UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

POLITICAL ELITES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 2004

Samuel Uwem Umoh

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Declaration

I, Samuel Uwem Umoh (213574183) hereby declare that:

The research reported in this dissertation is my original research. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university. This dissertation does not contain other persons' data or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons. This dissertation does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted their words have been re-written, the general information attributed to them has been referenced.

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Abstract

This is a study, through extensive empirical fieldwork research, of political elites and democratic institutions in South Africa from 2004-2018. The study examines the dynamics, roles and challenges of political elites in shaping democratic institutions in South Africa through an examination of the National Assembly. These roles cut across plenary debates, the passage of bills and committee functions. Through the frameworks of democratic elite theory, the political and social composition, attitudes, values and party roles of the elected members of the parliament are discussed. The study also examines the structure, composition, and functions of committees in the parliament. The study explores the roles and functions of elites using qualitative methodology to gather data through interviews and observations. Twenty-five elected members of the South African Parliament were interviewed for the study. The findings of the study also demonstrate that committees are the engine room of the Parliament. The cross-party nature of committees with different MPs from various parties offers an atmosphere for members to actively participate in debate and recommendations transparently. The findings of the study also show that ideological values are a key factor in the recruitment of MPs and determine to a large extent how MPs coalesce around particular value systems and the type of attitudes MPs display in the Parliament. The study recommends that for effectiveness and efficiency of the parliament three steps must be taken. Firstly, the appointment of an independent speaker is essential to promote fairness in parliamentary debates and enhance democracy without party influence. Secondly, the parliamentary rules need to be reviewed particularly in terms of the discipline of MPs and to curb the unruly behaviour of MPs. Thirdly, for effective checks and balances of MPs, MPs should not occupy ministerial offices.

Dedication

I dedicate this work to my son Joel and daughter Joan.

Acknowledgements

The PhD journey has been a mixed bag of curiosity and anxiety that I started in 2014. I would not have made it to this point without the encouragement, prayers, support and love of some important individuals.

Firstly, and most importantly, I thank God for the grace to finish despite hurdles.

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Chapter One: Background to the Study

1.1 Introduction

South Africa's democratic transition from the Apartheid regime to a democratic state was realized through the first democratic election in 1994 (Inman, 2013; Kearsey, 2007). The second democratic election in 1999 enabled South Africa to embark on a path to the sustenance and consolidation of its democracy (Southall, 2003). The democratic transition is a regime change and an interval between a change of government to another (Seo, 2008; Johnston, 1999; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). One of the key elements of democratic transitions is the transfer of power derived from the electorate as a result of democratization and the emergence of democratic institutions (Francis, 2006; Linz, 1993; Przeworski, 1986). Consequently, the democratic transition in South Africa was aimed at a transformation that was underpinned by the rule of law, constitutionalism, protection of individual and civil liberties, and institutions of accountability (Inman, 2013; Kearsey, 2007).

Booysen (2014:66) splits South Africa's democracy into two periods: the first decade of democracy from 1994-2004, and the second decade of democracy from 2004-2014. In this dissertation, the focus is more on the latter in that the study continues the debate on South Africa's second decade of democracy from 2004. This is because the second decade of democracy also created the opportunity to measure the extent of democratic consolidation from 1994-2004 based on Huntington's (1991) 'two-turnover test'. Huntington's 'two-turnover test' refers to the possibility of measuring democratic consolidation only after two elections have passed Using this enables a consideration of democracy in South Africa from 2004 onwards. Randall and Svåsand (2001:13) argue that one-party hegemony and electoral dominance over the opposition is not conducive for democratic consolidation for long

periods, despite the consolidation of democratic procedures. Prior studies on democratic transition emphasized the importance of political elites in the democratization process (Francis, 2011). However, the study's focused more on the period from 1994-2004 and I suggest a dramatic change in the country's political and social leadership (cf. also Francis, 2011). For instance, Suzanne Francis (2011) discusses in young democracies the emergence of new leaders at the national level; shifts within political organizations; access to and negotiation of political power, levels of political stability with new political expectations and new emerging elites. The quality of elites with the necessary vision, knowledge, education and experience is vital for democratization and influencing the institutions that intervene on the relations between private interests and public goods (Schneider, 1960; Mills, 1956: Hunter, 1953: Domhoff, 1967: Burnham, Putnam, 1977: Dye, 2000; Gonzalez & Dahrendorf, 1990).

Linz and Stephan (1996) notes that democratization is classified into three phases, and this can be understood as a process subdivided into three levels namely: the liberalization phase, transition phase, and the consolidation phase. Linz and Stephan (1996) explains the liberalization phase as a situation when a previous authoritarian regime opens up or crumbles. The transition phase occurs when the first competitive elections are held. The consolidation phase, on the other hand, occurs in a situation whereby democratic practices are more firmly established and accepted by the most relevant actors (Linz & Stephan, 1996). There is a large volume of literature on the roles played by political elites during the period of democratization and democratic transition in South Africa (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013; Seo, 2008; Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2008; Saeger, 2007; Linder &Bächtiger, 2005; Herbst, 1999; Diamond, 1993). These scholars argued that the democratization and the process of democratic transition in South Africa was possible through political elite' strategy, pacts and negotiations.

Linder and Bächtiger (2005) argue that countries changing regime from an authoritarianism regime follow a three dimensional process of democratization process which range from opening, breakthrough and consolidation. The scholars add that successful democratization is hinged on the actions and political intentions of the political elites. This allusion to change in government reveals how consolidated a democratic country is (Francis, 2006; Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Democratization and democratic transition is also based on democracy, a journey, involving several transitional phases before it can reach maturity over a period of time.

Thus, democracy as a political system offers the platform for change of government officials and for voters as well as citizens to influence policies through the selection of qualified officials for public offices (Booysen, 2014; Francis, 2006; Kou & Kao, 2011). In light of this, Kou and Kao identify another feature of a democratic country as the existence of a reasonable level playing field between officials and opposition (Kou & Kao, 2011:9). Therefore, the key to the sustainability of democracy is also hinged on political participation and political legitimacy vested in the people that are often expressed through democratic institutions which reinforce and deepen the formal processes of democracy. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (1998:25) in Geneva pointed out that democratic institutions are the structures needed to transform and achieve the values of democracy. Thus, Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) highlight democratic institutions as including the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government; political parties; civil society and the mass media (radio, television, newspapers, and the internet). Newly democratized states are expected to have mechanisms in place such as proportional representation; highlight parliamentary roles, presidents' tenure of office, autonomous decision-making between branches and layers of political institutions, and various forms of consociation (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 8). However, this also raises concerns about what happens, and what is the impact in situations when political elites act in a manner that negates these democratic tenets?

Therefore, political elites are vital in democratic institutions. Political elites are frequently referred to as 'bourgeoisie', 'governing elite', 'governing class', 'Member of Parliament, 'MP', 'representative elites' and 'political class' (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Albertus & Menaldo, 2013; Kuper, 1965; Mosca, 1939). Members of parliament are also political leaders in parliamentary democracies because of their strategic influence on politics and political outcomes (Allen & Cairney, 2015). Political elites are also immersed in policy-planning networks, and they hold the highest power and this power is independent of a state's democratic electoral process (Forbes, 2009).

Discussion of the roles, power and influence of political elites is also located in political elite theory (Dye, 2000; Putnam, 1977; Pareto, 1968; Domhoff, 1967; Michels, 1966; Wright Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953). These theories are explained in detail in Chapter Two, under the theoretical framework. Nonetheless, the central theme of these theories is that political elites are few, their interests are unified because of their similar backgrounds and institutional position, where their power is derived (Shannon, 2011; Francis, 2006; Pareto, 1968). They are described as those who influence policies, they have a large share in the distribution of power, whether through elective, appointive office, or without office (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Higley, 2010; Francis, 2006; Leftwich, 2000; Kuper, 1965; Dunner, 1964). These views are supported by classical elite theory of Mosca (1939: 50–51) who claims that the political elite is made up of individuals who execute government roles, control powers and enjoy the advantages of such powers. Allen and Cairney (2015:5), in their study of British MPs, note that MPs typically comprise individuals who come from privileged socio-economic backgrounds. These scholars further classify MPs into political advisers, professional councilor, and officials from local government.

In the light of this, one of the few South African studies on the political elites refers to political elites in South Africa as 'bourgeoisie' (Leo Kuper, 1965), noting that in many parts

of the continent, the term is used disparagingly. The importance of political elite's characteristics and composition is also essential for building effective states, and for enhancing the quality of democracy and good governance (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Booysen, 2014; Francis, 2006; Randall *&* Svåsand, 2002).

My focus in this study is on political elites that are members of parliament. Consequently, I define political elite as those who have access to political power based on their strategic location in institutions they occupy that gives them the power to influence policies and affect political outcomes (c.f Francis, 2011). Linking this discussion to political parties as the platform where political elites emerge, it is crucial to note that political parties and elections are some of the foundational pillars for democratic institutions. Randall and Svåsand (2001:4) highlight that parties play crucial role in democratic transitions due to their role in freely contested elections. They further argue that a 'heroic' moment for political parties occurs either immediately or during the first election whereby, for the first time in an autocratic regime, elections are conducted competitively and peacefully. This is also in the recognition that during Africa's wave of democratization, most Africa countries changed regime from prevalence of a single ruling party system to multiparty elections (Schraeder, 1994). However, Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) have observed that although most African states have engaged in electoral politics with pervasive multi-party elections since the mid-1990s, only a few countries implemented tangible democratic competition and participation structures. Van de Walle (2003) also adds that countries that changed from autocratic regime to democratic regimes are still characterized by dominant party structures, unsteady parties, ethnicity party base and unfruitful party debates. Such trend is what Diamond (2002) and Schedler (2002), cited in Kuo and Kao (2011:7), termed as 'electoral (authoritarianism)' or 'electoral autocracy'.

Carothers (2002), Lipset (1959) and Schraeder (1994) describe the importance of party and political elites as one of the conditions required during a transition process because they could either hinder or facilitate the process, of which political elites play a major role. This is connected to the structural features of African democracies because of institutional inheritance, electoral systems of the former colonial power, a strong presidency, residue of single-party rule, and a centralized government which tends to mitigate against democratization (Nijzink & Piombo, 2004; Randall& Svåsand, 2001; Schraeder, 1994). The attitude of political elites emerging from the previous autocratic regime is also attributed to political elites' characteristics. Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) illustrates that Africa's political elites have been and will continue to be predatory, unproductive, and misuse the state resource surpluses within the context of electoral politics. Orrnert& Hewitt (2006:8) further describe political elites and their interests as the state of 'kleptocratic', 'predatory', 'pirate' and 'vampire' politics.

In the light of the synopsis presented above, this research sought to understand, to what extent, features such as the composition and characteristics of the governing elite of South Africa, have strengthened or undermined the country's democratic institutions since 2004. This is also because the period 2004 marks a watershed in South Africa's political history as the period from which democratic consolidation can be measured (cf. Huntington, 1991). To achieve this, I focused on the National Assembly as a key institution that showcases political elites and their role in governing.

1.2. A Brief Sketch of Political Elites and Democratic Institutions

A vast literature exists on political elites and democratic institutions, but very little of it pertains to a specific consideration of how political elites, and particularly MPs in parliament, impact upon these institutions. Secondly, such studies do not explore this phenomenon (democratic institutions e.g. the parliament) in the context of South Africa from 2004-2014.

This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, South Africa operates a parliamentary system (Booysen, 2014), where robust debate is an integral part of parliament since 1994 (Seedat, 2015). Secondly, countries that have undergone democratic transition and are democratic regimes are characterized by proportional representation and various forms of consociational procedures to address various societal challenges (Randall & Svåsand, 2001: 8).

Despite the importance of democratic institution, such as parliament where the MPs are agents that perform oversight and accountability functions, it is worrisome that the MPs are still constrained in discharging their duties effectively. In the last few years, the South African parliament has also experienced interruptions and disruptions to its rules and procedures (Seedat, 2015; Francis, 2006; Barkan, 2005; Murray & Nijzink, 2002). These incidents have arguably severely undermined the parliament's functions, dignity and stability, while at the same time impact the public interest in Parliament (Seedat, 2015:1).

In the same vein, the South African Catholic Bishop's Conference Parliamentary Liaison Office (2015:1) notes that the Speaker of the South African National Assembly has been widely criticized for alleged discriminatory and partisan behaviour towards certain opposition members because she occupies a ' top six ' position in the ruling party, the ANC. On the other hand, Booysen (2014) alleges that South Africa's second decade of democracy, 2004-2014, was characterized by ANC continuous dominance through its entrenched dominant-party system that is characterized by weak parliament. Based on this incidence, Suttner (2004:755-756) foresees the ANC continued 'dominant party' and the likelihood of continuation of 'circulation of political elites'. Similarly, Booysen (2014:81) calls to attention that the parliamentary system is weak and exhibits presidential system, where there is no clear demarcation between the presidential system or parliament system. Secondly, Booysen, (2014:81) points out the inefficiency of the opposition party in the National Assembly where

opposition parties are expected to engage in serious parliamentary debates which often amount to ' toy-telephone conversations '.

While it cannot be ignored that scholars such as Francis (2006), Barkan (2005), Murray &Nijzink (2002) and Kuper, (1965) have explored political elites in the South African parliament, they have approached this subject in different contexts at provincial level and in order to meet different objectives. Moelestsi (2012), a political economist, argued that there is something wrong with the way political elites are managing South Africa, as their objectives are to maximize the consumption of the middle class and retain a monopoly of political power. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two other studies of political elites in South Africa that are directly relevant to this project. The first is the *African Bourgeoisie* by Kuper (1965) that considered the social and political background of the African elite in politics. He found that they did indeed constitute a specific social class and were comprised of similar socio-economic backgrounds. The second study by Francis explored the relationship between elite' values and political institutions in the context of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature, and showed that in that specific legislative context, the attitudes, values and behaviors of political elites substantially impact democracy (Francis, 2011). It is because of limited studies that exist on the subject in this context and the gap in this knowledge area that this topic was chosen. Again, it was found that despite previous studies, there is a significant gap in the knowledge and understanding of the political elite and how they strengthen or undermine democratic institutions in South Africa, nationally. Similarly, in the African literature, Kifordu (2011) reflected on political elites in Nigeria and democracy. Kifordu observed that the wave of elections since 2000 resulted in two types on perspectives on Africa democratization namely optimists and pessimists. Kifordu opined that the optimists believe that during the democratic transition, political elites and democratic institutions will evolve to look more or less like what is obtainable in other countries where clientelist[1] relations will fizzle out. On the other

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[1] [1] See Hopkin, 2006. Clientelism is the distribution of biased advantages to individuals or certain groups in exchange for political favours. Clientelism also is a feature of feudal society, where patrons referred to as

hand, the pessimists believe that during the democratic transition, the behaviour of political elites and its democratic institutions will remain unchanged. Kifordu (2011:1) also echoed that the elites located within the democratic system utilize public office for financial gain and access to state resources because of symptomatic practices such as ethnic manipulation, rent seeking, patronage and corruption which negatively impact upon democracy and governance. Similar concerns on MP's attitudes were identified by Allen and Cairney (2015:5) who wrote about the political elites in the United Kingdom (UK) parliaments on their alleged behaviour in terms of 'flawed characters', 'self-serving' behaviour and dishonesty' as a result of the MP's expenses scandal in 2009.

To attain their goals, political elites could also employ different strategies around issues that tend to benefit their interests economically and politically (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Gautney, 2014; Albertus & Menaldo, 2013; and Dahrendorf, 1990).These strategies include corruption, financial mismanagement, mobilization of coalitions, vote buying, gridlock, over-representation of interests, and bargaining during democratic transitions (Gautney, 2014; Albertus & Menaldo, 2013) which impact on democratic institutions. This is discussed in detail in chapter two of this dissertation.

This could also involve the utilization of self-serving instruments for the seizure of available opportunities to stifle competition and overruling competitive standards to handpick likeminded representatives without adequately consulting with the people (Booysen, 2014; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006). Given this context, the attitude of the ANC, the dominant governing party, and the DA, the opposition party exemplify this. A report by Business Tech (2015) and the Eyewitness News (2015) indicates that during the 2014 national elections, prospective electorates were sent a text message that 'the Nkandla report shows how the then President

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political elites and clients, referred to the masses are engaged in relationship characterized by obligation and duty.

Jacob Zuma stole your money to build his R246m home. Vote DA on 7 May to beat corruption'. In response to this, the ANC opened a charge of defamation and malicious conduct against the DA. Business Tech (2015) reports further that the ANC replied that the SMS was based on 'a deliberate lie targeted at president Zuma' and that the party will approach relevant recourse structures that deal with elections such as the Independent Electoral Commission and the electoral court, if necessary, to ensure that the conduct is inhibited.' The Democratic Alliance (DA) former parliamentary leader Lindiwe Mazibuko accepted the court challenge (Business Tech, 2015; Eyewitness News, 2015). In court, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the DA that the SMS did not violate the electoral code and Act (Eyewitness News, 2015). The court stated that the SMS was the DA's opinion and not fact. The court also found that it was unnecessary to rule on whether the SMS was false and ordered the judgement of the Electoral Court to be set aside with costs (Eyewitness News, 2015).

In a parallel event, the DA News, in 2014, noted that the DA party was excluded from the SABC live debates and the SABC election debate on the topic of land reform on 13th April, 2014. This appeared to be politically motivated to censor opposition parties in favour of the ANC, even though the debate is a national platform on which all political parties should be represented. This raises concerns, especially as the DA is the official opposition in South Africa (News, 2014). The DA News (2014) also reported that SABC removed the DA's 'Ayisafani' television commercial as well as radio adverts from the airwaves based on the argument that the adverts could incite violence. The DA claimed that the behaviour of the SABC seriously disadvantaged the DA's election campaign in 2014 and is an indication of the capture of the SABC for political party purposes. The tactics employed by the ANC and the DA can be expected as Dahrendorf (1990) posits that during the election campaign, every party tries to persuade the electorates that they are best suited to manage government affairs, while Randall and Svåsand (2001:5) contend that opposition parties will always challenge the

incumbent government, which is key for accountability. Similar concerns have been observed by Kou and Kao (2011:7) about opposition parties in Europe, that opposition parties criticize the ruling party regularly as a strategy to reach out to the electorates.

Hence, the political willingness of a few important political figures and the choices made by them influence democratic institutions (Rakner, Rocha & Fritz, 2007). In the literature written about other contexts outside South Africa, Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) indicates that democratization tends to create a gulf between political parties as they campaign for votes by changing their approach to winning by coalition. Furthermore, Posner (2005) claims that the elites tend to attract electorates on ethnicity bases which implies that the electorates would rather prefer to vote for parties and the MPs in which they share identity markers, because such parties portray themselves that they understand the people's needs.

1.3 Research Task

The central task of this thesis is to examine how political elites undermine or strengthen democratic institutions, with a particular emphasis on the MPs in the South African parliament. As argued by scholars (Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006; Leftish, 2000) that political elites have influence in the institutions they operate. This is a common theme in the African literature. In Allen and Carney's (2015), Chandra's (2006), Pareto's (1968), and Kuper's (1965) views, political elites have links with democratic institutions because of the wealth at their disposal and proper education which gives them the edge over the masses (Kuper, 1965; 1966). This also is in line with the literature in Europe, the UK and America (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Lovenduski et al, 2005: Kuo &Kao, 2011).

Moreover, Posner (2001) concurs that African voters aim to increase the amount of resources they can obtain from political elites because of the belief that the political elites from their

faction will benefit them. This is because political elites also seek to attract and maintain their power base with promise of resources to those who support them. Randall and Svåsand (2001:8) suggest that democracy in democratic institutions can be structured as either a 'winners take all' structure or an inclusive government approach. They explain that the presidential systems are tilt towards the 'winner's' approach, while the parliamentary approach tilts towards a more inclusive orientation.

Equally, Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) suggest that elites are influential because of their power to influence economic and political outcomes, as evident in developing countries where their impact is seen in large slice of the national revenues. As a result, Huntington (1991) argues that newer democracies are not fully "consolidated," despite the presence of electoral institutions in place. This also makes political democracy fragile as a result of economic instability and the continued dominance of political elites in politics. The establishment of a multi-party democracy without substantial modification in democratic institutions structure makes democratization irrelevant, hence advocating the need for improvement and change in the distribution of power (Randall & Svåsand, 2001; Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997).

Consequently, some theorists have sought to understand the conditions necessary for democracy in Africa. This literature forms the backdrop to an understanding of South Africa's institutions. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) argue that a consolidated democracy requires an institutionalization and legitimization of the democratic regime in the sense that political and social stakeholders accept the new rules of conduct. In addition, Diamond (1999) and Dahl (1971) identified multiple criteria that are essential for democracy, and are traditionally used as the framework for studies of democracy and democratization.

However, it could be inferred from the work of Kotze and Steenkamp (2009), Rakner, et al. (2007), Saeger (2007), and Lodge and Ursula (2006) that political elite played a significant role in the democratic consolidation process in African democratic transitions, and in particular in

South Africa. Literature (Booysen, 2014; Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013: Pamela, 2008; Saeger, 2007; and Harald & Tjønneland, 2001) abounds on how the South African transition itself was managed by both the old and new political elites during the democratic transition. Political elites attained this by negotiation, opposition alliances, coalition and elite pact (Booysen, 2014; Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013; Saeger, 2007).

It needs to be noted that a pact is a mutual agreement by actors on governance in the interest of all parties concerned (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986:37). The South African transition took place through a process of elite negotiation in the form of a series of elite pacts. Thus, scholars (Higley & Burton, 2006; Higley et al., 2002; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986) concur that through pact, transitions entrenched democracy. This also indicates that political elites are the pre-eminent variable for explaining democratisation, and also the reason for its breakdown.

Besides, Carothers (2002:12) explains that the intentions of the political elites are crucial for democratization because of political syndrome of feckless pluralism and dominant politics. Carothers (2002:12) explains that 'feckless pluralism' exists where political participation is superficial, political elites are corrupt and where there is a one dominant party. Carothers further explain that 'dominant power politics' entails domination of the system by one political group in such a way as there appears to be little prospect of alternation in power in the foreseeable future. The implication of this, according to Carothers (2002:12), is that this results in the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party, whereby the state's main assets are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party. This stands in contradiction to some of Huntington's (1991) claims in his 'two-turnover test' which requires the winners of the 'founding elections' to be defeated, and then for the new winners to be defeated in turn.

Randall and Svåsand (2001:13) also echo that one party dominance and electoral dominance over the opposition for prolonged periods despite the entrenchment of democratic procedures,

is not conducive for democratic consolidation. Leftwich (2000:29) however contends that all developmental states have been led by political elites, who have been relatively incorrupt, fiercely nationalistic and exhibited the one-man 'sultanism' in many African states. Leftwich (2000:29) adds that on the contrary, they have often been run by shifting coalitions of diverse interests and, as socio-economic change has occurred, all such states have experienced (sometimes severe) intra-elite political and policy conflict, often intensifying over time.

Cast in this way, Bacharach (1969) argues that there are no alternatives but to recast democracy, emphasizing the constitutional and liberal nature of the system of elite pluralism; the competitiveness of political elites; their accountability to the electorate at periodic elections and the open multiple points of access to elite power. In this view, elites become the core of the system of democracy.

With this overview, it appears that any consideration of the impact of political elites on political institutions must also consider the role of political parties in this process.

Randall and Svåsand (2001: 5-6) state that parties act individually and collectively to effect the rules of the Constitution and widen the formal outcome of the transition. Randall and Svåsand further note that political parties are important for the enhancement of accountability as a result of regular elections and as opposition which challenges the incumbent government. This also seem to suggest that the importance, strength and weakness of political parties also matter during democratic transition, however, parties are ineffective because of public lack of confidence (Booysen, 2014; Orrnert &Hewitt, 2006).

The importance of parties during democratic transition is highlighted by Booysen. Booysen (2014:66) explains that South Africa's first decade of democracy, 1994-2004, resulted in alliances and coalitions between the governing and opposition parties initially, but later cemented the party system and the consolidation of ANC power. Booysen also observes the

second decade of democracy, 2004-2014, was marked by the continued dominance of the ANC, but prone to inter-party tensions. Alliances in this decade have ignited the main opposition party, the DA, which has remained numerically significant in national politics as evident in the 2014 election. Booysen further states that the second decade of democracy in South Africa, 2004-2014, was also marked by the continued dominance of the ANC, but prone to party tensions, splits that also resulted in the emergence of opposition parties and mergers.

With this in mind, this dissertation considers the relationship between the political elite, their values, attitudes and behaviors towards democratic institutions in South Africa. This includes an exploration of the composition, characteristics and accumulation of power by the political elites and the way in which this impacts upon democratic institutions. In so doing, the dissertation will further show the ways in which political elites work and undermine political institutions. The dissertation will also provide new theoretical insights and contextual ones.

1.4. Research problems: Key questions asked.

In the light of the discussion on democratic consolidation and the role of political elites in the democratic institution, this dissertation is premised on the following key research question: In what ways do the prevailing attitudes, belief systems and behaviors of the political elites, particularly Members of Parliament (MPs), strengthen or undermine democratic institutions in South Africa?

Within this question are the following sub-questions which this study sought to answer:

i.   What are the roles of the political elites in governance and how do they shape democratization processes?

ii. What are the social, political and ideological backgrounds of the political elites and how does this impact on democratic institutions?

iii. Do the political elites coalesce around particular value systems and attitudes, and what is the impact of this?

iv. To what extent does inter-party conflict strengthen or weaken the democratic institutions?

v. How does the attitudes, belief systems and behaviours of the political elites strengthen or undermine democratic institutions in South Africa?

1.5 Research Objectives:

The research objective is to examine how political elites undermine or strengthen democratic institutions, with a particular emphasis on the MPs in the South African parliament. Thus, this dissertation has the following research objectives:

i. To explore the prevailing attitudes, belief systems and behaviours of the political elites in South Africa.

ii. To examine the roles of the political elites in South Africa and the ways in which they shape processes of democratisation.

iii. To identify whether the political elites coalesce around specific value systems, and consider the impact of this.

vi. To examine how inter-party conflict strengthen or weaken the democratic institutions

iv. To establish how the attitudes, belief systems and behaviours of the political elites strengthen or undermine democratic institutions in South Africa.

1.6. Broader issues to be investigated:

The broader issues to be investigated in this study centre upon democratization, democratic transition and consolidation in South Africa. This is crucial because, ideally, countries that have undergone democratic transitions and consolidation processes need to meet standards and criteria of democracy. As Saeger (2007) argues, despite the entrenchment of pre-conditions for a democratic state such as the formation of democratic institutions, such institutions are also inherently controlled by political elites. It is thus necessary to gauge if South Africa's democratic consolidation is sustainable over time, based on the effectiveness of the democratic institutions.

1.7. Significance of the Study

The focus of my dissertation is on the political elites' impact on democratic institutions. To this end, it is vital to study the social background of the MPs, the strategies of government, the arrangements of parliamentary parties in order to understand the policy making role (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:9). Parliament is the key democratic institution in South Africa where political elites as the MPs exert their power and shape policies. Political elites as the MPs influence policy in terms of the roles they perform in legislation and oversight (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Murray & Nijzink, 2002; South African Constitution, 1996). The importance of the parliament as a democratic institution is highlighted by scholars (e.g. Allen & Cairney, 2015; Booysen, 2014; Francis 2006; Murray & Nijzink, 2002). Hence, Murray and Nijzink (2002) argue succinctly that,

> …accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance... Democracy remains clichéd if those in power cannot be held accountable in public for their acts or omissions, for their decisions, their expenditure or policies… It is a symbol of good governance in both the public and private sectors… Accountability refers to

institutionalized practices of giving account of how assigned responsibilities were carried out (p.14).

In carrying out these duties, the MPs could either strengthen or undermine democratic institutions. This is evident in the attitudes and behavior of the MPs during the parliamentary sittings and debates in recent times. Unparliamentarily behavior and language by the MPs has been frequent in South Africa, characterized by the MPs unruly attitudes and disruption of the parliamentary rules (Doyle, 2016; Seedat, 2015; and News24, 2014). It also appears that the newest radical party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) MPs' attitudes exemplify this. The EFF constantly interrupts the president's speech and disrupt the proceedings of the State of Nation Address – SONA (Thulani, 2016; Doyle, 2016; Seedat, 2015; News24, 2014), while certain MPs also call the presidency derogatory names and disregard parliamentary rules which affect the effective functioning of the parliament (Thulani, 2016). With this overview, it is vital to study the social background of the MPs, their traits, recruitment process and their professional background because such variables impact how democratic institution is either strengthened or mitigate antagonism (Allen & Cairney, 2015). Attitudes and behaviours of MPs could either impede democratic institutions or capture policy-making (Albertus & Menaldo, 2013).

At this juncture, it is necessary to highlight Diamond's (2002) criteria on electoral competition as it relates to the legislature as one of the democratic institutions in this context. Diamond (2002) therefore highlights certain criteria for assessing the level of democratic consolidation, including the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by the ruling party; the proportion of votes won by the ruling party and the number of years incumbents have been in power. With this in mind, the necessity of this study is great because there are few or virtually no studies in South Africa that focus on how the MPs' behaviour undermines or strengthens democratic institutions. Prior studies conducted on political elites in South

Africa, for instance, Francis (2006) and Kuper (1965) tackle these themes in different contexts at provincial level and historically. These studies did not explore the political elites in the South African Parliament nationally, and even less considers this in the context of South Africa from 2004-2014. This gap in knowledge in this area is the reason for the choice of this topic. Thus, this dissertation is grounded in both the classical elite theories (such as Pareto's 1968 Circulation of Elites and Mosca's 1939 theories of the Ruling Class) and contemporary elite theory that considers the role of elites in a democratic society. Hence, an empirical study based upon semi-structured open ended interviews with members of the political elite at the parliament in South Africa is pertinent. This kind of study is still rare in South Africa. While there have been a few studies on the parliament, no study has yet examined the relationship between the values, attitudes and behaviour of political elites and democratic institutions at the national level in South Africa.

1.8. Research Methods

The dissertation adopts a qualitative approach premised on interpretivist approach. A qualitative research methodology is widely used in the social sciences as a method for investigating and understanding the meaning people ascribe to phenomena (Creswell, 2013:32). The participants for the study were the MPs in the South African National Assembly selected by simple random and purposive samplings. The criterion for the selection of the MPs sampled was that they had been an elected member of the National Assembly, elected in 2014. Data was gathered by primary and secondary sources. The primary data was gathered by semi-structured interviews with the MPs as well as the Minutes of Parliament, Hansard, Minutes of Select and Standing Committees of the parliament, parliamentary speeches and other institutional records. The data was analyzed through thematic content analysis, as is appropriate in research that frames knowledge through an interpretative meta-theory. The information was reviewed in the light of the research questions posed to draw out

themes, in their specific context. The research methodology is discussed in-depth in Chapter Four.

1.9. Structure of Thesis

This study is organized into seven chapters as follows:

Chapter one - Introduction and background – this provides an overview of the study. The chapter provides an overview of the research question, a description of the research problem, the research goals, the objectives of the research and the research questions. It also discusses the theoretical framework that underpinned the study, the significance of the study, the research methodology and methods, sample size and sample technique, data collection and structure of the thesis. This dissertation examines the political elites and the democratic institution in South Africa since 2004. It addresses a gap in research into what ways do the prevailing attitudes, belief systems and behaviours of the political elites particularly Member of Parliament (MP) strengthen or undermine democratic institutions in South Africa? What are the roles of the political elites in governance and how do they shape democratization processes? What are the social, political and ideological backgrounds of the political elite and how does this impact on institutions? Do the political elites coalesce around particular value systems and attitudes, and what is the impact of this? To what extent does inter-party conflict strengthen or weaken the democratic institutions? The broader issues investigated in this study centre on democratization, democratic transition and consolidation in South Africa. My aim is to gauge if the consolidation of democracy in South Africa is sustainable, based on the effectiveness of democratic institution. This is crucial because, ideally, countries who have undergone democratic transitions and consolidation processes need to meet the standard and criteria of democracy.

Chapter Two defines and contextualizes the MPs as 'elites', 'bourgeoisie', 'governing elite', 'governing class', 'Members of Parliament', 'representative elites' and 'political class'. It demonstrates that the MPs are vital in democratic institutions and the sustenance of democratic institutions in South Africa. The chapter interrogates the theoretical and contextual literature (which often forms the theories on elites) on political elites and democratic institutions in South Africa. It sketches and contextualizes the concept of democratization and democratic consolidation providing a starting point for understanding the concept of political elites in democratic institutions which sets the scene for contextualizing political elites and democratic institutions in South Africa from 2004. The importance of the political elites in South Africa was demonstrated during the negotiation and bargaining that took place during South Africa's transition to democracy. The democratic transition was possible in South Africa through the strategies, compromises, negotiations and pacts of political elites. Political elites adopt various tactics and strategies to influence government policies, political outcomes and interests. These strategies include entering coalitions, use of persuasion, inducement, coercion, manipulation, negotiation, bargaining and mobilization of a coalition.

Chapter Three unpacks the concept of the Parliament and discusses the types of the parliamentary system. It also presents the parliament's powers and responsibilities. The link between political parties, parliament; and political elite were explored also. The chapter highlights also how political parties recruit the MPs by proportional representation. I claim

that the MPs elected by the PR system nurture a dominant-party system and excludes citizens from participatory democracy.

Chapter Four reflects upon the research methodology of the dissertation; discusses the research method in-depth, the implementation and the justification for the research method. The study was based on a qualitative approach premised on an interpretivist approach. Through this method, I was able to probe with questions such as 'why' and 'how'. This occurred in the context of understanding the social composition of the MPs and why they joined politics. The study was also approached from a Meta-theory approach which locates the behaviours of the MPs in political elites theories. Such as the classical elite theories (such as Pareto's Circulation of Elites and Mosca's theory of the Ruling Class) and contemporary democratic elite theory that considers the role of elites in a democratic society. The participants for the study were MPs in the South African National Assembly selected through purposive sampling. Data were gathered through several sources such as interviews, observation, Minutes of Parliament, Hansard, Minutes of Select and Standing Committees of Parliament, parliamentary speeches and other institutional records. The collected data were analyzed by thematic content analysis.

Chapter Five reveals that the behaviours of the MPs in the South African parliament are illuminated in the context of the social, political and ideological backgrounds. The chapter unpacks presentation and analysis on the background and beliefs of political elites and its impact on democratic institutions. This draws extensively upon the biographical information collected through interviews, observations, documentary analysis and minutes of meetings. Through this information, the prevalence of specific characteristics among the MPs, such as gender, occupation, education, social composition and age was revealed. From the

information, it was deduced that the MPs in the National Assembly were already involved in politics before becoming MPs. The chapter further interrogates different definitions of democracy by the MPs and how these different views affect their roles in parliament. The ideologies of the MPs also demonstrate their definition of democracy as interrogated, defined and understood by the MPs. This also impacts on the positions that they take and the policies that they pursue. This chapter shows the participation of different parties and the MPs and their ideologies in the NA. By joining and belonging to certain parties initially, the MPs align with the party's ideology. Extending this discussion further, chapter five also discusses the ideologies of six political parties namely the ANC, ACDP, DA, EFF, IFP and UDM from the twelve political parties that won the National Assembly representation in the South African 2014 elections. The social and political background of the MPs reveals much about their ideology, values and attitudes.

In Chapter Five, the applicability of democratic elite theories to the MPs in the South African National Assembly is clear. Firstly, the analogy of the social composition of the parties is also indicative that the MPs have the powers to influence the proceedings of the parliament. The 'power to influence' makes them political elites, but not necessarily superior as claimed by Pareto (1968) and Mosca (1939).

Secondly, the social composition, such as age, education and gender, no doubt impacts on the MPs' recruitment and the political elites' (MPs) circulation. As Pareto's (1968) circulation of elites postulates that when the current elite starts to decline, it is challenged and it makes way for another. To Pareto, political elite circulation occurs by assimilation and revolution. Assimilation implies that the new elites are merging with elements of the old, while revolution implies that the new elites are wiping out the old. I concur with Pareto as the study demonstrates that the MPs have circulated themselves through coalition, cross -party alliances, shifts and the formation of new parties (e.g. Economic Freedom Fighters). As is

herewith demonstrated, the MPs, such as the EFF leader Julius Malema, a former ANC Youth League President, has used the ANC as the springboard to launch his political career. The rise of new political elites like Malema challenges the old political dominant class (ANC) he was once part of.

Through ideology, opposition parties such as the EFF construct popular radical alternatives to 'circulate' and 'recycle' themselves in power. Ideological values are also key in the recruitment of the MPs and determine, to a large extent, how the MPs coalesce around particular value systems and the type of attitudes the MPs display in the parliament. MPs coalesce with other MPs with whom they share similar ideological values and preferences. Although variation exists in terms of ideological positions among the MPs and their party ideologies, MPs' interests are unified due to common interests. This is illustrated in agreements by parties in the parliament when they challenged the former president, Jacob Zuma in the 'Nkandla issue' which eventually led to his impeachment and appearance in court.

Chapter Six presents and discusses the parliamentary committees, their composition and structure; roles and functions of committee and challenges stifling the functions of committee. This is in line with the various roles that the MPs play in parliamentary committees based on data collected through interviews (MPs, party researchers and committee secretaries), observations, parliamentary debates, parliamentary publications (in session), Hansard and committee minutes, which are vital to the overall argument of this chapter. It considers the structure, composition and functions of committees in the parliament and also the factors that impact on the roles of the MPs.

The chapter demonstrates that the MPs' work is not limited to the parliament because MPs work also involves constituency work and committee portfolio roles. The chapter thus shows

that parliamentary committees are the engine of the National Assembly, an indication of the various types of committees that are set up. In committee, the interests of the people are paramount, unlike at plenary sessions where the MPs propagate party agendas and ideology. It is thus in committee where the public become truly represented. MPs working in committees intensify the participation of MPs in discussions because of its small size addressing common agenda. This also results inefficiency in terms of the amount of work that can be done.

Chapter Seven is the final chapter of the study. It presents a synopsis of the study and draws logical conclusions from the findings of the research. It also makes recommendations that should inform future studies and proposes the way forward for sustaining democracy and effective democratic institutions in South Africa.

1.10. Conclusion

Chapter one lays the backdrop context of this study to provide the reader with the background on political elites and the democratic institution in South Africa since 2004-2018. It begins by introducing the study with an overview of the research problem, research objectives and the research questions. After that, it also discusses the theoretical framework, significance of the study, the research methodology and methods, sample size and sample procedure, data collection and structure of the thesis

Chapter Two: Literature Review; Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

2.1. Introduction

This chapter unpacks and reviews the concept of the political elite and democratic institutions by assessing the various definitions and views of numerous authors. It sketches and contextualizes the concept of democratization and democratic consolidation providing a starting point for understanding the concept of political elites in democratic institutions. A general framework of what a democratic institution is and the road path to democratization and democratic transition in South Africa is discussed which sets the scene for contextualizing political elites and democratic institutions in South Africa from 2004. This chapter also elaborates on the ways political elites influence policies. The link between political elites, democratic institutions and democratization is unpacked. Finally, the theoretical framework for the study is discussed.

2.2. Concept of Political Elite

In a quest to understand political elites, it is necessary to explore the diverse definitions of political elites because as they are defined by different authors. Political elites occupy key government positions and they determine public policies. The term political elite can mean different things to different authors depending on the context through which they view it (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Higley, 2010; Chandra, 2007; Francis, 2006; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006; Pareto, 1968; Kuper, 1965). Political elites are strategically located in institutions that empower them to affect political outcomes, in Higley's (2010:163) view. Kuper (1965) refers to them as bourgeoisie, while Allen and Cairney (2015) conceptualise them as a political class. Allen and Cairney (2015); Chandra (2007); Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) posit that the

term political elites is synonymous with other terms such as 'politician', 'MPs' 'candidate', 'political class', 'incumbent', and 'entrepreneur' .They distinguish a 'politician' as an individual who seeks office in the government, while an incumbent intends to retain office. As politicians even after their departure from the parliament they still utilize their expertise for personal gain after their exit from Parliament (Allen & Cairney, 2015:3).

From the overview of the different terms associated with the term, political elites (Bourgeoisie, political class, power elite), the clarity of each term is noted, as well as the strength and weakness. Bourgeoisie is also called the 'capitalists', which means individuals who owns the capital, which they use to exploit labour and expand wealth. Hence, to acquire or increase their wealth, the bourgeoisie, buy and exploit labour-power, using the excess value from the employment of the labour-power (The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, 1995:110; Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1996:196). The bourgeoisie is the social class that emerged to own the means of production during modern industrialization and whose societal interests are the value of properties and the preservation of capital to ensure that their economic dominance in society is perpetuated (Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1996:196).

