. The CNDP, based in North Kivu, insisted as precondition for the way forward for the integration of its troops into the national army both the eradication of the FDLR rebels and the return and reinstallation of 45,000 Congolese Tutsi living in refugee camps in Rwanda. Since 2004, the CNDP has launched different offensive and defensive attacks on Bukavu, Goma, Sake and other places responding to abuses against Tutsi, whom it claims to protect. The CNDP has been accused of human rights abuses too, although its officers have denied such accusation. Different attempts have been made, with MONUC intervention, to bring the concerned parties (especially Kinshasa government and Nkunda) to find solutions that would bring end to the conflicts that are still paralyzing life in Kivu region till nowadays. The national army, in collaboration with different armed groups in Kivu region (especially FDLR, Mai-Mai) has occasionally launched attacks to the CNDP bases to destroy it but with no success (ICG 2007: 7-16, HWR 2007: 10-12).

Without going into political machination involved in the 2004 DRC conflicts, the analysis elaborated above points out a lack of political will and commitment on the concerned parties to end violence. The previous violent conflicts (the 1996-7 and 1998-2001 wars) had destroyed the Congolese society socially, economically and politically. Fear, mistrust and uncertainties based on these past experiences had become psychological driving forces in the society. Lack of improved life conditions and the failure to implement political and social reconciliation mechanisms of the Congolese society in its totality constituted a conflict-oriented milieu. The anti-Tutsi feelings and expression, the presence of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* on DRC territory and their actions continued to be a threat to Congolese Tutsis and to the regional security. The latter points to the core of the following chapter in which I would like to examine the instability in Great Lakes Region in connection to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees.

Although this study focused on DRC conflicts till 2006, it is to be added that the instability in DRC and in the Great Lakes region of Africa has continually been a hot issue. The CNDP continued to be one of the key players in these conflicts (United Nations Joint Human Rights Office: UNJHRO 2009). By November 2008, the CNDP managed to militarily secure several

strategic positions in Kivu regions. It occupied then a large area in the Kivu provinces (UNJHRO 2009). However, since end of 2006 till end of 2008 there have been internal power struggles within CNDP and speculatively some misunderstanding with Kigali⁶⁴ (Ntarugera 2009; UNJHRO 2009). In January 2009 General Nkunda was arrested by the Rwandan Government and held *incommunicado* in Rwanda. General Bosco Ntaganda (*Appendix 10*) took over the command of CNDP (*Appendix 3*).⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Kigali supported militarily CNDP, ensuring thus that FDLR does not launch attacks into Rwanda (HRW 2007, UNJHRO 2009).

⁶⁵ The reasons for Nkunda's arrest are still unclear (Ntarugera 2009). The legal Counsel representing Laurent Nkunda has set forth process with the Rwandan Government to discuss the case of Nkunda's detention. A meeting between the interim President of the High Military Court of Rwanda (Capt Bernard Hategekimana) and Counsel representing Nkunda was to take place on the 5th October 2009 (www.cndp-congo.org). Following Nkunda's arrest, the Governments of Rwanda and DRC launched joint military operations (*Umoja*) against FDLR in North Kivu. And in March 2009, CNDP began a process of rapid integration into FARDC (UNJHRO 2009).

Chapter Five

The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees And instability in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

Geographically the Great Lakes Region of Africa comprises nine countries: Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. However this study limits itself on the countries that share borders with Rwanda i.e. DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. The post-genocide Great Lakes region of Africa has been marked by instability in various aspects: political vacuum, human rights abuses, economical instability, refugees-generating conflicts and conflict-generating refugees. Almost all countries of the great lakes region did feel the impact of the Rwandan genocide at least in terms of the refugee flows. Chapter two in its second section makes allusion to the linkage between the Great lakes region's instability and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees however with less details and analysis. Thus this chapter intends to assess more closely the role of these refugees in the overall instability that the Great Lakes region of Africa has witnessed following the Rwandan genocide.

The chapter argues that to a larger extent the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees have constituted a security threat in the region on many different dimensions: human security of the refugees themselves and hosting population, societal security as well as national and regional security. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first section describes the responses of the regional countries (specifically DRC, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi) to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees' situation. The last section examines critically the extent and nature of the role of these refugees in the instability that marked the host countries and the Great lakes region as a whole, focusing more on the security aspect. Certainly the previous chapters may be referred to in order to situate the subsequent chapter's discussion.

5.1. THE REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES

Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide which claimed life of about 1 million Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutu, over two millions Rwandan Hutus took refuge in neighbouring countries particularly Burundi, Tanzania, DRC and Uganda. Among these refugees were the officials of the defeated regime, the ex-FAR and the Hutu militiamen but also thousands of ordinary people who followed their leaders' call to flee the RPF (Luyt 2003:101; Shalom 1996:1:14; Kisangani 2000:165). Although the international community stepped in for humanitarian assistance the aforementioned regional countries had to shoulder all the responsibility of dealing with the massive inflow of these Rwandan Hutu refugees.

Certainly the implications of refugee flows are blatant both for refugees and host countries. Studies have shown that refugees generally compel the host country to stretch its resources so to accommodate them. The refugees often face traumatic experiences that affect their psychological state. Additionally the refugees' situations are also compounded by difficult life conditions in their refugees' camps wherein overpopulation and overcrowding carry the possibility of epidemics that claim lives of these refugees (*Appendices 6 to 9*). When no effective control is in place in the refugee camps all sorts of crimes develop and threaten the lives of refugees (Cohon 1981:257-8; Akokpari 1998: 223-5).

Most likely the degeneration of the life conditions in refugee camps into intolerable levels may create subsequently an environment conducive to conflict as Staub (2003:293) would argue. These theoretical observations suggest thus that following the 1994 Rwandan genocide (with over two million Rwandan population fleeing the country) mechanisms and policies were needed in regional countries to take on the onerous task of dealing with the outbreak of refugee crisis. This implied to ensure the well-being of the millions of Rwandan Hutu refugees by providing essential services and assistance, promoting and facilitating the voluntary repatriation, and ensuring that the set-up refugee camps retained an exclusively civilian and humanitarian character accommodating only people entitled to humanitarian protection and assistance.

