CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP AND ELECTIONS: POST 2016 ELECTION VIOLENCE IN ZAMBIA

By

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(BTh, BTh Hons)

SUBMITTED FOR EXAMINATION POSTHUMOS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master’s Degree in Systematic Theology in the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

April 2019
Declaration

I Bwalya Mulenga Felix (215082030), declare that this dissertation, ‘Church-State relationship and presidential elections: Post 2016 election violence in Zambia,’ is my own work, and that any and all sources that I have used or quoted have been dully indicated and acknowledged by means of complete reference following the Harvard style of in-text referencing and in the bibliography.

Sign………………………………………… Date……………………………………

Name of the Supervisor: Prof. Lillian C. Siwila
Dedication

It is my genuine and warmest gratefulness that I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of Lily Phiri you left fingerprints of grace on our lives. You shall not be forgotten.
Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to express my immense gratitude to my God the Almighty for His grace upon me to complete this work.

I am profoundly indebted to my Supervisor Prof. Lillian Siwila for the constructive guidance during my research. You gave me a lifetime memory of your benevolence and intelligence.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge with a sincere heart the contributions of the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics and everyone who contributed in any way.
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMG</td>
<td>Christian Churches Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>CCZ</td>
<td>Council of Churches in Zambia</td>
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<td>ECZ</td>
<td>Electoral Council of Zambia</td>
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<td>CWM</td>
<td>Council for World Mission</td>
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<td>EFC</td>
<td>Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>JCTR</td>
<td>Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection</td>
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<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>PVT</td>
<td>Parallel Vote Tabulation</td>
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<td>RCOG</td>
<td>Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
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<td>UPND</td>
<td>United Party for National Development</td>
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Abstract

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This study sought to determine the role that the Church played in the post 2016 election violence in Zambia. It utilized Bonhoeffer’s perception of Church-State relations as a conceptual framework which underpinned the study. The methodology employed was based on non-empirical evidence and document analysis. Tools used to analyze documents were ecumenical statements and other press release by Church leaders in response to post 2016 election events.

The argument of this study is that although the Church’s intervention does not always lead to a reconciliatory outcome, it has been almost universally trusted to bring peace and reconciliation. However, the Church, in this case, contributed to political failure, was complacent and lacked timing to build a trustworthy public relationship. The study argues that the ambiguous role that the Church played in promoting reconciliation post 2016 election violence was as a result of an improper relationship between the State and the Church. The term ‘improper relationship,’ in this study refers to non-reciprocal relationship which advantaged the State alone. The study also noted that political leaders have seductive power that can easily jeopardize the fundamental principles of the Church and its prophetic mission.

Chapter One:
General introduction

1.0 Introduction

The Church in Zambia has always been influential in fostering peace and reconciliation in the country. For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to emphasize that the terminology ‘Church’ is very complex. Agbonkhianmeghe Orobator, an African ecclesiologist, confirms that the theological discipline that systematically studies the nature, mission, and structure of the Church dates back to the early 14th Century. To this day, ecclesiologists have written many publications on ecclesiology without any conclusion (2010:35-44). The Greek word ‘Ecclesia, ‘translated in the New Testament signifies a meeting, an assembly or congregation. This was commonly used among the Greek States to denote the assembly of citizens summoned by the public crier. In the New Testament, the word Church means a ‘Christian assembly’ or congregation of the faithful associated with worship and service (Milne, 1998:259-308). Therefore, in this study the term ‘Church’ means the community (body of Christ) that worships and serves Christ in a local community. In other words, the Church in this thesis is the ecumenical movement which represents different Christian Churches and traditions that usually collaborate on many important issues.

Often, the Church in Zambia has been called upon to lead the process of national dialogue and reconciliation. The Church has always promoted a non-violent method of mitigating conflicts through dialogue and perceives these conflicts as moments of grace and opportunities for reconciliation as a nation and a call for the conversion of hearts. It becomes a national and all-inclusive effort, seeking genuine transformation of hearts, systems and procedures in order to promote unity, respect for human rights and peace for all. This is also considered a prophetic call motivated by the wish to promote a just, peaceful and united society. There were numerous times when the Church advocated for peace among ethnic groupings and politicians in Zambia. The Church is actually considered to be the conscience of society which offers guidance on how to live irrespective of diversities. During the period of colonial rule up to independence in 1964, the Church attempted to straddle the gulf between ministering to the needs of the local population without antagonizing the colonial masters and bring the local community to a point of passive

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1The word church in this study will be used to mean the ecclesia other than one particular denomination.
acceptance of colonial rule. For this reason, the colonial administration viewed the activities of the Church as practical tools of indoctrination and often as vehicles for dissent against colonial rule. The primary aim of the church during colonial rule was to provide social welfare via education and healthcare and agricultural extension. For this reason, the drive for an independent Zambia found a secure home in Churches. Churches formed a significant part of the associational landscape, consisting not only of a forum for spiritual communication but also a sanctuary for secular resistance. Mission stations provided a place where the contradictions between Christianity and politics of racism and colonialism were discussed freely. The effect was that Zambia was clearly driven by Christian beliefs and packaged in Christian social action (Howell and Pearce 2002:182).

During Kaunda’s United National Independence Party, the church offered checks and balances. The most significant example was when the church rejected scientific humanism as the nation’s ideology (Gifford, 1999:191). At the height of discontentment over a one-party system by many Zambians, the Church spearheaded dialogue between proponents of multiparty democracy and UNIP. Out of the dialogue, President Kaunda agreed to change the constitution to allow for plural politics. The church also continued to denounce the MMD’s corruption and misrule. Notable was the way the church denounced President Chiluba’s Christian nation declaration (Phiri, I.A, 2003:401-428). Recently when the fifth president, Michael Sata, died in 2014 chaos erupted in the ruling PF as many jostled for presidency, it was the Church that helped to reconcile different factions (Daily mail editorial comment dated 9 April 2019).

However, today there is a discourse that the Church is losing its moral authority and trust as seen in its alleged corruption. This was confirmed through a Pastoral Statement issued by the Council of Churches in Zambia (Council of Churches in Zambia) on July 19th, 2008. The CCZ bemoaned the high levels of corruption which have permeated the Church in Zambia (CCZ Pastoral Statement July 20, 2008). Since then this discourse has become more dominant as substantiated by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection in its paper, ‘Partisan Church Contributing to Zambia’s failure ‘ dated 28th October 2016. In it, the Center announced that it feared that the Church was the major contributor to political failure because of alleged corruption. The paradox is that despite the country calling itself a Christian nation there appear to be contradictions and extremes in Zambia. Experience shows that some Church leaders in the mainline and newer
Pentecostal churches remain exposed to the actions of opportunistic politicians. Therefore, Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection advises the church to develop a strategy that would embrace the promotion of multidimensional programs of civic education and the formation of social conscience at all levels and encourages competent and honest citizens to participate in politics.

This realization has become a challenge not only to the healing of wounds inflicted on humanity by violent conflicts, but also to amend or even change how to do theology in Africa. As the Church is losing its morality and trust in society, it is necessary to engage in an open discourse on contemporary issues that are affecting the role of the Church in society to explore the dynamics of politics and the impact of the interplay between the Church and the State.

Therefore this study seeks to determine the role that the Church played in the post 2016 elections violence in Zambia; whether the church promoted reconciliation or perpetuated violence and why? In order to fulfill this task this chapter will include the general background of the study, motivation for the study, statement of the problem, limitations and objectives and conclude the introductory chapter.

1.2. General background to the study

Countries across the globe hail Zambia’s peaceful transfer of political power during every presidential election as a sign of the country’s mature democracy (Lewanika and Zamchiya, 2015:1-17; Baylies & Szefiel 1992:75). This has also made the country a celebrated and safe haven for refugees (UNHCR, 28 August 2018). The smooth and peaceful handover of power started with the ousting of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) by the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) in the historic 1991 elections which brought to an end the 27 years of Kaunda’s UNIP rule. Government had transitioned without revolutionary or military violence. Baylies and Szefiel stress that, ‘Almost uniquely in Africa, the elections produced a peaceful transfer of power, President Kaunda appearing on television the next morning to concede defeat and his successor Frederick Chiluba being sworn in’ (1992:75). Twenty years after ousting UNIP, the MMD lost and peacefully conceded to the Patriotic Front (PF)’s Michael Sata, to the admiration of many countries across the globe. This was lauded by the rest of the world as this came at a time when most of the African countries, like Zimbabwe, were embedded with violence due to failure by their leaders to concede defeat (Hohn, 2009: VI; Lewanika and Zamchiya, 2015:6).
However, Zambia’s enviable record of 25 years of peaceful democratic elections appears to be under threat. With claims of electoral malfeasance still fresh in the minds of many opposition members and a remarkably violent pre-election period, Zambia’s pluralist democracy is facing its sternest test. For example, commencing in May 2016, the campaign saw many gatherings and events marked by increasing levels of violence. This included political assassinations and forcible dispersal and intimidation of supporters. Violence had become so routine that the Electoral Commission of Zambia suspended all campaign events in July 2016. Much of the violence was attributed to the ruling party, raising concerns that the election result was influenced by a climate of intimidation (Cummings, 2016). Hence the failure by the opposition to accept the outcome of elections. The reason for refuting the results was that prior to the 2016 elections, the main opposition, the United Party for National Development (UPND) had indicated that there would be ‘Armageddon’ if the results would not be in their favour because it is alleged that they feared to lose.

Therefore, no sooner did the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) declare Edgar Lungu of the PF as the winner than the UPND petitioned the result. When the Constitutional Court threw out the petition for not providing evidence within 14 days’ constitutional period, violence became the order of the day. On the other hand, the opposition UPND had called the credibility of the electoral process into question by the ECZ’s controversial decision to award the contract for the printing of the ballot papers to the Al Ghurairi Printing and Publishing Company. Despite the Dubai-based firm’s history of providing services in elections such as the recent polls in Uganda, its’ bid was coasted double that of the South African company that has an established relationship with the ECZ. This move was investigated by the Zambia Public Procurement Authority and drew sharp criticism. Nevertheless, the Al Ghurairi was awarded a contract (Cummings, 2016). Additionally, the UPND also questioned the Lungu administration for putting forward a controversial electoral bill which was passed shortly before the dissolution of the National Assembly. This bill, among many other things, proposed that ECZ officials be immune from prosecution for actions undertaken while executing their duties. It also allowed the President to fire ECZ officials unilaterally. There were also rumors of a leaked PF road map to rigging Cummings, 2016).

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Many scholars insist that the Church has a critical call to appreciate and make use of its powers derived from moral legitimacy and beliefs that peacemaking is an integral manifestation of its faith and relationship with constituencies (Wafula, 2008; Magesa, 1996). It is important to note that the Church has characteristics and skills of a successful mediator in conflict situations. The Church has always commanded respect because it is believed to have impartiality with regard to issues of dispute (Wafula, 2012:18-19). However, Cheyeka argues that the Church in Zambia appeared to be too corrupt to promote reconciliation. According to him, the behaviour of Church leaders is not inspiring because the Church has been neutralized and silenced by the State to an extent that it has lost its moral fibre (Cheyeka 2016: 159-172).

The political failure of the Church on the one hand is reflected in its complicity and silence to speak against tribal discrimination and political injustices which characterized the 2016 General Elections. Kapika (2016) observes that Zambia has no genuine political parties that can compete on the basis of ideas but many Zambians have reverted to tribal identities as foundations for political competition. Political leaders have often exploited tribal loyalty to advance their political gain, parochial interests, patronage and cronyism. Bertha Osei-Hwedie (1998:331) categorized Zambia’s 73 tribes into five groups based on language. The Bemba speaking group includes not only the Bembas, but also Bisas, Ushis, Lalas, Lambas and Ngumbos. The Tonga speakers are the Tongas, Ilas and the Lenjes, together commonly referred to as the Bantu Botatwe. The Nyanja speakers are Tumbukas, Chewas, Ngonis, Sengas and Nsengas. While the Lozi speakers include Lozis, Nkoyas, Makololo, Subiyas, Nyengos and Namashis. The remaining tribes such as Luvales and Kaondes cannot be easily categorized. The largest group is the Bemba speaking of Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt provinces. These are followed by the Tongas and the Nyanjas. It is worth noting that there is political rivalry between the groups especially between the Bembas and the Tongas and the Lozis. It should also be noted that the church in Zambia has a history of division which traces its history from the mission and colonial influence. The coming of missionaries in the country created divisions that meant denominations became ethnic oriented. This was partly due to way in which missionaries settled in the country.

However, during the 1991 elections, all ethnic groups rallied behind Frederick Chiluba, a Bemba speaker, and the MMD mainly with the intention to remove President Kaunda and UNIP from power. However, this unity broke down because it was an alliance created for the sole purpose of
fighting Kaunda. The other reason that caused the cohesion to break down was due to disagreements over the sharing of cabinet positions. Those who contributed financially to the fall of Kaunda felt that they deserved high ranking positions in government (Hwedie 1998:332). At the same time, regionalism and tribalism became more rife both pre and post the 2016 elections. The Commonwealth Observer Group (2016) noted with concern the escalating pattern of ethnic-centered politics in these elections. It was observed that although politicians had repeatedly sought to appeal to particularly ethnic or regional groupings since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991, the level and degree to which this had been exploited were pronounced in 2016 elections (Hwedie, 1998:6).

On the other hand, despite the Church being trans-ethnic and with full knowledge of the fact that tribal interests have played a major role in armed conflict and civil unrest in some parts of Africa, some church leaders promoted hatred, tribalism and exacerbated violence through stern speech. Similarly, in Uganda, Christianity has been involved in the ongoing civil war with what began as the Holy Spirit Movement and now is known as the Lord’s Resistance Army. An even more dramatic example of the abuse of Christianity for violence was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Bjorn Moller, 2006:33). Additionally, the catholic church contributed to the laying the foundations for ethnic resentment by initially privileging the Tutsi and then from the mid 1950 switching to privileging the Hutus and providing some kind of divine sanction for their blatant racist tendencies. Amazingly, members of the clergy and nuns also took part in planning and implementing the genocide. Some of the most bizarre atrocities against humanity took place in churches (Bjorn Moller, 2006:34).

This was compounded by some pastoral statements which in many ways appeared to fuel tensions rather than peaceful co-existence. Ecclesiologists in a 2005 paper from 47 Christian leaders across the world suggest that reconciliation is the mission of God, ‘therefore, when the Church is a passive bystander and refuses to become a constructive agent of reconciliation amidst divisions and destructive conflicts, it is guilty of withholding love to neighbor and it is promoting a defective gospel.’ Yet some Church leaders were compromised by rich politicians and contradicted the ecclesiologists’ understanding of the role of the Church. Other clergy men and women took a

4Conference of Catholic Bishops of Zambia Statement August 28, 2016
partisan stance, subsequently robbing the Church of its independent voice of conscience (Michele, 2016).\textsuperscript{5}

Furthermore, the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation has further complicated matters because it has created what I call ‘a marriage of convenience’ between the Church and the State. This Church-State relationship can be both a challenge and prospect for reconciliation (Gibbs and Ajulu, 1999:74). Cheyeka observes that although every successive government has benefited politically from this declaration, President Edgar Lungu put the Church into a serious dilemma because the reality entails that the Church-State relationship jeopardizes the role of both the State and the Church in society (2016:159-170).

To this end, Storey (2012:11) elaborates that although both the State and the Church have seemingly related responsibilities, they are somewhat distinct. Rulers have a special responsibility to shepherd God’s people, render services with integrity, righteousness, just and in a transparent manner and to protect human rights. The Church has a role in helping the state to fulfill God’s expectations, by reminding it of those expectations and holding it accountable to its tasks (Villa-Vicencio in Bentry \textit{et al}, 2012:8).

Bonhoeffer stresses, ‘the responsibility of the Church is to act as a witness to God’s reign, calling the government to justice where it is unjust, making it aware of its failures and mistakes’ (Bonhoeffer in Green and De Jonge, 2013: 714). Bonhoeffer further maintains that, ‘it is also to act to preserve at least among its own members the order of outward justice no longer in the polls. Therefore the State and the Church both fail God when the relationship is polluted and compromised’ (Bonhoeffer in Green and De Jonge, 2013:714).

Nevertheless, Forster (2016:61-88) observes that the State-Church relationship is not reciprocal because the state often abuses the Church for expedience and votes. For instance, in South Africa during the 1980s at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle, the Methodist Church of Southern Africa banned the South African flag from all Church buildings because the regime’s injustice had put it beyond the pale of civilized nations and it became a symbol of oppression. Here, the flag symbolizes the invasion of the Church by the State. In other words, the Methodist Church of Southern Africa detested the uncritical partnership that existed between the Church and the State.

\textsuperscript{5}
In 1994 when democracy dawned on South Africa, a new flag representing a liberated ‘rainbow’ people was introduced and the Church readily accepted the flag. Nevertheless, merely less than two decades into democracy, the present ANC Government has stained the flag. It has continued to abuse the Church for political ends (Storey, 2012:12; Forster, 2016:66-81). Rieger also observes how a Christian nation like the USA usually justified the status quo, sometimes unconsciously. He states that the founding fathers of the 18th Century vividly remembered the European situation and some of the dangers of symbioses of Church and State (2015:24). Therefore, Zambia as a Christian nation must draw lessons from South African and American examples of the interaction between Church and State. Above all, the Church in Zambia should be quite concerned about the marriage of convenience between the Church and the State (especially regarding the public pronouncement that is usually made by the State that the Church and the State are one).

In this light, Muwowo emphasized that the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation was hollow as there is little to show that Zambia is a Christian nation as Zambia faces mounting social, political and economic problems, including widespread corruption. This was due to his opinion that the State uses religion to abuse its citizenry. Muwowo stated, ‘This relationship is abusive and has far reaching consequences on the role of the Church in Society’ (Muwowo etal, 2010:1). Henriot underscores:

‘the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation by the second president Fredrick Chiluba on 29th December 1991 was just a political gimmick aimed at ensuring that the critical non-governmental voices within the church and society were neutralized by intentionally preventing their leaders from being involved in the political affairs of the country’ (Henriot, 1998:3; Phiri, 2003:401-428).

In 1995, the then Vice President of Zambia, Brigadier General Godfrey Miyanda, applied Biblical texts literally to neutralize critical voices during Frank Mutubila’s Frank Talk programme which was broadcast on ZNBC TV saying:

‘Zambia has become a ‘chosen nation’ the ‘new Israel.’ The leaders are anointed, hence nobody has a right to question them or disagree with them. Hence the view of the opposition is seen as representing Satan since they always go against God’s chosen leaders’ (ZNBC, 05 August 1995).
Consequently, the role of the Church and the State in society are jeopardized. For this reason there appears to be no moral conscious of the State. In return, the Church appears to be a major contributor to political failure (Mukuka, 2015:11; Cheyeka, 2016: 159-172).