On the other hand, the political class refers political elites that have indicated an interest to eke out a living from politics, possess political power and built a political career due to their experience that makes them have a political identity (Francis, 2008, p.179). As echoed by Francis (2008 p.179) that the social composition of political elites is one of the ways of determining whether they comprise a political class (Francis, 2008, p.179). The political class is likely used in specific electoral systems (Francis, 2008).

From the overview of the meaning of the political class, it can be described as those who occupy a formal political office within which political institutions bestowed them with the

opportunity to advance their control over public resources through the career paths presented within the institution. The political class is also associated with political careerism whereby they enjoy social benefits where they progress from different levels of either been elected or appointed into government position until their retirement. Such political class could also infer that a small bunch of politically active people and from whom the national leadership is largely drawn. The political class also applies to where the dominant parties consolidate their organizations (party) and their income as a group. The political class manifest where the party leader or boss select party member that would be voted for in an election through the proportional party list.

However, the weakness of the political class is that it is a broader term than the political elite because it often comprises non-elected individuals. Hence, the term, the political class is not used in this study because it denotes inequality amongst the governing and the governed in a democratic country. As well as indicate superiority amongst people within the same party. Secondly, the term implies that the main priority of the political class is political careerism and self-interest.

Equally, the power elites are individuals that occupy a dominant position in key political institutions where they influence the decision for the whole nation (Wright, 1958). Wright also explains that the power elite may not be conscious of their elite status, which also makes them unaware of their roles.

The overview of the different terms on political elites such as political class, power elite and bourgeoisie indicates that these terms mean different definition in a different context. Due to the weakness of some of these terms, in this study, I did not use the term bourgeoisie because the political elites are not necessarily a group of people whose legitimate power is drawn from the means of production.

Also, I did not use the term power elite because the term does not accurately indicate the type of roles such as individuals perform because they are unaware of what is expected of them. Hence, the extent of the power at their disposal, the link to the political institutions where they work and how they shape policies is unclear.

Hence, the term 'political elite' is adopted in the context of this study. The rationale for such is that the term, the 'political elite' is narrow and captures how elected individuals are conscious of their elite status and aware of their roles which gives them the power to influence government policies. Also, political elites deploy resources and have context-specific knowledge not available to the non-elites.

Having highlighted the various definition of the political elite, thus the definition of the political elites that guides this study is that usually defined by elite theorists like Pareto. For this study, I describe the political elites that operate in the context of democratic government and democratic institution setting using Pareto's definition of the political elites. I adopted his definition to the political elites in the parliament. Thus, the definition of the political elite that guides this study is that such individuals are elected representatives who use their position to influence policies because of their statutory role in democratic institutions within constitutional and institutional ambits which empower them to influence government policies that effect change nationally. Such politicians can influence policies because they belong to a social class and possess certain qualities such as intelligence and education.

Political elites are also described as 'elitist' because of their intellect, talent, power, wealth, or position in society (Leftish & Hogg, 2007; Chandra, 2007; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006). The majority of scholars describe political elites as individuals who occupy public office or a significant position of power and influence major political decisions on a regularly basis

(Allen & Cairney, 2015; Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2008; Chandra, 2007; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006; Kuper, 1965; Dunner, 1964).

Mills (1956) likened political elites to a '*power elite*'. He describes them as those who occupy key dominant positions in dominant institutions such as those in the political, economic and military spheres. He emphasizes that whatever decisions they make have consequences on both their citizens and those around them. He notes that they usually succeed weaker predecessors and some might not be aware of their status as an elite. Leftwich (2000 cited in Orrnert and Hewitt 2006: 13) concedes that they are the lynchpin that promotes state development and have a relative degree of autonomy. Political elites are associated with the democratic institutions because of wealth and education which equips them to start a political career (Chandra, 2007; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006). Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) classify political elites into Ministers; controllers of media; CEO of corporations; large property owners; upper-level public servants; publicly prominent intellectuals and leaders of trades unions.

In light of this, Pareto (1968) distinguishes two types of political elites namely that governing elite and non-governing elites. Pareto explains that governing elite comprised of individuals that plays significant role in government either directly or indirectly. As observed by Francis (2008: 2) there are different types of political elites that may coexist with other elites. She noted also that political elites are backed up by the institutional position they occupy. Hence they are central to investigations of power due to changes they initiate and without them, power does not exist (Francis (2008).

Wright Mills (1956) clarifies that the elites can be drawn from political leaders which include the president, a handful of key cabinet member and close advisers; major corporate owners

and directors; and high-ranking military officers. He expatiated further that they can either belong to:

i. Metropolitan 400: This implies members of historical notable local families

ii. Celebrities: These are prominent entertainers and media personalities

iii. Chief Executives: This includes presidents and CEO's

iv. Political Directors

Political elites also determine who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1936). They are involved in the authoritative allocation of scarce resources and values for the country (Easton, 1953). Adam and Tomsic (2002) concur that they are unified actors who monopolize politics and exert controls on social life. They emphasized also that they are heterogeneous; comprising individuals and groups of various social, historical origins and ideological orientations who aspire towards self-preservation and the protection of their interests. Higley's (2010:163) described political elites as individuals that 'make political trouble without being repressed'. With an emphasis on MPs in the UK, Allen and Cairney (2015:1) show that the political class rules over 'ordinary people' from Westminster and that in recent years, there have been complaints about them, based on the argument that the political class is feckless, unrepresentative, immoral and elitist. Because of this, Allen and Cairney (2015) echoed that political class implies three constructs namely political elite, political elites as a professional and political careerism.

The number of political elites can also differ from country to country; this can be expected as different countries have different histories, populations and political systems. For instance, Higley (2010:163) cited examples of political elites in different countries like in France, Germany and Australia. His study demonstrated that in Britain, political elites could sit at ease in a soccer stadium. In the United States, political elites are less than ten thousand; in France, Germany and Australia they are half of the number of political elites in the USA. He

showed that in small countries like in Denmark and Norway, the political elites only number about fifteen hundred individuals. Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) corroborated Higley (1980) that political elites are many in countries such as Nigeria and South Africa. They added that they are few ranging in 800-1000 in small countries such as in Benin or Malawi. Nonetheless, despite the numerical size of political elites and the country they come from, they are few, yet there is no fixed definition on the typology of political elites (Higley, 1980).

2.3. Ways in which Political Elites Influence Policies

Given the pivotal role that political elites play in democratic transitions and democratic consolidation, a discussion on how political elites influence political outcomes and policies are crucial in understanding their approach towards the democratization process. Political elites adopt various tactics to influence government policies, political outcomes and interests (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Booysen, 2014; Gautney, 2014; Albertus & Menaldo, 2013; Dahrendorf, 1990). These strategies include the formation of coalitions, persuasion, inducement, coercion and manipulation (Booysen, 2014; Dahl, 1971; Mills, 1956) and even sometimes the misuse of state resources for private gain (Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006). These tactics also include corruption, negotiation, bargaining, mobilization of coalitions, vote buying, gridlock, over-representation of interests and the implementation of rules that protects their interests (Gautney, 2014; Albertus & Menaldo, 2013; Marcus, 2011; Highley, 2010; Brady & Volden, 2006). Such tactics are also significant because they impact the effectiveness of democratic institutions.

In the same vein, parties with excessive access to resources could also obtain votes, control media coverage, and grant patronage to followers (Southall, 2013). Through access to resources also a ruling party could also have a stronghold on electoral politics (Butler, 2011;

Brook, 2004; Suttner, 2006). Consequently, in many African countries, the rule of the game is 'clientelism' and 'patronage' politics as a result for the clamour for political positions (Kotze & Steenekamp, 2008; Chandra, 2007; Orrnert and Hewitt, 2006; Randall & Svåsand, 2001). 'Clientelism' and 'patronage' implies vote-buying whereby the electorates are rewarded with states resources for their electoral supports (Albertus & Menaldo, 2013; Hopkin, 2003; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006). Albertus and Menaldo (2013) and Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) explained that a stronger link is maintained between political elites and the electorate through identity of ethnicity, a tactic adopted by MPs as a means to campaign and secure votes because the electorate prefers to vote for political elites from the same ethnic group because of the belief that their interests would be protected once in power.

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Arguably, the overview of tactics such as 'Clientelism' seems to suggest that the interaction between political elites and electorates in Africa is also based on the political elites and electorates seeking favours from each other. For the political elites, such favour is electoral supports and votes. While for the electorate, the favour is resources and materials. The other tactics also adopted by political elites are the use of violence, goods, symbols and practices.

In light of this, the Literature (Van de Walle, 2003; Hopkin, 2003; Albertus & Menaldo, 2013; Randall & Svåsand, 2001; Linz & Stepan, 1996) suggest that democracy in Africa countries is questionable. This is because countries that claimed to be democratically consolidated are still confined to just contesting elections because of the tendency of neo-patrimonial rule[2] and 'clientelism' which is still evident in these countries. The reasons for such a trend in African countries are because African political elites derive their legitimacy the electorates (Albertus & Menaldo, 2013).

Thus, the tactics employed by political elites, impact on democratic institutions because such tactics undermine public confidence in the democratic institution (Butler, 2014; Orrnert &

Hewitt, 2006). Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) also express concern that tactic such as 'clientelism' affect the quality of debate on policy issues during elections and the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Albertus and Menaldo (2013) put forth the arguments of Lasswell that, the behaviour of political elite is severely shaped by its ecosystem that conditions them to act the way they do. The tactics adopted by political elites are also analyzed during the decision-making process in terms of either who gain or lose (Polsby, 1980). The tactics and strategies that political elites adopt to achieve their goal are discussed briefly below:

i. Vote buying: This occurs through partnership with economic elites who financially support political elites (Albertus & Menaldo, 2013). Through tactic as vote-buying, both economic and political elite support themselves through reciprocal relationship. Economic elites could fund political elites to buy political supports in order to buy policies and decisions that favour their interests such as tax breaks, de-regulatory and privatization schemes (Gautney, 2014).

ii. Initiation of Bills at the parliament that favours them.

iii. Gridlock inducing in democratic institutions: Gridlock occurs when political elites disagree or cannot reach a consensus on passing a bill into law (Marcus, 2011; Brady & Volden, 2006). Gridlock also occurs when there are different party ideologies and the three branches of government are controlled by different parties (Marcus, 2011; Kelly, 2010; Brady & Volden, 2006).

iv. Reliance on military allies in the absence of institutional mechanisms to defend their interests.

v. Bargain for juicy policies and structures that increase the likelihood that elected political elites will be favourable to their interests during democratic transition processes. This also occurs through the advocacy of lenient electoral rules during the transition to democracy to increase the chances of political influence after an election

vi.   The imposition of restrictions on the electoral franchise.

vii. Alliance and Coalition initiatives: This occur when fading parties negotiate and engage in inter-party cooperation to rescue either their careers, switch to another party or end their parties tactfully (Booysen, 2014). Additionally, the parties that do not have direct constituencies and smaller parties have flexible party structures that enables them to switch with relative ease.

2.4. Democratic Institutions

This section discusses democratic institutions because consolidated democracy is predicated upon democratic institutions functioning properly, where there are procedures for citizens to participate in governance. A democratic institution analysis also reveals the extent to which a particular country is actually democratic. Democratic institutions range from the judicial system, the executive, the parliament, the mass media; and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006; Diamond, 1999; Lipset, 1990). The democratic institution discussed in the context of this study is the parliament of South Africa. The Parliament is an institution of a representative democracy whereby elected MPs speaks on behalf of the electorate (Calland, 1999). Luckham et.al (2000) explains that many new democratic institutions are adopted by a variety of countries based on institutional blueprints that are drawn from or modelled on western democracies. They explain that democratic institutions are a set of arrangements for organizing a political competition, legitimatization of rulers and the implementation of rules. They also noted that democratic institutions are a form of political participation that occurs through free elections to determine the composition of the legislature and the government. According to them, democratic institutions are set up for the following purposes:

i.   To assure open and fair competition of power based a popular vote, accountability of government and the circulation of elites.

ii. To avoid tyranny both by autocratic rulers and in some democratic systems by the majority.

iii. To enable participation either directly or through elections.

iv. To provide a forum for a national discussion of political problems and optimum settlement of different and potentially conflicting social interests.

v. To establish the basic civil rights and freedoms of individual citizens. .

vi. To state conditions to resolve the problem of inequality and conflicts.

At this juncture, it is important to discuss democracy and its features. This is worth mentioning because it gives a better understanding of democratic institutions and the democratization process in South Africa, particularly as the country that changed from a brutal regime that instituted a system of racist rule (Apartheid) with an oppressive rule of law and abuse of human rights. Scholars (Booysen, 2014; Kuo & Koa, 2011; Bratton & De Walle, 1997) underscore the importance of democratic principles, representation, accountability and legitimization of a democratic regime in a consolidated democracy. Democratic consolidation and its sustenance are achievable when political elites accept the established structure that regulates power and electoral competition (Leftwich, 2000: 137). The Inter-Parliamentary Union Geneva Report (1998) states that democracy is based on the existing rule of law and the well-structured functioning of democratic institutions that enable the set of laws. The report shows that democratic processes and institutions should accommodate citizens' participation through decentralized government and administration. Through this, it will broaden public participation, safeguard diversity, pluralism and the enhancement of social cohesion. Literature describes the features of democratic regimes into the following:

i. Universal adult suffrage and free elections held frequently.

ii. Election competition amongst qualified individuals through political parties.

iii. Protection of citizens' rights

iv. Inclusiveness of citizens in democracy through access to information

v. Participatory government whereby elected officials represent citizens and shapes government policies. (Kuo & Kao, 2011; Heller, 2009; Leftwich, 2000; Diamond, 1999; Bratton & Walle, 1997; Huntington, 1991; Dahl, 1989; Schumpeter, 1942):

Diamond (1999) and Lipset (1990) corroborates on the features of democratic regimes as the 'hardcore' of the democratic regime and that democracy cannot function without democratic institutions. They however caution that these features are insufficient to qualify a political system to be democratic, because these 'hardcore' features could be entrenched in any democratic regime, yet such a regime could still be autocratic. This is also because democracy and a democratic regime could be gauged by the strength of its democratic institutions and to a large extent democratic principle are implemented (Kuo & Kao, 2011; Muthien, Khosa & Magubane, 2001; Bratton &Van de Walle, 1997; Diamond, 1999; Lipset, 1990).

Muthien, Khosa and Magubane (2001) and Rustow (1970) concur that the effectiveness of a democratic regime is to gauge democracy when democratic institutions effectively achieve its stated principles. Nonetheless, the entrenchment of democracy and the existence of democratic institutions in most countries, this is not a guarantee of a democratic regime (Orrnett & Herwitt, 2006; Walle, 2005). This is also because effectiveness of democratic institutions are gauged when such institutions modify and regulates the patrimonial behaviour of its political elites (Orrnett & Herwitt, 2006; Bratton & Walle, 1997).

This is also because a substantive test of democracy is also determined to a large extent on how political elites exercise their powers within the prescriptive set of rules (Francis, 2006:17). The action of political elites is regulated by and within, democratic structures

whereby through institutional consensus, political elites in constant struggle subject their preferences to the competition so that such conflict is organized within institutions and procedures (Francis, 2011; Przeworski, 1991). Democratic institutions are vital because they influence norms, beliefs, and actions and shape outcomes and perpetuate the power of the political elites (Przeworski, 2004:1). Przeworski (1991) argues that institutions sometimes become highly durable and resistant to change. This infers that firstly, these institutions can also function as exogenous variables shaping the political norms and expectations of political elites through repeated interactions within institutional arrangements. This implies that the institutional norms are a platform that channels the political elites' attitudes over time. Secondly, the exiting institutional framework depends on the allocation of political power among political elites. This is in consideration that political institutions whether formal or informal determine the constraints and incentives political elites face. Therefore, given this scenario, democratic institution and the allocation of power strategically assists in the development of a credible mechanism which decreases the chances of opportunistic behaviour of political elites over time.

2.5. Conceptualization of Democratization and Democratic Consolidation

The ability of a country to sustain the transfer of power peacefully from one regime to another and the effectiveness of its democratic institutions reveals much about the country's democratic consolidation. Democratization is a change of regime to another, usually from an autocratic regime to a democratic regime (Booysen, 2014; Linz, 1993; Przeworski, 1991). The transition of the regime is reflected in the ' interval between a change from a regime that is autocratic to another that is democratic (Przeworski, 1986; O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986). It also involves the 'transfer of power', as a key element of democratization (Booysen, 2014; Linz, 1993; Przeworski, 1986; O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986). Democratization is also synonymous with catchy phrases such as Valenzuela's (1992) democratization term, 'the

second election test'; Huntington's (1991) 'third wave of democratization' and Przeworski's (1991) 'alternation in power'(e.g. Suttner, 2004; Adam & Tomsic, 2002; Huntington, 1991, Przeworski, 1991; Linz, 1990; Rustow, 1970). Linz (1990) views democratization as 'the only game in town'. Linz (1990:158) elaborates that 'democracy as the only game in town' implies when none of the significant political players and political parties hijacks the democratic processes as an alternative to gaining power. He elaborated also that it also implies no attempts to circumvent the decisions of democratically elected MPs. Schedler (1998:90) puts it succinctly that 'democratization entails securing democracies and extending such regimes beyond the short term and making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression . An excerpt from the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva (1998) explains that democratization occurs in stages such as opening, breakthrough, and consolidation, with examples of countries. The report also cites examples of countries that witnessed democratization such as Latin America, Africa, Europe, Asia and several authoritarian regimes that transformed into democratic regimes. The report also stated that democratization, is hinged on participatory and open regime. The term 'open society' in this context, is an ideal of democracy that denotes both freedom and transparency, the two fundamental values of a democratic society. Hence, the process of strengthening the democratization process and representative institutions such as the parliament will contribute immensely to the attainment of democratic goals and the establishment of pluralistic systems of representative government (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1998).

Conversely, there are crucial factors that come into play during the democratization process. This includes political history, regime type, interactions between key actor, the type of electoral system, levels of economic development, previous democratic experiences, levels of citizen's trust and the particular party systems in place (Booysen, 2014; Kuo &Kao, 2011; Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2008; Saeger, 2007; Rakneret et al, 2007; Kew, 2005; Bratton & De Walle, 2004; Randall & Svåsand, 2001).

Fukuyama (1995) suggests also the factors that guarantee democratic consolidation. This includes ideology, and a conscious commitment to democracy as a preferable alternative to other forms of governance. Secondly, democratic institutions, which sets the formal rules and governance structure for a democratic model of governance to be practised. Randall and Svåsand (2001) contend that the structural arrangements of African democracies mitigate against democratization. This alludes to the country's history, such as the voting systems of the former imperial power, strong central government and a dominant presidency in one-party rule (Randall &Svåsand, 2001:22).

Rakner et.al. (2007) posits democratization is process-oriented; entails the transition to formal democracy and its consolidation. They emphasized that democratization implies two things namely the processes of democracy and the 'transitional phase' of regime change. They identified also, three phases and 'types' of democratization. This includes: the liberalization stage, the transition stage and the consolidation stage.

i. Liberalization stage occurs after the end of a former autocratic regime

ii. A transition stage occurs after the first election occurs during electoral competition

iii. Consolidation stage occurs when democratic practices are firmly entrenched as procedures by political elites for sustainable democratic regimes.

Along the same lines, Randall and Svåsand (2001:2) opine that democratic consolidation becomes entrenched after the successive peaceful transfer of power. Suttner (2004:755) observes that democratic transition and consolidation gained popularity during the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime in Eastern European and Latin-America. He observed waves of democratization in Africa but saw that such democratization was flawed because they reverted to authoritarian regimes again. This is because structural conditions and various electoral laws make it difficult for opposition parties to generate

resources tp properly contest elections. Diamond (1996) contends that newer democracies are not fully consolidated, despite the entrenchment of electoral institutions because of the continued dominance of political elites.

Some democratic transitions are referred to '*hybrid regimes'* and as democratic '*grey zones'* (Kuo & Kao, 2011; Rakner et.al, 2007). These are democratic regimes that exhibit the characteristics inherent in consolidated democracies such as regular elections, but they have weak democratic institutions and therefore relapse to more autocratic forms of rule. Such democratic consolidation is also labelled 'democracy with adjectives' (Kuo & Kao, 2011; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006).

Hence, Muthien et al. (2001) highlight key pillars of democratic consolidation which include:

i.   A functioning multi-party parliamentary system and free and fair elections.

ii.   A strong sense of constitutionalism and rule of law, supported by institutions that buttress democracy.

iii.   Mechanisms of accountability including access to information that ensures transparency.

iv.   Mechanisms for citizens' participation in government, which may include public hearings of parliamentary committees and public participation in policymaking.

v.   A highly developed economic infrastructure with considerable potential for economic prosperity.

Rakner et.al (2007) stressed that democratization is relative and contextual, particularly on accountability of the human right abuses in previous regimes. They also echoed that only a few African political systems with democratic institutions in the early 1990s have so far developed into institutionalized consolidated democracies. Arising from the definition and

diverse views of authors, it is clear that democratic consolidation is based upon sustained democracy and democratic principles.

2.6. Political Elites, Democratic Institutions and Democratization

Political elites, democratic institutions and democratization are inter-linked. Political elites are vital in building effective states, the enhancement of quality of democracy and good governance (Allien & Cairney, 2015; Leftwich & Hoggs, 2007). In the South Africa context, political elites played an important role during policy-making, the initial negotiation towards democratization and its process. The literature demonstrates (Booysen,2014; Heller, 2009 ; Kotze & Steenkamp, 2009; Saeger, 2007) how South Africa's initial transition to democracy and consolidation process was managed by political elites like Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk through their political legitimacy and negotiation prevented civil war.

Successful democratization also depends primarily on the political intentions and actions of its political elites (Linder & Bächtiger, 2005; Carothers, 2002). Liberal democracy and consolidated democracy emerges through the effort of political elites (Kotze & Steenekamp, 2008). This is in keeping with the claims of Agupusi (2011), who argues that political elites, as actors, influence policy process, bargaining and outcomes through their ideology, values and views. Agupusi (2011) buttress that conflict is minimal amongst political elites when their interests and goals are similar. On the other hand, MPs whose inputs are considered during the bargaining and negotiation process are considered a power broker.

The power of political elites can also be assessed in terms of the influence associated with it. As put forward in Luke's (1974) three faces of power theory, he states that power involves the ability to modify the behaviour of other individuals within the decision-making process. He notes that this is evident from the outcome of a decision-making process and whose interest prevails. In Bachrach and Baratz's (1962:947) view, during decision making by

political elites, it is not all inputs of political elites that is accepted which manifests in their power summed as 'who gets what', 'how', 'who is left out' and 'how'.

Wieczorek (2011:2) explains that the institutionalization of democracy in any country is hinged on parameters as institutional consolidation, behavioural consolidation and attitudinal consolidation. They stressed that these are a yardstick to measure what either hinders or promotes democratic consolidation. They explained that behavioral consolidation implies when political elites do not attempt to take over the current regime. Secondly, attitudinal consolidation is the entrenched societal belief on democratic procedures. Thirdly, institutional consolidation entails how political elites and electorate resolve conflicts within democratic institutions. Orrnert and Hewitt (2006:14) reiterate that consolidated democracy reflects decisions by political elites to move towards democracy and their ability to resolve their conflicts. They argue that there is continuous recycling of elites and strong tendencies to stay in power for a very long time which they define the alternation of power as a 'tipping game'[2]. Przeworski (1991) posit that change occurs within democratic when diverse political elites negotiate the structure of governance after the end of a former regime. This is manifested during the processes of negotiation and bargaining among relevant political elites during the democratic transition.

Reasoning along these lines, Diamond and Lipset (1990) note that democratization is an illusion because democratic tenets and values are not strictly adhered to. This alludes to the absence of other elements necessary for 'hardcore' [democratic features] such as the formation of visionary political elites and the existence of political parties that reflects diverse views. Leftwich and Hogg (2007:5) assert that in consolidated democracy, political

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[3] [2] See Orrnert and Hewitt (2006); Walle (2005). A 'tipping game' is ' increasing possibility ' of a shift in power alluded to several interrelated variables which bring about cohesion among opposition parties. Through the gradual alternation of power but with occasional reversible steps will strengthen democratic expectations.

elites from various parties have divergent views on policy stance but, agree on policy that benefits their mutual interests. Countries that have established consolidation like what is obtainable in developed democracies negotiates through legitimate institutions and democratic procedures.

2.7. Political Elites and Democratization in South Africa

The role of political elites in South Africa's democratization is illuminated in the context of a political elite pact, alliance, coalition and bargaining which catalyzed South Africa's democratic transition (Booysen, 2014; Seo, 2008; Herbst , 1999). Democratization in South Africa was witnessed during the first democratic elections of 1994, when Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned for 27 years, became the country's first president of the post-apartheid era on the platform of the ANC. Seo (2008) elucidated that in South Africa, democratic transition implies a regime change from 'racial oligarchy' in the form of apartheid because it was only white people that enjoyed political rights and other privileges prior to this time, to a more participatory inclusive competitive political dispensation based on the universal franchise, which included black people. Seo (2008) further explains that South Africa's democratic transition to democracy comprised three levels. These are political transition from oligarchy to participatory democracy. Secondly, an economic transition from a closed white-dominated economic activity to a gradual open economy with the inclusion of black participation. Thirdly a change from armed struggle resistance to peace struggle.

August (2011) and Inman and Rubinfeld (2013) showed that the transition from Apartheid to democracy in South Africa has been successful through the attempts and intentions of the political elites. Such political elites were the likes of Nelson Mandela despite been imprisoned at several prisons such as Robben Island and Pollsmoor Prison, Cape Town suburb of Tokai until his release on 11 February 1990 (South Africa Government Agency, 2019).

This was a watershed in South Africa history because of peaceful negotiation which occurred more than four years from the release of Nelson Mandela from Pollsmoor Prison on 11 February 1990. They also mentioned that because of the negotiation and agreement by the three parties, political power shifted in 1994.

Those parties present in the negotiation were the National Party (NP) portraying what was once a-ruling white party, the African National Congress ANC representing the interests of South African blacks and Asians, as well as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) representing the traditional Zulu nation.

As Booysen (2014:68) observes, that South Africa's first decade of democracy (1994-2004) recorded a high amount of floor crossing, alliances and coalitions between the dominant party and the opposition party in South Africa, even though the ANC has maintained a powerful presence nationally. On the other hand, the second decade of democracy was characterized by the continued domination of the ANC has seen a decrease in major political interest relative to the first decade.

Booysen (2014) echoes also that the Constitution of South Africa enacted in 1996 is essential to the creation of a coalition in that it enables a party to win an absolute majority in terms of the PR system to have its country's leader elected to as president of the country[3]. The legislation was also adopted by the opposition parties to allow coalitions. It was in 2009 that South Africa's president finally signed legislation to outlaw the phenomenon. Butler (2011:4), however, laments that during the first ten years of democracy, the concern of ANC

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[3] Booysen (2014);Lodge(2003) The electoral system in South Africa electoral is structured on proportional representation, party-list system, where parties are allocated a seat in proportion to their electoral support.

political elites was ' careerism '-pursuing party office for personal gain-, resulting in internal factional wars and local elections.

In light of the above writings by scholars on South Africa's transition, it appears that the South African transition from apartheid to democracy exemplifies what Huntington calls a 'trans placement' (Huntington, 1991). Political elites are important in the democratization process. Scholars such as Kotzé and Steenekamp (2008); Linder & Bächtiger (2005);

Diamond (1993) ; Higley and Burton (1989); and Dahl (1971) reiterate the importance of political elites in the process of democratic consolidation in the stability of democratic regimes in the support for democratic institutions and entrenchment of democratic political values in developing counties. Political elites are important in the democratization process based on their acceptance of democratic institutions they adopt and the 'rules of the game' (Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2008; Fukuyama, 1995).

Albertus and Menaldo (2013) describe how political elites use their power to manipulate policy decisions through democratic institutions. They explained that this occurs when political elites control democratic institutions directly or indirectly. They explained also that political elites control democratic institutions directly through the de jure institutions established during the transition to democracy. Political elites also control democratic institutions indirectly through de facto institutions when they strengthen the institutions and policies that they implement. Political elites also agree on the type of political system that is best suited for the country after a democratization process has occurred. Transitions in South Africa from an oppressive regime to a democratic regime is unpredictable political processes driven by elites from the opposing group (Albertus & Menaldo: 2013; Galaen, 2004). Sager's (2007) study of a comparative case study of South African and Rwandese political elites concluded that political elites are crucial in democratic transitions, especially in minority or

authoritarian regimes. Saeger illustrates that Rwanda political elites were unable to effectively manage the negotiation process successfully like Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk did.

In a study on the deepening of democracy in India and South Africa, Heller (2009) found that India and South Africa are a good example of successful democratic consolidation in a developing country. Citing examples of how India experienced a brief period of authoritarian rule in the emergency of 1975-1977. She echoed that since the transition, the countries encountered challenges to democratic rule such as the risk of political regression and destabilization witnessed in countries as Latin America, East Asia and the rest of Africa.

In relation to South Africa, the democratic transition was possible in South Africa through political elite's strategies, compromise, negotiation and pacts (Boysen, 2014; Francis, 2006; Herbst, 1999). A pact is an agreement and rules either formally or informally that guides future democracy (Francis, 2006; O' Meara, 1996: Herbst, 1999). A pact is pertinent for creating a minimal set of expectations across a country's next regime and an assurance that certain groups' fundamental interests will not be threatened as the country moves into an uncertain period of democracy (O' Meara, 1996:464; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). In South Africa, democratic transition was also achieved through negotiations that the National Peace Accord[4] in 1993. These set the stage for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) forum[5] that was based on principles of multi-party democracy and followed guidelines that were created during the transition in South Africa.

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[4] see Francis (2011); Through the negotiation that occurred on 14 September, 1991 twenty-seven representatives from political organizations signed the National Peace Accord The NPA also paved the way for the CODESA negotiations on the conduct of democratic transition. The NPA also prepared the way for the CODESA negotiations.

[5] [5] see Francis (2006) A Record of Understanding between the ANC and National Party(NP) was recorded in September 1992 . CODESA was also as a result of the minutes and deliberation was necessary following the collapse of CODESA II, bilateral negotiations between the ANC and the NP became the main negotiation

Herbst (1998) citing Przeworski (1986) cautions that for a peaceful transition to occur the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse the process. However, pacts reduce ambiguity an provide assurances by negotiation and agreement to protect the public's and excludes those who support greater change (Francis, 2006:60-61).

Seo (2008) posits that the democratic transition in South Africa was possible through political elite' pacts and negotiations. He highlighted three types of democratization in South Africa, namely transition through a transaction, transition by extrication, and transition by a breakdown. He sets out the stages of democratic transition in South Africa, namely the initial phase of transition (1978-1989), the crucial phase of transition (1989-1991) and the maturity phase of transition (1991-1994). During the initial phase of transition, PW Botha tried to impose a transition to democracy without consultation and negotiation.

The key phase of transition (1989-1991) was a time when the talks for independence were started through a compromise between the government and the anti-regime camps. The democratic transition phase was also marked by tentative talks and compromises between the political elites. Yet requests for wider change led to the criticism of PW Botha and were a factor in his ultimate resignation as president. Hence, FW de Klerk was elected leader of the ruling National Party (NP) in this process and became South Africa's president. Also through negotiations meetings known as the Groote Schuur Minute (1990)[6], the Pretoria Minute

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channel. Two key negotiators were Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC, and Roelf Meyer of the NP, who formed a close friendship.

[7] [6] see Seo (2008);Francis (2006) Minutes and Accords were recorded between the ANC and the NP in Groote Schuur Minute. It is an agreement between the ANC and the NP to resolve violence and intimidation during democratic transition.

(1990)[7], and the National Peace Accord (1991) between the government and the ANC was established (Seo, 2008). This was also a significant moment for the democratic transition in South Africa.

The phase also ushered in the entrenchment of institutional rules and the first formal agreements signed between the government and the ANC, and set in place measures designed to establish an environment conducive to negotiation. This is vital considering the suspicion that had already existed amongst the party's supporters. Negotiations were also reached based on the Sunset proposals[8] by Joe Slovo, which the NP and ANC agreed to The conditions for elections during the negotiation process prior to the first democratic election in South Africa, according to Seo (2008); Herbst (1998), included:

i.   Strong and well-established provincial governments with appropriate budgets.

ii. Entrenched executive power-sharing, within the cabinet.

iii. The right to private property ownership.

iv. A senate to protect regional interests and legislation enforced by a special court

v.   Proportional representation as an acceptable voting system

The shortcomings of such pacts and its impacts on democratization has been flagged by scholars (Wieczorek, 2011; Brooks, 2004; Przeworski, 1991). Przeworski (1991: 90-91) claims that pacts have their weaknesses because some elites become cartels that restrict competition and distribute power. This also alludes to it turning democracy into a private

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[7] see Francis (2006) This *Pretoria Minute* included the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe as well as bring the state of emergency to an end. This was known as the Pretoria Minute (Francis, 2011).

[8] See Francis,(2011) on sunset proposal. Joe Slovo, was the leader of the South African Communist Party. In 1992 suggested the 'sunset clause' to establish a coalition government for the five years after a democratic election. Based on the sunset negotiating, De Klerk released political detainees

project of members of certain political parties, a sort of oligopoly where political elites prevent certain outsiders from entering.

Wieczorek (2011) corroborates that no such transfer of power has taken place in the dominant party structure, such as that of South Africa, which is one of the greatest measures of democracy. Arguably this is connected to the (ANC) solidifying its hold as the dominant party within South Africa which receives the majority of electoral support in national elections. This is attributed to the ANC being synonymous as the party of liberation and the driving force during the country's struggle for freedom. Since the ANC's rise to dominance in South Africa at the end of Apartheid, elections have become entirely predictable in terms of who wins the next election. Wieczorek (2011) buttresses this claim, that the ANC becomes a dominant party leveraging on the slogan that 'we won liberation for our people 'and the 'Mandela factor' which has also been a key reason why people still vote for the ruling party.

Brooks (2004) notes democratic consolidation is consistently regarded as a post-Apartheid governance project. He stressed that when one party dominates the political scene and faces a minimal risk of electoral defeat, there are concerns about the likelihood of decreasing policy response, public opinion, lack of transparency, the deterioration of democratic principles, and the emergence of oppressive methods of governance. This raises further questions about the quality of that democracy. Brooks explains further that the characteristics of such dominant parties are numbers, enjoys bargaining position, dominant chronologically and dominant governmentally (White, 2011; Suttner, 2006). White (2011:659) explains that in terms of number, it implies that such party receives at least a plurality. Secondly, the dominant bargaining position allows such a party to stay in power and in a strategic position to bargain effectively with smaller parties where necessary. Thirdly, dominant chronologically implies such a party is in power over a substantial period of time. Fourthly, such a party is dominant governmentally when it shapes the public policy agenda.

Wieczorek (2011) argues that where there is a dominant party, there is the need for an opposition party. This is because there are alternatives to the dominant party in the existence of political opposition. Second, it encourages discussion about policies within society and enables citizens to challenge government actions and policies relevant to curbing authoritarian tendencies and the abuse of power by the governing party.

In light of this, dominant parties also have the tendency to be undemocratic in a number of ways. These include intimidating minorities, looting the economy and participating only in elections they know they can win; and the likelihood of this is high as they remain in power. This negates the elements of democracy, undermines the pillars and processes of democratic consolidation and leads to a public loss of confidence in democratic institutions. In a situation whereby the dominant party seems to be firmly entrenched in power, voters who otherwise support the idea of democratic political pluralism are polarized between the realistic need to gain some control on the governing party and the need reduce the excesses of government. This is not surprising as Galaen (2004) forewarned that the dominance of the ANC in the South African parliamentary landscape, that in the 2004 general election the dominance will probably continue.. This also makes South Africa politics less exciting and predictable (Lodge 2003:160). The number of valid votes in the national election declined from over 19.5 million in 1994 to 15.9 million in 1999 while it dropped to 15.6 million in 2004(Wieczorek., 2011). From the above summary, it is clear that voter confidence has declined, which may speak to confidence in democracy. This is because of the possibility that the ANC would win the election no matter what.

Kew (2005) states that in several African countries, ethnicity and the promotion of ethnic-based interests is rife. Scholars (Booysen, 2014; Chandra, 2007; Orrnert & Hewitt, 2006, Randall & Svåsand, 2001) emphasized also that ethnic security dilemma persists in many

African countries and remains a constant source of instability. They stressed that through ethnic security dilemma, many ethnic groups are caught up in a mutual power struggle to protect their group's interests. Similarly, they mentioned that in many African countries, the ethnic security problem seems unabated and is a constant source of instability. They caution also that that if the focus is on ethnicity, politics is thus perceived as who is ruling rather than on how to rule.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

This section presents and discusses theories on political elite (Dye, 2000; Putnam, 1977; Domhoff, 1967; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953; Pareto, 1968; Mosca, 1939; and Michel, 1966). The theorists are classified into the classical elite theory (Pareto, 1968; and Mosca, 1939) and democratic elite theory (Putnam, 1977; Domhoff, 1967; Mills, 1975). Elite theories describe and explain the power relationship in contemporary society such as within democratic institutions. Theorists overwhelmingly claim that the political elite comprises a '*Ruling Class*' that consists of few individuals who possess political privileges due to certain traits and qualities such as social composition (education, aristocrats' family, money, knowledge psychological and intellectual superiority). They postulate that political elites are few and that power is concentrated. Secondly, political elites are united because of shared interests and institutional characteristics. Hence, these theories serve as a springboard for explaining divergence among South African political elites in the National Assembly. The other rationale for the use political theories is that there are virtually no studies in South Africa that draw on democratic elite theories.

2.8.1. Political Elites Theories Explained

Dunner (1964) explains that every organized society is governed by a 'political elite' in any type of political structure (democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian states) and they are individuals with 'large shares in the distribution of power'. He further explains that some groups of writers use the term 'political elites' inter-changeably with the 'ruling elite 'or 'ruling classes' by the classical and contemporary theorists. Michels (1966:342) notes in the 'Ruling Party' that societies cannot exist without the ruling class, who are an organized few that maneuver and outsmart the rank-and-file of particular organizations. He identified the ruling class as aristocrats and that aristocracy can be attained by birth, money; and knowledge (Michels 1965: 76). He also mentioned that there is a hierarchy within the political elite composed of 'the top gun' and sub-elite' despite that the one of aims of democracy is to exclude political elites. He explained that it is difficult to exclude political elites because democracy is a facade because it legitimizes the rule of political elites. Hence, he laments that participatory democracy is limited to very narrow strata of oligarchy. However, the limitation of the theory is that it was applied to organizations and the socialist party in Europe.

Pareto (1968:38) in his *elite circulation theory* propounded that there are strata within the society which comprise the non-governed (also referred to as '*Governing elite')*. This governing elites occupies the higher strata due to certain qualities such as intelligence, educational qualities and social class that allows these individuals to have the privilege to govern individuals (non-elites) who occupy the lower stratum. These qualities give political elites an edge over the non-elites so much so that they directly or indirectly play a considerable part in government. He points out that the strata within the governing class are further divided into subgroups. He emphasizes that for effective rule, an ideal political elite should comprise political elites who have the mixture of both Class I and Class II in his social taxonomy of classes. He distinguishes that,

1) 'Foxes' also referred to as adventurers belong to Class I residues. This implies that whichever the system of government, men in positions of power prefer to use the power to keep themselves in the position and manipulate it to achieve personal gains and benefits (Pareto, 1935: 1608). Pareto also notes that Class I should are capable of decisive and forceful action. To stay relevant in power, superiority and inferiority are used to keep the ruled class in order (Pareto, 1935: 686-87).

(2) 'Conservative lions' belong to Class II residues. They are imaginative, innovative and unscrupulous. The ruling under this class protects itself in several ways. This includes coercion, death, penalty, exclusion from public offices, exile and ostracization (Pareto 1935:1426, 1787-97). In addition to this, he sums up that the 'Men's history is the history of continuous replacement of some of these leaders as one climbs up, another decline' (Pareto 1968:36). Taking the arguments further, Pareto's circulation of elites postulates that the 'circulation of elites' implies that when the current elite starts to decline, it is challenged and makes way for another. To Pareto, political elite circulation occurs by assimilation and revolution. Assimilation implies that the new elite merging with elements of the old. While revolution, implies that the new elite replacing the old. The relevance of Pareto's theory to the MPs in the National Assembly is clear. The study demonstrates that the MPs circulate themselves through coalition, cross party movements and the formation of new parties (e.g. Economic Freedom Fighter). MPs such as the EFF leader, Julius Malema, a former ANC Youth league former president has circulated himself through revolution, using the ANC as his springboard to launch his political career. The rise of new political elites like Malema challenge the old political dominant class (ANC) he was once part of.

