

News covering in the online press media during the ANC elective
conference of December 2017

Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa

212556107

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Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.

Supervisor: Professor Donal McCracken

2019

As the candidate's supervisor, I agree with the submission of this thesis.

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Signed

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to all media practitioners, students and researchers around the world who are working towards the democratisation of the media.

Abstract

Online press plays an imperative role in the legitimisation of ideas, individuals, events and interpretations. Evidence suggests that news media play a significant role in legitimising and de-legitimising political candidates, particularly in the period leading to and after elections. There is increased interest in recent studies in the field of media framing, legitimisation and de-legitimising of political candidates. While scholars provide useful insights on prospective media use of frames to de-popularise political leaders, up to now, studies have not gone beyond explaining the frames used by the news media. Little effort has been made to understand the relationship between media frames and the different discursive practices that affect the construction of such frames. Drawing on Van Gorp's (2007) framing theory and Foucault's (1980) concept of discourse power/knowledge to investigate news coverage in the South African online press, this thesis examined the frames used by *News24* and *IOL* to legitimise and de-legitimise election candidates during their reporting of the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress. Using the national congress as a case study in point, qualitative archival data consisting of 100 news articles were retrieved from online archives of *News24* and *IOL*. The information was analysed to assess how the content reported was framed to legitimise or de-legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political leadership qualities both at the national and political party level. Through a critical discourse analysis approach, six broad frames were thematically organised and presented as evidence on how news frames were constructed through culturally constituted communication artefacts. The study found that the reports by both, *News24* and *IOL* were heavily influenced by the prevailing societal discourses that shaped politics and economy in the period of their construction. Notably, this thesis reveals how both presses used similar frames in their reporting. Even though they used similar frames, there were significant differences in approaches that were used by *IOL* and *News24* in reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. As a result, this study contributes to the body of knowledge, by confirming how the press evokes cultural discourses when reporting on political candidates, to remind readers and allow them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed reality as a frame of reference.

Key words: legitimisation; de-legitimisation; online press; Cyril Ramaphosa; Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Background to the study

The past decade has been the most turbulent for South Africa and its ruling party African National Congress, (hereafter referred to as ANC) government since the advent of democracy. Seen in modern times as a progressive nation led by a people-centred government, this perception began to wane after the assumption of power by Jacob Zuma as president of both the ANC and South African government (Booyesen 2019: 8). Corruption, maladministration, factionalism, and poor economic performance led the country into recession (Pauw 2017: 34). These challenges were in large part, blamed on the leadership of Jacob Zuma. As a result, calls for a leadership renewal became the ‘new song of the day’, both in the ANC and across South African. Various attempts were made (with little success) through parliamentary procedures¹ and protest to remove Jacob Zuma from the office of president (Karodia and Soni 2016: 56). Booyesen argues that "the ANC quest to reposition itself away from the capture and corruption that characterised Jacob Zuma's rule, started in the run-up to it's 53rd elective conference" (2019: 9). What this means is that the plot to remove Jacob Zuma's dated back to 2012 when Cyril Ramaphosa was elected deputy president of the ANC under then ANC president Jacob Zuma. All this was before the official end of his five-year presidential term. A later serious attempt to remove Jacob Zuma from the presidency was in October 2017. This was a few months before the ANC national elective congress. The attempts to remove Jacob Zuma from the presidency just a few months before the end of his term as president deserve careful consideration. These attempts help to illustrate the magnitude of the discontent and dissatisfaction that had engulfed members of the ANC, much of the South African population and the opposition parties².

The ANC National Elective Conference was scheduled to take place from 17 to 21 December 2017. The conference would mark the official and constitutional end to Jacob Zuma's ANC

¹ The opposition pushed for three motions in which they needed to cast a vote of no confidence to remove Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa.

² South Africa has 24 opposition parties, the majority opposition party is the Democratic Alliance (DA) followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

presidency³. As such, the conference was the formal and official platform for the ANC leadership and members to vote for the change of leadership. This happened after every five years (Mathekga 2018, Butler 2017 and Butler 2007). However, the period saw the emergence of potential contenders to take over after Jacob Zuma. Among the key contenders who were vying for the presidential position was Cyril Ramaphosa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Zweli Mkhize, and Lindiwe Sisulu (Du Plessis 2017: 23). Despite a considerable number of presidential aspirants, previously mentioned, Mathekga argues that the actual battle for the presidency was between Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (2018: 12). Both leaders were strategically positioned to take over from Jacob Zuma. Cyril Ramaphosa was the deputy president of both the party and government, while Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was close in proximity by virtue of her surname that she shared with Jacob Zuma, her former husband (Vandone 2019: 13). Lindiwe Sisulu was considered a potential presidential candidate. She announced her intention to run for the presidency in July 2017. However, she later withdrew from the presidential race to support the Cyril Ramaphosa campaign.

The period leading up to the ANC December conference attracted attention from various sectors of the country: the private sector and the public sector (Mathekga 2018, Booysen 2016 and Du Plessis 2017). It was characterised by much political activity and politicking especially by those political figures who wanted to replace Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa. Du Plessis described the phase leading to the elective conference as a period of uncertainty for both South Africans and those of the international community who had interests in South African affairs (2017: 12). This was so because the winner of this race would become Jacob Zuma's successor. To add, Mathekga notes that the phase leading to and during the ANC elective conference divided the country and the ANC (2018: 23). More so, the phase also heightened media interest and attention to the political dynamics pervading the nation. In this case, the media attention was predominantly fixed on the events that were unfolding in the period leading to the ANC elective conference, but more importantly on the political candidates and their political campaigns (Butler

³Jacob Zuma was legally going to continue as president of the South African government after the termination of his presidency as the ANC president at the ANC national elective conference in December 2017. According to Butler, this arrangement would leave Jacob Zuma a powerful man because he would be in control of the country's resources (2019: 156). Mathekga notes that the comrades in the ANC were not prepared to have Jacob Zuma continue as president of the country after the congress. As a result, they forced him to step down as president of South Africa (2018: 24).

2017: 265). In relation to that Mathekga notes that the political events that took place at and before the conference attracted both local and international media interests (2018: 13). Butler also notes that the ANC elective conference exposed the level of polarisation that characterised the South African media (2018: 12). Accordingly, the role of the media and how it covers political leaders and events of this nature deserves some careful consideration. Cushion and Jackson argued that during any political contest, the press claims a dual role of informing the citizens but also setting the agenda (as a political player) by influencing what the public talk about (2019: 986). Drawing on this assertion, it is therefore imperative to explore how the media report and represent political candidates during times of heightened political contests, particularly the ANC National Elective Conference.

Following this background, the chapter outlines the synopsis of the study. This includes the statement of the research problem. The discussion of the problem statement includes a short review of the literature. The gap in the literature is identified. The chapter presents the main purpose of the study. Key research questions and objectives are outlined. The chapter then highlights the research methodology and the principal theories and conceptual framework that informs the study. The significance of the study is explained and a justification for conducting the study presented.

Research problem for the study

Drawing its inspiration from the Press Council in South Africa, the news press is expected to cover and report political events and political candidates in a fair, objective and impartial manner (2007: 1). In that process, the news press and the news personnel should always uphold the news values of truth, objectivity, fairness and impartiality. They should always sidestep predisposed reportage of events and individuals by ensuring that their facts are always confirmed and that they are a true replication of the truth on the ground (Metz 2015; Ward 2015; Ward and Wasserman 2015). The role of the news press is therefore fundamental in that it equips citizens with information that allows them to make informed choices when presented with choices that affect their lives (Sunstein 2018: 56). In elections periods, the news press becomes the main source of information for the electorate. Sonnemaker argued that during elections periods, the news press plays a critical role of informing citizens in a deliberative democratic society (2015: 20). Therefore, at its optimal

level, the news press can ensure that citizens are objectively informed and act as a public forum and a sphere in which citizens can meaningfully and effectively participate in the governance of their democracy (McNair 2017: 45). To add, Altheide argues that, in its various forms the press is critical in providing education, news, and entertainment for the society (2018: 56).

Regrettably, news reports of political candidates are normally presented in a manner that seek to legitimise or delegitimise one political candidate over the other (Chambwera 2016; Mesquita and Almeida Medeiros 2016; Pang, Abul Hassan and Chong 2014). In South Africa the situation on the ground in this matter under discussion was nerve-racking. There was a growing concern over the way the news press framed political candidates, particularly in this election period. News reports on political candidates are presented to credit or delegitimise one political candidate at the expense of the other (Doudaki, Boubouka, and Tzalavras 2019; Wang, Kayuni, Chiweza, and Soyoyo 2019). Although the news press strives to report on political candidates objectively and in an impartial manner, news reports as seen and observed by various scholars, consists of distorted facts and are presented in favour of certain individuals and also presented in a manner that seeks to legitimise or delegitimise certain candidates (Oyesomi, Salawu, and Onyenakeya 2019). Chong and Druckman argue that in a major political contest like elections, the news press serves as a campaign tool that communicates ideologies of the most dominant and powerful ideologies in society (2007: 120). What this means is that the press frames their reports around the personalities and identities of political candidates to create desired public opinion that will affect the outcome of the elections. Maseng, Koosentse, and Ani observed that, though rampant in authoritarian states, the framing of political leaders is also a pervasive act in democratic states, particularly in South Africa (2018: 11604). This has led to the misrepresentation of political candidates and the rise of identity and personality politics. To add, the framing of political leaders has had detrimental effects on the choices that the electorate make when presented with different choices that are framed (Liu and Scheufele 2016; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009; Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar 2016). Framing of political candidates has also led to the problem of media polarisation as different media may slant their reports in favour or against certain candidates. As a result, news reports will not reflect the true and actual reality but will be biased in favour of the candidate that a media institution supports (Chambwera 2016: 56).

Recently, researchers have shown increased interest in the field of media framing and legitimization of political leaders (Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2014; Khuluse 2014; Maseng *et al.* 2018). For instance, Davies-Laubscher explored the media framing of Jacob Zuma (2014: 3). His findings concluded that the framing process employed by the South African media reawakened a new discourse on the practice of polygamy. In another study, Maseng *et al.* examined how the South African media de-popularised politicians, paying definite attention to Jacob Zuma (2018: 11604). These scholars established that the media used its agenda-setting role to negatively undermine Jacob Zuma's popularity and influence public opinion about Jacob Zuma and his leadership dynamics (Maseng *et al.* 2018: 11604). Similarly, Chambwera examined how framing has been used by the Zimbabwean media to legitimise and delegitimise Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai (2016: 3). This author established that frames available to journalists consciously or unconsciously, "are rooted in the culture and discursive practices in which they operate and are specific to historical period" (Chambwera 2016: 3). In a different study, Tiung and Hasim illustrated how through frames, the newspaper moulds the image, personality and reputation of politicians through the pages of the newspaper by playing up or playing down their news and pictures (2014: 408). In another study, Khuluse investigated the print media portrayal of Jacob Zuma's rape charges case (2011: 5). Findings from this study established that the press media "framed news which pronounced the death of Jacob Zuma's political career" (Khuluse 2011: 5).

While these studies provide useful insights on prospective media use of frames to de-popularise political leaders, up to now, these studies have not gone beyond explaining the frames used by the news media. To illustrate the above, previous research did not seek to analyse how such frames were used to legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and personalities of specific political candidates. Furthermore, while studies of media framing have been conducted by several scholars on local politicians (Davies-Laubscher 2014; Khuluse 2014; Maseng *et al.* 2018), little effort has been made to understand the relationship between media frames and the different discursive practices that affect the construction of such frames. As a result, our understanding on the relationship between the media framing and the legitimization discourse is informed predominantly by westerns scholarship that focused on analysing the legitimization strategies seen in various types of text (Fairclough 2013; Hart 2017; Meyer, Jancsary, Höllerer and Boxenbaum 2018; van Dijk, 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Surprisingly, the topic of how the online press uses frames to legitimise or delegitimise political candidates has not been closely examined, particularly the online press'

use of culturally constructed frames to legitimise and delegitimise the political and leadership qualities of political candidates in the period of heightened political contest. Consequently, little is known about the nature of frames used by *News24* and *Independent Online (IOL)* to legitimise and delegitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the period leading, during and after the ANC elective conference of December 2017. Therefore, the gap in the existing research has prompted this study.

Aim of the study

This study aimed to examine the frames used by *News24* and *IOL* to legitimise or delegitimise political leaders during their reporting of the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress. It sought to provide a detailed analysis of how content is framed and reported by the online press with the intention to legitimise or delegitimise political candidates. To achieve this, the study made use of framing theory (Van Gorp 2007) and discourse power/knowledge (Foucault 1980) to examine how the content reported in the period leading, during and after the congress were framed to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political leadership qualities both at national and political party level.

Based on a constructivist cultural studies approach, this study considers that the conduct of the online press is a practice through which meaning is constructed and communicated either to inform, disinform or legitimate and delegitimate certain events or individuals in the society. As Mesquita and Almeida Medeiros argue, this study also shares their sentiment that "legitimacy is not given priority, but socially conferred and legitimated through a practical and ideational process of elaboration, enactment and feedback" (2016: 385). While the practical process of legitimacy is commonly carried out by those in control of resources in any given society (Beetham 2018; Uphoff 1989), it is assumed that the online press plays an imperative role in the legitimation of ideas, individuals, events and interpretations (Mesquita and de Almeida Medeiros 2016: 385). This thesis provides evidence and emphasises that online press owing to its capacity to represent, signify and socialise ideas and represent individuals and events.

The information that was gathered for this study spans for three months: 1 October to 31 December 2017. During this time the online press was fixated and abounded with reports concentrating on the activities surrounding the ANC national elective congress, its dramatic proceedings and the outcome of the congress (Mathekga 2018: 12). The congress was of national significance because its outcome was going to determine, amongst other things, who would be the leader of the ANC and in 2019 consequently become the next president of the Republic of South Africa (Du Plessis 2017: 21). Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma were selected in this study because they were the main contenders in that race to become the president of the ANC. In other words, they were everyone's preferred candidates (Butler 2019, Mathekga 2018 and Du Plessis 2017).

Research questions

This study sought to answer the following questions:

1. How exactly did *News24* and *Independent Online* frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at party and national level in the period leading, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress?
2. What are the similarities and differences in how *News24* and *Independent Online* framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders?
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders?
4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa?

These significant questions were crucial in positioning the use of framing theory as a guiding theoretical foundation. This helped the researcher to explore in detail with the use of frames how *News24* and *IOL* delegitimised or legitimised the political leadership of Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa when reporting on the 2017 December elective congress. The media draws the audience's attention to specific topics setting agenda and then goes on to construct a suitable frame that is used to understand the information given to them (Entman 1993: 51). With

this understanding, the main assumption that the researcher engaged was that creating frames for stories is commonly a ‘mind-full choice’ by sources, reporters, journalists, and editors. Framing is a conscious work by professionals (journalists in particular) that are expected to tell a story while laden with certain time and space constraints (Boesman, Berbers, d’Haenens and Van Gorp 2017: 299). Because of the circumstances, journalists purposively structure the information and create an interpretive framework that allows their audience to understand the message. The study looked at how *News24* and *IOL* framed the reports that focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma. It examined how these frames legitimised and delegitimised these two political candidates. The key objectives of this study are listed below.

Objectives of the study

This study intended to achieve the following core outcomes:

1. To explain the frames used by *News24* and *Independent Online* in reporting the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at party level and national level before, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress.
2. To establish the similarities and differences in how *News24* and *Independent Online* framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders.
3. To explore the political, economic and social conditions that may have informed such framing.
4. To establish how such framing sought to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.

Significance of the study

The present study contributed to the existing body of literature. It contributed to the current understanding of how the press evokes cultural discourses when reporting on political candidates,

to remind readers and allow them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed reality as a frame of reference. The holistic analysis of this study added to existing research by identifying the different common culturally constructed frames that the *IOL* and *News24* used to legitimate or delegitimate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa's political and leadership qualities. No previous research that exists has ever holistically analysed the culturally constituted frames used to legitimise or delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in the election event such as the ANC 2017 December elective conference. Moreover, the study also confirmed results from existing studies that emphasised that the newspaper and journalistic discourse is constituted by society as it similarly constitutes society (Van Gop 2007; Chambwera 2016). Additionally, the critical and holistic analysis of this study added to the body of research that focuses on the presentation of female political leaders in Africa and South African in particular. Findings from this study confirm previous research that emphasised that there is a gender bias in the media that favour male political leaders and subject female leaders to incessant vilification. This study has revealed that the gender bias that is prevalent in the news frames does not exist in isolation. Instead, it is a replica of the patriarchal systems that shape society in which the media is functioning. Unlike previous studies that maintained that the African media utterly defies the ethics of news reporting (Guha 2018 and Cukier *et al.* 2016, Mavin *et al.* 2016), the present study revealed that the *IOL* and *News24* strive for objective and fair reporting as they endeavoured to present a balanced reporting that placed more focus on policy issues and candidate manifestos as opposed to candidates' personalities or their gender. This is a complete departure from previous studies that emphasised that the media in Africa when reporting on female political leaders, the absolute emphasis is placed on downplaying their personalities by amplifying culturally constructed gendered predispositions (Gedalya, Herog, and Shamir 2017; Thou 2015;

Tendi 2016). Furthermore, the study contributed to prior theory by applying, validating and extending the application of Van Gops' (2007) framing theory and Michael Foucault (1980) concept of knowledge/power and discourse. The theories have been extended to analyse the frames used to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. The results showed that the media select some aspects of the pre-existing discourse and frame them in a manner that conveys their preferred meaning. This meaning is not neutral. Instead, it is laden with power and ideologies meant to serve the interests of the ruling elites and maintain the status quo. Findings from this study have shown that apart from communicating ideas and information to the people, the press assumed the role of a political institution where it communicated and endorsed ideologies of the dominant groups in society while discrediting the interest of the powerless. Besides, existing research often separately depended on framing analysis or thematic analysis. The present research contributed by linking a variety of approaches in its methodology. The research included the case study, cultural studies approach, thematic analysis and critical discourses analysis. All the approaches were complementary to each other. A case study of the ANC 2017 election was covered with specif focus on the leadership and political qualities on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.

The discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation

Legitimation and de-legitimation are key terms used in this study. Every research has its contextual terms that are essential in defining the patterns of activities and events in a particular research context or setting. Understanding how legitimation and de-legitimation are defined and interpreted in this research is important in shaping the ideas of the study.

The following section briefly discusses the discourse of legitimization and de-legitimation. It unpacks the various key elements that inform the discourse of legitimization and de-legitimation. Among the key elements discussed in this section are authorisation, rationalisation, moral evaluation and mythopoesis. Focus on these elements is important in that it allows the researcher to situate the study within the broader discourse of legitimization and de-legitimation. It also helps in exposing the gap that exists in previous literature that focuses on legitimization and de-legitimation.

Evidence from various scholars suggests that interest in legitimization and de-legitimation have gained traction among political communication scholars over the past two decades (Fairclough 2013; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). The use of these two terms is usually related to discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003b; Van Leeuwen 2017; Van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Generally, the term refers to the act of making something or confirming the legitimacy of something or a government. Mostly, the most protuberant act of legitimization is to discursively create, validate, and institutionalise established truths, ideals and order (Fairclough, 2013; van Dijk 2008; van Leeuwen 2007). Also, as Deutsch stressed, "legitimacy holds is the assurance of the compatibility of a value-pursuing course of action with other key values" (1963: 309). However, for scholars like Oddo, legitimization is commonly perceived as an essential object of a political utterer in a quest to rationalise sequence of activities that are intended to be completed within the scope of the dynamic interest of the receiver (2011: 287). In relation to that, Van Dijk argues that since legitimization is profoundly ingrained in ideology, it presupposes norms and values. Moreover, Van Leeuwen argued that "the legitimations refer to how a group of individuals seeks to secure consent to their power from at least the most important among their subordinates" (2007: 14). More so, Frances (1982) cited in Lynn and Kartez (1995: 87) also argued that in political rhetoric, legitimacy is accomplished through communication that efficiently aligns actions with the prevalent social values of a particular time. This assertion was reinforced by Vaara who defines legitimization as "the creation of a sense of, beneficial, ethical, understandable, necessary or otherwise acceptable action in a specific setting" (2008: 985). This definition can be validated if one considers how governments and corporations have endeavoured to establish legitimacy in many contentious areas like immigration policy, defines strategy, and environmental issues. Put together, the definitions put forward by the various scholars (Fairclough 2013; van Dijk 2008; van

Leeuwen, 2007) suggest that “all facets of practice require legitimation, especially when practices are in the process of being established or changed” (Reyes 2011: 781).

De-legitimation, on the other hand, refers to the act of diminishing or destroying the legitimacy, prestige, or authority of an individual or government (Reyes 2011: 782). According to Screti de-legitimation can be understood as “discursively creating and transmitting a negative image of the other” (2013: 212). Thus, put in other words, the term de-legitimation presupposes the absenteeism of linguistic alignment with the predominant societal ideals of that time in addition to the “absenteeism of positive, beneficial ethical, understandable action” (Screti 2013: 212). Concerning politics, Steffek argues that de-legitimation of a political establishment happens when policies are confronted and threatened (2003: 77).

Scholars like Van Leeuwen argued that every system of authority attempts to establish the belief in its legitimacy (2007: 18). As such language has become the most important vehicle used in attempts to legitimize the systems or ideologies of those in authority. Scholars like Berger and Luckmann (1966: 112) cited in (Van Leeuwen 2007: 91) argued that “all languages are legitimation”. According to Van Leeuwen said, “incipient legitimation is present as a system of linguistic objectification of human experience is transmitted” (2007: 91). Effectively, what this means is that the initial process of legitimation takes place in every situation where communication of human experience is communicated. For instance, the transmission of kinship vocabulary serves to legitimize the kingship structure that is being communicated (Reyes 2011: 803).

Evidence from various legitimation studies suggests that there are four common categories of legitimation (Björkvall and Höög 2019; Smits, van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove 2017; Smith, Morreale and Mariani 2008). For instance, Van Leeuwen states that there are four main categories of legitimation. These are authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and mythopoesis (van Tatenhove 2017: 34). Furthermore, Bjorkvall and Höög argued that these forms of legitimation can unfold and manifest independent of each other or can also occur in combination (2019: 400). In the process of their occurrence, these forms of legitimation, are understood to be the crust of the text and talk which may not refer to the exact meaning being communicated and legitimized. On the other hand, these forms may also operate as “thinly sprinkled across detailed descriptive or prescriptive accounts of the practices and institutions they legitimise” (Van Leeuwen

2007: 92). What this effectively means is that these legitimization forms are easily recognised by exact linguistic resources and configurations of a linguistic resource (Screti 2013: 212).

In his study, Van Leeuwen stressed that legitimization plays an important role in communication as it adds the answer (explicitly and obliquely) to the question Why (van Tatenhove 2017; Smits 2017; Van Leeuwen 2007). What this means is that legitimization is operationalised when the question like; "Why should we do this? and, "why should we do in this way?". Such questions provoke a response that seeks to legitimise a course of action. Four forms of legitimization are important in this thesis, and these include authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis. Thus, legitimization is broadly discussed below.

Authorisation

Authorisation refers to the act or process of giving consent, permission, or license to carry out the desired course of action (Oxford Dictionary 2018: 24). However, scholars define authorisation as the act by a person in the position of authority to give consent or permission for a chosen course of action (Galvan and Guevara 2016; Idrus and Nor 2016). Van Leeuwen defined authorisation as "the process of legitimization by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, and law and of a process in whom the institutional authority of some kind vested" (2007: 92). In other words, the process of legitimization by authorisation is made functional and operational when the individual communicating use or refer to some agreed or respected tradition or any institutional framework that is well known and mutually respected by all the parties involved in the process of communication. According to Galvan and Guevara, since legitimization involves the process of answering the questions "why should we do this? or Why should we do this in this way? Authorisation involves responding to such questions at two different levels" (2016: 452). The first level is called personal authorisation or personal authority legitimization while the second level is called impersonal authority (Van Leeuwen 2007: 92).

Personal authority

Personal authority refers to the authority that an individual has or enjoys by virtue of their status or role in any given institution (Abdi and Basarati 2017: 88). Abdi and Basarati opined that an instance of personal authority is the authority enjoyed by parents and teachers (2017: 88). To

substantiate that point, Van Leeuwen argued that the authority by parents and teachers is used to “invoke any justification for what they require others to do other than a mere “because I say so”, although they many of cause choose to provide reasons and arguments” (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). Moreover, Abdi and Basarari argued that personal authority legitimation normally finds its proficiency from the authority’s exclamation (2017: 88). Thus, personal authority is a symbol of the “positional family” where verdicts are a function of the standing of a member and where conflict is resolved using members comparative power lying in their statuses. In relation to the above, Halliday, Matthiessen, and Halliday stressed that authority legitimation naturally takes the form of a “verbal process” clause (2014: 129). This means that the “projected clause” or the authority’s utterances, encompass some form of “obligation modality” (Halliday 2014: 129).

Under personal authorisation of legitimation, there is also a dimension called the “expert authority” (Abdi and Bassarati 2017; Van Leeuwen 2007). As the name implies, under this dimension of personal authorisation, legitimation is given by an expert rather than the status that is held by an individual like in the personal authority. Commonly found in academic text and news reporting, this type of authorisation involves the mentioning of credentials of that authority. However, if the person is well known it is usually not important to mention the credentials of that individual since the name of the authority only will possess enough weight to provide the authority for a specific situation (Abdi and Bassarati 2017: 86). According to Van Leeuwen, “the process of expert authorisation in legitimation often takes the form “verbal process clause” or “mental process clause” with the expert as subject” (2007: 96). What this means is that in the multimodal text the credentials of the expert may be visualised or signified by laboratory equipment, files, and other professional features (Abdi and Bassarati 2017: 89). Moreover, the utterances of the expert in the process of legitimation of a course of action are laden with some sort of recommendation, some forms of an assertion that justifies a specific course of action as the best or a virtuous idea. To add, this process offers no reasons why that course of action should be taken, nor does it provide an answer to the question “Why should I do this?” What it simply does is to say this should happen because a certain individual has said so (Abdi and Bassarati 2017; Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 2007).

Another dimension of the personal authorisation in legitimation is the “role model authority”. In this process of legitimation, celebrities, and popular personalities are used to motivate the

population to take a course of action. According to Van Leeuwen, in a role model authority “people follow the example of role model or opinion leader” (2017; 2007). The role model can be a part of the group or a popular figure from a distance. In this case, the reasoning behind is that the fact that this popular figure among the target population has espoused a particular form of behaviour, or accept as true certain things, is sufficient to legitimise the action of their supporters (Abdi and Basarati 2017; Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 2008). Moreover, this kind of legitimation has been seen to be a common practice in advertising and lifestyle media. Van Leeuwen (2007) cited in Fairclough and Fairclough (2013: 67) observed that home decoration magazines legitimise their prescriptions (How to create your own dream home) by propagating stories that are replete with the experiences of how famous media personalities beautify or refurbish their houses and homes. According to Van Leeuwen (2007) cited Abdi and Bassarati (2017: 89) famous people or celebrities are instantly and easily recognisable, “role model authority” is effortlessly conveyed visually, merely by presenting celebrities involved in the activities they intend to legitimise. In relation to this assertion, Van Leeuwen (2007) and Mead (1934) cited in Bates (2016: 193) also observed that individuals take on the behaviour of the clusters they fit in and subscribe to, of the "significant others" in their immediate and their wider social setting.

Impersonal authority

Legitimation scholars have established that not all authority is personal (Bjorkvall *et al.* 2019; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Tatenhove 2017; Smith 2008; van Leeuwen 2007). For instance, these scholars mutually agree that in this form of legitimation, the questions of "Why do this" is not answered by providing the reference to a name or individual. Instead, reference is made to the laws, rules, and regulations. Therefore, the issues are not who said why in this process, but the answer is because the law (rules, regulations, policies, and guidelines) say so (Van Leeuwen 2017: 553). Moreover, according to Van Leeuwen, the impersonal authority can also be the subject of "verbal process clauses" like personal authority (2007: 100). However, the difference between the two lies in that in impersonal authority there is a presence of nouns like “policy”, regulation, and rule (Van Leeuwen 2007: 100).

The authority of tradition

The authority of tradition is a common practice in news media (van Dijk 2008: 44). Though it has been declining, it is normally evoked whenever there is an immediate need to legitimise a certain course of action. According to several legitimacy scholars in authority of tradition; the implied or overt answer to the question "why" simply because it is "our" tradition, custom or practice (Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). In other words, the legitimating phrase, in this case, is that "this is what we have always done" (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). Therefore, by using such phrases that evoke tradition as repeated practice, it is assumed that tradition carries enough weight to go be questioned and challenged. According to Van Leeuwen, the common phrase in this legitimation process is "it was the practise or custom" (2007: 94)

Authority of conformity

Authority of conformity has a lot to do with the individual relation to the behaviour exhibited by others in their immediate community (Bandura 1999; Chamorro-Premuzic 2016; Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 2017; Van Leeuwen 2007; van Dijk 2008). What this means is that in authority of conformity the answer to the "why" question is simply because everyone is doing it and thus, "I should also do the same". Van Leeuwen said, "the process of the authority of conformity is not about what we used to do but because that is what everyone is doing" (2007: 99). In this case, the message conveyed by the communicator is that "if everyone is doing it, so should you". To that assertion, there is no further argument given by the communicator to justify why people should do a certain course of action (Fairclough 2003 cited in Nokkala and Saarinen 2018). On the other side, conformity legitimation may also adopt the method of an explicit. For Van Leeuwen, the conformity legitimation can be seen through high-frequency modality such as statements that begin with: "Majority of people....", "Many people" (2007: 97).

Moral evaluation

Moral evaluation legitimation is different from the authority legitimation because it is predicated on moral values (Fairclough and Wodak 2005; Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). According to Fairclough and Wodak, moral evaluation is not imposed by the authority without any reasonable and sensible justification (2005: 76). To add, in moral evaluation, common words are "good and bad". These words that seek to moralise or demoralise certain courses of action are understood to "travel between moral, aesthetic and hedonistic" realms and work in conjunction with authority legitimation (Van Leeuwen 2007: 97). To illustrate the previous assertion, Van Leeuwen argues that the moral evaluation legitimation process can be witnessed when "President Bush legitimises aggressive policies by pronouncing his enemies as the "axis of evil" (2007: 97). However, in many instances, as Van Leeuwen said, moral evaluation is associated with definite discourses that are of moral value. But these discourses are not easily made explicit and debatable (Fairclough and Wodak 2005; Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Concerning the above, scholars like van Dijk stressed that the moral value discourses are hinted at, usually by ways of adjectives such as "healthy, normal, and natural" (2008: 34). To add, Fairclough argued that the moral adjectives play a role as a catalyst that triggers a moral concept even when they are disconnected from the structure of interpretation from which they derive (2003: 33). What they do is that they "transfigure moral discourse into the form of generalized motives which are now widely used to ensure mass loyalty" (Habermas 1976:36 cited in Van Leeuwen 2007).

Evidence from various legitimation studies has established that moral evaluation can be evident in three spheres (Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk, 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). These are "evaluation, abstraction, and analogies". For Van Leeuwen, evaluation adjectives claim a fundamental place in moral evaluation legitimation. Nevertheless, as noted by Leech many adjectives are at once "designative and attributive" (1966: 45). What this means is that they communicate the concrete qualities of actions or objects and commend them in terms of some domain values. In other words, "praise is mingled with practicality". As a result, the mixing of praise with practicality plays a crucial role in that moral evaluation is concealed from being questioned and opposing arguments. According to Van Leeuwen, most commonly used adjectives in moral evaluation legitimation are "normal, natural". He argued that

these adjectives modify either a nominal group which has a normalised reference to a practice (or one or more of its constituent actions or reactions) as its head (as in natural and healthy response), or an attribute in a relational clause which has the practice (or a constituent action or reaction) as its subject (as in being upset is natural): It is perfectly normal to be anxious. Showing signs of stress about starting school is natural and healthy (Van Leeuwen 2007: 99)

Furthermore, abstraction is an alternative technique of expressing moral evaluation. This method of legitimisation involves the process of referring to practices in abstract ways that normalise them by distilling from them a quality that links them to the discourse of moral values. For instance, as Van Leeuwen posits, abstraction can be seen in cases where " instead of saying the child goes to school for the first time, we might say the child takes up independence"(Van Leeuwen 2007: 99). However, what this phrase does is that the practice of going to school is legitimised in terms of a discourse of "independence".

More so, another form of moral evaluation legitimisation is the conscious use of analogies by the communicator. Van Leeuwen stressed that analogy or comparison is one of the most effective ways of expressing moral evaluation (2007: 99). This is because comparison in any given discourse carries with it de-legitimation or legitimisation functions. Scholars argued that the answer to the question "Why must I do this"? has nothing to do with good or bad (Fairclough and Wodak 2005; Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Instead, one is expected to carry out a course of action simply because that action or activity is like another activity that has produced positive outcomes or values. Illich argued that in some instances the comparison is unspoken (Illich 1971 cited Van Leeuwen 2007: 98). What this means is that an action that originates from a certain social custom or way of doing things is defined by a term which, accurately, denotes a practice "belonging to another social practice, and the positive or negative values which, in the given socio-cultural context, are attached to that other activity, are then transferred to the original activity"(Illich 1971: 20). For instance, in his study on schooling, Illich is seen importing terms from the military, the prison to refer to the actions of the teachers, and speaks of drilling pupils, and incarcerating pupils (1971: 20).

Rationalisation

In modern discourse, rationalisation occupies a very critical place. Generally, rationalisation refers to the activity or process of trying to justify or explain a certain behaviour or an attitude using logical reasons. This can be done even where it is not appropriate (Oxford Dictionary 2015: 123). For Tolbert and Zucker rationalisation can be defined as “giving purpose to institutionalised actions” (199: 172). What this means is that the purpose of why a specific course of action is taken is explained. According to Van Leeuwen in the process of rationalisation, commonly two types of rationality are utilised (2007: 99). These are instrumental rationality legitimisation and theoretical rationality legitimisation practices. Thus, in the following section, a detailed discussion of these two types of rationalisation will be unpacked (Galvin and Guevara 2016, Idrus and Nor 2016 and van Leeuwen 2007)

Theoretical rationalisation

In theoretical rationalisation, legitimacy is predicated on whether actions or purpose is founded on truth or on the explanation of the way things are. According to Van Leeuwen "in the case of theoretical rationalisation, legitimacy is grounded, not in whether the action is morally justified or not, nor in whether it is purposeful or effective, but in whether it is founded on some kind of truth" (2007: 102). What this means is that theoretical rationalisation legitimisation is closely linked to the class of naturalisation. However, theoretical legitimisation broadens the scope of inquiry into the setup of things than naturalisation which offers a covert implicit portrayal of the way things are. As Van Leeuwen said, "where naturalisation only states that some practices or action is natural, theoretical legitimisation offers an unambiguous representation of the "way things are". Therefore, for Van Leeuwen theoretical legitimisation must take three levels or types. What he meant by this is that firstly, the definition of any activity must be in the terms of another, moralised activity. Simply put, this effectively means that for any given definition to be accepted as a legitimate definition, both activities must be objective and generalised, further, the connection between them should be constitutive (attributive) or significative (conveys signals and symbols) (Van Leeuwen 2007: 99).

Mythopoesis

The fourth type of legitimation is called mythopoesis. Storytelling is at the centre of this type of legitimation process. For example, in a story that involves morals, the protagonist is rewarded for engaging in activity that is accepted as socially legitimate. They can also be presented as heroes who were able to restore the legitimate social order. According to Van Leeuwen, the process of mythopoesis can be seen in the process in which schooling is legitimated (2007: 98). He argued that schooling is legitimated as an evolutionary, and a civilizing process. According to Wright (1975) cited in Taylor (2000: 508), stories play a vital role as tools of legitimation. He argued that “stories are symbolic in that they use symbolic action, specific actions that can nevertheless represent more than one domain of institutionalised social practice, and so provide a mythical model of social action” (Wright 1975 cited in Taylor 2000: 508).