For this reason, Storey reminds the Church of how it was forced during the years of struggle to revisit the Church-State relationship, to read scriptures with new lenses opened by the abuse of State power, and to refigure how the Church should engage with Caesar. He sees this as the appropriate means to define and preserve the roles of both the Church and the State in society (2012:12). Therefore, this study argues that a non-reciprocal relationship between the State and the Church affected the positioning of the ecumenical body pre and post 2016 election violence.

1.3. Motivation for the study

The main focus of this thesis is based on the lack of a clear and balanced model of Church-State relations in Zambia. The declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation by the second president Frederick Chiluba on 29th December 1991 has brought about a very unique Church and State relationship which also affected the response of the Church to the post 2016 elections violence.

The silence of the Church when citizens expected a voice of conscience is deemed a contradiction of what many believe is its divine call. This is because reconciliation is widely seen as a task for which the Church is qualified. Dion Forster (2010) stated. For this reason, many have been wondering who would bring reconciliation if the Church, which is revered as a catalyst for unity, appears to be corrupt and compromised.

The other motivation for the study comes from the contradictory statements among the Church leaders on matters of national importance. There is no consensus anymore on important issues among the clergy. Some clergymen, who are meant to be neutral due to the fact that they minister to people from different political affiliations, contributed to the post 2016 election violence because they have been seen endorsing political candidates openly, using hate speech and practicing blatant tribalism due to their greed for financial gain.

Therefore; it is against this background that I was motivated to explore how influential the church has been in promoting reconciliation post 2016 election violence in Zambia.

1.4. Research Problem
The study seeks to determine the role that the Church played in the post 2016 elections violence in Zambia - whether the Church promoted reconciliation or perpetuated violence. The Church has a divine mandate to foster peaceful coexistence and should not be an instigator of violence. The study acknowledges the fact that although the Church’s intervention does not always lead to a reconciliatory outcome, it is widely trusted that it has a critical call and power derived from moral legitimacy and beliefs to appreciate peacemaking as an integral manifestation of its faith and relationship with constituencies.

The major question guiding the research asks: What was the positioning of the ecumenical bodies to pre and post 2016 elections violence?

Zambia’s electoral history has been peaceful compared to many other Sub-Saharan African Countries. However, the recent Presidential elections in 2015 and 2016 have marked a shift in the trend, an increase in political violence. The former President of the country, Michael Sata, had a short tenure as he died in office in October 2014. In accordance with the Zambia’s Constitution, Sata’s death triggered the need for a by-election (Goldring et al, 2016:108). The vacancy in the Presidential office led to serious infighting within the ruling party, PF, as prospective candidates wrangled to become Sata’s successor. The PF Constitution states that the Presidential candidate is to be elected at the national convention. However, some senior party members argued that due to the short time frame the nomination should automatically be awarded to Minister of Defense, Edgar Lungu, who had been appointed acting president when Sata left the country for medical treatment before he eventually died (Goldring et al, 2016:108).

On 11th August 2016, Zambia held elections for the Presidency, National Assembly, Local Councilors, and the Mayors. Concurrently, a referendum was held on whether to enhance the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Zambia. It was the first contest under a newly amended Constitution. Although the election saw 13 Presidential candidates, the race for president was between two frontrunners - Edgar Lungu of the PF and Hakainde Hichilema of the opposition UPND (Goldring et al, 2016:108). However, it was observed that generally the 2016 election was not contested on a level electoral playing field. The ruling PF enjoyed significant advantage in the campaign period. The Zambian Police Service applied the controversial Public Order Act to deny the opposition the right to hold rallies. Moreover, the ruling party systematically used State resources like State events and Air Force helicopters, for campaigning purposes. The government
also attracted criticism for shutting down an opposition newspaper, The Post, two months before elections. The State media continued to be heavily biased in favour of the ruling party (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

Zambia has, in the past, been known for peaceful elections (Strauss and, 2012), but in 2016 the PF campaigns and to a lesser extent, the UPND campaign were strongly linked to incidents of violence. Some notable examples of violence in 2016 included an event of a former UPND MP where her supporters assaulted a Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) MP candidate in Namwala, and an event in Lusaka where the police shot and killed a UPND supporter. On 15th August 2016 there were riots almost everywhere in Southern Province and Lusaka. Market stalls were being burnt down in protest against the results by suspected UPND supporters. Almost 300 people were arrested (Goldring et al, 2016: 111).

In response to this crisis in Zambia, the ecumenical body attempted to promote reconciliation between the PF and the UPND but their efforts were in vain because it is yet to find an appropriate and effective way of relating to the State. I have chosen to focus on the Ecumenical Body (a union of churches of diverse traditions) because they have played a pivotal role in shaping the political destine of Zambia. Thus, This study attempts to investigate the positioning of the ecumenical body to pre and post 2016 election violence.

I will focus on the role the ecumenical body played to promote reconciliation in the light of Bonheoffer’s conceptualization of the Church-State relationship. To a large extent this study is critique of the Church. It looks at what the Church did as an organization which is trusted to promote reconciliation and co-existence.

The following sub-questions will assist in answering the research question:

What were some of the causes of the post 2016 elections violence in Zambia?
How did the ecumenical bodies respond to the post 2016 elections?
What are the possible interventions that can be used by ecumenical bodies to address violence during elections?

1.5. Limitations
The major limitation of the study was lack of capacity to deal with a detailed analysis of political violence because that is beyond its’ scope. The study is non-empirical and will only depend on available literature. Listening and conducting interviews could have broadened my spectrum and knowledge.

1.6. Research objectives

The aim of this study therefore is to determine the role that the Church played in the post 2016 elections violence in Zambia. In order to achieve the intended aim, there are three main objectives that have to be borne in mind:

- To investigate some of the causes of the post 2016 election violence in Zambia.
- To assess the response of the Church to post 2016 election violence in Zambia.
- To identify possible interventions for reconciliation in Zambia.

1.7. Significance and Relevance of the study

The study is significant because violence in Zambia is unprecedented and is becoming costly in terms of loss of important facilities, loss of lives and the negative impact on the economy (Zambia 2016 Human Rights Report-US Department of State). Violence is also adversely affecting the United Nations 2030 Agenda for sustainable development on a broader scale. This agenda is a plan of action which seeks to strengthen universal peace and recognizes that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions of all actors including the Church must collaborate in promoting peace which is an integral aspect of sustainable development. Robert Zuber writes in *Global action to prevent war*, ‘there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development’ (2010:1-4).

This implies that peace and sustainable development are intertwined and inseparable. Both of them are essential factors for development. Furthermore, violence is contradicting the Council for Word Mission’s theme: ‘*Together towards Life: Mission and Evangelism in Changing Landscape.*’ Therefore, the move of this study to examine the corruption in the Church which affected its positioning post 2016 election violence in Zambia will challenge the Church to take its rightful position of peace making and reconciliation. The study will motivate the church to reclaim its lost trust as a major factor in conflicts resolution. Most importantly this study will also explore the
dynamics of Church-State relations in Zambia and assess the impact of the interplay between religion and politics on the Church’s prophetic mission.

1.8. Conclusion

In this chapter I have explained what the thesis intends to achieve by outlining important sections that will further be explored in the chapters that follow. I started by looking at the background of the study in which I discussed Zambia’s enviable record of democratic elections which has made it a safe haven for refugees. However, this record is under threat because the country has backslidden especially pre and post 2016 elections. This was followed by the motivation for the study. The main focus of the thesis was based on the lack of a clear and balanced model of Church and the State relationship in Zambia. The declaration of Zambia has a Christian nation has brought about a very unique Church-State relationship which affected the response of the Church to the post 2016 elections violence. The silence of the Church on important issues also contradicted what is expected to be its divine calling. There were also contradictions among the Church leaders and divisive speeches motivated by their individual financial gain. The motivation was followed by the research problem, limitations, research objectives and the significance of the study. In the next chapter I will outline a brief political history that shows the progression of leadership from the federal republic to multiparty democracy.

Chapter Two:

History of leadership from the Federal Republic to Multiparty Democracy in Zambia

2.1. Introduction
Chapter One provided a general overview of the study including the general background, motivation for the study, research problem, limitations, and research objectives based on the outcomes of the study. The main aim of Chapter Two is to outline a history of progression of leadership in Zambia, starting from the Federal Republic to multiparty democracy. The chapter also discusses some of the effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia such as monopoly of government, ethnic divisions and suppression of media freedom, among others. I have divided the chapter into five parts. Part one provides an introduction. While part two presents a brief summary of Zambia’s political history as a Federal Republic. The third part deals with the progression of leadership from the Federal Republic to Multiparty democracy. The fourth part discusses effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia. The fifth part is a conclusion.

2.2. Zambia’s political History–a Federal Republic

Zambian history goes back to the debut of the Homo sapiens: there is evidence at Kabwe of human habitation in Zambia even before it was named Zambia after the mighty Zambezi River. Kabwe is situated north of the capital Lusaka. The human history of Zambia goes back into prehistoric times. The importance of Zambia in prehistory is that there are a number of places, if not the place, in which the true men developed (Brelsford, 1956:1). According to Fagan (1964) there were late Stone Age people of predominantly Bushman stock in the country by about 250 BC. By A.D 500 there were people who knew how to work iron, living at the Kalambo falls.

Fagan also says that excavations of mounds show evidence of the Semi-Bantu working iron and practicing agriculture in the area around A.D650. In the Zambezi Valley, the Ingombe Ilede site was also occupied by iron workers in 4th Century. From the same site there is a presence of copper and gold artifacts and glass beads dating from A.D. 850 which seem to suggest that by the later dates some sort of trade relationship with the East Coast Arabs had already been established (p.2).

Ndulo and Kent note that Church-State relations in Zambia can be traced back to pre-colonial period since 1890. The arrival of Christianity in Zambia dates back to the discovery of the Victoria Falls, otherwise known by the locals as the ‘mosi-oa-tunya,’ or ‘the smoke that thunders’ by a Scottish explorer, David Livingstone, in 1851. In the year 1855 he named it the Victoria Falls after Queen Victoria (1996:258). The colonial government did not initially want to participate directly in the administration of the territory. Rather, the government opted to use private organizations
such as the church and granted them protection from any form of attack. These organizations were
given powers to acquire land rich in minerals on behalf of the colonial government. This is the
reason the introduction of Christianity in Zambia ran concurrently with the discovery of minerals.

For this reason, Oliver Anthony argues, ‘most of the Missionaries who came to Africa were not
only interested in spreading the Gospel but were part of the colonial government. They were both
directly and indirectly involved in politics’ (1967:76-77). A good example is Francis Coillard of
the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society who persuaded King Lewanika of Barotseland to sign a
treaty with the British South African Company which controlled Northern Rhodesia in the 1890s.
The alliance the Church and the State helped a great deal to consolidate colonialism. By 1900,
British rule had been formalized by two orders, the north western Rhodesia and the north eastern
Rhodesia order in the council of 1900. Rhode’s name had been affixed by 1897 and the territories
were joined in 1911 as Northern Rhodesia (Zwanyika, 2013:24).

Even David Livingstone in his letter to Professor Sedwich of Cambridge University confirmed the
motive of his mission. He described his motive as more than meets the eye. His motives were not
only evangelistic in nature but also to find ways to benefit both Europeans and Africans
(Fletcher,1950). Through his influence, the London Missionary Society opened their first mission
centre in Northern Rhodesia which today is called Zambia (Zwanyika 2013:24). In 1888 Cecil
Rhodes a British Settler, spearheaded the British commercial and political interests in central
Africa.

Rhodes managed to convince local traditional leaders to grant him mineral rights concession. He
also invited churches to Northern Rhodesia and gave them huge pieces of land for missionary
objectives. The Church and the State continued to work closely in providing services such as
education and health care. By 1924 there were mission centers almost everywhere in Northern
Rhodesia. In the year 1888, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe) were proclaimed as British spheres of influence. The two were being politically
administered by Britain under Cecil Rhodes’ British South African Company (BSAC). In 1911 the
two Rhodesia’s were merged. In 1953 the two Rhodesias were joined with Nyasaland to form the
federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Zwanyika, 2013:24).
However, the cordial relationship between the Church and the State did not last forever. The church decided to drastically change the method of engaging with the State. When Governor Sir Hubert Stanley accused the Church of discrediting the government after the resolution by the church in Ndola’s Missionary Conference, the Church responded that they had a right to criticize the government (Ibid:328). John Taylor and Dorothea affirm that the missionaries, who were serving among the repressed natives, felt the need to start speaking on behalf of the voiceless. Four issues brought the colonial authorities and the Church into direct conflicts: (i) Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia (ii) Taxation of Africans (iii) labour unrest, and (iv) Land distribution (Zwanyika, 2013:24).

The ecumenical body, led by Bishop Alston May of the Anglican Church’s Northern Rhodesia Diocese, vigorously represented African interests on all issues. In 1922, the ecumenical body, through its General Missionary Conference, passed a resolution declaring the tax imposed by government excessive and unjust. They proposed a tax cut. Bishop May even wrote a strong letter to the colonial government calling for a fair and adequate representation of natives interests when dealing with land delimitation (Phiri, 1999:327).

Carmody (2002) writes that the nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda and his team benefited greatly from the Church’s critical distance. A Catholic newspaper, ‘The Leader,’ stimulated the nationalists’ morale to denounce the injustices of the colonial government. Kaunda and his friends were given space to articulate their perspective.

During the 1920s and 1930s there were advances and discoveries of copper and mining industries which spurred development and immigration. By the late 1930s, about 4000 European skilled workers and about 20000 African laborers had been employed in Zambia. By 1933, it produced a good percentage of world’s copper. This caused the British to monopolize its production under the Anglo America Corporation of North America and The Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) which controlled everything up to independence. In 1923 the United Kingdom took over the territory. The administration of Northern Rhodesia was shifted to the British colonial office in the year 1924. A legislative council was established whose members were elected by a small European minority of only 4000 but none by African majority (Besa, 2007:7).
After the reintroduction of plural politics, elections in Zambia have been held with the framework of multiparty democracy and a presidential system. The President and the National Assembly were simultaneously elected for 5 year terms. Before independence, elections for 5 members of the Advisory Council were held for the first time in the year 1918 at which suffrage was limited to the a small European community over the age of 21 who had lived in the territory for more than six months and owned at least AE 150 of property. This system of elections continued in 1920 and 1922, 1924 and 1926. In 1926 a legislative Council was formed and elections were held (Mulford, 1964:2-4, Besa, 2007:7).

Before the 1929 elections, the number of elected members was seven. Other elections were held in 1932, 1935 and 1938. The 1941 elections saw eight members elected with the new Northern Rhodesia Labour Party which was dissolved after its heavy defeat in 1944. Prior to the 1948 elections the number of seats was increased to 10 with 2 Africans appointed to the Council.

2.2.1. Elections under the Benson Constitution (1958-1964)

In 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed with all members of the territory to elect representatives to the Federal Legislative. Northern Rhodesia had 8 ordinary seats, and 3 member representing African interests, two appointed by European settlers while one was to be appointed by Africans. However, only three Africans qualified to vote.

In 1957 Sir Arthur Benson, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia started putting in place a new Constitution to primarily favour the minority of white settlers and disadvantage the majority black people. Among the noticeable features in the Benson constitution was that the drafters wanted total control of Northern Rhodesia. There were two kinds of voters namely, ordinary and special. The criteria for qualification as a voter for both were income and property. To be able to vote one had to attain some level of education and fill the form in English unassisted (Mulford, 1964:2-4; Besa, 2000:7).

This system automatically disenfranchised the natives and promoted white minority hegemony as the outcome always favored the white minority. This is similar to Kaunda’s framework during the One Party State whereby presidential ballot papers only featured Kaunda and an unappealing animal such as a frog. In this framework, people (mainly those who could not read or write) were required to choose whom to become president between Kaunda or a frog. This framework was
adopted after all opposition parties were banned in 1972. The system was used in 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988 (Perlez, 1991; Riedl, 2014:83). I argue that both the Benson and Kaunda frameworks are not different from the modern day model of vote rigging. The reason is that both trajectories cycle through various attempts to consolidate their rule and take advantage of people’s illiteracy to solidify their power. Similarly, modern African democracy is questionable as ruling parties are constantly accused of vote rigging.

2.3. Progression of Leadership from the Federal Republic to the Multiparty Democracy

The Federation was dissolved on 24th October 1964 and Kenneth Kaunda became the first President of Zambia. Zambia’s independence was ignited by the famous speech ‘Wind of change’ by Prime Minister Harold McMillan. In 1968, Kenneth Kaunda of UNIP defeated Zambia African National Congress leader Harry Mwanga Nkumbula (Kambilima, 2016). When Kaunda on 27th April 1967 declared Christian Humanism as a philosophy of the Nation and likened it to the Gospel, Christians wholly accepted it (Sakala, 1996:121). Throughout his presidency, Kaunda worked closely with the Church. This could be seen as another form of declaring Zambia as a Christian nation. Therefore this could defeat the embraced idea that Chiluba declared Zambia as a Christian nation. Perhaps the best way to put it is to state that President Chiluba constitutionalized the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation. In other words, the Christian nation clause was forced into the Constitution by Chiluba. In terms of church state relationship, Zambia like many other African countries, gained their independence under the influence and support of the Church.

In 1967 when Kaunda briefly resigned over ethnic divisions after the elections, it was a delegation of the Clergy led by Bishop Philemon Mataka who convinced him to rescind the decision (Sakala, 1996:118-119). Generally after independence, sectionalism appeared in Zambia. For instance, in the year 1971 UNIP experienced its most serious internal strife. In August of the same year a splinter party which appeared to be tribally motivated called the United Progressive Party (UPP) was founded by the then Vice President of the country, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe. In the by-elections held in 1971 the UPP leader won a parliamentary seat, suggesting the potential threat to the UNIP camp. The response from UNIP faithful was a demand for a one party state. In 1973 Kaunda constituted a Constitutional Commission to recommend the form and details of the single party system. Vice President Mainza Chona was appointed as chairperson. The commission received a large volume of written and oral submissions and presented the report in October 1972.

The smooth and peaceful handover of power started with the ousting of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) by the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) in the historic October 31st 1991 elections. Frederick was elected president with the support of the Church on 2nd November 1991. He became president, receiving 76% of presidential vote, and 125 out of 150 seats (83% of parliamentary seats). Frederick Chiluba ruled for two terms as prescribed by the constitution from 1991 to 2001. The result was hailed by international observers as an historic step in the country’s return to multiparty politics and embracing by the people of Zambia of an opportunity for democratic change. Local commentators also lauded this establishment of a ‘mature and stable democratic system of government’ in which Constitutionalism would prevail (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992:76).