Dahl notes in 'Who Governs' (1961) theory that the political elites constitute a small, but significant minority that influences political decisions by either initiating and or impeding

policies'. Dahl identifies a bargaining model whereby political elites mediate and adjust the role of different institutional segments of society.

Dahl notes that political elites continue in power due to the continued support given to them by the masses. Dahl (1976:39) defined political elites as minority individuals whose inclinations prevail constantly during political issues. He argued that with the scale and scope of the activities of the modern state, it is difficult to imagine any group to effectively control events across the board. Dahl also echoed that through oligarchy the minority ruling class strengthen democracy.

Dahl (1976:39) also suggests that democracy can be measured efficiently by observing the technocratic and institutional structures of countries. This is also related to procedural democracy, which makes it easy to measure the level of participation. Procedural democracy thus places greater emphasis on variables like elections, the executive and the parliament (Dahl, 1971). This is also linked to procedural democracy which makes it easy to measure the level of participation; hence it is relevant for this dissertation (see Chapter Five on the definition of democracy by MPs interviewed).

Mosca (1939:50) in the '*Ruling Class,* 'claims that the ruling class comprises a few numbers of people who possess political power and privileges. He elucidated that within the ruling class there are two strata: (a) the highest stratum; and the second stratum which is usually the larger numerically than the higher stratum. On the other hand, the non-ruling class are much larger in number (Mosca 1939:50). To sustain the influence of the highest strata a large group from the masses is created to support the ruling class and the system (Mosca, 1939:50-53). Mosca also agrees with Pareto that political elites (otherwise referred to as the ruling class) have certain traits and qualities that qualify them as such (Mosca, 1939: 60-61). Femia (2001 cited in Higley 1990) argues that Mosca's theory of 'Ruling Class'; Pareto's 'Circulation of

Elites'; and Dahl's 'Who Governs' are contestable based on the argument that political elites are not necessarily superior individuals nor possess organizational capacities, but are in an advantageous position because of privileges such as inherited wealth and family connections.

These can be removed, either by removing the social advantages that political elites enjoy or by abolishing the power concentrations that encourage competition. However, he echoes that these have not really been tested. He bemoans that the inevitability of political rule is a charade for democracy because elite-manipulated democracy is what is obtainable and it is practically impossible for them to be accountable to the masses. Higley (1990) put forth the arguments of Pareto when he likens political elites to being fox-like and 'profit-seeking capitalist' who rules through deception, demagoguery and the bribing of diverse interest. A 'demagogic plutocracy gradually kills the goose that lays the golden egg' (Pareto, 1902:62). Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1935) agree that the condition of the society matters to the ability of the ruling class to hold onto power. Political elites can devise various ways to perpetuate their hold on power which includes force, bargaining, concessions and the provision of great wealth.

Having highlighted the various definition of the political elite, it appears political elites manifests in various form as the political class, power elites or politician depending on the context they operate from. Thus, in the context of this study, political elite are elected representatives who use their power to influence policies because of their statutory role in democratic institutions within constitutional and institutional ambits which empower them to influence government policies that effect change nationally. Such politicians can influence policies because they belong to a social class and possess certain qualities such as intelligence and education.

2.9. Conclusion

The chapter contextualizes the concept of the political elite. It conceptualized political elites as 'bourgeoisie', 'governing elite', 'governing class', 'Members of Parliament', 'representative elites' and 'political class'. The chapter also demonstrates that political elites are vital in democratic institutions and the sustenance of democratic institutions globally, and in South Africa. The roles of political elites and how they shape political outcomes in the democratization process in their respective countries is also explored. The importance of political elites in South Africa was demonstrated during the period of negotiation and bargaining in South Africa's transition to democracy. The democratic transition was achieved in South Africa because of political elites' strategies, compromise, negotiation and pacts.

Equally discussed is how democratic institutions are an important institution in a consolidated democracy. This alludes to it being where MPs exert their power as and shape policies. Democratic institutions are also important for a consolidated democracy because it reveals the extent to which a country is actually democratic.

The chapter also reveals that political elites adopt various tactics and strategies to influence government policies, political outcomes and interests. These strategies include coalition formation, persuasion, inducement, coercion, manipulation, negotiation, bargaining, mobilization of coalitions, vote-buying, gridlock and the adoption of rules that lead to institutional over-representation of their interests. These strategies also have impacts on the effectiveness of a democratic institution.

The behaviours of the MPs are also discussed in the light of democratic elite theories (Dye, 2000; Putnam, 1977; Domhoff, 1967; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953; Pareto, 1968; Mosca, 1939; Michel, 1966). The theories suggest that political elites are the '*Ruling Class',* and comprise a

few numbers of people that possess political power and privileges because of distinct traits and qualities that separate them from others. Such qualities range from the social composition (such as education, aristocratic or connected family, money, knowledge and intellectual superiority). The subsequent chapter discusses the parliament as a democratic institution, where political elites influence policy.

Chapter Three: Parliament as a Democratic Institution in South Africa

3.0. Introduction

Examining the Members of Parliament (MPs) working within the institutional space of parliament reveals how they conduct parliamentary functions such as accountability and oversight. This is because the parliament is an arena where the MPs occupy key institutional positions and determine public policies. Thus the chapter explores how the MPs carry out their oversight and accountability functions, backed up by the constitution to influence government decisions. This chapter also contextualizes MPs work in the National Assembly and how the South African parliament evolved. It discusses the ways in which the MPs are key agents as the parliament carries out their work through various instruments and mechanisms of oversight. This includes Plenary Debates, Motions without Notice, Questions to the Executive, Budget Votes, Statements by Cabinet Members and Petitions. Through this mechanism, the executive is accountable and the citizens may also participate in government.

The chapter also highlights the link between political parties as platforms for the recruitment of political elites elected through the system of proportional representation (PR), who eventually become MPs Equally, the impact of intra-party conflict on the National Assembly manifested in cross-party defections and new party formations is highlighted. Issues and factors that affect the institutional capacity of the parliament are also discussed. Furthermore, the composition of the committees and the roles of the Chief Whip are explored to gain an

insight into how the MPs work in Parliament, which to a large extent gives them the power to shape political outcomes.

Based on the foregoing, I claimed that when the MPs work effectively in the democratic institutions like the National Assembly, it is indicative of the strength of such democratic institutions not only because they operate independently but that they are guided by acceptable constitutional principles. However, I show that because the MPs are elected through the party-list system of proportional representation this tends to nurture and protect a dominant-party system that in turn limits citizen's interaction with the MPs. This, I argue, removes citizens from the actual participatory democracy that is being envisaged.

3.1. Concept of the Parliament

South Africa operates a parliamentary system, established by Act 108 of 1996 constitution (Parliament, 2006). Under the parliamentary system, the President is elected by parliament (Booysen, 2014; Francis, 2006). The function of the head of state is different from the head of government in a parliamentary representative system (Francis, 2011). The parliament, as an entity, makes laws, regulates the executive, foster public participation and participatory governance (Booysen, 2014; Barkan, 2005; Nijzink & Piombo, 2004).

The parliament is also one of the democratic institutions in South Africa where political elites such as the MPs exert their power and shape policies. Political elites working as MPs influence policy in terms of the roles they perform by legislation and oversight in the parliament (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Nijzink & Piombo, 2004; Murray & Nijzink, 2002; South African Constitution, 1996). Ideally, the Parliament is the articulator of the will of the people, at the heart of governance and representative governance (Judith, 2006:135). The Parliament also seeks to reinforce constitutional principles in the political system and to create a bond between the government and its people (Booysen, 2014; Barkan, 2005; Murray & Nijzink, 2002). It does this

by acting as the link between government and citizens by raising awareness on democratic dispensation, encouragement of public input in parliamentary processes and a model for democratic governance (Parliament, 2009; Piombo & Njizink, 2005).

The existence of the parliamentary system is evident in South Africa in that the South African Constitution (1996) stipulates the three branches of government, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary[9]. The Constitution also stipulates the principle of the separation of powers by establishing a variety of structures devised to distribute power between the various spheres of government (Seedat, 2015; Mojapelo, 2013; Alvey, 2005). It also puts in place specific institutional checks and balances to avoid abuse of power (Seedat, 2015). Similarly, the constitution (1996) empowers the Parliament and set the parameter on the duties of the MPs. The MPs duties involve oversight, legislation and accountability. The overview on the parliament also suggests that the parliament is mandated constitutionally as one of the key arms of government to formulate and repeal laws; collate and articulate the interests of the nation as a whole; exercise oversight, accountability, and monitoring. Seedat (2015:5) highlights that in a modern democracy like a parliamentary system, the separation of powers is more than the initial goal of avoiding dictatorship and protecting freedom but continued to fulfil the particular vision of an ideal state of a nation.

In the same vein, the constitution Act 108 of 1996 established the Parliament at the national level and at Provincial level evident in a bicameral parliament comprised of the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (Parliament, 2006; 2009). The National Council of Provinces constituted in 1996 replaced the Senate that operated under the 1994-1996 interim constitution (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2006; 2009). The NA consists of 400 members while the NCOP consists of 90 delegates that represent the interest of citizens at the provincial level (Parliament, 2006; 2009; Harald & Tjønneland, 2001). The

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[9] See Southall (2014); Francis (2011) The interim constitution was drafted on April 27 1994 and served as transitional constitution. The interim constitution highlight that the parliament and constituency ratify the final constitution

South African Constitution (1996) also makes provision for democratic institutions such as the National Assembly, as a platform for indirect representation. In the context of this study, I interchangeably use the terms Parliament and National Assembly.

Given the bicameral structure of the South African parliament, which comprises the NA and the NCOP, the emphasis of this study is on the National Assembly, which is ascribed more power in the South African constitution, as it gives effect to policy-making through the meetings of the Assembly and the Committee system. The South African parliament is located in Cape Town with 400 elected MPs. MPs in the National Assembly are elected for a term of five years, guided by the Electoral Act, Act No. 73 of 1998, which regulates the election of the MPs into the NA and NCOP (EISA, 2014). The importance of parliament as a democratic institution is also illustrated in their roles balancing conflicting social interests in decisions related to society as a whole (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Booysen, 2014; Francis, 2006; Murray & Nijzink, 2002). The Constitution further reiterates the authority of the parliament as an autonomous institution for its power to amend the Constitution and to enact legislation per section 44 of the Constitution (Seedat, 2015; Constitution, 1996).

In the light of this, Parliaments are either classified into arena parliament or transformative parliament (Murray & Nijzink, 2006; Barkan, 2009). Murray and Nijzink (2006) explain that in arena parliament, issues are debated, yet few substantial decisions are taken. On the other hand, in the transformative parliament, a more active role in policy-making is carried out. Within the parliament, political elites such as Member of Parliament (MPs), the Speaker, Party Whip, political parties, Secretaries-General, clerks and administrators also influence decisions. It is worth to note also that in the Parliament, the interests of different groups in society are represented through political parties. For MPs elected into Parliament, national seats are apportioned between parties through the party-list system of proportional

representation (PR) known as a Droop formula[10] (Booysen, 2014; Lodge &Ursula, 2006; Barkan, 2005; Murray &Nijzink, 2002; Harald & Tjønneland, 2001). The closed-list PR system also known as the Droop formula is referred to 'the highest remainder method' (Booysen, 2014:83).

Under PR system, Lodge and Ursula (2006: xi) posit that the electorates elect allocated lists of candidates rather than individuals and it is at the discretion of parties to determine how to constitute their regional and national lists. Lodge and Ursula (2006) note that parties select their candidates in different ways but it is only the ANC that involves extra-party organizations that make up the Tripartite Alliance[11] in its candidate selection. This was evident in the 1994 and 1999 elections except for 2004, when allies in the Tripartite Alliance, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) were authorized to nominate a small percentage of contestants on the national list (Lodge & Ursula, 2006).

Literature highlights the disadvantages of the PR system because the electorates vote for parties and not individual MPs (Booysen, 2014; Camara; 2012; Lodge & Ursula, 2006; Judith, 2006; Barkan; 2005). Also in PR, Camara (2012) point out that party bosses wield enormous power and their interests usually prevail over the interest of the people. He argues further that PR gives room to floor crossing which impacts negatively on the accountability of individual MPs. Camara (2012:17) claims that,

> '... no MP elected from their preferred party's list can hold their own party to account
> for promises made during campaigning by voting to uphold a particular point on the
> party's manifesto, should the party choose to renege on that promise...Nor can any

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[11] [10] Booysen, (2014). Droop formula means that the seat counts of the competing parties are determined by their voting share

[12] [11] Francis (2011) The Tripartite Alliance was formed between the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The Tripartite Alliance was formed to oppose white rule and end apartheid.

MP vote according to the interests and wishes of their constituents on any issue when those wishes are at odds with the interests of the party they may have voted for…'.

Similar concerns about the national PR list have been highlighted (Lodge & Ursula, 2006; Judith, 2006) that the PR systems do not allow a formal threshold for parliamentary representation, nor citizens direct contact with elected representatives because citizens are removed from the selection processes. Elections under the national PR party-list system nurtures a South African party system dominated by the ANC (Lodge & Ursula, 2006; Pamela, 2008). Parliamentary role in Stuart Mill's view is summed succinctly (1861:37):

'instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable'.

Lodge and Ursula (2006) elucidate that almost every political system has some form of representative assembly despite variations in power, influence and functions. The Parliament represents the views and opinions of the people; influences, constrains and demands justification for the actions of government and to give them legitimacy (Seedat, & Naidoo2015; Barnett, 2009).

3.1.1. Types of Parliamentary Model

This section discusses the types of the parliamentary model because, to a large extent, it impacts on the work of MPs. Parliaments are classified into three namely; the Westminster, Congressional and Mixed systems (Russell & Cowley, 2015; Shija, 2012; Lijphart, 2012; McAntony, 2003).

3.1.2. Westminster Parliamentary Model

The Westminster system is a parliamentary model of government in the United Kingdom (UK) (Russell & Cowley, 2016) and a model the South Africa parliament is modelled after. The South Africa Parliament is a prototype adopted from former British colonies (Shija, 2012; McAntony, 2003). The South African Catholic Bishop's Conference Parliamentary Liaison Office Report (2015:1), note that a series of gradual changes have taken place since the advent of the parliamentary system in South Africa in 1800s (Shija, 2012; McAntony, 2003).

Under the Westminster Parliament, the executive is accountable to the parliament (Shija, 2012; McAntony, 2003). The executive is controlled by questioning, periodic voting on motions of 'no confidence' and review by committees (Austin, 2010; McAnthony, 2003). The advantage of the Westminster model is that the MPs have extensive powers to enact changes and institute policy at the parliament (Russell & Cowley, 2015; Lijphart, 2012).

However, the limitations of the Westminster parliamentary model (Russell & Cowley, 2016; Alvey, 2005; McAntony, 2003) is highlighted as the following: Firstly, the vote of no confidence in majority parliaments seems no longer to be a viable method of accountability because there is no strong tradition of separation of powers except that which exists between the executive, legislature and the judiciary (Russell & Cowley, 2016; Alvey, 2005). Secondly, in states that have a presidential role, the president has nominal powers to 'checkmate' the prime minister, but in reality, the president is a figurehead who is not supposed to meddle in parliamentary activities. Thirdly, members of the cabinet have little independence to actively disagree with government policies. Fourthly, the political culture in Westminster parliament also makes it highly unlikely for a member to vote against their party Global Parliamentary Report (2012) stated that members of the cabinet may be compelled to

resign simply because they oppose certain government's agenda, despite agreeing with most other proposals. The Prime Minister, who is also the leader of the party, may have a keen interest in promoting as many MPs from his party (Russell & Cowley, 2016). Questioning by MPs in the Westminster system also put undue pressure on the executives to be transparent.

3.1.3. Congressional Parliamentary Model

In the congressional parliamentary system, the head of government is not part and Member of Parliament (Shugart, 2005; Lijphart, 1999). The Global Parliamentary Report (2012) explains that there are separation and balance of powers between the executive and the congress which reduces the accumulation of powers by MPs. Also, the Congressional parliament emphasizes the accountability of the Executives and the separation of powers between the Parliament and Executives (Shija, 2012; McAntony, 2003).

Under the congressional parliamentary system, the executive has no close control over parliament activities and is thus less likely to exercise the party's power effectively (McAntony, 2003). In a Congressional system, daily executive questioning does not occur which reduces the opportunity to expose misconduct and accountability (McAntony, 2003). The advantage of the congressional parliamentary is its independence from the executive. There is also restriction of executive power, hence mitigate against abuse of power. As well as restrict the accumulation of powers by the executives, hence controls corruption.

3.1.4. Hybrid Parliamentary Model

A hybrid parliamentary model is also known as 'semi-presidential' is common in a democratic regime (Shugart, 2005; Lijphart, 1999). Shugart (2005:324) argues that hybrid parliament despite been labelled a semi-presidential or a hybrid parliamentary system, yet the

model is neither presidential nor parliamentary. The Global Parliamentary Report (2012) emphasize that hybrid systems are also termed as 'other systems' because some parties transcend the legislative and executive branches. A hybrid parliamentary system is characterized by a democratically elected president with substantial constitutional authority, a prime minister and MPs subjected to the NA majority's confidence (Duverger, 1980 cited in Shugart, 2005:324). The South African Catholic Bishop's Conference Parliamentary Liaison Office report (2015:1) state that although the British colonial rule in South Africa ended in 1910, the parliamentary system of the Westminster parliamentary system did not. It rather progressed toward a more ' hybrid ' structure during the first democratic election in South Africa in 1994.

3.2. The Structure and Composition of the South Africa Parliament

The South African Parliament is consists of Members of Parliament, the Speaker and Chief Whip. Section 92 of the 1996 Constitution states that MPs are accountable to Parliament individually and collectively for the execution of their duties (Parliament, 2016; Mbete, 2016). The South African parliament sitting arrangement is a triangular shape with the ruling party seated on the right side of the Speaker while the opposition parties' seat is on the left side of the Speaker (Parliamentary Liaison Office report, 2015). The parliament's functioning is also guided by a various mechanism designed to support the MPs to effectively fulfil their responsibilities (Murray & Nijzink, 2002; Mbete, 2016). Section 92(3) of the 1996 constitution of 1996 mandates MPs to comply with parliamentary rules.

The NA also has the power to control and establish its procedures, guided by the Powers and Privileges of the Parliament Act (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2017; Seedat & Naidoo, 2015). The Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act stipulate that it is contempt to behave in a manner that inhibits the functioning of the Parliament (Parliamentary Monitoring Group,

2017). Contempt stipulated in the Act includes disobedience to the Rules and Orders of the Parliament, failure to appear on request before a committee, obstruction of the MPs and making defamatory statements about other MPs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2017).

Members of Parliament shall not display unparliamentary behaviour, either in form of expression, unsubstantiated allegations, nicknames, statements or gestures considered offensive, inflammatory and intimidating by the presiding officer (Parliament, 2016; Seedat & Naidoo, 2015). Hence, to avoid conflict amongst MPs, the South African Parliament adopted the Parliamentary Code of Conduct in 1997 and the Members ' Register of Interests'. The Parliamentary Code of Conduct and Members ' Register of Interests was put in place to avoid conflicts of interest between members (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2015;Nijzink & Piombo, 2004). MPs also address each other as 'Honourable' or 'the Honourable Member (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2015).

3.2.1. Members of Parliament

The MPs represent citizen's interests through their constituency as public representatives where they interact with people (Parliament, 2016; People's Constituency, 2016). To also carry out their duty, MPs and their parties have their constituency arrangements and are allocated monthly allowance (People's Constituency, 2016).Although, the party may specify a geographic region MPs represent because MPs elected through proportional representational party-list do not have geographically designated ward (People's Constituency, 2016).

3.2.2. The Speaker

The Speaker is one of the important and key role players in the National Assembly. The Speaker is institutionally, the Parliament's administrative head; that lead the NA. The Speaker sits at the parliament with a mace positioned as a sign of power in front of him or her to demonstrate his power (Parliament,2016). A Speaker (currently Ms. Baleka Mbete) presides over the National Assembly with the help of a Deputy Speaker (currently Mr. Lechesa Tsenoli) (Parliament, 2016). The speaker is assisted by committees and in particular the Ethics Committee. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. The speaker is assisted by different black-robed clerks and messengers seated in front of the Speaker. The speaker is also assisted by the Sergeant-at-arms that enforces order and removes MP that exhibits unparliamentary behaviours at the Speaker's request (Parliamentary Liaison Office, 2015).

The Speaker is elected by the NA at its first sitting after a general election. Section 52(4) of the 1996 Constitution, also established the office of the NA Speaker and Deputy Speaker (Parliament, 2016; Mbete, 2016). Seedat and Naidoo (2015:25) argue that the Speaker enjoys a high-status position in the national protocol as the head of one of the three branches of government. The power of the speaker is also highlighted in section 90(1)(d) that states that the speaker may perform the role of Acting President (after the Deputy President, Minister appointed by the President and Minister appointed by the Cabinet) if the President is absent from South Africa or unable to fulfill his duties(Parliament, 2016).

The Speaker also determines the specific responsibilities of by the Deputy Speaker, the Chief Whip and three House Chairpersons, each with specific responsibilities (Parliamentary

Monitoring Group, 2015). The roles of the Speaker[12] is summed and classified into constitutional, substantive (legal) and administrative roles (parliament, 2016). This includes:

i.   Chairs the NA meetings and enforces the rules of NA

ii.   Acts as the NA leader and spokesperson of the NA .

Equally, the speaker also ensures that Parliament's procedures and processes are adhered to in line with the Constitution prescripts. The speaker also has the power to interpret the law and enforce the NA rule such as the avoidance of 'unparliamentarily' language by the MPs (Parliament, 2016; Pilkington, 1999). It is worth to note that the speaker as a member of a political party, s/he is also required to act impartially and respect all parties' rights (Seedat, 2015; Parliament, 2016). This ideal may be subverted through Party Loyalty as an interviewee stated that: *'although the Speaker is expected to act as an impartial moderator, most times she is been influenced by party decisions and ideologies'* (Personal Interview with DA MP4). Nonetheless, Seedat and Naidoo (2015:25) argue that controversies often trail the Speaker of the NA and this also occurs in other countries. This alludes to been either part of competitive politics or because it represents serious signs of a malfunctioning Parliament.

3.2.3. Chief Whip

The Chief Whip plays a vital role in the functioning of the National Assembly. Whips are political parties functionaries that play a crucial role in parliamentary debates (Seedat, 2015; Parliament, 2016; 2013). Chief Whips are appointed by their party to coordinate party affairs and inform MPs of both party and legislative affairs (Parliament, 2013). Additionally, Whips ensure members attend committee meetings and debates in the House (Parliament, 2013). The role of the Whip in the Parliament is vast because of the different attitudes, value systems and the beliefs of political elites in the Parliament. A participant stated that: *'the dominant party with the*

13[12] See Parliament (2016) The Speaker is equivalent in rank to a Cabinet Minister and has privileges.

highest number of votes usually appoint the Chief Whip whose duties entail organization of the house and at the same time the discipline of adhering members' (Personal Interviews with the DA Chief Whip and the ANC Chief Whip). 'The opposition parties also have Chief Whip of the opposition' (Personal Interview with the DA Chief Whip).

According to the DA Deputy Chief Whip, '*one of the rationales for the appointment of the chief Whip is experience and contribution to party'* (Personal Interview with the DA Deputy-Chief Whip). *Other smaller parties also have whips that also represent them in the Parliament. 'Recognition is also given to the Chief Whip of the largest minority party'* (Personal Interview with the DA Deputy-Chief Whip).

Similarly, the Chief Whips are also Members of Committees and the Committees are considered the engine room of the parliament (this is discussed in detail in chapter six). The DA Chief Whip echoes that, '*some of the roles of the Chief Whip is to ensure that issues are more debated in more detail than in plenary sessions, increase the level of participation of MPs in discussions and provide a platform for the public to present views directly to MPs, which is not possible in a plenary sitting of Parliament'* (Personal Interview with the DA Chief Whip). Also, the committee sets ethical behaviour guidelines for MPs and administers a code of conduct. This is also indicated every year, whereby Members of Parliament are also required to report their financial interests as well as those of their families, dependents and lifetime partners (Parliament, 2016).

3.3. Parliamentary Sessions, Sitting Days and Working Days

The programme of the Parliament comprises parliamentary sessions (when work is done in plenary groups), committees and constituency periods. The NA working hours as stipulated by rules are Mondays to Thursdays which begins at 2 p.m. or at later as decided by the

Speaker (Parliament, 2016). According to Parliament (2016) the Parliament has various sitting days which include:

i. Annual session: The average annual session is split into four shorter sessions each with a duration of one and a half to three months, divided by recesses that consist of constituency days and leave days .

ii. Sessions consist of sitting days, committee days and study group days.

Sitting Days occurs during plenary Committee Days when the committee sits. There is also Study group days when party study groups meet.

. Recesses consist of Constituency Days and Sitting weeks during parliamentary session

a) Constituency Days are reserved for MPs to perform duties relating to their constituencies.

b) Sitting weeks during session are planned by the Programme Committee of the NA considering that the schedule of sessions may vary significantly each week, depending on the workload and other factors.

i. Mondays are earmarked for party study group meetings. Although, Monday, maybe a committee day or, if required by the program, a plenary session may take place at 14:00(Parliament, 2016).

ii. Tuesdays are meant for committee sittings.

iii. On Wednesdays plenary sitting starts at 15:00 whereby Questions are posed to the Executive.

iv. On Thursdays, party caucuses are held on mornings.

v. On Fridays, is committee days and may also be used for plenary. It starts 9 am in the morning and usually end before 13:00

vi. On Saturdays and Sundays, the Parliament is closed

3.4. Phases of South Africa Parliament

The South Africa Parliament has evolved through many different eras from the pre-democratic era (1910-1961; 1961-1984; 1984-1994) and the democratic era (1994-1999; 1999-2004; 2004-2009; 2009-2014 and 2014 - present). The key focus of this section is not an attempt to provide a chronological narrative of South Africa's parliament, but to demonstrate how South Africa's Parliament particularly since the democratic phase (1994) has evolved and the impact of this on the current South African Parliament. It is however pertinent to note that a new constitution was adopted and unequal representation was abolished as previous versions of parliament during Apartheid saw unequal representation in racially separate houses for the Colored and Indian communities (South Africa History Online, 2019).

During this phase, the existing House of Assembly for the white people established a House of Representatives to represent Coloured and a House of Delegates for the Indians making the Parliament a Tricameral legislature. However, the numerically dominant white assembly could not be outvoted by the colored or Indian delegates. Black people also continued to be excluded. The phase also indicates that the parliament prior to the institutionalization of a democratic regime was not a platform for representation of the people. Nevertheless, a new transitional constitution was adopted with the end of Apartheid and the election of a new government in 1994 which also had interim Constitution that established non-racial democracy and equally representing all men and women of all races (South Africa History Online, Constitution 2019).

Consequently, after the 1994 election, the Parliament of South Africa was established and the adoption of Constitution as the supreme law and the creation of a democratic society, in which governance is exercised by Parliament, the executive and the judiciary (South Africa

History Online, Constitution 2018). This also resulted in the parliament being reconstituted to consist of a two Houses and the entrenchment of proportional representation.

Literature illustrates how the initial agreement between South African political elites brought about the Interim Constitution in 1993 (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013; Francis, 2011; Pamela, 2008; Nijzink & Piombo, 2004; Harald & Tjønneland, 2001). This later culminated in the outlined guidelines on rules for the election into the National Assembly, selection of the president and the establishment of nine provincial governments, that each has separate and independent legislatures. It took 4 years of negotiations (2 years during the period 1992-1994 and then from the first democratic elections from 1994-1996) before the proposed constitution came into fruition in the National Assembly, on October 11, 1996. The constitution laid out all the specific legislative structures, powers and duties as well as the method of proportional representation in the party-list electoral system (Parliament, 2016). Through negotiation, the 1993 National Peace Accord also laid the foundation of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) to negotiate the principles of multi-party democracy in the country (see Francis, 2011). Through the CODESA document, principles on the peaceful conduct of elections and multiparty democracy in the newly democratic country were highlighted.

In the same vein, the need for proportional representation in the NA was to secure space for returning exiles and senior party members not known in the local democratic movement who would not have otherwise received votes in a constituency-based system where they were not well known (Francis, 2006). This was also a means to ensure broad representation reflecting South African diversity in a multiracial context (Galaen, 2004).Harald and Tjønneland (2001) note the evolement of the South African Parliament and how it is an important model for other African

parliaments because of its excellently-designed democratic institutions, constitution, several independent watchdog agencies and commissions[13.]

Nijzink and Piombo (2002:2) call into question how realistic constitutional expectations of the South Africa Parliament have met its intended mandate. The authors observe that from the 1994 election, the Parliament played a central role in the new democratic system and that the first major work of the Parliament in South Africa was to serve as the Constitutional Assembly and finalize the new South African Constitution, which it did in 1996. Nijzink and Piombo (2002:2) further explain that the first democratic parliament was also confronted with the task of passing an extensive government programme of legislation intended to replace Apartheid laws and address the most immediate problems of a society deeply divided by racism, poverty and inequality.

A crucial point to note is that during the second Parliament, according to Nijzink and Piombo (2005), the members took overseeing the executive more seriously as a necessary step while in 1999, the NA set up the Rules Committee sub-committee to address the oversight responsibilities of the Parliament. To this extent the committee commissioned and debated on strengthening oversight standards focused on the report by Corder et al (1999) (Obiyo, 2013). According to Nijzink and Piombo (2005:65) in their review of the ten years of South Africa parliament, there was a high work load in the first parliament because the of the democratic transition evident in 494 bills, an average of 100 bills per year. They explain that from 1999 to 2003, there was decrease in the number of bills passed during the second parliament because of 'normalization' as evident in 313 bills, an average of about 63 bills per year.., whereas the decline in the number of bills passed during the second parliament can be regarded as a sign of 'normalization'. Nijzink and Piombo (2005) however caution that a decline in legislative performance also implies that if Parliament fails to take a constructive position and change the focus in its operations from

[14][13] Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2016) Watchdogs are state supporting institutions and agencies that protect the rights within the Bill of Rights which fall under their particular area. Examples of such are the public protector, South Africa Human Right Commission, Auditor-General, the electoral commission (SAHRC).

legislation to oversight and representation, it could be in danger of losing its central role in the democratic system. In his account of the first parliament, Barkan (2005:12-13) claims that the increase in the volume of bills during the first parliament alludes to democratic transition whereby the ANC either amended or reversed legislation by former Apartheid regime as evident in 494 bills and 313 bills in the 'second parliament'(1999-2004). To Barkan (2005) the volume of bills suggests that the NA is active in comparison to other parliaments in Africa because of how the bills are passed evident in that half bills of the bills were introduced by the opposition party; the DA, and the other half by the ANC.

Galaen (2004) provides a comprehensive account of the parliamentary landscape prior to the 2004 elections where he observes that the ANC has remained dominant in the National Assembly adopting different tactics and offering a 'nonpartisan' generosity which takes the form of chairperson-ships of portfolio committees in Parliament and ministries and deputy ministries in the cabinet to smaller parties that vote with it. Galaen (2004), however, foresees that the dominance of the ANC in the South African parliamentary landscape in the 2004 general election will likely [14]continue in the future. He also claims that the ANC's electoral dominance over the last ten years legitimizes a degree of dominance in political coverage proportional to their electoral support.

From the above picture, it could be inferred that South Africa's democratic parliament from 1994 until the present time has been shaped by a series of events. This is evident in the final constitution that sets out the basic structures, powers and functions of Parliament and the process of the closed party-list proportional representation electoral system. This also shapes democratic regimes and the institutional context in which MPs operate.

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[15][14] Bogdan (2014) The ANC support decline in the past two months in the nine provinces .

3.5. Powers, Responsibilities and Duties of MPs

MPs are empowered to carry out legislative functions as stipulated in Section 44 of the Constitution, in areas such as legislation, oversight and accountability (Mbete, 2016; Seedat, 2015; Parliament, 2009; Constitution, 1996). There are also parliamentary rules in place to enhance parliamentary activities through fair and meaningful participation of parties in the debates and processes of the Parliament. Given this, Rule 44 of the NA empowers the MPs with the right of free speech to debate in the Parliament because such freedom is regarded as the cornerstone of democracy in countries around the world, will allows MPs to debate freely on controversial issues (Seedat, 2015; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 1999). However this freedom is still regulated by the NA rules and practices.

Similarly, Rule 63 prohibits the use of 'offensive unparliamentarily 'language' (Pierre, 2015). The powers of the parliament are also reflected in composition of MPs at the parliament. Harald and Tjønneland (2001) in their study present a case study from the first democratic elections in South Africa 1994 democratic election. They highlights that the power of the NA is manifested in its authority pass a vote of no confidence by a simple majority and compel the resignation of the President and the MPs. They note that the independent statutory watchdog committees are appointed by the President on the basis of parliamentary appointment to protect the Constitution and control the executive power. Nevertheless, the President and Cabinet have no authority to dissolve Parliament before the end of their term until after three years can the NA be dissolved if supported by the majority of the MPs (Harald & Tjønneland, 2001; 3)

Arter (2013:67) stated that the powers of the presidents over cabinet formation and dismissal can be measured using the coding scheme developed by Shugart and Carey in 1992. Arter further explains that the President's power over the Cabinet can vary from unrestricted power, limited power or no power at all. According to Arter (2013:67) a score, of 4 is assigned to a cabinet

formation that depends entirely on the president characterized by the absolute power of the President to dismiss the Cabinet at will. Score 3 is assigned to cabinet formation whereby the president nominates Ministers but the parliament needs to approve such nomination. Score 2 is assigned when the president has restricted powers to dismiss the Cabinet. Score 1 is assigned when the President has the power to appoint the Premier who also has the power to nominate the rest of the Cabinet. Score 0 is assigned when the President cannot nominate Ministers except when recommended by the Parliament.

Because of this, Section 56 of the 1996 constitution, states that the NA or any of its committees can summon the Cabinet and presidents; compels institutions and political elites to comply with a parliamentary summons. Section 89 of the 1996 constitution states also that the National Assembly, can remove the president based on a resolution adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of its Members. The President may be dismissed on the grounds of gross misconduct, constitutional breach of law and inefficiency. The National Assembly is therefore mandated by the Constitution and Parliament (20016) to also carry out the following responsibilities:

  i.   To choose the President
 ii.   To pass legislation
iii.   To oversee the activities of the executive, chapter 9 institutions
 iv.   To ensure the accountability of Cabinet Members to the Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions,

3.6. MPs, Legislation and Oversight Functions

3.6.1. Legislation

Legislation is one of the functions carried out by the MPs at the Parliament. This is reflected in the autonomy of the parliament and the power of the MPs to formulate and amends legislation. The process of making law is highlighted by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2014) to include 'first reading' and 'second reading'. According to Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2014), during the 'first reading' bills are first presented by the Cabinet Minister proposing such a bill in the form of policy at the National Assembly. When such a bill is read, it will be referred for review and amendments to the appropriate Portfolio Committee. On the other hand, during the second reading, Bills are read to all the NA which may either be passed into law, referred back to committee for further amendment by the Minister before a final vote which takes about two years before the final bill is passed into law (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2014). Barkan (2005:12) echoed that between 75% and 80% of legislation presented by the Executive are changed substantially, before such legislation is passed into law. The reading of the first bill and the second bill, as well as delay in passing certain bills to law, alludes to contentious proposals that need to be carefully scrutinized (Barkan, 2005:12).

3.6.2. Oversight

Oversight is also one of the functions performed by MPs. MPs carry out core oversight functions which are a means of parliamentary control to hold three branches of government accountable at both national and provincial levels (Parliament, 2016; Seedat, 2015; Obioyo, 2013; Francis, 2011; Yamamoto, 2007; Murray & Nijzink, 2002). The key focus of oversight is the implementation of laws, application of budgets, strict observance of laws of Parliament and the Constitution and effective management of government departments. Highlighting the importance of oversight, Parliament (2009:10) maintains that the MPs scrutinise existing practices used as a prototype and to explore alternatives for future use. Moreover, oversight ensures that MPs, the three branches of government and democratic institutions comply with their constitutional responsibilities to achieve their designated duties (Malapane, 2015; Seedat, 2015; Mbete, 2016; Kaiser, 2006;

Nijzink & Piombo, 2004). Through the oversight mechanism communities and stakeholders also debate policies that affect them (Butler, 2011).

~~Oversight also requires either~~ informal and formal, observation, pragmatic and scrutiny by the parliament on the implementation of laws, application of the budget, and the strict conformity with legislation and the constitution (Mbete, 2016). Consequently, oversight function is supported by a variety of authorities such as the Constitution, public law, chapter 9' institutions[15] and committee rules. It is therefore an integral part of the system of checks and balances between the legislature and the executive (Seedat, 2015; Obioyo, 2013; Kaiser, 2006). The MPs in the South Africa National Assembly are also empowered to investigate the 'Chapter 9' institutions on matters that concerns employment procedures and institutional governance. Chapter 9 institutions includes the Public Protector, Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC); the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Commission); the Gender Commission; and the Auditor-General (Obioyo, 2013; Konstant, 2016). Chapter 9 Institutions are also mandated to report to the National Assembly on their discretionary spending, activities and performance at least once a year (Mbete, 2016).

At the same time, effective parliamentary oversight is crucial for promoting good governance and fighting corruption (DG McGee, QC, 2002; Ostrogorski 1902, 718-9 cited in Obioyo, 2013; 53). The functions of oversight summed by literature (Seedat, 2015; Parliament, 2013; Madue, 2012; Barnett, 2009) are:

  i.   To foster transparency of activities by the MPs and executives.

  ii. To serve as a public forum for the scrutiny and debates on government policies

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[16][15] See Konstant (2016); Chapter 9 institutions as the fourth branch of government. Chapter 9 institutions support democracy and are established by the constitution.

iii. To act as checks on the power of the executives. This is also to scrutinize whether the government's policies have been implemented and whether they achieve the stated objectives.

iv. To provide financial accountability. Parliaments do this by scrutinizing government spending and highlighting wasteful expenditure within publicly-funded services.

v. To protect the rights of citizens. Parliaments do this by monitoring policies and examining potential abuses of power, either by arbitrary behaviour, illegal or unconstitutional conduct by the government.

vi. To protect the liberties of the citizens.

vii. To detect and prevent maladministration.

The overview of oversight seems to indicate that through oversight duties, MPs are empowered to influence political outcomes in the Parliament. Through the oversight structures at the MPs, disposal, they also gather information and dictate the preferred course of action over the executive and government institutions. This also indicates how they shape the political process and outcomes. It also appears that through the mechanism of oversight, the Parliament ensures that the government is answerable to the people and involves the people in participatory governance. This also ensures that the citizens are involved in policy stances that affect them, which is also a key feature of democratic government.

3.7 Mechanisms of Oversight Functions

The model of a parliament adopted in a country determines the type of oversight mechanisms to be adopted. Cast in this way, the Members of Parliament utilize various mechanisms to perform their functions, supported by the joint rules of the National Assembly (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2016; Halchin & Kaiser, 2012). According to Parliament (2016) oversight mechanisms range from questions to the Executive, interpellations, subpoenas and other duties as ombudsman. In

addition, oversight mechanisms range from plenary debates, questions to the executive, motions without notice, notice of motions, budget votes, members statements, statements by cabinet members, petitions, approval of annual budgets and strategic plans (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2016 ; Nyathela & Makhado, 2012; Constitution 1996). The mechanism of oversight function is explained in details in the next section. Oversight is also carried out through public engagement Hopolang (2011) reiterated that public engagement promotes the oversight roles of the Parliament over the Executive. He stressed that through public engagement and participation, citizens exercise their fundamental right hence, holds the government accountable for their actions. The table below summarizes the categories of oversight functions and mechanisms of how the MPs make the government accountable and transparent (Parliament, 2019: 39-40).

Table 1: Mechanisms of Oversight

Function

	Constitution of the
Group 1:	Republic Legislation Government Programme of Action [5-year plan]
Group 2:	State-of-the-Nation Address Questions (Written and oral) President Deputy President Ministers Members' statements Ministerial statements Weekly session Debates in the House
Group 3:	Budget Speech Estimates of National Expenditure (ENE) Division of Revenue Bill Estimates of National Revenue Budget Review

Ministers' budget vote speeches

Departmental budget votes

Treasury Regulations relating to strategic

Planning

Reports of the Auditor-General (including

performance reports)

Treasury reports (monthly and quarterly

reports)

Audit Reports (Scopa)

Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement

(MTBPS)

Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations report

Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)

Financial statements (monthly financial

reports and quarterly performance reports)

Statistics South Africa reports.