The previous section unpacked the discourses of legitimation and de-legitimation. In this section scholarly work that defined the legitimation and de-legitimation was discussed in detail. Moreover, various elements that form the backbone of the discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation were presented and explained. Firstly, the concept of authorisation and its various sub-elements was detailed. Secondly, the aspect of moral evaluation was also unpacked in detail. Thirdly, the elements of rationalisation and its sub-elements were also explained. Lastly, the element of mythopoesis was defined and explained using evidence from various scholars. This section is important to this study because it allows the researcher to define the key terms that form the basis for analysis in later sections of the thesis. The researcher sought to analyse how the media frames were used to legitimise or de-legitimise the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Moreover, this section also allowed the researcher to expose the gap in the literature that force on legitimation and de-legitimation.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into eleven interrelated chapters. The sequences of these chapters are highlighted below as follows:

Chapter one is composed of the background and introduction of the study. It introduces the research and outlines the research question, objectives and significance of the study. This chapter introduces the key components that were later discussed in the thesis. For instance, the chapter highlights the methodologies and theoretical and conceptual framework upon which this study is based.

Chapter two introduces the case study. The case study that was chosen in this study is the 54th ANC national elective conference. In this chapter, the choice for this case study was justified and explained in detail. Its relevance to the study was also established.

Chapter three presents the background and brief ownership set up of *News24* and *IOL*. Not much literature has been written concerning the ownership structure of the two press. However, the researcher relied on the limited available literature. Focus on the ownership structure of the two press is imperative for the critical discourse analysis approach adopted to analyse data in this study.

Chapter four focuses on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. It presents the biographies of the two leaders. The chapter also draws on previous literature and themes that are commonly used by scholars to refer to the leadership and political qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.

Chapter five reviews the literature that is relevant to this study. In this chapter, the literature was presented thematically and in the order of research questions. These themes include media legitimization strategies, media framing of political leaders, socio-economic and political factors that affect the media framing and media framing of female political leaders.

Chapter six is composed of the theoretical and conceptual framework. It places the study in a theoretical context. The theory of framing and Michel Foucault's concept of discourse power/knowledge was discussed. The difference debate about agenda setting and framing theory was also discussed.

Chapter seven outlines the research methodology employed by the researcher. The chapter explains the research paradigm, data collection and sampling procedure, coding and data presentation and analysis procedures. The ethical considerations were also explained.

Chapter eight focuses on the presentation analysis and discussion of the two main frames that emerged from the data. The first frame that was discussed in this chapter is the Rand and Market Frame. Following the discussion of this frame, the chapter also presents, analyse and discuss data on the Economic recovery & Growth frame. These frames were presented, analysed and discussed in relation to the framing theory as well as previous literature.

Chapter nine presents, analyse and discuss the Election victory frame in detail. Data were presented and analysed in response to the key research questions. The analysis was done using critical discourse analysis.

Chapter ten of the thesis presents, analyse and discusses the findings from the broad frames that emerged from the data. Data on Jacob Zuma & State Capture, Factionalism & Unity, and Corruption frame were presented, analysed and discussed in relation to the framing theory, critical discourse analysis and previous literature.

Chapter eleven concludes the whole study by providing a synopsis of how *News24* and *IOL* framed the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and how they tried to legitimise or delegitimise either of the two political leaders. In this chapter, the key research findings are explained and discussed according to the key research questions.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the study. The chapter focused on the background and introduction of the study. It further outlined the research question, objectives and significance of the study. The chapter also introduced the key components that were later discussed in the thesis. For instance, it highlights the research methodology that the researcher employed and theoretical and conceptual framework upon which this study is based. Furthermore, the chapter also defined the key terms. These are legitimisation and de-legitimation. In this case, different literature that defined the two

terms were discussed. It was highlighted that the discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation is complex and functions in various ways.

Chapter 2: Background to the 54th national conference of the ANC

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the 54th ANC national elective conference. Firstly, it presents the background of the conference. The constitutional provisions that underpin the conference are also discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the researcher also outlines the reasons why the conference was so important to the ANC and the South African population. In this case, two arguments were reviewed. The first argument is that the conference was a determinant of the political future of ANC. The second argument is that the conference was hope for economic revival in South Africa. Furthermore, the chapter also outlines the significance of the 54th National Conference to this study. Presenting the background of the 54th conference is important because it provides the context within which the press was operating during the period of the conference.

The 54th national conference

The 54th National Conference of the ANC was held between 16 and 20 December 2017. It took place in the Nasrec Expo Centre, Johannesburg. This was a conference to elect the members of the National Executive Committee and other major ANC party officials (Mathekga 2018, Du Plessis and Butler 2017). The conference was convened under the theme of “Remember Tambo: Towards Unity, Renewal and Radical Socio-economic Transformation”. Mathekga argues that this 54th national conference of the ANC was one of the historical conferences in the history of the party (2018: 21). He said that “the battle at Nasrec was the most fiercely and openly contested elective conference yet held in the history of the ANC” (Mathekga 2018: 21). This is so because the conference revealed the long-concealed division and factional fights that were at the soul of the party. Additionally, the conference was said to be epic because of the battle to become president that was being pushed by two dominant factional groups in the ANC, the Jacob Zuma faction and the Cyril Ramaphosa faction. In the period leading up to the conference, it was claimed that ‘vote-buying’ became the order of the day (Du Plessis 2017: 139). This points to the intensity and

seriousness of the conference. As if that was not enough, the conference was also characterised by unprecedented levels of political violence and intimidation. For instance, Mathekga notes that “the process of nominating candidates for various leadership positions was marred by deliberate disruptions and in the run-up to the conference court interdicts were issued and physical intimidation was resorted to, including public display of violence” (2018: 22). This situation was exacerbated by the increasing policy disagreements that were unfolding in the ANC in the period leading to the conference. A case in point was the increasing level of intolerance that became so evident among ANC members as they continuously engaged in public tiffs on the direction the party should take in policy formulation (Du Plessis 2017: 140).

Events leading up to the conference

The president of South Africa during the period leading up to the conference was Jacob Zuma. In 2014 he was re-elected for a five-year term. At the time of the conference, Jacob Zuma was ineligible to contest for the position of president because he had already served two terms as president of South Africa (Mathekga 2018: 21). Jacob Zuma's presidency was marred by much political and economic turmoil. This led to continuous cabinet reshuffles; allegations made against him; the country's subsequent downgrading by international financial monitoring agencies and unending protest, much of it led by people who demanded the president's resignation (Pauw 2017: 67). Jacob Zuma has been accused of ‘state capture’ by allowing the Gupta family access to the Presidency as well as access to the cabinet and state resources. However, Jacob Zuma has repeatedly denied the allegations (Butler 2017: 45).

In March 2017 Cyril Ramaphosa, who was the deputy president, launched his campaign in preparation for the December elective congress. Opposing him, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who is Jacob Zuma's former-wife appeared at several ANC Women's League events and announced her candidacy in the upcoming elective conference (Du Plessis 2017: 139). In August 2017, it was announced that Dlamini-Zuma, who was the African Union Commissioner at that time, was returning to the country to pursue her presidential campaign.

There were political dynamics that unfolded in the period leading to the conference. Scholars argued that the battle for the leadership of the ANC exposed the factional⁴ division that is embedded in the ANC (Mathekga 2018, Du Plessis 2018, Hartley 2018 and Butler 2017). To illustrate this point, various writers argue that Cyril Ramaphosa was aligned to the anti-Jacob Zuma faction in the ANC, whereas Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was endorsed by the pro-Jacob Zuma faction within the party. Consequent to that, the ANC Women's League unapologetically endorsed Dlamini-Zuma while Ramaphosa was endorsed by the Trade Union movement's COSATU (Du Plessis 2017: 142), which he had for long been associated.

The conference was going to take place against a background of upheavals that were shaking the foundations of the ANC, the national economy and the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The conference followed a few months after an explosive policy conference that took place on 17 June 2017 (Mathekga 2018 and Du Plessis 2017). This policy conference helped expose the factional battles that were in the party. From this conference, it was clear that the ANC was divided into two dominant factions represented by the two chief contenders. Mathekga stressed that "the ANC went into Nasrec consisting of two main factions, replicated perfectly in the broader society outside the party" (2018: 22). The most heated debates that pitted the two factions against each other centred around the direction the party was going to take. On one hand, the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma faction emphasised radical economic transformation, while on the other hand the Cyril Ramaphosa faction felt that the Jacob Zuma-led ANC "has sold to the nation and there was a need for the ANC to engage rigorously on policy so as to enable it to turn the country around" (Mathekga 2018: 21), while the Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma faction was premised on the gospel of the self-determination of the black majority. Put differently, this latter faction preached that "leave us alone to do as we please with our African resources" (Mathekga 2018: 79).

Moreover, in the period leading to the conference, on the economic front, it was clear that the economic and currency markets had little confidence in the leadership of Jacob Zuma. For instance, the rand currency continued to weaken, and the prices of consumer commodities continued to

⁴ There were various causes of the factional battles that had characterised the ANC. According to Mathekga, ethnic differences was one of the main factors. There party was divided between the KwaZulu-Natal cabal against the Gauteng cabal. These were the two leading factions. On the other hand, the ANC factionalism was also defined along lines of economic and party policies. There was a group of leaders who believed in land expropriation without compensation (radical transformists) and those who believed that land expropriation was not possible and should not be done (white monopoly capital).

increase. Another heavy blow on the presidency of Jacob Zuma was the Moody's⁵ credit ratings downgrading of South Africa's international financial status (Pauw 2017 and Butler 2017). Additionally, in the period leading up to the conference, it was in the public domain that Jacob Zuma 'has sold the country' to the Gupta⁶ family. This was done in the manner of awarding government contracts to the Gupta family as well as allegations of their influence in making appointments. According to Mathekga, "Jacob Zuma has sold the nation to the controversial Gupta family, in the process collecting for himself, his family and cronies some petty cash" (2018: 22).

What do we know about the national elective conference?

Our knowledge of the organisation of the ANC National Elective Conference is limited to what is stated in the constitution of the ANC (Butler 2007: 178). According to the ANC constitution, the National Executive Committee is bound to convene the national conference every five years (African National Congress Constitution 2007). This provision is well explained in Rule 10.1-10.5 of the ANC constitution as amended and adopted by the 53 National Conference. Rule Number 10 reads as follows:

10.1 The National Conference is the supreme ruling and controlling body of the ANC. It shall be composed of:

- a) At least 90% of the [voting] delegates at Conference shall be from branches, elected at properly constituted branch general meetings. The number of delegates per branch shall

⁵ Moody's Investors Service, often referred to as Moody's, is the bond credit rating business of Moody's Corporation, representing the company's traditional line of business and its historical name. Moody's Investors Service provides international financial research on bonds issued by commercial and government entities. Moody's, along with Standard & Poor's and Fitch Group, is considered one of the Big Three credit rating agencies.

The company ranks the creditworthiness of borrowers using a standardised rating scale which measures expected investor loss in the event of default. Moody's Investors Service rates debt securities in several bond market segments. These include government, municipal and corporate bonds; managed investments such as money market funds and fixed-income funds; financial institutions including banks and non-bank finance companies; and asset classes in structured finance. In Moody's Investors Service's ratings system, securities are assigned a rating from Aaa to C, with Aaa being the highest quality and C the lowest quality.

⁶ The media was fervent in publishing the 'Guptaleaks', a series of revelatory emails detailing how the Gupta family had suborned government ministers, civil servants and even the president himself so as to ensure that lucrative governments contracts and tenders were won by or benefited a network of companies connected to the Guptas (Mathekga 2018: 23).

be in proportion to its paid-up membership, provided that each branch in good standing shall be entitled to at least one delegate.

- b) The number of delegates to be [elected] allocated to [National Conference by] each province to attend National Conference shall be fixed by the NEC in proportion to the paid-up membership of each province.
- c) All members of the National Executive Committee shall attend ex-officio as full participants in and delegates at the Conference.
- d) The remainder of the [10% of voting] delegates at the Conference shall be allocated by the NEC from among the Provincial Executive Committees, the ANC Veterans League, the ANC Youth League, and the ANC Women's League.

10.1.2 Non-Voting Delegates: The NEC may invite individuals, who have made a special contribution to the struggle or who have special skills or experience, to attend the Conference.

10.2 The NEC will appoint a conference preparatory committee that will circulate conference information in advance, determine the precise procedure for selection of delegates and indicate how the membership can then ensure their concerns are on the agenda.

10.3 The Conference shall determine its procedures following democratic principles. 10.3 Voting on key questions shall be by secret ballot if at least one-third of the delegates at the National Conference demand it.

10.4 The National Conference will be convened at least every five years.

Why is the national elective conference significant?

The significance of the ANC national elective conference is considerable. Hartley argued that the choice to focus on the 54th conference was informed by the level of anticipation that the people of South Africa and the world had over the outcome of the conference (2018: 21). Simply put, the

conference had two significant implications on the future of South Africa – the political and economic implications. Events of such magnitude always attract media attention both locally and abroad. Watkins argued that the political events and culture obtaining at a given time determines what the media focus on (2009: 45). Thus, in the section below, the two (political and economic) implications will be unpacked.

On the political front, the conference was viewed by most South Africans as the most decisive stage for the ANC and the country since 1994 (Du Plessis 2017: 38). Mathekga said, “the conference will see the emergence of policy directives that will provide an insight into how the ANC intends to govern the country in the future” (2018: 21). Simply put, the National Elective Conference as provided for by the ANC constitution was a place where policy and policy matters will be formulated (Butler 2019: 123). The conference has some other functions that are worthy of note. For example, the 54th National Conference Report and Resolution indicated that among other things, the 54th National Conference of the ANC reaffirmed the commitment and policies of the ruling party. Mathekga argues that the National Elective Conference is a place where policy matters are decided and voted and adopted together with the resolutions that will guide the party (2018: 22). For example, in the same conference, it was resolved that as a matter of policy, the ANC shall pursue expropriation of land without compensation. And this must be done without putting in jeopardy the agricultural sector and endangering food security in South Africa (Du Plessis 2018: 43). Butler argued that the conference was so important to South Africa because much of what will happen in 2018 and beyond depend on the resolutions and leadership coming out of the 54th National Conference (2017: 45). This scholar argues, “any predictions about the year ahead come to some strong caveats (Butler 2017: 45). What this means is that the outcomes of the conference were decisive for the future of South Africa.

On the economic front, the conference was perceived as the last hope that the South African economy must regain after the so-called “decade of waste” (Butler 2019, Mathekga 2018 and Du Plessis 2017). The term “a decade of waste” refers to the rule of Jacob Zuma that was characterised by high levels of corruption. Jacob Zuma's reign was also associated with high levels of inflation as was seen by the weakening of the rand against the United States dollar (Mathekga 2018, Butler 2017 and Du Plessis 2017). The country was heading for a recession with the economy experiencing stagnant growth. Marais and Groenwald observed that “investors, traders and fund

managers are keeping close eyes on the ANC elective conference” (2017: 1). This observation helps to illustrate the importance of the ANC National Elective Conference to the various stakeholders in South Africa. For Marias and Groenwald, the conference was of great significance because the outcome of the conference was going to have a bearing on the financial markets that were already in bad shape (2017: 1). Thus, for them, they expected a positive outcome. Marais and Groenwald argued that “the key risk is an outcome that is not favoured by the markets, which could have a negative impact on investor confidence” (2017: 1). However, for them, a win by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as president and a candidate from the Jacob Zuma camp was not positive. While a win by Cyril Ramaphosa a vice-president who was not compromised would presumably reboot the confidence.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the background of the 54th ANC national conference. To that end, the events leading up to the conference were presented. The conference was seen to be of significant impact on the future of South Africa and ANC. For instance, it was indicated in this chapter that the conference had both political and economic implications on the future of South Africa. On one hand, the conference was perceived as the last hope that the South African economy must regain after the so-called “decade of waste”. On the other hand, the conference was viewed by most South Africans as the most decisive stage for the ANC and the country since 1994. Moreover, it was also indicated in this chapter that our knowledge of the organisation of the ANC National Elective Conference is limited to what is stated in the constitution of the ANC. To that end, rule number 10 of the ANC constitution was outlined.

Chapter 3: Background to *News24* and *IOL*

Introduction

This chapter presents the background and brief ownership set up of *News24* and *IOL*. There is very limited literature available in relation to the ownership structure of the two press. The researcher had to rely on this limited literature to engage crucial discussions on the ownership structure of the two press. Understanding how *News24* and *IOL* are structured was imperative for the critical discourse analysis approach adopted to analyse the data in this study. It allowed the researcher to contextualise the journalists discourse within the broader continuum of news media ownership and its influence on journalist's content. The chapter pays specific attention on understanding the background of the two press. Moreover, detail on the control structure of the press was also given considerable attention. The chapter unpacks the details pertaining to subsidiary relationships and ownership of *News24* and *IOL*.

Background of *News24*

News24 that is wholly owned by the *Media24*. *Media24* is arguably the largest print media company in South Africa (Chuma, Bosch and Wasserman 2017: 94). This company is a subsidiary of Naspers, a corporation that was transformed from an apartheid-sympathetic newspaper conglomerate. Information provided by the *Media24* (2018) reveals that the company is owned by Naspers, which owns MIH Group, the owner of MultiChoice. The corporation is a global company that has investments across the world, including in Chinese companies like Tencent. Rumney stressed that *Media24* owns a lot of daily and weekly newspaper in South Africa. It owns the *Daily Sun*, which has over the years dominated the South African newspaper market immensely (2015: 66). Moreover, the company's "major dailies and weeklies are *The Witness*, *City Press*, *Beeld*, *Die Burger*, *Volksblad*, *Rapport*, *Sondag*, *Son* (daily and weekly), *Daily Sun*, *Sunday Sun* and *Soccer Laduma*" (Rumney 2015 and *Media24* 2018). This larger control of most South Africa's largest newspapers has ensured that the *Media24* enjoys a near monopoly of the media industry in South Africa. Tomaselli observed that apart from the daily newspapers that the newspaper controls, the

company also publishes a variety of community newspapers (2017: 129). It also publishes more than 60 titles - some jointly with other companies or under licensing agreements with international titles - selling more than 5.9 million magazines a month that are read by more than 8.7million people (Media Landscape 2018). Therefore, the fact that *News24*, occupies a huge place in the news and media industry informed the choice of the researcher to select it as an object of study.

Ownership of Naspers

According Slabbert Naspers' controlling structure is enormously multifaceted (2017: 1). To illustrate, *Media24* is the principal acquiring firm and it is controlled by Naspers. Naspers is controlled by means of "high-voting A-shares held by Nasbel, Keeromstraat 30 Belleggings (Keeromstraat) and Wheatfields Investments (Wheatfields). Moreover, Nasbel and Keeromstraat hold 53%" of the rights to vote and do so in consultation with other shareholders based on a voting pool agreement (Slabbert 2017: 1). Bloomberg revealed that Wheatfields has 12.63% of the voting rights in Naspers and is not part of the control structure. Sanlam is a 50% shareholder in Wheatfields. Wheatfields holds minority stakes in Nasbel and Keeromstraat, but that does not afford it with control. Nasbel is 49% controlled by Heemstede, a wholly owned subsidiary of Naspers (Bloomberg 2019: 1). The remaining shares in Nasbel, are extensively held by 2 611 shareholders. Keeromstraat has 2 843 shareholders, none of them being controlling shareholders (Slabbert 2017: 1).

The allocation of votes at Naspers shareholders meetings is as follows:

87.1. N shares	48.31%
87.2. Other A shareholders	1.35%
87.3. Sub-total	49.66%.
87.4. Keerom	31.3%
87.5. Wheatfields	19.04%
87.6. Total	100.00%

More so, *Media24* has the largest combined circulation in South Africa (Rumney 2015: 45). Its combined daily circulation is over 500 000. To add, evidence from the *Media24* reports indicate that the company commands a total readership of 7.7 million, while *Media24*'s additional dailies have a circulation is over 800 000 (*Media24* 2018: 84). In addition, according to the *Media24* statistics, the company's weekly urban newspapers have a circulation of more than 1.4 million weekly (2018: 84). Its community newspaper division accounts for 1.3 million weekly (Rumney 2015: 45). Apart from its dominance in the print space of South Africa, *Media24* has been South Africa's leading online news media channel. Tomaselli stressed that *Media24* plays a dominant role in providing the South African public with news and information (2017: 139). Its internet presence via 24.com was a setup of M-Web Studios and *Media24* Digital merger in 2006. The 24.com is widely known for its array of online services that it provides such as "careers, shopping, classifieds, property, health, free mail, instant messaging, blogs and photo albums" (*Media24* 2018: 76). In 2017, *News24* was named the best and most useful South Africa's news website.

News24 has multiple sections that contain links to different information that users may be searching for. The main sections on the online site of *News24* are South Africa, Travel, Technology, Green and Opinion. On its site, *News24* also publishes Special Reports (SA Politics, Zimbabwe, AIDS Focus and so on). These sections on *News24* platform gives the readers some in-depth coverage of the most events in the news. Moreover, their business news is accessed through *Fin24.com* and on the sport through *Sports24.co.za*. while Entertainment is reported on *Channels24.co.za*.

***News24* structures**

News24.com is South Africa's leading online news website. It is published in the English language. It was launched in 1998 after its creation by Naspers. Rumney stressed that *News24* is South Africa's largest digital publisher (2015: 35). Its area of focus is international, local news, business, politics, technology, sports, and entertainment.

Background of Independent Online News and Media

Independent Online South Africa is a news and information website that is based in South Africa. It is owned by Sekunjalo Investments from 2012 but it was previously owned by Independent News Media plc (INM) (Rumney 2015: 70). INM is a media organisation that is based in Ireland in the city of Dublin (Independent News & Media 2017: 3). The company was first established as Independent Newspapers Limited in 1904. It has a global presence in multiple countries where its operations include news media and entertainment. In Ireland, the company enjoys ownership of four national daily newspapers and three Sunday newspapers (Dooley 2018: 1). This also includes the highest circulation daily and Sunday papers in Ireland and 13 regional newspapers.

The Independent News and Media group of companies were dominated by Sir Anthony (Tony) O'Reilly and his family between 1973 and 2012 (Independent News & Media 2017: 3). According to the Independent News and Media, O'Reilly enjoyed control of Independent News and Media after he first acquired one hundred percent of the "A" shares of the company for the Murphy and Chance families (2017: 3). According to Dooley, the company expanded overseas after it was floated on the Irish Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange (Dooley 2018: 1). It was in 1999 that the company was renamed to Independent News and Media plc.

Independent News and Media (South Africa)

According to Brand South Africa, “until 2013 the Independent News and Media was the second highest newspaper publisher in the whole country” (2013: 1). The company owns multiple daily and weekly companies. According to Rumney in South Africa only, the company owns a total of fourteen newspapers (2015: 96). The list of these newspapers includes “*The Star* and *Pretoria News* in Gauteng, the *Daily Voice*, *Cape Times*, *Cape Argus* and *Weekend Argus* in Cape Town, *The Mercury*, *Post*, *Isolezwe*, *Daily News*, *Sunday Tribune* and *Independent on Saturday* in Durban, the *Diamond Fields Advertiser* in Kimberley” (Independent News & Media plc 2018: 89). Moreover, the company also control the national *Sunday Independent* and a total of 13 community newspapers in Cape Town. This huge presence in the news media and entertainment industry has placed the company on a strong financial footing resulting in it controlling the advertising and media industry as a monopoly. Records revealed by the Stats South Africa revealed

that group “accounts for 48% of the total advertising spend in newspapers, 22% of all newspapers sold in the country, and 63% of the English language market” (Roper, Newman, and Schulz 2019: 10).

In 2012 initial steps to sell the company's South African operation were announced. According to Rumney INM initially proposed to sell its South African operation for Euro 250 million. But the bids came in at around Euro 150 million (2015: 69). The company was then purchased by Iqbal Surve's Sekunjalo Investments consortium. According to the INM, Sekunjalo controls a 55% stake while the remaining stake is controlled by two government entities. The first entity is the investment arm of the South African government (Public Investment Corporation; 25%) while the second one is an investment arm of the Chinese government (China International Television Corporation and China African Development Fund; 20%) (Thamm 2015: 1). However, this arrangement has implications on the nature of this company. There has always been fears and reservations of the involvement of government in the media business in South Africa. Such that any case where there is government involvement in the ownership structure is followed by scepticism. This can be illustrated by the eminent journalist and media scholar Athon Harber's (as cited by Thamm 2015) observation, “the ANC is working with their Chinese allies –ruling party to ruling party, in a way the Chinese government so often works – to increase their influence in our local media and counter what they view as a hostile media sector” (Thamm 2015: 1).

The online site serves the online version of several South African newspapers, including “*The Star, Pretoria News, The Daily Voice, Cape Times, Cape Argus Weekend Argus, The Mercury, Post, Diamond Fields Advertiser, Isolezwe, Daily Tribune, Sunday Tribune, The Independent on Saturday and Sunday Independent*” (Independent News & Media 2018: 44). Therefore, it is *IOL*'s dominant presence in the South African media and news industry that made it a perfect choice as an institution for investigation in this present study

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the background and brief ownership set up of *News24* and *IOL*. The chapter paid specific attention on understanding the background of the two press. Moreover, detail on the control structure of the press was also given considerable attention. The relationship between *Media24*, *News24* and *Naspers* was unpacked. Also, the relationship between *IOL* and Independent

News and Media was also discussed. The chapter also unpacked the complex nature of control that the *Media24* and Independent News and Media has on different newspapers in South Africa.

Chapter 4: Biography and leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa

Introduction

This chapter focuses on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. It discusses in detail the biographies of the two leaders. It draws on previous literature and themes that are commonly used to refer to the leadership and political qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Profiling the background and lives of these leaders was essential in understanding how the two online press chose to frame their candidature for the 54th ANC national election campaign. Therefore, the chapter traces the history of these two leaders from birth to offer a detailed discussion of how this helped to guide how their legitimization and delegitimation of the two leadership qualities.

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: a short biography

Nkosazana Clarice Dhlamini-Zuma was born on 29 February 1949. She is sometimes referred to in political circles as NDZ. She completed her high school at the Amanzimtoti Training College in 1967. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma went on to acquire a bachelor's degree in Zoology at the University of Zululand. After that, she pursued a degree in medical studies at the University of Natal. It was at this university that she got involved as an active underground member of South African Student Organisation wherein 1976 she was later elected as its deputy president. Due to the threat from the apartheid regime, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma went into exile in the same year. She completed her studies in 1978 at the University of Bristol in the United Kingdom. While she was in exile in Britain, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma did not disconnect her ties with ANC structures back in South Africa. Du Plessis argued that "in exile in the UK, she became chair of the ANC's youth section and travelled throughout Britain and Europe gathering support for the ANC's cause" (2017: 13). Her efforts, in this case, were driven by the agenda to influence the British government to break their contact with the South African government. Moreover, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also involved in the Black Consciousness movement in Britain.

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma returned to Southern Africa in 1980. Upon her return, she worked as a Doctor at Mbabane hospital in Swaziland. Du Plessis stressed that “by default she became the doctor of choice for the ANC leaders and continued undercover activities” (2017: 17). It was in Mbabane that she married Jacob Zuma with whom she has four children. Du Plessis stressed that the marriage was a clandestine arrangement. After her return to South Africa in 1994, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma became the doctor of choice for Nelson Mandela. She was later appointed minister of health by Nelson Mandela. Du Plessis argued that “when the ANC came to power after the 1994 democratic elections, he had no hesitation in appointing her to the health portfolio in his cabinet” (2017: 27). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma served in the Ministry of Health from 1994 to 1999. After Thabo Mbeki assumed power in 1999, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was moved from the health portfolio to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Du Plessis “in June 1999, Thabo Mbeki shifted Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from the health portfolio to foreign affairs. For many, this was a curious move” (2017:24). This was so because Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had no background of foreign diplomacy. However, to some scholars, the transfer of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to foreign affairs was Thabo Mbeki’s way to prepare her for the presidency of the ANC in the years to come (Mathekga 2018 and Cilliers and Okeke 2012). After the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma also served alongside with Jacob Zuma. When Jacob Zuma became president, she served as the Minister of Home Affairs. In 2012, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was elected chair of the Africa Union. She served at the AU offices until 2017 when she returned to South Africa to launch her campaign for the ANC presidency (Mathekga 2018: 56).

A technocrat and reformist

Several scholars describe Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a technocrat and an administrator (Bauer 2012; Cilliers and Okeke 2012; Veins 2013). According to Bauer, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is a technocrat at heart (2012: 1). To illustrate that assertion, Bauer emphasised that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma took over the Department of Home Affairs and ushered in wholesale changes the moment she assumed office (2012: 1). In addition, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also credited for bringing stability to the Department of Home Affairs that had a reputation for having within it rampant corruption and unprecedented levels of incompetence (Du Plessis 2017: 36). Bauer argued

that “before she assumed office, the department was known for rampant corruption and incompetence it was a place where the government officials took bribes and slept on the job” (2012: 1). Cilliers and Okeke argued that “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma transformed the Department of Home Affairs by means of implementing effective internal control measures in finance and supply-chain management” (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1).

In relation to the assertion made by Cilliers and Okeke (2012: 1), Bauer opined that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma encircled herself with fittingly capable persons and staffed frontline offices with extra staff to deliver more and better services (2012: 1). Friedman argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma assisted in putting the Department of Home Affairs on a sound footing (2019: 1). This observation is like the argument that was made by Baure (2016: 1). These scholars argued that “among the most visible changes noticed in home affairs, the process of applying for official documents was streamlined to the extent where it now takes less than two weeks to apply for and receiving an identity document or passport” (Baure 2016: 1). Similarly, Friedman also stressed that under Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s watch, the Department of Home Affairs was known for its sterling performance in providing amenities to citizens (2019: 1). During her tenure at the Department of Home Affairs, in 2010 and 2011 the department received awards for service excellence and for being an employer of choice (Bauer 2012: 1).

Cilliers and Okeke also described Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a reformist. These scholars argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is one of the few ANC cadres who moved successfully from the era of Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma (2012: 1). She managed to connect the two administrations irrespective of the animosity that existed within the ANC between the Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma administrations. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s history as a health and foreign affairs minister suggests a capable person who has a lot to offer. Further, it also means that she has much to offer in bringing both “competent management and far-sighted political leadership to the commission” (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1).

Du Plessis argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a reformist in that she transformed the administration side of the African Union (AU) (2017: 34). To this may be added that “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s experience and her wisdom are underestimated” (Mathekga 2018: 69). To illustrate this argument, Du Plessis states that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a technocrat whose vast experience was able to bring “a degree of professionalism to the AU's lumbering bureaucracy”

(2016: 55). During the tenure of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in Addis Ababa, the most fundamental administrative issues were addressed. What this means is that “at least the basics: e-mails were answered, the website was updated, press releases were issued timeously” (Du Plessis 2017: 65). Moreover, in line with the above assertion, Allison also observed that during her tenure at the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma “brought a level of respect for process and respect for professionalism” (2017: 1). To explain this assertion further, Allison comments that the professionalism and commitment of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma ushered in a new era in the African Union bringing with it dignity and recognition to the institution as staff and the commission were urged to handle issues professionally saying (Allison 2017: 1).

According to Du Plessis, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma achieved some memorable success but sullied her reputation with some embarrassing decisions and some inexplicable measures regarding the treatment of HIV/AIDS” (2017: 63). Her main role revolved around the drafting and implementing the ANC National Health Policy. The policy encompassed amalgamating the nation’s disjointed health services and but also ensuring that primary health care was the focus (Du Plessis 2017: 28). In addition, Du Plessis stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was influential in rolling out free health care for the pregnant women and children for the very first time in the history of South Africa (2017: 30). Another great contribution to the health sector was the introduction of an exchange programme with the Cuban government. In this programme, some Cuban doctors were sent to South Africa while a cohort of South African medical students studied medicine in Cuba. This move had a positive effect on the quality of health in South Africa (Du Plessis 2017: 31).

An unpopular leader

Despite her success at home and abroad, various authors describe Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as an unpopular leader in South Africa and elsewhere (Allison 2017, Cilliers and Okeke 2012 and Louw-Vaudran). According to Louw-Vaudran, Dlamini-Zuma was not the person to rebuild the African Union (2017: 1). To substantiate this argument Louw-Vaudran said, “She wasn't popular, she wasn't liked” (2017: 1). To add, Cilliers and Okeke said that Dlamini-Zuma was unpopular with her colleagues at the AU (2012). Generally, Louw-Vaudran said, “the staff, the ambassadors, the

outside partners, all felt that she was very closed and uncommunicative” (2017: 1). The above observation can be validated by a similar observation that was made by Allison (2017: 1). Allison said, “it could take up to a month for African ambassadors to the AU to receive a meeting with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, whereas her predecessor Jean Ping was much more easily accessible” (2017: 1). All this pointed to a leader who had her enemies.

Moreover, Allison stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma never looked like she wanted the African Union position (2017: 1). It can be argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma did little to boost her reputation and popularity during her tenure in Addis Ababa. Also, it can be argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma found it difficult to make a wide cross section of friends both at home and outside the country. To substantiate this argument, Allison said: “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made few friends at Addis Ababa, in the process earning a reputation for being aloof and unapproachable while surrounding herself with imported South African staffers” (2017: 1). She was not a bad leader, but she did not deliver on the claims made by the South African delegates when they were campaigning for her to assume the leadership of the African Union. Jobson (2017) cited in Allison said, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was expected to come in to reform the commission, she had that good reputation from her time in government in South Africa, but she hasn't used the position as we might have expected” (Allison 2017: 1). Further, Allison stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's failure to transform the AU has made her unpopular in South Africa and beyond (2017: 1).

Like the above assertions, some scholars contend that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was never a good candidate for the position of Commissioner at the African Union (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). Cilliers and Okeke argued that “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a candidate of choice for the African leaders at the AU summit” (2012: 1). To illustrate that argument, these authors recall that her victory did not come because of her popularity with the member states. Instead, she won the position after South Africa and SADC strongly lobbied other member states (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). This lobbying for votes in favour of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma saw South African officials travelling to various countries across the African continent (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). It has also been speculated that the South African government used its economic prowess to garner support from other African states that were not in favour of the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-

Zuma, especially the Francophone Central and West African states (Allison 2017 and Cilliers and Okeke 2012).

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also described as the most absent AU commissioner of all times (Du Plessis 2017, Allison 2017 and Cilliers and Okeke 2012). It was claimed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was more closely involved in South African politics and the dynamics unfolding at home than in her job in Addis Ababa. Allison said, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the most absent chairperson from Addis since the AU was created” (2017: 1). This assertion is like the observation that was made by Désiré Assogbavi, cited by Lebour. She argued that “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was spending a lot of her time in South Africa, even when the continent is burning” (Lebour 2017: 1). To illustrate this point, Allison revealed that “one of the major criticisms that you hear in Addis from all quarters is that she had one foot in South Africa. Even from day one, it was clear that she was probably only going to be doing one term” (2017: 1). Lebour argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's agenda was to raise her profile by becoming the AU chairperson but that this did not yield the anticipated results (2017: 1).

A ‘compromised’ leader

Du Plessis’ claims that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political career has been plagued by problems (Du Plessis 2017: 33). Months after assuming power as the health minister she was involved in the disputes around a new South Africa health policy. Butler argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's tenure in the ministry of health was plagued by a financial mismanagement scandal concerning the government-sponsored AIDS play *Sarafina II* (Butler 2005: 110). It was also marred by increasingly strained relations with the non-governmental sector and health professionals. Her support of the drug Virodene set her against the Medicines' Control Council (MCC) and the Medical Research Council (MRC). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s support of the AIDS plan was criticised as insufficiently informed by the institutional and social realities that characterised South Africa during that period. Du Plessis asserts that just like most policies that were administered during that period, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma AIDS policy “over-estimated the economic and human resource that was at government disposal that would allow them to institute such a humongous policy” (Du Plessis 2017: 45).

Evidence from various authors suggests that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political career was marred by a lot of leadership and political controversies (Butler 2005; Du Plessis 2017; Mathekga 2018; Allison 2017; Cilliers and Okeke 2012). For instance, Du Plessis argues that "political controversies have dogged Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's career, starting with Sarafina II in 1996 while she was minister of health" (2017:30). The Sarafina scandal had a hugely detrimental effect on her political career because it was regarded as one of the first ANC big corruption scandal. Du Plessis stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not far from trouble in her political career (2017:29). This scholar said that the moment Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma came back from the AU she was involved in a scandal that involved the Presidential Protect Services (PPS). The PPS is mandated to protect the president, former presidency and their spouses. The problem was the PSS was not supposed to be given to anyone who is not in the presidium. What makes matters worse is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma never bothered to explain to the public why all this was happening (Du Plessis 2017: 40).