Chiluba was replaced by Levy Mwanawasa who won with 29% in 2001 and ruled up to his untimely death in September 2008. Rupiah Banda became president on August 19, 2008. Twenty years after ousting UNIP, the MMD lost and peacefully conceded to the Patriotic Front (PF)’s Michael Sata on September 20, 2011. This transition received much admiration of many countries across the globe as this happened at a time when most of the African countries like Zimbabwe were embedded with violence due to failure by their leaders to concede defeat (Hohn, 2009: vi; Lewanika and Zamchiya, 2015:6). This consistent democratic transition from one president to another is a source of inspiration in Africa (Lewanika and Zamchiya, 2015:1-17). However, in October 2014, following a long illness, president Sata died, creating a vacancy in the office of the president for the second time in one decade (Goldring et al, 2016:108).

Guy Scot assumed office as Acting President for 90 days as prescribed by the constitution. Like Kenneth Kaunda, Guy Scot was automatically disqualified from the presidential race because of his foreign parentage (Scottish). Therefore, the PF chose Edgar Lungu, the then Defense and Justice Minister. For this reason, presidential elections were held on 20th January 2015 where eleven (11) candidates contested. However, it was Lungu who emerged a winner with 48.3% votes. He went on to re-contest the heavily contested 11th August 2016 election against his main challenger, Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND, and won (Zamchiya and Lewanika, 2015:5).
2.4. The effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia

Democratization is usually a complex process which involves the interaction of agency and structural factors; domestic and international ones, and economic and non-economic ones (Nicolas Van de Walle, 2001:6). Bertha Osei-Hwedie attributes the origin of democracy to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 which helped to pave way for political change in Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union indirectly opened the way to the popularizing of democracy in Africa. Therefore, the 1990s are characterized as the years of the establishment of multi-party competition in Africa. There were both external and internal factors that contributed to the adoption of multiparty democracy in Zambia. The collapse of the USSR as a model for one party system, and demand for fundamental human rights (1998:227).

During the period 1994-1998, Africa witnessed its best economic results in over a decade. This allowed the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to become optimistic about the region, relieved to be able to argue that their policy package was finally working. Economists went so far as to declare that, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa is in better shape than it has been for generations, pointing out that its overall growth rate was 4.4 percent in 1996, higher than it had been for two decades (Emerging Africa Economist,13 June 1997).

In the words of Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel:

‘The overwhelming electoral victory of the MMD in November 1991 restored multi-party politics to Zambia and ended the UNIP monopoly of government which had been in existence since Zambia became independent in 1964. A coalition of forces disenchanted by economic decline and resentful of authoritarian one party rule, the MMD had moved swiftly to reduce the economic and social role of the State and to promote market restructuring in line with IMF conditions. An alliance of trade union leaders and local capitalists also committed itself to political reforms which encouraged hope that stable democratic institutions can be forged. However, barely few weeks in office the MMD started doing the exact opposite. There were massive criticisms of presidential authoritarianism and widespread use of patronage in appointments which raised doubt as to whether the MMD had replaced UNIP or reproduced it (1992:75-91).
Baylies and Szeftel are merely suggesting that democracy came with some impact on Africans. This is the reason Peters, (2002:302) argues that multiparty democracy, despite being an ideal model, has also brought with it a number of challenges, especially in Southern Africa.

For this reason, there are different interpretations and conceptualizations within and outside Africa about multi-party democracy. Some scholars argue that there is enough evidence to suggest that this development would be more than a passing phenomenon (Tisch, 1992). Others have pessimistic opinion that not too much should be expected from these sudden conversions since the developments were not a process of local evolution but imposition by outsiders (Petersen, 1991). Furthermore, looking at the poor economic situation in Africa, it is an open question whether democratization will proceed in a context of poverty and lack of economic growth. This is because economic conditions, to a large extent, determine the nature of political systems and the willingness and ability of African governments to support the establishment of a democratic environment including multiparty systems of governance (Theobald, 1995).

Gero and Simuntanyi argued that multiparty democracy has not brought meaningful change to Zambia. The reversal of the democratic process was a chain of events which culminated in the amendment of the constitution that determinably and partly circumscribed free competition. This is characteristic of the creeping reversal from a democratic to a hybrid regime (2003:13). Gero and Simuntanyi further observe that an autocratic style became clear when Chiluba single-handedly declared Zambia a Christian Nation without consulting his cabinet. At the same time, a number of ministers were involved in corruption scandals without being dismissed, indicating no difference in the style of governance to that of the predecessor regime. This attracted condemnation from the international community (2003:13).

When it became clear that none of the MMD’s campaign promises would be fulfilled, a Caucus for National Unity (CNU) was formed. The CNU seminar which was held in March 1992 and chaired by a cabinet minister, Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika who comes from Western Province, demanded a stronger commitment to democratic reform and proper conduct of governance (Baylies and Szeftel, 1991:90). The CNU membership was also a reaction by non-Bemba speaking tribes who felt that the MMD had been hijacked by Bembas. The Bembas, headed by Patrick Katyoka, did not see any trouble in the MMD being dominated by Bembas. The
Macwan’gi faction wanted a fair share of the national cake. It was startling how Chiluba thwarted the efforts to register the Macwan’gi (Gero and Simuntanyi, 2003:13).

During this time, media enjoyed no independence because the government refused to abandon its control of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) as well as the two national print media namely, *Times of Zambia* and *Daily Mail*, for which the UNIP was strongly criticized when the MMD was in opposition. Moreover, the private printing media was intimidated, especially *The Post* through constant comprehensive police searches and detention of journalists. *The Post* editors were often in court to answer charges of libel (Gero and Simuntanyi, 2003:14-15). In order to consolidate and perhaps abuse powers, the MMD changed 70% of the recommendations by the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission of June 1995 which would have made governance and wings of government independent from presidency and become more accountable to parliament in the so-called Government Paper No. 1 of 1995. Notable among the rejected recommendations were:

- Change the Public Order Act which since colonial times had provided the government with instruments to prohibit public assemblies;
- A new catalogue of the Bills of Rights (chapter iii) of the constitution;
- Restrain the powers of the president in relation to the state of emergency;
- Alter the proposed amendment that circumscribed free electoral completion by changing the qualification criteria for presidential nominees, which later came to be known as the ‘Kaunda clause’ (Gero and Simuntanyi, 2003:16-17).

### 2.5. Conclusion

The main aim of Chapter Two was to outline a history of progression of leadership in Zambia, starting from the Federal Republic to Multiparty democracy. The chapter also discussed some of the effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia such as monopoly of government, ethnic divisions and suppression of media freedom among others. The chapter was divided into five parts. Part one is an introduction. While part two presented a brief Zambia’s political history-Federal Republic. The third part dealt with the progression of leadership from the Federal Republic to Multiparty democracy. The fourth part discussed effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia.
Chapter Three:

Theoretical framework and Methodology
3.1. Introduction

The main aim of Chapter Two was to outline a history of progression of leadership in Zambia, starting from the Federal Republic to Multiparty democracy. The chapter also discussed some of the effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia such as monopoly of government, ethnic divisions and suppression of media freedom, among others. This thesis utilizes a Church-State relation attributed to Bonheoffer as its theoretical framework as it encourages the Church to successfully challenge, engage with the appropriate government and generally promotes reconciliation. This chapter has ten parts namely, Luther’s Church-State Model, Calvin’s Church-State Model, Catholic Church-State Model, Bonheoffer’s analysis of other models, Bonheoffer’s Church-State Model, and the relevance of Bonheoffer to the study. Thereafter, Chapter three will also outline a detailed research design of the study. This study is a non-empirical study, drawing from content analysis in the qualitative paradigm. It included research design, data collection, sampling, research instruments and method of data analysis.

This study has confidence in the Church’s prophetic role but it also understands its limitations and ineffective dimensions. This section presents Bonheoffer’s Church-State model. I will begin by trying to analyze different kinds of Church-State relations in order to show why I feel Bonheoffer’s model is the most ideal in reconciliation. I have identified four different kinds of Church-State models, which will be discussed in the following sections.

3.2. Luther’s Church-State model

Luther wrote his works on Church-State around 1523 under the heading ‘Temporal authority: To what extent should it be obeyed?’ He ably divided human beings into two kingdoms; one of God under Christ and the other which was non-divine. The first deals with the soul and the second deals with bodily affairs. In other words, the Church deals with spiritual matters while the outside realm handles physical matters. According to Luther, both the Church and secular are from God and it is His way of exercising His authority. Politicians are therefore expected to seek to establish peace and justice on earth. That is to say that it is the duty of the State to punish anyone who obstructs peace and justice (Bonheoffer, 1995:335). However, spiritual issues are under the jurisdiction of State and this makes the Church superior to secular authorities, because of its power to determine humanity’s final destiny. Luther was fully aware of the seductive power of the State
that could easily absorb the Church and jeopardize the fundamental principles of its being and mission. The State can easily corrupt the Church leadership with gifts and privileges (Kumalo, 2007: 231).

However, Kumalo argues that Luther’s approach is limited and handicapped by not recognizing the need for the Church to make a contribution to the promotion of participatory democracy and good governance. The Church in Africa, a continent faced with poverty, underdevelopment and bad governance cannot stand aloof from the Kingdom of the World and leave everything in the hands of politicians. Democracy is too fragile to be left only in the hands of politicians (Kumalo, 2007:231).

3.3. Calvin’s Church-State Model

It is in Calvin’s Institution of the Christian Religion where ‘a Christian polity’ is conceptualized. Here, Calvin inculcates unquestionable obedience to the State, whose duty is to safeguard external manifestations of righteousness, while religious affairs are reserved for the Church (McLellan, 1997:46). Calvin saw the need for the Church to collaborate with the State. According to McLellan, this resulted in the subordination of the State to the Church because both the State and the Church derive authority from the same God and work collaboratively to serve the same God. I must note her that during Calvin’s time the Church controlled the State.

3.4. Catholic Church-State Model

According to the Catholic Church-State Model, the Church and State are equal partners but their relationship is not mutual. The Catholic Church holds that the Church is far too superior to the State. It is the Church which understands the needs of humanity and for this reason the State must obey the Church (Flannery, 1975:705). This assumption that it is only the Church that understands human needs cannot go without criticism.

3.5. Bonheoffer’s critique of other models

Before giving his own understanding of Church-State relations, Bonheoffer begins by analyzing different types of models. He starts with the Catholic model which adopted the idea of the State
from Greek thinking. For the Greeks, the State is a product of human nature (1955:333). The catholic sees the Church as higher than the State because it goes beyond the temporal world. The Catholics believe that the State and its powers is a product of the nature of creatures. However, for Bonheoffer, the State is not just the fulfillment of the rational character of humanity but it is the creative will of God in the people. According to Bonheoffer, both the Church and the State were created by Jesus and both serve Christ.

Bonheoffer then goes to critique the Lutheran model. In fact Bonheoffer developed his Church-State model from Luther. Bonheoffer argues that the reformers took the State not as a community arising from the created nature of humanity, but on the origin of the fall (1955:336). The reformers held that it was sin which made it necessary for the divine institution of government. Therefore, they never understood the State from below, in which humans were agents of its existence. The Reformers saw the State from above or the divine perspective. But Bonheoffer believes that both the Church and the State are from Christ and can only exist but in Jesus Christ (1955:337).

3.6. Bonheoffer’s Church-State relation

Bonheoffer’s book *Ethics*, in the third section on ‘Church and State,’ states that the church and State are two legitimate institutions which are different in their services but are servants of the same Master and are both necessary for the wellbeing of the Community (1995:332-353).

Bonheoffer hails from a tradition which elevates the Church above the State. Here is Bonheoffer’s understanding of Christian Ethics:

‘The Christian does not live in a vacuum but in a World of government, politics, labour and marriage. Hence Christian Ethics cannot exist in vacuum. What the Christian needs is concrete instructions in a concrete situation. The roots and background of Christian Ethics is the reality of God as revealed in Jesus Christ.

This reality is not manifest in the Church as distinct from the secular World such as juxtaposition of two separate spheres is denial of God’s having reconciled the whole World to himself in Christ. On the contrary God’s commandment is to be found and known in the Church, the family, labour and government’ (Bonheoffer, 1955).
Bonhoeffer tries to show that God is manifest in the World just as He manifests Himself in the Church; the Church cannot claim the truth which is not in the World but what the Church can do is to help the State realize the truth which it possesses.

3.7. Bonhoeffer’s relevance to this study

The reason for choosing Bonhoeffer’s essay on Church-State relation is primarily twofold. Firstly, unlike most theologians whose writings can be categorized in a particular theological discipline, Bonhoeffer’s writings cannot be categorized because they transcend boundaries and classification, (deGruchy, 2007:7). Further, deGruchy points out that Bonhoeffer’s writings can only be understood when one refers to their Christological thrust:

‘For Bonhoeffer, the centre of reality, nature, history, politics, the Church and human life is Christ. So boundaries of faith and witness are classified and established as he reflects on the meaning of Christ within specific context. It is Christ the centre who establishes boundaries’ (deGruchy, 2007: 7).

This thesis acknowledges the central role of Christ in doing theology and the need to perceive and respond to Jesus in ways that are meaningful and relevant to African mentality and experience. Stinton (2004:1) also confirms that at the heart of the Christian faith is the person of Jesus Christ. Consequently, the very core of Christian theology is Christology. In line with this, John Mbiti (1971:190), states that, ‘Christian theology ought properly to be Christological, for theology falls or stands on how it understands, translates and interprets Jesus Christ, at a given time, place and human situation.’

Other contemporary African theologians also stress Jesus’ central place within African Christianity and the critical need to articulate the reality and significance of Christ in relation to the lives of African Christians. For example, J.N.K Mugambi and Laurent Magesa write:

‘Christology is, in the final analysis, the most basic and central issue of Christian theology. The faith, the hope and praxis of love the Christian theology attempts to explicate, and which Christians endeavor to witness to by their life, must have Christ as their foundation and goal. In fact, to be precise theology is not Christian at all when it does not offer Jesus Christ of Nazareth as the answer to the human quest’ (1989:10).
The other relevant perspective of Bonhoeffer to this study is the context in which he wrote his works. It was during turbulent times of war and his chief aim was to challenge the Church of his time to take into consideration the signs of the time, especially the type of Christianity relevant to such times. I am writing within the context of turbulent times in Zambia where I am also challenging the Church to look at signs of times for an effective way to promote reconciliation. In order to do this, I am using Bonhoeffer to create a model which accommodates dialogue and reconciliation. The Church needs to make a contribution to peaceful co-existence through dialogue.

3.8. Methodology

3.8.1. Research design

This is a non-empirical study located in the qualitative research paradigm which explores the role that church in Zambia played in promoting reconciliation post 2016 election violence. Qualitative research is the approach which is usually associated with the constructivist paradigm which emphasizes the socially constructed nature of reality. It is about recording, analyzing and attempting to uncover the deeper meaning and significance of human behaviour and experience, including contradictory beliefs, behaviours and emotions. Researchers are interested in gaining a rich and complex understanding of people’s experience and not necessarily in obtaining information which can be generalized to other larger groups (Crossman, 2019).

The approach adopted by qualitative researchers tends to be inductive, which means that they develop a theory or look for a pattern of meaning on the basis of the data that they have collected. This involves a move from the specific to the general and is sometimes called a bottom-up approach. However, most research projects also involve a certain degree of deductive reasoning (Crossman, 2019).

Qualitative researchers do not usually base their research on pre-determined hypotheses. However, they clearly identify a problem or topic that they want to explore and may be guided by a theoretical lens - a kind of overarching theory which provides a framework for their investigation (Lincoln, 2000).
The approach to data collection and analysis is methodical but allows for greater flexibility than in quantitative research. Data is collected in textual form on the basis of observation and interaction with participants, for example through participant observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups. Data is not converted into numerical form and is not statistically analyzed (Porter and Bhattacharya, 2005).

Data collection may be carried out in several stages rather than once and for all. The researchers may even adapt the process mid-way, deciding to address additional issues or dropping questions which are not appropriate on the basis of what they learn during the process. In some cases, the researchers will interview or observe a set number of people. In other cases, the process of data collection and analysis may continue until saturation, when the researchers find that no new issues are emerging (Hammarberg, 2016).

3.8.2. Data Collection

Kumar (2008) asserts that in dealing with real life problems the data tends to be inadequate. Therefore, it is important to collect data which is appropriate. There is so much that is involved in collecting data, for instance money and other resources such as transport cost and permission letters. Therefore, this study will collect data from primary and secondary sources. Primary data will be collected from statements and pastoral letters. Secondary data will be generated from books, academic journals, government policies and theses.

3.8.3. Sampling

This study employed the judgment sampling technique. This is a type of random sample that is selected based on the opinion of an expert and results obtained are subject to some degree of bias due to the frame and population not being identical.

According to Foley (2018) judgment sampling, also known as authoritative sampling or purposive sampling, is a non-probability sampling technique where the researcher selects units to be sampled based on his/her own existing knowledge, or his professional judgment. Judgment sampling is most effective when only a limited number of individuals possess the trait that a researcher is interested in. For this reason, judgment sampling is less time consuming than other sampling
techniques. Judgment sampling also allows the researcher to go directly to his/her intended target or group of interest.

Additionally, non-probability sampling is where the samples for a study are gathered in a process that does not give all the individuals in the population equal chances of being selected (Foley, 2018). I chose judgment sampling to analyze the role that the church in Zambia played to promote reconciliation post 2016 election violence because I intended to focus on three Church mother bodies instead of going to all Churches.

3.8.4. Research instruments

I have used document analysis, a form of qualitative research. According Bowen, document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic (Bowen, 2009). I have dissected documents through coding content into subjects similar to the way group or interview transcripts are analyzed.

3.8.5. Method of data analysis

Neuman (2011) observes that both qualitative data analyses and quantitative data analyses have similarities. Both of them systematically summarize and compare data in order to obtain theoretical ideas from empirical data. The qualitative analysis uses a diversity of creative techniques which require a fairly flexible approach. I have used thematic analysis. Therefore, the data was summarized and compared after being collected.

Thematic analysis is a form of analysis in qualitative research which emphasizes pinpointing, examining and recording patterns within data. Themes are patterns across data sets that are important to the description of a phenomenon and are associated to a specific research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006:79).