Group 4:	Reports on investigated matters of relevance by institutions supporting constitutional democracy (ISDs) and other statutory institutions supporting democracy for consideration by Parliament'.

Source: Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2019 ; Nyathela & Makhado, 2012;Constitution 1996; It is clear from the foregoing that there are various instruments utilized by the MPs to carry out their functions such as accountability, and checks and balances on the power of the executives.

3.7.1. Plenary Debates

Plenary debates are one of the means the parliament and MPs carry out oversight functions. Plenary debates usually involve oral expressions of views that promote strategic decision-making on relevant issues (Seedat, 2015; Yamamoto, 2007). Such debates can also be on issues identified by the Parliament or in connection to work of the parliamentary committee (Parliament, 2016). Through plenary debates, MPs also tables and address concerns related to their constituencies such as government policies and service delivery (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2019; 2016). The issues tabled at the NA are regulated by the rules of NA (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2019; 2016). The Speaker of the House usually moderates the debates. Hence such debates give room for MPs to express their views on certain issues in the country.

3.7.2. Notice of Motion

A motion is a formal proposal from an MP to take either debate, decide or intervene in a particular matter (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016). Before a motion is moved, the NA must be informed in advance so that parties and MPs could be prepared to debate on such motion (Parliament, 2016). It is important to note that each MP present in the NA must agree to notice of a motion before it be debated. However, if an MP wishes to move a motion without notice, the Party Whip need to consult with other parties ahead of time in order to obtain their approval (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). Exceptions also exist when a motion could be moved without notice. This is in a situation where the MP that proposes such a motion also proposes a draft resolution on the report of a Committee immediately after the debate on the report has been concluded.

3.7.3. Motions without Notice

Motions Without Notice is also a means through which MPs carry out oversight. Although it is standard practice, but not necessary for political parties to consult the NA they may attempt to move a motion without notice (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). Hence, to move a motion without notice, the Presiding Officer is informed of the intention to do so, to avoid an ' ambush ' on the NA. However, the motion may be moved if it is not objected to by the majority of the MPs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). With this in view, the Presiding Officer calls for the motions without notice during the start of the day's sitting, however if such a motion is objected, then it is converted into a Notice of Motion (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016).

3.7.4. Questions to the Executive

Questions to the executive are also one of the mechanisms used by the Parliament to carry out oversight. Questions to the executive are carried out by posing questions to executives such as the President, Deputy President and Ministers (Mbete, 2016; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). Through questions, the NA strengthens its ability to ensure the accountability of the executive (Mbete, 2016). Additionally, through questions, information is sought from the MPs on policies either drafted, implemented and the actions taken (Mbete, 2016; Yamamoto, 2007). Literature (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016; Mbete, 2016) outlines that questions are guided by the following criteria.

Hence, these questions:

i.   Should not express an opinion or views without fact

ii.   Should not include presumptions or judgements

iii.   Should not include abusive words or phrase.

iv.   Should not include rhetorical or offensive expressions.

v.   Should not include citations from newspapers or books.

In relation to the study, this criterion suggests that oversight mechanism is in place to strengthen the accountability of the MPs as well as parliamentary ethics that govern the MPs behaviour as they conduct their work in the parliament. This also implies that the MPs, as representatives of the people, abide by a set of ethics in the manner of acceptable forms of conduct. In this light of this, questions to the executive are also allowed because the MPs have freedom of speech which is important for robust debate to conduct their work. Nevertheless, question time as one of the mechanisms of oversight is ineffective because question time is referred to as 'question dodge' (Judith, 2006:135). Questions are guided by the following criteria based on the principles of parliamentary procedure and to achieve parliamentary agenda for the day. The criteria also allow deliberation on questions of interest

to the executive through debate to reach group decisions, usually by vote and to minimize friction.

3.7.5. Budget Votes

The budget vote is also an oversight mechanism because the discussion that takes place before the budget vote provides a platform for government to demonstrate how to source for funds, how to spend the money, taxations and borrowing (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016; Mbete, 2016). The oversight of public sector finances is a crucial factor of accountability because of the need to allocate resources between competing demands (Butler, 2011). Thus, the Minister of Finance and other government departments are accountable for how taxpayers ' money is spent by publicly stating the budget estimates for the next financial year (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016; Mbete ; 2016). By also presenting budget votes is to debates on budgets presented and seek approval which from the parliament. The authority to authorize the government budget provides the Parliament with the power to monitor whether the money allocated to the government are utilized for the said purpose (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016).

3.7.6. Members of Parliament Statements

Member of Parliament statements is an avenue through which the MPs raise issues at the Parliament. Through MPs statements debates on national and constituency are addressed. MPs are also given the chance to respond to comments addressed to them in terms of their portfolios. (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2016). The statement by MPs is also regulated by the NA rules and procedure. The Deputy Minister could respond on behalf of the Minister if such a Minister is absent at the NA (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2016).

3.7.7. Statements by Cabinet Members

MPs also have the opportunity to address and respond to debates at the NA. Their statements are guided by the NA rules and must include factual evidence. Mbete (2016) echoed that the NA needs to be informed ahead before such a statement is issued in particular on government policies. The rules of NA stipulates that a copy of the statement of the MP should either be given to each party's leader before or after the statement is expressed. When such MP is approved to speak by the Presiding Officer, such a statement is allocated 20 minutes.

3.7.8. Petition

A petition is a signed formal letter written by many individuals that want the Parliament to intervene and address their grievances (Mbete, 2016). Sections 56(d) and 69(d) of the 1996 Constitution empowers the Parliament to accept petitions and submissions on grievances from concerned persons or institutions (Constitution, 1996). It could be inferred from the above that petition is one of the ways the Parliament promote public involvement in the work of the NA and an indication of participatory democracy. Petitions also bring to attention how government departments are managed by the executive in connection to service delivery for the achievement of a better quality of life for all people. It could be inferred also from the overview that petition is also a platform to strengthen the integrity of democratic institutional systems.

3.8. Factors Affecting the Oversight Function

Many factors come into play which impacts on the effectiveness and success of the MPs work at the NA, and in particular their oversight functions. These range from the MPs training, the level of integrity among MPs, the role of the opposition, and the structure of the party system (Mbete, 2016; Madue, 2012, Ahmed; 2011; Butler, 2011; Francis, 2006;

Galaen, 2004; Horowitz, 2003). Moreover, additional factors are the MPs competence, institutional capacity and the parliamentary model (Mbete, 2016, Obioyo, 2013). Francis (2011) in her study of the KwaZulu-Natal Members of the Provincial Parliament (MPPs) found out that MPs previous experience like their previous political background, level of education, job roles and individual abilities impacts on the institution where such MPs work and this makes it easier to carry out their roles.

Mbete (2016), Barkan (2005) and Murray and Nijzink (2002) posit that the MPs lack of integrity and competence may result in weak institutions and 'rubber stamp' institutions. In the context of this study, a rubber stamp, is a political metaphor which refers to an MP or parliament with considerable power but rarely or never disagrees with more powerful organs rather s/he endorses decisions made by the executive without question. The danger of a rubber stamp parliament is that it becomes difficult for the MPs in the NA to influence executive policy proposals (Mbete, 2016; Barkan, 2005).

The Parliament is not a 'rubber stamp' Parliament because it has the power to alter expenditure estimates submitted by the executive. Through the Standing and Select Committees on Appropriations, the Parliament has the power to also alter revenue and expenditure estimates submitted by the executive through the Appropriation Bill and money bills in general. They do this through several ways such as inviting the public to make written submissions on the Appropriation Bill tabled annually by Minister of Finance. The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, stipulated in Act 9 of 2009 also empowers the Parliament to conduct public hearings on the Bill and report it.

Due to this, the Act 9 of 2009 echoes the requirement of the Constitution's that: "An Act of Parliament should provide a procedure on how to amend money Bills before Parliament". (Parliament, 2019).

Prior to the introduction of the Act in 2009, the Parliament could only approve or reject a budget but could not. But when the Act was passed, it empowers the Parliament to amend budget nationally and specific government budgets. Thus, the Act has also strengthened the ovesight duties of MPs over the executives (Parliament, 2019). The parliament is empowered to alter Appropriation Bill and money bills presented during the State of the Nation Address (SONA) by the President to the Parliament as well as budget speech by the Minister of Finance.

The President's State of the Nation speech to the Parliament highlights the priorities of the government for the coming year. Also, when the Minister of Finance delivers the Budget Speech and tables documents associated with the national budget. Such documents are the Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals, the Division of Revenue Bill and the Appropriation Bill. These highlighted documents include information of how to finance the priorities mentioned in the State of the Nation Address. The power to alter the bill also occur through the National Assembly plenary sitting where the Appropriation Bill, its votes and schedules is decieded by the parliament. When the parliament has agreed on the Appropriation Bill, it is submitted to the National Council of Provinces for deliberation and decision.

Further to alter the Appropriations Bill, MPs put forward a proposal to amend the Bill which might later result in funding been reprioritised, based on some of the public participation and comments (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2019).

Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2019) argue that the Money Bills Act and the Budget Office were put in place , however only few alteration were made by Parliament up till today. The need for public consultation was crucial, because the Parliament needed input from the

public, stakeholders and Minister of Finance. The Parliament has the power to alter expenditure estimates submitted by the executive is discussed in-depth under the Committees and oversight Functions in p.192- 193

Other factors that impacts on the effectiveness and success of the MPs work at the NA is also demonstrated in the literature (Allen & Cairney, 2015; Judith, 2006; Barkan, 2005). These are patronage politics, salaries of the MPs, NA's procedures, parliamentary resources, party structure, party representation held by the dominant and opposition parties.

Party politics affect also parliamentary procedures because MPs are vulnerable to being dependent on political bosses when salaries are low (Ahmed, 2011; Barkan, 2005). Barkan, (2005: 2) argue that party principles and loyalties influence the behaviour and attitudes of political elites in the parliament. The PR is highlighted as the weakness that plagues both political parties and the effectiveness of the parliament (Mbete, 2016; Booysen, 2014; Camara, 2012). This alludes to party disunity, unresponsiveness to the needs of the citizens and continued racial stratification.

Commenting on the structure of party system and patronage, Ahmed (2011) asserts that party patronage hinders MPs from carrying out oversight and accountability over members of the Executive in the same party because they will be perceived as being a non-comrade. It also appears that because MPs are selected through the party list system, that the decisions taken will be influenced by party decisions, hierarchies and political cultures. Also, the use of the party-list system of proportional representation in Parliament restricts younger MPs from the exercise of oversight over senior members from their party (Barkan, 2005).

Butler (2011) and Booysen (2014) claimed that the South Africa parliament is weak because of its dependence on party structure system that cannot efficiently regulate executive action and this curtails sufficient public debate. This manifest in the ANC caucus Code of Conduct

privileges which gives the party leaders powers to subdue the parliament (Booysen, 2014:81-82). In relation to this concept to the hierarchy of a party-list system, this implies a social relationship where few MPs nominated by their party boss are obliged to explain their actions to both their constituency and the party leader (Butler, 2011; Murray & Nijzink, 2002; Schedler, 1999).

Citizen engagement in the form of public involvement is equally an important factor in Parliament. Hopolang (2011) notes that public participation in the South Africa National Assembly and oversights are bolstered through the formation of Parliamentary Democracy Offices[16] and activities as 'Taking Parliament to the People' Programmes[17].

Nijzink (2002:87-87) argue that despite constitutional requirements, South African parliaments were not highly active in term oversight duties because there is little consensus between MPs on what oversight means in practice and how it should be performed. This is because MPs do not fully understand what their oversight function is (Francis, 2006).

3.9. MPs and Functions of Accountability

Accountability is also one of the means MPs ensure that the Executive accounts to their constituency, parties and voters.

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[17] [16] See Parliament, 2016; Hopolang, 2011; PDO –Brochure-English.pdf.: Parliamentary Democracy Offices (PDOs) are situated in South Africa's nine provinces with central PDO in Parliament. PDOs are established to create a sustainable parliamentary footprint in rural communities to involve them in parliamentary activities like debates.

[18] [17] See Parliament, 2016.;In Session,2017; In 2002, the NCOP initiated the annual Taking Parliament to the People (TPTTP) Programme to conduct oversight and to facilitate public participation in Parliament's processes. Taking Parliament to the People' programme are vital in bridging the gap between the parliamentary institutions and its citizens, by participating in law-making and oversight processes. During TPTTP activities delegates comprised of MPs from NA and provincial legislature visit communities .The delegates meeting climaxes in a public meeting where members of the public discuss challenges related to service delivery.

Murray and Nijzink (2002:14) argue succinctly that:

> '…*accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance... Democracy remains clichéd if those in power cannot be held accountable in public for their acts or omissions, for their decisions, their expenditure or policies… It is a symbol of good governance both in the public and private sectors…'.*

The key elements of political accountability are answerability, justification and enforcement. (Seedat, 2015: Butler, 2011; Schedler, 1999). Butler (2011); Stapenhurst and O'Brien (2007:1) identify two dimensions of accountability, namely vertical and horizontal accountability. Mbete (2016) and Butler (2011) explain that through lobby, vertical accountability is carried out by the citizens, political party, civil society and media to hold Executives. . On the other hand, Horizontal accountability, is usually executed by institutions such as the Parliament who possesses autonomous powers to act as checks and balances on elected officials, in particular, the Public Finance Management Act of 1999[18] (Mbete, 2016; National Treasury, Republic of South Africa , 2007).

Parliamentary accountability functions as summarized and outlined by Boven (2003) and Nyathela and Makhado (2012) includes the following:

i. Accountability ensures the promise of fair and equitable governance.

ii. To prevent abuse of power and nepotism

iii. To strengthen democratic control.

iv. To improve efficiency that fosters democratic growth delivery of service

v. To assess government performance publicly.

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[18] National Treasury, Republic of South Africa (2007). The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999) was passed during the first democratic government in South Africa. The Act seeks to enhance good financial management to maximize service delivery with limited resources.

Butler (2011:6-7) commenting on the effectiveness of accountability demonstrates how Former Presidents like Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki endeavored to secure personal political privileges of both parliamentary and presidential systems for themselves through evasion of direct electoral accountability.

However, accountability has been marred by corrupt practices of MPs that result in the loss of confidence by the public in the National Assembly. This is because of the NA's reluctance to make MPs accountable to its code of conduct which undermines the power of the parliament (Nijzink & Piombo, 2004). In Nijzink and Piombo's (2004:5) view, public distrust in the parliament also limits the power and autonomous of the parliament. An extract from the Mail and Guardian (2006) reported corruption charges against the former ANC and DA MPs who were convicted and fined on theft and fraud charges by Cape Judge President John Hlophe, because of the abuse of parliamentary travel vouchers.

Buttressing the above argument, Galaen (2004) in his thesis titled 'Measuring Press Performance in Upholding Democracy: The Case of the South African General Election of 2004' provides a comprehensive account of the South African parliamentary landscape before the 2004 elections. Galaen (2004:13) observes also that the ANC is consistently courteous to the third and fourth largest parties in Parliament, playing them off against the official opposition, with which it plays 'hard-ball' (Galaen, 2004:13). He argues that the ANC has remained dominant in the National Assembly adopting different tactics and offering a 'nonpartisan' generosity which takes the form of chairperson-ships of portfolio committees in parliament and ministries and Deputy Ministries in the cabinet to smaller parties that vote with it. Galaen (2004:13) contends that as the Parliamentary majority, the ANC can take long term decisions, not necessarily dictated by day-to-day opinion polls.

In light of this, Booysen (2014:81) maintain that the parliamentary system in South Africa is weak and exhibits characteristics of the presidential system because the majority party uses

ongoing credibility with citizens to bypass the parliament as the prevailing link between the party and the people which undermines the efficiency of the parliament. A contributory factor to the challenges of the Parliament, in the view of Booysen (2014:81) is the party's structure and ANC supremacy. Hence, the party structure also ensures that the ANC MPs are under the control of ANC leaders during the policy-making process from which they seek advice and political instruction. This is also reflected in the power of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) and the ANC top six officials that control both the ANC Parliamentary caucus and the ANC parliamentary Counsellor. Additionally, Booysen (2014:67) maintains that nevertheless, the ' closeness ' of the political party between the majority of the MPs and the executive obstructs the task of keeping the executive accountable.

On the contrary, Murray and Nijzink (2002:6) argue that not all African parliaments are weak because some parliaments are better than other parliaments because of better resources, powers and autonomy. He explained that since the wave of liberalization, democratization and democratic processes in the early 1990s African parliaments received financial support from international donors to strengthen their institutional capacity. Nijzink (2002:5) termed international donors as 'donor darlings' because after the 1994 elections, parliaments in Malawi and South Africa received financial supports, while parliaments in Swaziland and Cameroon received either little or no financial support. Mbete (2016) also echoes the parliament's challenge such as the inability of the MPs to exercise control over the Executive, hence, bypass the Parliament. He adds that these difficulties are evident in MPs poor success in policy analysis, evaluation, budget management, implementation, and legislative amendment.

Additionally, legislatures in the Westminster parliaments are weak and makes accountable difficult (Mbete, 2016; Obioyo, 2013; Butler, 2011; Nijzink, 2002), Hence, Camara (2012) advocates for the replacement of a PR party-list system with a constituency-based electoral

system whereby accountability will be based on constituency instead of accountability to party boss. This will also safeguard the constituents interest and constituency seats.

3.10. The Nexus Between Parliament and Political Parties

Political parties are platforms for the recruitment of political elites who eventually become MPs. One of the most important players in an election is political parties (Independent Electoral Commission-IEC, 2009:26; Booysen, 2014: 84).

The formation of political parties in South Africa is subject to the general rights and obligations inherent in the Constitution of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 as well as in the Interim Constitution of 1993 (IEC, 2014; Lodge & Ursula, 2006). Such parties also enjoy the rights granted in terms of freedom of speech, association, organization and mobilization (Constitution of South Africa 1996, Article 2). The Bill of Rights (Article 2, Section 19(1) of the Constitution also states that all citizens are entitled to political choices, such as the right to form a political party; recruit members for such parties, engage in political activities and to advocate for a political party. Additionally, the Bill of Rights equally states that the citizens also have ' the right to free, equal and regular elections to vote for and into any legislative position, as well as to contest for public office and to hold office if elected (Constitution of South Africa, 1996). Equally, the Electoral Act No 73 of 1998 also specifies the electoral processes in conduct of party formation and election conduct either at national, provincial and municipal levels. Hence, it prohibits forceful or inducing any person ' to either ' register as a voter to vote or any registered party or candidate (Electoral Commission Elections, 2014; Booysen, 2014).

The importance of political parties is reiterated by Dahrendorf (1990) that a high level of competence is required for political activity because, through their political party, each party persuade voters during the election campaign that it is the best at managing the State's

affairs. Arguably, through political parties, political elites select candidates best suited to their party's interests. This also alludes to sustainable democracy depends on functioning and effective political parties who play a critical role in the democratization process, institutionalization and consolidation of democracy (Lodge & Ursula, 2006: vii).

Lodge and Ursula (2006: vii) stated that vibrant political parties are platforms for the recruitment of political elites because they present candidates for elections. Secondly, parties are the machinery through which diverse interests are articulated. The Global Parliamentary Report (2012) elucidates that political parties are the organizing blocs on which parliamentary activity is built. It also stressed that the effectiveness of political parties largely determines the effectiveness of any parliament. Hence, there are different types of political parties such as elite based parties, mass-based parties, ethnicity-based parties, electoral list parties and movement parties (Brooks, 2004; Gunther, & Diamond, 2003). Global Parliamentary Report (2012) argues that elite-based and ethnicity-based parties were prevalent during Africa's period of democratization. He argued also that the same parties that recruit MPs in democratic countries have also become impediments to effective representation. This alludes to the electorate vote for parties instead of individual candidates because parties have the discretion on how to determine both their party's regional and national lists (Lodge & Ursula, 2006). Although parties choose candidates in various ways, the ANC involves external forces as the Tripartite Alliance[20] in its candidate selection (Lodge

& Ursula, 2006). The importance of the Tripartite Alliance was evident during the 1994 and 1999 elections, except for 2004, when allies in the Tripartite Alliance, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) were involved in the nomination of a small proportion of candidates during compilation of the national list (Pillay, 2012; Francis, 2011; Lodge & Ursula, 2006). By the same token, the significance of political parties as a recruitment platform for MPs into the NA is also evident in the six national elections for the

NA held in South Africa in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. In particular, in the 2014 general elections, 29 political parties were registered on the ballot paper (Electoral Commission, 2014). The Independent Electoral Commission (2009:6) states that in 2009, out of the 156 registered political parties, 40 contested the elections at one or more levels, while twenty-six parties contested the elections for the NA (IEC, 2009:6). In the same vein, political parties are to be registered with the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) in terms of Section 15 of the Electoral Commission Act[19] (Electoral Commission, 2014). In 2004, one of the requirements for the registration of political parties was a 'deed of foundation' signed by 50 registered voters. The parties that also contest for an election are also required to pay a deposit of R500 to the IEC. Additionally, a newly formed party requires a deed of foundation which should contain information such as names, identity numbers and signatures of voters. For a party registration at the national level, the signature.

of 500 individuals from the electorate is required and 100 signature at the provincial level (Umoh, 2016; Electoral Commission, 2014). For instance, during the 2004 NA election, parties that contested were required to pay R150, 000 to the IEC (Umoh, 2016; Electoral Commission, 2014). In 2014 election, the amount increased to R200 000 for the National Assembly election and R45 000 for the provincial parliamentary election (Umoh, 2016). This is in contrast to 2009 election, whereby parties that contested the 2009 South African election had to be a registered party, submit a list of candidates, and pay an election deposit of R180 000 for NA and R40 000 for the provincial legislature (IEC, 2009:6). This also indicates that the registration of a political party is a platform for the election of an MP into the Parliament and the party deposit to contest in South Africa election is increasing.

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[19] Pillay (2012); Francis (2011) The Tripartite Alliance is an alliance between the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The Alliance was formed in 1990 after the movements opposed to white minority rule by the apartheid government. COSATU is in a strategic political alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The 2014 Electoral Commission Elections Report (2014) highlighted that the nominations of candidates that contest in the parliamentary elections should be equal to the number of seats in the parliament. Additionally, the report indicates that there are 400 seats for the National Assembly, 200 seats reserved for the national lists and 200 seats reserved for the nine regions of South Africa. In light of this, the Electoral Commission have to decide, in terms of Schedule 1A of the Electoral Act, the number of seats allocated to each region for the National Assembly election, in consideration of the number of voting population and parties (Umoh, 2016; Electoral Commission Elections Report, 2014).

Linking political parties with a glimpse into the general elections, the literature demonstrates that the ANC is still the dominant party since it came to power after winning the first democratic election held on 27 April 1994. Johnston and Johnson (1994), Southall and Daniel, (2010) gave an overview of the ANC dominance during the first election till the fourth According to these scholars in the 1994 election when Nelson Mandela became South Africa's president, the ANC secured 62.6 per cent votes and 252 of the National Assembly's 400 seats. Secondly, in the 1999 election which was the second election, the ANC secured 65, 68 per cent votes and 266 seats in the parliament. Thirdly, in the 2004 election which was the third election, where Thabo Mbeki emerged as the president, the ANC secured 69, 69 per cent votes and 279 seats in the parliament. They observed also that the 2004 election was characterized by party internal wrangling and conflicts. This also resulted in the formation of the People's Congress (COPE), as a result of a breakaway by some ANC leaders, who were close to Mbeki.

For the 2014 election, Umoh (2016) and IEC (2014) observed the political parties represented in Parliament and their seats. The following are the names of the parties and their seats in the

parliament: ANC (249); DA (89); EFF (25); IFP (10); NFP (6); FF+(4); UDM (4); AIC (3) ; ACP (3);COPE (3); Agang (2); African People's Convention (1) and PAC (1)[20]

~~The 2014 seat allocation to~~ parties above indicates that the three parties with the highest number of seats are the ANC, DA and EFF. Equally important is the number of MPs drawn from each party, represented in the NA also matters as this influences their capacity. It is, also worth to note that the size of parliament is closely linked to the size of the citizens it represents. This also to a great extent influences human, infrastructural and financial resources capacity (Nijzink, Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006). With emphasis on elections into the NA, Umoh (2016) and the Electoral Commission Elections Report (2014:27) suggest that about 2089 contestants were nominated at NA level and 6562 at the provincial level. Further analysis by the Electoral Commission indicates that 827 females and 1262 males were nominated during the 2014 election. In comparison with 2009 where candidates nominated were 8651 at the NA level and 9130 at the provincial level.

It should be noted that in the 1994 election, out of the 400 seats, the African National Congress (ANC) won 251 seats, National Party (82) seats, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (42) seats (Álvarez-Rivera, 2016; Umoh, 2016; Lodge & Scheidegger, 2006; Brooks, 2004; Southall, 1994).

Literature (Álvarez-Rivera, 2016; Lodge & Scheidegger, 2006; Brooks, 2004; Southall, 1994) also point out the seat allocation during the NA 1999 elections. The following are the names of the parties and their seats in the parliament the ANC (266); the DP (38) ; IFP (34); New National Party (NNP) (28); UDM(14); ACDP(6); Freedom Front (FF)(3); UCDP(3); Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) (3) seats, the Federal Alliance (FA) (2); Minority

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22 [20] See South Africa - The First Twenty Years of Democracy, 1994-2014 available at South African History at *www.sahistory.org.za*

Front (MF) (1); the Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB) (1) seat, and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) (1).

In comparison with the 2004 elections the ANC secured 279 seats, the DP secured 50 seats and the IFP secured 28 seats. Similarly, in the 2009 National Assembly election, the ANC secured 264 seats, the DA secured 67 seats, the Congress of the People (COPE) secured 30 seats, and the IFP secured 18 seats (Álvarez-Rivera, 2016; Lodge & Scheidegger, 2006; Brooks, 2004; Southall, 1994).

The foregoing suggests party dynamics in the NA and election into the NA. Francis (2011); Booysen and Masterson (2009) contend that floor crossing contributed to new party formation. The implication of such is that floor crossing was a contentious mechanism in which MPs either from the NA or provincial legislature could change their political parties, start a new party or take their seats with them. Booysen and Masterson stated also that floor crossing started in November 2001, when the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) initially requested for floor-crossing legislation to formalize their merger into the Democratic Alliance (DA). However, the floor-crossing legislation request was not granted by the ANC who wielded power at the NA to grant such request because of the possibility of a threat as an opposition. The reasons given for the denial of such legislation by the ANC was premised on 'political realignment and the break-up of racial power blocks'. Whereas, when the NNP announced its decision in 2001 to leave the DA and form alliances with the ANC, the ANC passed the legislation that allows floor-crossing. Thus, floor-crossing usually start from 1 to 15 September and allowed only twice in an electoral term, during the second and fourth years following the general elections, based on the voided amendments (Francis, 2011; IDASA, 2007).

Nevertheless, to curb the trend of floor-crossing[21], the Parliament passed a legislation that required the MPs on a party list to give up their seats when they switch parties (Francis, 2011; Booysen & Masterson, 2009; IDASA, 2007). The legislation that prohibits floor-crossing was initially discussed during the ANC December 2007 National Congress at Polokwane (IDASA, 2007). The bill was passed by the parliament under the leadership of President Kgalema Motlane who assented to its constitutional amendment on 6 January 2009 (IDASA, 2007).

The scenario painted above seems to validate that the MPs as members of political parties adopt various strategies such as coalition, alliance and floor crossing to achieve their goal. The party alliance, party coalition and floor crossing in the South African NA seem to be indicative of this trend (Booysen, 2014; Francis, 2006; 2011; Barkan, 2005). The party dynamics in the NA also seem to demonstrate, as discussed in the previous section, that the MPs adopt various strategies such as coalition and alliances to achieve their goals which is also manifested in the South Africa parliament. In the Parliament, such alliance and coalition occur when two or more political parties either through pre-election agreements or pacts come together before an election to increase their votes (Booysen, 2014). For example, Booysen (2014:82) gives an account of a party coalition and alliance in South African politics that led to the rise and emergence of formal party status. Booysen cites an example of how COSATU Secretary General Zwelinzima Vavi was suspended because of a sexual misdemeanor in the workplace. She goes further that Vavi was reinstated before the 2014

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[21]See Francis (2011) Booysen and Masterson (2009); IDASA, 1997) The ' floor-crossing act, ' Act No. 22 of 2002, allowed members of a political party under criteria of at least 10% to exit their former party where they were elected in the previous elections. Through the Act MPs could either form a new party or join an existing party without losing their seats. Equally, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Fourth Amendment Bill, 2002, was passed in February 2003, allowed MPs at NA and provincial legislatures to change party affiliation

election as a strategy to prevent COSATU as a likely future opposition alliance and to minimize COSATU campaigning against the ANC.

Consequently, different parties such as the ANC, DA and Congress of the People (COPE) also adopted different strategies to survive politically. Besides, the opposition parties such as the NP, DA and COPE have adopted party alliance strategies in the form of weaker parties forming alliances with a stronger party. Booysen (2014:82) substantiates that party leaders for their own 'survival' initiate pre-election alliances with the current hosts of their former supporters. Kadima (2016) and Booysen (2014) illuminates that in the run-up to the 2014 election, several COPE leaders approached the DA for a sub-alliance level to win positions on party lists 2014.She noted that this was also evident in COPE MPs tactics for an alliance with the DA because COPE was losing its voters.

Booysen (2014), Lodge and Ursula (2006) and IDASA (2004) claimed that floor crossing has worked in favour of the ruling party and weakens the opposition. Again, the ANC continues to be the dominant party in the Parliament because it is perceived and regarded as the party that fought for liberation. The ANC is also the dominant party because it leveraged on the support from the Tripartite Alliance and affiliation with organizations such as the South African National Civic Organization (Sanco)[22] and the South African Student Congress (SASCO)[23] (Lodge & Ursula, 2006). Arguably floor-crossing also occurred because of the promise of rewards - i.e. chairmanships of committees that also lure people across to the dominant party. The dominance of the ANC was also witnessed in the 7 May 2014 election

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[22] See SA History Online (2006) SANCO was formed in 1992 to provide a national structure for the existing local level civics movement. More than 2 000 civics were represented at its founding conference. See Francis, 2011.

[23] SASCO is a South African student organization which was founded in September 1991 at Rhodes University Grahams town Eastern Cape through the merger of the SANSCO (South African National Student Congress) and the National Union of South African Student (NUSAS). After a week, on 1-6 September 1991 meeting where about 600 black and white students from 129 tertiary institutions converged to deliberate on the formation of non-racial student body.

when South Africa celebrated its 20th year of democracy. The ANC sealed its fifth successive election victory, but not without rivalry from the DA, its strongest opposition and also from the newly formed EFF. The National Election Commission (2014) stated that the ANC recorded a 62.2% vote, a decline from the 65.9% won in the 2009 election. The DA recorded an increase to 22.2% of the vote from the 16.6% achieved in the 2009 election.

The ANC victory is what Horowitz (2003:5) referred to as a 'Victory of the Condorcet ~~Winner'. This implies in the~~ context of this study, 'a Condorcet Winner' is also referred to as a 'Condorcet candidate' or individual that who wins a two-candidate election against each other in a plurality vote. He or she is always the winner no matter the type of the voting system used. The impact of this on the South African election is that arguably, no matter the number of elections and candidates contesting an election, the ANC will always, for the foreseeable future, emerge as the winner.

Another tactic employed by the ANC is altering the questioning procedures during question time at the Parliament. Murray and Nijzink (2002:7-8) attribute this as a defensive strategy by the ANC because this has been the ANC's style. Murray and Nijzink also attribute this to awareness of the ANC on its MPs members who do not utilize question time judiciously, while the opposition was more involved in the questioning. He argued that the ANC MPs do not utilize question time judiciously, while the opposition is more involved in the questioning. Hence, the ANC proposed to incorporate a partisan dimension during question time in the allocation of time to members.

My observations of the parliamentary seating during my fieldwork to the Parliament in 2016 support claims made by Murray and Nijzink's (2002). This was also evident in the way certain MPs behave during debates and parliamentary questioning. For instance, the ANC is unwilling to engage in vigorous deliberations. In contrast, most of the opposition such as the DA and the EFF seems to adopt a confrontational style and critique. This raises another

question worth exploring further, if the strategy that the EFF has adopted in the parliament is productive or counterproductive.

Contrary to claims that the ANC is the dominant party in the Parliament, the decline in votes is noticeable. Plausible reasons for this also include intra-party factions and conflicts that have become evident in aggrieved members of the ANC leaving the party and forming their party. An example is the formation of COPE by Mosiouoa Lekota, the formation of UDM by Bantu Holomisa and the formation of EFF by Julius Malema in 2013. The picture presented above also suggests the trends of floor-crossing, intraparty politics and formation of new party formation in the NA. This also indicates how MPs as political elites adopt strategies to 'circulate themselves' evident in floor-crossing. This also shapes party formation in South Africa and impacts on the electoral system. The table below shows seat allocation in the 2014 elections.

Table 2: Parliamentary Seats During 2014 Election [National and

Provincial Legislature]

Region	Seats At National and Provincial Elections
Eastern Cape	26
Free State	11
Gauteng	48
KwaZulu-Natal	40

Limpopo	19
Mpumalanga	15
Northern Cape	5
North West	13
Western Cape	23
Total	200

Source: South Africa Electoral Commission 2014

Additionally, institutional capacity in parliament and performance in committee meetings is also affected by seat allocations. The above discussion of political parties and elections in South Africa demonstrates an effective multi-party system and election processes in South Africa. This also tallies with the concept of democratic consolidation discussed earlier in this dissertation. It is worth to note also that the formation of the EFF in 2014 by Julius Malema brought a new dimension to parliamentary debates and parliamentary behavior. This also raises the question of what kind of parliamentary behavior by political elites is accepted, and what this represents. Is there a need to review codes of conduct that govern the attitudes and behavior of parliamentary members during debates? Hence to provide an insight into party dynamics and understand the dynamics of the MPs behavior in South Africa's parliament, a discussion of the major parties in the NA is briefly provided.

\3.10.1. The African National Congress (ANC)

The ANC is one of the oldest political parties in the history of South Africa. It was founded on 8 January 1912, with the name South African Native Congress until the change to ANC in 1923 (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013; Butler, 2011; Francis, 2006; Lodge & Ursula, 2006). The party was formed to eradicate injustice and to create a united, democratic non-racial country. The party was formed by political elites such as Dube John, Pixley ka Isaka Seme and Sol Plaatje and other important members of the chieftaincy. The members of the party were drawn from various sections such as those directly within the ANC, imprisonment, exile, Mass Democratic Movement formations, and in some of the broader Patriotic Front organizations. The ANC was also formed as a result of many grievances such as dissatisfaction with the South Africa Act of 1910 that established the Union of South Africa. In addition to grievances such as numerous laws that controlled and restricted black movement and labor. Hence, after forty-two years of the Apartheid regime, the ANC, banned for thirty years (from 1960 to 1990), came into power in April 1994 based on the first free elections. The ANC was able to win the election based on their ideological philosophy that cuts across a broad spectrum including African nationalism and social democracy.

3.10.2. The Democratic Alliance (DA)

The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the official opposition party in South Africa. The interim leader of the party John Steenhuisen was elected on 17 November 2019 after the resignation of the former party leader Mmusi Maimane (Tandwa & Madia, 2019).

However, before its recognition as the DA, it has evolved through a different phase of splits and mergers (Lodge & Ursula, 2006). Lodge and Ursula (2006;11) observed the DAs evolvement from the United Party, the Progressive Reform Party and later as the Progressive Federal Party. Formerly known as the United Party, twelve younger members known as the

'Progressives' such as Zach de Beer, Colin Eglin, Frederik Van, Zyl Slabbert and Harry Schwarz led by Helen Suzman, alleged that the party was not strong as an opposition to the National Party and the Apartheid policies (Mattes, 2011). Hence, they left the United Party and founded the Progressive Party in 1959 (Lodge & Ursula, 2006). The DA also witnessed an alliance between newly formed parties such as the New National Party (NNP) and Federal Alliance in 2000 (Booysen, 2011).

3.10.3. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)

Julius Malema and his allies, comrades Sindiso Magaqand and Floyd Shivambu founded the EFF on 17 August 2013 (Mbokazi, 2016). The party has 25 seats in parliament and is the third- largest party in the South African Parliament with 1,169,259 votes and a 6.35% vote in the 2014 election (Mbokazi, 2016). Julius Malema, the leader of the EFF party was ANC Youth League's former president from April 2008 to April 2012 before his expulsion [24] from the ANC because of been found guilty of hate speech (Mbokazi, 2016; Smith, 2014). He was also suspended for expressing his personal views on Botswana which contravened the ANC policy[25].

Commenting on the formation of the EFF, an EFF MP expressed the belief that, *'the impulsion of Malema was due to his strong beliefs on Marxism. It was on this basis that the EFF was founded*' (Personal Interview with EFF MP6). Thus, the EFF's ideology is underpinned by Marxism-Leninism and broader anti-capitalism foundations (Koekemoer, 2017). The slogan of the party is 'Economic freedom in our lifetime'.

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[27][24] See 'ANCYL leaders' convictions', Independent Online. 4 February 2012.

[28][25] See Mbokazi, (2016).; Smith (2014) Malema in his comment expressed that Botswana ruling party was a "puppet regime", and that he wanted to lead a task force against them. See the Sowetan, 30 August 2011. Also see Statement of the ANC's NDC on Comrade Malema at Anc.org.za.

The tactics of the EFF is a public populist strategy and tactics to garner publicity, headlines and provide heated debate in Parliament (Mbokazi, 2016). Based on observations during my visit to the Parliament in 2016 and parliamentary debates, it appears the party also has a divergent tactic in the way it acts as a check and balance on the executive. The ideologies of these parties are explained in depth in Chapter Five.

3.11. Political Parties, Parliament and the Political Elite

Discussion on the link between political parties, parliament and political elites is vital to explore the extent to which the three concepts shape the MP's work, the institutional capacity, and autonomy of the National Assembly. This is attributed to the structures of parliament and structure of committees (Francis, 2011; Nijzink & Piombo, 2004). This is in addition to the South Africa parliament having been characterized by parliamentary politics, evident in parties and partisan considerations which increasingly dominated parliamentary. proceedings within the 1994-2004 period (Nijzink, Mozaffa & Azevedo, 2006; Nijzink & Piombo, 2004).

Camara (2012:18) stated that interaction at the parliament from the angle of parties are strongly linked to party leaders, at the expense of the MPs who have little or no say to influence policies, and thus have less participation in party activities. He pointed out that the party-list system marginalizes the MPs and subject them to the control of party bosses. He stated further that Parliamentary rules and procedures also make it difficult for the MP to make contributions independently of the party whips and the caucus leadership.

Similarly, Murray and Nijzink (2002:4) highlighted that partisan power relations in parliamentary proceedings contributes to conflicts amongst the MPs. In recognition of this, the Parliamentary Code of Conduct in 1997 and a parliamentary Register of Members'

Interests was adopted the 2013 by the committees to prevent conflicts of interest among representatives (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2013).

The Joint Committee on Ethics and Members' Interests adopted the 2013 Register of Members' Interests. In view of this, the Joint Committee on Ethics and Members' Interests adopted the Register of Members' Interests in 2013 (Gubula, 2013). A report by Gubula (2013) indicates that when the Register of Members' Interests was tabled in 2013 for MPs to submit a declaration of their financial interests, the Co-Chairperson Mr. Lemias Mashile indicated that out of the 454 permanent MPs, 62 MPs did not comply with the deadline. Of the 62 Members, 59 submitted after the deadline and three did not submit due to Parliamentary political and partisan considerations also tend to affect accountability functions of the MPs. In similar vein, the Independent Electoral Commission (2014:49) also claim that trust in democratic institutions and political elites is crucial for confidence and contributes positively to the decision to vote.

3.12. Conclusion

This chapter began by discussing the types of parliamentary systems globally and in South Africa. In particular, it discussed the three types of parliamentary system namely the Westminster, Congressional and Mixed Model systems. The chapter also discussed how the South African Parliament is modelled on the mixed hybrid parliamentary model whereby the president is accountable to the MPs. The chapter also shows how the South African Parliament has also evolved through many phases. How the Constitution empowers the Parliament, the MPs and sets the parameters for the duties of MPs was also pointed out. These roles involve oversight, legislation and accountability functions.

From there, a discussion on the roles of the National Parliament, the structure of the parliament, and the key roles of Chief Whip, Speaker and Committees in the effective running of the National Assembly.