For Du Plessis (2017: 34) and Cilliers and Okeke (2012: 1), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's appointment to Foreign Affairs shocked many because she was said to lack diplomatic skills. Du Plessis argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma "was hardly known for her amenable personality or her diplomatic skills, and there were others in the department of foreign affairs better able and probably more capable of handling policy issues" (2017: 37). Moreover, Tony Leon, the politician turned diplomat, cited in Du Plessis, remarked that the appointments of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma into the foreign affairs ministry was tantamount to "sending the bull into the china shop" (Du Plessis 2017: 38). This criticism of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was later picked up by the press that nicknamed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as "Dogzuma". This name was a name of the monster Godzilla that destroyed everything in its sphere of influence. Mathekga stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's early days in the department were characterised by her "brusque and abrasive management style" (2018: 67). Her assumption of power at the Foreign Affairs gave her the impression that she was the most powerful women in the country and arguably the entire continent. The media likened her to Madeleine Albright, the secretary of state in the United States. Albright Madeleine was known as a bad character, who was stubborn, arrogant and known for her blunt decisiveness.

Based on all these stories, authors have argued that there were slim chances of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma winning the ANC election against her rival like Cyril Ramaphosa (Adebajo 2014; Butler 2015; Davis 2015). For instance, Adebajo argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a suitable candidate for the office of the president based on previous experiences in government and in the party (2014: 1). This author contended that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not able, for whatever reason, to operationalise several of the institutional reforms she promised. Moreover, Davis states that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a good leader in that she was liable for the failure of the most administrative processes as she would micromanage the organisation (2015:1). This resulted in a slow process of decision making and the alienation of other voices of reason within the organization. According to Davis, one of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's failures was evident in her failure to reform the AU (2015:1). This scholar argued that “two years after she pledged to reform the AU, more than 95% of its peace and security budget and half of its annual \$278m budget are still funded by external donors” (2015:1).

Furthermore, Adebajo asserts that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership on the continent of Africa has not been satisfactory (2014:1). As a leader of the African body, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma failed to lead the AU in the desired direction. This scholar said, “the commission's bureaucracy remains labyrinthine, dependency on Western donors continues and relations with the United Nations have worsened” (Adebajo 2014:1). In relation to the above assertion Butler argues that “in reality Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma would be a pitiful choice for president because she was at best a controversial minister under Nelson Mandela, allowing the Department of Foreign Affairs to be marginalised by Thabo Mbeki and claiming credit for Department of Home Affairs reforms undertaken long before her arrival” (2015:1).

In line with Butler's argument that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a controversial leader, Davis poses that if Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's work experiences are interrogated, it can be postulated that the idea that she did a sterling job as a minister does not hold up to criticism (2015:1). To add, Davis argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a capable minister in her tenure as Minister of Health. To illustrate her argument, Davis said: “in the first few years of the new government (1994), the health minister neglect to consult with civil society” (2015:1). This was clear on the issues of HIV and the Sarafina II scandal of 1996. Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa argued that the Sarafina II Scandal had a negative impact on the reputation of the government of South Africa

(2016: 4). This blame was squarely laid on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her department director-general, Olive Shasana. Similarly, Du Plessis argued that “matters went from difficult to disastrous in 1996 when Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma allocated 14 million to an AIDS awareness play, *Sarafina II*.” (2017: 45). Most of the bids that were presented were way below R 600 000. But she chose to award the contract to her friend Mbongeni Ngema after ignoring tender procedures. For Du Plessis, “although Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma did not face any legal consequences, her reputation was muddied” (Du Plessis 2017: 32). Du Plessis argues that:

on the streets she became a figure of parody: the taxi drivers laugh about *Sarafina 4* and *Sarafina 5*; the cartoonist fashion her unlike frame as a Broadway chorus girl chucking dollars about the stage of her profligacy; even her fellow parliamentarians joke about *Sarafina 2* on public platforms (Du Plessis 2017: 32)

To add, Du Plessis stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma became unpopular with the media and the private sector when she was the minister of health under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (2017: 30). This was after she had a conflict with the private global pharmaceutical companies who were reportedly manipulating prices of drugs. In her response to this situation, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma reacted by blocking the accessing of government medicine through third parties. This was in line with the ANC policy that sought to provide cheap medicine to the black poor population of South Africa (2018: 30). According to Du Plessis, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma became increasingly unpopular with big groups that were subsequently alarmed by rumours that she might succeed Mbeki in 2007.” This complex matter shows how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a favourite of the private sector which would play a critical role in her defeat in her bid to become the ANC president in 2017.

Moreover, Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa argued that the *Sarafina II* scandal validates the long-held criticism that Dlamini-Zuma's leadership was replete with leadership failures (2016: 5). For these scholars, the long-held notion that Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma's dislike in the public mind was based on gender bias cannot be sustained given the grave mistakes that she has made in all her previous leadership positions. However, these scholars did not completely dismiss the presence of gender bias when it came to leadership dynamics in South Africa. For example, Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa stressed that:

it makes sense, therefore, to argue that on the one hand, the idea of basing the rejection of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership on patriarchy is conclusive, while on the other hand the view that the above-mentioned failures and more importantly the Sarafina II scandal occasion a concern about her leadership is attractive (Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa 2016: 4)

What this meant was that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's ostensible incompetence, as well as the related scandals, meant that in influential quarters she was considered as incapable to lead. Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa endorse this view and argue how such scandals demonstrated her inability, "to lead the masses, [she] has the capacity to lead them to destruction" (2016: 4). According to Du Plessis, this scandal was very detrimental to the reputation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and the ANC because it was the first sign of corruption that 'was in the DNA' of the ANC leadership (2017: 32). Du Plessis argues that "in more recent times, the scandal has been reframed as the defining corruption scandal, in that it was the first sign of corruption post 1994" (2018: 32). Put differently, this debacle set in motion a myriad of corruption activities that were to unfold in the ANC.

Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa observed that in South Africa the concept of patronage is viewed in a negative light (2016: 4). These scholars stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was caught up in a web of politics that has a long history of patronage. For Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma belonged to the KwaZulu-Natal 'syndicate' that was associated with patronage (2016: 6). According to Calland (2013) cited in Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa, the fact that people who come from KwaZulu-Natal dominate in South Africa politics does not sit well with a lot of people (2016: 5). The reservations many had concerning the people linked to KwaZulu-Natal also brought to the fore the rise of "ethnic patronage" in South Africa. Thus, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was viewed as one of the allies and players in the ethnic dominance of the KwaZulu-Natal people. In relation to the above point, Habib and Taylor state that the sceptics about a possible election of yet another Zulu person regardless of gender made sense to many (2001: 208). To illustrate, Habib and Taylor argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma originates from KwaZulu-Natal and that her possible election as South Africa's president would subsequently gratify the 'rising Zulu chauvinists' and exhibited a concern around her candidacy among other Zulus (2001: 208). Thus, for these scholars, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma could be rejected for the position of president of

South Africa based on the notion of ethnic patronage, and more significantly on the rise of the KwaZulu-Natal ‘syndicate’ rather than on gender issues (Habib and Taylor 2001: 207).

Cyril Ramaphosa: a short biography

Cyril Ramaphosa had two siblings and he was a son of a policeman. He grew up in the South Western Native Township of Soweto where he attended school at Sekano-Ntoane High School (Butler 2017: 22). Cyril Ramaphosa did his matric at Mphaphuli High School in Sibasa, Limpopo in 1971. He completed his university studies at University of the North (Turfloop) where he gained a legal B.Proc. qualification. During his days at university, Cyril Ramaphosa became involved in campus politics and joined the South African Student Organization (SASO) (Hartley 2018: 23). According to Hartley, Cyril Ramaphosa rose through the ranks where he later served as the branch chairperson of that organisation at his university in 1972 (2018: 34). At the same institution, Cyril Ramaphosa was also involved as the chairman of the Student Christian Movement. Furthermore, in his days of activism as a student leader, he was detained for 11 months under a section of the Terrorism Act (Butler 2007: 31). This was after a pro-Frelimo rally that the students staged at the university. This detention was a first in the series of those that were to come, which culminated in the Soweto uprising (Butler 2007: 32). In June 1976, after the Soweto unrest, Cyril Ramaphosa was also detained again, this time for six months at John Vorster Square under the Terrorism Act (Moodie 2008: 45). Soon after his release, he continued to write legal articles and in 1981 he completed his university degree through correspondence with the University of South Africa (Mathekga 2018: 34). It was in that year (1981) that Ramaphosa joined the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa) where he served as its legal advisor (Du Plessis 2017: 21).

The champion of strong institutions

Evidence from various literature sources shows that Cyril Ramaphosa is normally portrayed as an individual who believes in building new, strong and working institutions in South Africa (Hartley 2018; Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017 and Butler 2008). According to Butler, Cyril Ramaphosa’s

involvement in politics did not end at university (2017: 23). Instead, his wish to emancipate black people was seen in his desire to build institutions that pushed for what he believed was right (Butler 2007: 67). Forbes stressed that “Ramaphosa first came to prominence in the 1980s as founder and promoter of the National Union of Mineworkers, created to improve the rights of black African workers” (2015: 1). In 1981, after he left university, Cyril Ramaphosa was actively involved in the formation of trade National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and in December of the same year he was elected the first secretary of that organisation. Moreover, in 1985, Cyril was very instrumental in the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Hartley 2018 and Mathekga 2018). In Durban, on the day of its formation, Cyril Ramaphosa delivered a keynote speech on the launch of the COSATU.

Like the observations that were made by Butler (2017; 2007); Hartley (2018) and Lodge (2009). Lodge stressed that Cyril Ramaphosa was a champion of creating institutions in South Africa (2009: 154). He said Cyril Ramaphosa was commonly credited as having been the guiding genius behind the effort within the CUSA. He found the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), to take advantage of recent industrial relations legislation and of a more enlightened attitude within the upper echelons of the main mining employer, Anglo-America. In addition to that, Lodge argues that Cyril Ramaphosa was normally credited as the “guiding genius behind the effort within the CUSA fold of the National Union of Mineworkers” (2009: 156). To illustrate this point, Lodge argued that “Cyril took advantage of the recent industrial relations legislation and of a more enlightened attitude within the upper echelons of mining employer, Anglo American” (2009: 56).

Mathekga argues that under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa in the NUM, the organisation developed into a very strong and influential union that controlled labour issues in the mining sector (2018: 45). This scholar notes that “NUM under Cyril Ramaphosa became an indomitable force on the labour front. In the fight against apartheid economic disruptions, in the form of labour strikes, inflicted serious harm on the system” (2018: 36). Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa also played a crucial role in the formation of COSATU and became its first secretary-general. According to Mathekga “COSATU was not an ordinary union focused only on the narrow shop floor interests of workers; it built solidarity with other social movements” (2018: 43). To add, the growth and strength of COSATU was accredited to Cyril Ramaphosa leadership. Mathekga notes that there was an exponential growth of the COSATU under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa (2018: 37).

This scholar argued that “COSATU’s strength was its mass appeal: under Ramaphosa leadership, union membership grew from 6000 in 1982 to 300 000 in 1992, giving it control of nearly half of the total black workforce in the mining industry in South Africa” (Mathekga 2018: 37).

A coordinator and mobiliser

Evidence from various sources portrays Cyril Ramaphosa as a coordinator and a mobiliser (Butler 2017; Butler 2007; Du Plessis 2017; Mathekga 2018). For instance, Butler argues that Cyril Ramaphosa’s ability to mobilise and lead was evident in the MDM⁷ (2017: 57). Similarly, Mathekga notes that although the MDM was poorly organised and lacked clearly defined the hierarchy of power from leadership to members, it had great ability to inspire the general population and the masses to embark on political action (2018: 39). The ability of the MDM to effectively undermine the apartheid government was attributed to its leadership under Cyril Ramaphosa. The UDF and MDM are important in understanding Cyril Ramaphosa type of leadership. Mathekga notes that Cyril Ramaphosa participation in the UDF and MDM exhibited his role and ability as coordinator. According to Makhoba cited in Mathekga, Cyril Ramaphosa must be described as a coordinator; a consensus-driven coordinator, in particular (2018: 42). This is so because of his contribution in the National Planning Commission where he was a deputy chairperson and National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP has been hailed as one of South Africa’s best long-term plan that has attracted harmony from different political parties. Mathekga notes that “the process of drafting and adopting the NDP was one of the few political processes that involved multi-stakeholder approaches as evident from wide buy-in from key interest” (2018: 40). The success of the process of bringing different stakeholders with different interest together was given to the grand experience of Cyril Ramaphosa as coordinator.

⁷ When COSATU and United Democratic Front came under pressure from government restrictions, the two organizations came together to form the Mass Democratic Movement

The pragmatic negotiator

One common phrase that has been used to describe Cyril Ramaphosa is that he is a pragmatic negotiator (Butler 2017; Butler 2007; Mathekga 2018). Butler describes him as a "consummate fixer for troubles and crisis" (2017: 89). In this case, Butler's portrayal of Cyril Ramaphosa can be vindicated by the person and activities of Cyril Ramaphosa active involvement in different crises where he played the role of a negotiator. Similarly, Moodie also describes Cyril Ramaphosa as an "a brilliant negotiator because he is able to see things from the vantage point of his antagonists and he respects them. If they cheat on him, however, he scathes them" (2008: 78). According to Mathekga, Cyril Ramaphosa was involved in the early negotiation of the release of Nelson Mandela and other ANC political prisoners in Lusaka, Zambia. He assumed the position of chairman in the National Reception Committee (2018: 32). He grew to fame after he coordinated the release of Nelson Mandela and other political leaders in South Africa. He was also a member of the International Mandela Reception Committee. Moreover, like the observations made by Butler (2007: 41), Hartley revealed that Cyril Ramaphosa was an indispensable player in the negotiation process (2018: 43). This scholar said that "Cyril Ramaphosa with the help of Roelf Meyer resuscitated the stalled negotiations resulting in the establishment of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum" (2018: 43). Similarly, Butler argued that it was because of the influence of Cyril Ramaphosa and other players in the negotiations that the Record of Understanding (26 September 1992) was made possible (2017: 89). Moreover, Lodge stressed that Cyril Ramaphosa's professionalism and integrity in handling the negotiations explains why there was progress and why the negotiations resumed in 1992 (2009: 45).

Additionally, Mathekga argued that Cyril Ramaphosa's negotiating skills as a pragmatic negotiator were also evident in his role in the peace negotiations on the international scene (2018: 65). Firstly, he was appointed by the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) to facilitate peace in Lesotho (Butler 2017; Hartley 2018; Mathekga 2018). In this case, he was credited for developing a sustainable road map that was very important in returning normalcy, national security and stability in the mountain kingdom (Butler 2017: 78). In a report to the SADC Security and Peace Council, the Department of International Relation and Cooperation (DIRCO) of South Africa described the character of Cyril Ramaphosa in the negotiation process as sterling (2014: 1). The report stresses that the presence of the SADC peace facilitator-led by Deputy President Cyril

Ramaphosa ensured that peace was restored in Maseru. It reads that "the presence of the SADC Observer Mission in Lesotho (SOMILES) and its effort to resolve both security and political stability to enable credible, free and fair elections yielded tangible and positive results"(DIRCO 2014: 1). The successes in the negotiation resonate with the observations made by Gideon du Plessis cited in *Biz News*, he said: "Cyril shines which comes from his supreme negotiating skills, pragmatic decision making and invaluable knowledge of union machinations and their profound political influence" (2017: 1). Cyril's roles as a negotiator were also seen in the role he played as a Special Envoy to South Sudan. Hartley described Cyril Ramaphosa's role in the negotiations process as exemplary (2018: 58). Hartley opined the South Sudan conflict was an opportunity of Cyril Ramaphosa to do what he knew best: to negotiate a peace and lasting solution (2018: 57). According to South Africa's Department of International Relation and Cooperation as a special envoy to South Sudan, "Cyril Ramaphosa mediated in the conflict that later resulted in the signing of the ceasefire agreement in January, May, and June 2014" (2014: 1). Steven Friedman cited in the Keller (2013: 1) stressed that "Cyril Ramaphosa does not have a reputation for being gung-ho". To illustrate his assertion, Friedman argues that Ramaphosa is not the type of a muscleman politician who goes in and starts fixing and cleaning up things, instead he is a more of a "conciliator and bridge mender" (Keller 2013: 1).

A visionary leader and a statesman

Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa is commonly regarded as a "visionary pragmatist" (Butler 2007 and Moodie 2008). Moodie stressed that Cyril Ramaphosa has a unique leadership style and character that can be drawn from his early religious years (2008: 54). Moreover, Moodie argued that "for all the chimerical quality of Cyril Ramaphosa presentation of self, I think his life shows a powerful sense of calling" (2008: 45). To support this assertion Moodie argued that the character of Cyril Ramaphosa is manifested in the genuine foundations of his character that is his ability to work hard, his attention to detail, his self-control and his occasional bursts of anger when his deepest commitments are slighted (2008: 67). Butler argued that "through evangelism and preaching, he learnt the humility to engage the emotions and intellect of poorer and uneducated people" (2007:

383). More so, Butler argued that “even as a young child Cyril Ramaphosa’s self-possession and charisma impressed his peers and his elders” (2017: 382).

However, Moodie disputed the deepest respect to Christianity that Cyril Ramaphosa is highly associated with (2008: 67). Moodie argued that the evangelical Christianity that Cyril Ramaphosa is highly celebrated for ‘has long left his repertoire’ (2008: 56). To that end, what might have remained in Cyril Ramaphosa is the deep commitment to the respect of human dignity, especially the dignity of black South Africans. In line with the above assertion, Butler observed that “Cyril Ramaphosa recognises others with integrity as well, and they respond to his recognition of them” (2017: 78). In this case, the picture that Butler creates is that of a leader who has a vision but also open to the suggestions of others (2017: 78).

Furthermore, Mathekga stresses that Cyril Ramaphosa “has had an enormously impressive and varied experience of public leadership” (2018: 35). Butler argued that “Cyril Ramaphosa was a natural leader who enjoyed an easy mastery of others” (2007: 282) This scholar said Cyril Ramaphosa has seen it all. Because of all the experiences that Cyril Ramaphosa has gained over the years; Mathekga believed that “Cyril Ramaphosa may be the most well-equipped and capable leader to run the ANC and the country in the post-apartheid era” (2018: 35). Moreover, Moodie likened Cyril Ramaphosa’s style of leadership to the Foucauldian leadership called "pastoral power" (2008: 67). What this meant according to Foucault is that this type of leadership comes with a calling. The calling sent to one who is expected to lead people in the wilderness. According to Foucault as a shepherd, the Christian pastor is expected to be well versed and informed as to the material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary (1980: 120). Furthermore, the leader must know what is going on, and what each of his members does. Lastly, the pastoral leader must know what goes on in the soul of each other. To that end, Moodie stressed that that kind of leadership is stressing and suffocating, and this is what we see in Cyril Ramaphosa when they describe him as both "arrogant and humble" (2008: 67). This is related to the observation that was made by Butler when he argued that Cyril Ramaphosa tries to lead by serving the needs of his constituency. Pastoral power for Cyril Ramaphosa involves institution-building-hence his insistent constitution-writing (Butler 2017: 45). As a leader, he wants to structure lives so that they retain dignity and autonomy. Mathekga stressed that while this approach to leadership by Cyril Ramaphosa may seem patronizing and controlling, he remains humble in the sense that

he is a servant of the people who perceive himself as the one who is serving a calling that transcends his own (2018: 88).

Butler argued that Cyril Ramaphosa spent most part of his life fighting for the emancipation of the black people (2011: 90). Because of that, he ceases to be a businessman. Butler argued that “Cyril Ramaphosa spent close to a decade embroiled in debates over black economic empowerment (BEE), the controversial attempt to increase ownership, management and control of South African business by black citizens” (2007: 351). This author also argued that “if you went through Cyril Ramaphosa’s diary, treating him as a real businessman, you could cancel 70% of his meetings” (2007: 351). Simply put, Butler reasons that much of Cyril Ramaphosa’s “philosophical activity has never been at the intersection between business and politics, where he has been able to apply his experience to the resolution of intractable policy problems” (2007: 351).

Most scholars describe Cyril Ramaphosa as an astute businessman (Butler 2007; Hartley 2018; Lodge 2008; Marcus 2007). Cyril Ramaphosa is notably known for his vast investments in different businesses (Marcus 2007: 66). He is the executive chairman of Millennium Consolidated Investment (MCI). He was the chairman of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (Butler 2007: 44). Cyril Ramaphosa was also a director in several companies, namely, South African Breweries, First Rand Limited, Macsteel Holdings, Alexander Forbes and Medscheme Limited. It is noteworthy to mention that Cyril Ramaphosa stepped back from his positions in his businesses after he was elected South Africa's deputy president in May 2014 by Jacob Zuma (Mathekga 2018: 1). According to Forbes "Cyril Ramaphosa stepped down as chairman of investment firm Shanduka Group in May 2015 and a year later completed the process of selling his 30% stake in Shanduka” (Forbes 2015: 1). The diagram below illustrates a list of Cyril Ramaphosa’s shares and other financial interest.

Table 4.1: List of Cyril Ramaphosa's shares and other financial interests

Number of shares	Nature		Name of company
50	Sports cars		Puma Sport Cars
100	Game farming		Ntaba Nyoni Estate
7500	Paper packaging		Mondli LTD
100	Cattle farming		Ntaba Nyoni Freedlot

Source: T Muringa.

Like the firm belief by most scholars that Cyril Ramaphosa is an astute businessman. Robert Lenzner cited in BBC Africa describes Cyril Ramaphosa as the “highest capitalist” in the land of South Africa (2019: 1). He argues Cyril Ramaphosa moved from being a leader of the trade unions that fight for the needs of the workers to be an employer of the workers. Robert Lenzner said, "from being a militant trade unionist and a general secretary of the biggest trade union organization in the world has surprisingly become a capitalist" (BBC Africa 2019: 1). What this means according to Robert Lanzer is that Cyril Ramaphosa should be understood as a "capitalist, the most prominent black member of the business establishment and a board member of the conglomerate he once stuck" (BBC Africa 2019: 1). Simply put, Cyril Ramaphosa has become a role player and owner in the system in which he has been fighting for his entire carrier. Moreover, Lenzer contends that Cyril Ramaphosa is a media baron (Robert Lanzer cited BBC Africa 2019: 1). To illustrate this, Robert Lanzer indicated that Cyril Ramaphosa under a company called New African Investment Ltd. owns The *Sowetan* which was once the country's largest daily paper. Cyril Ramaphosa also had shares in Times Media Ltd as its chair and Pearson Plc. (which owns the *Financial Times* of London and half of the *Economist* magazine) jointly own the *Financial Mail* business magazine and *Business Day*, the country's biggest business daily (Hartley 2018: 56). Some of Cyril Ramaphosa's businesses where he was either a partner or director are illustrated in the diagram below.

Table 4.2: Cyril Ramaphosa directorship and partnerships

Directorship/Patnership	Nature of business
Ramburg Investiment	Meet abattoir
Rumburg beef	Meet abattoir
Main Street	Tshivhase Trust
Musanda Investiment	Shelf company (dormant)
Tshivhase Share Dealing	Purchase, hold, sell JSE shares
Rumburg Properties	Meat abattoir
Puma Sports cars	Car Manufactures
Ntaba Nyoni Freedlot	Cattle farming
Ntabe Nyoni Estate	Game farming
Adopt-a-school Foundation	Schools (NPO)
Peaceway Trading	Property company
Mulambo Investment	Shelf company

Source: T. Muringa

In relation to the observation made by Robert Lenzer cited BBC Africa (2019: 1), de Villiers argued that Cyril Ramaphosa presidency was not going to improve the conditions of poor South Africans (2017: 1). de Villiers argues that Cyril Ramaphosa is a "deeply compromised capitalist billionaire with hands stained with the blood of the 34 victims of Marikana" (2017: 1). Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa has been involved in a lot of scandals that compromises his character. As Robert Lenders cited in BBC Africa (2019: 1) notes, Cyril Ramaphosa's involvement in the Lonmin Mine as a non-director caused a lot of controversy to his political rise. Cyril Ramaphosa was a non-executive board member in the same company when he rose to fame in the year 2012. Robert Lenzers cited in BBC Africa (2019: 1) argued that Cyril Ramaphosa's involvement in the mining industry will place him in an awkward situation. de Villiers argued that "Gold Fields employs about 90 000 miners, most of them black, many of whom work long hours as little as \$200 a month. These are the people he once represented" (2017:1). In the same vein, Zamikhaya Maseti cited in Naki (2016:1) echoes that Cyril Ramaphosa was a capitalist and his ascension to power was a clear

contradiction of the interest of the people he claimed to represent. Maseti said "Cyril Ramaphosa is the people's ideological and class enemy as a capitalist. If the people support him, what are their understanding of the class contradictions and the dynamics that Marxist-Leninist theory talks about?" (Naki 2016:1).

The involvement of Cyril Ramaphosa in scandals surfaced at the Marikana Commission where it emerged that the management of the company had pleaded with Lonmin shareholder and ANC heavyweight, Cyril Ramaphosa, to coordinate "concomitant action" against "criminal" protesters and is seen by many as therefore being responsible for the massacre. Smith argued that Cyril Ramaphosa a board member of the company was accused of encouraging violent police action (2015: 1). These revelations placed Cyril Ramaphosa on the chopping block and made him equally liable for the massacre just like any other shareholder of the company. A lot of developments, however, took place that may have influenced the fall of Cyril Ramaphosa. In the same year (2012), Cyril Ramaphosa was elected deputy president of South Africa. In the following year on 3 February 2013, he resigned from his position at Lonmin. To his advantage, the Marikana commission of Inquiry cleared Cyril Ramaphosa of any responsibility. The report read, "The commission has found that it cannot be said Mr. Ramaphosa was the cause of the massacre, and the accusations against him are groundless." (Farlam 2017: 108).

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the biographies of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. The history of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was traced and presented. Additionally, the chapter also discussed the various leadership attributes of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The review of literature on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma showed that there is a general negative perception about the leadership from the scholars. The chapter also unpacked the history of Cyril Ramaphosa. Various literature that focused on his background and leadership were reviewed. Overall, it emerged that Cyril Ramaphosa is a favourite of most scholars. This is because of the various leadership attributes that are attributed to him. The chapter highlighted the significance of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa background to this study. The next chapter reviews relevant literature on media and legitimization strategies, media framing of political leaders and content.

Chapter 5: Review of relevant literature

Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature that is relevant to the study. Literature review is always a crucial chapter that helps to place the study in focus. The chapter reviews four different sets of literature:

- Firstly, the chapter reviews the literature on media and legitimisation strategies.
- Secondly, it reviews the literature on the media framing of political leaders.
- Thirdly, it also reviews the literature on the framing and presentation of female political leaders.
- Finally, the chapter turns its focus on reviewing literature that focuses on the various factors that influence media frames and news content.

There is a dearth of literature that focuses on the framing of the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Media legitimisation and de-legitimisation strategies

Most studies in the field of legitimisation and de-legitimisation have focused on strategies used by the media in reporting political leaders (Erjavec 2001; Lavrusheva 2013; Mikkola 2017; Ross and Rivers 2016; Sadeghi and Jalali 2013). However, their focus was not entirely satisfactory in that they could not account for the use of frames and their cultural construction that allows them to work as a means of legitimising and de-legitimatising the political candidate's tools. For example, several researchers on legitimacy has established that the media and journalists employ different legitimisation strategies when reporting on events and political candidates (Erjavec 2001; Lavrusheva 2013; Mikkola 2017; Ross and Rivers 2016; Sadeghi and Jalali 2013). Mikkola argued that the Finnish media outlet used the most common legitimisation strategies of rationalisation, moralisation, normalisation, and narrativisation when covering on the co-operation negotiations in the period of the economic downturn (2017: 34). Mikkola argued that “all these strategies were used in various forms to establish legitimacy or illegitimacy of the co-operation negotiation

announcements” (2017: 4). In another study, Lavrusheva revealed that the media uses different legitimization strategies to allow people to make sense of the world around them (2013: 87). To illustrate, Lavrusheva’s study revealed that the UK media used “authorization, rationalization, narrativization and moralization” strategies to establish legitimacy of the political candidates (2013: 87). Lavrusheva argued that “strategic type has its own distinguishing features, objectives and ways of introduction. Hence each strategy is used to fulfil some specific objectives in addition to the legitimization and delegitimizing purposes” (Lavrusheva 2013: 87-88).

Furthermore, evidence from various legitimization scholars suggests that “to create, enact and extent social orders through narrative”, individuals are bound to exercise different strategies of legitimization (Berger and Luckmann 1996; Habermas 1976; Luckmann 1996; Walker and Laughter 2019; Van Leeuwen 2007). According to Walker and Laughter, the legitimization strategies that are used by journalists help them to “provide the explanation and justifications of the salient elements of the institutional tradition and justifies the institutional order by giving normative dignity to its practical imperatives” (2019: 45). This observation is similar to the argument posed by Van Leeuwen when he contends that all forms of communication replicate legitimization by means of terminology, vocabulary, framing, and various form of practicing language (2007: 23). More so, Habermas stressed that if an individual is considered legitimate, that individual will embody authority and right to influence others in their decision and relationships (1976: 98). To add, Berger and Luckmann reiterates that if a view is legitimised, it ultimately can be creased “into the fabrics of discourse such that alternative viewpoints have a harder time gaining visibility” (1996: 23).

In additions, Van Leeuwen explained how “legitimation strategies occur through narrative work such as moral evaluation” (2007: 91). Much of Van Leeuwen’s findings have been used to explain how journalists avow their authority by means of such legitimization tactics. These tactics may include but not limited to “quoting experts, bearing witness, self-reflexivity, storytelling, using semantics such as “said”, “according to”, and “confirmed,” and operating as an “interpretive community” that codifies journalistic practice” (Walker and Laughter 2019: 11). Similarly, Carlson argued that journalists constantly employ strategies of consolidation in a bid to guard their position against contestation from other parties seeking to increase their own authority or to rip to shreds authority they view as hostile (2007: 264). In support of the above, Carlson argued that in any given society, authority is never guaranteed, rather it is characterised by struggle and

necessitates continuous reproduction. Therefore, journalists should engage in a mode of constant process of authority maintenance (Eason 1988: 45). Moreover, Carlson argued that journalist efforts to constantly assert authority “are often discursive as journalists publicly solicit interpretations of what constitutes quality news and conversely what is considered problematic or outside of journalism” (Carlson 2007: 267). Therefore, from the discussion above, it can be said that journalists participate in “paradigm repair-work” and other devices to hoist their content above the fray and present their narrative as the only true one.

Carlson argued that “discourse in the form of quotes, debates, articles, assessments, etc.” and can be regarded as public text that mirrors and form broader framework of action. Similarly, Fairclough argued that “text are social spaces in which two fundamental social process simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction” (2007: 76). Put differently, what this means is that in any given discourse, interpretations are constructed that form future discourse and informs action. Thus, for Carlson, discussion about political events and certain individuals in the media does not only reflect opinion and appraisal about those portrayed, rather they “organise, produce, and disseminate meaning about those events and particular individuals” (Carlson 2007: 267). This assertion is like the argument put forth by Fiske when he argues that “discourse is structured and structuring, for it is both determined by its social relations and affects them” (1994: 3). Thus, the discourse is continuously reproducing and always acting on the social while it is also being acted upon by that same social.

Walker and Laughter (2019) argued that the commitment to master narratives by the media allows them to legitimise events and individuals. These scholars argued that “this commitment to master narratives means complicating facts can be obscured, alternative ideologies demonised, countercultures rarely covered (except as “other”), and power elites as voice of reason- all in the name of a good moral” (Walker and Laughter 2019:11). In the same vein, Campbell states that journalists include terms such as “post-racial America” that serve to let dominant White mainstream off the hook for any further racial introspection (2011:45). This means of communication by journalists therefore plays a vital role in legitimising the dominant ideology within society. In relation to that assertion, Shah and Thornton argued that “the press enacts a mass-mediated ritual of social control though its coverage, allowing politicians, reporters and

others with access to the public discourse the opportunity to legitimate specific stories – generally once that reinforces a white supremacy” (1994: 144).

In another study, Erjavec explained how the thematic and form structure of the news report work to legitimise and naturalise against the Roma (2001: 699). Erjavec argued that “the syntactic structure of discriminatory discourse offered the readers categories which differed very little: the headline and the lead constructed a close interpretation of the situation and the rest of the news report strengthened, legitimated and naturalized this interpretation especially with the use of evaluation” (2001: 699). More so, the scholar also stressed that to construct a comprehensible meaning of the news text, the news producers first and actively “reduced the definition to only one event, which presented the majority of the population in positive light” (2001: 699). More so, Erjavec also found that the journalist engaged in the process of de-legitimising the Roma ethnic group by mean of various strategies. This scholar argued that “to construct only one, natural dominant interpretation of the ethnic discrimination they selectively (mis) used information, used discourse difference with colonisation of common-sense language, and the strategies of denial of discriminatory discourse” (2001: 699).

Furthermore, Ross and Rivers argued that different legitimating or de-legitimising strategies are evident whenever there is communication aimed at convincing people about a course of action (2017: 1). From a discourse analytical perspective, Ross and Rivers examined the “visual-discursive features” of internet memes in the 2016 US presidential elections. The study was based on two candidates who were Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. The main purpose of this study was to examine how memes attempt to create a negative view of the candidates and reduce their legitimacy as potential United States’ presidents. In their analysis of the memes, Ross and Rivers used Van Leeuwen’s (2007) framework for the analysis of legitimising discourse in relation to how they de-legitimise. The study found that the memes were replete with latent meaning that were characterised by different de-legitimising strategies. These strategies include “authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis” (Ross and River 2016: 2). Moreover, the study found that the originators of the memes (content) have actively and consciously involved themselves in practices of political participation that bear their ideological standpoint. To that end, the (de)legitimation strategies of authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and mythopoesis have simply been used as communication vehicles through which the creators of

memes could communicate their disapproval or approval of the two political candidates. Ross and Rivers argued that:

within this participatory digital culture, the strategies of de-legitimising are woven into the meme iteration not only to help the creator share their view and spread their message, in the hope of influencing others, but to delegitimise the target of the meme in order to bring about their own desired political result (i.e. the election of one candidate at the direct expense of another (Ross and Rivers 2016:11).

This entails that the strategies of legitimisation have become useful tools through which individuals can communicate if whether a course of action can be legitimate or de-legitimised. Similarly, Sadeghi and Jalali used the Van Leeuwen (2007: 91) model of the discourse of legitimisation to explore the discursive strategies that were employed in Fars News. The main objective of their study was to examine how the Far news channels represent the Egyptian revolution as a legitimised action and Hosni Mubarak's government as the delegitimise regime (Sadeghi and Jalali 2013: 12). Moreover, like Ross and Rivers (2016: 12), Sadeghi and Jalali also focused on a political figure, although their scope of analysis was broadened to include the Far news channel and Mubarak's government. Consequently, the results of this study revealed that the news agency delegitimises the personality, leadership qualities and the regime of Mubarak by utilising several discursive strategies. In their findings, these scholars also highlight that the news media legitimised the Egyptian revolution using various discursive strategies. These strategies include the use of language and selected terms and frames that were in favour of the unfolding revolution. To add, the study's findings also revealed that the news agency did spend much of its effort in legitimising the revolution than delegitimising the regime of the Mubarak. It also emerged that the news media used the "authorisation" form of legitimisation to persuade its readers to perceive the revolution as a noble and necessary event and see Mubarak as the villain who must be removed from power by any means. Among the many subcategories of legitimisation, Fars News media mad use of "personal authority" more commonly. These findings are similar to the findings from the study by Ross and Rivers (2016: 12). In relation to the Far news agency role in devoting much of its effort in legitimising the revolution, Ross and River study found that the authority strategy of legitimisation have become useful tools through which individuals can communicate if whether a course of action can be legitimate or de-legitimise (Ross and Rivers 2016: 12).

While these studies provide useful insights on prospective legitimization strategies employed by journalists and the media, no research has been conducted on how online press used frames to legitimise or delegitimise the political leaders and their qualities. Particularly, how *News24* and *IOL* has used these strategies to legitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.