Thematic analysis is ideal to a range of research interests and theoretical perspectives and is useful as a basic method owing to the fact that it works with a wide range of research questions which concern people’s lived experiences. Thematic analysis can also be used to analyze different types of data from secondary sources such as media to transcripts of focus group interviews. It also works with large or small data sets. The other aspect is that thematic analysis can be applied to produce data driven or theory driven analyses (Braun and Clarke, 2006:80-81).
3.8.6 Conclusion

The main focus of this chapter was the conceptual framework that underpins the study and the methodology used. This thesis utilized a Church-State relation attributed to Bonhoeffer as the theoretical framework as it encourages the Church to successfully challenge, engage with the appropriate government and generally promotes reconciliation. The chapter had ten parts namely, Luther’s Church-State Model, Calvin’s Church-State Model, Catholic Church-State Model, Bonhoeffer’s Church-State Model and the relevance of Bonhoeffer to the study. Chapter three also outlined a detailed research design of the study. This study is a non-empirical study, drawing from content analysis in the qualitative paradigm. It included research design, data collection, sampling, research instruments and method of data analysis.

Chapter Four:

Presentation of Research Findings

4.1. Introduction
Chapter Three’s main focus presented the conceptual framework that underpins the study and the methodology used. This thesis utilized a Church-State relation conceptualized by Bonheoffer as the theoretical framework as it encourages the Church to successfully challenge, engage with the appropriate government and generally promotes reconciliation. The chapter offered various models to understand the Church-State relationship theoretically, including Luther’s Church-State Model, Calvin’s Church-State Model, Catholic Church-State Model, Bonheoffer’s Church-State Model and the relevance of Bonheoffer to the study. Chapter Three also outlined a detailed research design of the study. This study is a non-empirical study, drawing from content analysis in the qualitative paradigm. It included research design, data collection, sampling, research instruments and method of data analysis.

Chapter Four is a presentation of research findings and it is divided into seven parts namely: introduction, background of the 2016 elections, argument of the PF, views of the UPND, role of ethnicity in politics in Zambia, political violence in Zambia, good governance as a political agenda, the response of the ecumenical body and a conclusion. I will begin by providing brief background of the 2016 elections to highlight the context and circumstances under which the elections were conducted. This will also confirm assertions that suggest that although Zambia been committed to the ideals of democracy, people’s satisfaction with the way democracy actually works has sunk from a majority of 68% in 2012 to a minority of 48% in 2017 (Bratton et al, 2017:1).

4.2. Background of the 2016 elections

Zambia has functioned as a multi-party democracy since the removal from power of Kenneth Kaunda and his UNIP political monopoly in 1991. The nation has since held presidential and parliamentary elections. The 2016 general election was held against the backdrop of important institutional changes. The Constitution of Zambia was amended in January 2016, just a few months before the election, and further changes to the Electoral Process Act were enacted in June 2016 (Goldring and Wahman, 2016: 109). Additionally, the Constitutional amendments did not address problems related to the executive concentration of power. For example, the new Constitution did not do away with the controversial provision that enables the executive to appoint electoral commissioners. In fact, the amended Constitution enhanced the already great power vested in the presidency.
Goldring and Wahman further observe that a new and particularly controversial provision of the Constitution, Article 81(4), firstly allows the president to dissolve parliament if it fails to ‘objectively and reasonably carry out its legislative functions.’ Secondly there is a presidential runoff if no candidate amassed more than 50% of the votes in the first round of voting (2016:109).

The amended Constitution has received serious criticism from leading Zambian legal scholars for its content and for the executive driven process that created it fifty years ago, thus Zambia has engaged in a number of efforts to develop a new Constitution. Prior constitutions include one in 1964 at the time of independence, the 1973 constitution and the 1991 constitution. Constitutional amendments that have taken place in Zambia include those of 1969 and 1996. Numerous efforts have been directed at adopting a more democratic structure as well as political institutions which would be less susceptible to political manipulation. At the core of these amendments is the call for the development of viable institutions of State that promote participation, transparency, accountability and devolution in governance. In January 2016, the national assembly adopted numerous amendments to the 1991 Constitution. However, the amendments have been criticized by many both for the manner in which they were adopted and for the content of the amendments. Muna Ndulo and others have concluded that, once again, Zambia has failed to adopt a Constitution which responds to the aspirations of the people of Zambia. Overall, the amendments suffer from serious defects and bad drafting (Ndulo 2016:2-8).

Additionally, Ndulo (2016:2) observes that a key issue in the reform project is the demand for constitutional governance with restraints on presidential powers and a reduction in the excessive concentration of power in the executive. According to him, experience of presidencies across the world has shown that a presidential system is likely to lead to dictatorship and pose a danger to political freedom. unless there is an effective system of checks and balances, undisputed rule of law, constitutionalism, free and critical public opinion, and a fair and democratic electoral system.

Further, Ndulo argues that the amended constitution of Zambia is too long; about 117 pages. Some of the provisions such as the one relating to pensions (Article 187) natural resources (Article 253) and environmental protection (Article 255) do not belong in the Constitution and are better dealt with in ordinary legislation. Others that do not belong in the Constitution include provisions relating to the treatment of foreign investors and assuring them that their investment will not be
nationalized (Article 10/3,4,5). As Ndulo argues, a Constitution should instead deal with a general provision relating to property (2016: 2).

Muna Ndulo also views the preamble that declares Zambia a Christian State while simultaneously guaranteeing a person freedom of religion, conscience and belief as a contradiction. This is due to the fact that the same preamble declares Zambia as a ‘multi-religious State’. Declaring Zambia a Christian nation contradicts Zambia’s treaty obligations under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (Article 18:1) and the African Charter on People’s and Human Rights (Article 8) which guarantee freedom of religion. It further violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18). Freedom of religion is a basic fundamental human right or what could be referred to as ju *cogens norm*. Declaring Zambia a Christian nation promotes the pernicious idea that non-Christians are in some way second class citizens (2016:3).

The election saw Edgar Lungu of the PF being re-elected as president. However, the election was contested in the Constitutional Court by the UPND, who alleged that vote rigging and unfair practices occurred.

The Zambian political landscape has altered rapidly over the course of the past two decades, leaving the PF and the UPND as the two main political parties which seek to rule the country. This has been mainly due splits of existing political parties leading to the formation of new ones. The PF emerged out of a breakaway from the MMD, led by Michael Sata who formed the PF because of the dispute over who to take over from Frederick Chiluba. The PF ascended to power in 2011 with Sata as president, a position he held until his death in office in 2014. The UPND was as a result of a breakaway from the MMD in 1998 and was founded by Anderson Mazoka, who was a strong critic of the MMD failures. Hakainde Hichilema became UPND president in 2006 and his party came second in the 2015 by-election.

The 2015 Zambian presidential election had been closely contested, with only 27000 votes ultimately separating Hakainde Hichilema and Edgar Lungu. The 2016 election was far tenser than many previous elections and there was a rise in election related violence. The election resulted in Lungu emerging as a winner who received around 100,000 votes more than Hichilema - just over the 50% required threshold to escape a run-off.
The issue of media freedom was a key and mainly focused on the closure of *The Post* newspaper because of a dispute with the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). Zambia, at the time, had only four main newspapers, two of which were government owned and controlled; one which was private but biased towards the government. This only left *The Post* as the only independent print media and it is often perceived as critical of the government and the ruling party. Over 26 years of its existence, *The Post* newspaper has aroused the ire of successive governments through its commitment to exposing corruption and abuses of power. This has led to many attempts by government to destroy *The Post* newspaper by criminally charging its journalists and the Editor in Chief (Goldring and Wahman, 2016:110).

The paper began a long and arduous battle with the ZRA in relation to allegations that they had failed to turn over K 26,000,000 in VAT and employee income taxes between 2010 and 2014. After many legal battles the liability increased to K53.9 Million, an amount the company disputed. It was on these grounds that the ZRA raided the newspaper’s offices on 20th June 2016, barely two months before the elections, seizing the offices and other property and effectively halting the newspaper’s operations.

The second major concern was about the right to organize opposition rallies. Furthermore, the PF abused the government owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). The PF enjoyed significant advantage in the campaigns. The Zambian Police Service frequently applied the controversial Public Order Act to deny the opposition the right to campaign (Goldring and Wahman, 2016:110).

There were also concerns with the way that the votes were counted after the elections with irregularities reported, particularly in Lusaka. There, the Gen 12 form that certifies election results were withheld from UPND agents, raising concerns of vote rigging (Friedman, 2017). Additionally, there were reports of missing ballot papers and a UPND mayoral candidate in Lusaka at one stage arrived to find over 14000 UPND marked ballots in a bin. These factors led Hakainde Hichilema to challenge the results in the Constitutional Court. However, since there were already concerns of the appointment of President Lungu’s perceived friends to the Constitutional Court and changing electoral rules to shield those who conduct elections from prosecution, nothing materialized (Friedman, 2017).
4.3. Argument of the PF

The ruling PF hold that the reason for the UPND to refute the outcome of the 2016 elections was because prior to the elections its leader, Hakainde Hichilema, declared openly that he would not accept the outcome if results would not be in his favour. The source of his confidence was the defections of senior members of the PF to UPND who included the immediate past Republican Vice President Guy Scot, the former first lady and her son and former Defense Minister Geoffrey Mwamba, who was Hichilema’s running mate (Burnell 2001:239-263).

The UPND believed that these defectors would influence the voters from the PF’s stronghold to vote for the UPND. In fact even the choosing of Mwamba as running mate was a gimmick to woo support from the North, which is traditionally a PF stronghold. One might argue that the PF and the UPND have divided Zambia politically on ethnic and regional basis into two: north-east and south-west (Burnell, 2001:239-263).

Sibeko added the closure of mines to the list on the Copperbelt province which is another PF stronghold. The UPND were confident that the development had undermined confidence in the ruling party and would generate enough swing voters to give Hichilema the majority that he needed. For this reason, the UPND bubbled with confidence and declared that there would be ‘Armageddon’ if the results were not in their favour (Goldring and Wahman, 2016:108).

There are also allegations that the UPND also promised to petition the elections’ results at the Constitutional Court and the Law would turn down such elections’ outcome and put Hichilema in State House. The UPND believed that what they were doing was lawful would be justified by the law. As a result, no sooner did the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) declare Edgar Lungu of the PF as the duly elected President than the UPND petition such presidential results. Sadly for the UPND the Courts threw out the presidential petition, among others, for not providing evidence of irregularities within the 14 days’ Constitutional period in which to resolve presidential election’s petition (Goldring and Wahman, 2016: 107-121).

The PF claims that there is overwhelming evidence that Lungu won the August 11, 2016 presidential elections as proved by the number of PF members of parliament compared to those of UPND. The PF were expecting nothing else but victory because they funded massive infrastructure such as roads, hospitals and schools across the country. Furthermore, within less than one year of
being in office, Edgar Lungu enacted a new constitution which has been a demand of many Zambians since independence in 1964. The new constitution has revised articles that would make good governance a prerequisite to development (Goldring and Wahman, 2016: 111).

The PF were also anticipating a sympathy vote because the election of Lungu came as a result of the untimely death of president Sata. Besides, both local and international observers such as the European Union (EU), Southern African Development Committee (SADC) and African Union (AU) declared that the elections were free and fair; and that Edgar Lungu won the elections (Goldring and Wahman, 2016: 107-121).

After the Constitutional Court threw out the presidential petition, the UPND supporters resorted to widespread violence in which property was destroyed and lives lost. Many innocent citizens lost their hard-earned property. The target of the perpetrators was public facilities such as markets and government buildings. Burning tires were placed on roads and the UPND cadres clashed with the police (Goldring and Wahman, 2016: 107-121).

Many people were left homeless and they resorted to finding refuge at government schools. This prompted the Head of State to advise Mr. Hichilema to ask his supporters to calm down and appreciate coexistence. The president feared that if other regions were to retaliate, the situation would be turned into a civil war. He counseled the UPND to think about the people who came from their strongholds but have settled in other parts of the country. He warned that politics should not make us kill one another, reminding him that ‘we are brothers and sisters irrespective of our political affiliations.’ President Lungu advised Hichilema to go and stop the violence in his strongholds. He also assured the nation that more security personnel would be deployed to markets and other public facilities to ensure that property and lives were protected (2016: 107-121).

Therefore, President Lungu felt compelled to invoke Article 31 of the Republican Constitution to grant the police more powers to stop a spate of economic sabotage in the country. This meant that suspects of sabotage may be detained for more than 48 hours before being taken to court. The president claimed that this was done in the spirit of safeguarding public property and lives. The statutory instrument signed led to the declaration of public emergency to preserve national security. Subsequently, Parliament approved Article 32(2) for a state of public emergency for three months.
The UPND categorically refused to recognize President Lungu as duly elected president. This spread far and wide in that hatred and promotion of hate speech against the president continued. Moreover, Mr. Hichilema and his supporters’ refusal to recognize Mr. Lungu as Head of State led them to block the presidential motorcade in Mongu District of Western Province during one of Zambia’s celebrated traditional ceremonies, the Kuomboka of the Lozi speaking people. With sustained refusal to recognize President Lungu as president, from such an event, it is suspected that the UPND wanted to take over government by any means to them; probably including assassinating the president (Reuters, 2016).

The development led to Mr. Hichilema being arrested for treason and by then, the situation became unbearable. There was widespread violence in Zambia. The UPND supporters went on rampages to torch government buildings and markets, and lives were lost. In an effort to prove that the UPND did not recognize President Lungu, their members of Parliament continuously boycotted the Head of State’s addresses to the National Assembly (Deutsche Welle, 2017). Having investigated the views of the PF, I move on to analyze those of the UPND in the following section.

4.4. The views of the UPND

The UPND were unhappy with the appointment of people who are close to the President as judges to the constitutional court. For example the UPND believed that the appointment of Judge Mulonda, was in fact preparing for a dismissal of any presidential petition. This is because the new Constitution mandates the Concourt to have a final say on all matters relating to the interpretation of the constitution including presidential petitions (Sishuwa, 2016).

Sishuwa further argues that those who were appointed did not meet the constitutional requirements to serve as Judges in the Concourt, namely; specialized training or experience in human rights or constitutional law and 15 years’ experience as legal practitioners. The UPND argue that these individuals were appointed on the basis of being friends and relatives of the Head of State so that they could side with him in an event of any petition. According to the UPND this was the reason
why their petition was thrown out. Having dealt with the constitutional officers, next I seek to look at the voter’s register as another point of argument.

In December 2015 The Post newspaper reported that the ruling party officials were recruiting foreign nationals in border areas of Eastern and Luapula Provinces which are both PF’s strongholds, to register as voters. It is alleged that Peter Sukwa, the investigative journalist who exposed the story and attempted to take pictures of PF officials conducting the exercise, was left with fractured ribs and a deaf ear and that the PF supporters urinated on him. It had to take specialist treatment to save Sukwa’s life. But The Post newspaper was undeterred; they pursued the story further and in May 2016 published that several suspected Malawians in possession of Zambian identity and voters cards (Hibajene, 2016; Burnell, 2016:1-46).

Sishuwa reports that the UPND were angered by the bill which was hastily taken to Parliament by the PF government on the administration of elections. Among the other things, the bill sought was to provide Electoral Commission officials with immunity from prosecution for any decision taken in exercise of their duties and to criminalize the disclosure or publication of ECZ documents to unauthorized individuals. The bill also allows the president to sack dismisses officials for any reason. Despite wide criticism, the PF Government went ahead while using the majority advantage, to enact the bill. Sishuwa (2016) claims that this was a dress rehearsal for the 2016 elections.⁶

Sishuwa also cites increasing military involvement and change of rules concerning airspace during campaigns. On 20th May, 2016, the Commander of the Zambia Air Force (ZAF), General Eric Chimese, shocked the UPND when he introduced measures to tightly control the airspace. He is quoted as saying:

‘Under the prevailing security conditions today, as ZAF, we are duty-bound to take stringent measures that would prevent innocent air space from being used wrongly by perpetrators of violence within our nation. We as service chiefs are seriously concerned with the carelessness and lack of patriotism, hooliganism and total indiscipline that has been observed over the past few months from some of our citizens.’

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Chimese also took a swipe at some individuals who were justifying violence in the name of retaliation or self-defense. The UPND perceived these words as a veiled message to them because their leaders advised members to defend themselves against attacks by the ruling PF in the face of lack of protection from the police. They saw this restriction as way of frustrating the UPND campaigns while advantaging the PF.  

To this end, the UPND leadership complained to ECZ that the ZAF Commander had grounded their countrywide campaigns by denying them airspace. The remarks by the Commander were firstly taken as evidence that top military commanders were siding with the PF, the party in power. Secondly, they highlighted the increasing involvement of the Zambian military in electoral contests. The remarks may also have been taken as an early indication that the authorities were preparing the ground for manipulating the outcome of the elections since it were ZAF planes that ferried ballot papers. The UPND further accused Chimese of fomenting protracted civil strife in the event of a disputed election. The controversies in the new laws were further compounded by the printing of the ballots, which I discuss in the next section.

The awarding of a Dubai-based company called AlGhurairi printing and publishing to print ballot papers was not received well by the UPND. The main reason was that the UPND claimed that it was the same company which printed Uganda’s disputed election. This has led to speculations over potential rigging. Furthermore, AlGhurairi quoted US 3.6 million dollars for the contract which is more than double the amount tendered by a South African Company, Ren-Form CC, which printed Zambia’s ballot papers for the 2015 general elections. The South African firm has been printing Zambia’s ballot papers for the last general elections. Claims by the Electoral Commission of Zambia that Al Ghurairi provides superior security features are unsubstantiated.

The opposition was delighted to learn that Ren-Form CC had lodged an appeal against the ECZ’s decision to the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA), a government wing that reviews procurement matters. It is claimed that the ZPPA initially canceled the award, citing a number of glaring irregularities. However, it is alleged that the government privately asked the ZPPA to

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rescind the decision. A few days later, the ECZ confirmed that the final award was given to Al Ghurairi prompting several accusations of planned rigging.

Therefore, the UPND believed that the government had colluded with the Dubai-based company to defraud state coffers and steal the votes. Hichilema warned that if the deal is not cancelled, it would plunge the nation into chaos. True to his words, there was sporadic violence soon after the results were announced10.

Sibeko, speaking to Reuters on August 7, 2016, stressed how everyone was concerned about the high levels of violence post 2016 elections. Based on media reports by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, the post 2016 election violence was so severe that much property has been destroyed and lives lost. The other possible cause of the 2016 election violence was rhetoric aimed at mudslinging and dividing people on tribal lines, which I discuss in the next section.