However, as mentioned in chapter two, the situations were different in each hosting country (Tanzania, Uganda, DRC and Burundi) due to various factors. The latter included the then existing structures and conditions (political, economical and social) in the host country but

also the dynamics of refugees themselves. Certainly it wouldn't be illogical to postulate that the regional countries' responses to the 1994 Rwandan refugee crisis affected in a certain way the stability of the host country and that of the region as a whole. Furthermore recent studies remark that refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict and the by-product of war, they are also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability (Salehyan 2007:127; Collier in Furley 2006:2). Thus expanding on the chapter two the following paragraphs intend to describe and analyze the response of the regional countries to the refugees' crisis that followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

5.1.1. Tanzania's response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees' crisis

The United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania)⁶⁶, although not actively involved in violent conflict that ravaged the Great Lakes Region, has received thousands of people fleeing violence in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.⁶⁷ Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide Tanzania hosted thousands of Rwandan refugees. Maina (1997:81) reports that by the 3rd of June 1994 Tanzania had received already 410,900 Rwandan Hutu refugees scattered in various camps in west of Tanzania (districts of Ngara, Karagwe and Muleba) near Rwanda. These camps were Benako (330,000), Murongo (15,000), Lukole (8,500), Kagenyi (24,000), Nyakasimbi (1,400), Burigi (5,000), Chabilisa (22,000) and other smaller camps (5,000). In total Tanzania is estimated to have hosted more than 600,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees joining another huge number of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Tanzania since 1960 and about 538,400 Burundian Hutu refugees (Ogata 2005:178; Muggah 2006:137).

Life conditions in the Ngara, Karagwe and Muleba districts were to be affected by the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in many ways: resources distributions, sanitation, social and environmental impacts. Undoubtedly as Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz (1996:403) observe a sudden influx of thousands refugees confined to very limited areas is likely to have direct and indirect impacts on the environment. This has been the case of deforestation due to the refugees seeking mainly fuelwood for cooking. The immediate task

⁶⁶ Geographically, the United Republic of Tanzania (called simply Tanzania) is in the east of Rwanda and shares borders with Burundi (in west), Kenya (in north east), Uganda (in North West), DRC (in west) and in south three countries: Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique.

⁶⁷ By the 1st of January 2007, Tanzania was among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries in the world with an estimation of 485,000 refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Somalia (www.unhcr.org).

of the then Tanzania government was to address as properly as possible the sudden refugees' crisis by providing controlled assistance to the refugees and the Tanzanian population in the region where refugee camps were set; thus to ensure more or less better life conditions and security for all.

At the abrupt influx of the 1994 Rwandan refugees *en masse*, the refugee law in Tanzania was nearly 30 years old: the Refugees (Control) Act of 1966. Processes to prepare and implement a new law had been attempted since 1991. Although this 1996 Refugees Act had been characterized as the most comprehensive and detailed refugee legislation in Africa, a critical assessment of this law shows that the legislation was not very balanced for it emphasized very little in the way of refugees' rights only duties and potential penalties (Maina 1997:87-8).⁶⁸ In his address to the Cabinet in 1991 the then Tanzanian Minister of Home Affairs, Augustine Lyatonga Mrema, outlined the deficiencies of the 1966 Refugees Act and recalled the international legal framework in regards to refugees. These included "lack of definition of who a refugee is; duties of providing the refugee with the basics of life from the time of arrival in the country up to the time of departure; (...) absence of a specific institution entrusted with the task of dealing with the refugees in the country" (Maina 1997:89).

Certainly considering these deficiencies of the Tanzanian Refugees Act 1966, the legislation was inadequate to deal properly with the 1994 Rwandan refugees. For instance the Benako camp of about 330,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees hosted local leaders who participated in the Rwandan genocide and were taking other refugees in hostage (Ogata 2005:179). Obviously a need to define and separate 'innocent' refugee from the alleged criminals was *de facto* an imperative. To respond immediately to the refugees' crisis on its soil the then Tanzanian government put in place mechanisms and policies: structures to control refugees, the refugee camps and modes of administration and assistance (to the refugees) were set up.

⁶⁸ The 1966 Refugees Act of Tanzania in many of its section had a tendency to place very wide discretionary powers on individual authority. For instance section 9 of the Act gives the Minister or any competent authority appointed by the Minister the powers to depot any refugee at any time. And section 7 states that the competent authority may order the detention and slaughter of animals belonging to and brought into the country by any refugee. Section 8 mentions that refugees' vehicles may be used by the competent authority with no compensation to the owner of the vehicle. The freedom and refugees' rights are restricted in a way (Maina 1997:86-8).

Tanzania cooperated closely with UNHCR to assist the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in many aspects and ensuring the security of refugees and Tanzanian population. Tanzanian police was mobilized in this regards. As soon as the new Kigali (Rwanda) government was established, a functioning tripartite mechanism (Tanzania/Rwanda/UNHCR) was put in place and refugees' repatriation program was launched. Vigorous environmental protection programs were encouraged and installed in and around the camps aiming at preventing depletion of wood, water resources and soil erosion (UNHCR 2002: 68). Undoubtedly the Tanzanian history of calm and its solid and orderly structured response to the 1994 Rwandan refugee crisis contributed to the subsequent stability that continued to mark Tanzania unlike other regional countries.

5.1.2. Uganda's response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees 'crisis

Literature reports that relatively few 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees poured in Uganda following the Rwandan genocide. This might be due to the fact that the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda. And few data are reported about the life of these Rwandan Hutu refugees in Uganda. Thus it may suffice to outline here that by the end of August 1994 UNHCR estimated about 10,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in Uganda mainly women and children. And UNHCR in collaboration with the Ugandan local authority provided assistance to these refugees (UNHCR 2000:246).

5.1.3. Burundi's response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees 'crisis

Burundi is said to have received about 270,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 Rwandan genocide and among them were leaders and Hutu militiamen responsible for the genocide. These refugees were settled in the north of Burundi, a region mostly occupied by the Burundian Hutus (Scherrer 2002: xiv). However no clearly defined mechanisms and policies were immediately put in place by the then Burundian government in order to deal as adequately as possible with the massive influx of these Rwandan refugees (Scherrer 2002:153).

The history of Burundi has been also marked by the Hutu-Tutsi antagonisms that generated refugees both outside and inside the country⁶⁹ (Uvin 1999: 253-4; Lemarchand 2006:1-10). The detailed presentation of the Burundian history of violence is beyond the scope of this research. However, in order to situate and properly grasp the social, economical and political environment in Burundi in 1994 (at the massive influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees) some elements need to be highlighted. Going back in time to the pre-genocide situation since 1993 Burundi was plagued into violent conflicts that claimed thousands of lives. On the 1st of June 1993 Melchior Ndadaye won the presidential elections, the first Burundian Hutu to become president since independence in 1962. Tutsis were not happy for the defeat and immediately demonstrated against Ndadaye's victory. On 21st October 1993 the army (which is Tutsi-dominated) carried out a bloody coup in which President Ndadaye was killed. The coup triggered massacres in many parts of the country and by the end of the same month UNHCR counted about 500,000 Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries: Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC (the then Zaire). By mid-November 1993 the number of Burundian refugees and IDPs had risen to about 800,000 of whom 100 a day were dying; and by the end of December 1993 about 1.5 million Burundians (both Hutu and Tutsis) out of a population of 5.6 million had fled their homes to escape violence and up to 150 a day were dying (Arnold 2005: 857).