Media framing of political leaders

Although extensive research has been carried out on media framing of political candidates, no single study exists which has investigated the news framing of the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For instance, Chambwera examines how by certain frames the two Zimbabwean dailies (*Herald* and *Daily News*) legitimise and delegitimise the political leadership of Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai (2016). In this study, unlike the other de-legitimising scholars, the researcher did not make use of the Van Leeuwen model of the discourse of legitimization, but he made use of the framing theory as the basis of inquiry. Consequently, the key findings Chambwera's study were somewhat different from those found in the studies by Ross and River (2016: 9), Sadeghi and Jalali (2014: 1580). Chambwera's study revealed that the frames used by journalists to consciously or unconsciously report on the Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai are profoundly entrenched in the culture, values, philosophies and discursive practices in which they function, and in certain historical phases. What this means is that discursive delegitimising strategies were hidden underneath the frames that were carefully selected by the media to portray the political leaders. According to Chambwera, "The *Herald* and the *Daily News* functioning within the predominant culture may perhaps have utilised comparable frames as well as dissimilar ones to frame the party-political leadership of the winner and loser of an election" (Chambwera 2016: 56). Moreover, it was also highlighted that a similar frame can be used by two different newspapers to legitimise or delegitimise political leaders. Similarly, different frames can be used to achieve a similar purpose.

Unlike Chambwera (2016: 78), Davies-Laubscher employed a mixed method design to investigate how the South African media focused on portraying President Jacob Zuma's relationship as a form of cultural polygamy instead of identifying it as a multiple or concurrent sexual relationship (2014:

4). The newspaper analysis focused on the four key events in the summer and autumn of 2010 that illustrate how the South African media framed President Jacob Zuma's practice of concurrent sexual relationships as cultural polygamy. However, a common feature of these two studies is that they both used the framing theory as the framework and basis of their analysis. Davies-Laubscher's main objective in this study was to explain how the framing process (as practiced by the media) has stirred up novel discourse on the practice of polygamy and the effects it had on the South African women in terms of their bargaining power to "negotiate safe sex and practice their general attitude towards the dangers of contracting HIV" (Davies-Laubscher's 2014: 35).

Subsequently, Davies-Laubscher study revealed that the media engaged in the active use of frames that were aimed at representing Jacob Zuma in a negative way (2014: 35). To add, drawing on Entman argument, Davies-Laubscher stressed that most media frames are defined by what they omit, as well as include and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience (Entman, 2007:167). To illustrate, during Jacob Zuma's rape trial, the mainstream media continuously missed the chance of portraying Jacob Zuma's sexual exploits as anything other than the frames already assigned to it, namely 'culture' or more specifically, 'Zulu culture'. To be specific, the results of this study showed that the frames that were used by the media to report on Jacob Zuma at this time were misleading or leading the public into the thinking in a negative way. These findings, however, can be paralleled with the assertion made by in the study by (Sadeghi and Jalali: 2014: 1581). Sadeghi and Jalali argued that the role of the media has shifted from simply informing people about what transpires around the globe (2014: 1581). For Sadeghi and Jalali, in contemporary times, apart from informing, the media produce content intended at manipulating realities methodically and offer them to their consumers in a means that is in concurrence with their entrenched interest (2014: 1581).

In another study that focused on the news framing of Jacob Zuma in South Africa, Khuluse investigated the print media reporting on the Jacob Zuma case (2014: 5). Khuluse's main objective in this study was to establish "the level of bias, if any, in reporting a high-profile case of that magnitude" (2014: 67). The premises of his study were mainly on the role of media in the social construction of reality where the different values and preferences could colour the perception of facts. Therefore, Khuluse employed the ethnographic and qualitative content analysis allowed for

the systematic investigation of the content of newspaper articles while the use of discourse analysis highlighted the importance of language use in the social construction of reality (Khuluse 2014: 67). However, key findings of this study revealed that the media played a huge role in creating people's perception of the personality and leadership of Jacob Zuma. In this study, it was highlighted that media with the use of various discursive strategies like frames, participated in the social construction of the reality where the different values and preferences could tint the discernment of facts, largely painted a picture of Jacob Zuma as a corrupt man not fit to be in public office with his implication in corruption being perceived as a threat to the country's democratic ethos. The view was that this undermined democratic principles of equality, justice, and accountability.

To add, Khuluse in his study revealed that the reality constructed by the media played a great role in de-popularising the legitimacy of Jacob Zuma as a president. This scholar argued that "the print media's position on the Jacob Zuma corruption case was clearly that corruption is the evil that the people of South Africa fought so hard to overthrow to bring equality and justice for all" (Khuluse 2014: 67). The press was adamant that the presence of this 'pest' in the public domain could never be tolerated. In reporting the corruption case, the press highlighted how the allegations against Zuma were an antithesis of democratic leadership. Hence most of the press had a negative approach to the case and gave Zuma a name as a villain. According to Khuluse the newspapers socially constructed reality of a man who had lost all the honour and worth.

Furthermore, Khuluse's (2014: 67) findings discussed in the previous paragraph can be likened to the findings from another study that was conducted by Maseng *et al.* (2018: 11604). Maseng *et al.* examined how the South African media de-popularised politicians, paying definite attention to Jacob Zuma (2018: 11604). The study adopted the framing theory as the basis of its analysis. However, in their key findings Maseng *et al.* revealed that the media is and continues to be a crucial instrument of societal socialisation. As such, the ever-increasing involvement of the media in the transmission of principles, moral standards and values, resulted in the South African peoples being extra vocal concerning their displeasure, which led to relentless national demands for the removal of Jacob Zuma from power (2018: 11604). Moreover, these scholars further argued that the media used its agenda-setting role to negatively undermine Jacob Zuma's popularity and influence public opinion about Jacob Zuma and his leadership dynamics (Maseng *et al.* 2018:

11604). To illustrate their findings, Maseng *et al.* highlighted that before Jacob Zuma's rise to power as ANC president, both his “personal and political image has already received massive negativity as a result of the various socially and politically related factors which were simultaneously reported by the media” (2018: 11604). What this means is that the media, using frames and agenda-setting has managed to socialise the population, presenting them with the negative images of Jacob Zuma. In addition to that, Maseng *et al.* stressed that the media maligned Jacob Zuma’s reputation in two ways, “vilification came from the political front, and while on the other hand, his certain social practices were portrayed through negative sentiments by the media” (2018: 11604).

Moreover, the findings from the study by Maseng *et al.* (2018: 11604) are similar to the observation that has been done by Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli (2001: 77). In relation to the role of the media in socialising the people using its agenda-setting and framing techniques, Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli argued that in an elusive manner and more expressively, the news media choose to frame the kind of stories in a certain way. Simply put, what the media does is that it provides its audience with images through which we perceive others and ourselves as well. As a result, the images, frames, and catch-phrases that are laden with "signifiers act as raw material we use to confirm, modify or negate our already existing sense of identity" (Tomaselli and Tomaselli 2001: 34). To add, drawing on Hall, it can also be deduced that the media as it is, is a significant arena of contestations in the “circuit of culture” (1997: 55). It is a place where the presentation, construction, regulation, ingesting and manufacture of meaning are all closely drawn in the formation of identity, at both the individual and national level.

Furthermore, Tiung and Hasim showed how the Malaysian media framed political personalities of different politicians (2009: 407). Employing the framing theory, the study examines how the eleven national and provincial newspapers frame news of Datuk Yong Teck Lee. These scholars argued that the Malaysian newspapers engaged in the active process of moulding the image, personality and reputation through the pages of the newspapers by means of playing up or playing down their news and pictures. Generally, findings from this study revealed that provincial and mainstream newspapers were dissimilar in the ways they reported on the politician. To put differently, the scholars highlighted that “some newspapers tended to portray Datuk Yong negatively, while others pictured him as the hero of Sabah” (Tiung and Hasim 2009: 409). The

study also revealed that there were also neutral reports. Put together, this study shows how “the perception of the people can be developed through their exposure of newspaper coverage, framing of news can help to show how newspapers can play up or down such news and at the same time develop or destroy the reputation of political personalities” (Tiung and Hasim 2009: 409).

Moreover, in a different study, Watkins examined the role of media in creating meaning using frames while de-legitimising certain individuals (2009: 12). Watkins examined network television news (ABC, CBS, NBC) coverage of the “Million Man March” that was widely and attended by most Americans. In this study, Watkins’ focus was to investigate the overriding “framing practices – problem definition, rhetorical devices, use of sources, and images –employed by journalists” to make logic of the Million Man March. In this study, Watkins argued that “what gets selected, packaged, disseminated, and received as news is mediated by organizational processes, ideological beliefs, and power relations” (2009: 67). To that end, Watkins argues that news must never be regarded as a neutral reflection of reality, instead, it is as a mass-produced cultural artefact. Nevertheless, Watkins’s key findings revealed that the media frames selected by the journalists did not necessarily determine what the public thought about the march. However, the framing decision practiced by the same journalist effectively shaped the parameters of the public dialogue that ensued. Moreover, the findings also revealed that the other way the news media make social and political events and individuals more comprehensible is by employing a strategy that captures the spirit and vitality of movements through celebrity spokespersons. To illustrate this, the scholars stressed that the focus that was placed on the individual leader of the “Million Man March” is not a special unique journalistic practice. Rather, what it means is that most news frames pivot around the actions of those individuals that achieve newsworthy credentials.

In line with the observations made by Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli (2001), Hall (1997) and Maseng *et al.* (2018) that media actively participate in the creation of cultural meaning through agenda setting and framing. Likewise, Watkins argued that in the process of engineering news, the news producers make framing judgments. What this means is that the journalists play a conscious or unconscious decision regarding how to render real-world phenomena intelligible (Watkins 2009: 98). Moreover, Watkins stressed that journalists in the media houses make sense of the surrounding environment by means of using frames (2009: 98). The observation by Watkins in his study was similar to the assertion by Entman (1993). Entman argued that framing involves the

process of selection and salience. To explain this further, he stressed that "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation" (Entman 1993: 34).

In a study similar to Watkins' (2009), use of the framing theory as the basis of analysis, Tiung and Hasim examined how 11 newspaper framed news of Datuk Yong Teck Lee, a political leader from Sabah (2009). More so, in this study, Tiung and Hasim described how the newspaper moulds the image, personality, and reputation of politicians through the pages of the newspaper by playing up or down their news and pictures. The key findings of this study revealed that the reports of the same individual differed between mainstream national and provincial newspapers. According to Tiung and Hasim, some newspapers tended to portray the politician in a negative manner while others pictured him as the hero of Sabah. More so, the findings of the study revealed that there were both neutral and objective reports. The study also highlighted that the perception of the people can be formed once an individual is exposed to news coverage. This is made possible by the framing of the news that enables the newspapers to play down or up news and, in many instances, can build or destroy the reputation of political personalities. Tiung and Hasim argued that "journalists and editors draw the map or the internal story pattern for readers, and the map which is also known as framing, functions cognitively in structuring political debates, influencing the information levelling on the readers, and attributing to the policy responsibility" (Tiung and Hasim 2009: 123). The above observation is related to the findings of the study that was done by Wright and Holland on the media portrayal of the former Australian prime minister (2014).

Furthermore, recent work on framing has established that the role of the media has shifted from being an information gatekeeper to an active political player (Sadeghi and Jalali 2014, Chilton 2004, Bacue and Burgoon 2003). For instance, Sadeghi and Jalali argued that the role of the media has shifted from simply informing people about what transpires around the globe (2014: 1580). These scholars argued that, in contemporary times, apart from informing, the media produce content intended at manipulating realities methodically and offer them to their consumers in a means that is in concurrence with their entrenched interest (Sadeghi and Jalali 2014: 1580). Furthermore, Sadeghi and Jalali stressed that the discourse of the media has shifted and moved above the surface level of language structures (2014: 1580). Effectively, what this means is that

news articles are replete with underlying meanings and intentions that are hidden behind the discursive construction of them. Similarly, Chilton argued that the news media in different countries engage in an active process of packaging meaning into news in a fashion that their readers will trust and not question. Chilton said, “the representative news agencies of different countries try to deliver pre-packaged news in a way that their readers would trust in what their favourite government gives them as realities happening around the world” (2004: 35).

Media framing of female political leaders

Recent research on framing of political leaders has tended to focus on the way gender plays out in the media frames rather than how such frames were constructed to legitimise or delegitimise their leadership qualities of political candidates (Guha 2018; Cukier Jackson, Elmi, Roach and Cyr 2016; Mavin, Elliott, Stead, and Williams 2016). For instance, research has established that a woman leader is not portrayed positively in the news media as compared to their male counterpart (Guha 2018 and Cukier *et al.* 2016, Mavin *et al.* 2016). Guha argued that “women political candidates across the world are often misrepresented in all media platforms” (2018: 67). In the same study, Guha found that the stereotypes used to portray women are similar in print media and on social network platforms like Facebook. Furthermore, in another study that examined the representation of women leaders in Canadian broadcast, Cukier *et al.* found that women are underrepresented and are less likely to be portrayed positively or on leadership/expert positions and are more often represented as victims (2016: 45). More so, Cukeir *et al.* argued that “women are less likely to be framed as leaders or experts and are less likely to hold news host or anchor positions” (2016: 45).

To add, Mavin *et al.* revealed the “gendered nature of media constructions of women managers and leaders” (2016: 314). These scholars argued that women’s leadership is glamourised, fetishised and sexualised in both print and electronic media. Similarly, Vos in a study that analysed television news coverage of female politicians in Belgium revealed that female politicians receive less news coverage when compared to their male counterparts with the same social and political status (2013: 389). To add, Vos also argued that “in addition to a political gender bias that pervades

society, a real gender bias exists in the media.” Put differently, the presentation of female leaders is affected and reflect on the gender bias that pervades society.

In another study, Gedalya *et al.* examined the journalistic coverage of “Tzip Livni over the Knesset election campaign” where she was running as a candidate for the position of prime minister (2017: 167). Findings from this study point towards a gender bias reportage of the media. Gedalya *et al.* found that the media reflected deep gender bias, by portraying her as “lacking experience, unable to make decisions, and in general framed stereotypically with feminist traits” (2017: 165). For example, the media uses words like “young child, puppet on a string “and “incessant talker” (Gedalya *et al.* 2017: 165). These findings are like the observation that were made by Greenwald, and Lehman-Wilzig (2017: 1). In a cross-national study that examined the socio-cultural conception of gender in Israel and American press coverage of female candidates, these scholars found that the media sensationally presented female candidates in the media. To illustrate, the media highlighted the female candidate’s appearance and sexuality more than their policy promises (Greenwald, and Lehman-Wilzig 2017: 1). In relation to this, Nacos revealed that the female politician is depicted as not fit for political office simply because they are weak, indecisive and emotional. Nacos argued that the news media represented the female politician as a “bitch” who does not fit in the conventional profile of soft women. In relation to that, women who participate in politics are portrayed as “outsiders,” the exception, not the standard. Nacos shows that the women who receive coverage in the media are “most newsworthy when they are doing something ‘unladylike” (Nacos 2005: 440).

For instance, in a study that examined the representation of female terrorists in the media and framing patterns in the news coverage of women in politics and in terrorism Nacos argued that even though women have been among the leaders and flowers of terrorist organisations throughout the history of modern terrorism, the mass media stereotypically portrays females as terrorist and politicians as intruders in a profoundly masculine dominated field (2005: 435). In addition to that, Nacos emphasised that the contrast of news framing patterns in the news concerning females in politics and the ingrained stereotypes in the reporting of the woman extremists establish resemblances in the representations of these legitimate (women in politics) and illegitimate political players (women in terrorism) (2005: 436).

In addition to that, Nacos found that the media continue to utilise diverse framing patterns in the news with regards to females and males. This scholar argued that “journalists commonly work with gendered ‘frames’ to simplify, prioritize, and structure the narrative flow of events when covering women and men in public life.” (2005: 440). More so, the study also revealed that there is the pervasiveness of gender stereotypes, for instance, the feminine sympathetic disposition and the man expected aggressiveness that influence individuals to imagine males and females to act in a different way. As a result, “women in politics are commonly seen as compassionate, practical, honest, and hardworking, while men are seen as ruthless, ambitious, and tough leaders.” (Nacos 2005: 440). Additionally, by preserving these types of stereotypes, the news media amplifies the belief that the gentleness of woman office-bearers make them good candidates for handling proficiently societal challenges and policies, for instance, education and social welfare, but they are not capable to handle national security and foreign relations – zones best reserved to aggressive males. Similarly, Gidengil and Everitt found that, “the media represents female politicians as caring mothers most of the time not as politically active beings who are capable of leading the country, in fact, they are perceived as weak in politics” (2003:98). In relation to Everitt and Gidengil (2003: 210), Ross (2002: 92) contended that female politicians regarded the news media as a barricade to the office. This is because women politicians in their entirety are tremendously under-represented in the political sphere, and in instances where they are represented, the importance is positioned on trivialities like the type of dressing and not on policies and ideologies (Ross 2002: 92). Similarly, in a study that focuses on the female body and voice in audiovisual political propaganda jingles, Ngoshi and Mutekwa argued that the women have remained entrapped in a nationalist discourse that is male generated and they have not transcended that paradigm (2013: 246). Ngoshi and Mutekwa found that “judging by the lyrical content of their songs, the choir women seem to be suggesting that women cannot and should not conceive of their own and national emancipation outside the terms of the predominantly male-dominated national liberation movement” (2013: 246).

To add, Wright and Holland analysed Australian media portrayals of former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard's alleged sexism and misogyny's speech to parliament in October 2012 (2014: 588). In this study, Wright and Holland argued that there were various frames that the media used to vilify the speech and person of Gillard. These are the strategic attack, uncontrolled emotional outpouring, and hypocrisy (Wright and Holland 2014: 588). In this case, the scholars

argue that these framings as carefully done by the media professionals, “demonstrates the role the media plays as a gendered mediator, perpetuating the gender double blind that constrains female political leaders, as they negotiate the demand to demonstrate masculine leadership attributed without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of them” (Wright and Holland 2014:78). Consequently, the study found that the gendered media framings restricted the significance and relevance of Gillard's speech, truncated calls for broader contemplation on Australian political culture and further isolated females from political leadership. In addition to that, the study also revealed that the speech received acceptance in other countries while the mainstream domestic media framed the speech as a "hypocritical distraction arising either from the tactics of diversion or personal weakness in coping with the sustained attack". This difference of reportage between national and international media is as Goldsworthy cited in Holland points out, as result of context, which is the broader cultural context of international coverage contrasting with the specific political and electoral contexts. Wright and Holland argued that these leading framing damaged the “substance of the speaker's message, removing the legitimacy of Gillard's challenge to the sexism and misogyny on display” (2014:78). Moreover, by undermining her messages these framings also prevented the speech from acting as a rallying cry for a wider process of introspection into the gendered Australian political landscape. Gillard confronted continuous gendered coverage in the Australian media all over her prime ministership, as a result, this has covertly and overtly questioned the likelihood she could function as a “female leader”.

In another study, Omari focused on the portrayal of female politicians in Kenyan media (2008: 56). In her study, Omari argued that Kenya's print media is replete with stereotype images that portray women only in their domestic roles at the expense of their roles in national development. Findings from this study revealed that women and women's issues were allocated less space and portrayed more negatively compared to their male counterparts in all the analysed newspapers. To add, the media also depicted women almost exclusively in traditional roles in the home, and not as independent-minded and creative beings who have made many positive contributions to the country socially, economically, and politically (Omari 2008: 56). To substantiate these findings, Omari demonstrates that the marginalisation and negative portrayal of women politicians in the Kenyan media is influenced by the factors like patriarchal values that pervades the Kenyan society, a small number of women professionals in the media industry, and the fact that the media industry is largely male owned and dominated.

In a similar study, Thou explored how the Kenyan newsprint media in their coverage framed the 22 female parliamentarians in the 10th parliament (2015: 13). The main objective of this study was to examine the amount of media coverage and the level of prominence given to stories on women in politics. The study also sought to identify the dominant gender frames used in newsprint media content. The key findings of this study were that the newsprint media coverage of women in politics is low. Also, their stories placed in the inside pages and rarely do their names hardly make it to the headlines making them invisible. To explain these findings, Thou argued that “hidden” influences such as cultural backgrounds of the media professional, principles of what makes news and commercial interest contribute to the low coverage of women” (Thou 2015: 78). Thou’s findings can be likened to the observation that was done by Norris (1997: 19). In his study, Norris found that female political leaders were less noticeable in the news media. In many instances, females are regarded as inconsequential inside the political domain and incompetent of bringing constructive transformation, only because of the stereotypical positions dispensed to them by culture and society which encumbers them in sundry spheres (1997: 19).

Moreover, Ngubane analyses the representation of male and female politicians during the 2016 local government elections in South Africa (2010: 45). Using qualitative research methods, critical discourse analysis, and framing theory, Ngubane argued that in media there exist some differences and disparities that are pervasive between male and female politicians in relation to their depiction in the political arena (2010: 48). To illustrate, Ngubane argues that this is in part because women politicians encountered a lot of challenges to cross the threshold into decision-making or protuberant positions in most societies that are mainly male dominated (2010: 46). Therefore, key findings of Ngubane's study revealed that there is a great disparity with regards to the coverage of both women and man politicians in the print media (2010: 49). The results highlighted that women are less mentioned to in the news media or equated to men and did not feature equally in the political news, as they were reported in fewer articles concerning the 2016 local government election (Ngubane 2010: 45). Thus, the imbalance of coverage in the media would mean those female politicians will have less exposure and public acknowledgment problematic for them. In relation to the Ngubane’s findings, the Global media monitoring project also opined that “females continue to be underrepresented in the total population of people heard, seen, or read about in the print media regarding politics” (2010: 45).

Fountain and McGregor examined how the news media framed women politician in the 2001 local body election (2001: 55). These scholars argued that the coverage of political female leaders in this election “raises issues of both positive and negative gender stereotyping, including the female candidate, dubbed “the naked politician”, who stripped for billboards. Moreover, these scholars argue that the concept of “symbolic annihilation” was evident in the way women were framed in the media. Simply put, the concept of “symbolic annihilation” refers to the media’s condemnation of women (Tuchman cited in Fountain and McGregor 2001). Findings from this study revealed that “the presence of women leaders led to the media’s feminisation of the dominant ‘game’ or strategy frame, albeit in superficial ways” (Fountain and McGregor 2001: 55). In addition, the scholars also indicate that the New Zealand media did not judge the female leaders ‘behaviour harshly (as too aggressive), rather it appeared disappointed that the women did not resort to dirty tactics when they were attacked by their male counterparts. More so, Fountain and McGregor study argued that the modern bias facing women in politics is that the media simply use traditional frames – that are constructed around the dominance of men – in coverage of women, making it difficult for women politicians to be presented as anything other than political outsiders (2001: 59). In relation to that Gidengil and Everti for instance regard the application of conventional political frames such as metaphors of warfare and sport to women as a more subtle but insidious form of bias than preoccupation with “feminine characteristics (1999: 133). Results from Gidengil and Everti cited in Fountain and McGregor indicate that “what is perceived positively to be combative in a man may be judged negatively- to be aggressive in a woman” (2001: 60).

Political, economic and social conditions that affect news framing

Most studies on the factors that affect media framing has tended to focus on structural, economic and institutional factors that affect media frames instead of paying attention to discursive practices and culture effects on news frames (Sood and Iyenga 2016; Wagner and Meyer 2016; Van Ruler 2005 and Verhoeven 2016). For example, existing evidence from recent studies suggest that different corporations (political or business) influence directly and indirectly the framing of news and news content (Sood and Iyenga 2016, Wagner and Meyer 2016, Van Ruler 2005 and

Verhoeven 2016). In general, this group of scholars argue that the continuous interaction between the media and the political candidates and public relations personnel influence the way the media report on events and individuals. Sood and Iyenga argued that “candidate’s main goal is to spread their messages to as many voters as possible, and so they utilise the media both to clarify and articulate their messages.” For instance, Verhoeven argued that companies and business establishments serve as a substantial source of news for journalist (2016: 509). Similarly, Wagner and Meyer argued that “political parties and actors produce a large number of messages” (2017: 367). Put differently, what this means is that corporations and political actors influence and, in some instances, decide what journalists say, how they say it and to whom they may say it. According to Verhoeven the relationship between corporations and journalist can be evident in how public relations by business establishments affect what the journalists say, and how they say it in their newspapers (Verhoeven 2016: 509). Verhoeven argued that “the relationship between PR professionals and journalists and what journalists report about corporations has consequent effects on the public” (Verhoeven 2016: 509). In this case it can be deduced that corporations and different organisations engage in an active process of transmitting desired messages to the public through mass media through arranging positive news coverage and communicating with journalists on their organisational issues. Iyenga argued that “political candidates spend a lot of time interacting in different ways with the media, keeping is as much on their terms as possible” (1990: 23). Thus, this process allows them to shape what the media report about them and their activities. More so, findings from Van Ruler study indicate that the relationship that exist between corporations and the media and framing can be termed as “corporate framing mediated-moderation model” (2005: 45). In this case the scholar argued that there is a frame negotiation that takes place in the process of news construction between journalists and the corporations. What this means according to Van Ruler (2005: 45) and Verhoeven (2016: 510) is that the production of news involves an interdependent practice that takes place in three levels. To illustrate the above point Verhoeven argued that:

on the level of the individual PR professional and journalists who are part of the same network and have an interdependent relation. On the organization level where there is an interdependency between the editorial of the media; the PR departments of corporations and the marketing and advertising departments (Verhoeven 2016: 510)

In relation to the argument raised by Verhoeven that corporations play a critical role in affecting the framing and content of journalist news (2016: 510). Heath also observed that press relations have become the chief responsibility of public relations officials (2010: 345). In this case, public relations officials devote a great deal of their time creating ways that allow them to manage and use the mass media to a “corporation’s advantage”. To illustrate, Heath stressed that there is a multi-layered process of co-production of news that is normally used by PR officials in conjunction with journalists. He stressed that this multi-layered process of news production is also influenced by the cultures of the organizations or corporations and media organizations that involved. This similar observation can be related to the observation that was made by Verhoeven when he argued that “the process of news production as it is influenced by the social factors, it owes a vulnerable to the influence of the “broader societal cultures that they are part of”. Therefore, drawing on these arguments (Verhoeven 2016 and Heath 2005), it can be hypothesised that the news framing is heavily reliant on the external forces that are epitomised by the needs of corporations and organisations to maintain a good reputation.

Furthermore, evidence from studies on newspaper framing has revealed that corporation possesses a substantial influence on the type of media frames. As a result, researchers have not treated the effects of culture and discourse on media frames in much detail (Ihlen and Nitz 2008 and Miller 2006). For instance, a study conducted by Miller revealed that the media content and frames are affected and mirrored the events that were happening in the corporate world (2006: 1001). To illustrate this observation, Miller argued that “when environmental issues or accounting fraud occurs and when health issues are at stake, the media adopts protesters/antagonistic frames (2006: 1001). Put differently, what this entails is that media frames as they are packaged to the public, they are not independent of the unfolding events that are obtaining in their surroundings. Like Miller’s observation, Ihlen and Nitz argue that the media uses events from the world and different organization to frame their news (2008: 65). These scholars argued that “occasionally, mixed frames from corporations and other organisations are used in the media news” (Ihlen and Nitz cited in Verhoeven 2016: 511).

The argument that news frames are informed and dependent on the events obtaining in the corporate world was also amplified in a study by Danielian and Page (1994: 1056). In a study of American television news aired between 1969 and 1982, Danielian and Page found that “business

topics are considerably more visible in the television news in the US and Europe” (1994: 1056). More so, the results from their study also revealed that corporations were also mentioned most frequently of all interest groups reported in the news. In another study, Grant and Dimmick illustrated that events happening in corporate and business news dominated local television news in the USA (2000: 400). Further, another interesting finding from the study by Grant and Dimmick was that “corporate video news releases have been found to play a role in agenda building in the USA” (2000: 400).

On the other hand, evidence from other studies suggests that political candidates and corporations do not necessarily influence news frames (Esrock, Hart, D’silva and Werking 2002: 67). Esrock *et al.* suggest that instead of being impacted by the events and frames from the corporations, “journalists follow, as part of their interpretive practice, their own discursive strategies for handling corporate press news releases and that they introduce frames, thus maintaining primary press release frames while reframing secondary frames” (Esrock *et al.* 2002: 67). Moreover, a consensus among these scholars point to the fact that journalists are not always reporting on what the political candidates and organizations do and say. Rather, reporters often chose to cover any aspect of the election campaign or organization that is independent from the influence of the candidates or that is more interesting. The assertion made by Esrock *et al.* (2002 :67) resonates with the argument made by Wagner and Meyer when they contended that no matter how much the political actors and corporations may influence how the media report its stories, “much of what the people hear and read in the news is ultimately determined by the journalists and editors” (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367). For Wagner and Meyer, the media still retains its gatekeeping role in news covering that allows it to frame political candidates and organisations in a manner suitable for them. In additions, these scholars argue that “media outlets are systematically more likely to sample messages from some political actors than from others because they have a partisan bias towards specific parties” (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367).

To illustrate, the gatekeeping role of the media where it engages in the process of sampling bias is commonly driven by “supply side or demand side factor” (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367). What this means is that on the supply side the, the proximity of a media house to an ideology, organisation, institution or social group will motivate the media outlets to report more on that particular political party or candidate. On the demand side the media’s frames are influenced by

the type of the audience they are trying to please. To illustrate this assertion Wagner and Meyer highlighted that:

if some media outlets are closer to specific parties in ideological, organizational and institutional terms, those outlets are may report more about those actors and be more responsive to their messages. On the demand side, media outlets will differ in the political actors their readers support, and it may be that (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367)

Expanding on the argument that the proximity of a media house to a particular ideology, organization, institution or social group will motivate the media outlets to report more on that particular political party or candidate, Richardson stressed that journalistic discourse possess some very unique and definite textual features, some particular means of text production and consumption, and is defined by a “particular set of relationships between itself and other agencies of symbolic and material power” (Richardson 2007: 1). Put differently, what this means is that news text is affected by a myriad of factors like the “language of journalism, its production and consumption and the relations of journalism to social ideas and institutions. These three forces are so much integrated such that it is difficult to extricate or separate them (Richardson 2007: 1). Fairclough states that the key forces (language, production and consumption and the relation of journalism to social ideas and institutions) are different elements but not discrete (2000: 122). To illustrate his argument, Fairclough argued that the gathering and creation of the news is closely connected with the activities and views of (habitually powerful) social groups.

A considerable amount of literature has proved that the media occupy a special role in society because it either works to inform, disinform and in some instances it fans partisanship (Deacon *et al.* 2016 and Faris, Roberts, Etling, Bourassa and Benkler 2017). For instance, Faris *et al.* in a study that analysed both mainstream and social media coverage of the 2016 United States presidential election found that the media in the USA is rooted in different traditions (2017:3). On one hand was the media that was aligned to the leftist tradition while the other one was rooted in the right-wing tradition. Owing to that, the media coverage of the election was biased towards a candidate while delegitimising the other candidate. To add, the results of Faris *et al.* study also revealed that “on the conservative side, more attention was paid to pro-Trump, highly partisan media outlets. On the other side, by contrast, the centre of gravity was made up largely of long-

standing media organisations steeped in the traditions and practice of objective journalism” (2017: 4).

In another study, Deacon *et al.* offered a comprehensive account of how the print media and broadcasting media covered the elections campaign in the period leading up the British elections (2016: 183). Findings from this study indicate a growing increase in media polarisation during the campaign periods. To illustrate, Deacon *et al.* argued that “the news media reporting -print and broadcast-reflected the increasingly fragmented party system in that both the SNP and UKIP received unprecedented amounts of coverage in the UK wide election” (2016: 183). More so, the results from this study also illustrate a growing bias in how the newsprint cover the campaign. To support this assertion Deacon *et al.*, argue that most newspaper openly supported the Conservatives party and its policies and representatives and covered it in a favourable manner as opposed to other small political parties and their candidates (Deacon *et al.* 2016: 183).

More so, Kostadinova analysed how print media cover election promises of different political candidates (2015: 636). The analysis of the pledges and the newspaper articles in the period between 1990 and 2009 revealed that the pledges that are made by main political opponents are more likely to be covered than those that were from smaller political opponents. More so, the study also illustrates that the media was more inclined to cover stories that were related to economic policy in elections. To add, another interesting finding from this study was that the print media did not focus on ideological priorities of political candidates and their parties but were more disposed to report on their economic pledges and personalities (Kostadinova 2015: 636). These observations are closely related to the argument that was made by Iyengar and McGrady (2007: 55). According to Iyengar and McGrady “journalists have a tendency to report on what political elites are doing or planning to do, often ignoring other policy actors who are deemed to be less newsworthy than officials” (2007). For Iyengar and McGrady, media coverage is therefore driven and affected by the actions of “political elites, real world events, and competition for readership, more than partisan logics or journalists’ preferences” (2007: 55). Put together, findings seem to suggest that news media tends to cover the strategy of campaigns and personality. By strategy of campaigns the media is normally biased to follow and given more coverage to a candidate who is leading in the campaign or the political figure who appears to be the favourite of the public.

Studies over the decade have shown that partisan bias is a dominant factor that affects the media reporting and framing of political parties and their candidates (Baumgartner and Bonafont 2015; Larcinese, Puglis and Snyder 2011; Wagner and Meyer 2017). An underlying consensus that has emerged from media and political bias studies is that newspapers have a habit of favouring incumbents with campaign messages that resonate with their editorial agenda, and their political philosophy. For instance, Wagner and Meyer argue that “partisan bias may also affect what the media report on messages of political actors” (2017: 414). Put differently, media coverage of election or political events and political actors is likely to be more favourable to individuals than others. To add, Wagner and Meyer observed that during political campaigns and elections, partisan media have a habit of “deemphasising negative stories or scandals about political actors they prefer and overemphasise the faults of disliked ones” (2017: 145). In their study, Wagner and Meyer found that “partisan bias affects the micro-level coverage of individual party press release by the media” (2017: 145). To add, these scholars also indicate that the messages with a high news value are reported more if the message is from an actor the outlet is biased towards or favour more. In relation to Wegner and Meyer’s argument, Baumgartner and Bonafont argued that the media coverage of political actors reflects the opinions, preferences and links that are inherent between political parties and certain media outlets (2015: 280). Wegner and Meyer said, “media coverage reflects the preferences and partisan links between political parties and individual media outlets, which lead to important inequalities on how newspapers cover different parties” (2015: 280). What this simply means is that in any given political events, some political elites would have more favourable media coverage than other. This will also depend on the political orientation and ideological affiliation of a journalist (Baumgartner and Bonafont 2015: 280).

Similar to the above, Larcinese *et al.* emphasised that media tend to favour political parties and certain political candidates based on two grounds (2011: 1178). Firstly, the media behaves in a partisan manner because the bias is an institutionalised mode of operation within the system of a certain media outlet. This kind of set up is referred to as “political parallelism” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 6). Hallin and Mancini argued that media partisan coverage of political candidates is rampant in the media system where there is political parallelism. In this case, political parallelism describes “how the political system and the media system are tied to each other and how well different political views are represented in the media” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 6). Simply put, what Hallin

and Mancini meant is that in a system where political parallelism is high; there are greater chances for journalists to display bias in their reportage (2004: 6).

The existing body of research on the political economy of the media has established that economic competition exerts influence on the type of the media content and framing on news (Hallin and Mancini 2004 and Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). For example, Hallin and Mancini argued that “commercial pressure can encourage media to differentiate themselves politically” (2004: 186). Findings from the study conducted in Austria by Hallin and Mancini revealed that “in case of Austria, a formerly stable, institutionalised party-press parallelism has perhaps been replaced by a more flexible, economically driven partisan bias determined by market interests.” What this means is that the media content and framing of issues in this case has ceased to be influenced directly by political allegiance to political parties. Rather, their content is now driven by the need to satisfy the needs of their consumers who are inevitably aligned to a political party ideology of political actors. The assertion above can further be explained by what scholars’ term as the “profit motive” of the news media. These scholars argue that the media are business who are interested in generating profit. Because of that, the nature of their content is driven by the need to retain readers and viewers test.