4.5. Role of ethnicity in politics in Zambia

Eunice Moono (2015) carried out comprehensive research on voting patterns which she believes is one of the root causes of violence in Zambia. She has noted that the post-independence political landscape of Zambia has been characterized by incidences of ethnicity and regionalism in party politics. Available evidence suggests that candidates usually performed better in the regions where they came from. Peter Burnell confirmed that there is usually an ethnic basis of political cleavage and party competition, which connects to linguistic and regional differences. He noted that President Kaunda had a strong sense of purpose to build ‘One Zambia, One nation.’ Kaunda feared that tribal conflicts could pull UNIP apart. For this reason, from early on he predicted the opposing parties, including break away parties from UNIP, would politicize tribal and ethnic differences in order to draw votes. For instance, the bedrock of African National Congress support was with the Tonga speaking people of Southern Province which Kaunda did not appreciate because he wanted unity in diversity (2001:249).

The other ethnic group which threatened unity was the Lozi speaking people. According to Burnell, traditionally the political elite of western province have flirted with their own vehicles for

political representation owing to distinctive, long standing grievances. After 1953, the province, formerly called the Barotseland, had been a British Protectorate within Northern Rhodesia. The London Agreement reached with Britain as part of independence in 1964 confirmed the region’s special status which was bestowed by the Barotse Treaty (1890). Certain powers were reserved for the Litunga (royal ruler) (2001:249). It was later abrogated by Kaunda and his UNIP government. As a result, Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika’s Agenda for Zambia (AZ) party is the clearest example now of a regional party winning two seats in western province in 1996. Akashambatwa, one of the founders of the MMD and the National party, campaigned for the restoration of regional autonomy, communal ownership and economic self-determination for the province (Burnell, 2001:249).

It was observed by Hwende that during the 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections, Zambians of various ethnic groups put their differences aside and rallied behind Frederick Chiluba and the MMD. There was no division between Tonga, Nyanja or Bemba. People united to bring to an end UNIP monopoly. However, this unity broke down in the period post elections because most of the people who supported the MMD had a primary aim of removing Kaunda and UNIP. Although the MMD candidates did not appeal to ethnic and regional loyalties during election campaigns, it meant no more than that ethnicity lay dormant, remaining in the background ready to be mobilized at an appropriate time (Hwende, 1998:232).

An example of divisions was apparent during the MMD Convention. The shadow cabinet at the MMD Convention prior to the 1991 elections was fraught with ethnic tensions. There was fierce competition for the posts as each group fought for top posts. In particular, the Lozi felt marginalized and disillusioned at their failure to capture the Vice-presidency. The convention was characterized by prolonged negotiations and compromise lasting into the early hours of the following day, signifying a challenge in balancing major elite factions and their ethnic and regional support. After the general elections the unity disintegrated due to disagreement over the sharing of cabinet posts. In addition, the elite cohesion broke down because the MMD could not transform itself from a loose coalition of elites opposed to Kaunda to an integrated political party committed to well articulate ideological goals of development (Hwende, 1998:232). Furthermore, the voting pattern in Zambia since independence reflects a protest against the marginalization of smaller tribes. As Bertha Osei-Hwende has observed, ‘Since independence, Zambians have complained of
Bemba predominance to the detriment of other ethnic groups’ (1998:236). She cites the tenure of president Chiluba as an example of what led to other ethnic groups feeling marginalized. President Chiluba, unlike President Kaunda, did not pay attention to tribal balancing. In practice, his cabinet reflected both tribalism and regionalism. The Bemba speaking group was over-represented.

Resignations and sackings also revealed not only ethnic tensions among the leadership but other ills affecting the MMD. The resignations and sackings of a Vice-President and more than 13 ministers and deputies, especially the resignation of those who were considered as regional political leaders from Southern, Lusaka, Western and North-Western Provinces upset regional balancing and narrowed the MMD electoral support, reducing it to a Bemba-speaking party. It was no longer a national party that enjoyed the popular and legitimate support of all Zambians. As a result, other ethnic groups decided to form their own political parties and started making demands. For instance, the Lozi people started demanding for secession among other things (1998:236). This trend became rife during the 2016 general elections, in my view because the PF does not seem to have learnt from its predecessor on distribution of development. Therefore, some tribes still feel marginalized and would like to vote for a person who would share national resources equitably.

Sadly, some Church leaders from both the ecumenical body and Pentecostal churches contributed to political failure in Zambia during the 2016 elections through open promotion of ethnicity and regionalism. The paradox is that Zambia has called itself a Christian Nation, yet there are contradictions and extremes within the country. Experience has shown that Church leaders in a Christian nation became part of this sharing of false information which has led to sustainable political violence, divisions and hatred. Some Church leaders openly made remarks that privileged some ethnicity. Despite Church leaders’ full knowledge that tribal interests have played a major role in armed conflict and civil unrest across Africa, they promoted ethnic divisions instead of uniting the people under the motto of ‘One Zambia, One nation’ (JCTR, 2016).

The reality in Zambia brings into question the meaning of Christian nationhood if the Church cannot uphold love which is the central teaching of Christianity. Guy Hermet observed that in political systems characterized by an ‘authoritarian exercise of power and refusal to implement a sufficient and generalized participation of citizen in the political system’ religious organizations are the only ones capable of offering host structures, leadership, and means of expression distinct from those controlled by the power dominating oligarchy. Therefore, if Church leaders willfully
abandon love for everyone irrespective of their background, it means that the Church will lose its role in politics (Phiri, 2000:781).’

Archbishop Telesphore Mpundu, in a pastoral statement, stressed that it was not only the presidency that had failed in Zambia but the ecumenical body as well. He condemned irresponsible tribal talk among some clergy from some mainline and some Pentecostal churches as a recipe to genocide, which compromised the moral mandate of the Church. According to the pastoral statement, clergy men and women are expected to be trans-ethnic because they recognize and celebrate cultural diversity but also transcend those differences for the kingdom identity. Therefore, naturally Church leaders are expected to be promoters of peaceful co-existence and not perpetrators of violence.

For this reason, during the 20th anniversary of the genocide, Rwandan President Paul Kagame accused the Roman Catholic Church of inciting the Hutus to rise against the Tutsis in 1994. Several Catholic priests and nuns were charged with participating in the 1994 genocide. Pope Francis had to plead for forgiveness several years after the nasty event. Pope Francis conveyed his profound sadness and that of the Holy See and of the Church, for the genocide against Tutsis. This was when he met President Kagame in Rwanda (Longman, 2010; Anthony Court, 2016).

4.6. Political violence in Zambia

Muna Ndulo has observed that Zambia has been rocked in recent times by unacceptable levels of political violence perpetrated against those expressing views contrary to those of the PF government. Those who are perceived to be opponents of the government are attacked, assaulted, their meetings disrupted while highly compromised police force unashamedly looks on. Perpetrators of violence usually openly carry dangerous weapons and state publicly their intent to harm anyone who is against the government (2016:1).

11(Conference of Catholic Bishops Pastoral Statement, August 28, 2016).

12Aljazeera 20 March, 2017
What is even more painful is the fact that the government reaction, when not blaming victims for violence that befalls them, has been to disclaim any responsibility for the actions being perpetrated by vigilantes and party cadres. Surprisingly some civil society groups, prominent citizens, organizations and the Church leaders are afraid to assign blame for violence to the rightful owners and instead they call for restraint on both sides (2016:2). It is yet to be explained how a victim can exercise restraint if he/she is not being asked to forego their rights to freedom of expression.

After examining the jurisprudence developed by International Human Rights Court and International Human Rights instruments to which Zambia is a signatory, Muna Ndulo (2016:2) argues that under International Human Rights Law, the Zambian State is largely liable for political violence occurring in the country even if it is being perpetrated by private actions. He argues that the reason the Zambian State is to be blamed is because of its failure to implement these human rights protocols and create a level political playing field.

I argue here that because Zambia has never experienced the tragic forces of widespread election violence, deadly conflict or war since independence in 1964, it is easy to be complacent and think it cannot happen in Zambia. Zambians, and particularly politicians, should not deceive themselves that peace can be taken for granted. This was the mistake that the people in the United States made. Before the carnage of September 11, 2001 in the United States, few people would have imagined that sentiments of hatred between people of different religions, cultures, nations and races could have such devastating effects. That uncritical religion has the potential of causing that degree of violence is no longer in doubt. Similarly the most recent post elections violence that took place in Kenya between 2007-2008 between the Kikuyu and the Luo and other tribes should serve as an example of the consequences of mismanaging democracy. Dozens were killed and thousands displaced trying to escape violence in Kenya. This should cause the Zambian State to reconsider the electoral system and level the political playing field to avoid a possible civil war and genocide in future.

Nehemiah Nyaundi (in Magesa, 2010:123) also counsels that the issue of violence concerns the individual, the community and the nation. Violence disrupts individual ambition, curtails communal aspirations, and retards national development. Violence causes immeasurable anguish to individuals, families, communities and nations in general. Violence damages moral probity, destroys property, and leads to loss of life.

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4.7. Good governance as a theological agenda

The concept ‘governance’ is not new. It is as old as human civilization. Simply put, ‘governance’ means: the process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Government is one of the actors in governance. The list of other actors cannot be exhausted but includes church leaders, traditional leaders, co-operatives, NGOs (Wuye, 2011).

Good governance has eight major characteristics: it is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive. It ensures that corruption is minimized, the views of the minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society (Kaiso, 2010).

On the other hand, Michael Charo Ruwa (2001:32-36) excellently summarizes what constitutes bad governance. He begins by stressing that governance could be carried out in a good or bad way. He observes that it is actually bad governance that leads to discontentment by citizens resulting in coups, tribal clashes, collapse of the economy, brain drain and misuse of natural resources. There are primarily seven factors that show us what bad governance does:

- Interferes with the arms of government and concentrates power to few.
- Manipulates legislature and is in total disregard of public commitment. The interference is geared towards achieving selfish political ends. Bad governance uses the executive to achieve its ends.
- Does not practice participatory democracy.
- Does not recognize the rights of citizens (Right to associate freely, Right to movement, Right to own property anywhere, Right to express opinion, Right to assemble and Right to security).
- Does not have a vision for the country.
- It is not accountable and transparent.
- Operates on whims of presidential decrees that have no basis in the law.

Ruwa (2001:33-36) further identifies six characteristics of Bad governance which must cause the Church (the Ecumenical movement) to enhance its prophetic mission:
Bad Governance is not Accountable and Transparent

Bad governance is not accountable and neither is it transparent. Leaders, in most cases, are accountable to the executive and not the citizens. Public resources are misused with impunity. National projects cost triple the actual estimated cost and they are often of poor quality. Sometimes money is paid for work not done. Bad governance enriches a few people through corruption in order to procure political loyalty. Leaders are not loyal to the electorates and the Constitution, but to the executive.

Manipulation of the Electoral Process

Bad governance influences the election with often with money by buying votes. It uses the administration to intimidate voters, rigging ballots, denying people identity cards, and also meddling with electoral boundaries.

It interferes with the electoral process right from the issuing of identity cards which are prerequisites to registering a voter to sneaking pre-marked ballot papers in counting halls. It does not give opposition parties enough air time on national broadcasting media or allow them to hold rallies. It takes advantage of being in power, and is indifferent to political thuggery.

Bad governance ensures that it does not publicize the day/week of election and uses it as a secret weapon so as to catch the opposition unawares. It does not tolerate different opinions from within or without. Bad governance does not defend the constitutional rights of citizens. It involves:

Abuse of Human Rights
Bad governance encourages insecurity, torture of political criminals, arbitrary imprisonment and deportation.

Bad Governance does not promote National Unity
Bad governance promotes and benefits from tribal clashes and political sweet talk.

Because bad governance is insecure, it uses ‘divide and rule’ tactics to hold on to power.

Corruption
Bad governance promotes corruption (over budgeting of projects, supports projects with political benefits, mismanagement of tax payers’ money). Lastly, bad governance encourages mismanagement of resources.
This is the reason Therese Tinkasimire (in Magesa 2010:57-66) guides that in order to prevent violence during and after elections, good governance must involves theological agenda. She argues that to approach ethics or morality theologically is a challenging task because African Christian theology has grappled with this challenge in a way that bears profound results. For example, J.N.KMugambi observes that the way ethics were taught in Africa in the past did not help Africans because the method failed to take African ethical concerns and the African social, religious, political and economic environment into serious consideration. The perception of ethics was not integrative radically enough with practical reality, which left much to be desired (Magesa, 2010:57).

**The role of the Church in establishing, maintaining and sustaining Good Governance**

Michael Charo Ruwa (2001:38-42) argues that the involvement of the Church in issues that concern justice and peace is supported by Biblical teachings. He adequately outlines the role that the ecumenical body can play to ensure that justice and peace are promoted and maintained in society. This is only possible if God’s plan for the human being to share equally in God’s happiness is fulfilled. In order to restore God’s plan which has been distorted by politicians, the ecumenical body must participate in matters of politics, not only by denouncing evil but also through helping the faithful to inculcate the Gospel values of truth, honesty, reconciliation, justice and love. This is done by educating and sensitizing the members on matters of justice and peace among the governors and the governed. Having a good and effective operational network, starting from the national level via diocesan offices to the parishes, through to small Christian communities, the Church is able to educate the people as per the mandate of Christ:

- Provide education for justice.
- Guiding and facilitating pastoral action in order to make justice known through the social teachings of the Church.
- Working for eradication of injustice in contemporary situations.
- Giving information, advice and encouragement to all those involved in the promotion of justice.

This is achieved at the following various levels:
Civic Education Programmes- These target various cadres of people such as Church personnel, religious, laity, youth and other opinion leaders. This is done through workshops and seminars. Topics such as governance, democracy, the electoral process, responsible citizenship, Church and politics, gender, women and politics, fundamental rights and the constitution are discussed. Participants are always encouraged to get involved in goal setting and making decisions related to their future.

Lenten Campaigns- The Lenten Campaigns are held annually during the period of lent and target the small Christian communities. Its aim is to sensitize individual faithful on their various roles in development. Lenten Campaigns make information dissemination very effective and swifter.

Participation in policymaking- Christians, besides criticizing and challenging the establishment, are also encouraged to share their views on various political issues.

Participation in election monitoring and observation- This is to ensure that the elections are free and fair and that people vote as it is their fundamental human right.

Speaking for the oppressed and downtrodden- The church speaks for those displaced during tribal clashes, hosting them and providing for their basic necessities. The Church also extends the care to the needy irrespective of their ethnic background, gender, creed or political affiliation.

Provision of literature on good governance- This is done through provision of simplified books which explain the Constitution, pastoral letters on various issues of concern affecting citizens.

Community mobilization- The Church mobilizes the faithful to assume their rightful socio-political role in shaping the future of the nation. This is because a vibrant civil society is the basis of true democracy and good governance.

Poverty eradication- The Church is also involved in income generating projects that are aimed at alleviating poverty such as credit unions, small scale industries, and savings and loans scheme. The Church ensures that the people own their project through capacity building for empowerment as well as by enhancing sustainability.

Quality education- Since quality education is key to development and good governance, the Church is involved in provision of quality but affordable education. Schools which are run by the
Church are usually very competitive, so much so that many people prefer them to government grant aided ones.

This is a simple task because the Church possesses teachings that contain principles such as justice, freedom and fairness that represent democracy. By the Church’s nature and mission, the church endeavors to cultivate the moral values which are necessary for democracy and by extension good governance to thrive. As a family the church was built on the values of the ‘Kingdom of God’ as taught by Jesus Christ. These values include justice, peace, and dignity of human persons, righteousness, truth, love and special care for the marginalized in society (Ruwa, 2001:5).

Therefore, African Christian theology cannot ignore the issue of good governance, injustices and oppression perpetuated by corrupt governments. Theology has a mandate to point out and preach against such social sin by standing in solidarity with the poor and marginalized of society. In this way it participates in stopping the exploitation of the weak by the dominant groups (Tinkasiimire, Wuye (2011:4) stresses that the Church is to be the light, check and balancing instrument for good governance, members of every church group need to infiltrate the political terrain to bring sanity into the system.

4.8. The response of the ecumenical body to post 2016 election violence in Zambia.

The key research question for this study was: How did the Church respond to the post 2016 election violence in Zambia? From the onset I would like to emphasize that the aim of the study is not to cast aspersions on the Church but it is about self-critique. It looks at what the Church should have done. The answer largely lies in the Church-State relation. Does the close relationship between the Church and the State in Zambia jeopardize the role of either? Does this relationship promote the prophetic responsibility of the church to criticize wrong actions of the State? It has been observed that whenever the Church has a close relationship with the government, it loses its direction as a reconciler and voice of reason as far as socio-political issues are concerned (Kumalo, 2007).

Firstly, it must be accepted that the Church is trusted to promote reconciliation. Hugo Van der Merwe (2003) supports, ‘Reconciliation is generally seen as a task for which the Church is uniquely qualified. Many Church leaders claim they understand reconciliation better (or at least more deeply) than other actors in society and feel that they are well positioned to address this concern. ‘However, the ecumenical body in Zambia just like some churches in South African
apartheid chose a neutral stance’ or what Tobias Masuku (2014) calls ‘quiet diplomacy.’ Neutrality qualified those Churches that were characterized by a soft approach towards apartheid in South Africa, adopting an ignorant position and accepted the political status-quo without questioning it. Churches which adopted a neutral position were those from Pentecostals or evangelical movements (Barret in Knitter 1985:77).

Some of those Churches chose to remain silent due to the restrictions of their doctrines. Their doctrines do not encourage members to get involved in ‘things of this world’ or ‘worldly things.’ Their concern is mission to win more souls before the return of Christ (Masuku, 2014).

Other churches in South Africa were referred to as ‘daughter Churches of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) which, to a large extent, were surrogate churches of the apartheid government. The DRC was usually called the ‘mother’ Church or ‘Big Mama’ (Barret, 1982:63). The DRC dominated these daughter Churches in different spheres including finances. Daughter Churches depended on the ‘Big Mama’ for finances and human resources. Annually, the daughter Churches received up to R12 million from the mother Church (Cronje, 1982:7).

This kind of relationship caused the daughter Churches to lose their prophetic voice. Daughter Churches could not speak against the system adopted by the mother Church (Cronje, 1982:7). Representatives of the Churches told the TRC on 17th November 1997 that they had been blinded by the regime’s propaganda, and had not made any concerted effort to oppose the heresy of apartheid due to the fact that those who spoke against apartheid were deemed ‘communists.’ Therefore, they chose silent diplomacy and supported apartheid in their structures (Anglican Communion News Service, November 25, 1997).