In January 1994 Cyprien Ntaryamira also a Hutu was appointed the President of Burundi by the National Assembly. However, the violence continued in many parts of the country (Hutus and Tutsis killing each other) and the number of IDPs was increasing deplorably. The national army, police and Burundian Hutu militiamen were implicated in the violence. The country had fallen into an institutionally very insecure period marked by terror, oppression and economic decline. During this period the process of democratization was turned upside down. Relief agencies tried to cope with refugees and IDPs as they could. President Ntaryamira was killed on the 6th of April 1994 in the plane he shared with the then Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, and he was replaced by Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a Hutu. Throughout 1994 Burundi experienced a state of low-intensity internal violent conflicts. However the then government was facing many internal challenges: the IDPs, the economic decline, reconstruction of the country (infrastructures), the rise of militiamen (both Hutu and Tutsi) and the reconciliation of Burundians (Khadiagala in Boulden 2003: 216-7; Dagne and

⁶⁹ Internally displaced people: IDP

Farrell 2003: 1-2; Arnold 2005: 857). And this is briefly the state which the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees found in Burundi.

The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees already marked by a history of Hutu-Tutsi antagonism and genocide feared the Tutsi-dominated Burundian government and army. This might have been one of the reasons that led many of these refugees to join and strengthen the Burundian Hutu militiamen as soon as they crossed into Burundi (Scherrer 2002:153). I shall come back on this point in the second section of this chapter. The point to highlight here is that at the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees the Burundian society was already ethnically fragile and sensitive. The society was destroyed by the Hutu-Tutsi violent confrontations which affected inevitably the functioning of the state. Mechanisms to deal properly with the massive arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees immediately were technically absent. However, since UNHCR and other international relief agencies were already present in Burundi (due to IDPs and Burundian refugees as mentioned above) they intervened: setting up refugee camps for 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and providing assistance to the latter.

5.1.4. DRC's response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees 'crisis'

The Democratic Republic of Congo (the then Zaire) is the regional country that received many of the Rwandan Hutu refugees. As mentioned in previous chapters about 1.5 to 2.0 million Rwandan Hutu populations took refuge in DRC. Among these were thousands of ex-FAR (*genocidaires* and *non-genocidaires*), the officials of the 'defeated' Rwandan regime that planned and oversaw the genocide, and thousands of Hutu militiamen who carried out the genocide (Kisangani 2000:165; Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz 1996: 403). The massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees into DRC found the country already in a very bad shape politically, economically and socially.

Without repeating all details described in previous chapters, it may suffice to briefly recall that prior to the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC, the latter was marked and characterized by a state of non development, the political chaos and disorder, the longstanding dysfunction of the state, national economic decline, destruction of public infrastructures, corruption and injustice (McNulty 1997:54). This deplorable situation and difficult life conditions prevailed in the whole country and had created alienation, anger and frustration among the Congolese people. Political opposition was in existence but weak and

paralyzed as far as concrete actions to change the situation were concerned. The Kivu society has been characterized by a history of conflicts between Banyarwanda and ‘natives’ and unsolved issue of citizenship rights of Banyarwanda who were consistently regarded as ‘foreigners’ (Autesserre 2006:9; Jackson 2002:520).

Certainly from the above description it would not be irrational to argue that the 1994 DRC state was not effectively fit to deal properly with the sudden outbreak of massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees. The literature points out that the then Zairean authority failed to control the influx of these refugees. UNHCR and other international relief agencies stepped in immediately to provide assistance to this massive population in need. The refugees were settled in camps in Kivu region (Clapham 1998:138; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:337). However till September 1994 the Zairean authority was still absent and UNHCR on its own could not ensure security in and around refugee camps. This vacuum permitted the proliferation of criminal activities within and from the refugee camps. The hosting population especially those near the camps started showing discontentment and asked for refugees to be repatriated or to be settled in other parts of the country (Royer in Guichaoua 2004: 442,460; UNHCR 2000: 251).

The massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees affected the life in eastern DRC, politically, socially and economically. Infectious diseases including cholera spread in the region claimed thousands of human lives (of both refugees and local population). Serious ecological problems emerged increasingly as rapid deforestation within and around refugee camps took place as well as a very poor sanitation (Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz 1996:403-5; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). The then opposition led by Etienne Tshisekedi urged the Kinshasa government to deal effectively with the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees unfortunately in vain (Arnold 2005:885). Mobutu on his side used the situation. He hoped to strengthen his influence and pursue his purposes making himself indispensable on both international and domestic fronts, resurfacing politically as the protector of refugees in central Africa (McNulty 1999:70-1).

An agreement was made between Mobutu and the French that the then Congolese forces were not to disarm ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen. UN system and international humanitarian NGOs gave no thought to the definition of who actually was entitled to refugee status and protection. Ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen controlled the refugee camps in

full view of the UN and humanitarian agencies; and they were supported militarily by the French through *Operation Turquoise*⁷⁰. UN and international humanitarian NGOs ignored violations of international law arising from the location of refugees' camps too close to the Rwandan border. These camps were soon turned into 'military camps' (Mamdani 2001:254; Nzungu-Ntalaja 2005:18). The international community and Mobutu regime failed and/or refused either to separate *bone fide* refugees from armed ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* or to disarm the latter. The defeated 1994 Rwandan government, ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen reorganized and launched attacks against Congolese population (targeting Tutsis) and into Rwanda. The situation became increasingly volatile and exploded into violent conflicts in DRC, affecting the Great Lakes region's peace and stability. In the following section I intends thus to examine closely the extent and nature of the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the instability that marked the post-genocide Great Lakes region of Africa.

5.2. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES' ROLE IN THE INSTABILITY OF THE POST-GENOCIDE GREAT LAKES REGION

The above analyses although with less in-depth details suggest that the Great Lakes Region's response to the 1994 Rwandan refugee crisis was multifaceted in character. Various factors influenced each regional country's behaviour towards the refugees in question. This regional response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees mirrors theoretical considerations of certain scholars. Jacobsen (1996:655-8) in his study on refugee influxes argues that a set of factors influences refugee policy formation in host countries. These factors include among others the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with the country from which refugees flee and national security considerations. In the line of the empirically-based Staub's perspective (2003:298-9,381-4), Jacobsen's list could rationally be expanded. In other words, dynamic factors such as history of aggressiveness or conflicts (in a society), social cultural and political background conditions (of host society) and the prevailing life conditions in the host country play inevitably a role in shaping refugee policies in host country.

⁷⁰ Operation Turquoise was a French-led military operation in Rwanda in June 1994 with the authorisation of the Security Council although not under United Nations command. The force was composed of French troops (majority) and African troops from Senegal, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Mauritania and DRC. The operation Turquoise claimed its mandate to be the protection of IDPs and refugees, creating a "safe zone" for humanitarian assistance to IDPs (Dallaire 2003:421-455).