More so, existing research also recognises the critical role played by media ownership on media frames and news content (Hanretty 2014, Stetka 2012 and Yanich 2010). A consensus among these scholars is that there is a direct relationship between ownership of a newspaper and the news content that the newspaper produces. For example, Yanich argued that ownership matters in the production of news on local media outlets (2010: 51). In a study that examined the relationship between local news content and ownership structure in 17 television markets in the United States, Yanich observed that “the station-level ownership profiles positively affected local content” (2010: 51). Put differently, Yanich argued that “consolidated ownership profiles of individual stations can negatively affect the amount of content on the station.” In another study Stetka explored the “various practices of business and political instrumentalization of media by their local owners, often” (2012: 433). Findings from this study highlight that business and political instrumentalisation of media normally result in constrained editorial independence and increasing intertwinement of the systems of media, politics and the economy. In a different study, Hanretty examines the level of owners influence in 211 different print and broadcast outlets in thirty-two

diverse states in Europe (2014: 235). In this study, Hanretty argued that the influence put on journalists by the owners of the media inevitably affect the type of news content and the editorial policy of that media outlet.

In addition, Okech's study in Kenya examined how media ownership forms shape content in the Kenyan media (2008: 45). Findings from Okech's analysis of two Kenyan newspaper revealed that ownership patterns affected news coverage in the 2002 Kenyan elections. Okech argued that "the emerging winner in the election was the candidate with most coverage from the newspapers" (2008: 45). More so, the study also revealed that the media coverage of the election was personality driven. Therefore, put together the findings from this study suggest that "objectivity though practiced in some instances, it widely affected by the editorial line of the said newspaper" (Okech 2008: 45). Moreover, communication scholars stressed that concentrated private ownership of media institutions affects the type of content that is given to the public (Bagdikian 2000; Baum and Zhukov 2019; Herman and Chosky 2002 and McChesney 2000). For example, Baum and Zhukov argued that if newspapers are privately owned, chances are that those newspapers are likely "free to follow the whims of individual owners, that may be driven by profit, ideology, and a sense of civic duty" (2019: 37).

Like the findings made by Baum and Zhukov (2019: 39), Bagdikian argued that ownership merging incumbers the multiplicity of news, as well as plummeting its public and foreign policy content (2000: 55). Similarly, Gehlbach and Sonin argued that "media ownership typically influences media bias, but media ownership itself is endogenous to the anticipated bias under state and private ownership" (2014: 163). In the case of government press these scholars argue that the government owned media content is heavily affected by "the mobilising character of the government" (Gehlbach and Sonin 2014: 163). Simply put the government affect the content and framing of issues in cases where it needs the public to take a plan of action. As such, the government would not hesitate to influence the media it controls to report in a biased manner. To illustrate, Gehlbach and Sonin argued that government control and its mobilising character increases bias in news content and "the bias in news reporting reduces the informational content of the news" (2014: 163). In another study, Besley and Prat found that even without clear censorship, the government often influence news content by preserving an intricate association with the media (2006: 720).

However, even though previous studies provide useful insights on institutional and structural factors that affect media frames, such expositions are unsatisfactory because they fail to account for the role of culture and discourse in influencing the media frames.

News values and their impacts on journalistic discursive practices

News values refer to "the criteria of news selection and presentation of events as published news" (Caple and Bednarek 2016: 435). Harcup and O'Neill defined news values as "as systems of criteria central to the decision-making process as to what will or will not be selected as news and as ideological constructs (2017: 71). According to Caple and Bednarek news values help explain that makes something "newsworthy" (2016: 435). As a concept, newsworthiness can be traced to the seminal work of Galtung and Ruge (1965). These scholars put forward a system of aspects describing events that together can be used as defining "newsworthiness"⁸. To achieve this, Galtung and Ruge (1965) focused on newspapers and broadcast news to devise a list that they used to describe what they believe were significant contributing factors as to how news is constructed. In their seminal study, Galtung and Ruge described news values as a "chain of news communication" (1965: 55). According to these scholars,

'chain of news communication' involves processes of selection (the more an event satisfies the "news factors", the more likely it is selected as news), distortion (accentuating the newsworthy factors of the event, once it has been selected), and replication (selection and distortion are repeated at all steps in the chain from event to reader) (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 55)

Moreover, Galtung and Ruge's concept of news values was based on three compounding hypotheses. Firstly, the two scholars argued that "the more factors an event satisfies, the higher the probability that it becomes news. Secondly, they argued that these factors will tend to exclude each other and finally, the events that satisfy none or very few factors will not become news. Galtung and Ruge argued that news values cannot be universal because they vary between different

⁸ The concept of newsworthiness means the worth of a happening or issue to be reported as news, as established via a set of news values (such as Negativity, Proximity).

cultures. In support of Galtung and Ruge's concept of news values, Joye, Heinrich and Wöhlert (2016: 5) opined that:

Among the many lists of news values that have been drawn up by scholars and journalists, some attempt to describe news practices across cultures, while others have become remarkably specific to the press of certain (often Western) nations. In Western practice, decisions on the selection and prioritisation of news are made by editors based on their experience and intuition, although analysis by Galtung and Ruge showed that several factors are consistently applied across a range of news organizations.

Galtung and Ruge (1965) theory of news values was later tested on the news presented in four different Norwegian newspapers from the Congo and Cuba crises of July 1960 and the Cyprus crisis of March-April 1964. According to Joe *et al.*, Galtung and Ruge (1965) hypothesis of news values was tested in various countries and "the results were mainly consistent with their theory and hypothesis" (2016: 6). Later in 2001, Galtung and Ruge's (1965) work was updated by Tony Harcup and Deirdre O'Neill (2001) in a seminal study that focused on the British press. Harcup and O'Neill's content analysis study that analysed three main national newspapers in the United Kingdom was important in that it developed a set of values that could be applied to the contemporary world. Forty years on, they found some notable differences, including the rise of celebrity news and that good news (as well as bad news), was a significant news value, as well as the newspaper's agenda. They examined three tabloid newspapers.

Yan argued that methodologically and conceptually, "news values can be approached from four different perspectives: material (focusing on the material reality of events), cognitive (focusing on people's beliefs and value systems), social (focusing on journalistic practice), and discursive (focusing on the discourse)" (2020: 41). Moreover, Bednarek stressed that a discursive perspective tries to systematically examine how news values such as Negativity, Proximity, Eliteness, and others, are constructed through words and images in published news stories (2019: 157). This approach is influenced by linguistics and social semiotics and is called "discursive news values analysis" (DNVA). It focuses on the "distortion" step in Galtung and Ruge's chain of news communication, by analysing how events are discursively constructed as newsworthy (1965: 65).

However, in a briskly embryonic market, achieving relevance, giving audiences the news, they want and find interesting, is an increasingly important goal for media outlets seeking to maintain

market share (Reichstein and Brusch 2019: 1063). This has caused news establishments to be more open to their audience contribution and opinion and forced them to embrace and apply news values that attract and keep audiences. Given these changes and the rapid rise of digital technology in recent years, Harcup and O'Neill updated their 2001 study in 2016, while other scholars have analysed news values in viral news shared via social media. The progression of co-operative media and citizen journalism is swiftly changing the traditional difference that exists between news creators and docile audience and may perhaps in future lead to a redefinition of what "news" means and the role of the news industry (Reichstein and Brusch 2019: 1063).

News values

A myriad of internal and external factors poses a great amount of pressure on the journalistic decision (Moyo, Mare and Matsilele 2019: 490). This pressure is more common and heavily felt during the decision-making processes. Many different factors have the potential to influence whether an event is first noticed by a news organisation, second, a story will be written about that event, third how that story is written, and fourth whether this story will end up being published as news, if so, where it is placed (Harcup and O'Neill 2017: 1470). Owing to all these considerations, Moyo *et al.* argued that "there is no end to the list of news criteria" (2019: 490). Damstra and De Swert opined that there are multiple competing lists of news values (2020: 146). These can be classified into two categories. The first category includes aspects of events and actors. While the second category involves the aspects of news gathering and processing. Cape and Bednarek argued that:

the selection criteria of news include not only the newsworthy aspects of happenings or news actors, or the professional practices of journalists, but also external aspects that impact journalism practice, such as the influence of proprietors or advertisers, meeting deadlines or competition among news providers (2016: 445).

Therefore, in the following sections, the various news values that affect news selections are briefly discussed.

Values in news actors and events

Frequency as a news value is associated with the events that occur abruptly and are in accordance with the news organisation's agenda are more likely to be reported more than those events that occur slowly or at the ill-timed moment of day or night (Damstra and De Swert 2020: 146). In the concept of frequency, continuing developments and trends less likely to obtain plentiful coverage (Harcup and O'Neill 2017: 1470). Moreover, timeliness, according to Galtung and Ruge refers to the selection of news events that have only just happened, are current, ongoing, or are about to happen are newsworthy (1965: 67). Familiarity also refers to the selection of news that has a lot to do with people or places close to the target audience. Harcup and O'Neill prefer the term proximity for this news value, which includes geographical and cultural proximity (2017: 1470). Negativity is commonly associated with bad news. According to Damstra and De Swert, "bad news is more newsworthy than good news" (2020: 1464). Every so often referred to as "the basic news value". Contrariwise, it has also been put forward that positivity is news value in certain cases (such as sports news, science news, feel-good tabloid stories (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 67). Conflict is also another prominent news value. Conflict involves news selection predicated on the opposition of people or forces resulting in a dramatic effect. According to Caple and Bednarek events with conflict are often quite newsworthy (2016: 435). The news value of conflict is sometimes included in negativity rather than listed as a separate news value. Unexpectedness is a selection of news based on events that are out of the ordinary, unexpected, or rare are more newsworthy than routine, unsurprising events (Harcup and O'Neill 2017: 1470). Moreover, ambiguity explains how news is selected based on events whose implications are made for better copy than those that are open to more than one interpretation, or where any understanding of the implications depends on first understanding the complex background in which the events take place (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 67).

Values in the news process

Continuity is one of the most common value in the news process. According to Tandoc Jr and Oh continuity involves a situation where a story that is already in the news gathers a kind of inertia (2017: 997). Continuity is common because the media organisations are already in place to report the story, and partly because previous reportage may have made the story more accessible to the

public (making it less ambiguous) (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 67). Composition is also commonly cited by various scholars as a dominant factor in the news processes (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Tandoc Jr and Oh 2016; Harcup and O'Neill 2017). Muddiman and Stroud argued that composition refers to the idea that stories must compete with one another for space in the media (2017: 586). For instance, editors may strive to offer a balance of dissimilar types of coverage, so that if there is an excess of foreign news, for instance, the least important foreign story may have to make way for an item concerned with the domestic news (Muddiman and Stroud 2017: 586). In this way, the prominence given to a story depends not only on its news values but also on those of competing stories. Competition also plays a crucial role as a news value in the news processes. What this means is that commercial or professional competition that exists between media may lead a journalist to endorse the news value given to a story by a rival (García-Perdomo, Salaverría, Kilgo and Harlow 2018: 1180). Caple and Bednarek argued that in news processes co-option occupies a crucial place. According to these scholars co-optation as a factor in news processes explains the types of a story that is only slightly newsworthy in its own right may be covered if it is related to a major running story (2016: 445). Further, prefabrication in news processes explains a story that is slight in news terms but the way it is presented may influence its selection as newsworthiness. Reichstein and Brusch argued that “prefabrication involves a story that is marginal in news terms but written and available may be selected ahead of a much more newsworthy story that must be researched and written from the ground up” (2019: 1063). Joye *et al.* argued that the predictability of a story affects its selection as newsworthy (2016: 5). According to these scholars, “an event is more likely to be covered if it has been pre-scheduled” (Joye *et al.* 2016: 5). Damstra and De Swert identified that the impact of the story on the audience allows it to be selected as newsworthy (2020: 1464). For Damstra and De Swert “the impact of a published story (not the event), for example, whether it is being shared widely (sometimes called Shareability), read, liked, commented on. Engaging with such analytics is now an important part of newsroom practice” (2020: 1464). Reichstein and Brusch argued that the logistics of covering a news story play an important role in determining the newsworthiness of a story and therefore its publication. Reichstein and Brusch “although eased by the availability of global communications even from remote regions, the ability to deploy and control production and reporting staff, and functionality of technical resources can determine whether a story is covered” (2019: 1062).

Nevertheless, drawing on the two categories of the news values discussed in the previous sections. It is assumed that the *IOL* and *News24* news selection processes and reportage of the ANC 2017 election conference where the focus was specifically placed on the political and leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa were in part influenced by any of the news values highlighted above. It is assumed that news personnel at *IOL* and *Ns* decision to cover certain aspects of the ANC elective conference, Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa was influenced by as systems of criteria central to the decision-making process as to what will or will not be selected as news and as ideological constructs (Caple and Bednarek 2016: 435). Additionally, drawing on the material perspective of the news values, it is further presumed in this study that certain aspects of the event itself (ANC 2017 December elective conference) heighten the likelihood of it becoming 'news'. These aspects include the popularity of the ANC as a ruling party, the popularity of Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa and the conflict that arose during the voting process in the conference.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature that is relevant to the study. This chapter is significant because it placed the study in focus. Four sets of literature were reviewed. Firstly, the chapter reviewed the literature on media and legitimization strategies. Secondly, it reviewed the literature on the media framing of political leaders. Thirdly, it also reviewed the literature on the framing and presentation of female political leaders. The chapter discussed the literature on the various factors that influence media frames and news content. Finally, the concept of news values and how they affect the news processes was unpacked in the chapter. The next chapter presents and discusses the conceptual analysis and theoretical framework of the study.

Chapter 6: Theoretical and conceptual framework

Introduction

The previous chapter has focused on the review of relevant literature and presented three main areas of attention. The chapter also gave a historical overview of the surrounding issues relevant to this thesis. This current chapter presents the theory upon which this study is based.

The study sought to examine how with the use of frames *News24* and *IOL* legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The framing theory is presented and discussed on how it naturally informs on the ideas of this thesis. The framing theory has been the subject of debate for many years and the discussion about its role and place in communication and political communication continues unabated. Nevertheless, in this current study the researcher examines the theory's main attributes and the debates which surround them. When that is done, the researcher sets out to engage and apply some of the elements that are applicable to this current study.

Framing theory

The history of framing theory can be traced from two different disciplines. According to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), framing has both psychological and social roots. From the psychological point of view, the studies conducted in relation to framing have revealed that the same information that is presented to a similar audience can lead people to think differently or make different decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). For example, Kahneman and Tversky cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury argued that the reason why there is always a difference in the interpretation of the information presented to people "is that a given consideration needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use" (2007: 8). What this means is that the processing of information that one does is directly or indirectly influenced by the frames of reference already existing in a person's head. To illustrate this assertion, Scheufele and Tewksbury argue that if a person does not understand or comprehend a certain notion or topic,

that exact concept is not an accessible thought, and as a result that individual cannot be affected by any frame associated to that concept (2007: 8). Nevertheless, equivalence framing is related to the concept of loss and gain (Bazerman 1984 and Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In this case, frames are purposefully and logically equivalent. However, that logically equivalent information is presented in a certain way that either encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context. Moreover, these “different but logically equivalent frames” motivates the individual to change their preferences in relation to an occurrence (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 263).

In relation to that Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar argue that equivalence frames are every so often presented in terms of opposite terms like “gains versus losses, full versus empty, fat versus fat-free” (2016: 8). Furthermore, in their study, Cacciatore *et al.* stressed that individuals are more averse to risk when presented with the making choices in terms of gains (2016: 8). On the other end, if the same information is presented in terms of loses the same individuals are more risk-seeking. Additionally, Kahneman and Tversky indicated that “human choice is more contingent on the description of choice problems” (1979: 263). To add, these scholars argued that when individuals are presented with outcomes defined as potential gains, individuals expressed risk aversion and chose certain payoff. But when the same outcome is presented in terms of losses rather than gains, individuals portray the attitude of risk seekers. Therefore, from its psychological roots, framing is understood to be how the information is presented as opposed to what is being presented (Cacciatore *et al.* 2016: 8). These types of frames are commonly used and associated with research that is related to framing effects (Scheufele and Iyengar 2014). Because of that, equivalency framing is beyond the scope of this section. This is so because in this study the researcher did not examine the effects of the frames on an individual as they receive information, but examine how the media create and employed frames they used to legitimise and de-legitimise the Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the battle for the ANC presidency in 2017.

The application of the framing theory in the field of sociology has revealed that framing encompasses the creation of meaning and how people succeed in making sense of their day-to-day interaction with the world (Cacciatore *et al.* 2016; Entman 1993; Entman 2007). Scholars like Cacciatore *et al.* defined this kind of framing as emphasis framing because certain sets of consideration are emphasised over the others (2016: 19). Emphasis framing is understood as a

persuasion technique in which case focus is placed on those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context. The process of giving salience and consideration to a topic and concept is central to this study. This is so because this study endeavours to unpack how the use of certain frames (consideration of issues over others) was utilised by the media to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Moreover, the sociological roots of the framing theory can also be traced back to the works of Goffman (1974). In his study, Goffman argued that individuals make use of schemas of interpretation. Essentially, this means that individuals make use of a framework that assists them in making an otherwise hollow sequence of events into something that is meaningful (Goffman 1974: 63). Therefore, this type of framing symbolises the process of communication where central organising ideas form the basis of the information that is to be communicated is presented. To illustrate, Gamson and Modigliani argued that emphasis framing must be understood as "central organising ideas" that gives meaning to a stream of unfolding events (1989: 3). Nevertheless, Shulman and Sweitzer argued that emphasis frames are common in studies that seek to examine how political issues are thematically portrayed, or the content being communicated (2018: 155). Thus, in this study, the researcher endeavours to examine the way the media engages in the process of "organising ideas" to create a narrative that assists them in legitimising or delegitimising the two political candidates who were vying to succeed Jacob Zuma as state president. Additionally, emphasis framing will be applied to this study to explain how *News24* and *IOL* emphasised on certain issues and presented them in such a way as to legitimise and delegitimise the leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Framing defined

Different scholars have come up with differing definitions of the concept of framing (Goffman 1974, Gitlin 1980 and Shulman and Sweitzer 2018). For example, Entman asserts that framing can be conceptualised as "the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connection among them to promote a particular interpretation" (2007:164). This definition emphasises the notion of selection and negation of other parts of an event and chose others to present them in a way that favours a pre-determined outcome. In relation

to the definition proposed by Entman (2007); Tewksbury and Scheufele (2007) argued that framing as known in the media is predicated on the key assumption that how a particular issue is categorised in the news reports can highly influence how the same issue is understood by the audience. More so, Scheufele and Iyengar said, “framing effects refer to behavioural or attitudinal outcomes that are not due to differences in what is being communicated, but rather to variations in how a given piece of information is being presented (or framed) in public discourse” (2012: 13). Similarly, Gitlin defined framing as the process that involves “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of selection, emphasis, and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse” (1980: 23). This definition helps echo Pan and Kosicki’s conceptualisation of framing (1993: 57). According to these scholars, framing is a conscious or unconscious stratagem of creating and meting out news discourse or characterisations of the discourse itself (Pan and Kosicki’s definition 1993: 57). Tuchman (1987) cited in Chong and Druckman 2007: 103) stressed that frames in communication “organise everyday reality”. They do so by providing "meaning to an unfolding strip of events" and promoting "particular definitions and interpretations of a political issue" (Shah *et al.* 2002 cited in Chong and Druckman 2007: 103).

In relation to Shah *et al* (2002) cited in Chong and Druckman (2007: 103), Jamieson and Campbell suggest that frames activate knowledge, stimulate “stocks of cultural morals and values, and create context” (1997: 72). By so doing, frames occupy a central position in communication as it is. Similarly, Maher argued that framing is “a process by which potential elements are either included or excluded from a message or its interpretation by virtue of a communicator’s organising principles” (2001: 99). Moreover, for scholars like Van Gorp, framing is the way in which journalists shape the news within some latent structures of meaning as well as the way audience view the world as journalists do (2007: 60).

However, the huge number of definitions attached to the concept of framing is alarming. It is proof positive that a lot of conceptualisation and operationalisation of the concept has been tried by many scholars (Maher 2001; Pan and Kosicki 1993; Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Van Gorp 2007). Whether they succeed or not that is beyond the scope of this study. However, for the purpose of this study, it is apparent that framing involves the process of communication through organising principles or ideas that are employed in the creation of reality characterised in news reports that help promote a certain interpretation. Therefore, this definition extended to this current study will

help to explain how in the process of communication journalists actively engage in the process of mental interpretation, presentation, prominence and omission of issues when they were reporting on the political contestation between Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

In reporting (constructing) of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, *News24* and *ILO* can be said to have gathered and put together some elements of the two leaders' leadership qualities in a bid to construct a reality that was reflected in their news discourses. Consequently, in exploring how the two-news media construct the reality in their reporting it is inevitable for the researcher not to consider the constructive approaches within the study. Thus, this study will inevitably infuse the constructive approach as it explores other framing approaches that might be pertinent to this study.

Central to the process of framing is the use of frames. According to Gamson and Modigliani frames can be understood as "interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue" (1989: 3). For these scholars, lying at the heart of this package is "a central organising idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue" (1989: 3). Similarly, Gitlin argues that frames are broadly unspoken and unacknowledged, that is crucial in organising the world for journalists who report them and to some extent, for the ordinary individual in most instances rely on the news report presented to them by the journalist (2003: 44). At the core of this current study is the need to elicit and explain the central organising ideas that affected and motivated the construction of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as national and political leaders in South Africa. To achieve this, this study adopts the standpoint that there is an unspoken interrelationship between "the microcosmic elements in a given message and the macrocosmic worldview of the communicator" (Maher 2001: 6).

Furthermore, Scheufele argues that framing should be understood on two levels. These two levels are macro level and micro level (1999: 103). For this scholar, as a macro construct, the concept "framing" can be interpreted as the styles of presenting information that reporters and other correspondents utilise to present information in a manner that reverberates with prevailing underlying schemas amongst their audience (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007: 8). Moreover, schemas are defined as "cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus including its attributes and the relations among attributes" (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 131). For Entman, schemas play a vital role in that they assist the audience to process and make sense

of new messages by deciding, deliberately or involuntarily, how the messages presented to them fit into their understanding and feelings about their surrounding environment (2007: 163). Thus, in the process of making decisions on how to tell the stories, journalists need to insert for their consumers prompts on how that narrative adheres with their entrenched attitudes and ideals. In relation to that, Reese took a step further and applies the element of time (2007: 148). To that end, this scholar argues that “frames are organising principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese 2007: 148). Thus, drawing from the previous assertion by Reese (2007: 148), it can be argued that in framing the leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, journalists at *News24* and *ILO* did not just create and impose their particular world views on their audience, rather they evoked time-tested worldviews and paradigms that were in sync with those of their intended audience. This can be explained by Tuchman (1987) cited by Scheufele (1999: 119). Tuchman argues that “the mass media dynamically set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events” (Tuchman 1987 cited by Scheufele 1999: 119). In relation to the previous assertion, Neuman, Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) cited in Scheufele (1999: 119) assert that the mass media give a spin to any given story. It achieves this by considering their “organisational and modality constraints, professional judgments, and certain judgments about the audience” (Scheufele (1999: 119).

According to Reese frames are “structures that draw boundaries, set up categories, define some ideas as out and others in, and generally operate to snag related ideas in their net in active process” (2007: 150). Owing to this assertion, one can reason that frames must not be seen in the light of mere story topics or themes such as crime or business (Chambwera 2016: 45). Rather, frames are fundamental in that they construct specific meanings around topics through emphasis, interpretation, and omission. Drawing on this line of reasoning, it can be argued that when analysing frames in the newspapers' stories as is done in the current study, it is of vital importance that one does so and rises above the text to investigate the influence around how the text was presented (Chambwera 2016: 45).

Moreover, D'Angelo demonstrates that framing is steered by a “combination of cognitive, constructivist and critical perspectives” (2002: 878). The cognitive paradigm of frames explains the process of individual interaction with the media text and then make use of their prior knowledge

or interpretive schemas to make meaning of the text. According to D'Angelo in a cognitive state “frames exist as prior knowledge, used by individuals to “efficiently” process information conveyed in news frames” (2002: 878). To illustrate this point, individuals can also converse about political issues using their mental frames about those issues (Gamson 1992: 44). This relates to Neuman *et al.*'s observation that a person's prior knowledge makes available a basis to “alternatively accept, ignore, and reinterpret the dominant frames offered by the media” (1992: 44). On the other hand, the critical paradigm examines frames as “controlling, hegemonic and tied to larger elite structure” (Reese: 2007: 150). Moreover, the constructionist paradigm perceives news reporters as originators of interpretive packages of the viewpoints of politically interested patrons and a frame can dominate news coverage for a long time (D'Angelo 2002: 870). The argument of the constructivist paradigm relates to Gamson and Modigliani's assessment of frames. They perceive frames as “central organizing principles” (1989: 25). However, while the current study lies heavily within the constructivist paradigm, it also borrows some ideas from the critical paradigm in as far as it examines power contestations manifesting as well as influencing the frames used and applied by *News24* and *ILO*. The cognitive paradigm is applied in this case to explain how the constructed portrayal of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were supposed to reverberate with the cognitive schemas of their addresses.

Episodic and thematic frames

A further useful distinction of frames can be seen in the works of Gross (2008), Iyengar (1990) and Scheufele (1999). According to Gross, frames can be separated into episodic or thematic frames (2008: 169). Episodic frames are events or context. Fundamentally, episodic frames are constructed in a manner that helps to limit the audience's comprehension of problems or political issues in the context of what is being reported, not making any connection between problems (Gross 2008: 169). According to de Vreese episodic frames can also be referred to issue-based frames (2005: 51). For de Vreese, issue-specific frames allow for “a profound level of specificity and details relevant to the event or the issue under investigation” (2005:51). This ensures a high level of issue-sensitivity. On the other hand, thematic frames are understood as the types of frames that place issues within the wider context. Gross argued that thematic frames allow the audience

the privilege to create connections between problems and place them in broader and inclusive societal discourse (2008: 173). However, placing the two types of frames in context, thematic frames was more applicable in this thesis, considering that the study aimed to examine the representation of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the context of an election. To achieve this examination, the context within which the press reported the two political candidates had to be examined from a perspective of thematic rather than episodic frames. The assumption informing this study is that the representation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa was informed by deep embedded historical narratives as well as the broader social discourse of politics in the country.

Scheufele and Tewksbury said that there are two types of frames, namely media and individual frames (2007: 9). This is so because frames are understood as schemes that are operationalised to present and to understand the news. Scheufele and Tewksbury's (2007: 9) assertion derives its inspiration from the argument put forward by Kinder and Sanders who argued that, "frames serves both as devices embedded in political discourse, which is equivalent to the concept of media frames, and as internal structures of the mind, which is equivalent to individual frames" (1990: 77). To illustrate, frames, therefore, consciously and unconsciously organise the world both for journalists who report it and to some considerable extent for those who rely on the news report from the journalists (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 9).

Media frames and individual frames

Media frames are normally understood as "the central organising idea or storyline that provides meaning to unfolding strips of events" (Gamson and Modiglian 1987: 37). Central to this type of frame is the "essence of the issue". This type of frame also assumes that the frames and media's role predicated on turning hollow and nonrecognisable activities into a noticeable occurrence. In relation to that, Tuchman cited in Fountaine and McGregor (2001) also conceptualised media frames as the type of frames that organise everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality. It also perceived as an important feature of the news. What this means is that media frames "are central to journalism as they work as routines for journalists that allow them to swiftly identify and organize information and to package it for efficient relay to the audience"

(Gitlin 1980: 79). Therefore, the concept of media framing can comprise the intention of the source, but the purposes can also be unintentional.

On the other end, the individual frames are defined as the “information-processing schemata of individuals and media frames as attributes of the news itself” (Gitlin 1980: 78). According to Friedland and Zhong “frames are bridges that connect the broader social and cultural spheres and everyday understanding of social interaction” (1996: 2). Scheufele defined individual frames as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individual processing of information” (2012: 13). To that end, there are also two levels at which this type of framing can operate. What this means is that two levels of reference can be used to interpret and process information: global and long-term political view and short term, issues related to framings. According to Scheufele global political views are a result of certain personal characteristics of individuals and have a rather limited influence on the perception and interpretation of political problems, short term, issue-related frames of reference can have a significant impact on perceiving, organizing, and interpreting incoming information and on drawing inferences from that information (2012: 13). Similarly, McLeod argued that individual frames refer to the “cognitive devices that operate as non-hierarchical categories that serve as a form of major headings into which any future news content can be filed” (1987: 78). To add, Chong and Druckman argued that individual frames refer to an individual’s mental comprehension of a specific situation (2007: 101). These scholars said, “unlike frames in communication, which reflect a speaker’s emphasis, frames in thought refer to what an audience member believes to be the most salient aspect of an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 101). Thus, from these assertions, individual frames denote the process through which the audience make sense of the political news they receive from the media.

This study is more concerned with media frames as opposed to individual frames. Essentially, individual frames are not applicable to this current study because they are concerned with how the audience receives the frames as presented to them by the media. Whereas this study is interested in examining how the media frames operate in constructing meaning that influenced the representation of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Frames as independent and dependent variables

Scheufele categorised frames into independent and dependent variables (1999: 103). On one hand, dependent frames involve the various factors that influence the creation and modification of various frames. For example, at the media level, a reporter or journalist may be influenced by a myriad of factors such as social-structures or organizational variables (Scheufele 2007: 9). In this study media frames analysis is useful as it helps to address the question: what other factors influence the journalists or other societal groups to frame certain issues in the way they do it? Shoemaker and Reese argued that the dependent frames can refer to the effects of the individual or ideological disposition of an individual, while at the individual level, dependent frames are an outcome of the way an individual can frame an issue (1996: 34). Basically, dependent frames look at the relationship of frames to other variables. Thus, it can be assumed that the frames that were used to report news on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were probably influenced by other surrounding factors such as the journalistic culture of an organisation or the individual organizational culture of that certain organization.

In this study, the research question: what other factors influenced the framing of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will be examined from the perspective of media frames as dependent variables. Dependent variables are of crucial importance because they will help in this current study to explain the outcome (frames) of the production process. This includes organisational pressures, journalistic routines, and elite discourse (de Vreese 2005: 52).

On the other hand, independent frames are concerned with the frames that are independent of other variables. In this type of frames, the main issue is the question: what kind of frames influence the audience's perception of certain issues, and how does this process work? Scheufele argued that in independent frames, "the most logical outcome is a link to audience frames" (1999: 108). However, since the main question that is answered by the research that examines media frames as independent variables is limited to "what kind of media frames influences the audience's perception of certain issues, and how does this process work" (Scheufele 1999: 108). These kinds of media frames will not be applicable to this current study.

Framing and agenda setting

The terms framing, agenda setting, and priming have attracted substantial scholarly attention since their introduction (De Vreese 2005; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Scheufele 2012). Generally, agenda setting refers to the notion that there is a strong and solid correlation that exists between the emphasis that a communicator places on any given issue (e.g. 'based on relative placement or amount of coverage') and the significance given to those specific issues by the receiving audience (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176). Scheufele defined agenda setting as "the transfer of salience from mass media to audience" (2012: 13). Thus, what agenda setting means is that if a certain topic is covered more frequently in the new media, there are high chances that the audience will regard the most covered issue as more important (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176). However, priming refers to "the changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 63). In simple terms, priming is understood to function when news content suggests to news audience that they ought to use specific issues as yardsticks for assessing the conduct and performance of social and political leaders. Iyengar and Kinder said priming is when "media coverage makes an issue more salient in people's minds, this issue is also more likely to be used as one of the standards by which governments, policies, and candidates for public office are judged" (1978: 63).

Scheufele stressed that priming is normally seen as an appendage of agenda setting (2007: 13). In this case, priming is said to be an extension of agenda setting based on two reasons. Firstly, both agenda setting and priming are grounded on a 'memory-based model of information processing' (Tversky and Kahneman 1973: 208). To illustrate, Iyengar and Kinder argued that the models assume that people form attitudes based on the considerations that are utmost salient and available to them when they are faced with a situation that requires them to decide (1987: 35). In relation to that, Tversky and Kahneman stressed that "judgments and attitude formation are directly correlated with the ease in which instances or associations could be brought to mind" (1973: 208). Secondly, priming is argued to be an extension of agenda setting based on the theoretical foundations. Collins and Loftus argued that when making some issues more salient in the audience's mind (agenda setting), the media can affect and influence the considerations that people consider when making judgments about political candidates or issues (priming) (1975: 409).

However, for the purpose of this study, a distinction between agenda setting and framing is analysed. The relationship between the two has sparked a continuous debate (Cacciatore *et al*,

2015). According to the De Vreese the main difference between the two concepts is that while agenda setting deals with the salience of issues, framing deals more with the presentation of those issues (2005: 1). Agenda setting is defined as the idea that there is a strong relationship between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues and the importance that the audience place on those same issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972 cited in Scheufele 2007). Framing, therefore, differs greatly from agenda setting simply because it is founded on the assumption that how an issue is characterised in the news reports is likely going to have an influence on how its intended audience will receive and understand it (Scheufele 2012: 45).

Drawing on Scheufele's model of agenda-setting and framing classification, the difference between agenda-setting and framing will be explained by examining two questions. These are: a) how the news messages are processed and b) how the effects are produced (Scheufele 2007: 148). These questions will be tested against the two theories simultaneously.

News processing

According to Scheufele another level of comparison between agenda setting and framing can be done by comparing the differences that exist between the model of media effects (2007: 13). To that end, the question that should be asked in this comparison is whether the consumers of the news content encounter the same experience when they are exposed to the two processes (agenda-setting and framing). Simply put, the comparison is premised on questioning the amount of attention to news content that an individual need for the two processes to take place. For framing scholars (Scheufele 2012; 2007; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007), it is normal to assume that framing effects take place only when the audience of the news content place considerable attention to the news messages. For example, Scheufele argues that "the content and implications of an issue frame are likely to be most apparent to an audience member who pays attention to a news story" (2007:13).

On the other end, a similar logic of comparison can be applied to the agenda-setting process. Eveland argues that "people attending to a message and engaging in some level of elaboration of it are most likely to recall information about it later" (2004: 177). Essentially, what this means is

that the accessibility of an issue- and therefore its place on the agenda - may be higher when people attend to messages about it. However, from the above illustration, it may seem that agenda setting, and framing are operating at the same phenomenological process, but within the process of news processing by the audience lies a significant distinction. Scheufele reasoned that “attention to messages may be more necessary for framing to occur than an agenda-setting effect” (2007: 14). The argument advanced by Scheufele (2007: 14) is similar to the findings from Chong and Druckman’s study (2000). Chong and Druckman suggest that the mere repetition of frames may have a huge effect on the less knowledgeable persons that are less focused to marginal prompts but more “more knowledgeable individuals are more likely to engage in systematic information processing by comparing the relative strength of alternative frames in competitive situations” (Chong and Druckman 2000: 45)

Therefore, drawing on the assertion by Scheufele (2012; 2007 and 1999), the most evident distinction between agenda setting and framing based on the model of effects is that sheer exposure to the news texts is enough to trigger the process of agenda-setting, but it is not the same with the framing process. For the framing process to set in motion, it needs more than exposure to the news content. An individual requires both exposures and that the audience pays enough and thoughtful attention to the messages as they are presented to them with latent meaning packaged in various forms (Scheufele 2007: 9).

Locus of effects

Another level of comparison of framing and agenda-setting is the “locus of cognitive effect” (Scheufele 2007:15). According to Scheufele “in both framing and agenda-setting the audience process information provided by the news and store it in memory” (2007:15). Agenda setting approach is premised on the memory-based models of information processing and this makes it fall within the framework of accessibility model. Price and Tewksbury argued that the agenda-setting effects believes that the crux of effects is dependent on the heightened and increased accessibility a topic or issue obtains from its handling in the news (1997: 481). Drawing on this analysis, it can be postulated that in agenda-setting, it is not the information about the subject/issue that influences the audience. Rather it is the amount of processing time and consideration that is

placed on an issue that conveys the effect. Contrary, the framing approach assumes that the locus of effects lies within the description of an issue or the label used in news coverage about the issue. Scheufele argues that “it is the underlying interpretive schemas that have been made applicable to the issue that are central effects of a frame” (2007: 15). Therefore, from the level of psychology, the difference that exists between framing and agenda setting is the matter of “whether we think about an issue and how we think about it” (Scheufele 2007: 16).