This was similar to the stance taken by the ecumenical body in Zambia post 2016 election violence. The State appears to have dominated by using the Church for its own purposes. The notable example is the funding of organizations like ‘Christians for Edgar Lungu’ during the 2016 elections campaigns and the national house of prayers provided by the PF government (Cheyeka, 2016:159). Kumalo (2007) warns that the Church ought to be worried whenever political leaders offer the Church preferential treatment, showering it with gifts and privileges. He argues that this gives political leaders freedom to rule without any criticism from the Church and subsequently the Church loses its voice of reason. This situation is referred to as ‘Erastianism’ (New World
Encyclopedia). Erastianism occurred in the Lutheran German and Petrine Russia where the Church was a department of the State and was expected to support and legitimize the government. In both countries, the Church failed in its prophetic responsibility to criticize the unjust actions of the State (New World Encyclopedia).

This is the reason Van Reken (1999) sternly warns against two dangers the Church must avoid if it tries to address immoral social policies:

‘The first is that it will fail to address all the clearly immoral policies and so will be silent when it should speak out. The church in Zambia should learn from some churches in South Africa which failed to speak out against the clearly immoral policy apartheid.

The second, even worse danger, is that a Church will speak out and defend the wrong side of the moral issue. When this happens the Church is complicit in the injustice as happened in some US Churches which opposed civil rights for African-Americans.’

The Church in the US chose to side with an evil policy that encouraged discrimination against their fellow human beings on the basis of their skin pigmentation. Therefore, the Church in Zambia must remain resolute in condemning any form of injustice and never accept any compromise.

The Church is in a privileged position with regard to knowing what is clearly morally permissible and what is morally impermissible because it has God’s word. Therefore, the Church should speak out on the clear moral injustice of the day.

I have quoted VanReken extensively because his warning is very timely and applicable to the Church in Zambia where the kind of relationship between the Church and the State appears to be improper and complicated. It could be argued that the State is trying by all means to control the Church. According to Cheyeka (2014b) President Chiluba brought the Church closer to the State and declared Zambia as a Christian nation in 1991 as a ploy to persuade Zambians to be obedient to the self-proclaimed messiah, Chiluba himself. Christianity was abused for selfish ends. Chiluba’s design was that the church nation instituted at State House was meant to rid the nation of corruption and prosper the country (Cheyeka, 2002).

The then Vice-president, Brigadier General Godfrey Miyanda, urged citizens to adopt a Christian orientation in everything. This proposed orientation also meant submission to the Christian State,
which, according to Jenkins (2011:187), included the willful refusal to acknowledge the flaws of
the government and to connive with corrupt officials. Subsequently, there was resounding silence
among leading Pentecostal men and women over Chiluba’s corruption (2016:160). A closer
examination of the dealings of the PF government under President Lungu indicates that Lungu’s
PF had adopted Chiluba’s design for political ends.

In fact, one might even argue that the PF government appears to be indirectly promoting a ‘State
theology’ or ‘State Church’ through its programs and creation of a Ministry to superintend over
the affairs of the Church (Cheyeka, 2016:160). Forster (2016) distinguishes between ‘State
Church’ and ‘State theology.’ According to him when there is increasingly complicit relationship
between the State and the Church, like much like what happened between the Methodist Church
of Southern Africa and the State. This situation is referred to as ‘Church State.’ ‘State theology’
entails expressing support for the State and acting as shield to deflect criticism, against its policies,
actions and theology (De Gruchy, 2005:197). Hence whenever government officials are speaking
at church events emphasize that the PF government and the church are one and must collaborate.
In my view, this statement implicitly means promotion of ‘Church State’ and ‘State theology.’

This has subsequently annihilated the Church’s voice of prophecy in Zambia. The neutral stance
or quiet diplomacy of the ecumenical body in the aftermath of violence that erupted after the
August 11, 2016 elections should be condemned by all well meaning Zambians because the church
was presented with opportunities to counsel political players. For example, when the UPND raised
a number of flaws in the electoral process and printing of the ballots the Church did not cease the
opportunity to create dialogue. The Church was also silent when the UPND refused to recognize
President Lungu. The Church could not also listen to the concerns that the PF raised pre and post
elections such as threats of civil strife if results did not go the UPND’s way. The ecumenical body
could not promote public relations because it was too close to the State.

The reason the Church in Zambia remained complacent was as a result of uncritical acceptance of
the State. Kumalo stresses, ‘Democracy is precious yet too fragile to be left solely in the hands
politicians without being protected by the citizenry and broader civil society including the Church.
The democratic life of a country requires the Church to adopt a different approach towards the
State,’ (Kumalo, 2007). In other words the Church cannot be separated from politics. But there
must be a critical distance between the Church and State.
Masuku argues that like in post-apartheid South Africa the close relationship that existed between individual religious leaders and the 1994 democratic government silenced the voice of the Church (Masuku, 2014). In other words, the Church is expected to be prophetic always and keep critical distance to the State (Masuku, 2014).

This is the reason Kumalo encouraged the Church in Africa to take a lesson from the Church in Rwanda whose uncritical acceptance of the State saw the Church lose its credible voice of protest and a major contributor to the genocide. The genocide was as a result of the Church-State relations in Rwanda. The Church in Rwanda had a tendency to side with whichever government that was in power for favours from the time of missionaries to colonialism, to Tutsi and ultimately Hutu regimes (2007:5).

Hence, Komakoma (2003:4-14) speaking to the Zambian context, also advised that the starting point in understanding the relationship between the Church and the State is that of collaboration based on mutual independence and self-governance. This will give room to the Church to have the freedom necessary to allow her to fulfill its prophetic mission of being the conscience of the nation. For this reason, the Church has a duty to bring moral conscience to the nation. It is not expected to get involved in partisan politics. The concern for the Church is also important for a healthy separation of Church and State.

On the other hand, Villa-Vicencio (2011) sees the role of the Church as a ‘Kairos,’ meaning time, opportunity and appointed time. Villa-Vicencio believes that the church in Africa has a Kairos moment to heal and reconcile. However, he cautions that if this chance is missed the loss will be immeasurable. I agree with Villa-Vicencio that the Church in Zambia has a Kairos moment to promptly intervene in the conflict and violence that emerged from the post 2016 elections. If the church in Zambia is to bring reconciliation between the two parties there is a need for the church to find a neutral ground. In my view, silence on straightforward matters of social concerns amounts to incompetence and hypocrisy. I will argue that dialogue between the ruling Patriotic Front and president Edgar Lungu on one hand; and the United Party for National Development and its leader Hakainde Hichilema on the other, needed proper timing if it was to yield tangible results for the benefit of the whole nation. But the Church in my view, appeared to have responded too late for the desired purpose. The silence of the Church on many pertinent issues concerning the 2016 elections was enough to render the Church’s planned dialogue irrelevant.
In addition, the Church was not proactive in reducing political tension which has the potential of sliding the Country into unprecedented civil strife. The ecumenical body did not seize the opportunity to do public relations amidst plenty indicators of violence. It was only seen attempting to promote reconciliation when Hakainde Hichilema was incarcerated because they saw that violence had increased. Had Hichilema not been arrested, it would have meant that the Church could have treated violence as normal. It also meant that the Church could have continued to be mute at the expense of loss of public infrastructure and lives; and at the expense of its prophetic calling.

According to the 1978 Mexican Statement to which 34 member countries were in attendance, public relations was defined as the art and social science of analyzing trends, predicting their consequences, counseling organizations’ leadership and implementing planned programmes of action which will serve both the organization and public interest. In other words public relations, are acts of being pro-active. Therefore, Zambia is now engulfed with unresolved conflicts because the Church was not pro-active and did not perform public relations. I liken this to the example of the Church in Rwanda that could not emphasize the gospel of equality of humanity but instead returned the favour by offering unconditional support to the Kayibanda government even if it was perpetuating inequality and ethnicity (Kumalo, 2007).

Subsequently the poor timing of the Church has made it too difficult to bring about reconciliation. Johnson (2012) discourages the Church from being silent on important issues. He said, ‘silence when God has commanded His Church to speak is not only defiant towards God, but it is unloving toward others.’ Johnson (2002) associates silence to persecution. It is common knowledge that politicians usually silence the Church as way of concealing the truth. But the Church must always stand ready to speak the truth no matter the consequence. I agree with Johnson, because if the Church chooses to be silent when it is needed most, it is in agreement with the status quo. It means that the Church is in agreement to loss of property and lives. It also means that the Church has legitimized injustice and violence.

Another reason that caused the Church in Zambia to fail to be a credible voice of prophecy was fragmentations, misunderstandings and contradictions among ecumenical member churches. Musika in the Daily News dated Wednesday, June 21, 2017 quotes The Civil Constitution Society Agenda (CISCA) Chairperson, John Mambo, who observed that there was a crisis in the Church
which should urgently be defused. Mambo was reacting to some members of the ecumenical body that had distanced themselves from the Pastoral Statement issued on 16th June 2017 by Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB) President Telesphore Mpundu who spoke on behalf of the three Church mother bodies.

Mpundu spoke in the presence of Churches Council of Zambia (CCZ) President Winston Kalembo and Secretary General Suzanne Matale. Archbishop Mpundu said that Zambia had become a dictatorship. Immediately, two other Roman Catholic Bishops, namely Bishop Phiri and Banda of Eastern and Copperbelt Dioceses respectively, distanced themselves from the statement. They said that the words were not reflective of the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Zambia but were Archbishop Mpundu’s personal opinion (Pastoral Statement issued on 16th June 2017).

This brought confusion, shame and divisions to the Church in Zambia. In a joint Pastoral Statement, three Church mother bodies called for dialogue between the PF and UPND to overcome differences and build national unity. They also called for the release of UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema who was being incarcerated for alleged treason. But other member churches in separate interviews which include the United Church of Zambia, Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, Bishops’ Council of Zambia and the Anglican Church argued that there could not be any meaningful dialogue for as long as the UPND did not recognize Lungu as duly elected president of Zambia (Ndhlovu, 2017).

They categorically distanced themselves from what was meant to be a united voice of the Church in Zambia, claiming that the statement was just imposed upon them. They stated that no one consulted them when the pastoral letter was written. They also accused Mpundu and his colleagues of using their positions to champion partisan politics. This development disgraced the Church in Zambia to an extent that people started wondering who would give moral guidance to politicians.13

In a related development, the Church of God overseer, Bishop Booker Munampelu, emphasized his Church’s commitment to working with the government to bring about unity. Munampelu acknowledged all the good efforts of the government in enhancing development and commitment
to democracy and good governance. He also doubted the authenticity of the sentiments attributed to Archbishop Mpundu that suggested that Zambia had become a dictatorship.¹⁴

Certainly this kind of confusion should not be found in Church. It only shows that greed has taken over and something is terribly wrong with the Church. One can simply describe the contradictory statements by Church leaders as a sign of corruption. This was the reason Bishop Mambo blamed the Church for the political crisis and regretted being called a bishop. He complained about inconsistencies and divisions within the Church. He said, ‘I even feel embarrassed to be called bishop, the body of Christ should call for an Indaba to address the crisis (Daily News, June 21, 2017).

Perhaps Mambo’s frustration and disappointment are justified. Mambo comes from a background of collaboration on important issues among Churches. During his time, the Church spoke with one voice. The Church in Zambia played a pivotal role in the transition from one party state to multiparty system in 1991. The church collectively facilitated the peaceful transfer of power which made Zambia’s smooth transitions enviable in Africa and globally. This is due to the fact that people generally believed in the charisma and unique nature in peacemaking and reconciliation of the Church. Many people connected the mission of the Church to God who is the epitome of what constitutes true reconciliation. However, today the Church seems to have lost this trust. It is each one for him/herself and God for all of us. The Church is in a deep crisis and painfully fragmented. It is impossible for the Church to speak with one voice on important matters of national interest. Therefore, Mambo is justified to propose an urgent Indaba to look at the crisis within the body of Christ.

One of Zambia’s independent tabloid The Lusaka Times in its lead story shortly after the 2016 general elections quoted the Church, affirming that the elections were peaceful, free and fair. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) represents all churches affiliated to the church mother bodies. The (CCMG) said that their deployed Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) estimates were consistent with the Electoral Commission of Zambia’s official results for 2016 presidential elections declared, giving confidence that the results announced by ECZ at Mulungushi
Conference Centre in Lusaka accurately reflected the ballots cast by voters at the 10,818 polling streams located at 7,700 polling stations.

However, four months later, the same CCMG was captured by *the Zambian Watchdog* dated 27\textsuperscript{th} January 2017 saying the 2016 general elections left Zambia polarized due to irregularities in the electoral system. According to them, some polling stations appeared more than once on the electoral register, questioning the credibility of the 2016 general elections’ results. This is extremely disappointing to say the least. In precise terms, this means the Church was in a state of confusion and cannot be trusted to promote reconciliation. It also means that the Church, through its confusion, was inciting violence. This is the result when the Church fails to embrace moral values in its operations and the result is usually violence and chaos.

The confusion in the Church was also visible when president Lungu announced the creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and National Guidance. In their joint pastoral letter, the three Church mother bodies namely, the Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB), the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ) and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) represented by Archbishop Telesphore Mpundu criticized Government for creating such a ministry. They argued that the ministry would just cause confusion because every individual church had a hierarchy. Therefore it was unnecessary to create such a ministry.

Moreover, creating such a ministry is a drain to limited national coffers. The money that would be spent on the ministry could have been channeled to important developmental programmes. They also insisted that the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation was equally irrelevant and misplaced because a nation is not Christian through declarations but through virtue. The declaration is an indirect way of creating a theocracy and an infringement on other minority religions’ freedom of worship.\textsuperscript{15}

But in a separate interview, Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Executive Director Pukuta Mwanza, speaking to the *Daily Nation* dated Monday, August 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2017 hailed the government for creating the ministry. Rev Mwanza said the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation pointed to a strong desire to commit this unique nation to serve God. However, the United Church of Zambia, one of the largest protestant Churches and a key member of the CCZ, also openly
celebrated the creation of the ministry of Religious Affairs. One wonders who to listen to if the Church has become a laughing stock. There seems to be no democracy and reconciliation in Church (Daily Nation, August 28, 2017).

Magesa (2010:133-134) advises the Church to practice democracy and reconciliation within itself if it has to be trusted to promote dialogue. He stressed, ‘If the Church has to remain a source of inspiration and a model; it must start from its own house, since charity begins at home.’ Yes, unless the Church in Zambia learns to practice democracy and reconciliation within itself no meaningful reconciliation will take place.

It is profoundly doubtful for the Church to function as a mechanism of social control when it is disjointed. This is the reason Nyaundi (in Magesa, 2010: 128) upholds:

‘While we can ascribe a lofty function to religion, it is appropriate to caution that whereas religion is often regarded as a force for good of the individual and the society, it is also the case that can be a carrier of despicable evil’.

Nyaundi is saying that the Church can contribute to peace and tranquility in one instance and can be also the source of violence and much evil in another especially if it is in a state of confusion. Nyaundi also suggests that the Church is a fragile bubble that needs to be handled with care.

4.9. Conclusion

Chapter Four was a presentation of research findings and it was divided into nine parts namely: introduction, background of the 2016 elections, argument of the PF, Views of the UPND, role of ethnicity in politics in Zambia, political violence in Zambia, good governance as a political agenda, the response of the ecumenical body and a conclusion. I began by providing a brief background of the 2016 elections to show the circumstances under which the elections were conducted. This also confirmed assertions that suggest that although Zambia has been committed to the ideals of democracy, people’s satisfaction with the way democracy actually works has sunk from a majority of 68% in 2012 to a minority of 48% in 2017 (Bratton et al, 2017:1).
Chapter Five:

Possible interventions that can be used by the ecumenical bodies to address violence

5.1. Introduction

Chapter Four was a presentation of research findings and it was divided into nine parts namely: introduction, background of the 2016 elections, argument of the PF, Views of the UPND, role of ethnicity in politics in Zambia, political violence in Zambia, the response of the ecumenical body and a conclusion. This chapter will focus on the possible interventions that can be used by the
ecumenical bodies to address violence. The study proposes the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a suitable model that the Church in Zambia can use to address the post 2016 election violence. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created by the post apartheid regime to address human rights violations committed during the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Church played a pivotal role in the implementation of the commission’s mandate. Desmond Tutu stressed:

‘It is important to remind us that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is expected to promote not to achieve reconciliation. Reconciliation has to be the responsibility of all South Africans, a national project and we hope that Churches and other faith communities will be in the forefront of this healing process which is possibly going to go on for decades’ (1999).

Furthermore, Hugo Van der Merwe argues that there could be no genuine reconciliation without the involvement of the Church in the process. ‘Without the input of religious figures, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would have been quite a different phenomenon. While the conceptualization of the TRC legislation and the drafting of the Act were essentially political processes driven by pragmatic political concerns, the lobbying activities of the Churches and other NGOs did bring about some key adaptations in the final legislation (2003: 269). In other words, the Church carries within itself valuable resources for enabling and Fostering reconciliation. ‘It is the Church’s duty and call to break the walls of division that exist among people of different backgrounds and cultural heritage. The Church is called to be an instrument of reconciliation (Moyo, 2002:294).’

Therefore, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a model could be borrowed by the ecumenical body in Zambia to promote reconciliation during post 2016 election violence. It is also worth noting that to a large extent there are contextual similarities in Church-State relations between Zambia and South Africa. These also relates to similar ethnic misunderstandings that make some tribes feel politically marginalized and were one of the major causes of human rights violations and the post 2016 election violence. I have divided this chapter into seven parts. Part one is an introduction; part two discusses the social and political context of South Africa; part three presents the role of Truth and Reconciliation commissions; part four looks at the impact of the Church on the TRC; part five will deal with the Church’s various resources for its ministry of reconciliation; part six proposes forgiveness as a possible intervention and part seven is a
conclusion. I will begin with a social and political context of South Africa which explains the genesis of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

5.2. Social and political context of South Africa

To appreciate the genesis and indeed the importance of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) it is vital to look at the social and political climate of South Africa at the time the TRC was established. Dion Forster (2010) arguably states that as the case with the Church throughout the world, the social and political climate of the day played a significant role in developing and appropriating Christian mission. He is supported by Van der Merwe (2003) who says that social divisions are what necessitate reconciliation. The apartheid era presented the church with the challenge of fighting the fundamental source of this division – apartheid.

The most significant and disturbing social and political changes which the church had to contend began to take place in Southern Africa during the 20th Century. Apartheid (an Afrikaans word meaning ‘separateness’) is a system of ethnic separation of which persons were classified into racial groups according to the colour of their skin. The main groups were black, white, coloured (persons of mixed racial descent) and Indians (Forster, 2010).

This system cunningly ensured that black people who are the majority population group did not have a right to vote in ‘white’ South Africa. They were only eligible to vote in their ‘independent’ homeland. These black homelands were the remotest, least arable, and least economically viable tracts of land in the whole Southern Africa (Forster, 2010).