Certainly (and theoretically) refugees by conventional definition of the term (UNHCR 1978)⁷¹ are people in need of assistance. Therefore good policies (in host countries) are imperatively needed to provide protection and all assistance refugees may need. However recent studies remark that refugees are not merely unfortunate victims of conflict. They are also important political actors who may play a role in conflict dynamics. Although the vast majority of refugees may never directly engage in violence “refugee flows facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict, they alter the ethnic composition of the state, and they can exacerbate economic competition” (Salehyan 2007:127; Gleditsch & Salehyan 2006:335). Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide (with over two million Rwandan populations pouring in regional countries) the Great Lakes Region became more than ever a scene of violent conflicts and human rights abuses. In this section I thus intend to assess critically the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the overall instability that marked the post-genocide Great Lakes Region. I will mainly concentrate on security issue that has been ubiquitous in the region.

5.2.1. Violent conflicts in the post-genocide Great Lakes Region of Africa and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees

As the previous chapters outlined the post-genocide Great Lakes Region has been convulsed by violent conflicts. One of the particular marks of this ‘paroxysm’ is the two wars (that erupted in DRC: one in 1996 and the other in 1998) in which regional countries were actively involved militarily, politically and economically. Baptized “wars of liberation” the two wars were multidimensional in character and emerged out of a complex context of state collapse, national and regional insecurity. Although fought on DRC soil, the two wars affected to a large extent peace and stability in the whole Great Lakes Region of Africa. The analysis in chapters three and four highlights the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in these two wars. I intend not to repeat just what these chapters have pointed out. The paragraphs below examine these two wars in their regional and/or continental dimension discerning critically the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees’ place in the conflicts.

⁷¹ The UN defines a refugee as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [herself] of the protection of that country” (UNHCR 1978). A refugee is thus anyone who flees his/her country of origin or residence for fear of politically-motivated harm.

(i) The 1996 DRC war and instability in Great Lakes Region of Africa

In October 1996 the AFDL, an alliance of several anti-Mobutu forces, headed by Laurent Kabila launched the war from Kivu region and toppled Mobutu in May 1997. Regional countries Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi were involved in this war. The diagnostics of the causal roots of the 1996 war in DRC reveal certain indisputable ingredients to the eruption of this ‘regional’ war. These include the non-functioning of the state under Mobutu; Congolese population’s alienation, anger and frustration; the porous borders (a threat to regional security) and an increasingly ethnic hatred in Kivu provinces following the 1994 Rwandan genocide (McNulty 1999:54; Khadiagala 2006:2-3; Arnold 2005:885-9).

Recalling from Chapter Three the 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees (particularly ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) perpetrated terror, criminality and drove a wedge into the Banyarwanda community in the Kivu provinces (Pottier 2002:41; Scherrer 2002:145). They spread the anti-Tutsi ideology and subsequently the Congolese Tutsis became gradually a target of violent attacks and exclusion (Kisangani 2000: 167-8; Vlassenroot in Kaarsholm 2006:57-8; Zartman 2005:126-7; Arnold 2005:886-7). Staub (2003:305) and Dutton *et al* (2005:458) observe that the *genocidaires* or perpetrators of killings in general are likely to continuously spread the hatred ideology and engage into killings hunting down their “enemy” (the Tutsi in this case).

As soon as they crossed the border into DRC, the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) reorganized launched attacks into Rwanda and against Congolese Tutsi (Barber 1997:10). They controlled the refugee camps (in eastern DRC) in full view of the UN and humanitarian agencies. These camps were soon turned into ‘military camps’ (Mamdani 2001:254; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). From DRC soil, the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* mobilized and collaborated closely with the rebel movements operating from DRC territory. These rebel groups included the Burundian CNDD-FDD and FNL, the Angolan UNITA, the Rwandan Hutu rebels ALiR and Ugandan rebel groups. The Kivu region was suddenly turned into a source of insecurity for both Congolese population (particularly Tutsis) and neighbouring countries: Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Furthermore with the massive arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern DRC life conditions worsened. Economy became worse as ever, very poor sanitation and infectious diseases

(including cholera) featured the region claiming thousands of lives of both refugees and local Congolese population (Biswas & Tortajada-Quiroz 1996: 403-5; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18).

This reality reflects the observations of recent studies on refugees. Scholars Gleditsch and Salehyan (2006:335, 340-1) among others remark that refugees can constitute a channel of transnational spread of ideologies conducive to conflict and arms; and they can increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host countries. Refugees can also expand rebel groups' networks constituting subsequently a threat to the security of the host countries and the neighbouring states; and most likely altering the diplomatic relationships among the concerned countries. Additionally refugees can have negative effects on economic conditions and change the demographic profile of receiving region. They can be responsible for the spread of infectious diseases in the host areas and create serious environmental problem through deforestation, causing a decline in living conditions. And as Staub (2003:293) would argue difficult life conditions are mostly like to lead to violent conflicts.

The Congolese state was practically absent to address effectively the crucial issue of the 1994 Rwandan refugees that was drastically worsening the living conditions of Congolese population and threatening both domestic and regional security. The regional countries (Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi to a less extent) resolved to solve the security problem themselves by supporting vitally the AFDL rebellion. These regional states aimed at destroying the bases of aforementioned rebel groups (ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*, Ugandan rebels, UNITA and Burundian rebels). In other words, the 1996 war of liberation to overthrow Mobutu had a regional dimension i.e. to solve the increasingly regional insecurity which was linked to great extent to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees as the above argument points out.

Certainly many other regional and internal factors such as state collapse, frustration of Congolese population, economic deterioration, and economic interests might have contributed directly or indirectly to the outbreak of the 1996 war as chapters two and four mentioned. However, the main argument here is that the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees contributed to the increasingly insecurity in the eastern DRC provinces and in the regional countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi). The 1996 war on DRC soil was therefore conceptually an expression of the instability that prevailed in the Great lakes region. However it is important to note that not only the security of both regional countries and Congolese population was at a stake in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The very fact that

the armed groups (ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen) lived in and controlled the camps was *in situ* a potential threat to the *bone fide* Rwandan Hutu refugees. The Rwandan invasion in DRC in 1996 to destroy the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* bases was indiscriminate in the refugee camps in eastern Kivu provinces. About 232,000 refugees (majority of them were non-armed) lost their lives and many others were dispersed into Congo's deep forests wherein life conditions were harsh (Kisangani 2000: 163-180). The 1996 war of liberation ended with a spectacular victory of AFDL and its regional allies (Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi) in May 1997. Joseph Kabila became the new *Chef d'Etat* of DRC.