Second level agenda setting

Scholars like McCombs and Shaw argued that there is no convincing comparison that can be drawn between agenda setting and framing (1972: 176). To illustrate this argument, McCombs argue that framing can only be understood as an extension or improved form of agenda setting (2005: 453). From McCombs and Shaw's framework of agenda setting, framing refers to making characteristics of an issue more prominent by presenting them to the audience in different modes, as a result shifting audience's attention (1972: 176). Weaver, McCombs and Shaw coined this aspect “second level agenda setting” (2004: 273). Ghanem likened framing to agenda setting because it is concerned with the process of how the news media tell the audience about how to think about issues (1997: 3). Moreover, Entman defined framing “as the process of selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendations for the item described” (1993: 51). However, reacting to Entman's (1993) definition of framing, McCombs and Ghanem argued that Entman's definition can be rephrased to read hence: “framing is the construction of agenda with a restricted number of thematically related attributes in order to create a coherent picture of a particular object” (McCombs and Ghanem 2001: 89). Additionally, expanding his earlier definition, Entman stressed that “agenda setting is equal to successfully performing the first function of framing, that is, to define problems worthy of public and government attention” (2007: 163). Therefore, for Entman attribute or second level agenda setting encompasses framing's main business of highlighting the causes of problems, encouraging moral judgments and promoting favoured policies (2007: 163).

Though the definition of Entman (2007) highlighted above, is regarded as one of the best and widely cited, most scholars have criticised it for failing to explain the similarity between framing and agenda setting (Cacciatore *et al.* 2015; Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). For example, Scheufele and Iyengar (2012) stressed that the definition of framing proposed by Entman (2007) has brought a lot of confusion when it tried to differentiate from agenda setting. Scheufele said, “the all-encompassing definition of framing also helped set the stage for a conceptual vagueness surrounding the concept of framing that is still lingering in many studies on the topic today” (2012: 6). However, Scheufele stressed that the imprecision in the early definitions has led scholars like McCombs (2005) to propose for framing to be regarded as the appendage of agenda setting (Scheufele 2012:7). McCombs (2005) was motivated to call framing an extension of agenda setting chiefly because of the definition given by Entman (1993) that refers to salience, which is normally regarded as a key characteristic of agenda setting. Nevertheless, Scheufele and Iyengar note that a group of scholars who call for framing to be regarded as extensions appendage of agenda setting contend that mass media “influence audience perceptions by highlighting the importance of issues (first level agenda setting) or issue attributes (second level agenda setting, which they see as equivalent to framing)” (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012: 9).

Therefore, one key difference between priming, agenda setting, and framing is that priming, and agenda setting are “accessibility-based effects” (Iyengar 1990: 21). According to Funkhouser cited in Scheufele, “media coverage can influence perceptions of salience among the lay audience, either for particular issues or attributed of issues (Funkhouser 1973 cited in Scheufele 2012: 7). Effectively, what this means is that the amplified salience means that pertinent nodes in the minds of the mass media consumers get stimulated and that this stimulation is distributed to interrelated ideas (Collins and Loftus 1975: 407). Consequently, these sets of nodes are easily and readily accessible and thus “retrievable from memory when we have to make decisions about candidates or policy choices and are more likely to influence our attitudes and evaluations” (Iyenga 1990: 23). On the other end, framing is based on “applicability effect” (Price and Tewksbury 1997: 481). To illustrate, scholars who believe framing to be based on applicability effect argue that a frame is enervated or reinforced based on their applicability to a certain cognitive schema (Price and Tewksbury 1997: 481). In simple terms, the presentation of an issue or information (i.e., frame) makes it less or more probable for that information to be processed by means of utilising a certain schema. In relation to this, Bruner and Minturn (1955) cited in Scheufele (2012) note that, “If

presented (or framed) in a sequence of numbers, the stimulus is more likely to be processed as a number, but if presented in the context of other letters, it is more likely to be processed as a letter” (Bruner and Minturn 1955 cited in Scheufele (2012: 19).

Therefore, the different theoretical foundations of “accessibility and applicability effects” have significant effects for fathoming the mechanism through which agenda setting, priming, and framing is premised. For instance, Scheufele argues that the theoretical mechanisms suggest that accessibility effects function collectively across the mass media audience (2012: 8). However, this does not rule out the moderating effect of the level of influence that political sophistication or pre-existing knowledge on an issue have on agenda setting or priming. Iyengar and Kinder’s seminal work has already revealed that the political sophistication and pre-existing knowledge have significant and moderating effects on agenda setting and priming (1987: 35). Thus, in summation, the underlying theoretical assumption of agenda setting and priming stress that a topic can be primed or made prominent to the audience, even if they do not possess any background information of that issue (Scheufele 2012: 9). On the contrary, the applicability models believe effects like framing are dependent and vary in strength depending on an audience’s established schemas (Scheufele 2012: 9). Thus, for Scheufele, in framing, “the representation of information will be significantly more likely to have an impact if it resonates and is applicable to audience members mental schemas” (2012: 9). To illustrate, what the above quote entails is that the effects of framing in the audience are less likely to occur if the mass audience does not possess the relevant schemas or pre-existing knowledge of the issue reported by the media.

Carragee and Roefs argued that combining framing with agenda-setting fails to take into consideration certain means in which frames create meanings and how they advance certain modes of perceiving topics (2004: 218). In addition to that, these scholars further argued that if we reduce framing to the level of agenda, we risk the problem of ignoring how certain frames apply to various issues and how a sole topic position can be a by-product of a single frame (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 218). To illustrate their argument, Carragee and Roefs used the example of American policy from the aftermath of World War II to the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991(2004: 218). They said an examination of this event (Soviet Union's dissolution) may assist in identifying frames as they relate to certain countries, for instance, Vietnam. However, an investigation of that nature may neglect “that the ideological character of the Cold War frame informed news coverage of

American policies in many nations across four decades" (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 218). Relating the above assertion to this current study, the argument could be imperative in that an agenda-setting perspective may pay attention to the ideology operating at the time of the event neglecting how even a pre-independence ideology, for instance, one-party state, could have informed the news coverage of the two newspapers.

The pedigrees of agenda-setting, and framing can also be another aspect that can be used to differentiate the two concepts. Carragee and Roefs argued that while agenda-setting has its ancestries in media effects, the same cannot be said about framing (2004: 218). For these scholars, framing is different from agenda-setting because its roots are deep and can be traced from the sociological research of scholars like Goffman (1974: 76). To add, framing can also be seen to have originated from the sociological work of Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980). These scholars researched on how different frames could inform news production as well as the implications that the frames have ideologically. However, drawing on the above discussion, it is reasonable to argue that while attribute agenda-setting may describe the attributes of an object of particular news coverage which are meant to promote a particular meaning, frames are what informs the production of the news in the first place. It is frames and framing that govern what attributes will be attached to a specific object. To illustrate, Borah argues that in political matters "framing refers to the characterisations of a course of action where a central organising idea provides meaning to the event." (2011: 248). It therefore appears from these scholars that although agenda setting and framing are harmonising, they are essentially not similar and the demand for framing to be treated at second level agenda setting places restricting limits on the functionality of frames. In a nutshell, this study, therefore, draws on the assertion by Reese (2011: 52). Reese asserts that "while the two (framing and agenda setting) are associated agenda setting does not take into account the more dynamic organising ability of frames" (2011: 52). Similarly, Chibuwe (2013) cited in Chambwera (2016: 52) argues that "it is the frames that a media organization employs that determine the salience given to the objects as well as the objects attributes" (Chambwera 2016: 52).

Framing and culture

This study examined the use of framing to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma during and after the 2017 ANC elective conference. This electoral conference can be described as a highly competitive environment. Chong and Druckman argued that “politics is typically competitive, fought between parties or ideological factions and the issues that are debated are framed in opposing terms” (2007: 99). In relation to that Carragee and Roefs note that the dispersal of political, economic and cultural resources in any given society has a tendency of shaping frame sponsorship and framing contests, thus studying the construction of reality through framing essentially encompasses the investigation of power (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 216-217).

The above-discussed framing position resonates with Hall's (1997) argument on framing and power. Hall contends that social and political power cannot be overlooked when one is examining media effects (1997: 51). Similarly, Entman echoed Hall's (1997) argument and stressed that framing occupies a central position in the political process (Entman 2007: 163). What this means is that power as we perceive it and speak about it is not a sanctuary of the select few but “frame production is a multifaceted process in which influence travels in different directions” (Borah 2011: 250). Therefore, the fact that the production of frames is affected by a plethora of factors that operate at different dimension paves way for the inclusion of the discussion of discourse and power in this study. Discourse and power are some of the variables that influence the production of media frames (Hall 1997: 55). Consequently, the use of Michel Foucault's (1980) concepts of discourse, power/knowledge will be unpacked in the following sections.

Apart from power, culture is another notion that has been neglected by framing (Van Gorp 2007). Van Gorp contends that there is a need to examine “how frames as part of culture get embedded in media content, how they work and how they interact with the schemata of both journalists and the audience member” (2007:61). Hall stress that culture is the sphere of construction and dissemination of meaning between members of a society (Hall 1997: 55). News reporters in news media deliberately or unconsciously hand-pick frames drawing from the innumerable cultural reserves of frames that are readily accessible. These stocks of frames are in sync with a person's belief system together with other influences inside and outside the media situation (Van Gorp 2007: 61). As a result, this study adopts the view that framing encompasses the interchange that happens between the “textual level” (that is frames applied in the media) the extra-media level (the

discourse of frame sponsors) and the reserves of frames that are readily available and accessible in any given culture (Van Gorp 2007: 63).

Framing, discourse power/knowledge

This study employed the Foucauldian perspective to examine the frames that were used by *News24* and *ILO* when they covered Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To investigate framing from a Foucauldian point of view, this study adopted the view that the news media in South Africa operate as political institutions who are also products of the power dynamics and are responsible for diffusing the power relations embedded in the broader South African society.

Frames are referred to as “largely unspoken and unacknowledged” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 13). The concept of discourse as proposed is relevant to this study as it proposes the analysis of text beyond its face value. Discourse analysis presupposes the analysis of the present text beyond its surface attributes (Foucault 1980). In this study, the approach that was adopted aimed to explain the frames that were utilised by *News24* and *ILO* to explain “the history of the present” (Foucault 1980: 90). According to Hook, when one seeks to explain the history of the present, they engage in the process where they “interrogates the present, examines its values, discourses and understandings with recourse to the past as resource of destabilising critical knowledge.” (2001: 20). This is the reason in the previous chapter the researcher sought to evaluate the background of the two leaders (Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) and how they arose to become prominent individuals both at a party and national level. Moreover, as concluded by Maher (2001: 99) that the “the microcosmic elements of the text need to be related to macrocosmic elements outside the text” relates perfectly with the proposition made by Hooks when he contends that:

If one is to guard that one's analytic efforts do not result in mere markings of textuality, with limited political relevance, restricted generalisability, and stunted critical penetration, then it will be necessary to corroborate the findings of textual analysis with reference to certain extra-textual factors (history, materiality, conditions of possibility) to drive the analysis of the discursive through the extra-discursive (Hook 2001: 38).

Foucault defined discourse as “the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (1980: 66). Bloor and Bloor stressed that “discourse can also refer to actual written text or spoken data, and to the whole act of communication involving production and comprehension, not necessarily entirely verbal” (2017: 153). According to the above assertion, discourse can therefore be understood as the process of communication that encompasses notions like environment, contextual information or knowledge that is common to both a producer of text and their audience. Further, Mills stresses that when Foucault refers to “the general domain of all statements” he was referring to all “meaning-producing utterances and statements which have some effect” (Mills 2003: 53). Further, by “individualisable group of statements”, Foucault referred to utterances which combine into a grouping as in when we refer to a discourse of femininity (Foucault 1980: 66). More so, Foucault refers to discourse as “the regulated practices that account for a number of statements are the unwritten rules and structures which produce particular utterances and statements” (Mills 2003: 53). Taking a closer look at the expression that “the regulated practices that account for a number of statements”, the expression gives the impression that discourse bears some semblance to frames. It can therefore be inferred that frames are an integral part of the discourse and as such, corroborating framing and the Foucauldian concept of discourse in this current study assisted in answering the research questions: What other political, economic and social conditions that may have informed the framing of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma?. Moreover, the concept of discourse was a useful tool in helping the researcher to understand the context that influenced the coverage of news by *News24* and *ILO*. It also laid the foundation for the critical discourse analysis that was employed as a data analysis technique in this study.

Conceptualising framing as a function of discourse, therefore assisted the researcher to dig deep beyond the written text in our analysis. This is because as argued by Hook, discourse analysis equips the author with the ability to interchange simultaneously in or out of the media text (2001: 38). In addition to that D’Angelo also stressed that frames are two folded in their functioning, they are both “internal structures of the mind” and “devices embedded in political discourse.” (2002: 23). Consequently, in adopting this line of reasoning the study tried to circumvent the shortfall of treating “frames as mere story topics or object attributes” (D’Angelo 2002: 23). As such, this study

concur with Carragee and Roefs who argued that frames should not be treated as simple story topic (2004: 220).

According to Mills, the concept of discourse that was advanced by Foucault is intrinsically connected with power relations (2003: 34). Foucault argued that “the relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of discourse” (1980: 93). Therefore, trying to understand discourse, “through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp, precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power” (Foucault 1980: 70). Consequently, in this study explaining frames utilised by *News24* and *ILO* to frame the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made it easy for the researcher to understand the power relations that were obtained in the period leading and during the 2017 ANC elective national conference. Nevertheless, it is imperative to highlight how:

Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault 1980 in Mills 2003: 54-55).

In line with the above assertion, it can be noted that frames like discourse are “open to resistance and contestations” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 115). In addition to that Chong and Druckman note that politics is naturally competitive, as a result, issues that are produced for public discussion are framed in binary terms (2007: 115). Therefore, when explaining frames that were employed by *News24* and *ILO*, the researcher is disposed of in explaining framing in a competitive environment in which different news media could use a single frame but, in an effort, to advance a conflicting discourse. This approach will, therefore, avoid the pitfall of making frames “all-powerful organizing principles whose authenticity and authority could never be challenged” (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 115). This is because, in communication, there are chances that numerous frames can be adopted in direct or indirect incongruity to each other.

In every discourse, there are rules and conventions that give discourse identity and actualise its functional parameters. Foucault argued that “the rules of formation are conditions of existence for

a particular discourse” (1989: 24). In simple terms, the functioning of any given discourse is reliant on several enabling conditions. Drawing on this line of thinking, this study adopted the approach that discourse emanating from *News24* and *ILO* were influenced and informed by a myriad of “historical, institutional, cultural, political, economic and social practices operating as discourse conditioners or enablers” (Chambwera 2016: 55). The discourse enablers or conditioners could include the history *News24* and *ILO*, the ownership set up of the newspaper, a cultural practice that informs news production and reporting, economic and socio-political dynamics that are obtaining in the country and in which the two media institutions were operating. The discourse enablers occupy a crucial place in the process of frame production. To illustrate the above, Fourie notes that in the process of text creation, there are clusters of people who are guided by text production conventions that in turn out to be discursive practices (2009: 22). Therefore, this study examined these discursive practices in its endeavour to explain the frames that were used by *News24* and *ILO*.

Foucault argued that there is no such thing as neutral knowledge (1980: 69). For him, all knowledge, all “scientific” discourses, are intrinsically and intimately bound up with power. This would form what Foucault referred to as power/knowledge. Mills argues that knowledge discourses work within “institutions with their own “technologies” or techniques to regulate social conduct” (2003: 38). Therefore, it seems from the above expression that knowledge is a form of power which also operates to disseminate power (Foucault 1980: 69). This could be said about the media as producers of knowledge. The media is understood as key players in producing knowledge. Chambwera argues that “the media are key in knowledge production thus they become conduits for various relations of power in what Foucault calls the politics of knowledge” (2016: 57). To substantiate the above assertion, it can be argued that the knowledge that is communicated by the media is not value-free (Chambwera 2016: 57). Since the process of obtaining knowledge is continuous in nature, it follows that the media are very cautious to utilise relevant frames that reverberate with the fixed mental schemas of their targeted audience (Chambwera 2016: 58). This observation compares to Foucault’s assertion concerning the 18th-century researcher and knowledge. Foucault asserts that “the 18th-century researches that were not just based on the collection of raw data but in terms of schemas which were more or less clear or conscious for them” (Foucault 1980: 74). Framing encompasses the process of linking some facets of reality to inspire a specific way of processing and interpreting information among the audience (Entman

2007: 169). For Foucault, power relations “go right down into the depth of society... they are not localised in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes” (Foucault 1995: 27). Drawing on this line of thinking, this study adopts the view that the forces involved in the process of frame production employed in the construction of the reality of the political leadership Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma are not solitary but multi-faceted.

Because power and knowledge are complementary, this current study examines how *News24* and *ILO* were involved in communicating text and meaning replete with power when they were disseminating news. Whose goal was to legitimise or delegitimise either Cyril Ramaphosa or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Foucault argues that, “as a discourse fixes text with a specific meaning, it disqualifies other meanings and interpretations” (1980: 65). Further, Foucault speaks of this discursive process as “reducing the contingencies (the other meanings) of text, in order to eliminate the differences which could challenge or destabilise the meaning and power of the discourse” (1980: 65). Therefore, this study endeavours to interrogate how the vacillation of power manifesting through frames in online press reports operated to legitimise or delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The study draws inspiration from Foucault’s argument that “one cannot confine oneself to analysing the state apparatus alone if one wants to grasp the mechanisms of power in their detail and complexity” (Foucault 1980: 69).

Moreover, Foucault argued that power and knowledge complement each other (1980: 65). According to Mill power and knowledge supplement, each other and one way this happens is through “the commentaries of discourse: the statements or texts which continually reaffirm the meanings enacted by the discourse, without ever breaching the discursive paradigm” (2003: 42). Therefore, the media has become political establishments that are incessantly entangled in power contestations. The entitlement is noticed in the way the media seek to legitimise or delegitimise political actors (Chambwera 2016: 79). Consequently, this study examined how *News24* and *ILO* made claims for power by means of framing the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. This study interrogated how by such framing there was a conscious effort to legitimise or delegitimise the two leaders that were contesting for the ANC presidential post.

To add, Foucault also argues that for power to function successfully, there are certain discourses of truth that require operationalisation (1980: 93). In that regard, Foucault contends that, “we are

subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (1980: 93). It appears that one of the principles and function of journalism is truthfulness. As such the media can therefore be viewed as a crucial player in the production of truth in any given society. Chambwera notes that framing is one of the ways in which the media operationalise the truth (2016: 57). To illustrate, the media simply uses frames to construct, package and contest the truth. More so, Foucault argues that we need to concern by the means in which "power disregards the rules of right and instead invest itself an institution"(1980: 93). Drawing inspiration on this assertion, this study therefore examined how power manifested itself in *News24* and *ILO* when they framed Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political leadership.

Conclusion

This chapter seeks to unpack the theory that informs the study. It explains the framing theory and the concepts of discourse power/knowledge as formulated by Foucault in 1980. The origins of framing are explained. It highlighted that framing has both sociological and psychological roots. Moreover, the difference between agenda setting and priming, and framing and agenda setting is discussed in depth. The relationship that exists between framing, culture, power and its elements is unpacked and linked to the key research questions. Further, the Foucauldian discourse of power/knowledge is employed to explain how frames as every so often unspoken and unacknowledged form part of the discourse which construct and is produced by knowledge. It is also highlighted that news power and knowledge are dependent variables. Having engaged the theoretical and conceptual framework that guided the thinking of this study, the next chapter presents the methodological processes that was undertaken to complete this study.

Chapter 7: Research methodology

Introduction

This current chapter focuses on the methodology employed in the study. This section is vital to this work because it answers two main questions: How was data collected and/or generated? The second question is, how was that data presented and analysed? In this case, the researcher gives a detailed outline of the research approach that was employed to arrive at the answers he sought when embarking on this study. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to provide a thorough description of the actions that were taken by the researcher to investigate the research problem. A rationale for the application of each step is also elucidated in this section. To that end, the following sections were discussed in this chapter: research paradigm (interpretivism) , research design and approach (qualitative cultural study approach) , research strategy (case study), data collections procedures (content analysis), sampling of data (purposive sampling), quality control measures (trustworthiness) and modes of data presentation and analysis (thematic and critical discourse analysis).

Interpretivism research paradigm

This study is an explanatory in nature. It falls within the interpretivism research paradigm. Neuman defined interpretive research as a kind of study that is concerned with how “people interact and get along with each other” (2014: 89). In other words, it is the “systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain social worlds” (Neuman 2014: 106). Neuman notes that the main aim of conducting interpretive research is to “develop an understanding of social life and discover how people construct meaning in a natural setting” (2014:104). The main aim of this study is to examine how *News24* and *ILO* constructed and created meaning when they reported on the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma during the 2017 elective conference. Drawing on the Neuman’s

definition of interpretive research, this study takes the view that the press as they report the news, are engaged in the process of creating and maintaining their social worlds (2014: 80; 104).

More so, Neuman argues that the interpretive research involves conducting a very close and detailed reading of the text to gain a profound and deep understanding of any given text (2014: 104). In this case, the text would mean a broad combination of written words, pictures or conversations. Evidence from various scholars suggests that interpretive researchers conduct research to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning that is hidden within a text (Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano and Morales 2007; du Plooy, Davis and Bezuidenhout 2014; Leedy and Ormrod 2005; Neuman 2014). This study, therefore, falls within the interpretivism paradigm because it is one of its endeavours to engage in the analysis of news text that was constructed by *News24* and *ILO* when they reported on the ANC 2017 elective conference. This study aims to examine how *News24* and *ILO* text on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was loaded with meaning in forms of frames that aim to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership qualities of these two presidential candidates. According to du Plooy *et al.* the true meaning of the text can only be reached through a detailed examination and study of the text, by contemplating its many messages and seeking the connections among its parts (2014: 103). Thus, this study takes the approach that the true meaning of the text can never be obvious on the surface. Instead, it can only be reached out through a detailed examination and study of a text (Neuman 2014; du Plooy *et al.* 2014). As a result, the study endeavours to scrutinise the text constructed and produced by *News24* and *ILO*. In this case the researcher tries to navigate the inside of that text and draw out the viewpoint that the text presents in its entirety. This process helps the researcher to develop an understanding of how each text relates to the other parts of the broader social context.

The cultural studies approach

Evidence from various studies suggests that the cultural studies approach research “traverses the intersection of the text, power relations, and knowledge” to gain an understanding of how and in what manner reality is constructed (Marshall and Rossman 2011 cited in Chambwera 2016: 68). Mass media discourse plays a crucial role in reflecting a certain culture and catalysing its creation. According to Zelizer central to the cultural study of journalism is “it’s subjective expression, the

constructed nature of its meanings for events, the politics of identity building and the grounding of each of these premises in practice” (2004: 176).

This study draws on British cultural studies which can be traced to the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies which was established in 1964 at Birmingham University. The most common work in that field was that of Stuart Hall (1980) and Raymond Williams (1983). To add, British cultural studies was a breakaway from English studies and was influenced by Marxism which was inclined to expose the working conditions of the British working class (Zelizer 2004: 98). Scholars who form part of this class perceive “culture as everyday practice” (Hall 1997 and Allan 2004). For instance, Hall (1997) and Allan (2004) view culture not in terms of the “the high and popular culture but as everyday practices” (Chambwera 2016: 59). In relation to that, Turner views cultural studies as “the need for seeing the cultural process as a whole, so that the textual analysis of media products (for instance) should be conducted in relation to an analysis of the institutions and social structures producing them” (Turner 1996: 52).

More so, Turner also argues that cultural studies scholars like E.P. Thompson (1924-1993) perceived culture as “a lived network of practices and relationships that constitute everyday life, within which the role of the individual subject had to be foregrounded” (Turner 1996: 63). This study endeavours to examine how the news press represent the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, the examination of the frames that were used by *News24* and *ILO* is literally an examination of the lived experience of media practitioners, their institutions and the social structures that constitute them (Chambwera 2016: 60). Additionally, Ziauddin and Loon stressed that the cultural studies approach seeks to investigate the issue at hand in terms of “cultural practices and their relation to power” (1999: 9). Woo, Rennie and Poyntz describe cultural studies as “theoretically and methodologically catholic” (2015: 285). What this means is that cultural studies are multidisciplinary because it borrows from a discipline like sociology, psychology, linguistics and anthropology (Ziauddin and Loon 1999: 48). Therefore, the introduction of cultural studies in this study occupies a significant place. It brings framing and cultural studies together to link the sociological approach to framing with the constructionist approach in cultural studies (Chambwera 2016: 60). For the purpose of this study culture is defined as the process of meaning making in any given society. Moreover, the term culture is applied to include the context of existing meanings and the dynamic which stimulate the production and

dissemination of new meanings (Lewis 2002: 3). This culture may be formed and operate through a broad range of social groupings and social practices: for examples, family, neighbourhood, age-group, ethnic group, religion, workplace, text style, clothing style, nation, globe and so on (Storey 2018: 45).

Evidence from various scholars suggests that interpretive research has eight different typologies (du Plooy *et al.* 2014; Leedey and Ormond 2005 and Neuman 2014). These are hermeneutics, constructivism, ethnomethodology, cognitive, idealist, phenomenological, subjective, and qualitative sociology. This study falls within the sphere of social constructivism. Social constructivism presupposes that there is no such thing as a predetermination of reality (Amineh and Asl 2015; Yin 2003). Instead what we understand as reality is socially constructed. According to Creswell *et al.* social constructivism is a world view that assumes that people seek understanding of their world in which they live and work (2007:19). These scholars argued that “individuals develop subjective meanings of their experiences-meanings directed towards a certain object or things” (2007: 19). This study sought to examine how the news press constructed the reality (through the framing of issues) that was aimed at legitimising or delegitimising Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. According to Neuman social constructivism research takes the form of an inquiry that perceived individuals as social actors (2014: 104). These individuals are continuously engaged in the creation of meaning through their day to day “interaction with other (hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives” (Creswell *et al.* 2007: 21).

As a result, this study sought to construe the construction of news content by the press as social actors who are actively engaged in the construction of reality around the personality and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Drawing on Neuman’s argument that “social reality is fluid and fragile, and people construct it as they interact with others in an ongoing process of communication and negotiation” (Neuman 2014: 34), this study took the view that reality as it is constructed, it is more or less limited to context, time, space and groups or individuals in a particular situation and cannot be “generalised into one common reality” (Neuman 2014: 34). Consequently, the constructed nature of news stories justifies the use of the constructivism approach in this study.

Hall notes that inside the constructivism approach lies two other approaches (1997: 67). These approaches are “semiotic and discursive approach” (Hall 1997 cited in Chambwera 2016: 60). According to Chambwera the semiotic approach is commonly linked to the work of de Saussure (1916) whereas the discursive approach is related to the Foucauldian works on discourse and power/knowledge (Chambwera 2016: 60). Nevertheless, this study draws on Foucault's (1980) concept of discourse, power/knowledge. This is because it is assumed that media content is a dynamic indicator of the common issues that pertain to culture (Gamson and Modiglian 1989 cited in Chambwera 2016:61).

In addition, scholars like Terre Blanche *et al.* note that the constructionist approaches seek to determine “how the versions of the social world are produced in discourse” (2006: 282). This study aimed to examine, and construe frames utilised to construct meaning around the leadership and political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the period leading, during and after the ANC 2017 elective conference. To achieve this, qualitative data in the form of words are examined in the “context of their cultural meaning and construction” (Neuman 2014: 105). Accordingly, drawing on Neuman’s view that constructivism scrutinises images and words in the context of their meaning (2014: 89). This research adopted the view that the cultural context in which *News24* and *ILO* framed the political and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is a structure of meanings (connotations and denotations) and practices and performances that work concomitantly to construct reality and aestheticism (Terre Blanche *et al.* 2006: 286). To add, the constructionist approach also assumes that the frames that were adopted and utilised by *News24* and *ILO* were a “re-enactment of the prevailing discourses and relational patterns broader society” (Chambwera 2016: 60).

Case study research strategy

This study adopted a qualitative case study research design as it seeks to examine how *News24* and *ILO* legitimised and delegitimise (using frames) the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Creswell *et al.* defined a research design as a map or structure that explain how the researcher will go about in collecting data that will answer the key research questions (2007: 67). Similarly, De Vaus and de Vaus noted that a research design serves the

purpose of making certain that the evidence obtained enables the researcher to answer the initial questions as clear as possible (2013: 2). Simply put, research design would refer to the plan a researcher puts in place to arrive at the evidence needed with the following questions in mind: “what type of evidence is needed to answer the questions (or test the theory) in a convincing way” (de Vaus 2014: 3).

Evidence from various studies suggests that case studies are the prime examples of qualitative research (de Vaus 2014; Neuman 2014 and Stokes 2003). Stokes defined qualitative research as a range of research paradigms that are “primarily concerned with meaning and interpretation” (2003: 3). For this scholar, qualitative researches are more typical of the humanities and approaches such as narrative analysis and genre analysis have been developed for the study of literature (Stokes 2003: 3). According to de Vaus case studies are believed to be the perfect example of qualitative research design because they normally adopt an interpretive approach to data (2009: 10). In simple terms, case study research “studies things in their context and considers the subjective meanings that people bring to the situation” (de Vaus 2009: 11). Baxter and Jack argued that case study research methodology allows the researcher to investigate complex phenomena in their context (2008: 544). In relation to that Yin (2003) cited in Baxter and Jack argues that qualitative research methods allow the researcher “to explore individuals or organisations, simple through complex intervention, relationships, communities, or programs” (Baxter and Jack 2008: 544). In simple terms, case study research ensures that the researcher explores the issue at hand from a variety of angles which in turn allows different aspects and corners of the issue to be revealed and understood (Baxter and Jack 2008: 544).

Research from various scholars revealed three situations in which a researcher can make use of a case study approach (Baxter and Jack 2008; Stokes 2003 and Yin 2003). Firstly, a researcher can adopt the case study when they need to address and answer “how” and “why” questions. Secondly, the case study approach can be employed in studies where the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study. Thirdly, a case study approach can also be used when the researcher intent to cover contextual conditions because the researcher has the conviction that they are pertinent to the phenomena under investigation. Finally, the researcher can also use the case study when there are no clear boundaries between the “phenomenon and the context” (Baxter and Jack 2008: 545). This study adopted the case study of the ANC 2017 elective conference to

investigate how the online press use frames to legitimise or delegitimise the political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the context of this study, the case is the news media legitimising and delegitimising political leaders. But the case could not be considered without a context, *News24* and *ILO* coverage of political leaders, and more specifically the ANC 2017 elective conference (Baxter and Jack 2008: 545). The choice of the case study strategy was therefore informed by the assumption that the boundaries between the case (*News24* and *ILO* legitimising and delegitimising of political leaders) and the context (ANC 2017 elective conference) are not clear. In simple terms, the case and the context are intertwined. Huberman and Miles defined the case as “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (1994: 430). To add, Baxter and Jack noted that the case is the unit/component of investigation or analysis (2008: 545). It will be impossible to answer the principles research question: how *News24* and *ILO* legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma? without considering the context within which the phenomena is unfolding (Baxter and Jack 2008: 545).

Various scholars have revealed that a common problem associated with the researchers who use case study approach “is the attempt to answer a question that is too broad or a topic that may have many objectives” (Baxter and Jack 2008; Creswell and Poth 2003; Miles and Huberman 1994; Stake 1995; Yin 2003). However, several suggestions have been brought forward to counter the problem associated with a case study approach. Baxter and Jack argued that the researcher using case studies should bind the case by “a) time and place b) time and activity and c) by definition and context” (2008: 545). Drawing on the model proposed by Baxter and Jack (2008: 545), this study adopted the case of the ANC elective conference that took place from 17 to 22 December 2017. Not every data was analysed in this case. The researcher analysed news articles that span from the period before and after the conference (1 October to 31 December 2017). The process of selecting and marking boundaries is important in the selection of the context because the boundaries help to guide the researcher on what falls in the scope of the research project. Baxter and Jack argued that “the establishment of boundaries indicate what will and will not be studied, they indicate the breadth and width of the study” (2008: 547).

Units of analysis

The unit of analysis for this study is online news articles that the researcher collected from the news archives of *News24* and *ILO*. Unit of analysis can be defined as the “what” of the study (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 45). Graneheim and Lundman defined a unit of analysis as the “great variety of objects of the study” (2003: 106). These scholars note that a person, an organisation, clinic or a programme can be used as a unit of analysis (Graneheim and Lundman 2003: 106). Patton defined a unit of analysis as “interviews or diaries in their entity, and the amount of space allocated to a topic or an interaction under study” (1987: 44). In the same vein, Weber notes that unit of analysis is “parts of the text that are abstracted and coded or every word or phrase is written in the transcript” (1990: 55). Similarly, Neuman notes that the unit of analysis refers to “what the researcher examines in order to construct summary descriptions of all such units and to explain differences among them” (Neuman 2014: 98). Drawing on Neuman’s definition, the term unit of analysis can therefore be extended to encompass “individuals, groups, organisations and social artefacts” (du Plooy *et al.* 2014: 45). Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole also noted that “a period of time can also be considered a unit of analysis” (2013: 44). However, this study elects to use online news stories from *News24* and *ILO*. These online stories can be regarded as social artefacts. This is so because according to Chambwera when newspapers and news artefacts are studied, every single editorial automatically becomes a unit of analysis (2016: 63). Consequently, in this study, editorials, analyses, news (political, business or economic), commentary and opinion pieces were chosen by the researcher with the belief that the news producers and their editors typically produce and publish content, even from the content contributors, that conforms to their prevailing and dominant acceptable frames (Chambwera 2016: 65). Thus, for the purpose of this study, every single story that comprises of some relevant information that relates to the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, be it editorial, analysis or “news” will be considered a unit of analysis. The choice to consider the entire story a unit of analysis is inspired by Van Gorp and Vercruysse assumption that “different framing devices are found throughout any story which combines to lead to the frames” (2012: 1274).

Data collection

Data were drawn from *News24* and *ILO* online archives. This was in the form of electronic news artefacts. As argued by Terre Blanche *et al.* data drawn from documents like newspaper articles, books, and official documents can be used in the gathering of qualitative research (2006: 86). To add, it can also be assumed that data from news articles and written documents are a good resource that can be utilised for constructionist analysis. This is so because news articles and books are of “a constructed nature and a means by which ideas and discourses are circulated in society” (Terre Blanche *et al.* 2006: 316). In this study, the researcher made use of online news stories as extant texts. According to Charmaz, there are two classes of text that can be used for analysis (2006: 98). These are elicited text and extant text. For Charmaz elicited text involves “research participants in the coming up of data” (2006: 98). This class of text may include data from interviews, internet surveys made up of open-ended questions (Charmaz 2006: 98). Whereas the extant text is the data from the text the researcher has no role in its construction. For instance, this type of text may include “public records, organisational documents, and mass media products” (Chambwera 2016: 62). Be that as it may, Charmaz argued that extant and elicited text can be applied in a study both as primary and secondary data. News articles that were used in this study are extant text applied as primary data sources. Each single news article in this study was considered as a point of “intersection for social discourses” (Terre Blanche *et al.* 2006: 316). As a result, to investigate frames that were utilised in any given story, every individual article becomes the entry point and work as a point of departure to unpack the range of forces and the practices that created it.

Data gathering and data corpus

In this study, the researcher retrieved relevant online articles/stories from *News24* and *ILO* archives. This is so because the use of the internet has made it simple. Three search engines (Google, Yahoo and Bing) were used as gateways to *News24* and *ILO* website. Content from the news archives of the two news websites was retrieved using search keywords. Personally, generated keywords like “Cyril Ramaphosa 2017, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 2017 and ANC Elective conference 2017” were typed in the search bar of each of the three categories (Business,

Politics and Economy). The search for news articles was only limited to *News24* and *ILO*. This was done to search for metadata that speaks to the leadership qualities and political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The search for the news articles was made easy because the websites of both *News24* and *ILO* allowed for a focused search using the date range. This provision allowed the researcher to limit the search of news articles relevant to the study to the period between 1 October 2017 and 31 December 2017.

Moreover, after the data corpus was gathered, meta information was attached to each article that resulted from the search. The meta information included the uniform resource locator (URL), date of publication, access date, search engine used, keywords used and source. This information was important because it helped in creating the data set, and ultimately offer more dimensions for the analysis of the thematic map later in the analysis of data.