To implement this cruel system of apartheid, black people were removed from their ancestral land. This land was in turn expropriated and either put to use by the government or sold to white South Africans to establish farms. Furthermore, to maintain this system of segregation, black people were forced to remain in their homelands and systematically oppressed and disenfranchised by various ways (Forster, 2010).

Economically, black people were disenfranchised through job reservation (some jobs were for white people only) and professions were not open to black people. Bantu education was meant to train black people to do unskilled and manual labour. There were restrictions on freedom of movement and inequitable access to health care (Forster, 2010).
Forster (2010) explains that for 40 years, church pulpits became safe places from which policies and abuses were addressed. Among remarkable figures that were critical of apartheid was Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Sadly many who spoke against abuses were banned from preaching or jailed or denied to gather in groups of more than two persons. However, despite these threats the Church developed many prophetic statements such as the Confession of Belhar, the Coettesloe Declaration and the Kairos document. The church supported an agenda to transform South Africa and turn it into a democratic and reconciled community. Therefore, when apartheid ended in 1994 with the first democratic elections, the task to heal and reconcile South Africa was brought to the Church. The new government of Nelson Mandela constituted a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was headed by Archbishop Tutu (Forster, 2010). Henceforth I lay stress on the need to borrow from the role that the Church played in South Africa in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an ideal model for the Church in Zambia to promote reconciliation post 2016 election violence.

5.3. The role of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

One might ask: what then is the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions? Truth and reconciliation commissions have played a critical role in a number of Countries that had to come to terms with a past marked by protracted conflicts, civil strife, violence and massive human rights abuse. I will argue that this concept of Truth and Reconciliation is also the ideal model for Zambia post 2016 elections which have left the country polarized and in unprecedented violence. It is worth noting that in the past, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions were established to investigate human rights violations in various countries. Particularly, Commissions were used after countries had undergone some significant political changes such as transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one (Schlunck, 1998:415). Therefore, this makes the TRC a relevant model owing to the fact that Zambia has just experienced unprecedented violence during the 2016 elections which were conducted under a new constitution.

The most widely known example is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 1995 in South Africa to examine apartheid-era crimes. It was an ambitious project established with a mandate to try to promote reconciliation in South Africa, which mainly focused on gross human rights violations during apartheid. Firstly, it sought to uncover the truth about abuses and to establish exactly who was responsible and the extent of abuses (Van der Merwe, 2003). Some
scholars have criticized the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, saying that it sacrificed justice for reconciliation. Another criticism is that it was built on the Christian sense of forgiveness; consequently it appeared as though it was based on the compromise of justice because of amnesty which is a fundamental form of injustice. Others find the truth commission as being too authoritative. Nevertheless, successes that the TRC brought outnumber the demerits (Van der Merwe, 2003).

In spite of some Flaws here and there, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission made a number of significant contributions. Barry (2009:361-396) outlines twelve notable contributions that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission made in South Africa which Zambia can also emulate post 2016 election violence:

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission presented itself as a microcosm of the nation, and as such it could be said to hold out a mirror of what the nation is, and the promise of who the people of South Africa can become.

It exposed a great deal of truth about the past. It exposed much about the nature and extent of gross human rights violations. Villa-Vicencio states, ‘never again will South Africans be able to say, we did not know’ (2000:202).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission created a space where narratives of suffering could emerge, thus allowing greater understanding between the sections of South African society separated by the realized boundaries of apartheid.

It made possible a greater fusion of horizons, a base line of understanding and it defined the parameters of discussion of the past. Wilsons stresses such that the range of permissible lies is now much narrower because of the work of the commission (2001:225).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also revealed much about ‘the causes, motives and perspectives’ of persons responsible for perpetrating human rights violations and the extent to which many of the nation’s worst perpetrators were themselves victims (Villa-Vicencio, 2000:204).

It endeavored to find out how people could go to an extent of committing such atrocities (Villa-Vicencio, 2000:203).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission confirmed the necessity of political solutions to prevent further atrocities.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission facilitated catharsis—indeed reconciliation and healing for some but not for everyone. It challenged the nation with facts that are needed for mental health services. The commission participated in the creation of a democratic, human rights culture and a shift from a punitive to a restorative justice ethic in South Africa. It reminded the nation that reconciliation is both a goal and a process, and of the dangers of mistaking one for the other. Lastly, the commission challenged the Christian Church to do business with both its theology and its practice of reconciliation.

5.3.1. The purpose of Truth Commissions

Truth Commissions focus on the past happenings, without concentrating on a separate event in the past but attempt to paint an overall picture of certain human rights violations over a period of time. Truth Commissions exist for a pre-determined period of time and cease to exist once their mandate ends. They usually end with the submission of a report of their findings. This means that during their mandate, Truth Commissions are vested with certain powers (Hayner, 1994:613).

According to Angelika Schlunck, Truth Commissions have largely three purposes:

Firstly they exist to investigate past human rights abuses, not with an aim to prosecute individuals, but to find out the truth about certain events, for example, when and where did what happen, who was involved, as a perpetrator, or as a victim? A truth commission is first of all an instrument to examine the facts about the crimes and atrocities that have happened in a particular country. The second important purpose is to give a report of those findings and publish them, and to confront the public with the truth. The third purpose of truth commissions is the acknowledgement of the past. Acknowledgement is the first step to reconciliation and a key to the healing process in conflict stricken societies.

The success of truth commissions depends on the political will, availability of financial resources, and support from the public. The major advantage of truth commissions is that they can be established almost instantly at a relatively low cost. Moreover it is a temporary institution with a
limited mandate that can be designed according to the specific needs in a given society. The proceedings before a commission do not have to follow the rigid rules of the law of criminal procedure. This therefore, implies that truth commissions are more flexible in hearing and accommodating witnesses, and in evaluating evidence (Schlunck, 1998:415).

5.4. The impact of the Church on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

According to Hugo van der Merwe, without the input of religious figures, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would have been quite a different phenomenon. Although the conceptualization of the TRC legislation and the drafting of the act were essentially political processes driven by pragmatic political concerns, the lobbying activities of the Churches and NGOs brought about some key adaptations in the final legislation (2003:269).

While not affecting the fundamental shape of the TRC, these inputs pushed the TRC towards a more victim-centered approach. The Church played a pivotal role in mobilizing the local communities. The TRC made extensive use of church network when setting up Human Rights Violation hearings in local communities. Through the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and other religious networks, local ministers were drawn into the process of coordinating meetings, arranging publicity, statements taking and other crucial functions to ensure effective community engagement in the hearings (Van de Merwe, 2003).

Many churches provided direct assistance in facilitating the implementation of effective gross human rights violation hearings. In some cases churches also assisted in creating a limited support structure for victims seeking counseling. Churches also took part in hearing of testimonies of victims and perpetrators and recommended amnesty. Apart from hearing the stories from victims and perpetrators, churches developed programmes for children who could not speak for themselves. These children could be gathered in a hall and asked to draw their stories (Merwe, 2003).

5.5. Church resources for its ministry of reconciliation

According to Barry (2009:364), the Church has resources that it used during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I will argue that the same resources can be useful for the Church in Zambia to address the post 2016 elections violence. Claudia Nolte (2004) supports this, ‘it is the
church’s duty and call to break the walls of division that exist among people of different backgrounds and cultural heritages.’ Ambrose Moyo also argues that the message of reconciliation and forgiveness through faith in Jesus Christ is at the core of the life and ministry of the Church. The church is the instrument through which God chooses to be reconciled with creation as a whole but more so with people, and to reconcile people with one another irrespective of race, colour or creed (2002:294). Suffice to state that the Church in Zambia must affirm this duty in a pragmatic manner by ensuring that there is reconciliation in the country post 2016 election violence. Below are some of the notable resources that the Church has for its ministry of reconciliation which the Church in Zambia can also take advantage of and promote peaceful co-existence.

5.5.1. The Church’s Spirituality of Reconciliation

Spirituality is a word that is commonly used yet difficult to define. As a matter of fact, important attempts have been made to define it. Spirituality is emerging as an interdisciplinary study with a close relationship with theology. It is also an area of study in methodology from both theology and history (Barry, 2009:264).

In Christian terms, ‘spirituality’ concerns the way people subjectively appropriate traditional beliefs about God, the human being, creation and their interrelationship, and then express these in worship, basic values and life style. For this reason, spirituality is the whole human life viewed in terms of a conscious relationship with God, in Jesus Christ, through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and within the community (Sheldrake, 1998:34-35).

Dietrich Bonheoffer insisted that especially in situations of social upheaval and turbulence, the Church has a calling to be a spiritual community- led by the Holy Spirit to embody spiritual communion, and spiritual unity, and cultivate a spirituality that emphasizes the purpose for which the Church exists (Bonheoffer, 1986:100-139). In other words, the Church is called to embody a spirituality of reconciliation (Hay, 198:152). Sheldrake stresses, ‘the challenge to Christian spirituality is to show how its vision of God may contribute powerfully to peaceful co-existence and transformation (1998:202).’

5.5.2. The Holy Eucharist and sharing a meal as a resource for reconciliation
According to Stuckelberger, within the church community, the ministry of witnessing to God’s reconciliation is manifested in practice of the Holy Communion or the Holy Eucharist (1988:442). This is supported by many theologians like Klein (1999:222), Ruhbach (in Bohme 1986:48), Seitz (in Bohme 1986: 69-74). Indeed, Holy Communion is frequently deemed the “sacrament of reconciliation” (Klein 199:226). The communion nature of the Eucharist bears reference to political, economic and social human interaction and is therefore a reflection of these dynamics present in the gathered community (Klein 1999:223).

Christians believe that the Eucharist means renewal of personal and social life. That is to say that the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist actually engenders the reconciliation. According to Luther, the realization or manifestation (“Werk”) of the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper is the communion of saints- the embodied Church, where each member belongs to the others (Nolte, 2004:2/15).

The Holy Communion is therefore, the ultimate sign of God’s unconditional acceptance; all, even the unaccepted and excluded, are welcome. Moreover, in reference to Jesus’ parable of The Great Feast, it can be noted that the ‘symbolism of the banquet of the kingdom of God is included in the Supper. The full and complete reconciliation of God in Christ with the World is translated as a historical reconciliation between the unreconciled and the excommunicated’ (Dalferth 2003:16). Since God invites everyone to the Holy Communion, it is the duty of the Church to imitate God. The Church is supposed to go beyond the conditions imposed by human beings, overstep humanly construed boundaries, and share the common gift.

Mageto (2010:142) proposes that in order for the Church in Africa to forge a more reconciliatory continent, sharing meals must be considered. He cites Jesus who spent his time gathering around tables, which included a variety of ordinary people that everyone could see in their eating together the breaking of many social taboos. Jesus did not only share meals with disciples but also other friends, strangers, sinners, some of the religious elites, and outcasts. This table hospitality presented by Jesus Christ is contrary to the one that an educated African desiring political benefits exercises.

Shriver (1999) emphasizes that the act of sitting down to eat a meal is a human gesture of consent to human company; where barriers of social custom or a history of hostile relations have stood in the way of such consent. The mere joint presence of the alienated, now around the same table
consuming the same food and drinks, can be a powerful symbol of the beginning of negotiation on its way to reconciliation.

In the words of Thevathasan (2014), food diplomacy initiatives are increasingly becoming recognized as a successful means to open peaceful dialogue as a result of our increasingly cosmopolitan palettes. Food is regarded as one of the oldest forms of exchanging, with yet untapped recognition to deliver social conflict transformation. With this in mind, International Alert’s Conflict Kitchen London opens up a new avenue to pursue peace dialogue by taking people on a tantalizing journey to explore new culinary experiences. Conflict Kitchen London can help promote better community engagement around the complex interchange of cultures, religions and ethnicities in one of the most multicultural cities of the world. Food is a natural convener of people and the favourite place for discussion is where food is made and served.

Furthermore, the globalized market has enabled food from all over the globe into people’s homes and by so doing, giving access to other cultures. When people acknowledge the shared space where they live it means inclusiveness in the exchange of cultures and help in reducing stereotypes and misinformation about other cultures. The idea of food as a connector of peoples and communities is now recognized globally. For example in Afghanistan, a popular saying, ‘I have had water and salt in your home,’ means that through food eaten together people are bounded together. Food is a powerful tool to broker peace and is used as a source of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The practice of food rituals encourages forgiveness and reconciliation through sharing of meals between people in conflict cooked by the perpetrator’s family members. Community peace is made possible through ‘Mustafaha’ translated as a hand shake and ‘Mumalaha’ meaning sharing of bread. The meal Covenant is also prominent in the Bible as a Hebraic principle though not specifically mentioned. The special meal becomes the meals for reconciliation not just between people, but also between humanity and God.

However, food can also divide people permanently and paralyze the community beyond redemption especially where there are inequalities in the distribution. The good example is the infamous war over food between Lebanon and Israel called the ‘hummus’ (Thevathasa, 2014). This also confirmed by Brinkman and Hendrix (2011). Rising food prices contribute to food insecurity, which is a clear and serious threat to human security. Interest in food security as a catalyst for political violence and conflict has grown rapidly since 2007-2008, when food protests
and riots broke out in 48 countries as a result of record world prices. In February 2011, the Food Price Index of the food and agriculture of the UN (FAO) reached a new historic peak, and the rise in food prices contributed to the wave of protests across the North Africa and the Middle East that toppled Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Aki, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

However, sharing a meal presents a viable strategy for dialogue, confession, conflict resolution and reconciliation. It also presents very essential means to end violent conflicts and making our world a much more just, peaceful and humane place to live in. Having discussed all interventions I now give concluding remarks.

5.5.3. Training for honesty and transparency

Apart from being concerned about political activity, the Church has the ability to shape society morally, ethically and promote a culture of reconciliation in society (Klein, 1999:18). Notable examples in South Africa are the 1960 initiatives of church leaders such as Beyers Naude and others who worked tirelessly to promote a human and peaceful society. These leaders emphasized training as a reconciliation strategy that could be helpful in a polarized society (Merwe, 2003). Claudia Nolte (2004:7,15) believes that the church has the ability to influence and shape society morally and ethically. An investigation by Helga Dickow(1996) has shown that the Church is indeed a force in the formation and cultivation of a culture of a certain caliber.

In view of this, there is an urgent need to inculcate human virtues that promote humanity, compassion, honesty and solidarity if our nation is to develop. The inculcation of good virtues must begin in homes. A good mannered person is always a good asset which is admired, loved, respected and welcomed everywhere.

George Tucker (1999) stresses, ‘your child’s education begins at home.’ Tucker is correct in the sense that ‘charity begins at home,’ and a home provides a favorable environment for training. Good manners are usually acquired by observation; children will always imitate their parents. Once children from an early stage are trained for example, to value the belief of universal bond of sharing, they will not be greedy in adulthood.

These good virtues will become manifest in various human acts, clearly visible in social, political, economic and family life. In other words, society will produce leaders who are honest, humane
and transparent. It is widely confirmed that some violent conflicts emerge from lack of sound leadership.

Tinkasiimire in Magesa (2010:59-60) emphasizes: Honesty and integrity are judged on the basis of established values, norms and taboos. They signify the wholeness or completeness of character, which does not permit of a split between the inner and outer realities of the person, or between word and deed. In African ethical perception, honesty and integrity require something more than mere truthfulness or avoidance of lying. It may also mean owning up to one’s mistakes. One should take responsibility and expiate for one’s wrongs. This takes great courage for anyone, but especially for a person in the high leadership position in government or church.

In political leadership, honesty and integrity demand that every leader must be ready and prepared to own up to and explain his/her actions and omissions when called upon to do so with regard to the responsibilities he/she is charged with, or to bear the consequences of failure to perform as expected. This helps to enhance the quality of service delivery required to individuals and communities.

When honesty, integrity and accountability prevail, there is improved allocation of resources as well as public expenditure-effectiveness through participatory tracking and monitoring systems. Honesty, integrity and accountability also enhance the ability of citizens at local government levels to move towards engaging with higher level bureaucrats and politicians in a more informed manner, thus increasing the chances of effecting positive social change. They help to promote good governance and play an important role in creating transparency and dissemination of the much needed information. They strengthen the citizens’ voice, promote dialogue and consultation and lead to meaningful development at the grassroots level.

### 5.5.4. Ecumenism and community participation

The church’s ecumenical work is reconciliatory in nature and purpose. Additionally ecumenism and co-operation among the various Christian communities has become a force in establishing structures, institutions, programs and forums for dialogue and reconciliation (Stuckelberger, 1988:512-525).
Mageto (2010: 143) writes that members of the community have the responsibility to recover to full one of the members who has strayed. It is in a community where people can discover that divine forgiveness and human forgiveness belong together and if one accepts either is bound by both. Community discipline is only upheld by the pursuit of reconciliation as highlighted in the New Testament.

Mageto encourages African Christian intellectuals to step up in their respective positions to realize democracy and reconciliation. Africans are by nature communal, although the continent has failed in addressing most controversial issues that continue to haunt this continent which include: negative ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, lack of national unity, and cohesion, power struggles which are prominent in most of the countries. Mageto is correct because unless Africans rediscover who they really are troubles and conflicts will not come to an end.

In the words of Ng’weshemi (2002: 15-16), ontologically the human being in African thought is best viewed as a living force among other forces in the universe. A person is in constant interaction with other beings in the universe to which one is linked by the network of relationships. Placide Tempels (1959:71-72) writes:

“For the Bantu, a person never appears in fact as an isolated individual, as an independent entity. Every human being, every individual, forms a link in the chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the ascending line of his ancestry and sustaining below a person the line of their descendants….the Bantu is quite unable to conceive an individual apart from their relationships.’ Tempels is supported by J.VTaylor (1963:99-100) who said:

‘Man (sig) (humanity) is a family. This chain of humanity, in which the tides of the World-energy ebb and flow most strongly, stands at the heart of the great totality of beings….. the underlying conviction remains that an individual who is cut off from the communal organism is nothing…. As the glow of a coal depends upon its remaining in the fire, so vitality, the psychic security, the very humanity of man (sig) (humanity), depends on his (sig) (their) integration into the family.’

Ng’weshemi further argues that for Africans one is not human simply by birth. Rather, one is human through a progressive process of integration in society. This fits well in what Shweder and Bourne call ‘holistic culture.’ These are cultures which are referred to as ‘sociocentric’ organic cultures. In such cultures, the approach to the understanding of the human being is holistic in that
the paramount value lies in society rather than individual. The African notion of humanity cannot view one as an autonomous individual.

The Zulu people of South Africa say, ‘Umuntu ngu muntu nga bantu’ translated as ‘a person is a person through other persons.’ Instead it is seen as experienced in the perspective of the essential relation of the self to society or community. In African traditional thought, the way the created order was established by God aims at ensuring the survival and well being, primarily of human beings. The goal of human existence is for human s to achieve life in its fullness.