(ii) The 1998 DRC war and instability in Great Lakes Region of Africa

Laurent Kabila's regime showed inability or unwillingness to solve the three problems at the initial origin of the 1996-7 war, i.e. the regional security (specifically the security of the Eastern neighbours), the status of Congolese Tutsi and the establishment of a broad-based government. Indeed these problems became worse than before. Laurent Kabila ignored and systematically excluded the former democratic opposition against Mobutu and mistreated many AFDL leaders. Furthermore, despite the security arrangements signed by the Kabila regime with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi; the DRC (particularly the eastern region) remained a source of insecurity and the launching ground of attacks against these countries. This became worse as Kabila expelled the Rwandan-Ugandan troops from DRC soil despite their instrumental role in securing his victory and launched an anti-Tutsi campaign (Arnold 2005: 889; Scherrer 2002:251-3; Reyntjens 1999:243; CIPF⁷² 2002:12). Subsequently as chapter four points out, in August 1998 a new "war of liberation" against Kabila's regime broke out from Kivu provinces. Rwandan and Ugandan troops gave a vital military support to the new Congolese rebel RCD. The eruption of the violent conflict provoked a chain reaction leading to the involvement of several other African countries (Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Libya and Sudan) and the emergence of a myriad of new rebel factions. The 1998 war was then dubiously titled "Africa's First World War" and claimed millions of human lives (Afoaku in Clark 2003:115-6; CIPF 2002:12).

⁷² CIPF (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy) report on Great Lakes region: *Conflict Risk Assessment Report* of 2002

Certainly to maintain objectivity in the face of complex and multidimensional evidences is surely difficult. Many of the available literatures on DRC conflicts arguably seem to be “thick description” of complex episode to use Clack’s terminology (Clark 2001:262) than being ‘scientific’ analysis of the events and factors driving them. I shall confess that without minimizing the weight of all other factors in the 1998 war (in DRC), the main focus here is the security (internal and regional) problem. As elaborated in Chapters Three and Four under Kabila’s regime in 1997 DRC and the eastern DRC in particular was plagued gradually into interethnic hatred and violent conflicts. The anti-Tutsi sentiment grew increasingly sharper in eastern DRC and the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* became indispensable actors on the scene. Kabila collaborated so closely with the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* to spread the anti-Tutsi campaign and they were a vital force on Kabila’s side in the 1998 war. These 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees reorganized into FDLR continued to cooperate with many other rebel groups operating from DRC territory, particularly the Burundian rebels, Ugandan rebels and *mai-mai* groups consequently threatening the regional security. The regional countries to secure their own borders from attacks by insurgents within the DRC resolved in invading DRC the second time. Having African countries fighting each other on DRC soil in 1998 war (on Kabila’s side there were Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Libya and Sudan; and on anti-Kabila rebellion’s side there were Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to less extent) affected certainly the interstate relationships between these countries and increased the instability in the Great lakes region. This insecurity in DRC and on its eastern borders was also in some aspects an extension of instability that prevailed in regional countries.

5.2.2. Insecurity beyond DRC soil and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees

Certainly this academic exercise intends not to explore the regional countries’ reality (politically, economically and socially) in details. Rather to explore briefly and assess the nature and extent of the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (if any) in the internal insecurity in each some countries.

(i) Uganda

Despite its intervention in the DRC conflict aiming at securing its borders, Uganda has been unable to bring an end to its own internal turmoil. Empirically based studies show that Museveni’s regime has had success in many aspects of life in Uganda. However, Museveni’s

government has failed to capture the imagination or win the support of population in northern sections of Uganda. The absence of the government and the longstanding insecurity in the northern-western region of Uganda has led to an increasing frustration among the civilian population in that region (Clark 2001: 265-6). Surely the population frustration creates a fragile environment (socially, economically) that can be easily infected by conflict as Staub (2003) would suggest. The northern and western regions of Uganda has been plagued into insecurity for decades due to the rebellion LRA against Museveni's regime claiming thousands of human lives, creating IDPs and contributing to vulnerability and instability in the aforementioned regions.

Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide the insecurity in northern and western Ugandan regions increasingly worsened. Since 1996 a new rebellion the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) composed largely of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* and Zairian soldiers emerged and started launching attacks in Uganda (south-western) from DRC's territory. The ADF aimed at destabilizing the Museveni's regime that had supported the RPF. The ADF perpetrated crimes, terror and human right abuses in Ugandan western region (CIFP 2002: 14-5; Reyntjens 2005:4). In 1999 eight tourists were hacked to death in the Bwindi Impenetrable Forest of Uganda. The killers are said to be Hutu rebels (ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) based in DRC; and were targeting American, British and others seen as supporting Ugandan military and sympathizing with the Tutsi (www.bbc.co.uk; www.query.nytimes.com).

(ii) Rwanda

As mentioned in previous chapters, following the 1994 Rwandan genocide the new regime in Kigali faced many challenges (economically, socially and politically). These included among many others the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure, the unity of Rwandan society, the terrible psychological trauma left by the genocide, orphans and widows, and especially the insecurity on Rwanda-DRC borders. As soon as they poured in DRC the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* reorganized and infiltrated north-western Rwanda killing mainly Tutsi genocide survivors, Hutu seen as RPF collaborators, forcing young Hutus to join them in the forest, and destroying infrastructure. The new government in Kigali had made several appeals to international community and to Kinshasa government to intervene, but no actions were taken (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18; McNulty 1999:76; Arnold 2005:855-6). Surely the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* actual and potential attacks on Rwanda have been a threat to Rwandan

security. And as pointed out above this has been the main reason Rwanda invaded DRC in both 1996 and 1998 wars.

(iii) *Burundi*

As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, in the 1994 the Burundian society was ethnically polarized and experienced a state of low-intensity internal violent conflicts due to its history of Hutu Tutsi's tension since independence. The Hutu-Tutsi antagonism has led to an unstable political climate and periodic outbreaks of violent conflicts that generated thousands of refugees and IDPs and claimed thousands of human lives (Uvin 1999: 253-4; CIFP 2002:16; Lemarchand 2006:1-10). In the aftermath of 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan Hutu refugees in Burundi (particularly ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*) opted to join and strengthen the Burundian Hutu militiamen as soon as they crossed into Burundi (Scherrer 2002:153). The ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* participated in instances of insecurity that prevailed in Burundi, targeting their 'enemy' the Tutsi. Scherrer (2002:228-31) reports further that late 1994 the Burundian Hutu rebel group FDD-CNDD collaborated with the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* in murdering and plundering in Burundi's rural areas close to DRC. Scherrer (2002:232) writes further that,

[In mid-1996] the FDD continued to make free use of both Kivu provinces as a hinterland and worked increasingly closely with the perpetrators of genocide from Rwanda. Genocidal Pan-Hutuism seemed increasingly to be becoming a reality. The massacre in Bugendana (in the province of Gitega) on July 20, 1996, in which Hutu extremists, spurred on by an inflammatory, RTL-like radio station in Congo-Zaire and reinforced by Rwandan killers from the *Interahamwe*, attacked a Banyarwanda camp and bestially murdered three hundred Tutsi refugees, mostly widows and orphans (...).