Generating the data set

The results showed stories related to the candidates but stretched beyond the period of study. The initial total of these stories surveyed was 194 articles. The articles were all read in order to determine which once specifically focused on the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the process of reading and selecting the stories, the researcher was more interested and disposed of in selecting the stories that appeared in favour of or against either of the two candidates. *News24* produced 84 stories that were focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The researcher repeated the reading and selecting process in order to reduce the number of stories to the preferred benchmark. *ILO* produced 110 news articles that focused on the two candidates. Because the number of the article was beyond the preferred number, the researcher engaged in the process of reading and re-reading of the articles in order to select the best and suitable articles. The final batch of stories were those that reflected the news media's or author's position with regards to the leadership and political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. After the process of selection was done, the researcher was left with 100 news articles. The remaining contents were included in the data set and were relevant for analysis. The researcher created four folders that were titled:

- i) *News24* on Cyril Ramaphosa
- ii) *News24* on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma
- iii) *ILO* on Cyril Ramaphosa
- iv) *ILO* on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

The researcher then went on to print out these articles. They were printed because the researcher believed that coding would be easier and as such more reliable if the articles are in printed format.

Population and sample size

The population of the study was all the articles/stories found in *News24* and *ILO* from 1 October to 31 December which focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. A total of 100 (n=100) news articles/stories were purposively collected for examination. The sample included online articles from the Business, News and Politics sections of *News24* and *ILO*. The sample was broad enough to include articles from editorial, news articles, commentary and opinion pieces. The choice of this sample was informed by the belief that the Business, News, and Politics sections are the most read categories. They are also likely to have been constructed to communicate a certain type of discourse. Purposive sampling was utilised in this study because the researcher only needs to make use of relevant articles that spoke to the leadership qualities and political personality of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Moreover, the online news articles were collected based on the understanding that “they are suitable for constructivist analysis, as they have an obviously constructed nature and are a means by which ideas and discourses are articulated in society” (Chambwera 2016: 63).

A total of 50 online articles were retrieved from *News24* and *ILO* respectively. From *News24*, 20 articles were retrieved from the Business section (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and ten on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). Another 20 from the News sections (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and ten on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). This makes them 40 in total. The remaining 10 articles were retrieved from the Politics section of *News24* (five focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and five on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). Thus, the total number of online articles collected from *News24* was 50. Similarly, a total of 50 online news articles were also retrieved from the *ILO*. 20 news articles

were collected from the Business section (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and ten on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) and another 20 news articles from the News section (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and ten on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). More so, another ten articles were retrieved from the Politics section (five focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and five on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Sample of articles selected from *New24*

Category	Number of articles
Business/ Economy section	20 (ten for each candidate)
News/headlines Section	20 (ten for each candidate)
Politics Section	10 (five for each candidate)
Total	50

Source: T Muringa

Table 7.2: Sample of articles selected from *IOL*

Category	Number of articles
Business/ Economy section	20 (ten for each candidate)
News/headlines Section	20 (ten for each candidate)
Politics Section	10 (five for each candidate)
Total	50

Source: T Muringa

Duration of the study

Analysis in this study is based on the news displayed on the online version of *News24* and *ILO* online websites. The period of analysis spans from 1 October to 31 December 2017. Sensibly, the press conference announcing the nominees who were contesting for leadership positions of the ANC elective conference marked the beginning of the controversy and attracted widespread media coverage. This means that the sample included editorial, news articles, and commentary and opinion pieces in the pre and post congress coverage as well as the congress itself. In this study, editorial, news articles, commentary, and opinion were considered with the assumption that editors would mostly publish material, even from a contributor, that fits into the frames acceptable in their editorial policy.

Data Analysis

Inductive and deductive thematic analysis

This study employed thematic analysis to acquire themes that enable the presentation of data as well as facilitating the discourse analysis. Essentially, thematic analysis refers to a systematic process of “identifying patterns of meaning in a database” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 89). In this case, the goal of thematic analysis is to highlight the most prominent constellation of meanings existing in the data.

Evidence from different scholars has suggested that there are two ways of analysing data in thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998; Braun and Clarke 2006; Firth and Gleeson 2004; Hayes 2013). For instance, Braun and Clarke note that “themes or patterns within data can be identified in one or two primary ways in the thematic analysis process” (2006: 83). These scholars referred to these ways as inductive or bottom up and theoretical or deductive/ top down. In the inductive approach, the themes that a researcher identifies are closely related to the data itself (Hayes 1997 cited in Braun and Clarke 2006). Deductive or theoretical thematic analysis refers to the analysis that is theory driven. Du Plooy *et al.* noted that theoretical thematic analysis involves analysis that is theory-driven (2014: 97). Simply put, in the theoretical thematic analysis approach, the researcher does not need to go through all the finer detail of the data to choose the categories. The researcher

simply needs to make use of pre-existing knowledge and a conceptual organisation of the themes. Creswell *et al.* argued that “the theory-driven approach is particularly suited when there is already knowledge and a conceptual organization of the themes” (2007: 45). These themes should be analysed in the answers or when the goal is to test a theory. On the contrary, in inductive thematic analysis, the themes that the researcher analyse will not be related to the theoretical interest in the area or topic of inquiry. Therefore, in simple terms, inductive analysis refers to the process of coding data without the direct influence of the “researcher influencing the pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (Hayes 1997: 55). To that end, it can be noted that inductive analysis is “data-driven”. However, Braun and Clarke stressed that the assumption by inductive analysis that the analysis of data is independent of the other outside factors, but the data are superficial (2006: 84). These scholars argued that “researchers cannot free themselves of their theoretical and epistemological commitments, and data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). This study employed an inductive thematic analysis. The choice inductive thematic analysis was informed by the need of the researcher to identify and examine frames that were used to legitimise and delegitimise the Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The researcher allowed the data to speak for itself rather than approaching the data with pre-conceived themes and codes.

Semantic and latent themes

Various scholars revealed that there are different levels at which themes are identified in the thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998; Braun and Clarke 2006, Galvin, Suominen, Morgan, O’Connell, and Smith 2015; Vaismoradi, Turnen, Snelgrove 2016). For instance, Boyatzis notes that themes can be identified at both semantic and latent level (1998: 102). Graneheim and Lundman argued that an important decision when conducting content analysis is to choose whether the analysis will focus on manifest or latent content (2004: 106). Kondracki, Wellman, and Amundson note that both semantic and latent analysis deals with interpretation, but the interpretation varies in depth and level of abstraction (2002: 23). While manifest content refers to the obvious or the surface meaning presented in the content, latent content denotes the deeper and underneath meaning of the text. To add, Downe-Warmboldt (1992) cited in Graneheim and Lundman argued that manifest

thematic analysis deals with the “content aspect and describe the visible, obvious components, referred to as the manifest content” (Graneheim and Lundman 2004: 106). In line with the above, Braun and Clarke argued that “within the semantic or manifest approach, the themes are identified within the explicit or surface meanings of the data, and the analysis is not looking for anything beyond the written text” (2006: 84). More so, Patton argued that semantic approach to thematic analysis involves the process of “progression from description, where the data have simply been organised to show patterns in semantic content, and summarised, to interpretation, where there is an attempt to theorise the significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications” (1990: 108).

On the contrary, the latent thematic approach involves the analysis of what the text talks about. It also encompasses the relationship between the underlying meaning of the text. For example, Braun and Clarke argue that latent thematic level surpasses the semantic content of data (2006: 85). It is unique and different from semantic level because it focuses on identifying and examining the fundamental embedded ideas, ideologies, and conceptualisation “that are theorised as shaping or informing the semantic content of data” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). To add, in latent thematic analysis, the development of themes is infused with the process of interpretation and the analysis produced beyond mere description but is theorised (Braun and Clarke 2006: 85).

Therefore, bearing in mind the constructionist approach that informs this study, it is from the latent thematic approach that this study conducted the process of thematic analysis. Burr argued that a relationship exists between constructionist paradigm, latent analysis and critical discourse analysis (1995: 44). This scholar noted that latent thematic analysis originates from the “constructionist paradigm” (Burr 1995: 45). Similarly, Braun and Clarke argued that the constructionist background of latent thematic analysis makes it overlaps with the critical discourse analysis (2006: 34). According to Taylor and Ussher, the overlap between constructionism paradigm, latent thematic analysis, and discourse analysis has given birth to a concept called thematic critical discourse analysis (2001: 67). Braun and Clarke argued that in thematic critical discourse analysis “broader structures and meanings are theorised as underpinning what actually articulated in the data” (2006: 85). The latent approach is crucial to this study because it paves the way for the critical discourse analysis which is an integral aspect of analysing data in this study. Critical discourse analysis is a useful tool because it helps to shed light on the cultural/power relations that

are lying underneath the surface of the semantic structure of the data set (Richardson 2007: 102). In this study, themes and frames were identified and analysed beyond the mere semantic construction and meaning. The themes were also categorised, interpreted and analysed at the latent level to gain the underlying ideas, assumptions and conceptualisation, and ideologies that informed their construction (Braun and Clarke 2006: 64).


A summary of the thematic process adopted in this study

The process of thematic analysis involved the stages of gathering all relevant articles within the specific time frame. That is from the 1 October to 31 December 2017. This raw data is referred to as the *data corpus*. The researcher checked the data for relevance. All extraneous data was removed. This then allowed the researcher to retain the data that was best suitable and of most relevance to be the unit of analysis. Braun and Clarke referred to the refined content as the data set (2006: 56). From the main data set, the researcher then drew out, derived and categorised some preliminary codes. These codes allowed the researcher to identify different features of the data (either semantic or latent) that were pertinent for the process of analysis to kick off (Braun and Clarke 2006: 56). The coding of data was important because it allowed the researcher to organise data into various categories that are meaningful. The researcher then introduced themes that worked as umbrella terms for certain codes. All codes that emerged were assigned to a related theme if their meaning fell within that theme. More so, the other small emerging themes were assigned to bigger themes allowing them to occupy the place of sub-themes.

At this stage of the thematic process, all themes that were introduced were only temporal. This type of themes is referred to as candidate themes. A process of recapitulation was conducted to review the validity of all candidate themes. Creswell *et al.* noted that the process of reviewing candidate themes is important in the thematic analysis process because “it allows the researcher to check for the validity of the assignment made, and verify whether a candidate theme actually does cover all the codes assigned to it” (2017: 34). Some of the candidate themes and codes were shifted from place to place during the preview phase. This process was carried on until all the wrongly placed and assigned codes were relocated to their relevant themes, and all worthless candidate themes have been abandoned. Finally, a thematic map was generated to visualise the sub-themes

and their interrelations. The map was used for analytic purposes. Figure 4.1 below visualise the thematic analysis process followed in this study.

Figure 7.1: The thematic analysis process of this study



Source: T. Muringa

Generating codes and categorising articles

In the coding process, ‘coding’ refers to the action while ‘codes’ refer to the names given to the concepts derived through coding (Corbin and Anselm 2008: 66). Corbin and Anselm explained that the main purpose of coding is to break down the data, rearranging and grouping it into identified categories and subcategories which bring together data about a topic which has so far been scattered across sources, and ultimately allow comparison within the data (2008: 66). The

researcher could code the utterance using emergent coding; whereby the researchers approach the data with no prior set coding categories but allows the categories and names of categories to emerge from the data.

All the articles that were collected were scanned, printed and read to create the data set. The articles were reviewed and read again. This process is important because it allowed the researcher to generate valid codes. According to Braun and Clarke, these codes “underline interesting features of the article and are mapped to meaningful groups which describe the semantic content of these features” (2006: 76). Because this stage in the process of thematic analysis is dealing with the data set, all the articles were analysed, and they generated at least one code. Braun and Clarke argue that generally, an individual article may generate more than one code, “since each code describes one interesting feature, and is documented individually” (2006: 65).

Defining themes and creating the coding sheet

The codes that were generated in the previous section were used to identify candidate frames. In that process, every single code becomes a frame. But as patterns and association emerge, new sub-themes were created, and additional codes are linked to existing themes. This paved the way for critical discourse analysis to kick off. The coding sheet used in this study is illustrated in the coding table below.

Table 7.3: Coding sheet

Themes	frames	Problem description	Causal interpretation	Moral evaluation	Treatment Recommendation	Linguistic Expression
Economy	Transformation	<i>News24</i> Efforts to legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa	The economy is under threat from the Zuma faction led by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	South Africans are blessed to have Cyril Ramaphosa And should be grateful	The ANC leaders and members ought to support Cyril Ramaphosa	" we need to come up with something that grabs the imagination of our people so that the markets can see that we are an economy worthy investing"
	Rand					
	Markets	Efforts to delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has similar policies to Jacob Zuma	It is misleading to elect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma must not be voted for	"radical economic transformation a populist policy"
		<i>IOL</i> Efforts to legitimise Nkosazana	<i>IOL</i> The congress will focus on economic development	<i>IOL</i> Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was focused on economic development	<i>IOL</i> Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma must be given a chance	<i>IOL</i> " Ramaphosa is seen as more market-friendly than is defeated rival Nkosazana-"
		Efforts to delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	The rand is performing poorly	Nkosazana Dlamini's victory won't improve the economy	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma cannot be trusted	"Support Ramaphosa and we will not see a downgrade – Gordhan"
		Efforts to endorse Cyril Ramaphosa campaign	The markets are responding positively to Cyril Ramaphosa sentiments	Cyril Ramaphosa is the messiah of the South African economy	Cyril Ramaphosa must become president to save the economy	"Rand strengthens after Ramaphosa's victory iol"

Election victory	Contribution to the nation and ANC	<i>News24</i> Efforts to legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership qualities	The country has had poor leadership under Jacob Zuma that has divided the party and nation	Cyril Ramaphosa can unify and rebuild the ANC and South Africa with his leadership skills	People should put their support on the Cyril Ramaphosa	"we think he is the most rightful person to steer South Africa forward"
	Compromised leaders					
	Electability					
	Unity	Efforts to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's campaign	The branches cannot nominate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma will not win the battle for president	Nkosazana cannot be supported	"win for NDZ will see the ANC lose 2019"
		<i>IOL</i> Efforts to legitimise Dlamini-Zuma	<i>IOL</i> We have never had a female president	<i>IOL</i> South African need to have a female leader	<i>IOL</i> A female leader in the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma must be supported	<i>IOL</i> "she is a leader of leaders and mother of mothers"
		Efforts to delegitimise Nkosazana's ability to win	Nkosazana has been in government and presided over its failure	It is risky to elect someone with flaws like Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	we should vote for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	"Nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma a farce"
		Efforts to endorse Cyril Ramaphosa Campaign	The private sector has no confidence in the leadership of the ANC	Cyril Ramaphosa will inspire confidence in the ANC and private sector	Cyril Ramaphosa presidency must be supported	"Cyril Ramaphosa is the best person to lead the quest to reclaim ANC victory"

Corruption	Jacob Zuma and State capture	News24 Efforts to legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa	Jacob Zuma and his corrupt administration have destroyed the economy of South Africa	Cyril Ramaphosa will fight against corruption	Cyril Ramaphosa fight against corruption must be supported	"Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the centrepiece of his campaign"
	ANC factionalism	Efforts to delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership mirrors that of Jacob Zuma	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will bring back Jacob Zuma's reign	Nkosazana is not the right person to lead South Africa	"Zuma supporters rally around Dlamini-Zuma"
		IOL	IOL	IOL	IOL	IOL
		Neutral on the faction in ANC	The leadership battles have divided ANC	There is a need for a leader who can unite ANC	A leader who speaks unity must be supported	"The leadership battle has opened a rift in the ANC and pitted Ramaphosa and party veteran against Zuma"
		Efforts to endorse Cyril Ramaphosa	Corruption has destroyed the party and state	Cyril Ramaphosa is firm on combating corruption	Cyril Ramaphosa must be supported	"Cyril Ramaphosa has vowed that when he takes over, he will deal harshly with corrupt officials and politicians"

Source: T Muringa

Critical discourse analysis

Evidence from various scholars revealed that Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on dominance relations by elite groups and institutions as they are being enacted, legitimated or otherwise reproduced by text and talk (Chambwera 2016, Braun and Clarke 2006 and Van Dijk 2001). For instance, Chambwera argues that discourse analysis presupposes the “study of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analysts in such a relationship” (2016: 95). Similarly, Van Dijk stressed that Critical Discourse Analysis “is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (2001: 357). In relation to that Richardson argued that CDA seeks “an effect on social practice and social relationships, particularly on relationships of disempowerment, dominance, prejudice or discrimination” (2007: 26). For Van Dijk:

the typical vocabulary of many scholars in CDA will feature such notions as power, dominance, hegemony, ideology, class, gender, race, discrimination, interests, reproduction, institutions, social structure or social order, besides the more familiar discourse analytical notions (2001:375).

CDA was a useful analytical tool in this study because the study aimed to understand power, dominance and social relations that characterised the news reports that were published by *News24* and *ILO* in their reporting on the political qualities and leadership abilities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. More so, the study aimed to unpack the underlying discourses that pervaded the text as they were presented to the public with an aim to legitimise, delegitimise, disempower and discriminate Cyril Ramaphosa or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from the period 1 October to 31 December, a period that marked the end of the ANC 2017 elective conference and all its proceeding.

Previous studies have revealed that CDA discards the possibility of a “value-free’ science” (Van Dijk 2001 and Wodak 2011). For instance, Van Dijk contends that science, and particularly scholarly discourse, are intrinsically part of, and shaped by social structure, and produced in social interaction (2001: 88). In relation to that, Wodak argued that CDA views language use both in speech and writing as a method of social practice. What this means is that perceiving discourse as

a social practice suggests “a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation, institutions and social structure, which frame it” (Wodak 2011: 52). To that end, discourse is twofold in that it shapes, and it is also shaped that which constitute its existence. To illustrate the above, Wodak argues that:

discourse is a socially constructed constructive as well as socially conditioned- it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of knowledge (2011: 52)

According to Richardson CDA's main objective is to establish the relationship that exists between text and its social conditions, ideologies, and power relations (2007: 26). This scholar argues that “CDA engages with, analyses and critiques social power and how this is represented and both explicitly and implicitly, reproduced in the news” (Richardson 2007: 29). This study draws on the definition by Richardson which stresses that “CDA involves analysis of a text at three levels, that is, the text level, the discursive level, and the social practices level” (Richardson 2007: 29). To that end, it is usually at the social practice level that CDA traverses past what is provided for under the thematic analysis.

Drawing on Richardson’s (2007: 29) model of CDA, text level analysis and thematic analysis were done concurrently in this study. According to Richardson the text level for CDA refers to the discursive practice level (2007: 29). Simply put, discursive practices are those processes that inform and shape the journalistic creation of text as well as how their audience use and comprehend text (Richardson 2007: 29). Therefore, analysis in this realm place is into consideration that:

... newspaper discourse fulfils particular functions; has been created in accordance with particular production techniques and in specific institutional settings; is marked by particular relationships between others agencies of political, judicial and economic power; is characterised by particular interpersonal relationships between writer and reader; and is consumed, interpreted and enjoyed in ways that are specific (Richardson 2007: 76-77)

More so, in this study, the analysis done at the discursive practices level encompasses specifically the professional and established institutional stimuli in the construction of text both at *News24* and *ILO*. This approach was inspired by the desire to determine how professional and established

institutional influences could have manifest in the framing of the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Additionally, the setup of these newspaper target audience was also taken into consideration. This was so because the researcher believed that “the nature of a newspaper audience largely influences how journalists package their news stories but also influence such packaging” (Chambwera 2016: 67). It can also be argued that “it is also the target audience that could have played a role in how the two newspapers sought to legitimise or delegitimise either Cyril Ramaphosa or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Chambwera 2016: 67).

Results from previous research suggest that the news industry in South Africa is characterised by rigid competition for a target market whose buying power is threatened by the ever-increasing prices of commodities in the country (Chambwera 2016; Jackson 2019; Jere and Borain 2018; Richardson 2007). Therefore, the issues of readers being perceived not only as mere consumers who enjoy buying the newspaper, but as a target market for advertising, were placed into consideration and examined in this study. Moreover, drawing on various scholars of the political economy of the media, the researcher investigated the institutional issues relating to media ownership and control of *News24* and *ILO* to determine how these factors could have affected the types of frames and the frames used to legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The researcher also examined the issues of professional ethics and practices of journalism as they manifest in the production of text under examination. To illustrate, the researcher examined the principle of objectivity and truthfulness as they manifest in the discourses of legitimacy and illegitimacy (Chambwera 2016: 69).

Furthermore, the researcher also examined the text at a social practice level. At this stage, the researcher was more concerned with exposing the relationship that existed between journalists and their social formations. It was assumed that this relationship could have shaped the construction of frames and their nature that journalist attaches to stories (Chambwera 2016: 69). As argued by Wadok, the researcher takes the view that the relationship between journalists and their social world is dialectical (2011: 345). What this means is that journalists influence the social world in the same way they are influenced by it. To substantiate the previous point, Richardson argues that analysis at the social practices level considers:

... economic practices, such as the whole mode and relations of production, the class composition of the audience and their relative value to other agencies such as advertisers; political practices, such as the structuring influences of political and legal institutions; and ideological practices, such as the role of journalism in spreading and supporting social values and the relationship of such social values to wider structured social inequalities (Richardson 2007: 114)

Different scholars suggest that when carrying out CDA, the researcher needs to consider the prevailing socio-economic system and economic conditions within that context (Chambwera 2016; Jackson 2019; Jere and Borain 2018; Richardson 2007). Drawing on Richardson (2007) model of CDA, this study examined the socio-economic system and economic conditions that were obtained in South Africa in the period leading, during and after the 54th ANC 2017 national elective conference. The idea was to ascertain how the prevailing conditions manifested in the news that was presented to the public and shaped the framing of the leadership qualities and leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma during the period under investigation. Bearing in mind that newspaper discourse and news media are two strong agents and conduits of power, the framing of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and the determination to legitimise or delegitimise them could be a motive to challenge or maintain the prevailing economic state of affairs, thus it required to be investigated. Additionally, the strong desire for relevance and survival in the deteriorating economic set up could also influence the news framing by *News24* and *ILO*. Some of the factors that the researcher considered in the process of analysis were the ideological political system and the relationship between journalists and politicians both from within the ANC other outside the ANC. To add, the researcher also considered the reigning legal instruments in the country. These could also have impacted on the frames that were used by the journalists from *News24* and *ILO*.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the analysis of the factors that influenced the framing of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not done in isolation. Rather, in a bid to identify the frames used by *News24* and *ILO* to legitimise or delegitimise the two leaders, an analysis was done in a way that identified and explained frames concomitantly while putting specific attention to the issues discussed in the previous sections.

Limitations of the study

In critically investigating and interpreting the online articles sampled, the researcher relied heavily on his own subjective cognitive models and context models. While an effort was placed in order to remain objective in the process of interpretation of the text and using various sources as guidance and support to the analysis, the researcher's experience as a journalists political inclination and therefore his systems of beliefs, might have an effect on the results of the study. Moreover, it being a case study, the data sample was limited to the online news articles concerning one event (54th ANC National Elective Conference) and involves limited private owned news outlets. An extensive research, encompassing supplementary and diverse sources, or larger pool of data, may have permitted the researcher to reach further and more varied results on the subject. In addition, the use of critical discourse analysis as a data analysis approach constitutes a limitation. Owing to its “interpretive nature, and a lack of an explicit, structured and unified approach to analysis” (du Plooy et al. 2014: 97), the same data sample can be construed and investigated by means of different interpretive lenses.

Data quality control

Trustworthiness of the study

Trustworthiness or truth value of qualitative research and transparency of the conduct of the study are critical to the helpfulness and veracity of the research findings. Trustworthiness or rigour of a study denotes the extent of “confidence in data, interpretation, and methods used to ensure the quality of a study” (Pilot and Beck 2014: 24). Amankwaa argued that in every study, the researchers ought to establish the procedures and measures essential for a study to be considered worthy of consideration by the person who reads (2016: 122). This study drew on Guba and Lincoln’s (1985) criteria for establishing trustworthiness. This is so because the criteria have been widely accepted and used as the foundation of establishing the notion of trustworthiness among qualitative researchers. These criteria include “credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability; they later added authenticity” (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 15).

Credibility

The credibility of the study, or the confidence in the truth of the study and therefore the findings, is the most important criterion (Polit and Beck 2014: 21). According to Guba and Lincoln, the common question asked when one wants to ascertain the credibility of a study is “was the study conducted using standard procedures typically used in the indicated qualitative approach or was an adequate justification provided for variations?” (Connelly 2016: 436). Thus, in this study, the researcher employed various steps to ascertain that the data is credible. The researcher ensured that there is prolonged engagement with the data and reflective journaling. More so, the data and findings were revisited several times before presented. Lastly, to ensure credibility in this study, the researcher explored alternative explanations before the findings were presented.

Transferability

Available evidence suggests that the nature of transferability, the extent to which findings are useful to persons in other settings, is different from other aspects of research in that readers determine how applicable the findings are to their situations (Polit and Beck 2014: 45). Amankwaa argues that researchers need to provide a vivid picture that will inform and resonant with readers (2016: 122). According to Connelly qualitative researchers focus on the informants and their story without saying this is everyone’s story (2016: 436). In this study, transferability was ensured by supporting the study with “a rich, detailed description of the context, location, and people studied, and by being transparent about analysis and trustworthiness” (Connelly 2016: 436).

Dependability

Recent studies have proved that dependability has more to do with the constancy of the data over time (Connelly 2016, Creswell *et al.* 2007 and Polit and Beck 2014). For instance, Polit and Beck argued that “dependability refers to the stability of the data over time and over the conditions of the study” (2014: 45). Similarly, Connelly argues that procedures for dependability consist of preservation of a researcher’s audit track of “procedure logs and peer-debriefings with a colleague”

(2014: 436). Therefore, to ensure dependability in this study, the researcher preserved all notes of all activities that take place in the process of conducting the study. More so, all decisions about any aspect of the study were also noted down and kept safe. These decisions include the choice of what to constitute the unit of analysis, and what news articles to select for analysis (Guba and Lincoln 1994 and Creswell 2007).

Confirmability

Qualitative research scholars have noted that confirmability refers to the level of neutrality or the extent findings are consistent, constant and may well be repeated (Du Plooy *et al.* 2014; Connelly 2016; Creswell *et al.* 2007; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Neuman 2014; Polit and Beck 2014). For example, Connelly stress that “qualitative researchers keep detailed notes of all their decisions and their analysis as it progresses” (2016: 435). The notes should be kept to allow other colleagues or reviewer to review the process they took in conducting the study. In this study, to ensure the confirmability of the research findings, the researcher allowed peer-review of the notes by colleagues. The researcher also handed over the notes, data, and findings to other respected researchers so that that they can be discussed in peer-debriefing sessions (Neuman 2014: 66). Guba and Lincoln (1994) cited by Connelly (2016: 435) argued that these peer-debriefing sessions and discussions avoid prejudices from only one individual’s perception of the study.

Ethical consideration

Data for this study was retrieved from online archival material. This material was already available for the public to use in the public domain. However, to ensure that the researcher followed and fulfilled all relevant ethical matters, this study went through the University of KwaZulu-Natal ethical review committee process. The steps taken by the researcher to conduct this study were approved and sanctioned by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee.

Conclusion

This chapter chronicled the research methodology employed by the researcher in carrying out this study. It was explained and justified in this chapter why the researcher chose to use the constructive qualitative research paradigm. Moreover, the methods of collecting data used and the sampling technique employed by the researcher were explained. It was made clear that the study used purposively selected electronic archival material that was retrieved from *News24* and *ILO* news websites. Additionally, the methods of data presentation and analysis were detailed. It how highlighted the researcher used both thematic and critical discourse analysis. Thematic analysis was important as it helped to categorise emergent frames and themes and paved the way for detailed analysis of the themes through critical discourse analysis. However, the following chapter presents, interprets and analyse the research findings. Findings in the following chapter were organised and analysed by the sequence of the themes that emerged in the coding of data.

Chapter 8: Rand & market and Economic recovery & growth frame

Introduction

The previous chapter chronicled the research methods used to carry out this study. The thesis examined the frames used by *News24* and *IOL* to legitimise or delegitimise political leaders during their reporting of the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress. It further examined how the leadership qualities and political personalities of both Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were framed in *News24* and *IOL*. The study used editorial, news articles, commentary, and opinion pieces as units of analysis as it sought to examine how the content reported in the period leading, during and after the congress were framed to legitimise or delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political and leadership qualities both at national and political party level. A total of 100 news articles were analysed using both thematic and critical discourse analysis.

The researcher used the thematic coding process to arrange data. Through this coding process, there emerged six broad frames that *News24* and *IOL* used in the process of reporting news on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. These frames were Rand and Market; Economic recovery and Growth; Jacob Zuma and State capture; Factionalism and Unity; Corruption frame. Both presses used the same frames in their reporting of the two candidates. However, these frames were used in contrasting ways. This will be explained in detail in this chapter and the ones that follow.

This chapter presents, analyses and discusses data from Rand and Market; Economic recovery and Growth frame. In presenting and discussing the findings, the following questions will be answered:

1. How exactly did *News24* and *IOL* frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress?
2. What are the similarities and differences in how the two *News24* and *IOL* framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders?
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders?

4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa?

Following this introduction, the next section focuses on the Rand and Markets frame.

Rand and markets: brief overview

The rand and markets frame was used by both *News24* and *IOL* extensively in the period leading to and after the elective conference. In both *News24* and *IOL*, the frame was used to report on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa abilities to change and build confidence in the ailing South African currency and poor performing markets. Sampled reports from both news-press revealed that the press utilised the persuasion techniques that allowed it to focus and place emphasis on those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Entman 1993; Entman 2007; Cacciatore *et al.* 2016; Goffman 1979; Scheufele 2012). In this case, the rand and markets frame paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa ability to transform the markets and strengthening the rand. On the other hand, sampled reports also revealed that in both *News24* and *IOL*, little and negative attention was placed on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's ability to transform and inspire confidence in the rand and market. Drawing on this observation, it can be opined that the press emphasised on certain sets of consideration (Cyril Ramaphosa) over the others (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) (Secheufele 2012). To add, the fact that the media places negative attention on the female candidates seems to agree with findings from previous studies (Cukier *et al.* 2016; Guha 2018). For instance, concerning the observation that a female leader was portrayed negatively and given less attention, Cukier *et al.* argued that more often in the press, women leaders are underrepresented and less likely to be portrayed positively (2016: 45). Guha also observed that female political candidates across the world are frequently misrepresented in various media platforms (2018: 67).

Moreover, data from *IOL* and *News24* revealed that the press placed the blame of the poor performance of markets and weakening rand on Jacob Zuma and his allies. The repeated emphasis on how Jacob Zuma's leadership and policies negatively affected the rand and markets was rampant in *News24* and *IOL*. This manner of reporting issues by placing considerable emphasis and amplifying the role of Jacob Zuma when reporting about the rand and markets performance

deserve careful consideration. It seems to suggest that *News24* and *IOL* chose to focus on certain elements of the stories and amplifying them so that the reader may arrive at a predetermined conclusion (Shulman and Sweitzer 2018: 156). Moreover, the reporters can also be said to have appealed to the already existing information in the memory and minds of its audience and reminded them of the reason why they rand and markets performance is not up to standard. By so doing the media can be understood to have drawn the audience's attention to how the Jacob Zuma administration affected the rand and the markets, and then it goes on to construct a frame and give cues that audience will use to understand the information given to them so that they will adopt a certain course of action (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012: 20).

Furthermore, incessant focus on Jacob Zuma and how he negatively affected the rand and markets seems to suggest that the press was participating in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse. To illustrate, the press can be said to have played in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse that was replete with statements of how Jacob Zuma and allies destroyed the country and its economy. To explain this observation, there were dominant sentiments in South Africa that the poor performance of the rand and markets was a result of Jacob Zuma's poor policies and leadership. Therefore, drawing on the prevailing discourse about Jacob Zuma, it can be assumed that *News24* and *IOL* reports participated and played out in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse. The press draws from the already existing discourse to make sense of the obtaining events and thus create reality from them. To add, journalists in the media houses make sense of the surrounding environment through using frames. These frames are culturally constituted in that they are not independent of the context and society within which they are constructed (Entman 1993: 34). This observation is consistent with findings from Sha *et al.* (2002) who argued that the media uses frames that are culturally constituted. For Sha *et al.* these frames activate knowledge, stimulate stocks of cultural morals and values and then create a context.

Rand and markets: *News24*

Sampled reports from *News24* revealed that in the rand and markets frame, the press paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to steer the rand and market performance in a positive direction. For example, Wallace and Gokoluk said:

Markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma's ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender. Still, a victory by Ramaphosa won't necessarily buoy the rand much, given South Africa's faltering economy, according to Credit Agricole (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1).

To add, in another report Brand and Galouchko (2017) stressed that

The rand has rallied more than 6% since Cyril Ramaphosa, who has pledged to revive the struggling economy and stamp out corruption, was elected leader of the African National Congress on December 18 (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)

Further, in a different report Cronje (2017) reported that

Other market analysts have noted that the local unit has been strengthening based on positive sentiment around the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president (Cronje 2017: 1).

Drawing on the above quotes it is apparent that the reporters placed emphasis on the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to impact the rand and markets in a positive direction. But most importantly, this was done against serious vilification or downplaying of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's ability to influence the markets and the weakening rand. The reporters made it clear that the rand and markets were not favouring Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1). On the other hand, it was also emphasised that the markets were responding favourably towards sentiments of Cyril Ramaphosa victory. For example, in a report by Wallace and Gokoluk it was reported that "markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma's ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender" (2017: 1). Therefore, what this suggests is that *News24* reporters when reporting on the matter of rand and markets chose and selected to place salience on the capacity of Cyril Ramaphosa while omitting and negating to report on how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma can influence the rand and markets positively. This finding seems to confirm Entman's argument that the press occasionally selects some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a certain problem definition, causal interpretation and moral evaluation (1993: 34). Evidently, in the case of the rand and markets frame, the press selected to portray Cyril Ramaphosa in a manner that will

allow its readers to perceive him as the right person to improve the markets and the performance of the rand.

Additionally, the style in which Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's personality was downplayed deserves some careful consideration. To illustrate, the personality of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was discredited in that the press portrayed her as a leader whose rise to power was not going to change much in terms of the state of the rand and the market. Simply put, the press downplayed her leadership capacity by making emphasis that "markets are likely to respond negatively against the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma victory" (Cronje 2017: 1). To add, the press also emphasised that "the rand is not likely to strengthen under Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership" (Brand and Galouchko 2012: 1). This manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma suggests that the press either consciously or unconsciously downplayed the leadership capacity of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma while amplifying the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to influence the rand and markets. Drawing on the previous observation, it seems that the *News24* presentation of issues was slanted in favour of a certain gender over the other. In this case, gender bias was evident in that a female leader (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) was downplayed in favour of a male leader (Cyril Ramaphosa). These findings seem to be consistent with Vos' findings that showed that there exists a gender bias within the media that allows women to be underrepresented and less likely to be portrayed positively when they occupy leadership positions (Vos 2016: 45).

Furthermore, sampled data from *News24* revealed that the reporters applied the technique of sentimentality in the rand and markets frame. The sentimentality technique allowed the press to present the readers with their emotional past that was bound to evoke undesired feelings (Richardson 2007: 114). This means of presenting issues allowed the reader to understand and reflect the problem within the parameters and framework given by the news reports. For example, emphasis on how the rand and markets were contextualised and placed in their historical context by incessant reference to how Jacob Zuma's rule has negatively affected the economy. To illustrate, the poor performance of the rand and markets were blamed on the leadership of Jacob Zuma. It was made clear in the reports that were it not for Jacob Zuma's disastrous leadership, the rand and markets would have not been performing the way they are doing. For example, in a *News24* report by Wallace and Gokoluk, it was said that "the rand and markets a result and suffer from the Jacob consequences of the disastrous Jacob Zuma rule" (2017: 1). Now, creating a link of the present

poor-performing rand and markets can be said to have reminded the reader about their emotional experience with Jacob Zuma. Referring to Jacob Zuma was likely to evoke negative emotions against Jacob Zuma because according to the post-Jacob Zuma discourse, anything to do with Jacob Zuma was despicable. To explain the previous assertion, the environment within which the press was operating is worthy our consideration. To illustrate, the issue of rand and markets performance has a deep emotional effect in most of *News24* audience. Its target audience who are business and middle-class people with vested interest in the market performance and the rand were emotionally susceptible to the issue of rand and markets. This section of South African society was being affected by unstable rand and markets. The weakening of the rand means a loss of business and an increase in the cost of living for these two groups of society. As a result, any issue that presents a negative picture of the poor performance of the rand and markets was likely to evoke their emotions.