The other section of this chapter explores the relationship between parties, parliament and the MPs. Political parties are comprised of political elites drawn from diverse groups who shape and influence the decision. MPs as political elites are key agents in the parliament where they shape policies and political outcomes elected by the proportional representation. The MPs also carry out these duties through a variety of oversight frameworks to strengthen the accountability of executives. This may take a variety of forms and use various techniques ranging from specific inquiries by select committees and annual hearings on appropriations. These oversight mechanisms include plenary debates, questions to the executive, motions without notice, a notice of motions, budget votes, members statements, statements by cabinet members, petitions, approval of annual budgets and strategic plans.

Equally, the importance of political parties as a recruitment platform for MPs into the NA is demonstrated in this chapter. This is evident in the parliamentary system in South Africa has also been shaped by proportional representation. In the Parliament, the interests of different groups in society are represented through the political parties. The roles of Speaker, Chief Whip and the Committees are emphasized. To ensure the smooth functioning of the NA, are rules which govern the proceedings of the Parliament. It could be inferred also that there are strong linkages between the political party, political elites and the parliament. The party dynamics in the NA also seems to demonstrate that MPs adopt various strategies such as floor-crossing, coalition, and alliance to achieve their goals. MPs are elected by the PR system by the citizen and by their parties through the national party-list PR system which tends to thus nurture a dominant party system and limits citizens' interaction with the MPs.

This, I argue, excludes citizens from the governance process, and in particular, the poor community whose access is limited.

The subsequent Chapter discusses the research method utilized in the study to achieve the research objectives. It also discusses how the study was carried out and the justification for the research methods employed.

Chapter Four--- Reflections on Research Methodology and Methods

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the research method that guided this study. It also justifies the selected research method used. This is in recognition of the nature of the study. Hence, the study was based on qualitative research, underpinned by an interpretative and meta-theory of social science that addresses social inquiry. Social inquiry, addresses issues such as human behaviors, social arrangements and the types of political structure. Thus, in the context of the study, this relates to political elites (MPs) behavior and the political organization (National Assembly). The chapter also unpacked research design, data collection and data analysis,

4.1. Qualitative Research Paradigm

It is necessary to note that research is guided by a philosophical viewpoint referred to as a research paradigm (Creswell, 2014). A research paradigm is an approach and belief in how researchers understand and address research problems (Creswell, 2014; De Vos et al. 2011; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Paradigms are also human constructions, which indicate where the researcher is coming from which helps them to construct meaning embedded in data (Scotland, 2012; Lincoln, 2000).

A research paradigm is also classified into positivism, constructivism and interpretivism (Creswell, 2014; Guba, 1990). Positivism is a method that studies societies and mostly used

as a conceptual framework in quantitative research where empirical hypothesis testing is required (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2014; Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999).

Constructivism implies that people construct meanings as a result of interactions with people (Creswell, 2014). On the other hand, interpretivism is underpinned by the belief that reality

consists of people's subjective experiences of the external world (Creswell, 2014; Neuman, 2000; Walsham, 1993). In the same lines, a research paradigm consists of four sections namely methods, methodology, ontology and epistemology (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999). Ontological studies reality and the entity within it (Scotland, 2012). Epistemology studies knowledge and how such knowledge is acquired (Mertens, 2015; Scotland, 2012). A methodology is a wide term that refers to the research design, research processes and techniques on how a study was carried out (Mertens, 2015; Yin, 2014; Scotland, 2012).

4.2. Qualitative Research

The research is underpinned by qualitative research; therefore, this section presents and discusses the meaning of qualitative research. Qualitative research, examine and explain a social phenomenon (Creswell, 2014:32). Its emphasis is on participant's perspectives and views of participants on a specific phenomenon or issue (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2014). It probes such issues and concerns with questions as 'why' and 'how'. It also describes participants perspective and investigates the constraints of participants daily experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011:8-10).

Given this context, a qualitative method was suitable for the study for several reasons. Firstly, it provided a deeper understanding of the experiences and perspectives of the participants [MPs] selected for this study. Secondly, it provides detailed information on the political elites in the South African Parliament. Thirdly, it also provided information on the institution (NA) where they work, factors that impact on their work.

4.3. Interpretivist Paradigm

The study uses qualitative research; hence it leans towards an interpretivism paradigm. It describes the meaning and experiences of participants in a natural setting (Creswell, 2014;

Stake, 2006; Neuman, 2000; Walsham, 1993). Interpretivist research is underpinned by knowledge and meaning from where interpretation is inferred from participants experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Myers, 2009; Göran, 2012; Gephart, 1999). An Interpretivist paradigm is appropriate for the study for several reasons. Interpretivist research does not predefine dependent and independent variables but focuses on the experiences of the participants as the situation emerges (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994). Thus, Stake (1995) suggests monologues and narration to describe participants' experiences. The research process and data collection are also interactive because the researcher participates in the study. Thus, during the gathering of data, there is interaction between the researcher and participants, where quality data is obtained (Willis, 1995; Walsham, 1993).

Consequently, in the context of this study, I assumed the role of an interpretivist researcher, that went to the field (NA) with a sketch of the research context but assumed that this is insufficient without human interactions to explore Such meanings. Having already considered documentary sources, I approached the field from the position of contextual knowledge without first-hand information. Although, before going to the field from I conducted underground investigation on the social composition (educational background, political history etc.) of the political elite from desktop review (Parliament website, Hansard, Insession Parliamentary magazine, MPs biography).

4.4. Metatheory

The study is guided by meta-theory to describe the behaviours of MPs from the lens of the political elites theories (Pareto's Circulation of Elites and Mosca's theories of Ruling Class) and the contemporary democratic elite theory that considers the role of elites in a democratic society. Given this, this section discusses metatheory to have an understanding of the concept. Meta-theory is the analysis of theory, such as the development of underlying theory, its development and application that show both the underlying theory and theorization

assumptions (Steven, 2010; Wallis, 2010). Dervin (2003:136) explains that meta-theory is broad and encompasses an 'assumption on broad perspectives on the nature of reality and human beings (ontology)'. He explains further that it is the nature of knowing (epistemology), nature of power (ideology), the purposes of theory, values and ethics (axiology)' (Dervin, 2003:136). Meta-theory attempts to create theories that are more advanced during and after a study (Wallis, 2010:74). This alludes to a set of assumptions that can be used to generate and guide the development of research questions (Finkel, 2014:6). Finkel (2014:7) explains that assumptions are background beliefs that are considered as true and provide the framework which scholars can construct theories. A meta-theory also assembles assumptions that assist researchers to identify interesting research questions and the development of theories afterwards (Finkel, 2014:8). It also involves the study of the 'sources and assumptions; and contexts such as the study of theorists and communities of theorists, the process of theorizing, the use of those theories and their implications' (Wallis, 2010; Zhao, 2014; Wallace, 1992).

In this way, meta-theory is useful in developing the theory on political elites in the South African Parliament. In terms of revealing how political elites 'circulate' themselves through the party and the NA. This is also in recognition that few studies have discussed the MPs behaviours in the light of political elite' theories as earlier indicated in Chapter Two.

4.5. Selection and Sampling of Participants

The participants selected for the study were elected MPs of the National Assembly, elected in 2014. Therefore, twenty-five participants that represented their parties at the NA were selected. These are the MPs from parties such as the ANC, DA, EFF, IFP, UDM and ACDP. The small sample size of the participants alludes to qualitative research usually comprise a sample size smaller than quantitative research to provide comprehensive information on the phenomenon been investigated (Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) suggested a sample size comprised of 20-30 participants. Hence, the participants were selected purposively because of

the nature of qualitative studies which provide rich information gathered from participants. Patton (2015:264) describes purposive sampling as the selection of information-rich cases for in-depth study to explore issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry.

The rationale the twenty five participants were selected is because of the following reasons. Firstly, a sample of twenty-five participant was considered sufficient for the study because Creswell (2014) suggested that a sample size comprised of 20-30 participants could be selected in a qualitative research. Thus, the MPs were purposively selected because of the roles they play as elected representatives in South Africa's democratic institutions. This is also in consideration that, the study seeks to understand the perceptions of the MPs and their roles in their party, the NA and within parliamentary committees. Secondly, the MPs are also in a vantage position to describe their perceptions on their roles in their party, the NA and within parliamentary committees. Thirdly, the MPs were selected from different parties [the ANC, DA, EFF, IFP, UDM and ACDP] provided diverse views on their ideologies, roles in their party, the NA and parliamentary committees. Thus, such diverse views from the MPs provide rich information based on their knowledge on the topic been discussed and proved to be important sources of new information based on their perceptions

Fourthly, the twenty-five sample is hinged on the type of study; qualitative research where the sample size is generally less relevant. Thus, the selected MPs does not numerically represent each party's size to enable in-depth case analysis that is crucial to the research.

4.6. Data Collection

In qualitative research, data is gathered through several means such as interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), observation and document analysis (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2014; Lincoln & Guba, 2011; Myers, 2009). Data gathered by observation is a scientific approach that collects data by observing participants in natural settings or environments where such

incidents occur naturally (Creswell, 2014; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Focus group discussions are used when an issue needs to be examined in-depth. A focus group discussion includes consists of like-minded participants with similar backgrounds or perspectives assembled together to discuss specific issues (Creswell, 2014; Lincoln, 1994). Although data is gathered by various means, interviews and observations are the common methods of data collection (Stake, 1995).

In light of this, data was gathered from direct observation of behaviours (during my visit to the parliament), from interviews (with MPs, party secretaries and party researchers) written opinions, and public documents. I attended meetings of Select Committees, Portfolios and Standing Committees in Parliament to conduct personal observations of the workings of those committees and the interactions of the political elite within them. I attended the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry. Data was also gathered from party secretaries and party researchers. From observation, I also found out that each party has researchers who work around the clock to ensure the MPs speeches are ready on time. The party secretaries and party researcher are young and have a broad background in political science. I also interviewed the Parliamentary Librarian who also served as a useful resource person who assisted me to find documents. He also explained the symbols used at the parliament (parliament mace, parliament emblem). Their inputs also contributed immensely to the data because of diverse opinions, thus contributing to the objective research.

Also, other multiple sources were used to supplement the primary data. These included historical analysis, extensive examination of existing literature, magazines, monographs, electronic sources, MPs biography, archival material and academic journals.

4.6.1. Documentary Sources

Documentary sources were utilized in the study. Document analysis is equally used in qualitative research to interpret documents to assign meaning to what is been examined (Bowen, 2009). The documentary sources used in the study were government records, Hansard, debates of parliament, committee minutes and reports, administrative records, ministerial records and policy documents produced by the National Assembly (Parliament, 2016; Bowen, 2009). In addition, biographies papers of MPs, documents by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), commission reports, and party materials (official party records such as party constitutions, rules, policy documents and technical reports, party speeches, press statements) were drawn upon. In addition, media reports from a wide variety of sources and public submissions to parliament were used. These documents also assisted in the background check on the MPs before the field study began. It also assisted with formulating the interview questions. Through these documents, the names, addresses and telephone numbers of most MPs were obtained. This is not surprising because the MPs are public figures.

However, some of the documentary sources needed to be verified, particularly those in the media. For instance, before the interview was conducted, it was reported in the media that a particular MP was a graduate with a specific degree. However, in the interview, the MP said she did not finish the programme because she was too busy with party activities. Also, I attended parliamentary debates and committee meetings which provided the opportunity to be acquainted with the roles of the party and the institutional roles of the MPs. Although, it was initially difficult to obtain the minutes of committee and party activities because each party's secretary acted as a gatekeeper on these documents. However, through perseverance and follow up, I was able to relate with the party researcher who assisted me to obtain the documents I needed. The party researchers were also invaluable and assisted me to book an appointment with the MPs

4.6.2. Interviews

An interview is one of the means data is gathered. It involves asking open-ended questions to talk to participants and gathering data about a topic (Creswell, 2014). Before conducting the interviews, the MPs were contacted through telephone and email for an appointment before travelling to NA, located in Cape Town for the field study.

I also had access to the MPs contact details from the parliament's website. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and the MPs were very receptive to the idea of being interviewed when I told them the nature of the study. The participants were informed that the interviews were for my PhD dissertation. An interview is suitable for the study as a data collection method because it probes the opinions and experiences of participants (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2014). Hence, the study sought to understand the views and perceptions of participants on the various roles they play in the party, committee and parliament which could not be obtained from other sources.

Through interviews, a researcher poses questions to the participants to probe the issue as it emerges during the discussion (Creswell, 2014). It is also useful for understanding the perceptions of participants and serves as a new primary source of information for future study (Francis, 2009). The interviews conducted with the participants were semi-structured, and open-ended questions that allowed participants to add their voice to the study. It is also flexible because it explores emerging issues as it arises.

To conduct the interview, I approached the MPs at the Parliament lounge. This paid off on many occasions when an unexpected opportunity simply allowed me to talk with the MPs. The interviews were based on semi-structured open-ended interview questions because it enabled me gather more detailed responses and probe the MPs during the discussion.

4.6.3. Construction of Interview Questions

The online information from the parliament website and background information on the respondents assisted in the formulation, framing and drafting of the interview questions. In constructing the interview questions, I developed a list of various themes within the framework of the research objectives that was tailored to each particular MP, his/her political party, role in the legislature and committees, government position and any professional background the respondents might have. Each interview comprised two parts. The first consisted of biographical questions (on gender, age, occupation, social and educational background, political background and involvement in politics), which also provided a way in to the more sensitive questions of the second part. In constructing the interview questions, I developed a list of themes within the framework of the research objectives. The questions were tailored to each MP, their political party, role in the NA and committees, government position and any professional background the MPs. The interview comprised two sections. The first section consisted of biographical questions (on gender, age, occupation, social and educational background, political background and involvement in politics). The first section also prepared the MPs on sensitive questions of the second section. The second section covered questions on party mandates, functions of the MPs at the institutional level such as party, committee and NA. The second section also comprised the definition of democracy, party ideology, mechanisms in place within the party to ensure that democratic institutions thrive, and how these mechanisms are monitored. The background information scooped from the parliament website on the MPs assisted in the framing and drafting of the interview questions.

4.6.4. Conducting the interviews

The interviews were conducted in 2016-2017, at the National Assembly located in Cape Town. The interviews were conducted when the parliament was in session. The reason is that it is easier for MPs to grant interviews within the confines of the National assembly than elsewhere. All interviews were conducted in the medium of English as because most of them speak and understand the English language. Some of the interviews were conducted at the MPs offices and some in the NA restaurant during lunch break. Some of the interviews were also conducted before parliamentary meetings, in the evenings after parliamentary sessions, before and after committee meetings and portfolio meetings. The length of the interviews also varied depending on the participant's mood, willingness, and work schedule. The venue and timing of the interviews appeared to have little impact on the receptiveness of the participants. In some cases, responses to some questions reached the point of saturation which provided the opportunity to probe answers to other questions much further. On occasion, some of the MPs were interrupted by phone calls.

Similarly, negotiating access to MPs and conducting the interviews was not difficult. Lodging in a hotel close to parliament (about 3 minutes' walk to the parliament) afforded me the opportunity to get to the parliament early and leave late without being concerned about the time needed to travel. Prior to the interviews, appointments were booked through the party secretary and the party researcher. Party secretaries and researchers were able to confirm MP's itineraries, schedules and availability. I found out in the course of the study that the party researcher writes MPs speeches.

On some occasions, the party secretary or researcher contacted me impromptu to suggest further availability of MPs for an interview. On occasion, hanging around the parliamentary lounge enabled me to secure further interviews and to confirm appointments with participants. Some of the participants were very helpful by referring me to other likely MPs

in their social networks who might be interested in the study. Some of the likely MPs were those in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), but they did not qualify to participate in the study, nonetheless, they provided other useful inputs. The MPs also offered assistance by sending minutes and parliamentary Hansard to me through email.

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4.6.5. Writing up the Interview Information.

After the interview, the interview was written immediately after the interview took place to ensure that no information was lost. A separate file was created for each MP and the interviews were coded with a number. The data was also was also cross referenced with other information and broken down into relevant themes according to the objectives of the study and the key research question. Working this way enabled information to be quickly and easily

retrieved. It also assisted in identifying any areas in which questions had been overwhelmingly answered, as well as to highlight which themes participants found too sensitive and thus to re-word these.

4.6.6. Receptiveness of Participants

During the interview, the MPs were happy to conduct the interview and discuss their biography. This is because the first section of the interview paved the way for a relaxed atmosphere for robust discussion. During the interview, I discovered that majority of the MPs were happy to discuss their roles and political background.

Equally, access to the opposition and minority parties was not difficult. However, it was more difficult to gain appointments to interview the ANC MPs, despite them having the largest number of seats in the parliament. This is also because the ANC MPs first had to gain permission from the party's Chief Whip before granting an interview. During the interviews, I took notes but deliberately did not use a voice recorder to encourage more robust discussion. This was also to eliminate nervousness and to create a relaxed mood for the MP to engage in more robust discussion. It also minimizes the MPs reluctance to talk in depth about their political and institutional roles.

4.7. Data Analysis

The data from the interview was analyzed through the principles of content analysis to identify patterns and themes in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Kumar, 2011; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). The steps in content analysis according to Kumar (2011:278-279) include identification of the main themes, assigning codes to the main themes, classification of responses under the main themes and integration of themes and responses into the text of the report. Content analysis is also an iterative process that involves data collection, data coding

in looking for patterns and categorizing data into themes and sub-themes (Creswell, 2014). The interviews were transcribed after they were completed simultaneously with the ongoing data collection process. This allowed me to further explore new issues in subsequent interviews. Once all interviews had been transcribed, codes were developed. A code is an issue, topic or idea that is discussed by interviewees and can be identified through reading the data (Hennink et al., 2011). To do this, I familiarized myself with the data by repeatedly reading the data and identified codes. Coding allowed me to identify and label repeated issues and patterns that appeared and to then categorize them into different themes. Thereafter, themes were refined in detail and arranged according to hierarchy, main and sub themes.

4.7.1. Coding of interviews and the use of Quotes

The interview was transcribed immediately after the data was collected and assigned codes relevant to the interview guide questions (Saldaña, 2013). A code is a topic, idea and similarity identified from the data (Theron, 2015; Creswell, 2014). To code the data, I used the manual coding that involved pencil and paper as suggested by Saldana (2009:22). Codes were used because it allows the generation of topics from the text, which helps the researcher to progress easily into coding and theme (Theron, 2015; Creswell, 2014).

Direct quotations from participants were highlighted to illustrate the arguments of the participants. Some quotations represent a small proportion of the participants words to depict the broader themes. The interview was also utilized to develop my argument.

4.8. Ethical Consideration

The research is guided by research ethics. Ethics is the application of a system of moral principles to prevent harm to participants (Sieber, 1993:14). Ethical consideration is

important so that the constitutional rights, privacy, dignity, and emotional well-being participants are protected (Webster, Lewis & Brown; 2014). The study is guided by informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality. Informed consent means that the participants have the necessary information that they require to decide whether they would like to participate in the research (Webster et al, 2014:109). In conducting the study, I explained the purpose of the study to the participants before the interview and I then read the consent form slowly. Unclear issues were clarified before the interview and the participants then approved of their participation in the study by signing the consent form. The consent form contained the purpose of the research and the role as well as the contributions that participation entails. Anonymity of the respondents was ensured as all the participants were given pseudonyms to protect their identity. Confidentiality is important to protect the participants against harm and to ensure their right to privacy. The participants were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point if they felt uneasy with their involvement in the study. After a period of five years, the research data will be disposed of by means of shredding all the documents of the study. Any voice recordings will be permanently deleted and cassettes destroyed as well.

Participants were coded according to the number of MPs selected in each party for the interview. The MPs were coded (MP1, MP2) according to how they were selected and the numbers of MPs selected per party. In this study I draw upon direct quotations from these participants to illustrate the arguments of the respondents.

4.8. 1. Anonymity and Confidentiality of Participants

The research is guided by research ethics. Ethics is the application of a system of moral principles to prevent harm to participants (Sieber, 1993:14). Research ethics in research is important to protect the constitutional rights, privacy, dignity, and emotional well-being participants of participants (Webster, Lewis & Brown; 2014). Thus, the study is guided by

informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality. Informed consent means that the participants have the necessary information that they require to decide whether they would like to participate in the research (Webster et al, 2014:109). In conducting the study, I explained the purpose of the study to the participants before the interview.

They also read the consent forms. Unclear issues were clarified before the interview. The consent form explained the purpose of the research and the roles of the participants. The anonymity of the participants was protected because all the participants were assigned pseudonyms to protect their identity. Since the MPs were twenty five in number, they were assigned pseudo names as MP1, MP2- MP25.

Equally important is confidentiality to protect the participants against harm and to ensure their right to privacy. The participants were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point if they felt uneasy with their involvement in the study. After a period of five years, the research data will be disposed of by means of shredding all the documents of the study.

4.9. Special challenges

The research was impacted by challenges as the study was carried out. Some of the MPs were not punctual to the appointments and some did not honour the appointment. During the interviews, there were protests at the NA which coincided with the President's State of the Nation Address (SONA). Some of the opposition members were busy during this time preparing for the SONA address. Also entering the Parliament is theoretically not difficult since the parliament is a public institution and accessible to the public. The public is entitled to access the gallery and visitors are provided with a pass that contains their details. During the initial interviews, I had access to all areas of the parliament but when one of the security officials saw me conversing with an MP for an interview, my access became restricted. The

security official claimed that my free access could threaten his job. The security officials alleged that I should have sent a letter of introduction and detailed the purpose of my study before entering the parliament. At a point, officials did not want me to take pictures of the parliamentary symbols such as the mace, but through the assistance of the Parliamentary Librarian, I was able to move around the parliament. He also assisted with taking photographs and he also provided important information on the working of the Parliament and the meanings attached to the parliamentary symbols. I do not believe that the attempt to restrict my access had any bearings on the interviews or the findings of this study because I was able to strategize around this. Nonetheless this, raise concerns for future researchers who are unaware that this might be the case.

4.10. Conclusion

The chapter detailed how the research was carried out. It presents the research methodology of the study, discusses the research method in depth, the implementation and the justification

for the research methodology adopted. The study was also approached from the Meta theory approach which locates the behaviours of the MPs in political elites theories. The next chapter presents the research findings and draw out themes, in their specific context.

Chapter Five: Social, Political and Ideological Backgrounds MPs

5.0. Introduction

The chapter draws extensively on biography information collected from the MPs interviews, observations and minutes of meeting to document the prevalent characteristics of the MPs, The biography information are gender, occupation education, social class and age. The recurring themes from the data gathered are presented and discussed are party ideology, social composition of MPs (political activities of MPs, educational background of MPs, occupational background), the MPs motive for joining politics, inter-party relationships and definition of democracy by the MPs. To illuminate the party ideologies, the ideologies of six political parties namely the ANC, ACDP, DA, EFF, IFP and UDM were unpacked as a reference point because it highlights the ideological difference of the parties. The six parties were selected from the twelve political parties that contested and won South Africa parliamentary seat in 2014 elections

In addition, this chapter defines democracy based on MPs views and political ideology. At the end of the chapter, I make certain claims. Firstly, I claim that political ideology is a belief system MPs use to actualize their interests and to achieve this, MPs need a platform as the parliament to achieving this. Secondly, political ideology impacts on the strategies political parties employ to achieve their aims. This alludes to political ideology been one of the means MPs, as political elites strategize and sustain themselves in power. Most of these ideologies are also identified by their position on a political spectrum described with nomenclatures as 'left' 'middle' and 'right'. Thirdly, despite entrenched consensual party ideology, MPs also have their ideology which might not necessarily align with their party's ideology. This is also

located in MPs political values which underpin their political attitudes and behaviours. This is also because MPs lean towards parties that their ideology aligns with theirs. Fourthly, differences in MPs political ideology are contributory factors to the inter-party conflict which also impact on the democratic institutions, if the personal ideology of the MPs does not align with the party's ideology it could lead to conflict. Although, this might not be so initially. Initially, when MPs join the party, they might believe in the party ideology, but when their ideology shift, they exist to another party that aligns with their party or where they could express their ideology.

The consequences of differences in MPs ideology and their party is that this could also affect party's discipline and cohesion because of difference in MPs ideological convictions which result in the inclination to disagree with their party. Party discipline in this context is to ensure the smooth operation of Parliament and the rules by which all MPs agree to address incidence at the Parliament. MPs who disagree from their party's position can put the party in jeopardy due to a lack of perceived solidarity among party members.

It may be assumed that if MPs share different ideological views and positions despite been within the same party, could also lead to rebellion and a difficult situation to agree on specific policies because of MPs preferences during parliamentary voting.

Such party discipline also impacts on party's solidarity because MPs who cannot accept the party's discipline rebels and could also cross to another party. Thus, when MPs change their party affiliation and engage in party crossing, it also provides important insights into the dynamics of intra-party conflicts and discipline. Such party discipline is reinforced by caucus meetings, party leaders and party whips to enforce the smooth running of the party. At the same time, party leader ensures that MPs are compelled to vote according to the party policies.

MPs who disagree with the position of their party could, due to a lack of perceived unity among party members put the political party at risk and could pull out of the party

Fifthly, I claim also that MPs social composition such as gender, education, social class and age impacts on the institutional space in which they work. This is because MPs backgrounds shape their political ideology and strategies which has a spill over effect on their overall behaviour pattern.

5.1. MPs Ideology

Political ideology impacts on the political behaviour and strategies political parties employ to achieve their aims and also impacts on democratic institutions. Findings from the interviews indicate that there was consensus amongst the MPs that they were influenced by party ideology that influenced their joining the parties they now belong to. As stated in Chapter One, confirmed through the fieldwork, political elites have similar social backgrounds that make them coalesce around comparable beliefs, interests and attitudes in terms of ideological conformity. This also tallies with Mosca's (1939) assertion that political elites have an edge than the masses because of their social position, property or class. Although the ideologies of the MPs are explained in their views through the interviews I conducted with them, I also located the MPs ideologies in the literature. Findings also suggest that the MPs have diverse perception based on their ideologies on democratic consolidation and governance. A few examples illustrate this, from the interview with the MPs. The ANC's and ACDP's ideology is underpinned by socialism and egalitarianism' (Personal Interviews, ANC MP1; ACP2).

On the other hand, the DA's ideology is underpinned by liberalism (Personal Interviews, DA MP3). In contrast, the EFF ideology is underpinned by Marxism-Leninism (Personal Interview, EFF MP4). The IFP political ideology is located in a broader nationalism, interpreted ethnically as part of the party's ideology and Pan-Africanist. Given this, the ideology of these identified six political parties is discussed in depth in later part of this chapter. An ideological concept such as socialism and liberalism is also embedded in the description of the terms *Left* and *Right* (Jou & Dalton, 2017). At this juncture, it is important to bear in mind that the rationale for discussion on MPs ideology is that political ideology is crucial for understanding political activity, MPs behavior and reasons they act the way they do.

Also, viewing ideology in context of literature, ideology is an interrelated set of attitudes, values, and beliefs with cognitive, affective, and motivational properties on how society is structured (Napier, 2009:315). Values serve as building blocks for political ideologies (Knight, 2006; Freeden, 1996). Ideology is a platform through which political elites engage in political activity such as belief systems, attitudes or views about society directed towards action (John, Federico & Napier, 2015; Napier, 2009; Schwarz Mantel, 2008; Freeden, 1996). Freeden (1996) links ideology to a 'thought-behaviour' relationship. Although the term 'ideology' was originally formed in the eighteenth century, by French author Antoine Destutt de Tracy who tried in the 1790s and 1800s to find a 'systematic' study of the sources or origins of ideas (Gould & Truitt, 1973).

An ideology performs four functions namely explanatory, evaluative, orientation, and programmatic (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014; Napier, 2009). Political ideology also has symbolic and operational aspects to it (Napier, 2009:312). Ideology is a discursive substructure in terms of being socially constructed and also a functional or normative substructure (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014; Napier, 2009). It is also both an expression

of the interests of a particular class (Heywood, 2003) and a defence of specific interest or class (Ball et al, 1995).Ideology is also a political perspective through which to understand and act upon the social world and legitimate political power (Letitia, 2014; Knight, 2006; Vincent, 1992). Political elites, also based on their ideology, identify themselves by position on the political spectrum as left, centre and right (Jou& Dalton, 2017; Letitia, 2014). As indicated by the IFP MP (Personal Interview) and the IFP 2016 Constitution, the party's position rests on tenets such as the principles of African Humanism otherwise known as 'Ubuntu/Botho'. Ubuntu/Botho emphasize that government should promote and protect human happiness (IFP Minutes of Meeting, 2016; Constitution of the IFP).

On the contrary, the EFF ideology is underpinned by 'leftist' position (Personal Interview, EFF MP7). This also indicates that ideologies also reflect party position as the left, centre or right cliché (Jou & Dalton, 2017; Letitia, 2014). Elias and Gemeni (2009) present the competing methods for estimating parties' positions in the Left-Right dimension based on the 'standard' method developed by Laver and Budge in 1992 which measure parties' positions. Discussing the left and right cliché, Napier (2009:312) identifies ideology to be symbolic or operational. Napier (2009:312) distinguishes that 'symbolic' refers to general, abstract ideological labels, images, and categories, including acts of self-identification with the left or right. While operational ideology implies specific concrete, issue-based opinions classified into either left or right (L-R). The Left-Right category is one of the ways political elites orientate and position themselves to politics (Jou & Dalton, 2017). In a class-divided society, 'we will always see "ideology" operating for the benefit of the dominant class and to the detriment of the subservient class (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014: 146).

Eagleton (2007) define ideology as the process of production of meanings, values; a set of ideas typical of a particular social class and ideas which help to legitimize a dominant political power. Ideology is also a set of specific beliefs, thoughts, conceptions and notions that some class or political party adheres to (Soviet Philosophical Dictionary, 1954). Marx

and Engels, in *The German Ideology* (1846), state that the class structure, economy and means of wealth production ('substructure) determines the overall ideology (superstructure) of a society. Lukas (1972) describes ideology as a projection of the class consciousness of the ruling class.

Abercrombie and Bryan (1978) cite Marx and Engels definition of ideology as the ideas of the ruling class are, in any age, the ruling ideas" applied to every social class in service to the interests of the political elite.

Also, ideology depicts some ideas on what is considered as the appropriate type of government and the best economic structure. Marx (1978) describe ideology as a broad, cohesive set of political ideas and beliefs. Marx also echoes that ideology is meant to serve the interest of the political elite.

Marx and Engels's (2001) defines ideology as the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, ' all that men say, imagine, conceive'. They also state that one of the aims of ideology is to legitimize those forces in a position of hegemony because it tends to formalize power and complicate the exploitation that often keeps a disempowered group in its place.

Having identified the different definition of ideologies, the definition of ideology that guides this study is the Marx concept of ideology. Ideology is a term used to describe a set of ideas and values associated with a political system that is dominant in a govern society and are used to justify the dominant class's power and privilege.

Hence, in the context of this study, I define 'ideology' in several ways. Firstly, ideology is a set of beliefs or philosophies followed by an individual or a group of individuals like the political elites or their party. Secondly, ideology is a particular set of ideals, principle or doctrine of how a society should be run and also the most suitable means of achieving an ideal political arrangement.

Thirdly, political ideology is largely concerned with how power should be allocated and how such power should be used. Linking the definition of ideology to political elites in the parliament, political elites try to get power through ideology and through their ideology possess such power which they use to influence policies and effect changes.

At this juncture, it is important to unpack the ideology of the six political parties identified earlier (DA, ACDP, ANC, EFF, IFP, UDM) in ideological concepts such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism and Marxism-Leninism, and through the perceptions of the MPs. This is vital to have an insight into the MPs political ideas and its impact on the institutional spaces where the MPs work. The next section presents and discusses the ideology of the six political parties identified earlier (DA, ACDP, ANC, EFF, IFP, UDM).

5. 2. The DA and Liberalism

The DA's ideology is liberalism, a concept underlined by the concept of liberty, freedom and egalitarianism (White, 2011; Kanazawa, 2010; Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2009; Huntington, 2002; Dunn, 1993). The concept of liberalism is attributed to John Locke who believed that all individuals have the right to liberty and right to life which should not be violated by the government in the social contract (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014; Kanazawa, 2010). MPs that subscribe to liberalism ideology are referred to as 'liberals'.
In light of the above, the 'DA's ideology, is underpinned by 'liberalism' (Personal Interview, DA MP1). Another DA MP stated,

'I am a liberal thinker and in the liberal school.... believe in freedom of speech... There is a

class of ideology. Obviously, the ideology of DA, we believe in the independence of the constitutions... We fight for the functionally of parliament... it is around rules of law, strong institutions and constitutions given by the people...' (Personal Interview, DA MP3).

In the same vein, DA MP4 describes his ideology as 'the notion of sitting on behalf of 46,000 South Africans who voted for the MP of DA in their constituency' (Personal Interview, DA MP4). Moreover, from my observation when I visited the DA's office in Cape Town to conduct the interview, written on the office door of the DA's MP office was the Map of the Western Cape and '46,000' written boldly on the wall. When I probed the DA MP, he mentioned that the '46,000' were the voters who voted for him. He thus had a strong belief in the importance of representative democracy. Hence, liberals believe that the government is entrusted with the responsibility such as welfare like health, housing, education, and pensions, and regulating the economy (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014, Ryan, 2007; Heywood, 2003).

Buttressing this argument from the historical angle, Letitia (2014) observed how the DA, the then Progressive Party, was 'cautious liberals' accepted universal suffrage. In a Strategy Document of 1992, the now DA referred to as the Democratic Party (DP) attacked the ANC and the National Party (NP) for not being committed to liberal democratic values. Therefore, in the first democratic election in 1994, the DP propagated "liberal democratic values among the new electorate… untainted by violence, corruption, apartheid and socialism", and in so doing, exemplifying itself as a "centrist party (Welsh, 1994: 111). Welsh further states that the strategy of the DP in the 1994 elections was that the ANC would gain the vote of the 'far -left' and the NP the vote of the 'far-right' and the DP will take the political centre.

Scholars (Booysen, 2006; Scheidegger & Lodge, 2005) brand the DA as a liberal party, 'centrist' constituency and a party seeking to protect the public from 'power-hungry' ANC. Hence, for the DA to increase its support base the "incongruous ideological" position had to

target poor black voters and advocate the free market (Booysen, 2006: 143). Booysen (2006) argues that the DA pretends to be a social-democratic party but displays a mixed bag of orientations in terms of being conservative in its policies, also manifested in the 2004 elections. Galean (2004) concur that despite the DA being dominated by white people in the upper echelons, the DA will likely develop multiple ideological personalities if it can maintain its growth in support as evidenced by the 2004 general elections.

The overview of the DA's ideology suggests that the party's philosophy is hinged on liberalism which embraces a broad spectrum hinged on value and beliefs of equality. It also appears that DA's MPs tend to be liberals who support a diverse spectrum of opinions.

5.3. ACDP and Social Conservatism

The ACDP ideology is underpinned by Christian "socialism and egalitarianism" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2). MPs that support social conservatism are referred to as 'conservatives'. Conservatives supports policies on the distribution of power and wealth in any society, which are the means to attain egalitarianism based on the belief that all people are equal despite their social status (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002). Conservatives preserve a range of institutions such as the monarchy, religion, parliamentary government and property rights to emphasize social stability rooted in traditional practices and continuity (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014). The ACDP constitution states that, "ACDP would support any first, second, third or fourth generation rights, on condition that these rights are not condemned by the Word of God[26]".ACDP MP maintain that the "ACDP ideology is underpinned by Conservatism" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2).

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[26] Theme Committee for A.C.D.P. Preliminary Submission regarding constitutional principle 11 (fundamental rights and freedoms) Available [Online] http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/0987.PDF

Conservative parties are also referred to as religious parties and from a socio-economic perspective, as those parties who support free enterprise and the free market who are positioned on the right. The ACDP position in the use of the label is in the centre-right to right-wing in their political position. Many parties are associated with clichés as '*Left*', '*centre*' and '*Right*' in their ideology which indicates conservative policy preferences (Jou & Dalton, 2017; Mari, 2009).Mair (2009) explains that the cliché 'Left and Right' started during revolution era in French Assembly whereby MPs seating arrangement was according to their party type either as a liberal party or conservative party.

He explains further that in contemporary politics, the Left and Right cliché is associated with political elites beliefs as individuals, party's positions on issues and a cue for voters in terms of their voting choices.

Besides, the 'ACDP's ideology stands for freedom of religion and the party is based on Christian principles' (Personal Interview, ACDP Chief Whip). A reading of the ACDP's Committee Minutes shows how this relates to governance. ACDP's minute cites Exodus chapter 18:19-23 which states that powers must be separated and shared in order to be completely representative:

> ''Listen now to me and I will give you some advice and may God be with you. You must be the people's representative before God and bring their disputes to him. Teach them the decrees and laws and show them the way to live and the duties they are to perform. But select capable men from all the people - men who fear God, trustworthy men who hate dishonest gain and appoint them as officials over thousands, hundreds and fifties and tens…. Have them serve as judges for the people at all times, but have them bring every difficult case to you,- the simple cases they can decide themselves. That will make your load lighter, because they will share it with you. If you do this

and God so commands, you will be able to stand the strain and all these people will go home satisfied. We therefore argue for a separation of powers…''

The ACDP is positioned on the "political right of the ideological spectrum" with only "slight variations in their policy positions" which also signals political values and polarization of ideology (Jou& Dalton, 2017; Rohanlall, 2014). Rohanlall (2014) buttress that conservatism is a common ideological feature among the South African parties. Hence, viewing ideology in the view of the ACDP's MPs , findings reveal that political ideology is one of the motivating factors the MPs join ACDP. As expressed by ACDP MP;

"In 1993, I joined the party. Although it is a Christian party, anybody can be a member but in terms of leadership, you must be a Christian" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP1). Another, ~~MP indicated that the religio~~us position of the party is an important consideration for joining the party when he became involved with the ACDP before.

He expressed that: "The party is based on Christian principles although other religions are embraced in the ACDP" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2). He also describes that "the ACDP stands for freedom of religion and the party has people from other faiths that support the values based on the philosophy on Christian democracy which got inspiration from early European philosophers" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2). Similarly, the ACDP "party ideology is reflected in the party manifesto that is pursued in the committees standing for righteousness and justice" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2).

Findings also reveal that besides party ideology, the ACDP's MPs also have their ideology that aligns with the ACDP's ideology. The ACDP Chief Whip describes her ideology as the notion of "no future, unless a shared future… Anything one does must consider others..." (Personal Interview, ACDP Chief Whip). Terence, Dagger & O'Neill (2014) argue that MPs

with conservative ideologies also disagree on policy preferences because traditional values are susceptible to changes.

The overview of the ACDP's ideology suggests that the party's ideology is hinged on social conservatism rooted in socialism, egalitarianism and biblical principles. ACDP ideology also advocates for the preservation of traditional values and structures.

5.4. The ANC and Socialism

The ANC ideology is described with a multi-faceted ideology which is nowhere near the extreme left (Rohanlall, 2014: 92). According to an ANC MP, "the ANC's ideology is underpinned by 'socialism, Marxism and Leninism... this covers every area... Leninism comes with practical considerations… I believe do the right thing... I don't believe in a supreme being..." (Personal Interview, ANC MP). Through Marxism–Leninism, societies are organized into a socialist state, a step towards an egalitarian society (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014). Memela (2008) states that "the ANC political mansion has many ideological rooms", and as such is ideologically hybrid which implies that it has a "broad-church ideology" (Booysen, 2012; Memela, 2008).

Memela (2008: 2) states that there are numerous people and political ideologies from all the corners of the earth found within the ANC, speaking to all people irrespective of race, creed, and religion or class background. From a historical perspective, Fatton's (1984) analysis of the ideology of the ANC indicates that, despite its socialist rhetoric, the ANC is fundamentally a populist movement which transcends "petty-bourgeois radicalism" by an "all-class" common front. He notes that the ANC failed to develop a truly socialist revolutionary strategy. The ANC is neither ultra-left nor ultra-right but, leftist with minimal state intervention (Memela, 2008). Bond (2013) argues that the ANC seems to "talk left but

walk right". This can be interpreted as the ANC choosing to use socialist language but adopting liberal capitalist tendencies.

Additionally, based on the transformation of ANC's party ideology, the ANC gives equal representation to both men and women in the parliament. The number of women represented in the Parliament has increased substantially from about 2.7% from 1994 to 41% (International IDEA, 2016; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). The increase is also attributed to equal rights for men and women in the 1996 South African Constitution and the introduction of a quota system after the 1994 elections (Francis, 2011).

The overview of the ANC's ideology suggests that the party's philosophy is many-sided such as socialism, Marxism and Leninism.

5.5. The EFF and Marxism

The EFF ideology is underpinned by Marxism–Leninism, a concept similar to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Andrain, 1994). The concept of Marxism-Leninism is underpinned by revolution whereby the working class has a shift from capitalism to a socialist state (Terence, Dagger & O'Neill, 2014:6). To achieve the socialist state, Lenin suggests "diversity in the discussion, unity in action" , public control of social institutions and the ownership of resources needed for production (New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, 1999; Koekemoer, 2017).