Furthermore in August 2004 the Burundian Hutu rebels FNL in collaboration with *Interahamwe* attacked Gatumba refugee camps (in Burundi) killings at least 152 Congolese civilians and about another 106 were wounded (HRW 2004:1). Till 2006 Burundi witnessed instability in many aspects: security, politically, economically and socially.

Is there a hope for peace and stability in Burundi as well as in great lakes region as a whole? This imperatively demands a synergy of many efforts to seek, design and implement mechanisms and principles that could lead to the path of peace and stability. The insecurity (domestically and regionally) proved to be a crucial issue whose positive solution was a *sine qua none* condition to a sustainable development in the whole region and reconstruction of

the regional societies. The chapter's analysis pointed out the role the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (especially ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen) played in destabilizing the region.

Certainly based on Staub's perspective (Staub 2003) the chapter's argument maintains that the difficult life conditions that characterized the countries of the region created a climate conducive to conflicts. Furthermore (psychologically) since the Hutu refugees particularly ex-FAR and Hutu militias had played a role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide likely they would continue hunting down their 'enemy' (the Tutsi) wherever they are (Dutton *et al* 2005:458; Staub 2003: 305). Additionally, the psychological state of these 'refugees': severe fear and anxiety of their future, depression, anger, aggressiveness (Cohon 1981:257-8) and shame provides also to a certain extent a rationale behind such violence-oriented behaviours. Thus as scholars (such as Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2 to name few) and this humble research have shown refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict and the by-product of war, they are also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability.

Chapter Six

Summary and Conclusion

The present study attempted to assess rigorously the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The research focused on the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo which felt the most terrible repercussions of this genocide especially the eastern DRC region.⁷³ The research hypothesis stated thus that “*The mass migration of Rwandan Hutu population following the genocide of 1994 contributed to the escalation of ethnic violence in the eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006.*” The present academic exercise hoped to make a contribution to the fields of political science, peace and conflict studies by providing objective and rigorous analysis on possible linkages between the 1994 Rwandan refugee movements and the growth of ethnic intolerance and instability in the eastern DRC. This might hopefully shed more light on the understanding of conflicts and mostly on the refugees’ potential role in destabilizing the host region or country.

Thus as entitled this last chapter intends to sum up the main points of the research findings and draw from the latter a conclusion. The chapter is subsequently divided into two main parts. The first section consists of a summary highlighting some of the key findings of this research. The second section is a conclusion and some recommendation from academic viewpoint.

⁷³ As suggested by some prominent scholars to study a single case can yield reasonable hypotheses and/or theoretical outcome (Moses and Knutsen 2007:132)

6.1. THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE IN THE AFRICAN GREAT LAKES REGION: THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES AND INSECURITY IN THE REGION

The Rwandan genocide has been one of the cataclysms the world and Africa in particular have witnessed in the post-cold war era. Indeed as chapter two of this work outlined the post-colonial Africa has been torn apart by intense and internal conflicts. Since 1990s the Great Lakes Region of Africa (particularly DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) has been convulsed by civil wars, interstate conflict, genocide and flawed democratic transitions (Lunn 2006:1). Studies have argued that the Great Lakes Region's instability takes its major roots in the history of each regional country: the decay of the state and its instruments of the rule in the DRC (former Zaire), the "kin-country" syndrome, and the crystallization of ethnic tensions that have characterized Rwanda and Burundi generating the displacement *en masse* of population of those countries (Breytenbach *et al* 1999:1; Mauceri 2004:111; Lemarchand 1997:11; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:214).

The ethnic confrontation (between Hutu and Tutsi) that marked the history of Rwanda and Burundi has contributed to a large extent to the instability that marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In 1994 the apex of this Hutu-Tutsi antagonism was the genocide in Rwanda that claimed lives of about a million of people (mostly Tutsis and few moderate Hutus) and generated a massive outflow of more than two millions refugees in the region. As Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005: 18) observes all the countries of the Great Lakes Region felt the impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda at least in terms of refugee flow. Although, geographically the Great Lakes Region of Africa comprises of nine countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, the most affected states were Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC. These 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees have played an active role in conflict dynamics and instability in eastern DRC region and in the Great Lakes Region in general.

6.1.1. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and interethnic attitudinal change in eastern DRC

Chapter three assessed critically the shift in Congolese interethnic relationships following the 1994 Rwandan genocide focusing on the change of attitudes towards Congolese Tutsi in the

eastern Kivu provinces. In order to measure and examine the nature and extent of the attitudinal changes towards the Congolese Tutsis in post-genocide DRC, two variables were rigorously analyzed. These were (i) The nature and extent of violent attacks against Congolese Tutsis; (ii) The nature and extent of political exclusion and discrimination against Congolese Tutsi. The chapter findings showed that before 1994 there was no record of antagonism or any form of violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern DRC. The available literatures on pre-genocide eastern DRC articulate unanimously that any form of tension or conflict in Kivu provinces was between “native” ethnic groups and “Banyarwanda” (Hutu and Tutsi collectively). No anti-Tutsi sentiment or violent attack targeting exclusively Tutsi occurred in pre-genocide Kivu region (Mathieu & Tsongo 1998:397; Mugangu in Guichaoua 2004:647-8; Vlassenroot 2002:499-515; Lemarchand 1997 on <http://web.africa.ufl.edu>; Pottier 2002:26). However with the massive arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (including ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen responsible for the Rwandan genocide) in eastern DRC the interethnic relationships gradually shifted. The Congolese Tutsi populations became increasingly and exclusively a target of violent attacks and socio-political exclusion. The Kivu provinces were plagued into violent conflicts that spread throughout the DRC and affected the Great Lakes Region as whole.

Various analytical studies have attempted to comprehend the complex violent conflicts befallen on post-genocide DRC pointing out factors such as economic interests, liberation and ethnicity as driving forces behind DRC conflicts (Jackson 2002:520; Chabal and Gentili 2005:132; Scherrer 2002:256; Autesserre 2006:6-7; Reyntjens 1999:243; McNulty 1999:54-56; Solomon 1997:3; Rutazibwa 1999:17; Pottier 2002:40-41; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004:397; International Crisis Group 2007:22-28). Without dismissing these scholarly observations, the present research suggested that difficult life conditions, the social-cultural characteristics together with the psychological dispositions of both refugees (genocidal perpetrators and *bone fide* refugees) and host populations created a milieu conducive to violent conflicts (Staub 2003; Dutton *et al* 2005:458).