Therefore, all activities are directed towards this end and this life in its fullness is only realized in the community - anything that frustrates communal living leads to decrease in life. It is also important to maintain a good relationship with God and ancestors for this life to even flourish. Anything that goes contrary to this essential goal and aspiration contradicts God’s good intentions for humanity. Moral evil also understood as sin is indirect offence against God through the disruption of the order set up by God (2002:15-28).

Ng’weshemi seems to be suggesting that in African tradition peace and co-existence are integral aspects of existence. It can be argued that by nature Africans are expected to live in harmony with one another because it is sin to disrupt unity. Mabovula (2011:38) maintains that any member of the community whose personal life is guided by Ubuntu (person in other persons) could be said to have embraced the core humanistic attributes of Ubuntu. These include being caring, humble, thoughtful, considerate, understanding, wise, generous, hospitable, socially mature, socially sensitive, virtuous and blessed: character attributes that veer away from confrontation towards conciliation. A person is evil if he/she violates and disrupts tradition and stipulated moral order and codes that ancestors oversee which hold the community together.

This is the reason acts of witches or sorcerers who use supernatural powers are disowned because they cause harm, pain and suffering to the community. Any person who suffers harm as a result of attacks by evil agents is considered to be an innocent victim. Africans are also unhappy with natural calamities such as droughts, earthquakes, floods and other because they disrupt life (Ng’weshemi, 2001:30).

Benezet Bujo (1998: 181-182) asserts that today we cannot by ourselves master ethical problems that affect our society. We have to enter into dialogue with other cultures. Psychotherapy, for
instance, rediscovered the profoundly human dimensions of methods applied by other religions and cultures, which were previously regarded as ‘primitive’ in a negative sense. It is high time that ethics as is has been formulated in the Western tradition, come to relativize its claim of universal validity and cease to regard itself as the highest and best level of moral consciousness.

Similarly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa was also inspired by Thabo Mbeki’s call for ‘African Renaissance,’ particularly African values of oneness, discipline, solidarity, self-identity and achievement. This call enabled Africans to deal with their in a positive manner by drawing on the humanistic values they have inherited and perpetuated throughout their history. Bujo (1998:181) supports that communal living is vital in solving some of Africa’s perennial issues, including conflict resolution. He also believes that Africans can make contributions of rich values to the rest of the human race through their conscious application.

The term communitarianism is derived from the word ‘community,’ and it refers to any philosophical standpoint that defines a person in the context of social bonds and cultural traditions, rather than through individual traits (Daly, 1994). An African community is an ongoing dynamic association of men and women who have a special commitment to one another and have developed a distinct sense of their common life (Ramose, 2002). Common life, in this context is perceived as any public discursive space which members construct through action-in concert. In this context, the history of a person’s life is the story of his or her transactions with the community’s material and moral worlds, which in effect, is the story of his or her relations with particular sets of social goods.

This is a social contract in which an individual’s choice of way is a choice constrained by the community’s pursuit of a shared end (Mabovula, 2011:38). Simply put, the community has a responsibility to regulate an individual’s behaviour towards other members of the community for purposes of maintaining peace and stability.

Another key aspect in communitarianism is corporate ownership and protection of children. Waghid, Van Wyk, Adams and November (2005:108) maintain that the slogan ‘your child is mine (and) my child is yours,’ has a particularly African flavour to it and in many ways epitomizes the sense of community so prevalent in African society. In this sense a child becomes a property or an asset of the community members who have a responsibility of protecting that particular child.
against enemies and ensuring that the child becomes a significant member of that particular society.

Therefore, one can argue that this principle has been eroded in Africa. Some examples are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria and Uganda where children are abandoned, sexually abused and sometimes turned into soldiers. The Department for International Development’s (DFID) report, ‘The causes of conflict in Africa’ dated March 11, 2001 states: ‘Children have become one of the main targets of violence and in turn are being used to perpetrate it. Children are deliberately indoctrinated into a culture of violence and used as a specific instrument of war.’

Militia groups and irregular armed forces such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Interahamwe in Rwanda/DRC, the RUF in Sierra Leone, UNITA in Angola, and formerly RENAMO in Mozambique have made a practice of forcibly recruiting children and initiating them through acts of violence against their own community. The intention is to create a fighting force that is separate, reckless towards others and with a tactical approach that has an advantage over adult conventional forces. There are now approximately 350,000 child soldiers globally, of whom 200,000 are in Africa.

Barber (1998) holds that people envisage civil society as complex web of social relations that tie people together. The initial stratum is constructed first into families and kinships, associations like clans, and then into clubs, neighborhoods, communities, congregations and more extended social hierarchies. This is the central notion of a community where people work together to create peace and love for one another. In other words, the community trains people to love one another, unite against common enemies as a means to prevent conflicts. Khoza (2005:266) confirms this by describing communalism as ‘a concept that views humanity in terms of collective existence and intersubjectivity, serving as the basis for supportiveness, cooperation, collaboration and solidarity.’

5.5.5. Political engagement as a resource

According to Luther’s Two Kingdoms/Regiments theory, both the ‘spiritual’ and the ‘worldly’ realms of existence are placed under God’s authority. God acts as the lover of the world and redeemer not only in spiritual domains of the economic and the political. Therefore, Christians
should be active instruments in both domains. It follows that Luther’s political idea involves critical participation, thereby closely relating the spiritual with worldly kingdom and admonish both to stand in line with God’s struggle against evil (Moltman, 1984:134; Altman 1992:82-83). Luther spoke of service and worship within the world (weltlicher Gottesdienst), and included prophetic diaconia of the poor and weak or promotion of social justice. To this end, Theissen elaborates that, ‘Luther’s two kingdoms teaching could provide a sound basis for the church’s involvement for the establishment of “efficacious social welfare policies” to name but one example (1999). By building an equitable society, the grounds will be laid for reconciliation among the ethnic groups in Zambia.

The Church cannot take a neutral stance in issues impacting the social reconciliation debate, such as redistribution of wealth (Moyo, 2002:298). It is important for churches to realize that it is their duty to call upon those who have acquired riches through the exploitation or impoverishment of others to voluntarily return some of the wealth they control to its rightful owners and thereby contribute to the creation of a reconciled society (Moyo, 2002:298).

Stuckelberger has listed some of the direct assets that the church has that can be helpful in political processes of reconciliation such as being economic/financial abilities, the number of church members and helpers (human resource), organizational structures that are already in place, location of churches within a given context of need, strength of being community-based and a grassroots level organization (1988:531-532).

Indirect assets for reconciliation which can be employed in the secular realm may include proclamation, conscience-building, and ethical formation. This can include education for democracy, petitions, demonstrations, protest actions, public hearings, rallies, opinion polls and other initiatives, solidarity, and community has resources for practically assisting victims of human rights abuses (Hay, 1998:158).

5.5.6. Forgiveness as a possible intervention

Mageto in Magesa (2010:141) proposes that in order for the Church in Africa to forge a more democratic and reconciliatory continent, it must consider forgiveness among other interventions. I am in agreement with this assertion because our nation will become a better place if politicians would practice forgiveness post 2016 election violence in Zambia. ‘Political forgiveness is vital
owing to the fact that it centres on the capacity of victims and creditors to release transgressors and debtors from their moral financial debt’ (unknown author).

Luskin (2002) and Enright (2001) define forgiveness as the principled decision to give up ones justified rights to revenge; it also requires the forgiver to recognize that the offender is a mere mortal or a human, like the victim. They further argue that forgiveness is a two faced arrangement. On the one hand it does not necessarily mean reconciliation because the offended might have good reasons why he/she does not wish to reconcile. Reconciliation, in this case, might be an additional choice. While on the other hand, it is impossible to reconcile with ones enemy without forgiveness. Therefore, forgiveness is both a process and a choice which may also be intrapersonal or interpersonal. Forgiveness is also a very complex terminology which is applied in this context. It is impossible to experience forgiveness in the same way because it is experienced differently by different people. Richard Wilson stressed that if forgiveness is legislated or regulated, it may become fraught with difficulty. Wilson, whose sister was murdered in Burundi, put it; ‘In Burundi, the rhetoric of forgiveness has been used by politicians to avoid accountability’ (Charter for Reconciliation).

John Braithwaite, founder of the Restorative Movement, defines forgiveness as, ‘a gift victims can give. We destroy its power as a gift by making it a duty’ (Worthington and Scherer, 2004). Simply put, any group movement towards forgiveness might best start with individual story telling without any coercion to forgive. In other words forgiveness is both voluntary and personal which cannot be imposed upon any one. To force people to forgive is an injustice which may not produce sincere results (Tutu, 2014).

Forgiveness is usually categorized as having two distinct forms namely, unilateral forgiveness and bilateral forgiveness. Unilateral forgiveness requires nothing in return. It is an act of generosity on the part of the victim (s). This is because there are reasons that motivate people to forgive for example compassion for the offender, the wish to free oneself from pain or a pragmatic way to move on. Bilateral forgiveness involves an exchange. It is a contractual relationship between two people driven by an apology and remorse. Bilateral forgiveness is usually tied up with justice because of compensation or paying of a social debt. However, if too many conditions are attached to forgiveness, it may become almost the opposite, with characteristics similar to vengeance and vindictiveness (Luskin, 2002).
Forgiveness may require relinquishing something that one valued most such as giving up ones moral indignation, desire to retaliate or attachment to being right. It is important to note that there is no set method to teach forgiveness. People are free to explore their own forgiveness journey without being forced. Although forgiveness usually leads to reconciliation, it is not always a condition for the latter to unfold. There could be pragmatic reasons why communities must make conscious choices and decisions not to seek to punish or retaliate. This is just one of the many ways of pardoning that lead to reconciliation but is different from forgiveness. A victim might forgive a perpetrator who is serving a jail sentence but may still see the necessity for the perpetrator to be incarcerated (Tutu, 2014). Therefore, forgiveness is an extremely complicated phenomenon which must be handled with a lot of care. Forgiveness is used in context making it a very difficult term to define. As a process it sounds like not a single gesture in response to an isolated offense, but a bubble, inconsistent and long term process. There is also recognition of the limitedness of humanity prone to error. It also sounds that forgiveness is also closely connected to empathy. Furthermore, forgiveness sounds like the offended placing oneself in the offender’s life. Forgiveness is also different from reconciliation although it may lead to the later.

**Importance of forgiveness for community building**

Scholars such as Exline *et al* (2003) and Luskan (2002) have shown that forgiveness is a good and useful public health and community building tool. Forgiveness produces better health outcomes, helps in building healthy relationships and reduces anxiety. They propose four aspects that make forgiveness a very important and integral factor in community building:

**Forgiveness can bring new insights**

The Charter for Compassion gives a vivid illustration of how forgiveness can bring new insights in the victims’ life. When Kemal Pervanic, a survivor of the notorious Omarna concentration camp returned to Bosnia some years after the end of the war, he recognized the cruelest of his former Serb camp guards by the road hitch-hiking. The sight caused Pervanic to react in a surprising manner; he started laughing. When he was asked why he was laughing, Pervanic explained:

‘What else could I do? I did not want to swear or scream or get violent. I laughed because I remembered the monster this man had been. But now, hitch-hiking alone on a dusty road, he looked
almost pitiful. People describe these people as monsters, born with a genetically mutant gene, but I do not believe that. I believe every human being is capable of killing.’

Forgiveness can help to transform attitude

Forgiveness in this context is about shifting and even transforming people’s attitudes, prejudices, and perceptions about others. Forgiveness is an act of kindness born out of the victim’s generosity but also a re-humanizing gift emphasizing the humanity of the perpetrator. Put differently, forgiveness is about reducing fear through the recognition of the human being in the enemy. Tutu argues that forgiveness is the only way to liberate oneself from the prison of the past animosities and rancour (199:272). This is demonstrated in the case of Palestinian Bassam Aramn and Israeli Rami Elhanan who both lost young daughters in the Israel –Palestine conflict. As Bassam says in the film about his and Ram’s life *Within the Eye of the Storm*: ‘If you want to change others, first you have to change yourself.’ Rami describes the suicide bomber who killed his daughter as ‘victim, just like my daughter, grown crazy out of anger and shame.’ He also reflects, ‘When this happened to my daughter I had to ask myself whether I would have contributed in any way. The answer was that I had, my people had, for ruling, dominating and oppressing three and a half million Palestinians for 35 years’ (Charter for Compassion).

Forgiveness can help to repair broken relationships

Another way forgiveness promotes community building is that it allows people who were once hostile towards one another to live together again. That is to say that forgiveness is a key to reconciliation between friends, family members, spouses, neighbors, races, cultures and nations. This process is an assurance that conflicts will not recur and that victims will not retaliate. For instance, Salimate Badgi-Knight was brought up in a Muslim community in Senegal where she was circumcised at the age of five. Through her influence, her three sisters work with her to stop Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Her mother, who saw no harm in female genital mutilation, actually learnt that it was a violation of human rights and has vowed to fight the vice. Hearing Salimate’s story of pain, her father too has mobilized his kinsmen to join forces in stopping FGM. As a result, over 50 girls in his community have been saved from FGM (Tutu, 1999:271-277).

Forgiveness can help to break the cycle of violence
Repetition of conflicts that consciously and unconsciously hold grievances and renewed by generations can only be stopped by forgiveness. In other words, its only forgiveness that has power to destroy conflicts that are connected to generational bondages.

5.5.7. Conclusion

This chapter focused on the possible interventions that can be used by the ecumenical bodies to address violence in Zambia. The study proposed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a suitable model that the Church in Zambia can use to address the post 2016 election violence. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created by the post-apartheid regime to address human rights violations committed during the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Church played a pivotal role in the implementation of the commission’s mandate. Desmond Tutu stressed: *It is important to remind us that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is expected to promote not to achieve reconciliation. Reconciliation has to be the responsibility of all South Africans, a national project and we hope that Churches and other faith communities will be in the forefront of this healing process which is possibly going to go on for decades* (1999). Furthermore, Hugo Van der Merwe argues that there could be no genuine reconciliation without the involvement of the Church in the process, ‘Without the input of religious figures, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would have been quite a different phenomenon. While the conceptualization of the TRC legislation and the drafting of the Act were essentially political processes driven by pragmatic political concerns, the lobbying activities of the Churches and other NGOs did bring about some key adaptations in the final legislation (2003269). In other words, the Church carries within itself valuable resources for enabling and Fostering reconciliation. ‘It is the Church’s duty and call to break the walls of division that exist among people of different backgrounds and cultural heritage. The Church is called to be an instrument of reconciliation (Moyo, 2002:294).’ Therefore, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a model could be borrowed by the Ecumenical body in Zambia to promote reconciliation during post 2016 election violence. It is also worth noting that to a large extent there are contextual similarities in Church-State relations between Zambia and South Africa and ethnic misunderstandings that make some tribes feel politically marginalized and were one of the major causes of human rights violations and the post 2016 election violence. The chapter was divided into seven parts. Part one is an introduction, part two discussed the social and political context of South Africa, part three presented the role of Truth and Reconciliation commissions,
part four looked at the impact of the Church on the TRC, part five dealt with the Church’s various resources for its ministry of reconciliation. Part six focused on forgiveness as a possible intervention.

Chapter six:

General Conclusion

6.1. Introduction

This study sought to explore the role that the Church in Zambia played to promote reconciliation post 2016 election violence. It was argued that the ambiguous role played by the Church to promote reconciliation post 2016 election violence was a result of the uncritical Church-State relations. The ecumenical body remained too close to the State to be a credible voice of prophecy.

The research has involved a qualitative study and has not made use of any quantitative data and its tools of analysis. The research used the theoretical underpinning of Church-State relations theory to explore the role that the church played to promote reconciliation post 2016 elections in Zambia. The research sought to respond to the following objectives:

(i) What were some of the causes of post 2016 election violence in Zambia?

(ii) How did the ecumenical body respond to the post 2016 election violence?

(iii) What role can the Church play in promoting reconciliation post 2016 election violence among political parties in Zambia?
In this chapter a summary of the conclusion drawn from the research findings from Chapters Two to Five will be provided. I will also suggest some practical recommendations for the interplay between Church and State in Zambia.

6.2. Conclusions drawn in the study

In this study, I explored the role that the church in Zambia played to promote reconciliation post 2016 election violence.

In the introductory chapter I outlined the general background of the study, motivation to the study, research problem, limitations, research objectives, significance of the study. This was followed by Chapter Two in which I discussed the history of leadership from the Federal Republic to multiparty democracy in Zambia. The first part dealt with the progression of leadership, in the second part I looked at some of the effects of multiparty democracy on the people of Zambia among them monopoly of the government, ethnic divisions and suppression of media freedom. Then I went on to discuss research findings and the possible causes of violence. I also gave a response of the Church to the post 2016 election violence. The study noted that the ambiguous response of the Church in Zambia to the post 2016 violence was due to an uncritical acceptance of the State.

Chapter Four outlined the conceptual framework underpinning the study, and a detailed research methodology. This chapter comprised seven parts: part one is an introduction, while part two presented Luther’s Church-State Model. In part three I discussed Calvin’s Church-State Model, part four introduced Catholic Church-State model, and thereafter I outlined Bonheoffer’s critique of other models in part five. This was followed by Bonheoffer’s Church-State relation and his relevance to the study. The research methodology included a research design, data collection, and sampling, research instruments and a method of data analysis.

This was followed by Chapter Five whose major focus was on possible interventions that can be used by the ecumenical body to address violence. The study proposes the South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a possible and an ideal model that the Church in Zambia can use to deal with the post 2016 election violence.

6.3. Signpost for future research
The study shows that there is a need for a further discourse on the interplay between the State and the Church. Additionally, based on the abundance of information on the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation, more study is required. The issues that emerged from the study were as follows:

There is no way the Church can be separated from politics because the State is a divine institution of God for humans created to keep law and order in society. The Church on the other hand, is God’s institution which bears upon total human life and contributes to the creation of values for a sound society. In other words both the Church and politics have much in common to build a healthy society. However, the Church must be concerned with its closeness with the State and the State’s persuasive power. Wherever there was an uncritical acceptance of the State, evidence has shown that the role of the Church was either compromised or jeopardized. The question is, in the midst of poverty which is attracting Church leaders to the wealthy political leaders, how can the Church remain an independent voice of conscience and faithful to its mission to be the ‘salt and light’ of the World? In light of this, the study recommends the following:

Since African leaders both in Church and State continue to fail to address controversial issues that constantly haunt the continent such as negative ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, lack of national unity and cohesion, power struggles, Theology must incorporate these for serious reflection.

There is also a serious need to address the historicity of the controversial issues that continue to haunt Africa.
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