The EFF ideology is underpinned by Marxism–Leninism (Personal Interview, EFF MP1-MP 7). Reiterating the importance of Marxism–Leninism to their party beliefs and ideology, an EFF MP 8 noted that,

"...We are Marxist and we believed this will help us... We defined our ideas based on their views... We believe liberation should not be just on paper. EFF MP8 also

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mentions that 'according to Marxism, the assets belong to the majority ...'" (Personal Interview, EFF MP8).

Similarly, another MP explains that

"the EFF started in 2013 and was started by a majority of ANC Youth League members who defaulted to form another party. This arose in debate amongst some of ANC Youth League in 1994-2007 when 8% of the land was recovered, less than 30% of what was agreed. The ANC failed to recover the land. The Youth League decided to take action by leaving the ANC" (Personal Interview, EFF MP).

The EFF MP explains further that "Julius was suspended and the youths went to him to start the party. He was invited to speak to the people at Marikana. It was this event that led to the formation of the EFF" (Personal Interview, EFF MP). The value system of Economic Freedom Fighters leans towards a radical, Left, and anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement with an internationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles (EFF constitution, 2016). EFF MP7 describes the first national meeting of the EFF was where "what is to be done from Russian Leninist principles was contextualized. We were inspired by this and understood the content of these principles" (Personal Interview, EFF MP7). Observation also reveals the ideology of the EFF manifested in their party logo, the red uniform. The EFF MPs clad in red uniforms that the MPs wear during plenary sittings in Parliament. An EFF MP echoes that "the red gown symbolizes the suffering miners and poor South Africans. It is party rules to wear the uniform as our ideology". The uniform makes us share in the burden of the suffering of the people, especially the miners who risk their lives to work..." (Personal Interview, EFF MP)[27].

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[27] See Economic Freedom Fighters(2013). Statement of the economic freedom fighters on the anniversary of the Marikana massacre of 16 August 2013

Harris (2014) mentions that the EFF is popular with blacks. He echoes that the EFF draws support from the electorates located in the rural area and unemployed young blacks with low education. The EFF also reinvented itself through the EFF documents that are antecedents to the ANCYL (The African National Congress Youth League policies) during 2008-2012, the period Malema served as the ANCYL president. Commenting on the formation of the EFF (Robinson, 2014) Robinson (2014) traced the formation of the EFF to the 17 Shaft Conference which occurred in Johannesburg on July 10th 2013. It was at the meeting the pillars of the EFF[28]. and the slogan 'struggle for economic freedom in our lifetime' was coined.

~~The ideology of the EFF also~~ manifest in its party ideas known as the EFF Seven Pillars. The pillars of the EFF are the economic emancipation, expropriation of South Africa's land and free access to basic needs (Koekemoer, 2017). The other pillars are massive development of the African economy, a move from reconciliation to justice, accountable, corrupt-free government and society without fear of victimisation by state agencies (Robinson, 2014; Horwitz, 2016). However, concerns have been raised on the sustainability of the EFF because they are yet to be proven as a first-time party in governance (Robinson, 2014; Horwitz, 2016).

The overview of the EFFs ideology reveals that the party's philosophy is hinged on Marxism-Leninism. The of focus of such ideology is the mobilization of people especially the working class to bring about changes to address their plight by creating the platform for them to own public means of production. Thus, it appears that EFF's MPs tend to be revolutionary in their tactics to bring about the supposed change.

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[28]see Koekemoer (2017)The EFF is a radical and militant that believes that political power without economic emancipation is useless.

5.6. IFP and Nationalism

The IFP's ideology is nationalism and their political position is based on the principles of African Humanism otherwise known as Ubuntu/Botho that emphasize that the government should promote and protect human happiness (Minute of Meeting, 2016; Constitution of the IFP). Nationalism is based on the philosophy that countries should rule themselves by self-governance without external interference (Heywood, 2002; Triandafyllidou, 1998). Hence nationalism is attainable because of features such as common descent, culture, language and race (Heywood, 2012; Triandafyllidou, 1998). Scheidegger and Lodge (2005) describe the IFP as conservative, demonstrated in the 2000s through their "philosophical conservative" policies centred on democratic consolidation, family values and religion (fear of God). Letitia (2014) portrays the IFP has having prominence in Zulu affairs. The ideology of the party 'nationalism' in Hamilton et al (1994: 74) view started with the IFP has identification with monarchical leadership and the Zulu-speaking heritage; describing it as "the king's intervention in politics" in the region of KwaZulu-Natal, whose history dates back to King Shaka. In 1992 the IFP requested for an autonomous Zulu nation which was the call for KwaZulu-Natal to secede from South Africa. The party is also described as 'Zulu nationalists' or 'Zulu traditionalists', exhibiting a claim to a 'Zulu Kingdom' (Hamilton et al, 1994: 75-76). Hamilton et al (1994) demonstrate that although, the IFP was initially formed as a 'national cultural liberation movement' in which popular mobilisation was based on a unified Zulu ethnicity and membership restricted to the Zulus. However, in 1992 after the end of Apartheid, the IFP membership became open to all people. They mentioned also that Zulu revivalism was manifested when the IFP not only appealed to Zulu culture but appealed to the restoration of Zuluness in an attempt to prevent foreign cultures in South Africa and to avoid being banned by the Apartheid government.

In the same tone, the IFP had its 'traditional power structures' and loyalty to chief authority (Hamilton et al 1994). During the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1992, the IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi, advocated against a single model of governance for the entire South African populace but each party should have their constituency (Hamilton et al 1994). Piper (2006:148) observes how the IFP during the 2004 election loss to the ANC because of its ideological shift which brought an abrupt end to their thirty-year party dominance in KwaZulu-Natal. This alludes to the new strategy the IFP adopted in the 1980s and 1990s in favour of liberal democratic politics at the expense of militant Zulu nationalism. Piper (2006) explains that the IFP members who favour liberal democracy were suppressed by traditional politics within the party and subsequently left. In this sense, Piper concludes that the post-apartheid IFP has not transformed but is trapped between militant Zulu nationalism and inclusive conservative-liberalism. However, Francis (2011) contends that Piper did not examine the IFP's party documents because his interviews were limited to a predominantly white grouping of KwaZulu-Natal MPs who joined a black-based political party from prominent white party politics who left the party. She argued that their departure was because of the location of the KwaZulu-Natal capital, which the party wished to locate in Ulundi, but the disgruntled MPs wished to be in Pietermaritzburg. The significance here is that the capital issue indicated that this was an African political party and the white members from prominent positions in white politics who joined were mistaken if they thought they could take it over (c.f Francis, 2011). The policy documents of the IFP also indicate a broader Pan-Africanist vision alongside a local nationalism, reflecting the many people who helped to shape it from the 1970s when the Black Consciousness Movement was banned and they needed a political home (IFP Manifesto, 2006; Francis, 2011).

The overview of the IFP's ideology reveals that the party's philosophy is hinged on nationalism which centres on individual's commitment to the nation which transcends more than individual or group interests. It also appears that IFP's MPs tend to be conservative.

5.7. UDM and Social Democracy

The United Democratic Movement ideology reflects social democracy and a centre-left, social-democratic orientation. Social democracy is a philosophy similar to socialism but within the framework of capitalism (Heywood, 2012). MPs that subscribe to the ideology of social democracy pursue and support policies on participatory democracy, redistribution of income and principles of equal opportunities (Heywood, 2012; Badie, Berg-Schlosser & Morlino 2011; Miller 1998). In 1997, UDM was founded by a prominent former National Party leader, Roelf Meyer and a former African National Congress and Transkei homeland leader, General Bantu Holomisa. Holomisa was also a former ANC Executive Committee member and involved in the ANC underground movement (Francis, 2011). Bantu Holomisa was expelled from the ANC because of allegations of possible bribes that were paid to the former Prime Minister of Transkei, George Matanzima and Miss Stella Sigcau, the former incumbent Prime Minister. Elischer (2010) points out that the radical strand of socialism is a prevalent dominant political ideology after the end of colonialism. This is partly because, after independence, polite elites and state incapacity to provide for its citizens led African politics into a free market arena (Letitia, 2014; Elischer, 2010).

Gleaning from the above ideology of UDM, the party's core principle is the use of an established political process to effect change from capitalism to socialism peacefully.

5.8. Political Ideology and Political Elites in South Africa Parliament

Bringing forth the dynamics of the different political ideologies of the parties discussed above with political elites in South Africa parliament depicts a wide array of political ideologies present among political elites. It appears many of these ideologies derives from philosophies which they adapted to suit their parties and South Africa political terrain. This

corroborates Letitia (2014) assertion that liberalism, socialism, communism, conservatism and nationalism broadly make up the ideologies of the present parties in South Africa. These ideologies also evolved the context of historic struggles. This also suggests that since the work of Duverger (1954) scholars have advanced beyond the 'simple typologies' of parties as liberalism, communist and socialist.

Additionally, ideology is also fundamental in the explanation and evaluation of the operation of democracies and analysis of democratic processes (Gabel & Huber, 2000). It explains party competition, coalition-building and policy outcomes (Jahn, 2011: 746). It is also crucial for a democratic country to have competing ideologies because ideology enables citizens in democratic societies to "debate the choices open to them" and in that way help them "shape their future society" (Schwarzmantel 2008: 183). Divergent ideologies serve a springboard for healthy debates and dialogue, fosters competing views on how societies should be organized and prevents stifled boring political debates (Schwarzmantel, 2008: 13). Nonetheless, through limited ideology, MPs from the ruling class prolongs their stay in power to control the beliefs of the electorate and to legitimize their power within a particular society (Marx cited in Terence, Dagger and O'Neill, 2014: 146). Inverting this position, one might argue that the wide array of ideology in South Africa serves to protect South Africa's democracy.

5.9. The Social Composition of MPs

This section presents and discusses the prevalent social composition and political background of the MPs interviewed. It also explores how political elites social compositions impacts on

the institutional space (Parliament). This is also to examine whether the MPs coalesce around similar values and beliefs. This is based on the assumption that political elites' backgrounds and political training shape their political ideology. The social and political background of the MPs is a determining factor of the attitudinal disparities between political elites in parties and the type of party agendas they prioritize (Francis, 2011:73). This alludes to their party affiliations and the values attached to it, which also determine their attitudes, behaviour and interests (Francis, 2011:73).

In light of this, the discussion on the social composition of MPs is weaved around the following themes. This is the political activities of the MPs, MPs educational background, MPs occupational background, MPs motivation for MPs joining politics, inter-party conflict and the MPs perspectives on democracy. The subsequent section discusses the MPs social composition such as racial and gender composition; age profile; educational background; prior political background and activities of MPs; occupational background .

5.9.1. Racial and Gender Composition

As indicated in the previous section that there is a high increase of women MPs in ANC. This suggests that the ANC gives equal representation to both men and women MPs in the Parliament, attributed to the quota system introduced after the 1994 elections by the ANC (Francis, 2011: 91). The increase in women is attributed to the South African Constitutional provisions and the quota system introduced by the ANC after the 1994 elections (Francis, 2011: 91). Based on these reasons, the ANC has equal numbers of women in terms of numerical representation of women drawn from the Women's League's (ANCWL) in the

parliament. Women representatives in the parliament have increased from about 2.7% from 1994 to 41% in 2004 (International IDEA, 2016). Despite this positive picture, men MPs still dominate the South Africa parliament. Nevertheless, the numerical representation of women ANC in the South African National Assembly is still dominated by men MPs (Francis, 2011: 91).

Male dominance in South Africa parliament also alludes to societal constructions of gendered roles for female MPs who perform family duties and child-rearing. Such gendered roles arguably affect female MPs full participation in politics because they are constrained by time availability that also limits their political aspirations and advancement. A female ACDP MP, whose husband is a professor, claims "her husband follows her to Cape Town anytime there is a sitting" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP). In line with this, Francis (2011:89) argues that to be considered for a position of power, "women MP must have a combination of qualities make them more remarkable than their male colleagues". These, she claims, such women MPs have to repeatedly demonstrate if they are to be considered for office.

Tordoff (1997: 103) cautions that "these women sections have become the preserve of tradition-minded women loyal to the party leadership". This appears to be confirmed in my observations and interviews in the Parliament. This is because the attitude of the women MPs from the ANC seems to further corroborate this argument. When I approached the women ANC MPs, they were not responsive to the interviews but they referred me to their Chief Whip whom they said I should seek permission from before they can grant me an interview. Unlike the ANC MPs who did not require permission to grant an interview.

5.9.2. Age Profile

Findings reveal that there is wide variation in the ages of MPs in the Parliament. The majority of the ANC MPs are within the age bracket of 40-60 years. The ACDP seems to be older and within the 45-60 age bracket. The first is the age grouping of the EFF MPs who seem to be younger MPs in the Parliament. The EFF MPs age ranges between 30-42 years. Younger MPs expressed that lack of party seniority and parliamentary positions among the former ANCYL members was one of the historic reasons for the defection of former ANCYL members to form another political party - the EFF.

Findings also reveal that the IFP party also has the youngest MPs in the NA. Young age is deliberately sought by the IFP as part of their recruitment and participatory strategy.

There is wide variation in the ages of MPs in Parliament. However, the ANC MPs are older and seniority tends to be held among older MP. It also reflects a longer career but also a view widely held that elders deserve respect. The age groups represented across Parliament suggest that value and priorities of younger MPs are different from their older counterparts (Inglehart, 1977 cited in Francis, 2011: 97).

5.9.3. Educational Background

Education is equally important in the political journey of the MPs because it is one of the indicators of activism and social networks (Norris & Lovenduski, 1997 cited in Francis, 2011:114). Pareto (1968:38) in his elite circulation theory propounded that there are strata within the society which comprise the non-governed ('Governing elite'). He emphasized that the Governing elite occupies higher strata due to certain qualities such as intelligence,

educational qualities and social class that makes these individuals ahead of other classes. The availability of office for political elites is also based on criteria as MPs social class, MPs age, educational levels and MPs prior professional occupation (Francis, 2008:13). Findings also indicate that the MPs in South Africa National Assembly have diverse educational backgrounds, educational specializations and educational levels. Quite a number of the MPs have Bachelor's degrees in subjects ranging from Economics, Sociology, Psychology, Law, Business Administration, Management, Public Policy and Nursing. Among the EFF MPs, they have Diploma and technical qualifications. A significant proportion of the ANC MPs went to school outside South Africa while on exile and a few MPs schooled in London. MPs that would have missed out on school were able to benefit from distant learning through UNISA.

One MP from the DA did not have any qualifications beyond a vocational qualification, but this does not seem obvious because the MP is very vocal during the parliamentary debates (Personal Interview, DA MP). Another DA MP claims he "upgraded his educational skills by enrolling in other educational courses online" (Personal Interview, DA MP). Education is of particular significance to the DA because, as one DA MP describes this, "before being nominated onto the party list you have to write a test and debate in front of the party who watches and scores you" (Personal Interview, DA MP). There are MPs that did not finish schooling, this is attributed to various factors such as early involvement in party activities at a young age and some MPs spent part of their life in prison as a result of their involvement in the Anti-Apartheid Movement where their schooling was suspended.

Educational background also seems to provide access to the party list for political recruitment into the parliament. This is also in line with Mills (1957) and Mosca's (1941) argument that education plays a critical role as this allows such MPs contacts and connections to enter the branches of the power elite. This also corroborates Mosca's (1939) claims that political elites

coalesce around MPs whom they share similar values, ideology and class. Educational background is a basis for social networks in parties (Francis, 2011: 118).

5.9. 4. Prior Political Background and Activities of MPs

Findings suggest that the majority of the MPs in the National Assembly already acquired political experience before they became MPs. Many of the MPs were politician for a long time before been elected into the National Assembly. Some worked their way through the various levels of the South African parliamentary system from local and provincial levels before reaching the national level.

In terms of party related background and activities, the participants had diverse experiences. These range from having served as the party's legal adviser, Treasurer and Member of the Executive of the party. For instance, the ACDP MPs occupied the position of Party Branch Chairperson. The ANC MPs started their political career as political activists, free agents, student union and trade union representatives. Similarly, the IFP MP started politics as a student activist, National Chairperson for the party and the Youth Brigade of the IFP. Another IFP MP was a Member of Education Department in KwaZulu-Natal, a Commissioner for the Judicial Commission and a former member of the Senate, experiences that cut across education, the judiciary and political office.

Furthermore, the UDM MP was the Deputy Secretary of the party and youth leader that promoted the party's agenda in all ramification especially in their Constituency. An IFP MP was the Chief Whip of the party that ensures that the party members are compatible and treated with dignity. For the DA MP, some started politics in 1998 by representing farmer's agricultural union. Others were Councilor and the Chairperson of the party responsible for building structures for the DA members. Other DA MPs also served as the Chief Whip that

ensures the smooth operation of the party parliament. Some also served as a member of the panel at City Council Twanshe, Ward Councilor, a student activist and Provincial leader. In the words of DA MP1, "I started politics in 1998 by representing farmer's agricultural union. In 2002, I became a DA member and a councillor. I have been a councillor for 9 years and helping the people at the grassroots. I got elected in 2009 at national level…" (Personal Interview, DA MP).

For the EFF MPs, they have an educational background as Members of Arts, Culture and Tourism; Member of the Regional Executive Committee, a student activist and formerly the Coordinator of the ANCYL. As the ANCYL Coordinator at the Provincial Legislature, he was responsible for the on the ground structure of the ANC and performed the role of the ANCYL Secretary. The MPs gain pre-parliamentary experience at the local level as a local councillor or on the national level, working for an MP, the back offices or a political party (Allen, 2013).

5. 9. 5. Occupational Background

The MPs have varied occupational experiences before becoming an MP, They are drawn from varied professional background. The elite theoretical perspectives, substantiate**s** Mills' (1957) assertion that most political elites occupies top positions in the elite membership in one or more social club. The MPs occupation's range from being a consultant, lawyers, business directors, army officers, employees of government parastatals, small business owners and NGO workers before resigning to concentrate on their roles in the parliament. Some of the female MPs have been involved in modeling and nursing before switching fully into the Parliament. The EFF MPs have been involved in volunteering for organization campaigns and NGO funded by Nelson Mandela Children's Foundation dealing with HIV/AIDS as well as an appointment by the Ministry of Health. Thus MPs experiences cut

across prior institutional position, organizational and party roles. One MP declared, 'I am a trained nurse and am still involved in social upliftment...' (Personal Interview, DA MP1).

This also indicates that many MPs combine socio-political work with parliamentary work. The demographic analysis of the MPs combination of suggest that they comprise the 'chattering classes' of professional occupations (Norris, 1997), although Francis found out that in KwaZulu-Natal that this was not the case except in certain parties such as the DA and former NNP (Francis, 2011:13). The occupations of South African MPs demonstrate also that there are certain occupations considered more 'conducive to politics', offering 'generous vacations, interrupted career paths, professional independence, financial security, public networks, social status, policy experience and technical skills useful in political life' (Norris & Lovenduski 1995:165). Allen and Campbell (2013:4) stated that certain occupations are important consideration in the political career of MPs because such occupation is additionally useful proxy category for social class. Whereas this might be the case for some MPs there was found to be a diverse demographic among MPs, some had stronger socio-development backgrounds and others strong political organizing or popular struggle connections which fit South Africa's specific political historical experience.

5.9.6 Motivating Factor for MPs joining politics

MPs in South Africa are motivated by many factors for their involvement in politics, ranging from a desire to transform society because of the impact of Apartheid, a concern around a specific issue, the influence of a political figure, worker's conditions or simply friendship and parental influence. Political motivation "may be rooted in an individual's personality and tempered by the larger political environment" (Francis, 2011:138). Party ideology has also in

many cases shaped their particular involvement, as have roles they have occupied in Parliament. An ACDP Chief Whip describes how she was influenced into politics watching a televised discussion of an election manifesto (Personal Interview, ACDP MP). An ANC MP described the historic circumstances which shaped his involvement. He said, "...We fought against fellow blacks who were supporting Apartheid… Apartheid divided the blacks along tribal level. Schools were divided, schools... Schools speak Zulu only...' (Personal Interview, ANC MP1). On a similar theme, another ANC MP stated that:

> "Apartheid brought me to politics... I started as a student union member. I joined the ANC in 1978 during my Matric through contacts in Swaziland to get military training… From high school I was recruited... I was involved in the political struggle against discrimination... I was an underground member getting instruction from the leadership and preparing pamphlets so that others can get it... In 1980, I left for training in Angola through the bush to Angola from there to Mozambique..." (Personal Interview, ANC MP2).

MPs are impacted by other socialisation factors such as those that occur within the family (Jou & Dalton, 2017; Francis, 2011; Eric, 1997). The view of an IFP MP captures this, as one of the youngest MPs in the Parliament, in this he attributes his success to socialisation within the IFP family, and his knowledge of IFP politics to his uncle, Buthelezi the founder of the party (Personal Interview, IFP MP). There are thus many ways in which MPs are socialised into politics. Socialization is the process through which individuals acquire knowledge, habits, and value orientations that will be useful in the future (Eric, 1997). For ACDP MPs, their Christian orientation is a defining feature of this socialization. As one stated:

> "I was excited about the changes in South Africa in 1980... That was the beginning of my interest in politics... As a born again Christian, I needed to be in a party to changes going on... I was inspired by God, I felt I needed to be a member... In 1993, I joined

the party… Although it is a Christian party, anybody can be a member but in terms of leadership, you must be a Christian" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP5).

Political role models also play a part. As one EFF MP stressed,

"Before joining the EFF in 2014, I joined the ANC in 1997 where I was a member of the Youth League in 1997-99. I was active in school politics. I live politics in the rest of my life. In Port Elizabeth, the state of emergency was declared. I grew up in politics. It was still political unrest in Port Elizabeth. Constant teargas, as young as I was. I later realized that government use to deal with blacks this way. I grew up seeing. I became involved around 5-7 years, we would play with tyres and comrade appointed us to take charge of tyres. We were appointed with a leadership position... Cops came and beat everyone... No privilege for pre-school... I grew up in a township in 1990. Mandela seems to be symbol everyone was looking to for the day. When Mandela was released, the first place he arrived was Peace Park in Port Elizabeth in my place... Mandela was peoples hope to deliver us. The majority of us were members of ANC..." (Personal Interview, EFF MP).

The specific context in which this MP grew up formed shaped their socialization into politics and his political orientation. Within this geo-political space in Port Elizabeth, the ANC *was* the movement. In contrast, an IFP MP said,

"I have a lot respect from Mandela... I do not believe Mandela defined the struggle because he could not have signed so early the agreement with white minority when most of the land was still in their possession. In 27 years… there were people who filled the vacuum... The story of South Africa is untold. It does not fully represent the historical context and the roles of others played in the struggle must be told. The struggle was not just Mandela, there were men who fought also while he was in prison. I think this aspect is not well explained to the youths, undoubtedly Mandela

fought for South Africa's freedom but the liberation fighters also pressurized the white government to submit to the will of the people ..." (Personal Interview, IFP MP).

He speaks of a broader ideological and political influence beyond the geographical space that influences his views and political orientation today.

5.9.7. Inter---Party Dynamics and Democratic Institutions

The differences in political ideology between parties contribute to the culture of inter-party dynamics within democratic institutions in South Africa. This is well understood among MPs. 'MPs in the Parliament and Committees frequently misunderstand each other because we don't believe in the same ideology" (Personal Interview, DA MP1). Despite this, the committee system, as distinct from the National Assembly, provides a platform through which MPs work together to achieve common goals sometimes defending other parties in the interests of democracy. For example, a DA MP said, "the first time EFF was thrown out, MPs went to court to challenge the decision" (Personal Interview, DA MP3).

Inter-party does arise because of different political cleavages, policy positions, political affinity, orientations, party attachments, and early life experiences as these relate to policy concern (Jou & Dalton, 2017; Francis, 2011). However, this does not mean that because of the ideological differences of the MPs they are rigid to their political position or ideology in committee. When necessary they work together to achieve common goals. Frequently, parties represented by their MPs will likely work with others whose ideology and party position seems similar to theirs. As one MP argued, "despite each party's ideology, the relationship between other MPs parties are cordial most times because they work together with other

opposition parties… sometimes to checkmate the ANC" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP1). Competing ideologies enable citizens of democratic societies to "debate the choices open to them" and in that way help them "shape their future society" (Schwarzmantel 2008: 183).

The MPs also agree on a number of issues despite the differences in their ideology. An example of this is the issue over Nkandla and the expenses spent there by former President Zuma (Personal Interview, DA MP). My fieldwork shows that, in South Africa, through the committee system, opponents agree mutually on specific policies of interests based on priorities.

Moreover, parties do also emphasize to the public those areas that they believe they will secure votes (Elischer, 2010:8). Rohanlall calls this "cherry-picking" (2014: 145). To Rohanlall, cherry-picking is a mid-point accommodation between liberalism and socialism, a common occurrence in contexts with a wide ideological spectrum. Since 1994 until today, parties know that one single ideology cannot capture and accommodate their stance on many issues. Rohanlall (2014) argues that South Africa's parliamentary opposition continues to maintain a remarkable ideological consensus faith in an open political system and private competition in a market economy. Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) argue that the dominant party and institutions tend to use the mass media to communicate the dominant ideology and are reliant on the mass media to be sympathetic to that dominant ideology. This communication through the media does not reflect the diverse ideology present within the institutions of government. And the diversity of ideology is necessary for a healthy democracy (Schwarzmantel, 2008; Knight, 2006).

Ideology can take different nomenclatures (socialism, liberalism, nationalism, democracy, social and Marxism-Lenin). Ideology is a potent form in which MPs also engage in political activity through the platform of democratic institutions. Ideology comprises belief systems

and attitudes about society but is directed towards action. These can evolve over time and be influenced by institutions such as the Parliament. Although, as Feldman (2004) claims, MPs develop many political attitudes during their lifetime which is difficult to measure, the ideological differences that remain in South Africa today and are expressed through political parties are indicative of a consolidated democracy. This has even led to the formation of new political parties where the ideological position in important policy areas has been unresolved within them. For example, the issue of land ownership, access and usage, a fundamental feature of African society reflects these diverse ideological positions. As an EFF MP stated, "The EFF started in 2013 by a majority of ANC Youth League that defaulted to another party''. This arose on debate amongst some of ANC Youth League in 1994-2007 when only 8% land was recovered, less than 30% that was agreed. The ANC failed to recover the land. The youth league decided to take action by leaving the ANC" (Personal Interview, EFF MP). Indeed, despite the Land Reform Programme introduced in 1994, the pace of transformation in land access has been slow. Other parties such as the DA see land as something ultimately to be left to market forces, whilst the IFP view land as something to be held in trust in the Chieftaincy system for future generations to be able to access and use land. Despite common agreement that land is a fundamental resource and access to land is critical, each of these parties have a very different ideological approach to it. This is indicative of a healthy democracy.

5.10. MPs Definitions of Democracy

Democratic institutions thrive under democratic conditions. In the context of South Africa, representation in the parliament is one of the key tenets of democracy where MPs play a crucial role. People vote for parties whom they believe share their political values and represent their interests in the political process. In this study, the views of the MPs about what comprises democracy in South Africa were explored. MPs overwhelmingly share the

view across parties that democracy comprises, as one MP stated, "government of the people, for the people, by the people... Everything must be based on the people" (personal Interview, DA MP2). How this is actualized in politics is what constitutes the main difference. For example, some MPs focus on the process of politics. One MP claimed, "It Involves people in everything, having access to freedom… allowing debates and being consciously conscious" (Personal Interview, DA MP2).

Many MPs across party lines expressed their understanding of democracy in liberal democratic terms. Many spoke directly of democracy as a form of political representation, the process of electing people into capable leadership. For example, one MP said, "You become a voice in the Parliament where laws are passed and decisions are taken based on the constitution of the country" (Personal Interview, ANC MP) And another argued,

"Democracy is when people are able to exercise their rights and decide their votes. In other words, when they can be elected into positions. It is their constitutional right irrespective of colours or race (Personal Interview, ANC MP).

For others who share these liberal views on what constitutes a democracy, the rule of law, free and fair elections and tolerance in society was a determining feature. For example, 'Democracy is free and fair elections on regular basis… There is also the need for an open society of freedom of speech and movement. The state must ensure the permanent safety of the citizens. Citizens should be able to go about without fear (ANC MP 2). As another MP argued, "democracy is a system that allows freedom of speech and the right system of equality" (Personal Interview, UDM MP2). One MP emphasized the importance of elections and the holding of elites to account for the decisions made, formally in line with ideas about representative democracy. He said, "Democracy is the ability for the people to choose the government they want through free and fair elections and every

votes count. "The government must be held accountable for the decisions" (Personal Interview, ANC MP1).

The MPs also emphasized the key institutions that strengthen democracy and its importance in a democratic system. For example, one MP said,

> "Democracy is about giving all people in the country chance to participate in building the country through different representatives, placing the constitution of the country first and above all... It is allowing multi-parties participation and respect for each other's views... It is recognizing that Parliament is the highest legislature and political parties are well represented. Whatever happens in the country is governed through the Legislature. Hence, there is the supremacy of the Parliament working side by side with the judiciary." (Personal Interview, IFP MP)

Equally, the ability of democratic institutions to guard against the abuse of power was a common theme among members of opposition parties in South Africa, and particularly among MPs from the IFP who were interviewed. One IFP MP said,

> "The political system must be able to correct, to ensure that there is no abuse of state power. It is vital to have active citizenry, their voices must not be confined to elections. You trust political power to the people you elected. It is vital for the civil society to be able to flourish and guard against any one party system..." (Personal Interview, IFP MP2).

This greater role for citizens in the form of participatory democracy was a recurring theme among the IFP and, in discussions about democracy, many MPs indicated similar views that went beyond the liberal representative democratic tradition and reflect other participatory democratic traditions in their formulation.

Some MPs interviewed also indicated that they considered there to be other fundamental weaknesses with considering liberal democratic institutions to be the only measure of democracy. Their concern was with what democracy, as it is practiced in a liberal tradition, produced. For example, in a discussion of this, some MPs from the opposition party discussed the weakness inherent in the party-list system in proportional representation which incapacitates the electorate on deciding which MPs serve in their interests. For others, the level of socio-economic transformation that the system has produced is a cause for concern. One MP said, "...We are far behind… it is a burden of shame to blacks. The democratic system has weakened, and not sharpened the citizens" (Personal Interview, EFF MP). In another case, "Democracy is an open opportunity for all. We open all levels of freedom... we have achieved social freedom, freedom of accessibility to the people... *but there is no economic freedom*. In terms of opportunity, this is far below what it should be" (Personal Interview, DA MP4). What is particularly interesting in this case is that the MP belongs to the DA, supposedly the vanguard of the free market system. Even here, it may well be that MPs question what the system produces.

Sometimes the process of enacting democracy, and concerns with the level and speed of socio-economic transformation leads to different political styles. As one MP stated, "Democracy is about… the decision to advance the will of the people and placing them in better conditions in society. This is the main reason why the EFF method is more confrontational and direct" (Personal Interview, EFF MP1).

Whilst remaining committed to the principles of liberal democracy, many MPs question whether that produces a better society for all people. The injection of participatory principles that go beyond the narrow confines of elections and representation, and the use of a political style that forces debates to consider the impact of democracy on the lives of ordinary citizens, political elites show that the substance of democracy is equally important in the South African context.

5.11. Conclusion

The social and political composition of MPs in the South African Parliament reveals that it is comprised of individuals from diverse political and social backgrounds. MPs were motivated by many factors that led them into politics and in many cases, their experiences were the foundation for their belief systems and the parties they chose. There is evidence to suggest that MPs, as the political elite, coalesce around particular value systems and attitudes. Parties predominantly attract MPs that share their ideological beliefs although they too remain diverse formulations.

The political elite in South Africa represent diverse ideological belief systems. Ideology can take different nomenclatures (socialism, liberalism, nationalism, humanism, Marxism-Lenin). Ideology is also a platform through which MPs engage in political activity in the democratic institutions of Parliament. Diverse ideology is a key element in the sustenance of democracy. Though they indicate that they share a commitment to the principles of liberal democracy, they do also question whether it produces the desired goals of socio-economic transformation in South Africa, a goal around which they coalesce. MPs do also work together to meet common goals, far away from the confines of the party and public posturing in the National Assembly. They agree on multiple issues, despite the differences in their ideology. Competing ideologies enables citizens of democratic societies to debate the choices open to them and in that way help them shape their future society.

In the next chapter, I explore the parliamentary committee system, the engine of the South African Parliament.

Chapter Six: Parliamentary Committees:

The Engine of the National Assembly

'We do nothing in chamber other than to dramatize,

and the real business is in the committee'

(Personal Interview, Chief Whip of the DA)

6.0. Introduction

Drawing on the political elite theory of Dahl's (1961) 'Who Governs' this chapter demonstrates that MPs are powerful because of their influence on the executives and reflects the fact that MPs, as the political elite, constitute a small, but significant minority that influences political decisions by either initiating and or impending policies. This the MPs achieve by working in various committees that scrutinize bills. This chapter discusses the roles of MPs in committees and demonstrates how committees are the place where the real work takes place in the South African Parliament, far away from the posturing in the National Assembly.

The importance of the committees as the engine of the Parliament is reflected through MPs who wear many hats, as party representatives in the Parliament, as representatives of constituencies and, in as policy technocrats working in committee. The constituency work

that MPs do is an extension of MPs work in Committee. In this chapter, the types of committees and their roles are elucidated through personal observations of the Committee system in practice in the South African Parliament. These observations took place in the Portfolio Committees on Trade and Industry and Home Affairs. Also, the chapter draws on data collected through interviews, conversations with party researchers and committee secretaries, and through committee documents and other parliamentary primary documents including Hansard.

This chapter unpacks the constitutional provisions that empower the Committees in their roles. It considers the structure, composition and functions of Committees in the Parliament and also the factors that impact on the roles of MPs. I claim that MPs are overstretched in their capacity, working on multiple committees and multiple policy and technical areas simultaneously. This also impacts on the capacity and the effectiveness of the Committees to achieve their mandates to achieve their mandates. The composition of the Committees, the powers that are enshrined in the various parliamentary and party roles and the ways that these intersect, also matters for effective functioning and the extent to which it strengthens or undermines democratic institutions.

Additionally, the challenges faced in the committees by MPs are discussed. These include party ideology, the impact of the proportional representation and the workload of MPs. The challenges manifest especially for smaller parties who struggle to participate effectively. More so, the effectiveness of committees is undermined by the method of appointment of MPs into the committees, some of whom are appointed outside their areas of expertise which affecttheir overall contribution to the parliamentary roles. The functioning of the committee reflects also the power relationships amongst MPs and the relative party strengths. The functioning of the committees, and power relationships amongst the MPs, is guided by the institutional process such as the parliamentary rules and the ethics committees which

regulates MPs behaviours as well as balances party's interests and parliamentary interests. That said, MPs wear many hats for both the public and their party and the institutional parameters mean that the party drives the key agenda. The structure and composition of committees can also undermine the democratic institutions when the dominant party is both the majority, the Chairperson is from the dominant party and the proportional system of representation is viewed alongside the role of the Chief Whip. A series of recommendations are provided to strengthen democracy in South Africa, both for now and the future.

6.1. Parliamentary Committees

Parliament is one of the platforms through which MPs shape policies by representing the people. In carrying out their functions, the MPs work in the Parliamentary Committees. Parliamentary Committees is modelled on the British Parliament. Parliamentary Committee is a cluster of MPs delegated to perform diversified roles that are insufficiently carried out during parliamentary session (Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office, 2015; & Peacey, 2002).

The Committees of Parliament comprise groups of MPs in Parliament appointed by Parliament to carry out certain functions or investigate matters either too complex or too technical for the normal routine of parliamentary business (Mickler, 2017; Mbete, 2016; Kyle & Peacey, 2002). As observed by Mickler (2017) globally, parliaments utilize committees in daily parliamentary operation such as plenary session preparation to achieve efficient policy-making. He adds that the Committees are the prime organizational structures for the preparation of plenary sessions and documents and all parliaments work to a greater extent or lesser extent through them.

Committees in the South Africa context, like political parties, are also proportionally representative of the parties in Parliament (Parliament, 2016). As stated in Chapter Three, South Africa's parliament is bi-cameral comprising of the National Assembly and the

National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (Parliament, 2013). Each of these chambers has their own committees (Parliament, 2013). The dissertation focuses on political elites in the first House; hence the key emphasis is on the Committees in the National Assembly.

In South Africa, MPs conduct their work in plenary sessions, joint sittings and in Committees. A plenary session involves MPs who convergences as one group. In joint sittings, Members of both Houses meet as a group during a joint session (Parliament, 2013). Parliamentary Committees also work in smaller groups as MPs, where they report to the Plenary where policies and decisions are ratified; in the deliberation of Bills, committees debate and vote on such Bills (Parliament, 2010; in session, 2016).

According to an ANC MP, "the main objective of the committee is oversight of the Department, accountability of the Executive and to see if the mandates were fulfilled" (Personal Interview, ANC MP8 and ANC Chief Whip). Away from the public posturing in the Plenary, one MPP stated that "the role of parliament is to legislate for the common good of the people, irrespective of party affiliation" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP, interview 20). Thus the Committees fulfil a significant cross-party role, away from the spotlight placed on Parliamentary Plenaries. The importance of the Committee System is described by the Chief Whip of the Opposition, the DA, who emphasizes that,

> "We do nothing in chamber other than to dramatize, and the real business is in the committee" (Personal Interview, DA Chief Whip). This perspective is shared by MPs across the party. From my observation of the Plenary session and interview with the MPs. The ACDP MP2 MP said, "Committees are not jamboree or drama activities like what you saw yesterday in the Chamber... Committees are beyond party politics" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2).

MPs are also specialists who play a significant role in policy formulation and monitoring what all other state bodies are doing (Obiyo, 2006).

Within the parliamentary process, parliamentary committees play an important role. This is because within the parliamentary process, parliamentary committees play an important role. This includes mechanisms for investigating issues of public concern. Committees also play a pivotal role in making government policy and administrative functions more transparent and accountable, involving parliamentarians more involved in decision-making and oversight, and providing greater access to Parliament for the electorate (Mickler, 2017; Bates, 2010; Alvey, 2008).

According to South African MPs, Parliamentary Committees are the key arena through which work is done. One MP argued,

> "the real work is done in the Committee. You won't see anyone sleeping in committee meetings but you will see people sleeping in Parliament... We discuss and debate on matters before the Committee, different divisions and operation issues. We do oversight visits to know what is on the ground. A Committee Report is then compiled… this is not a party stuff... The document is like a guide to what we have done. There is the Portfolio Committee and the Standing committee. The Standing Committee is a combined two houses committee, depending on the roles of the committee. It is not a lower Committee" (Personal Interview, DA MP5).

The majority of the MPs agreed that the committees are the engine room of the Parliament because the committee draws strategic plans on issues they focus on as indicated in the various perspectives of the MPs in the above quotes. The perspective of the above MP also resonates with Obiyo (2006) who argues that the given the constitutional obligation to Parliament as a fully deliberative and democratic body, the old legislative laws, procedures and activities during old parliamentary regime.

According to Obiyo (2006:53) this was evident in the radical changes of the first five years of Parliament, manifested in the pace in which the Committee System developed. Callan (1999) echoes this in his claim that the first five years of the South African Parliament granted extensive powers to committees under the post 1994 dispensation. This is also indicative that parliamentary committees during this era were vested with power to track, examine, investigate and recommends on any aspect of parliamentary programme, budget, policy and other concerns within the scope of matters referred to the committee concerned (Parliament, 2008; Obiyo, 2006; Murray & Nijzink (2002). In recognition of this, they are also referred to as the 'engines' of Parliament because of the crucial role they perform (Parliament, 2013: 37), driving the parliamentary business forward.

The committee as the 'engine' of Parliament also manifests in the various types of committees in the NA set up. The types of committees are explained in the subsequent section in this chapter. From observation, in Committee, the interests of the people are paramount, unlike in Plenary Sessions where MPs propagate party agenda and ideology. In the Committees ALSO, Parliament's oversight and legislative work come alive through discussion and debates on bills and policies that are debated in the Committee. To a large extent, it may be claimed that these functions protect the rights of citizens and ensure service delivery. The importance of the Committees in South Africa may be seen in the light of Dahl's (1989) arguments that democratic countries exhibit criteria such as the effective participation of citizens, whereby they have adequate and equal opportunities to form their preferences and place questions on the public agenda and express reasons for one outcome over another. Dahl's (1989) argues that democratic countries have the springboard for people to decide the political policies that are deliberated. In South Africa, the principle of public participation is exercised through the Committee System where members of the public can

petition the Committees directly. The multiple centres of power in South Africa - parties, Plenaries and Committees - enable public participation through multiple arenas.