Prior to the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Kivu provinces life conditions in DRC (the then Zaire) had deteriorated deplorably. The non-development had become a ‘signal feature’ of the nation, the political chaos, the dysfunction of the state, economic decline, corruption and injustice had created alienation, anger and frustration among the Congolese people (McNulty 1996:54). Additionally the Kivu society has been characterized

by a history of conflicts between Banyarwanda and ‘natives’ and unsolved issue of citizenship rights of Banyarwanda who were consistently regarded as ‘foreigners’ (Autesserre 2006:9; Jackson 2002:520). The massive arrival of about two million 1994 Rwandan refugees in eastern Kivu provinces aggravated disorder in the region and in the country as whole. Life conditions became worse to both refugees and local communities. Increase of food shortage, poor sanitation, promiscuity, spread of cholera and other infectious diseases, ecological damage, insecurity and economic deterioration led to a humanitarian catastrophe (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005: 18; Royer in Gichaoua 2003:453-457). Furthermore, the Rwandan Hutu refugees included the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. And as studies have shown these ‘genocidaires’ were most likely to continue hunting down their target perceived as a ‘virus’, an ‘enemy’ to be killed, the Tutsi (Staub 2003:305; Dutton *et al* 2005:458).

The failed state in DRC under the Mobutu regime provided a context for the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen) to reorganize and start launching attacks into Rwanda (as early as end of 1994), aiming at destabilising the new government in Kigali (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005). The ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* spread hatred ideology and mobilized local ethnic groups and Hutus to hunt down the Congolese Tutsi. The latter gradually became an ‘enemy’, an ‘out-group’, a target of violent attacks and exclusion. From Staub’s perspective (2003: 370) when facing persistent difficult life conditions that frustrate psychological needs (identity, connection, etc.) people tend mostly to turn to a group. The latter is suddenly defined as an ‘out-group’ and scapegoated for life problems. In this process which often leads to violence, hatred ideologies are adopted. Following the fall of Mobutu in 1997, life conditions in DRC were not improved they rather become worse. The Kabila regime collaborated closely with ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* and the anti-Tutsi sentiment increasingly sharpened in eastern DRC and in whole country in general.

6.1.2. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the rebel movements in eastern DRC

The above consideration illustrates in a way the scholars’ observation that “refugee flows facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict” (Gleditsch & Salehyan 2006:335). Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide DRC witnessed two national ‘wars of liberation’ (in 1996 and 1998) both rooted in the Kivu region’s convoluted mixture of political machination, communal violence, borders sensitivity, and the exploitation of mineral and agricultural wealth of the region (Jackson 2002:520). The 1996-7

struggle that toppled Mobutu's regime put in motion a complex chain of conflicts that marked the DRC since then, involving various actors and different alliances: internal rebel groups and regional states.

The DRC conflicts can be divided into three main phases: (i) the October 1996 to May 1997 (anti-Mobutu rebellion: launched by AFDL); (ii) the August 1998 to late 2001 (anti-Kabila rebellion: launched by RCD); and (iii) the 2004 onwards conflicts. In each phase the main actors were descriptively assessed (their constituency and *raison d'être*). The presence of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* (reorganized under ALiR which became FDLR) on DRC territory has been one of the factors that led to the outburst of the two 'wars of liberation' (the first two phases of the DRC conflicts: 1996 anti-Mobutu and 1998 anti-Kabila). The ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* in Kivu provinces had become a security threat on many different dimensions: human security of the host population particularly Congolese Tutsi and regional security particularly to Kigali government. They contributed significantly in anti-Tutsi propaganda that marked the DRC conflicts.

With the arrival of the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* in DRC the eastern Kivu society became more ethnically polarized. The whole region was increasingly submerged into a phase of profound dualization characterized by a theme of *Bantus vs. Hamites* (Reyntjens 1999). In this context the rebel movements and alliances were formed following the line of 'Bantus vs. Hamites' and/or the principle that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. The ALiR/FDLR has been one of the main actors in DRC conflicts. It mobilized local population on the basis of its ideology, and participated in military training of internal rebel movements (such as *mai-mai*) and arms trafficking.

Certainly the survival (political, social and economical) of either party involved in the violent conflicts in DRC and in Kivu provinces in particular was to a larger extent the main driving factors behind these conflicts. When the group's survival is threatened politically, socially and economically the need for connection becomes powerful (Staub 2002:16; Ross 1995:525). Hence the formation of alliances and rebel movements observed in DRC as conflicts unfolded. The complexity and multidimensionality of DRC conflicts is indeed of no dispute. This academic exercise emphasized that the frustration of the 'universal' psychological needs to use Staub's terminology (2003:293-4) was mostly the rationale behind

initial driving forces in the conflicts: threat of one's identity, fear, survival security, inability to control or address life problems (in all aspects) and to satisfy material basic needs.

6.1.3. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the instability in the Great Lakes Region

The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees have constituted to a larger extent a security threat in the region on many different dimensions: human security of the refugees themselves and hosting population, societal security as well as national and regional security. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide over 2 millions Rwandan Hutu populations took refuge in neighbouring countries particularly Burundi, Tanzania, DRC and Uganda. Among these refugees were the officials of the defeated regime, the ex-FAR and the Hutu militiamen but also thousands of ordinary people who followed their leaders' call to flee the RPF (Luyt 2003:101; Shalom 1996:1:14; Kisangani 2000:165). Studies have shown that refugees generally compel the host country to stretch its resources so to accommodate them. The refugees often face traumatic experiences that affect their psychological state. Additionally the refugees' situations are also compounded by difficult life conditions in their refugee camps and when no effective control is in place in the camps all sorts of crimes develop within and around refugee camps (Cohon 1981:257-8; Akokpari 1998: 223-5). This certainly illustrates the Staub's theoretical perspective (2003:293).

Thus mechanisms and policies were needed in regional countries to take on the onerous task of dealing with the outbreak of refugee crisis. Although the international community stepped in for humanitarian assistance the aforementioned regional countries had to shoulder all the responsibility of dealing with the massive inflow of these Rwandan Hutu refugees. However as descriptively detailed in chapter five the situations were different in each host country (Tanzania, Uganda, DRC and Burundi) due to various factors (political, economical and social) but also the dynamics of refugees themselves.

It suffices to briefly mention here that the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*, officials in the former Rwandan government that oversaw genocide) contributed in one way or the other in the insecurity problem that prevailed in the post-genocide Great Lakes Region. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees were actively involved in some instances of violence in Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Burundi. The ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* were main actors in DRC conflicts and collaborated closely with

Burundian Hutu rebels and Ugandan rebels (ADF and LRA) in perpetrating violence in Burundi as well as in Uganda. This observation correlates to some recent scholarly consideration that refugee flows are not only the results of conflicts or political turmoil. The refugees are an important active mechanism by which conflict can spread across regions. The refugees can expand rebel networks increasing subsequently the risk of insecurity outbreak in both host and origin countries (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006: 335).