The DA MP2 corroborates on the Committees as a key arena and as the engine room of the Parliament. He states, "in the Committee MPs have greater say because they can speak more at such meetings than in the Parliament where you speak just for 3 minutes" (PersonalInterview, DA MP2). The oversight mechanisms within Committees are not restricted to in-house discussions and MPs frequently engage with the public outside the confines of the Parliamentary buildings. One MP, also from the opposition stated that "We do visit communities to know what problems they are facing and what they want us to do" Personal Interview, DA MP1). Alvey (2008) concurs that a comprehensive system of parliamentary committees provides greater accountability by making the policy and administrative functions of government more open and accountable. The consensus from the majority of the MPs on their roles in committee is that they oversee how various ministries are run and check the excessive tendencies of the Executive. Again, this is realized through direct interaction with people in communities. As one MP stated, "We invite people to explain issues so we make law based on the issues or problem… More importantly, we speak to people on the ground. This involves reading newspapers and other social media to know what is going on... and to visit communities to know what problems they are facing and what they want us to do." (Personal Interview, DA MP1).

6.2. Constitutional Provisions on the Roles of Parliamentary Committees

In performing their duties, the Committees are empowered by the Constitution. The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2016) states that the Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to makes its own rules, orders and to direct its internal proceedings. Each House has a set of rules and orders according to which it operates, while Parliament also has Joint Rules that direct joint business (Parliament, 2016). The National Assembly and its'

Committees also initiate legislation, under certain conditions (Parliament, 2004; Obiyo, 2006; DG McGee, QC, 2002). Obiyo (2006) argues that Rule 152(1) allows the public and the media to attend the meetings of Committees and Sub-Committees, except on certain occasion.

During my fieldwork in the Parliament, it was observed that the Rules of the Assembly ensure orderliness and the smooth running of the House. These provide the etiquette through which business functions. According to one MP, the "Rules of the Assembly guide in the code of conduct so that MPs do not undermine parliamentary activities, decisions and policies, and for the smooth Plenary debate" (Personal Interview, Chief Whip of ANC; supported by the Chief Whip of the DA). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rules under Rule 152(1) of the Assembly that "Committees and Subcommittees meetings are open to the public. I could not attend the Rules Committee, because it was not open to the public but only to senior MPs where the ethical conduct of MPs was discussed. This was because of the nature and sensitivity of the committee, allowing MPs to deliberate openly and freely about specific cases (to make a decision that could then be reported). In such cases, it may be that MPs would feel constrained debating such matters publicly, particularly when party bosses come to re-select members for the next parliamentary list.

6. 3. Types of Committee

The type of committees is indicative of their roles and responsibilities. The Parliament (2016:

109) lists the following committees in the NA as established by the Rules. These include:

The Rules Committee, established by Rule 190.

The Programme Committee, established by Rule 205.

The Disciplinary Committee, established by Rule 216.

The Forum of Committee Chairpersons, established by Rule 221.

The Portfolio Committees that must be established in terms of Rule 225 (these mirror the subject areas or portfolios of the Government Departments).

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts, established by Rule 243.

Ad hoc committees, that may be established in terms of Rule 253.

The Chief Whips' Forum, established by Rule 256.

During my fieldwork in the Parliament, I observed that the committees were of various types and MPs belonged to more than one committee. These committees are the Portfolio Committees, Joint Committees and Select Committees. The Portfolio Committees serve the National Assembly, while Select Committees conduct oversight for the National Council of Provinces (Parliament, 2013; Obiyo, 2006; Harald & Tjønneland, 2001). The MPs that were interviewed for this study belonged to the following Committees: namely the Committee on Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs; the Committee on Land and Rural Development; the Committee on Agriculture; the Committee on Justice and Correctional services; the Committee on Higher Education and Training; and the Committee on Finance.

Harald and Tjønneland (2001) observe that Notice that over 50 committees are consisting of the National Assembly's 27 Portfolio Committees of shadow government departments. They also listed 14 NCOP select committees; seven standing joint committees dealing with issues such as finance and defence; two joint committees; and a changing number of ad hoc committees. Harald and Tjønneland explain that such committees also vary considerably but typically have between fifteen and twenty-five members selected by party whips with the party's parliament representation. Committees also have extensive powers to decide their procedure, order committee chairmen, arrange committee meetings and consult with other parliamentary committees by calling on any institution or individual to submit evidence(Parliament, 2013; Obiyo, 2006; Harald & Tjønneland, 2001).

The large number of Committees alludes to their relative importance in South Africa's democracy. When democracy was ushered in South Africa in 1994, the governing parliamentary committee system was overhauled and the number of its Committee increased (Obiyo, 2006). Obiyo (2006) explains that democratic transition in South Africa was marked by consensus-building and negotiation, which culminated in a parliamentary committee structure where cross-party work flourished and where the ANC did not need to use its majority unlike what was obtainable during the Apartheid government were only 13 committees existed.

Obiyo (2006) argues that during Apartheid government Parliament was defined by secret meetings and hearings; there were restricted powers and basically, the "rubber-stamp" laws brought forward by the Government of the National Party and the State Security Council in power at the time. However, from 1994, Parliamentary Committees were for the first time in South Africa, open to the public and the press.

This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, this indicates that South Africa is a democracy, the proliferation of more committees and ability of the public to participate in the process of policy-making and scrutiny strengthen the mechanisms of access to information, transparency and accountability. Secondly, it indicates the Committee's role in the process of doing democracy and involving the public in the activities of the Parliament. Through the press, the public is also informed of the issues discussed and decisions reached by the Committees. This also indicates how institutions, such as the Chapter 9 institution are effective in South Africa's democracy. As Dahl (1989) and Schumpeter, (1942) highlighted, provisions that go way beyond electoral competition enhance and deepen democracy. These are present in South Africa's transformation from an authoritarian exclusive Apartheid regime to a more participatory inclusive competitive political dispensation.

Viewing this in light of interviews conducted with MPs, there was consensus amongst MPs that 'the party's Electoral College is narrowed simply to the number of seats, and each party decides which MP is to be in which Committee. According to Chief Whip of the DA, "it is the party that decides where or which Committee one can function most effectively... you cannot just wake up and choose the Committee..." (Personal Interview, DA Chief Whip). All parties operate on the same principle in South Africa, selecting where their members serve according to their perceived expertise or interest. As confirmed by the UDM MP, "The MPs are selected by their parties to be in such committee based on the premise that the MP can function effectively" (Personal interview, Chief Whip UDM MP1). This indicates that the parties are concerned with institutional capacity, and confirms Pareto's claims on the circulation of the MPs and rising capacities that enable them to function as elites.

Notwithstanding this, the importance of having a legal background, or being able to understand legal and technical information in performing parliamentary roles was highlighted. A DA MP stress that these backgrounds are important in fulfilling the roles and duties. He express that "a legal background is important to have meaningful debate and contribution on issues affecting the people" (Personal Interview, DA MP6). This may also be fulfilled through the party researchers who provide important information to MPs on documents that has a legal or technical background.

6.3.1. Portfolio Committees

"Every department has a Portfolio committee and the Portfolio committee is the engine room of the parliament" (Personal Interview, ANC MP4). According to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2017) the NA committee is thirty-seven (37) while NCOP is ten (10). In the NA, Portfolio committees usually supervise departments, executives and Ministries. Being representatives of the people, committee members decide how government

departments deliver on their promises and if they use taxpayer's money judiciously (Sicetsha, 2019). The committee is also tasked with votes on bills covering the jurisdiction of the department, to track and report also annually on budget and strategic plans (Sicetsha, 2019). Committees can also make site visits as part of their oversight function, where they can find out directly from the people at ground level whether the government delivers its promises (Parliament, 2016). Therefore, much of the work of the Committee is undertaken in committees, but the House makes final decisions on all matters. When a special task is to be undertaken, the parliament selects an ad hoc committee but is dissolved once their task is completed (Parliament, 2016; Parliament, 2009). These Committees are often appointed in an emergency or in an urgent situation to be resolved. Committees keep on running whether there is parliamentary sitting or not.

The overview on portfolio committees also indicates how MPs have power, through their committee work, to shape political outcomes and that the interest of the people frequently come first in committee while party interests are set aside. This is also clear through the appointment of a Special Task Team to explore claims made against former President Zuma while he was in power.

I observed the importance of the committee during my visit to the Committee on Trade and Industry [32].At the Committee on Trade and Industry there is robust debate and non-partisan

[32]The Committee on Trade and Industry is one of the thirty-two committees in the NA. During my visit to the parliament and the committee on Trade and Industry, the composition of the committee is comprised by MPs from different political parties. They are Mr. Andre Hermans (Secretary); Ms. Joanmariae Fubbs (Chairperson), ANC; Anton Alberts,(FF+); Mr. Ghaleb Cachali (DA); Mr. Jan Esterhuizen(IFP); Mr. Geordin Hill-Lewis (DA); Mr. Nqabayomzi Kwankwa (UDM); Mr. Mosiuoa Lekota(COPE); Mr. Dean Macpherson (DA); Mr. Mbangiseni Mahlobo (ANC); Ms Priscilla Mantashe,(ANC); Mr. Simanga MbuyaneButane (ANC); Ms Elsabe

Ntlangwini , Louw (EFF); Mr. Nyiko Shivambu (EFF); Ms. Lerato Theko (ANC) and Mr. Adrian Williams (ANC).

The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2017) statistics shows that the Trade and Industry in 2014 has held 29 meetings (62% attendance rate), 59 meetings was held(60%)in 2015;48 meetings (64% attendance rate) in 2016; 56 meetings (63% attendance rate) in 2017 and 27 meetings (81% attendance rate) in 2018.

discussed. It was observed that the interests of the people come first while party interests are set aside. In these committee meetings, the Director Generals of the Departments are summoned and called to give an account of their office. The Chairperson also acts as the moderator for the Committee and reads the minute of the last meeting to the MPs while the secretary takes notes. The committee also responds to various written comments submitted by the public and listens to presentations from the industry and public.

Based on the on these comments and presentations, the Committees make recommendations. I observed also that, despite working in a cross-party manner, when the DG is called to account, the MPs in the dominant party are less vocal. For example, the ANC MPs were more lenient during the questioning of the Deputy Director of Trade and Industry.

Theoretically, the size of the party matters in the Committee as members can by a simple vote in a dominant party democracy vote out the opposition. However, most committees operate based on consensus, a set of principles that was developed during the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum during South Africa's democratic transition. However, if it was a critical matter, the majority party can outvote all others.

6.3.2. Joint Committees

Several joint committees are mutually appointed by the NA and the NCOP guided by rules of the parliament, constitution and an Act of Parliament. An example is the Constitutional Review Committee (Parliament, 2016). Similarly, in the Committee, the MPs discuss and debate different department, issues and work together. An agreement is reached through consensus, although the MPs in Committee might vote or not on a particular decision. The MPs work in a joint committee, as finding also reveals that ''MPs can belong to more than a Committee known as the primary Committee and alternate Committee. In the primary Committee, MPs have a voting right, while in alternate Committee member has no voting right but rather act like representative when the member is not available'' (per. Interview, UDM MP1). According to UDM MP2, ''Voting is not necessarily needed in the Committee but there is agreement on issues through consensuses because the issues are people-oriented '' (UDM MP2).

From the above, it can be deduced that the functioning of the committee reflects the power relationships such as agenda-setting and work ethics. It also shows how the MPs work together to influence, and achieve a political outcome. This is significant because, despite the MPs party ties and partisan power, interactions amongst MPs during the parliamentary proceedings increase transparency and accountability. Secondly, the institutional process guides and regulates the political behaviour of the MPs which also minimizes conflicts of interest among MPs. This is also in recognition that in the parliament, the interests of different MPs are represented through political parties. Moreover, drawing from the political elite theory of Dahl (1961) on 'Who Governs', it is apparent that the MPs have the power to hold executives accountable. It also appears that the political elites constitute a small, but significant minority that influences political decisions by either initiating or impeding policies. In the committees, the MPs are compelled to work together on most issues through consensus-seeking to influences the NA agenda.

6.3.3. Multiparty Committees

Multiparty Committees listen to the voices of all the participants, and their divergent views (Parliament, 2016). The Committee reacts to proposals and report tabled before it in several ways, including further review by "noting," adoption "amendment "or" referral to the Committee (Parliament, 2016). The Parliament (2016; 2009) points out that committee report is considered for debates which undergo motion whereby the Speaker seeks suggestions from the executives. Moreover, when the executive suggestion is given, it is reported back to the committee. According to Parliament (2009:31) "once a report has been adopted by the house, the Speaker communicates the recommendations of the House to the relevant Minister and copies the relevant House Chairperson, Portfolio Committee Chairperson and Director-General. The Speaker also requests the Minister to direct his or her responses to the Speaker for formal tabling".

From the above, it could be deduced that the functioning of the committee, power relationships and interaction between the different MPs from different parties are guided by the institutional process. This also serves as a control and check on the power of the Executive, thereby power is not skewed in the favour of the Executive and a balance is created between a party's interest and Parliament's interest. This also corroborates with the political elite theory of Dahl in Who Governs (1961). Dahl states that the MPs have the power to hold the executive accountable, and accountability takes centre-stage, as one of the core roles of the Parliament. This is unlike the Parliamentary Plenary Sittings where the MPs make a less meaningful contribution. Thus, how the Committee's function strengthens democratic institutions. Secondly, it reflects that political elites significantly influence political decisions. Through bargaining, the political elites perform a mediating and adjusting

role between various MPs reflecting different party interests. This on the long run shapes the character of the MPs as political elites. This also disciplines the MPs and minimizes unparliamentarily behaviour so as not to undermine democratic institutions.

6.3.4. Internal Committees

The internal committees consist of senior Members of Parliament charged with the effective administration and daily activities of the Parliament (Parliament, 2009). There are several internal committees. Examples are the Rules Committee and its sub-committees that deal with House rules, the budget of the House, support for Members, internal arrangements, and powers and privileges of members. Other internal Committees are the Programme Committee that plans the work of the Assembly, the Disciplinary Committee, and the Committee of Chairpersons (Parliament, 2016: 109). The internal committees form the power base of the Parliament. It is pertinent to say that without these committees, parliamentary debates and other functions will not be successfully implemented. Similarly, the NA rule guides the activities of both the NA and its Committees based on agreement amongst political parties and parliamentary office-bearers (Parliament, 2016). The rules are also reviewed by the Rules Committee (Parliament, 2016).

The Rules Committee, for instance, is established by the National Assembly Rule 190 (Parliament, 2016: 109). It is headed by the ANC Chief Whip (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). The Rules Committee ensures that rules and order are adhered to by the MPs (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). The code of conduct disapproves of any MPs to use legislative mechanisms to undermine institutional decisions and policies (Parliament, 2016; Harald & Tjønneland, 2001). Hence, to enhance the smooth running of the Parliament, the Rules Committee determines the activities and arrangement of other committees (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). In 2015, the Rules Committee held 21 meetings; in 2016, 11 meetings with 40% attendance, in 2017, 2 meetings with 61% attendance and 4 meetings

with an attendance rate of 95% in 2018. The level of attendance in committee has increased each year (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016).

6.3.5. The Public Accounts Committee

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts of the National Assembly serves as the Parliament's watchdog on how the government spends taxpayers ' money (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016). The Auditor-General tables report annually on the finances and financial management of the variousdepartments and institutions of government (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). The Committee also regularly calls on Heads of Government Departments and Agencies to monitor and account for spending (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). The Committee can recommend that the National Assembly takes corrective actions if necessary (Parliament, 2016). The Public Accounts Committee acts as a watchdog to curtail and scrutinize the spending of the Executive. Senior party MPs are appointed by political parties in this committee to defend the party's interests(Parliament, 2016). Reiterating on the importance of this Standing Committee, one MP states,

> "The Standing Committee is not particularly limited to a Department. The Committee is subject to improvement… for example, the functions of municipalities in terms of budget allocation... We check on the municipality for self-delivery... We find out that often the municipality is not strong enough... Municipalities must not view us as if they are the little brother of government... They are integral part of the government...
>
> All development is local... You need to get to the grassroots... Municipalities need to go back to basics where the need of the people is paramount... There is duplication of functions of government..." (Personal Interview, IFP MP5).

In the same vein, working in a Committee of the House increases the participation of MPs to work effectively because in a smaller group, a huge amount of work that can be done. MPs in the Public Accounts Committee discuss in-depth and debate on issues because of the availability of time that is unavailable in the plenary sessions. This is vital because to a large extent the majority of the Bills are debated in Committee, whether they are passed into law or not. Thirdly, MPs also work in their areas of interest, occupational background and expertise. Working in Committees also, MPs draw on their varied educational specializations, occupational background and political experiences in carrying out their work.

Findings also reveal that the MPs belong to more than one committee. An MP expressed that he belonged to nine committees. The Committees are platforms also for the public to be involved in representative and participatory government because the public directly expresses their views and influence the outcome of the decisions of Parliament. Based on personal observations of the Committee in practice, the public participates through public hearings, oral hearings and submissions on draft legislation, either in person, by post delivered by hand and online.

The public is also involved in parliamentary activities through their input in bills. This is demonstrated in when a bill is presented at the NA, it is sent to the appropriate portfolio committee, and such a bill is advertised by the Committee for written submission, oral submission as well as public hearing from the public(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; 2019). Based on submissions from the public, the Committee, NA and interested parties deliberate on the tabled issues.

In light of the above with my visit to the parliament, from observation, the public sits in the gallery section in the Parliament to observe parliamentary proceedings. This alludes to the fact that public hearings are free and the public is also allowed free entry into the parliament.

While in the committee meetings, the public has limited access. Given also that my fieldwork in Parliament also coincided with the former President Zuma's State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 20th May 2016, the public presence was huge. This is also significant because the subsequent section of this chapter, mentioned earlier that SONA is one of oversight mechanism. Secondly, the work of Parliament and its Committees is underpinned by public engagement as a measure of participatory government. This is also because the input of the public on government policies and legislation is crucial in a consolidated democracy. In essence, one of the hallmarks of a democratic government is public participation because public participation is noticeable in Parliament's tasks (Parliament, 2016; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016). Arguably, when the MPs belong to many committees, it affects their effectiveness and efficiency because of their work overload. From observation also, it was deduced that smaller parties are also significantly affected because they do not have enough MPs to represent them at the different committees. The workload of committees also impacts on the proportion of time MPs scrutinize documents due to time constraints. That said, the MPs who were interviewed stressed that the Committee System in the South African Parliament is effective. This alludes to MPs working in their area of interest and passion for their work which propels them to work long hours to be effective.

6. 4. Roles of Parliamentary Committees

Parliamentary committees are vital in the parliament because of their roles in carrying out the task of the parliament (Parliament, 2013; Bates, 2010; Alvey, 2008). Committees are also empowered in their role by the Constitution to expedite government oversight and control by enacting legislation, reviewing and amending the proposals submitted by the Executive to ensure accountability of executives as well (Mickler, 2017; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016; Bates, 2010; Calland, 1999). Because of its size and varied

specialization working in committees is beneficial for both MPs and NA. As summed by the Parliament (1999:1) the benefits of working in Committees allows Parliament to:

(i) Carry out more work is done because of its small size of MPs.

(ii) Guarantee a more thorough discussion of issues than in plenary sessions.

(iii) MPs participation in discussion increases.

(iv) Ensure a more thorough discussion of issues than in plenary sessions because MPs are involved with their area of expertise

(v) Afford MPs the platform to present their views directly to MPs, unlike what unobtainable in NA plenary sitting.

(vi) Offer a platform where MPs gather information and data about a particular committee's work.

Hence the above suggests that the roles of parliamentary committees are varied depending on the nature of such committee. An IFP MP explains, for example, that a "Standing Committee is not particularly limited to a department which deals with oversight of the Department" (Personal Interview, IFP MP) and "there are certain portfolios that have an impact on different levels" (Personal Interview, DA MP3).

Committees are also empowered to summon executives to give an account of their office through various techniques of oversight, such as briefing sessions, reviews of departmental budgets, strategic plans of departments, annual reports, public hearings and expenditures (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; 2010; 1999; Parliament, 2013). During my visit to the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, the Committee had summoned the Former Minister of Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba but he was absent and the reason provided was that he was attending to other ministerial duties. The absent Minister sent his Personal Assistant which angered the Committee, because they could not under these circumstances conduct

their oversight function as effectively as they had wished to. This also indicates that clashes in ministerial and parliamentary business have such an effect across the system.

Committees employ different methods of conducting oversight, such as briefing sessions, analyses of departmental budgets, strategic plans of departments and annual reports, public hearings and spending (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016; 2010; 1999; Parliament, 2009). For instance, during my fieldwork visits to the Committee on Trade and Industry, the Committee summoned the Deputy-Director (DD) of Trade and Industry, I observed during the question and answer posed to DD, and it was easier for him to address the queries posed to him by the ANC, the party he comes from. But it was difficult for him to address the questions posed to him by the opposition party (DA). This was also because the ANC were more lenient during their questioning of the DD. The format of the summons occurs through inquiries, cross-examining, writing a report and making a recommendation.

The Committee System also provides Members with the opportunity to enhance their knowledge on key issues in which they are specialized, working in a Committee for a long period also implies that the MPs are exposed to the subject area of the Committee where they work in depth. Through Committee System, the MPs are also acquainted with the subject matter to effectively participate and carry out their role. Their specialization improves the capacity of the MPs as they become more acquainted with the portfolio, and thus ensure they are able to monitor effectively.

A significant proportion of the MPs also belonged to a multiple Committees. One ACDP MP belonged to a total of nine parliamentary committees and has served in most committees that exist in the Parliament. This is because the MPs have a small number of seats at the NA. This also suggests that the committee's work also overlap.

Working in committee also shows the power relations amongst the MPs and illustrates how MPs through their positions in the Committee influence policy-planning and exert considerable power on government decisions. An EFF MP stated that they act with one voice in the Committee when he said, "there is no competition because the party ideology guides us in our contribution in various committees" (Personal Interview, EFF MP). This corroborates Michels (1966) view on his discussion of oligarchy that from amongst the same, or connected, political elites not all of them can make decisions through participatory democracy, despite the entrenchment of democracy. Mickler (2017), notes that party interests affect the structure of committees at the NA and that this is particularly true if decisions of the dominant party comprised of majority influence the NA outcomes. From the overview, the various committees serve different purposes and play a crucial role as the engine room of the parliament in terms of policies, bills scrutiny and oversight functions.

6.4.1. MPs and their Functions in Committee

The formulation of law is one of the key roles carried out in the committees. Much of the oversight over the executive is done through committees, particularly the portfolio committees (Parliament, 2013). As an MP argues, "We perform oversight on a range of matters including constitutional provisions like the Public Protector, Human Rights Commission and Legal Aid Board..." (Personal Interview ACDP MP2).

MPs also stated a variety of perceptions about what constitutes their role. The only MPs that expressed this in partisan terms were the EFF MPs. In terms of their function, one EFF MP opined that, "I represent the voice of the party, what keeps us awake is the party manifesto, our views are backed by conference decisions..." (Personal Interview, EFF MP1). Another MP claimed, "Our mandate is to oversee development in terms of our policies through house allocation of expenditure in the country" (Personal Interview, EFF MP2).

All other MPs interviewed spoke widely of the non-partisan nature of the committees. The importance of the committee in terms of the accountability and oversight function is expressed by the ANC Chief Whip who states that "Committees takes care of things behind the scenes and try to find consensus... Parliament is focused on ideology and party policies but in the Committee the people matter. The highest priority is the masses; we are very focused on the pragmatic situation" (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). Despite being the party in power, these views were shared across the political spectrum.

In terms of performing their functions, MPs indicated an overwhelming consensus that they did engage fully in the processes that this entails. For example, in the words of a UDM MP, "We summon the Director Generals of Ministries to account and answer questions based on reports and complaints of the people" (Personal Interview, UDM MP4). Moreover, these involve following up where Departments are not functioning as they should or producing the results. According to a DA MP, "My Committee meets once in a week… we often summon Directors of ministries found wanting or performing poorly" (Personal Interview, DA MP4). In essence, most MPs talked about the necessity of their committee role as driven by a deeper, and frequently personal, desire to ensure that the poorest South Africans are receiving necessary services. An ANC MP referred to this. The MP said,

> "Our main objective here is to ensure service delivery in the legal framework of the Constitution. The role of the Committees is beyond party politics. We are for serious business ... More so, we ensure that these agencies get enough funds to function and we supervise indirectly the way the funds are utilized... This is done by summoning the Director-General once in a while to answer questions in the Committee" (Personal Interview, ANC MP8).

In my observations on the Committees in Parliament, some Directors-Generals were summoned to appear to account. In one instance for example, the Director-General of the

Department of Home Affairs was summoned several times to explain issues about immigration and porous borders. Alvey (2006) concurs that the Committees through their roles enhance the democratic process by taking the Parliament to the people and giving them a role in its operations.

The combinations of these functions are important in curbing the excessiveness of the executive arm of the government (Personal Interview, ACDP MP1). This functions are also crucial in protecting the interests of the public. This is because the MPs represent and articulate the interest of the people at the local level; their consistencies. The MPs also articulate the interest of the people at national level.

6.4.2. Committees and Oversight Functions

The MPs in the discharge of their accountability and oversight functions are empowered by the Constitution (1996). As personally observed during my fieldwork, the Deputy Director of the Trade and Industry was summoned to provide an account' of actions in the Department. Based on the summons, the Deputy Director was informed that he would be summoned again if necessary should amends not be made (Personal Observation, Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry). However, within Parliament there is not a complete separation of power as Ministers are also MPs. This makes checks and balances on the exercise of executive power difficult. This also has the possibility to hinder accountability and oversight functions of committees.

The committees as the engine of the parliament also performs crucial role in terms of its oversight and budget fiscal oversight functions. The Oversight Model became agreed to in precept in March 2008, however the National Assembly had followed the oversight version

on 19 March 2009 to make certain that there was political consensus amongst political elites at NA (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016) .

In light of this, there was consensus among the MPs on the roles of committee as them being representative of the masses, ensuring accountability of executives, and providing a check on budgetary allocations and spending. One MP argues that the "Parliament is involved with oversight committee, set rules for Committee-Chair and Reviews, to see to how the Parliament utilize financial and physical resources" (Personal Interview, ANC MP1).

In line with the findings above, Obiyo (2006:64) points out that "the actual powers committees have in law-making and the oversight process is essentially about matching formal powers with the capacity to utilize such powers".

Moreover, the MPs work is not limited to the Parliament because they also carry out their work at their constituency. The Parliament (2019) parliamentary Monitoring Group point out that the committees conduct oversight visit to:

  (i)   Detect challenges during oversight visit .

  (ii)   Offers recommendations based on identified challenges

  (iii)   Proffer solutions to identified problems and likeable solutions

  (iv)   Solving identified issues through policy recommendations.

  (v)   Report back to Parliament to describe the issues explicitly and to explain the process how evidence was gathered.

Thus the report of the committees is based on empirical facts. A further check is also carried out if a Committee is not effectively performing its oversight function as the opposition would raise this in a plenary session.

6.4.3. Committees and Budget Fiscal Oversight

Budget fiscal oversight is also one of the roles the committees perform. A budget is a compilation of document that indicates the future financial plan of the government (Parliament, 2016; Mbete, 2016).Through budget inequality and wealth redistribution amongst citizens is addressed (Parliament, 2011:11). During the budget oversight process, the Appropriation Bill is presented every year in February (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). Thus, every year, the presented budget is forwarded to the relevant committees for review when the appropriate committee receives a briefing from the National Treasury (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). Budget fiscal oversight involves the political process that examines competing needs for limited resources; the economic process that examines resource allocation; and the administrative process deals that with coordination (Parliament, 2011:8-9).

According to the National Treasury (2018; 2019) documents used for budgetary oversight include Medium Term Strategic Framework; the State of the Nations Addresses of the current year and previous years; budget speeches and all budget documents of both current and previous years; and speeches by ministers and accounting officers. Additional documents are presentations to committees of Parliament such as financial expenditure reports; current and past annual performance plans; National Treasury documents; and the Auditor-General's reports (National Treasury, 2018; 2019). During budget oversight, money allocation and the amount to be spent on resources is deliberated on (Mbete, 2016; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016).

For instance, the Budget Fiscal oversight instrument such as the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act came into effect in April 2009 (Parliament, 2019; 2009). The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act empower the NA to amend the budget and other money bills before Parliament (Parliament, 2019; 2009). South Africa

changed from a single budget year to a multi-budget framework to the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 1997 (Mbete, 2016; Obiyo, 2016; National Treasury, 1998). According to the National Treasury (1998;1) the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) sets out the national and regional government's three-year spending plans. It seeks to ensure that the budgets represent the social and economic objectives of the government on development and reconstruction. The Standing Committees on Appropriations and on Finance also plays a crucial role in Budget Fiscal oversight. The Bills are debated by Parliament before they are signed into law by the President (Parliament, 2019).

Mbete (2016) and Parliament (2019) explains the process involved in Budget Fiscal oversight. This involves tabling the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS). The Minister of Finance presents the budget speech for the subsequent fiscal year in February (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2016). The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) outlines the National and Provincial governments ' three-year expenditure plans (Mbete, 2016; Parliament, 2016).

Also through the Budgetary Review and Recommendation Reports (BRRR), the Committee on Appropriations deliberates and report on the MTBPS to the House in November of each year (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016). The BRRR is submitted to the Minister of Finance and the portfolio Minister (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016). Mbete (2016) emphasize that through the MTEF the executive plans projects and allocates the resources to achieve strategic priorities. The budget details and targets are tabled to the Parliamentary Committees to ensure that government plans and performance are consistent with the priorities set out in the strategic plans and the MTEF (Mbete, 2016; National Treasury, 1998).

6.5. The Constituency: As an Extension of MPs work in Committee

MPs work also entails working in the constituency, a representative democracy whereby MPs articulates the views of the electorate at the level of the constituency (Calland, 1999). The importance of the constituency in the discharge of MPs duties is reflected in its weekly activity whereby the MPs visit their constituency every Monday MPs go to their constituencies (Peoples Assembly, 2015; Insession, 2013). The constituency is important because MPs are allocated constituencies by their party who selected them through the party-list system. The Constituency is also the platform the MPs, as representatives of the people, interact with the public. In the words of UDM Chief Whip "as a member of the legislature, you become a voice of the constituency" (Personal Interview, UDM Chief Whip).

 There are also 350 constituency offices across South Africa where MPs interact with the public (Peoples Assembly, 2015; Insession, 2013). Due to Cabinet decision, Parties represented in the Parliament have constituency offices and an allowance for the political party (Middleton, 2015:8). The constituency allowance was put in place since 1978 to establish an infrastructure for the benefit of the constituents (Middleton, 2015:9). Section 57(2) of the Constitution 1996 states "financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the Assembly in proportion to its representation". Hence, Constituency offices and allowance for political parties ensure the MPs perform their duties effectively by bolstering the relationship between the NA, MPs and the public.

Parliament (2013) highlights that parliament's allowances for constituency work in 2013/2014 totalled R243 million. The allowance was appropriated to the four largest parties. This included the ANC (R160 million), the DA (R41million), COPE (R20 million) and the IFP (R10 million). Parties with few seats in the parliament allocate large areas to their MPs (Parliament, 2009). The allowances affect small parties and the type of projects they execute. The more projects, parties boost their chance in the upcoming elections. Small parties also

have few constituencies because the MPs are few, unlike large parties that have many constituencies. To a large extent, constituencies play a vital role in enabling the public to become active citizens to participate in parliamentary activities.

It is not only because of the representative function and enhancement of participatory democracy role that the MPs have that necessitates constituency work. But because the MPs are appointed by parties to represent the party ideology and to deliver the dividend of democracy to the people. They equally serve as a link between the party and the government. This is corroborated by one of the MPs view that "going to the constituency is not compulsory, but it can affect MPs who do not go as their names might be removed from the party list and not voted in the next election" (Personal Interview, DA MP). Thus, political elites in South Africa fulfil the bargaining model identified by Dahl, whereby political elites negotiate the role between various sectors in the society. As long as they do so, Dahl notes, political elites will continue in power due to the continued support given to them by the masses.

6.6. Factors That Shape the Committees Functions

This section examines the factors that shape the functions of committees including challenges and barriers that weaken the effectiveness of the committees. The discussion was drawn extensively from my fieldwork through interviews and attendance of committees meetings. The legislative mandates of the Committees are often impeded because of various barriers or challenges. I summarize these factors below based on the recurring themes that emerged from interviews conducted with the MPs. These include ANC dominance in committee settings; social composition such as educational background; committee composition; the intervening role of opposition parties, political ideology, competition and reforms.

6.6.1. Social Composition (Educational Background)

The educational background of MPs is a key factor that affects the appointment of MPs into committees and impacts significantly on democracy. This is significant because education plays a vital role in the endorsement of democracy in developing societies and in the support of democratic values. This is because MPs with lesser qualifications tend to contribute less in parliamentary Committees meetings.

Education is important for MPs in functioning in the committee as I pointed out in chapter five. Parties also take this seriously, but it appears to be a factor of very particular significance for the DA and the IFP who have appointed MPs with high levels of qualifications. Parties also employ diverse methods to select their MPs. These include interviews, competency tests, a consideration of records of accomplishment and skills to select candidates. The selection of the MPs is also to ensure a transparent selection system and fairness to all members of the party.

For example,

> "the process in the DA is very involved. You apply. There is a serious process of elimination e.g. interviews, speech writing and a test on legislation, policies and political awareness... You make a speech in the front of the selection panel. There is PME, which implies performance management evaluation. It involves meeting standards. Then there is your involvement… these are added to give you a mandate..." (Personal Interview, DA MP 8).

Another DA MP3 states that "To be in the Parliament, I wrote a test and did an oral interview... You also make a speech and the panel gives you mark..." (Personal Interview,

DA MP3). These two methods of test writing and oral interviews are particular only to the DA.

Findings also indicates that some parties select their MPs through Curriculum Vitae (CV). The overview of the MPs selection suggests that they are selected on different criteria such as their educational and professional background; political experience with party activities and constituencies and commitment to party principles and ideologies. The role of education is paramount to members being able to contribute to the deliberations in committee meetings. Equally, important is the MPs occupation during their recruitment. This is because some occupations are recognized as being 'conducive to politics' (Norris & Lovenduski 1995:16). Norris & Lovenduski (1995:16) considers such occupation being useful in political life. The occupations are related to "generous vacations, professional independence, financial security, public networks, social status, policy experience and technical skills" (Norris & Lovenduski 1995:165).

Some parties during the recruitment processes emphasize MPs skills related to educational backgrounds and occupations (such as the DA). Other parties focus more on public popularity and community-based leadership (such as the EFF). Obiyo (2006) emphasized the importance of expertise to carry out parliamentary duties. According to Obiyo (2006), the Parliamentary Committees participate in all the MTEF budget and Money Bills, but the MPs lack technical capacity particularly on budget fiscal oversight. In light of this, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2016) suggests that to help with these difficulties, Section 15 of the Act set up a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO). PBO gives autonomous, expert examination and guidance to Parliament and its Committees on issues identified with the financial limit and Money Bills. This was also preceded by the establishment of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act of 2009 (Act 9 of 2009). Act 9 (2009) states that the MPs can offer a suggestion, but not all of them need to do so (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016).

Furthermore, from my observations when I attended some of the committee meetings, some MPs contributed less to the committee debates. Others simply signed the attendance register and excused themselves from the meetings. The MPs attitude tallies with Pareto's (1968:38) elite circulation theory, that MPs' qualities opportune them with access to power. This may be the case, but those qualities (education, occupation) is a common route to politics but insufficient. For opposition parties with small numbers of seats at the NA, attending committee meeting is crucial, beyond signing the register. Because the MPs are elected based on how active they are in committee meetings. However, this seems less important for the majority party who have large numbers of the seat and have the power to outvote, should they need to.

6.6.2. Committee Composition

The composition of committees is also important for the functioning of the committees and the extent to which it strengthens or undermines democratic institutions. From the interviews, it was deduced that the MPs pass laws, perform Oversight on constitutional bodies such as the Public Protector, Human Rights Commission and the Legal Aid Board. The MPs to a large extent have experience in legislative function at the national level and align their party roles with institutional roles. Party ideology also determines the policies that the MPs tilt to and support. Obiyo (2006:64) argues that "the actual powers committees have in law-making and the oversight process is essentially about matching formal powers with the capacity to utilize such powers". He contends that for "these engines" to run efficiently a combination of factors are needed.

The number of committees that MPs belong to also affects the effectiveness of the MPs in the committees. As discussed previously, there are different MPs who attend just one committee and others who attend up to nine committees. Parties who possess very few seats have to

attend more committees and need to specialize in all of them. These are also prevailing conditions that undermine the ability of some MPs to fully participate effectively. As one UDM MP said, "We are not a young party... with very few of us in Parliament... This makes it imperative for me to belong to various Committees...' This causes inefficiency as a result of workload and time constraints that impact on my participation in the committee meetings" (Personal Interview, UDM MP).

An MP from the UDM also cited examples of smaller parties such as COPE and the ACDP, with just 3 MPs spread across some of the committees. He mentioned that the MPs are usually absent from some of the meetings. Despite the importance of the Committees as the place in which real parliamentary business takes place, the Deputy Chief Whip of the DA points out that "the structure and composition of committees most times favour the ANC" (Personal Interview DA Deputy Chief Whip). This is because the chairperson of each committee is selected by the majority party (ANC). Because their numbers, the ANC occupies the majority seats in the Parliament and also holds the positions of Chairpersons of the Parliamentary Committees. Many MPs believed that the position of Chairperson enables the party to utilize the power within the committee to favour the position of the party from which they come. An ACDP MP argued that the "ruling party controls most activities in the committee" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP2).

Similarly, a DA MP expresses that "the number of MPs from the ruling party strengthens the dominance of the ruling party in the committee meetings" (Personal Interview, DA MP7). The overview suggests that the ANC determine the outcomes of policies because of their position as the Chairperson and having many of their MPs in various committees.

The dominance of the ANC and their influence in committees is attributed to the system of proportional representation. As it was demonstrated in the subsequent chapter that the system of proportional representation ensures that MPs are more accountable to their parties than to

the voters. This also undermines democratic institutions and hinders the effectiveness of the committee in several ways. Firstly, the MPs are chosen by parties, thus they tend to focus more on party activities and party roles than the constituency that elected them. This implies that even in their committees' roles, the MPs tend to put the party first, instead of their constituency where participatory democracy occurs. Secondly, this has implications on the quality of debates, policy and legislation. Thirdly, the question of check and balances becomes stifled and impractical, which in turn undermine democratic institutions.

The perspectives of the MPs corroborate Dahl's proposition that the ruling elites are a subset of people whose preferences take precedence regularly when there are disparities on important political matters. This alludes to some MPs given greater opportunities than other MPs to express their views because their policy preferences will likely prevail. Daniel and Silkstone (2007:2) point out that accountability and oversight by parties are weak because of the close links between the executive and legislature. They reiterate that South Africa's party-based system hinders the committee oversight function because the executive is elected by the parliament and by the majority party leadership, although, mechanisms such as quarterly reports and annual report were put in place to address the challenges of non-compliance by executives (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2016).

6.6.3 Chief Whip and Party Whips

Party Whips contribute significantly to the smooth running of the Legislature and the Committees (Mickler, 2018). They act in the interests of their party and ensure the discipline of the MPs (Parliament, 2016; Mickler, 2018). They also ensure the smooth running of both their party and the parliament (Parliament, 2016; Mickler, 2018). From observation, when I attended the Committee on the Police and the Ethics Committee, it was deduced that Party Whip consists of Whips from different parties who are represented across different

committees. Each party has their Party Whip. There is also the Chief Whip who is responsible for all the Party Whips.

The Chief Whips are from the ANC, the largest party; and the Chief Whip from the opposition party, the DA (Mickler, 2018; Parliamentary Monitory Group, 2016; Parliament, 2016). The Chief Whips are formally appointed by the Speaker, based on the recommendations of all the political parties. The Chief Whip is the most senior party Whip, with the ultimate responsibility for the actions of all the MPs in the party.

According to the DA Chief Whip, the role of the Chief whip is to ensure that members abide by the Rules of the Assembly and these rules are enforced through the Rules Committee. The Chief Whips serves as "a bridge between the party and the MPs. He or she ensures members participate, protect party policies in parliamentary debates and at the level of the Committees" (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). According to the ANC Chief Whip, "the ruling party usually nominates someone with experience for the office of the Chief Whip because of the nature of the work to be done... a novice in the political structures of the party may not be appointed as Chief Whip of the party" (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). In the appointment of the Chief Whip, the ANC looks at experience and past records of MPs, including their positions on party policies" (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip).

Data from interviews and observations during my fieldwork suggests that the Chief Whip carry out two distinct roles. These roles are intertwined to the institution (parliament) and the party. At the parliament, the Chief Whip ensures the smooth running of parliamentary debates and the conduct of the MPs. On the other hand, at the party level, they ensure that part policies adhere to. The responsibility of the chief Whip includes "ensuring that... in the case of the ANC, ANC MPs adhere to party policies..." (ANC). The Chief Whip core duties are combined with many other duties. Members often convey their grievances and challenges to the Chief Whip who ensures that the party caucus listens to the message of MPs. Thus the

Chief Whip acts as a mediator between parliament and party. The Chief Whip responsibilities also include ensuring that the rules of the NA are adhered to by all MPs. The overall coordination and management of all whippery activities are also vital functions of the Chief Whip. To do so, they work with other parties. For example, "the Chairperson of the DA Parliamentary Caucus manages the meetings between the DA MPs in the party, ensures there is unity, cohesion, and a focus on the party's agenda in the Parliament" (Personal Interview, DA Chief Whip). The DA Chief Whip emphasized that

> "It is always tough and challenging trying to manage a big group of people with different opinions and mindsets... Some people don't want the Parliament to work while others want it" (Personal Interview, DA Chief Whip). An ANC MP stated that ' in this work, the way committees usually work, we usually disagree... At times we vote, when there are some issues... But usually, when we deal with defence and security, it is difficult to disagree..." (Personal Interview, ANC MP).

The Chief Whip of the majority party assumes all the responsibilities of the whippery in the Parliament, including that of opposition parties. They also act as an intermediary between the party and the opposition party and is responsible for the allocation of time for opposition parties in debates. In an internal Chief Whips Forum, the Chief Whip of the majority party chairs the meeting. They also coordinate the plenary activities with the Chief Whip from the opposition to ensure that the programmes of the House (Parliament) are in order. Forty (40) Whips both in the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces, report to the Chief Whip (Personal Interview, ANC MP). To ensure the smooth running of the Parliament, the Chief Whip submits the Parliament programme to the Speaker after consultation with the other Whips. The Chief Whip who is also the party Whip of the ANC ensures the ANC MPs participate in parliament activities and adhere to party policies, similarly, the Chief Whip of the opposition works with the Chief Whip from the ANC to coordinate the other whips of

other represented parties in the Parliament. He also checks the excesses of the ruling party on the Floor (Parliamentary Debates) and at the Committee level.

In addition to these extensive roles, the Chief Whip is responsible for the political management, political guidance and political education of all ANC members. The Chief Whip also ensures that the collective decisions of the ANC are adhered to and that legislative programme is delivered accordingly to the agreed timetables. They are also responsible for discipline both in the House and discipline of the party caucus. Thus the Chief Whip has substantial responsibilities and also substantial power. While the Committees curtail the power of the Executive, the Chief Whip ensures that the MPs from the majority party in the same committees act following the party policies.

The powers and functions of the Chief Whip in this context corroborates Michel's (1966) argument that inevitably, all institutions are run by a 'leadership class'. All of these mechanisms are used to strongly influence the outcome of any decisions made democratically by members (Michel, 1966).

6.6.4. Opposition Parties

The participation of opposition parties in parliamentary committees is also vital for the effectiveness of democratic institutions, as they serve as a watchdog to the ruling party. Section 57(2)(d) of the Constitution recognize the leader of the NA's with largest opposition party as the leader of the opposition (Parliament, 2016; Constitution, 1996). The MPs from the opposition party had a good understanding of their roles and responsibilities, despite their small numbers.

According to an IFP MP, "the roles of MPs are to influence policies and the opposition party can also make inputs into draft legislation so that the masses can benefit... We are here to make meaningful input into draft legislation... To ensure the department links to the constituency need." (Personal Interview, IFP MP). Other MPs from the opposition party agreed. For example, the UDM MP posited that, "we give ideas… we are not just opposing for the sake of opposition stuff. As the Chief Whip, I managed the finances of the parliament. You are responsible to your party... As the Chief Whip, I became the spokesman of the party in the Parliament... For instance, I need to know the programme of the day... This will determine issues." (Personal Interview, UDM MP). Probing the MPs on how issues are determined, an IFP MP maintains, "we do not oppose for the sake of opposing, but for the sake to better the lives of the people" (Personal Interview, IFP MP). For these MPs their dedication to their roles and responsibilities is clear, because they want to improve the lives of people in South Africa.

In contrast, an ANC MP argued that it was difficult to fulfil the mandates of the Committees because of the opposition in the Committees. Moreover, when discussing the role of the EFF in the House he said that, "I agreed with some principles of Malema but not the method of the EFF. It is irrational and it is difficult to agree with them... Generally, we disagree but just within the house" (Personal Interview, ANC MP). The style of politics in the House has a bearing on the work of the Committees since in the House public posturing dominates the debates, despite that MPs may coalesce around shared values. Of course, one is mindful of the hypothesis by Orrnert and Hewitt (2006) that indicates that democratization appears to fragment elites by putting them in a competitive position for electoral support. This competition for electoral support is critical because the efficiency of the opposition parties in committees is questionable because of their low numbers. Thus the posturing in the House can be seen as a way to extend their support and thus efficiency and oversight in Committees where the real work of Parliament takes place.

6.5. Competition

Competition is one of the criteria of a liberal democratic country and a platform to gain power under suitable peaceful protocols (Heller**,** 2009; Leftwich, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Dahl, 1998; Schumpeter, 1942). In response to questions about the ways competition between members of the legislature from the same political party have an impact on the Committee or the Legislature, the MPs claim that "disagreement often occurs in the Chamber, but during the Committee meetings, MPs from different parties push aside their differences to work for the people" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP1). And, "disagreement slows down the process of the Legislature" (Personal Interview, ACDP, MP2).

Studies on the interaction between elites (e.g. Reis & Chiebub, 1997 cited in Francis, 2011:203) note that competition between elites shows how political elites value preferences that have implications for democratic government. Interests are safeguarded by regulation so that "the accepted rules of the game, and the existing power relations among groups prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions" (Bachrach & Baratz 1962: 642).

Findings indicate that the MPs belong to a Study Group within their party. The study Group examines investigates and deliberates on issues. Each Study Group is headed by a Chairperson and managed by a Whip. The core function of the ANC Study Group, for example, is to conduct oversight on matters, formulate policy on matters under study and to conduct political work on the legislative programme before presenting this to the Committees in Parliament (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). The Study Group guides the approach and attitudes of ANC MPs so that they have a unified position on issues such as the format of questions, motions and budget votes. The Study Group is not known to the public and not

open to the public. The aim of the group is to interact and get to know issues better, outside of the purview of Parliament.

The Study Group regulates intra-party competition within the Parliamentary Committees. As one MP stated, by and large, "there is no competition in the committee, but we have a Study Group to debate the views. For instance on the Secrecy Bill, we went to inform people that the Bill is not okay" (Personal Interview, IFP MP). Likewise, as the DA MP claimed, "competition does not really affect legislative work because the policy and rules in place ensure that this is minimal. In instances whereby there are issues, these are resolved within a party internally before any committee meetings (Personal Interview, DA MP2). Without mentioning the Study Group, an EFF MP alluded to acting with one voice in Committee when he said, "there is no competition because the party ideology guides us in our contribution in various committees" (Personal Interview, EFF MP).

For the ANC, it appears that the Parliamentary Committees is regulated by the Study Group because , "the main function of the Study Group is to advance the policies of the ruling party and principles in the Committees" (Personal Interview, Chief Whip of the ANC). These policies form the nucleus of interaction between the ANC members and the members of other parties in the Parliament. Also the Study Group also utilizes party researchers that work behind the scenes who providing information and analysis to the Study Groups. These researchers also attend Plenary Sessions to get understand how issues are being debated (Interview with ANC Researcher). As expressed by the parliament librarian, "the party researchers write speeches for the MPs and visit the parliamentary library to research on policies" (Personal Interview, Parliamentary Librarian). The researchers also study issues within the Study Group, summarize bills and advise members accordingly (Personal Interview, Parliamentary Librarian). The researchers also check the policy implications of such bills.

Beyond this, the close link between the Executive and the Legislative also ensure that the ruling party has access to a wealth of information about policies, the implications of these and access to technical and specialised analysis. Thus, a ruling party in the South African Parliament occupies an advantageous position not merely in terms of the number of MPs in Parliament and in Committee. But they have access to resources and can defend their position. The party provides access to resources but also ensures that the MPs stay along the party line as the disciplinary measures (non-selection next time) are harsh.

6.6. Party Ideology and Committee

MPs work in different committee based on their party's ideology and mandate. Chapter Five, discusses the different ideological positions of selected parties in the National Assembly. From my observation on the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, it was that ideological differences lead to unhealthy arguments instead of informed debates and discussions in the public interest. Political ideology sometimes impacts on the political behaviour and strategies used by MPs during their committee work. Ideology is a belief system, attitudes or views about society directed towards action (John, Federico & Napier, 2015; Napier, 2009; Schwarzmantel, 2008; Freeden, 1996). Francis (2011) refers to ideology as "political etiquette", and a key factor in the relationship between political elites (MPPs) in KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature. Despite similar ideological preferences, she found that extreme differences in political etiquette led to intra-party conflict.

Francis' study on political elites at provincial legislature corroborates with the MPs perspective particularly in the interaction between the MPs from the ANC and the EFF. This also extends to the perceptions held by MPs in other parties. For example, an ACDP MP mentions that "The EFF… We don't support their violent tendency and their constant disruptions of the Parliament which undermine the role of the Legislature in a democratic

government... We prefer the DA because of their pragmatic approach to issues without violent tendencies when compared with the EFF" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP1).

Ideological divisions among parties do impact on the discussions in the committees. For example, an EFF MP states that their party's mandate is "to oversee development through budget allocations in the country for Houses" ...the committee is basically comprised of an "ANC agenda… and the committee does not fulfil our mandate because, for instance, houses in South Africa belongs to the minority white... How can we say that a mandate is fulfilled when 22 years into democracy many blacks are still homeless due to a white rich minority dominance" (Personal Interview, EFF MP).

According to a DA MP, "the committees try to reach a consensus across party lines when that is possible, but on particularly contentious issues of an ideological nature or those that threaten the vested interests of the majority party, this will become a vote".

One DA MP claimed, "Sometimes we vote when we cannot reach a consensus... Unfortunately, the Committee is broken… It is completely a political issue, like the National Prosecuting Agency, not effective" (Personal Interview, DA MP 7). But there are also times when the MPs break ranks and the Chairperson lead the way forward for consensus. For example, in discussing the work of the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, an ANC MP states that,

> "We sometimes vote, but mostly we agree on decisions. An example is a discussion on the budget. That money is not enough for agriculture. The Chairperson for the committee did not agree but insisted that the money will be available next year, while members felt something must be done immediately" (Personal Interview, ANC MP2).

On other occasions, the opposition parties are simply outvoted. For example, an IFP MP discussed the state of the national electricity supplier Eskom and the rolling blackouts that

citizens were experiencing across the country as a consequence of the state of infrastructure and poor maintenance. The IFP requested collective action be taken, but no decision was taken by MPs (Personal Interview, IFP MP).

At the committee level, people's agenda is the key emphasis of consensus decision-making. It is not televised like a parliamentary sitting whereby the party agenda and discrediting the opposition, is pursued as a strategy to canvas for votes. Although, ideological divisions have an impact on reaching a consensus. An example is deciding on how to address government incompetence and maladministration, but such issues are rarely discussed because of incoherent consensus.

6.7. Mechanisms for Sustaining Democracy

This section highlights the MPs opinions on the mechanisms for sustaining and strengthening democracy based on the MPs definitions of democracy in chapter five. This is significant because democratic consolidation is one of the broader objectives discussed in the study. From the interviews, the MPs summed the mechanisms of the sustenance of democracy as viable political parties, an independent Speaker, a vibrant civil society, constitutional reforms and a necessary review of parliamentary rules. I also discuss how these mechanisms can be sustained in democratic institutions and, how democratic institutions could be strengthened.

The MPs expressed that one of the challenges to the sustenance of democracy is the effectiveness of the parliamentary rules. The MPs across parties were concerned about how the political behaviours of the MPs in the Parliament undermined its core business. The Chief Whip of the ANC explains that "We never imagined that the MPs will behave like street boys when we formulated the Rules of the House… We did not include what to do when members become unruly and disruptive like the EFF" (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip).

It needs to be noted that there were instances where MPs displayed unparliamentary behaviour. Commenting on unparliamentary behaviour, the People's Asembly(2014) reports how during a debate on former President Jacob Zuma's 2010 budget vote, Malusi Gigaba, the former Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, accused Mbhazima Shilowa, the former Deputy President of COPE, of misappropriation of funds and that he has a memory of 'rat.'

Also, the EFF alleged that the ANC killed the people of Marikana. The presiding officer corrected Malema, but he did not withdraw his statement but rather walked out with his party member (eNCA, 2014). While walking out, the EFF MPs howled and barked numerous derogatory remarks (eNCA, 2014).

Equally, the EFF members interrupted the SONA speech of former President Jacob Zuma in 2015 which made former Minister Jeff Radebe comment that the "unruly and unparliamentary conduct" of some Members of Parliament intention is to render this respectable institution ungovernable and bringing our hard-earned democracy into disrepute.

As earlier mentioned in the subsequent section in this chapter that my fieldwork to the Parliament also coincided with the former President Zuma's State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 20th May 2016, the public presence was huge. I also observed that the EFF members interrupted the SONA speech of former President Jacob Zuma in 2016.

Such disruptions of parliamentary business have led some in the ANC to call for a review of the NA rules. An MP argues, "I strongly believe the unruly behaviour and constant disruptions of parliamentary debates by the EFF raise the question of the effectiveness of the Rules Committee. There is a strong need for the amendment of the Rules for stiffer punishment to impose on any member who deliberately disrupts the parliamentary sitting" (Chief Whip of the ANC).

In the same vein, the MPs from the opposition; the DA points out how the ruling party (ANC) undermines democratic institutions. The Chief Whip of the DA mentions, "We work in a political environment where the ruling party protect their mandate, which affects compliance with the rules of the Committee" (Chief Whip of the DA). Another ANC MP argues that "However, MPs across parties were concerned about the way in which political behavior in Parliament undermined its core business. The Chief Whip of the ANC explained that, "We never imagined that MPs will behave like street boys when we formulated the Rules of the House. We did not include what to do when members become unruly and disruptive like the EFF" (Personal Interview, ANC Chief Whip). Another ANC MP contends that,

> "Bundling MPs out of the Parliament when parliamentary debates collapse is not a proper way to address disruptive members… It signals the wrong information to children visiting the galleria... Nobody would have thought the opposition will become powerful and violent... The chaotic nature of the EFF is becoming unbearable." (Personal Interview, ANC MP).

Although most ANC MPs referred to the EFF when they discussed unruly behavior and as a young party "with no committee of elders" to reel in the disruptions and enforce discipline (Personal Interview, ANC MP8), other parties also mentioned the governing party. DA MPs, for example, mentioned the way in which rules can be undermined in ways that are not obviously disruptive. As the Chief Whip of the DA claimed, "We work in a political environment where the ruling party protects their mandate, which affects compliance with the rules of the Committee" (Chief Whip of the DA).

Most of the ANC MPs referred to the EFF when they discussed unruly behaviour. They also labelled the "EFF as a young party with no committee of elders who reel in the disruptions... and enforce discipline (Personal Interview, ANC MP8).

The overviews suggest that democratic institutions are undermined by disruptive behaviours. Although, democratic institutions in a liberal democracy are established based on the premise it is a springboard for the MPs and parties to achieve their objectives (Dahl, 1998; Przeworski 1991). In a liberal democracy, there is "devolution of power, a set of rules, abidance by the rules and the subjection of all interests to competition" (Przeworski 1991:14).

That said, the frequent disruptions of parliamentary business have led some in the ANC to call for a review of the NA rules. An MP argues,

> 'I strongly believe the unruly behavior and constant disruptions of parliamentary debates by the EFF raise the question of the effectiveness of the Rules Committee. There is a strong need for the amendment of the Rules for stiffer punishment to impose on any member who deliberately disrupts the parliamentary sitting' (Chief Whip of the ANC).

This also suggests that constitutional reviews should be an important feature of South Africa's democracy. This alludes to the fact that when the constitution was drafted, it did not take into account that the MPs indulge in unparliamentary behaviours. In the constitutional review, the roles of Chapter Nine institutions should be clearly defined and strengthened to perform effectively

Arguably, the behaviour of the EFF MPs alludes to the Human right such as freedom of speech and privilege. Human right such as freedom of speech is one of the hallmarks of a consolidated democracy (Przeworski 1991; Dahl, 1998). The MPs also enjoy parliamentary privileges. Parliamentary privileges are specific rights the MPs enjoy either collectively or individually which immunes them from criminal liability like slander because of their statements (Erskine, 1997).

The parliamentary privileges of MPs range from the right of freedom of speech, freedom from molestation, Freedom from arrest in a civil action and unrestricted access to the parliament (Erskine, 1997; Parliament, 1999). Such privileges also guarantee that parliamentary debates are unrestricted, prevent defamation and to carry out their functions without restrictions (Erskine, 1997; Parliament, 1999).

The MPs also emphasized that the sustenance of democracy could be achieved by strengthening the Public Protector. This will ensure that the interests of the public are not undermined by the behaviour of the political elite. The MPs reiterates that the Public Protector in South Africa has been particularly vocal on issues that have come to the attention of the Public Protector Office. Such issues concern misappropriation of funds, corruption and state capture. It appears that the Public Protector is a powerfully neutral independent institution in South Africa's democracy. The MPs, for example, agreed that the Public Protector must be empowered. Because of its power, it will be able to prosecute any erring political office holders without any intimidation or interference

Additionally, the majority of the MPs interviewed irrespective of their party expressed also that the behaviour of MPs impact on the quality of South Africa democracy. This concern the calibre of people appointed into the judicial branch of government.

Equally important is effective opposition parties who curtail the dominance of the ruling party and provide effective oversight on the executive. In the South Africa Parliament, the opposition parties work in unison with other parties on several occasions to strengthen democratic institutions. For example, an IFP MP expresses that "the relationship between the other MPs is cordial because they have frequently worked together with other opposition parties where interests are shared. "We work together with opposition parties, especially

when the issues on Zuma came to the floor... In local and the executive governance we co-governed with the DA." (Personal Interview, IFP MP).

The EFF MP mentions also "political parties a times work together to check the ruling party and to challenge court decisions like the Nkandla cases... The president mislead the country, we challenge issues like this in court" (Personal Interview, EFF MP).

Such support also seems apparent when the vested interests of another party are threatened. For example, the DA supported the EFF when they were removed from Parliament. A DA MP said, "the first time the EFF was thrown out, the DA went to court to challenge the decision and the EFF were recalled...we went to the court on the Zuma's corruption charges". (Personal Interview, DA MP3). This also suggests that irrespective of their party ideology, the MPs can coalesce around similar value. As demonstrated in the subsequent chapters that the DA's ideology is different from the EFF. Nevertheless, the DA did not support the manner the EFF were bundled out of the NA.

In the same vein, there is a need for constant evaluation, reform and improvement of political institutions. In terms of reforms, the MPs also agreed on the need for reform. A DA MP says, that "We are a young democracy, reform is important in terms of being a global player in the world" (Personal Interview, DA MP4). An ACDP MP states, "In terms of reform… we need to be careful, we don't need ridiculous changes... we need to change things that are not working" (Personal Interview, ACDP MP1).

One area that needs such reform, in particular, is the contested role of the Speaker. In the views of a DA MP,

> "the Speaker who is the Chairperson of the ruling party will not be able to discharge her duties without the influence of her party. I think there is need for independent Speaker which will not be biased in the running of the affairs of the Parliament according to constitutional requirements" (Personal Interview, DA Chief Whip).

The IFP MP concurs with the above view of the DA MP, based on his experience as an MP from the opposition party. The IFP Chief Whip puts succinctly,

"the Speaker of the house shielded [President] Zuma from penetrating interrogation. She displayed her manifest bias and thereby obstructed executive oversight. In the way Mbete has conducted herself in the role of Speaker, she displays an abysmal understanding of the responsibility of an historic and distinguished office, which has its genesis in the mother of Parliament at Westminster, which spans a history of more than a thousand years" (Personal Interview, IFP MP).

Although the power of the speaker is in line with Section 90(1) (d) of the Constitution. The Constitution empowers the Speaker to act as the President when the president his absent or incapacitated until the National Assembly appoints another MP (Constitution, 1996; Parliament, 2016). Equally, the speaker as the leader of the parliament is expected to run the NA with guidelines prescribed by the constitution. The NA also oversees the activities of the executive branch of government. Yet, the DA MP argues that "it is virtually impossible for the Speaker to discharge her duties impartially and without fear or favour" (Personal Interview, DA MP). The Speaker, Mbete, was viewed by members of the opposition parties to be an obstacle to constructive debate and executive oversight in Parliament (Mercury, 2014). A report by the Mercury (2014) notes how the speaker hinders the constructive debate. This manifested in the way the speaker handled former President Jacob Zuma's question time relating to the Nkandla debacle whereby she disallowed a follow-up question by EFF leader Julius Malema.

The overview suggests that it is a herculean task maintaining the balance of powers between the different branches of government. An ANC MP from the ruling party also questions the power balance between the executive and legislative branches (Personal Interview, ANC

MP7). Hence, the study suggests the separation of powers between the branches of government.

The other ways to sustain democracy is that the judiciary should remain independent without the Executive interfering or casting doubt on its judgments. The vibrancy of the civil society must also be protected as a watchdog.

6.8. Conclusion

The different committees have varying levels of activity. The chapter discusses the role of political elites in the various Parliamentary Committees they function. The chapter is underpinned by a literature review and biography of the MPs, gathered from the data obtained from observations and interviews. The chapter shows that the Committees are the engne room of the Parliament. This is because several Committees perform a different function to achieve a common agenda. The Committees also functions as an extension of MPs constituency work where participatory democracy occurs. The Committees structure, composition and their functions show how the Committees is the engine room of the Parliament. There are several Parliamentary committees where the MPs social background is useful.

Equally, important are factors that impact on the functions of the Committees. This includes the social background of the MPs, the Chief Whip and the number of seats occupied by the MPs in the NA. The chapter shows that working on multiple committees impacts on the workload and the ability to fulfil their mandates effectively. A nexus of factors and the Committee's composition indicates the extent democratic institution is either strengthened or

undermined. Committees are arenas political elites coalesce and work together irrespective of their party ideology. In Committee, the MPs debate in-depth.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion, Summary and Recommendations

7.1. Conclusions and Summary

The study examined the roles of political elites in democratic institutions in South Africa since 2004. In the context of this study, political elites are the MPs that work at the parliament. It explores how the MPs attitudes, values and behaviours either strengthen or undermine democratic institutions in South Africa. The broader objectives of the study look at democratization, democratic transition and consolidation in South Africa. This was to gauge democratic consolidation in South Africa, based on the axiom that consolidated democracy is predicated on democracy tenets. Amongst such tenet is an effective democratic institution.

Chapter Two interrogated the theoretical and contextual literature (which forms the theories on elites) on political elites and democratic institutions in South Africa. It explained and contextualized the concept of democratization and democratic consolidation, provided a starting point for building an understanding of the concept of political elites in democratic institutions. It also provided the foundation for contextualizing political elites and democratic institutions in South Africa from 2004

Chapter Two contextualizes the concept of the political elite. It conceptualized political elites as 'bourgeoisie', 'governing elite', 'governing class', 'Members of Parliament', 'representative elites' and 'political class'. The chapter also demonstrates that political elites are vital in democratic institutions and the sustenance of democratic institutions globally, and

South Africa. The roles of political elites and how they shape political outcomes in the democratization process show that they play a crucial role in South Africa's transition to democracy. South Africa's transition to democracy was achieved because of political elites strategies.

Equally discussed is how democratic institution is an important institution in a consolidated democracy. This alludes to it being where MPs exert their power as and shape policies. They exert their power through several tactics and strategies. These strategies include coalition formation, persuasion, inducement, coercion, manipulation, negotiation, bargaining, mobilization of coalitions, vote-buying, gridlock, over-representation of interests, and the adoption of rules for self- interests. Different tactics are employed to achieve different agendas and political outcome. These strategies also impact on the effectiveness of a democratic institution and how such tactics either strengthen or undermine them. This is because tactics show how political elites influence policies, which is crucial in understanding their approach towards the democratic process.

In addition, the behaviours of the MPs is discussed in the light of democratic elite theories (Dye, 2000; Putnam, 1977; Domhoff, 1967; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953; Pareto, 1968; Mosca, 1939; Michel, 1966). The theories suggest that political elites are the '*Ruling Class',* and comprise a few numbers of people. The few people possess political power and privileges because of distinct traits and qualities that separate them from others. Such qualities range from the social composition (such as education, aristocratic or connected family, money, knowledge and intellectual superiority).

Chapter Three illustrates how the MPs, as the political elite, act as the key agents in the political-institutional such as Parliament. How they execute their parliamentary functions of accountability and oversight provides them with extensive power to shape political outcomes. Political elites as MPs influence policy in terms of the roles they perform in legislation and

oversight. The oversight and accountability functions are supported by the constitution, which enables them to influence government decisions. They achieve this through various means, such as Plenary Debates; Committee meetings; Motions without Notice, Questions to the Executive, Budget Votes, and Petitions amongst others. These measures are necessitated for checks and balances, and a vital component that strengthens the principle of the separation of powers. This chapter also demonstrates that political parties in South Africa are the platform for the recruitment of the MPs into Parliament through proportional representation.

Chapter Three unpacks the types of parliamentary systems globally and in South Africa. In particular, it discussed the three types of parliamentary system namely the Westminster, Congressional and Mixed Model systems. The chapter also discussed how the South African Parliament is modelled on the mixed hybrid parliamentary model whereby the president is accountable to the MPs. The chapter also shows how the South African Parliament has also evolved through many phases. How the Constitution empowers the Parliament, the MPs and sets the parameters for the duties of MPs was also pointed out. These roles involve oversight, legislation and accountability functions.

From there, a discussion on the roles of the National Parliament, the structure of the parliament, and the key roles of Chief Whip, Speaker and Committees in the effective running of the National Assembly. The other section of this chapter also explores the relationship between parties, parliament and the MPs. Political parties are comprised of political elites drawn from diverse groups who shape and influence the decision. MPs as political elites are key agents in the parliament where they shape policies and political outcomes elected by the proportional representation. The MPs also carry out these duties through a variety of oversight frameworks to strengthen the accountability of executives. This may take a variety of forms and use various techniques ranging from specific inquiries by

select committees and annual hearings on appropriations. These oversight mechanisms include plenary debates, questions to the executive, motions without notice, a notice of motions, budget votes, members statements, statements by cabinet members, petitions, approval of annual budgets and strategic plans.

Equally, the importance of political parties as a recruitment platform for MPs into the NA is demonstrated in this chapter. This is evident in the parliamentary system in South Africa has also been shaped by proportional representation. In the Parliament, the interests of different groups in society are represented through the political parties. The roles of Speaker, Chief Whip and the Committees are emphasized. To ensure the smooth functioning of the NA, are rules which govern the proceedings of the Parliament. It could be inferred also that there are strong linkages between the political party, political elites and the parliament. The party dynamics in the NA also seems to demonstrate that MPs adopt various strategies such as floor-crossing, coalition, and alliance to achieve their goals. MPs are elected by the PR system by the citizen and by their parties through the national party-list PR system which tends to thus nurture a dominant party system and limits citizens' interaction with the MPs. This, I argue, excludes citizens from the governance process, and in particular, the poor community whose access is limited.

Chapter Four discusses the research method utilized in the study to achieve the research objectives. It also discusses how the study was carried out and the justification for the research methods employed. It was based on a qualitative approach premised on an interpretative and the meta-theory of social science to understand political elites in the South African Parliament. The participants for the study were MPs in the South African National Assembly selected through purposive sampling. The primary data was gathered by semi-structured interviews with MPs in addition to primary documents such as Minutes of Parliament, Hansard, Minutes of Select and Standing Committees of Parliament,

parliamentary speeches and other institutional records. Hence through the interpretivist approach, the MPs were probed questions such as 'why' and 'how' on why they joined politics and their work experiences as an MP, committee and constituency their involvement. The collected data was analyzed through thematic content analysis.

Chapter Five explored the recruitment of MPs through political parties. This chapter is based on the MPs biographical information collected through interviews, observations and minutes of meetings to further sketch the specific characteristics among the MPs, such as gender, occupation, education, social composition and age. The ideologies of the MPs also demonstrated their definition of democracy as interrogated, defined and understood by MPs. This also impacts on the positions that they take and the policies that they pursue. The MPs in the National Assembly were already involved in politics before becoming MPs. The chapter interrogated different conceptions, perceptions and definitions of democracy by MPs and how these different views affect their roles in the parliament.

The chapter also demonstrates that by joining and belonging to parties, the MPs align with the party ideology. However, this had the potential to change through dynamics such as floor-crossing, emerging differences in intra-party ideology and intra-party conflicts which might also result in new party formations by aggrieved MPs. The social and political background of MPs reveals their ideology, values and attitudes. Thus, the behaviours of MPs in the South Africa NA is also illuminated in the context of social, political and ideological backgrounds. Extending this discussion further, chapter five also explored and discussed the ideologies of six political parties namely the ANC, ACDP, DA, EFF, IFP and UDM from the twelve political parties that won representation in the National Assembly in the 2014 South African elections.

Chapter Five also view the MPs in the light of political elite theories (e.g. Pareto, 1968; Mosca, 1939; Michels, 1966) to explain and describe power relationships in democratic institutions. I agree with certain arguments on with the political elite theories utilized in this study (e.g. Pareto, 1968; Mosca, 1939; Michel, 1966). The MPs are a small minority that holds the most power and through these positions influence political outcomes. The analogy of the social composition of the parties is also indicative that MPs have the powers to influence the proceedings of the parliament. The 'power to influence' makes them a political elite, but not necessarily superior as claimed by Pareto (1968) and Mosca (1939).

Firstly, I claim that social composition such as age, education and gender no doubt impacts on MPs recruitment and the political elite (MPs) circulation. As Pareto's (1968) circulation of elites postulates that when the current elite starts to decline, it is challenged and makes way for another. To Pareto, political elite circulation occurs by assimilation and revolution. Assimilation implies that the new elite merging with elements of the old, while revolution, and implies that the new elite replacing the old. The relevance of Pareto's theory to the MPs in the National Assembly is clear. I agree with Pareto as the study demonstrates that the MPs circulate themselves through coalition, cross-party coalescing and the formation of new parties. The EFF under party leader, Julius Malema, a former President of the ANC Youth league shows the prevalent patterns in Pareto's discussion through revolution, using the ANC as his springboard to launch his political career. The rise of new political elites like Malema challenge the old political dominant class (ANC) he was once part of.

The chapter also indicates that through ideology, opposition parties construct popular radical alternatives to 'circulate' and 'recycle' themselves in power. Moreover, ideological values are key in the recruitment of MPs and determine, to a large extent, how MPs coalesce around particular value systems and the type of attitudes MPs display in the parliament. The proportional representation system employed nurtures and supports a dominant-party system

that limits citizens' interactions with their MPs. This, I argue undermines the rationale for the PR system in the first place, to create a participatory democracy.

Political ideology comprises a set of belief systems that MPs adopt to express their values and to actualize their interests. Parliament comprises a platform through which the political elite achieve this. Most of these ideologies are identified by their position on a political spectrum described with nomenclatures as 'left' 'middle' and 'right'. Although variations exist in terms of ideological positions among the MPs and their party ideologies, MPs also possess common interests. This is illustrated through agreements by parties in the Parliament to work together against common challenges. An example provided is when they challenged the former president, Jacob Zuma over the issue of spending on his Nkandla residence, which eventually led to his impeachment and appearance in court. Another comprised the support provided to the EFF when excluded from Parliament. This coalescing of interests occurs despite different ideologies, orientations and parties. Hence, opposition parties are playing a crucial role in democratic institution building and democratic consolidation in South Africa.

It also appears with a cue from the Zuma Nkandla issue and the eventual removal of former president Zuma that the MPs are indeed 'powerful' and shape political outcomes in terms of their accountability and oversight function. These findings in this dissertation do not support claims by other scholars that the Parliament is merely a 'rubber stamp' Parliament that just endorse Bills and does not question the Executive. It also signifies one of the criteria of a consolidated democracy with the presence of strong functional opposition. It indicates that MPs strengthen democratic institutions in this regard.

Chapter Six examined the various roles MPs play in parliamentary committees based on data collected through interviews (MPs, party researchers and committee secretaries), observations, parliamentary debates, parliamentary publications (in session), Hansard and committee minutes. This chapter unpacked the constitutional provisions that empower the

committees in their roles. It considered the structure, composition and functions of committees in the Parliament and also the factors that impact on the roles of MPs. MP's work is not confined to Parliament but comprises of committee and constituency work. The Parliamentary Committees are the engine of the National Assembly. In the committee sessions, the interests of the people are paramount, unlike at plenary sessions where MPs propagate party political agendas driven by their ideology and for the media. It is thus in committee where the public become truly represented.

The Committees of the National Assembly also provides the platform for the public to present their views directly to MPs, unlike a Plenary sitting of Parliament. It is also a platform for the public to be involved in representative government, hence strengthens participatory democracy in South Africa. The Committee system also gives effect to cross-party bonding and serves as a key indicator of democratic consolidation. Firstly, the committee system increases the participation of MPs in discussions because it comprises a smaller group working to a non-partisan common agenda. This also results in inefficiency in terms of the amount of work that can be done. Secondly, MPs are opportune to discuss in-depth and to debate on issues because of the availability of time that is unavailable in the plenary sessions and their specialized focus. The cross-party nature of committees with different MPs from various parties provides an avenue for in-depth discussions.

Thirdly, MPs also work in areas of their interests, occupational background and expertise. This also aligns with the data analysis in Chapter Five that demonstrated that MPs have varied educational specializations, occupational backgrounds and political experiences, which are brought to bear effectively in committee sessions.

I claim that MPs who 'wear many hats' working in the institutional spaces of the Parliament, as a party member and as a committee member, are not always doing so in complementary roles. I make claims that the structure and composition of committees can undermine the

democratic institutions when the dominant party is both a majority and the Chairperson of the committee. This is accentuated through the Whippery. The implication of this is that it affects the effective participation and efficiency of the smaller parties and the larger opposition parties.

When an MP belongs to more than one committee, it does have the potential to affect their effectiveness and efficiency in terms of the scrutiny of bills, and capacity to monitor and provide oversight of government. This is likely to impact more on the smaller parties who have fewer members to cover this parliamentary work. This also results in party roles that conflict with the availability of MPs for parliamentary duties, especially at the committee level. At times MPs do not attend parliamentary debates but do attend to committee duties where the work is done. Their attendance at committees is not negotiable and parties demand reports and accountability from them, demonstrating that parties also recognize this.

Also, party politics tend to impact on the effectiveness of the Parliament. This has implications for democratic institutions and can undermine the institutions in several ways. For instance, the ANC has been careful not to 'grill' the MPs from their party during committee questioning. It needs to be noted that MPs holding two offices simultaneously as a Minister and MP impact negatively on the core committee functions, and in particular the accountability functions. Majority party MPs are frequently careful to hold back on exercising their accountability function for fear of forfeiture for selection for another term. This is further worsened by the PR party list for fear of losing their parliamentary positions or not being selected for the next election. When this is the trend, it tends to undermine the principles and practices of democratic institutions.

The study also revealed that Chief Whips are also vital in the parliament in ensuring MPs adhere to rules of the parliament, the smooth running of the parliament and party political positions. While it cannot be ignored that MPs privileges such as the right to speak freely

seek to guarantee open discussion at the NA. Nevertheless, some of the rules of Parliament may be insufficient to address behaviour that was not anticipated when they were created. MPs undermine the democratic institutions when the house rules are not adhered to and disruptions consume time and energy without meaningful plenary debates.

In light of the foregoing discussion, South Africa does have a consolidated democracy and it is also one which ensures participation beyond representation in many meaningful ways. The political elite have placed a critical role in this. That said, some challenges impact on the institutional capacity of the Parliament and at times undermine these very institutions. The first of these is the close links between the Legislative and Executive branches which impact on the effectiveness of the committees to hold Government to account. This is accentuated by the party-list system of proportional representation which acts as a grip on MPs who are seeking re-election for a further term. Secondly, some of the institutional offices – such as that of the Chief Whip - when considered alongside the party dominance of the majority party and the party-list system restrict MP's ability to exercise its oversight task when the parties are in discord.

7.2. Recommendations

Strengthening democratic institutions in South Africa is depends on the attitudes and behaviour of the political elite. This alludes to both the power relationships and the institutional structures that exist in the Parliament impact on this. As such, this dissertation proposes many reforms to strengthen South Africa's democracy now and in the future.

Firstly, there should be a review of the parliamentary rules and procedures. There is a need for the procedures and processes in Parliament to curb instances of unparliamentary behaviour that disrupt the business of Parliament against the public interest. The responses to unparliamentarily behaviours, such as bundling MPs out of the Parliament, is not a proper

way to address disruptive members, nor conducive to the strengthening of democracy. Amendments to parliamentary rules should address how to debate and disagree respectfully. These parliamentary rules need to be reviewed particularly in terms of discipline in parliament and to address the unruly behaviour of the MPs. The functioning of Parliament is crucial to the sustenance of democracy in South Africa. Constant disruptions and threats of violence, whether explicit or implicit, undermines the function of the NA. Such disruptions consume the time and energy to address the real-life problems that poor and vulnerable South African citizens face and undermine meaningful plenary debates. There is a strong need for the amendment of the Rules so that stiffer institutional punishments can be imposed on any member, and party, that deliberately disrupts the parliamentary sitting.

Secondly, there is also the need for an independent neutral Speaker in the Parliament who can run the affairs of the parliament with impartiality according to the constitutional requirements. The Speaker also has extensive powers and privilege to determine and shape questioning and debate. The rationale for an independent neutral Speaker is because of the strength of the party system. In this case, the Speaker who is also from the ruling party will not be able to discharge her duties without the influence of her party. As such, the Speaker tends to protect the policies of the party who is elected to occupy the office and does not necessarily perform the accountability function attached to the office fairly. An independent speaker is necessary to promote fairness in parliamentary debates and to enhance democracy, beyond party influence, including being shielded from the mandates of the Executives, who are members of the same party.

Moreover, there is an urgent need for the party-list system of proportional representation to be reviewed as the electoral system used in South Africa. This particular form of proportional representation removes from the electorate the opportunity to elect individual MPs and to hold them to account. The party-list component of the system of proportional representation

strengthens the power of the party over MPs and has the potential to undermine their ability to scrutinize and monitor the Executive branch. For the MPs in the dominant party, this implies a contradiction of their Committee roles and functions. The system used also perpetuates the dominance of the ruling party. Rather MPs should be selected based on criteria such as performance, values, capacity, character, competence and integrity in a constituency-based system of proportional representation.

The study also suggests stronger separation of powers in the South African political institutions. Ministers should not concurrently be members of the legislative arm of the government and the executive, as gives them too much power and limits their accountability function.

Furthermore, Chapter 9 institutions should be more clearly defined and strengthened as these institutions, and particularly that of the Office of the Public Protector has been proven in South Africa to provide effective oversight far away from the party politics that are present in Parliament, and the interests of South Africa's citizens. This will strengthen democratic institutions in South Africa.

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SECTION A

Can you tell me how you became involved in politics?

How did you come to be a member of the legislature?

Can you tell me about your social and educational background?

Can you tell me about your political background?

Profile:

Educational and Social Background

I studied beauty culture (Johannesburg).It was not something I loved but I found a way to

Can you tell me how you became involved in politics?

Section B

Can you tell me about your role as a member of the legislature?

Can you tell me about your role as a member of X standing or select committee?

How did you become Chief Whip?

What are the key factors that are important in enabling you to shape policy and legislation in the legislature and committee?

Can you tell me about the way in which you define democracy? What is democracy in your view?

In what ways do you think that South Africa's political institutions function effectively?

What words might you use to express your political ideology?

How does party competition impact on the work of the legislature? Can you give me examples?

In what ways does competition between members of the legislature from the same political party have an impact on the X committee or the legislature?

What are the main ways in which your political party supports political institutions in South Africa?

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What are the various mechanisms in place within the party to ensure that democratic institutions thrive, and how does your party

Thank you for participating