6.2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The 1994 Rwandan genocide not only claimed the lives of about million Rwandans (mostly Tutsis) but also it left the country shaken. The Rwandan society was profoundly wounded in many ways including experiences of profound traumas, creation of thousands of orphans and widows, and the associated destruction of thousands of families. The present research shows that the Great Lakes regional countries (mainly Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and DRC) did feel the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide at least in terms of refugee flows and instability (particularly increase of regional insecurity). As a case study the research findings confirm that the mass migration of Rwandan Hutu population following the genocide of 1994 contributed to the escalation of ethnic violence in the eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees contributed to the interethnic attitudinal change towards Congolese Tutsis in eastern Kivu provinces. The Congolese Tutsi became increasingly an out-group and an ‘enemy’. These refugees contributed in expansion of rebel formation and networks in a ‘Bantus-Hamites’ created climate in eastern DRC region.

To conclude, I would like to simply note that the difficult life conditions that characterized the countries of the Great Lakes Region have created a climate conducive to conflicts. Additionally, the psychological state of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees – trauma, severe fear and anxiety of their future, depression, anger, aggressiveness, genocidal past (Cohon 1981:257-8 Dutton *et al* 2005:458; Staub 2003: 305) and shame – also provides (certainly to a certain extent) the rationale behind the violence-oriented behaviours of these refugees: particularly the officials of the *Abatabazi* government, the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militia. Thus as scholars (such as Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2 to name a few) and this research have shown refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict

and the by-product of war, they are also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability.

Recommendations

- Certainly the complexities of the historical, social, economic, and political realities in each particular conflict case are to be critically considered as far as the African conflict studies are concerned. Thus to achieve lasting peace, conflicts should be imperatively mastered. This requires fully comprehending and addressing the root causes and complex factors and forces of conflicts (Adedeji 1999:7). The academics through research and publication can offer a great contribution in this aspect.
- Undoubtedly the path to peace and sustainable stability and development in the Great Lakes Region of Africa demands axiomatically a synergy of many efforts in many aspects. Based on the present research's analysis the persistent difficult life conditions (with subsequent frustration of 'universal' psychological needs) appear to be initial starting points to violent conflicts. Therefore, in order to end and avoid violent conflicts (that have ravaged the Great Lakes Region of Africa) policies that promote development, national stable economy, respect of human rights, justice and good governance are to be implemented in the regional countries.
- Research findings show also that refugees are also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability. Thus mechanisms and policies are needed in regional countries to take on the arduous task of dealing with the refugee crisis. This implies to ensure the well-being of refugees by providing essential services and assistance, promoting and facilitating the voluntary repatriation, and ensuring that the set-up refugee camps retained an exclusively civilian and humanitarian character.
- Studies and the present research have shown that the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism has been one of the key ingredients in violent conflicts in Great Lakes Region. It has become a 'virus-like' in the region. The Hutu-Tutsi confrontations particularly in Rwanda and Burundi have led to deep-seated hatred, wounds, trauma, suspicion and insecurity in

the regional societies. Thus governments and leadership that would promote a path to reconciliation are needed in the region. In the regional countries (particularly Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) there is a need to implement policies and mechanisms that promote processes of psychological healing, educational process in values of forgiveness, tolerance, respect of others and appreciation of differences.

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APPENDICES: MAPS AND PICTURES

Appendix 1: The Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, 1998



From : www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/congo_demrep_pol98.jpg (political 1998)

Appendix 2: Areas held by MLC and RCD in 2003



May 2003

From: www.newsimg.bbc.co.uk




Feb 2003

Appendix 3: Armed groups (CNDP and FDLR) in North Kivu in 2009



From: www.news.bbc.co.uk

Appendix 4: South Kivu region, DRC



Appendix 5: North Kivu region, DRC

In the following map of the North Kivu region (in 2003):



: Presence of *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*, FARDC



: Presence of the FDLR (*Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda*)



Appendix 6: Living conditions in Refugee camps (Goma Camp of Rwandan Hutu refugees, DRC 1994)



From: nakedmaninthetree.wordpress.com/2008/03/

Appendix 7: Living conditions in Refugee camps (Kibumba refugee Camp, DRC 1994)



1250907 www.fotosearch.com

Appendix 8: Living conditions in Refugee camps (Aerial view of Ngara Camp of Rwandan Hutu refugees, Tanzania 1994)



From: www.unhcr.org/4651c83b2.html

Appendix 9: Living conditions in Refugee camps (Benaco Camp of Rwandan Hutu refugees, Tanzania 1994)



1250909 www.fotorearch.com

Appendix 10: Some Photos (From: www.google.co.za)




Juvenal Habyarimana:
President of Rwanda from 1973 to 1994 (died in 1994).



Col. Theonest Bagosora:
Rwandan Ministry of Defence Cabinet Director in 1994 during genocide. He is sentenced (life in prison) by ICTR.



Mobutu Sese Seko:
President of DRC from 1965 to 1997. He had a strong friendship with President Habyarimana (Rwanda). He died in 1997 (in Morocco).



Jean Kambanda: Prime Minister and Head of the Interim Government in Rwanda (in 1994 during genocide). He is sentenced (life in prison) by ICTR.



Yoweri Museveni:
President of Uganda from 1986 till today (2009).



Paul Kagame: President of Rwanda from 2000 till today (2009).



Gen. Laurent Nkunda:
One of the military commanders of RCD till 2003, founder and commander in Chief of CNDP till 2009.



Gen. Bosco Ntaganda:
One of the military commanders of CNDP, and commander in Chief of CNDP since 2009 after the Gen. Nkunda's arrest.



Gen. James Kabarebe:
Currently Chief Staff of Rwandan Army. In 1997-1998 he was appointed military commander in Kinshasa and then Chief of Staff.



Laurent Kabila: Leader of AFDL that overthrew Mobutu in 1997. He was the President of DRC from 1997 and he was assassinated in 2001.



Joseph Kabila: Son of Laurent Kabila. He is the President of DRC since 2001 till today (2009).



Gen. Jean Pierre Ondekane: He was the military chief commander of the RCD at the rise of the 1998 anti- Kabila (Laurent) rebellion in DRC.



Prof. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba: He was the president of RCD rebel movement against Laurent Kabila in 1998. He was one of the four vice-presidents in the transitional government of DRC from 2003 to 2006. He is currently a senator in the DRC.



Jean Pierre Bemba: founder and leader of the MLC movement, which was part of the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion. He was one of the four vice-presidents in the transitional government of DRC from 2003 to 2006.



Gen. Paul Rwarakabije: One of the founders of ALiR (end of 1994) which became FDLR in 2002. He was commander-in-chief of FDLR till 2003 when he deserted the FDLR and went to Rwanda. He was then integrated into the Rwandan Army (Rwandan Defence Forces, RDF).