However, a close analysis of the setting within which the *News24* reports were constructed seems to suggest that when referring to Jacob Zuma's impact on the rand and markets, the press was actively vilifying the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through evoking and painting a gloomy picture around the leadership of Jacob Zuma. This is so because over the years, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was understood as the successor of Jacob Zuma (Du Plessis 2017: 98). She was also perceived as the leader of the Jacob Zuma faction that was meant to continue the Jacob Zuma legacy after his presidency (Mathekga 2018: 56). Therefore, by evoking the negative emotions brought by the Jacob Zuma rule, the *News24* reporters were simply reminding its readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is one of Jacob Zuma's cronies. As result, a victory for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma means a return of Jacob Zuma's rule that was not favoured by the rand and markets.

Sampled data from *News24* revealed that the reporters placed more emphasis on painting a gloomy and doomy picture of the weakening rand and poor market performance by ways of quoting different sources and business sources to authenticate their reports. For example, a *News24* report of 17 November 2017, there was heavy reliance on the sources when reporting on the rand and markets. For example, in a report mention above (17 November 2017; Cronjie 2017), an analyst from Credit Agricole CIB and Toronto-Dominion Bank was quoted heavily in the report. The analyst explained how bleak the situation was for the rand and markets. He also expressed concern over how the ANC members will vote on the conference. To add, the analysts indicated that the

ANC members ought to vote for a leader who has the potential to bring confidence in the markets and who will allow the rand to regain its strength on the international markets. This stance by the analyst seems to have legitimating undertone that favoured the dominant voices that were of the idea that Cyril Ramaphosa was the only leader who has the potential to boost confidence in the rand and markets. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the use of the analyst to endorse the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa was a conscious strategy by the reporters to assert their subjective agenda while hiding behind the guise of the analysts. Now, the analyst stance that the ANC "ought to vote for a leader who has the potential to bring confidence" (Cronjie 2017: 1), when carefully analysed within its context of its construction does not mean that ANC members should vote for Jacob Zuma or anyone related to him. There is no way the analyst could advocate the members to vote for a person who is linked to Jacob Zuma. Instead, drawing on the context and economic background, one can assume that by suggesting that the "ANC members should vote for a leader who has potential", the analyst was insinuating and endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa. This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa at the height of the disastrous rule of Jacob Zuma, a different section of the South African society was calling for Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred and right candidate to bring confidence in the South African economy.

However, the reporter's use of sources serves two objectives. Firstly, it allows the press to abide by the principle of objectivity. Secondly, the use of sources helps the reporters to inset their subjective opinions within the reports without them compromising the principle of objectivity (Chambwera 2016; Richardson 2007 and Wodak 2011). Therefore, when referring to sources (in the form of experts) outside South Africa, it can be assumed that this was a strategic communication technique by *News24* reporters to report on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in a way that is seen as ethical. This serves to authenticate the press position and the situation that has affected South Africa and allow its audience to hear from a trusted and objective source who is an expert in the field of economics. Additionally, the use of analyst by the reporters seems to serve the purpose of authenticating the press' subjective ideological stance. These findings are barely distinguishable from Richardson (2007: 99) who argued that the continuous use of sources in the person of analysis seems like a way for the press to expediently state its position without jeopardizing the professional ethics of objectivity. In this case, the press applied this strategy to maintain its authenticity even in situations where they were communicating their own subjective opinion.

Table 8.1: Linguistic expression in rand and markets frame: *News24*

<p>“Markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender. Still, a victory by Ramaphosa won’t necessarily buoy the rand much, given South Africa’s faltering economy, according to Credit Agricole.” (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1)</p> <p>"Others reckon the bullishness will extend beyond the ANC conference. Toronto-Dominion says the rand may strengthen 10% to 12.55 next year if Ramaphosa or another candidate outside Zuma's faction wins, especially if they push the president to step down as head of state before his terms end in 2019." (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1)</p> <p>"Someone alternative to the Zuma candidate may be appointed as new ANC leader and presidential candidate for the 2019 election," said Cristian Maggio, head of emerging-markets research at the Toronto-based bank. This would be a major improvement in the outlook for South Africa, especially if, again as I expect, after the appointment, Zuma is recalled from the presidency by the ANC." (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1)</p> <p>"Markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender” (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1).</p> <p>“The rand has rallied more than 6% since Cyril Ramaphosa, who has pledged to revive the struggling economy and stamp out corruption, was elected leader of the African National Congress on December 18.” (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)</p> <p>“The market is positively surprised by the increasing amount of support that Mr. Ramaphosa is rallying behind him,” (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Other market analysts have noted that the local unit has been strengthening based on positive sentiment around the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president.” (Cronje 2017: 1).</p> <p>"Ramaphosa is seen as more market-friendly than his defeated rival Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma" (Cronje 2017: 1).</p> <p>“As soon as it became public that Ramaphosa was the new ANC president, those behind the markets reacted positively.” (Cronje 2017: 1).</p>
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A deeper analysis of data at least hints that *News24* framed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in binary and contrasting terms. What this means is that their election campaign was presented in terms of "win versus loose" "gain versus loss" situation. To illustrate this, Cyril Ramaphosa's election campaign was packaged as a victory. It was presented as a gain for the markets, rand and South Africa. For example, a *News24* report by Wallace and Gokoluk (2017: 1) compared the impact of the two leaders on the rand and markets when it said "markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma's ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender" (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1). Presenting Cyril Ramaphosa in terms of "win" or "gain" in relation to the rand and markets can be interpreted as a conscious or unconscious effort by *News24* reporters to make their audience to be more averse to risk when they are presented with making of choices in terms of gains (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007).

On the other hand, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's relation to rand and markets was presented in terms of losses. Simply put, the victory of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a victory to South Africa. Instead, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's victory would continue the weakening of the rand and poor performance of the markets. By so doing, the reporters were consciously or unconsciously aware that their audience is very cautious when presented with information in terms of losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 267). Therefore, presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's possible victory as a loss and threat to the rand and markets would make its audience to be avoiding and more risk-seeking in terms of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's victory. Effectively, how the reporters framed the victory of the two political candidates served to legitimate and de-legitimate these two leaders. Put differently, portraying Cyril Ramaphosa's possible leadership as a victory for the markets helped to credit his leadership campaign. On the other end, presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's victory as a threat to the rand and market served to discredit her political campaign to be the next leader of the ANC. To add, how the two leaders were presented in this case seems to suggest that the reporters presented logically equivalent information to the audience in a way that encourages and discourages certain kind of interpretation and course of action (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2013). This logical information as presented by *News24* can be said to have motivated the readers to change their preferences concerning the weakening rand and markets and strengthening of the same.

Apart from being used to legitimise and discredit Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma respectively in the period leading to the conference. Analysis of the data found evidence that the rand and markets frame was also extensively used by *News24* after the elective conference and the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. In this case, the news reports were replete with information highlighting how the rand and markets positively responded to a Cyril Ramaphosa victory. For instance, in one report titled “*Rand rallies to pre-Gordhan ouster levels on Ramaphosa*”, Brand and Galouchko stressed that

the rand has rallied more than 6% since Cyril Ramaphosa, who has pledged to revive the struggling economy and stamp out corruption, was elected leader of the African National Congress on December 18 (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)

Putting the above quotation and headline into historical context, the rand was performing poorly since the last time Pravin Gordhan was a finance minister of South Africa. It was the period before he was removed from office by Jacob Zuma. During his period the rand was performing well and that was the last time the rand gained on the global markets. Now, presenting and comparing the gain of the rand with the period of Gordhan after the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa seems to suggest that *News24* reporters essentially used the past discourse to explain the present. To illustrate this, *News24* used the history of the present to justify and legitimise the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. It did so by allowing its readers to refer to the past (where Cyril Ramaphosa was not president) and compare it with the present (where he is now the president) and then the readers would judge for themselves the extent to which Cyril Ramaphosa's victory could influence the rand and the markets as opposed to the period of Jacob Zuma's presidency. Drawing on this analysis, it seems that the media links the present to the future by digging deep in the frame reserves that already exist in the minds of the audience and evoke them, thereby allowing the audience to process them within the prevailing present conditions. The observation that the rand and markets frame was drawn from the past historical events ties well with previous studies that argued that frames are culturally constructed and as part of a culture they get embedded into the media content (Borra 2011, Van Gorp 2007 and McCracken 1986). This is made possible by journalists' continuous reference to past events to explain the current unfolding reality (Borra 2011; Van Gorp 2007; McCracken 1986).

Rand and markets: *IOL*

The rand and markets frame was used by *IOL* when reporting on the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the period leading to the ANC conference. From the analysed data, key results emerged that the rand and markets frame was mainly employed to expose how the rand and markets were performing in response to the nomination processes in the period leading to the ANC election. More so, the data showed that its extensive use in *IOL* was when *IOL* reporters used the potential victory of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to predict the performance of the rand and markets. For instance, the rand and markets frame were utilised more to credit Cyril Ramaphosa by indicating how his victory can positively affect the performance of the rand and the markets. On the other hand, analysis of data also indicated that the mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma concerning the markets was minimal. Furthermore, her mention concerning the performance of the rand and markets was replete with negative connotations that served to discredit her ability to positively steer the markets in a positive direction. For instance, an *IOL* report by van Zyl said, "the rand seems not to favour a Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma victory" (2017: 1). In a different report, Bulawayo said: "the rand performance is positive in response to Cyril Ramaphosa victory more than Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma" (Bulawayo 2017: 1).

The results from the data also showed that while the press reported on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the reporters did not place a similar positive emphasis on how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's victory is related to the rand and markets. In simple terms, the press did not afford fair coverage to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This observation suggests that *IOL* reporters were not impartial when they were reporting on the two political candidates. Instead, the reporters were biased in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa. Therefore, drawing on the assertion that the press placed less attention on one candidate over the other when reporting on the rand and markets, it can be suggested that *IOL* downplayed the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It did so by not mentioning her positive impact on the rand and markets and by the limited focus on her when reporting on the issue of rand and markets. By so doing, *IOL* was successful in selecting certain aspects of the unfolding events and then place salience on them. Further, *IOL* placed focus on the specific aspect of an issue (Cyril Ramaphosa) while downplaying other aspects (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma), and thus create a

framework of reference that will guide its audience in interpreting the performance of the rand and markets in the period leading to the ANC elective conference.

Additionally, in an *IOL* report of 29 November 2017, Philemon Bulawayo reported that the "the rand had also benefited from increasing signs that Cyril Ramaphosa was leading Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the race to replace President Jacob Zuma as leader of the ANC" (Bulawayo 2017: 1). To authenticate the stated observation, Bulawayo quoted several sources that endorsed the idea that the rand and markets are responding in favour of sentiments of Cyril Ramaphosa's victory. In another report published on 6 December 2017, Khumalo said that the rand and markets are strengthening more in response to the sentiments that Cyril Ramaphosa is the possible winner of the ANC elections (2017: 1). In this report, the reporter quoted a handful of statistic that were used to justify the positive change in rand and markets performance after the announcement of Cyril Ramaphosa's victory in the ANC branches. For instance, the quoted sources placed emphasis and affirmed that a win for Cyril Ramaphosa was a positive step towards reviving the weakening rand and markets. One of the sources affirmed that "the market is starting to price a Ramaphosa victory. This we think is the real reason for the strength" (Bulawayo 2017": 1). Similarly, in a different report, Bulawayo said, "Annabel Bishop, the chief economist at Investec, said the up case for the market is perceived to be an ANC election outcome where Cyril Ramaphosa is elected president of the ANC" (2017: 1). Put together, the heavy reliance on sources served to authenticate the *IOL* subjective stance that favoured a Cyril Ramaphosa's victory.

Moreover, sampled reports showed that *IOL* was emphatic in creating a link between Cyril Ramaphosa's victory in the branches and the rand and markets. Effectively, by associating possible Cyril Ramaphosa's victory to the positive performance of the rand and markets, *IOL* reporters engaged in the conscious or unconscious process of legitimising the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. What this means is that *IOL* reporters created the impression to its readers that the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa was going to bring about the positive economic performance that was to be ushered in by the positive performance of the markets. Drawing on this line of reasoning, it therefore, seems that *IOL* reports on the markets were simply artefacts that were replete with legitimating meaning; meaning communicated to its readers to make them understand the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa in the framework created by the press.

Table 8.2: Linguistic expressions on rand and markets: *IOL*

<p>“rand had also benefited from increasing signs that Cyril Ramaphosa was leading Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the race to replace President Jacob Zuma as leader of the ANC” (Bulawayo 2017: 1)</p> <p>“The market is starting to price a Ramaphosa victory. This we think is the real reason for the strength” (Bulawayo 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Rand strengthens after Ramaphosa’s victory” (Khumalo 2017: 1)</p> <p>"The rand strengthened more 1% as markets increasingly priced in deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa's victory in the neck-and-neck race for the ruling party's presidency" (Khumalo 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Annabel Bishop, the chief economist at Investec, said the up case for the market is perceived to be an ANC election outcome where Cyril Ramaphosa is elected president of the ANC”</p> <p>"Rand strengthens on Ramaphosa's prospects" (Bulawayo 2017: 1)</p> <p>"The rand strengthened yesterday on hopes that Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa would win the race to become the next leader of the ANC at a party conference" (Bulawayo 2017:1)</p> <p>"Trader bets on Ramaphosa's win: Rand reaches 3-months high as ANC votes- (van Zyl 2017: 1).</p> <p>"The rand is stronger on the likelihood of Cyril Ramaphosa being elected ANC head, Stephen Innes, Singapore-based head of trading for the Asia Pacific at Oanda Corp., said a note" (van Zyl 2017: 1).</p> <p>"the chief economist for the Efficient Group said he had very little that the rating agencies would react negatively if Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma becomes the next ANC president" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1)</p> <p>"The rand responded well to the change in leadership" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1).</p> <p>"The rand responded well strengthening against the US dollar the election of the 65-year-old former union leader and businessman" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1).</p>
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Results from *IOL* point to the fact that the press operated as terrain of cultural contestation where different ideological battles were fought (Gramsci 1937). In simple terms, the press participated in amplifying and authenticating the dominant ideological voices in the prevailing in South African

at the time of the conference. This was seen by the underlying ideological sentiments that were replete in their text. Results from the sampled data showed that the rand and markets frame endorsed and was pro-Cyril Ramaphosa sentiments. What this means is that the manner of presenting the rand and markets' positive response to the possible victory by Cyril Ramaphosa suggest their hidden interest in the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. However, this cannot be understood without referring to the political context within which the news articles were constructed.

More than the issue of impartiality in the representation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, an underlying ideology that sort to naturalise and justify the contradictions and exploitation of the capitalist society were observed in the sampled data. What this means is that *IOL* report amplified and naturalise the class struggle that pervades South African society. For instance, in the rand and markets frame, there was an interminable emphasis on the notion that the rand and markets respond favourably to the positive sentiments of Cyril Ramaphosa. On the other hand, the readers were continually reminded that the rand will perform negatively to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma victory. Moreover, the reports periodically emphasise that the business community is confident of Cyril Ramaphosa's win in the election. The presentation of these two candidates in binary terms present a contradiction of two societal classes that were epitomised by these two candidates. Drawing on the historical background of the two political candidates, Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma hail from two different social classes. Cyril Ramaphosa stood for the elite/ruling class while Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for the poor working class. The group of people who are identified in the reports that were impressed by the performance of Cyril Ramaphosa in the campaigns is not the poor people in South Africa. The poor or working-class has less to do with the performance of the markets or the strengthening of the rand on the international market. The performance of the rand and markets is the discourse of the elite in South Africa. It is the elites who have vested interest in how the rand and markets perform in the international arena. Drawing on this illustration, it is safe to assume that the reports that focus on the performance of the rand and markets simply reflected the ideas of the ruling class in South Africa. The ruling elite whose interests were spearheaded by Cyril Ramaphosa. Therefore, this manner of focusing on the ideas of the ruling party allows the press to ignore the struggles of the working class. What this means is that the ideas of the poor and working-class were downplayed

and thus remained invisible in *IOL* news reports. They were ignored as though they do not exist (Richardson 2007: 137).

In addition, the way the press sort to naturalise and justify the ideologies of the ruling class help to confirm the argument from previous studied (Mesquita and de Almeida Medeiros 2016: 385) that news content does not only exist to inform the public about the current affairs, instead, it is carefully constructed social and cultural artefacts aimed at manipulating of social values and attitudes of readers. It does so by communicating the ideas of the ruling class. Together, these observations seem to suggest that news-press plays an important role in the legitimation of ideas of the dominant groups in society (Beetham 2018: 88).

Economic recovery and growth: *New24*

Data sampled showed that the Economic recovery and Growth frame was evident in almost every *News24* business report during the period leading to and after the elective conference. It was apparent from the sampled data that the press attached meaning to a strip of unfolding events (elections campaigns) and thus promoted particular means in which the reader could define and interpreted the events that were unfolding (Shah *et al.* 2002 cited in Chong and Druckman 2007: 103). To illustrate, in the period leading to the conference, the press chose to focus specifically on the events that were unfolding in this period. The news reports were replete with events that were directly related to the conference. Thus, by focusing on these events and placing emphasis on certain political candidates, one can assume that the press selected specific elements of the events and create a narrative that it gave to its readers through the Economic Recovery and growth frame.

Apart from selecting a strip of unfolding events to give meaning to them, results from this study showed that the reporters selected some aspects of an individual story and give prominence to specific aspects of the story. For example, in a report by Vecchiato (2017), Cyril Ramaphosa statements in relation to growing the economy were quoted extensively. In this case, the reporter placed considerable emphasis on the aspects of Cyril Ramaphosa's speech where he promised to rebuild the economy. Additionally, the report also presented and emphasised the idea that Cyril Ramaphosa possesses knowledge of not only the South African economy but also other

neighboring and international economies. For instance, Vecchiato quoted Cyril Ramaphosa saying, "South Africa needs to do what other economies were doing, that is to grow the economy" (2017: 1). This statement in the report was followed by a quotation from Cyril Ramaphosa that said "A number of economies around are growing and the world economy is responding very positively in terms of growth, but we are moribund and need to come with a plan that needs to take us out of this" (Vecchiato 2017: 1). What is clear from this manner of reporting on Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership is that he was framed and presented to the reader as a leader who is concerned with the economic growth and recovery. To add, emphasis on his ability and willingness to grow the economy has only served to legitimise his leadership.

To build upon the example used in the previous paragraph, it can be assumed the reporters either consciously or unconsciously endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa economic ideology. To substantiate, in the report discussed in the previous paragraph, the reporters embarked on the rampage to endorse Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate to improve the economy of South Africa. Placing this report into context, Cyril Ramaphosa's economic approach that was being supported by these reporters is commonly understood considering the capitalist ideology. What this means is that Cyril Ramaphosa's economic policy was synonymous with the interest of the capitalist interest who were driven by profit. This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa is well known as one of the richest people who has interest in many sectors of the economy. Therefore, his social status automatically placed him in the same camp with the capitalists. As a result, what he stood for were the interest of the capitalist. Drawing on this contextual analysis, it can be assumed that the media by supporting and endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa's economic turnaround policy it was playing an instrumental role in authenticating the capitalist ideology. The most plausible explanation of this is that *News24* is owned by a big corporation (Naspers) who is also motivated by profit-making.

Put together, the above illustration points to the fact that the press supported Cyril Ramaphosa only because his economic policies were in line with their interest and their ideology. He was the media's favourite because of his proximity to their ideology. This observation seems to be in complete agreement with findings of Wagner and Meyer (2017: 367). These scholars argued that the proximity of a media house to a certain ideology or organisation will motivate it to report more on that political party or candidate in a positive manner. To add, the media will also respond

positively to the messages of those political candidates it shares the same ideology with (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367).

In keeping with findings from previous studies (Richardson 2007; Chambwera 2016), results from the data showed that the news reports are cultural artefacts that cannot be isolated from the context of their construction. To substantiate, evidence from the data revealed that the Economic Recovery and Growth frame was not a brainchild of *News24* journalist. Also, the frame was not created to report news for the ANC national elective conference. Instead, further analysis of the context of construction proves that the frame was had discursive roots in the prevailing "Economic Downgrade" discourse that dominated discussion in South Africa before, during and after the conference. To explain, there were negative sentiments that expressed concern for the need for economic growth and economic recovery after poor economic policies from Jacob Zuma's administration that negatively impacted the economy. In simple terms, the reports on economic recovery and economic growth bear semblance and replicated the situation that was in South Africa. This was is so because the reports on economic recovery and growth were replete with statements that were like those used previously in the conversation of an economic downgrade.

Moreover, the notion that the construction of the economic recovery and growth frame was influenced by prevailing economic conditions can be seen by how the news reports endlessly replicated figures and sentiments that were common and dominant in the prevailing economic discourse in South Africa. For example, a deeper analysis of data indicated that news reports that focused on economic recovery and growth were replete with statistics and figures that were drawn from the previous (2016) budget speech by the minister of finance. To substantiate this observation, in a report by Vecchiato figures of the current economic growth were presented (2017). Vecchiato said, "South Africa economy is set to expand 0.7% this year, down from 1.3% predicted in the February budget" (Vecchiato 2017: 1). Essentially, these figures were borrowed from the previous budget speech. What the reporters did was simply to go and dig deeper into the previous national budget and use the figures that were reported in the budget of the previous year. This approach to news production through borrowing from other text (budget) point to the fact that the news reports as we understand them are not isolated from other text. Instead, they are a part of an intertextual text. Put differently, the fact that the reports resample sentiments and figures from other text points to the fact that text cannot be viewed in isolation because it exists in relation to

other text (Richardson 2007: 100). To add, it is also clear from the observation above that the news reports were successful in incorporating, reformulating, reinterpreting and re-reading previous text (Richardson 2007: 100).

Moreover, sampled data showed that the Economic recovery and Growth frame was employed successfully to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in *News24*. For instance, reports that referred to economic recovery or economic growth when reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were almost silent on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma plans to grow the economy. However, results from analysed data showed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma approach to economic growth was presented in a negative and de-legitimizing manner. To substantiate, her economic policy was framed as “radical economic transformation”. The term “radical economic transformation” refers to the changing of the composition of output that the economy is producing and ownership and control patterns (Du Plessis 2017: 38). As an economic approach, “radical economic transformation” became a dominant phrase in South African politics after the emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters political party. Its application according to the EFF, meant the immediate and abrupt transferred of control of the economy to the black majority. It also meant the redistribution of land without compensation (Pauw 2017: 88). All these approaches were perceived by many analysts in the South African society to possess detrimental challenges and undesirable impacts on the economy and food security.

Moreover, apart from being the centrepiece of the EFF economic policy, "radical economic transformation" was also adopted in the ANC during the leadership of Jacob Zuma. Its application and meaning in the ANC were extended to policies that were perceived as pro-black. It was also applied to explain the land restitution policy that was pushed by Jacob Zuma and his faction. However, the adoption of the phrase by the Jacob Zuma government was met with a negative reaction. What this means is that the term was then used as a scapegoat to loot the state resources and as a façade by corrupt officials to engage in various corrupt activities (Booyesen 2019: 56).

Drawing on the contextual background of the phrase "radical economic transformation", the press by aligning Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership to radical economic transformation only served to discredit her leadership. This is so because the press created a connection between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and one of South Africa's most hated policies. The policy was hated because it was assumed that its application in the South African economy will unsettle economic growth. More

so, its emphasis on land redistribution without compensation was perceived as a threat to the agricultural sector and ultimately to food security. What is more interesting is how the press played down the economic policy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It did so by selecting the negative aspect of the policy and amplify and then present them to the reader. The fact that the policy was detrimental to the economy was emphasised. This allowed the reader to interpret the policy of radical economic policy using the framework presented to it by the press.

Put together, the results discussed above seem to suggest that the press discredited the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through attacking her policy. This assertion seems to fit well with findings from previous studies that indicated that women are less likely to be framed as capable leaders (Gedalya *et al.* 2017). Their capabilities to lead are undermined. Moreover, the media tend to give them less coverage when compared to the amount of attention placed on their male counterparts (Vos 2013; Ngubane 2010). However, when comparing the results that the press discredited Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership by emphasising on the negative aspects of her policies, with findings from previous scholars. It should be noted that our results seem to be in contradiction with findings from previous studies (Ross 2002; Nacos 1997). To illustrate, while these scholars maintain that women politicians in their entirety are tremendously underrepresented in the political sphere, and in instances where they are represented, the importance is positioned on trivialities like the type of dressing and not on policies and ideologies (Ross 2002; Nacos 1997). Results from this study showed that the press paid a great deal of emphasis on matters of policy when they were reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, although in a negative manner.

Table 8.3: Linguistic expression from the economic recovery and growth frame: *News24*

<p>“A lack of support from a clear majority of the 86 voting members of the ANC’s National Executive Committee will limit his scope to drive policy changes and assert his authority over President Jacob Zuma, whose second term as the nation’s leader ends in 2019” (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1).</p>
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“A number of economies around us are growing, the world economy is responding very positively in terms of growth, but we are moribund, and we need to come up with a plan that needs to take us out of this.” (Vecchiato 2017).

“New economic plan needed to avoid investment strike – Ramaphosa” (Vecchiato 2017: 1).

“South Africa needs to do what other nations do during times of economic weakness and come up with a recovery plan that grabs the imagination of investors and its people, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa said in an interview in Cape Town” (Vecchiato 2017: 1).

“Ramaphosa urges ANC to correct its ways to revive economic growth” (Mbatha and Vecchiato 2017: 1)

“Bold, decisive action is needed to change South Africa’s growth trajectory and the government should target an expansion of 3% in 2018 and 5% by 2023, he said at an ANC event in Soweto on Monday.

The country needs a “new deal” to accelerate radical economic transformation so that growth is more inclusive of the majority black population, the deputy president said” (Mbatha and Vecchiato 2017: 1)

“Lew Geffen, chair of Lew Geffen Sotheby’s International Realty, expects the property market in 2018 to show swift and significant improvement on the back of Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s election as new ANC president” (Smith 2017: 2)

“The ANC in Ekurhuleni will support Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to replace Jacob Zuma as ANC president, it said on Tuesday. This was due to her "unwavering commitment" to radical economic transformation, regional executive committee chair Robert Mashego said” (Tandwa 2017: 2)

“Minister of Water and Sanitation Nomvula Mokonyane banged the radical economic transformation drum and voiced her support for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Gerber 2017: 1)

“the Dlamini-Zuma faction now talks tough – radical economic transformation. This populist approach is partly a response to the growing unhappiness of the courage to fight corruption” (Thokoane 2017)

From the analysed data, it was apparent that the press gathered and put together some elements of the two leaders' leadership qualities in a bid to construct a reality (Van Gorp 2007). The most striking example is how the reporters created a connection between the dire situation affecting South Africa and the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to address the ailing situation. To illustrate, in a report by Paul (2017), after the reporter painted a bleak picture of the South African economy and used the authority of Malusi Gigaba to justify it, the reporter juxtaposed this bleak situation with the speech of Cyril Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa was in this report quoted saying “A number of economies around us are growing, the world economy is responding very positively in terms of growth, but we are moribund and we need to come up with a plan that needs to take us out of this.” (Paul 2017: 1). The juxtaposition of Cyril Ramaphosa's plan to grow the economy and the bleak situation that has characterised the economy plays a role in justifying the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa was being presented to the readers as a leader who has a great plan and concerned about the potential that the South African economy has. He was also portrayed as a leader who is familiar with the economies around the world and how these economies could affect the South African economy. More so, reference made to the fact that Cyril Ramaphosa referred to the South African economy as "moribund" also gives the impression that Cyril Ramaphosa was in touch with the realities of the economy of South Africa. Put together, this manner of presenting Cyril Ramaphosa only served to legitimate him as a political leader who possesses the right qualities that were so much needed in South Africa after the disastrous rule of Jacob Zuma.

Furthermore, how the press endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa bears some resemblance with sentiments for Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership that dominated South Africa for many years. To substantiate, over the years Cyril Ramaphosa was eyed as the preferred candidate to preside over the government of South Africa (Hartley 2018; Butler 2011, 2009, 2005). From the time of Nelson Mandela to the presidency of Jacob Zuma, calls for Cyril Ramaphosa to become president have been in the public discourse in South Africa (Butler 2009, Butler 2007). After the Nelson Mandela

resigned, Cyril Ramaphosa was recommended heavily but to take over the reins of power. Moreover, during the problematic periods of Jacob Zuma's reign's calls for Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate dominated public discourse (Pauw 2017).

Therefore, *News24* legitimating Cyril Ramaphosa by presenting him as the most capable candidate to bring about the much-desired economic growth has its inspiration from the ANC leadership renewal discourse that dominated the ruling party and South Africans that Cyril Ramaphosa was the preferred leader who can grow the economy. What this means is that the press by presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as the leader, it consciously or unconsciously selected some specific elements of the unfolding events (ANC leadership succession) and assemble a narrative that highlights the connection with the readers to promote a certain interpretation. Simply put, the press emphasis on Cyril Ramaphosa to become president was consistent with the calls (readily available schemas in the heads of the readers) for Ramaphosa to become president owing to his ability to lead both in the private sector and the government (Shulman and Sweitzer 2018, Gitlin 1980 and Goffman 1974).

Moreover, the economic recovery frame can be said to have been motivated and inspired by the prevailing socio-economic conditions that have affected the South African economy. The economy of South Africa during the period under investigation was not performing well. The rand was weakening daily; the prices of basic commodities were increasing. There was a lot of discontent in South Africa. There were poor investments in the country and South African credit ratings were downgraded leading South African economy into a recession. Calls for urgent need to revive the economy were growing daily. These calls prompted a protest that was calling for Jacob Zuma to resign and hand over leadership to a more capable leader. Therefore, it can be assumed that *News24* reference to all prevailing conditions in and juxtaposing them with Cyril Ramaphosa allowed them to dig deep into the past to influence the present. It explains the history of the present (Hook 2001: 20). Simply, put, the fact that *News24* reports on economic recovery and growth were replete with comments that referred to the causes of the economic decline and then present a possible saviour who can resuscitate the economy in the person of Cyril Ramaphosa seems to suggest that *News24* borrowed and evoked the past to legitimise the capability of Cyril Ramaphosa to turn around the fortunes of the country. Thus, the economic recovery and growth frame has its roots in the economic discourse that pervades South Africa in the period before the election campaigns.

The above assertion resonates with findings of Ihlen and Nitz (2008) and Miller (2006). These scholars emphasised the extent to which the prevailing events and conditions impact on the news frame. For instance, a study conducted by Miller revealed that the media content and frames are affected and mirror the events that were happening in the corporate world (2006: 45). To illustrate this observation Miller argued that "when environmental issues or accounting fraud occurs and when health issues are at stake, the media adopts protesters/antagonistic frames" (Miller 2006: 45). Put differently, what this means is that the media frames as they are packaged to the public are not independent of the unfolding events that are obtaining in their surroundings. Ihlen and Nitz argue that the media uses events from the world and different organization to frame their news (2008: 65). These scholars argued that "occasionally, mixed frames from corporations and other organisations are used in the media news" (Ihlen and Nitz cited in Verhoeven 2016: 511).

Economic recovery and growth frame: *IOL*

Sampled data from *IOL* indicated that the economic recovery frame was used extensively by *IOL* in the period leading to the conference more than after Cyril Ramaphosa's election victory. In this frame, the emphasis was placed on the potential of Cyril Ramaphosa and capability to revive the economy that was plundered by Jacob Zuma and his cronies when he was the president of South Africa. For example, in one report, Pillay and Pillay said that "the future of South Africa's economy and the possibility of further downgrades will be directly impacted by the outcome of the ANC's elective conference" (2017: 1). The previous quote, though sound neutral, a dramatic shift was evident in the report when the reporters first quoted Pravin Gordhan who said "the country needs new leadership, and that if Cyril Ramaphosa was elected there would be no need to worry about their rating agencies" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1). Now, this statement is suggestive in nature. It suggests that the new leader that South Africa needs were Cyril Ramaphosa. This is so because, in the same statement, the reporter went on to say that "if Ramaphosa was elected there would be no need for downgrade" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1). In simple terms, this statement implies that the reporters were crediting Cyril Ramaphosa through appealing to its readers that the problem of the downgrade and other economic challenges will be dealt with by Cyril Ramaphosa.

In keeping with findings from previous studies, results from the data showed that in the economic recovery and growth frame, reporters relied heavily on external sources to assert and authenticate their stories. They referred to external sources. Some of the sources' names were identified while some were referred to as “reliable sources”. To illustrate, in a report of 29 November 2017, the reporters quoted a variety of sources when they were reporting on the potential of Cyril Ramaphosa to transform the economy. What was more interesting is that the reporters relied on these sources to justify the potential for Cyril Ramaphosa to steer the economy of South Africa in the right direction. For example, a chief economist for the Efficient Group, Dawie Roodt was quoted saying that he has confidence that if Cyril Ramaphosa is elected ANC president was going to improve the state of the economy. The report said, "the chief economist for the Efficient Group, said he had very little doubt that the rating agencies would react positively if Cyril Ramaphosa becomes the next ANC president" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1). Moreover, another economist was also quoted saying that after the change of leadership in ANC there is no doubt that the new president will improve economic status in the country.

The use of sources has its implication on how the content is read by the audience. This is so because sources allow the reporters to authenticate their report and erase the elements of biased reporting. Moreover, the reference to sources also seems to suggest that the reporters used sources to authenticate its subjective endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa without jeopardising its moral claim on objectivity. More often, the opinion of the sources cited by the reporters replicates the ideological standpoint and editorial policy of press in question. Findings discussed above seems to consistent with findings of Richardson who argued that more often, the journalist makes use of sources to justify and authenticate their subjective positions and opinion that they might have integrated into their reports (2007).

Moreover, analysis of data showed that there was strong evidence that *IOL* framed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in binary terms. To illustrate, the press contrasted the two leaders in the economic recovery and growth frame. What this means is that whenever the sources were presented and commented on the positive potential of Cyril Ramaphosa, they were also mindful to comment on the negative potentials that lie within the possible victory of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Simply put, in a report of 29 November 2017, when the chief economist for the Efficient Group, Dawie Roodt's positive comments on Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to grow the

economy, the reporters was quick to stress and highlight on the negative aspects of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Consequently, in terms of underlying meaning, one is tempted to assume that the pressing manner of presenting the two candidates allows it to assume the position of a cultural terrain and battlefield where ideological battles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariats are fought (Gramsci 1937). For instance, the two candidates stood for two different ideologies. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for radical economic transformation. This was an economic approach that was widely interpreted as pro-masses. On the other hand, Cyril Ramaphosa stood for the ideas of the ruling elite. He is best understood as capitalist. Drawing on this, it follows that the press by comparing the two leaders it was consciously or unconsciously comparing their ideologies and thus package the Cyril Ramaphosa ideology as the dominant one to its readers.

Table 8.4: Linguistic expression in economic recovery and growth frame: *IOL*

<p>“economist has said that Ramaphosa's victory would lead to an improvement in the economy” (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1)</p> <p>“expectations were that with Ramaphosa- a technocrat who is seen to be close to the business sector- as the president, the economy would improve” (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Gordhan: #CyrilRamaphosa can rescue SA” (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1)</p> <p>"the chief economist for the Efficient Group said he had very little that the rating agencies would react negatively if Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma becomes the next ANC president" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1)</p> <p>“but the rating agencies would probably act positively if Cyril Ramaphosa is president. He might be able to influence the facts over some time, but not overnight" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Ramaphosa promised to promote growth, improve investor confidence and tackle a disheartened 28% unemployment rate” (Staff Reporter 2017: 1)</p>

“According to Ramaphosa’s plans, jobs become the highlight of government policy” (Staff Reporter 2017: 1)

“Ramaphosa revealed his plans to ensure that the government avoids an unsustainable debt level. He will exercise fiscal discipline to ensure that resources are utilised for development, instead of servicing the debt”(Staff Reporter 2017: 1)

Sampled data suggest that how Cyril Ramaphosa as a social actor was presented only sort to credit his campaign for president of the ANC. In a report titled “*Ramaphosa’s plans for saving the SA economy*”, *IOL* report embarked on a journey to describe and explain the so-called "Ramaphosa's plans to save the economy" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1). In this report the reporter begins by presenting the current situation that characterised the South African economy. Immediately after contextualizing the report, the reporter then stressed that “Ramaphosa promised to promote growth, improve investor confidence and tackle disheartening 28% unemployment rate” (Staff Reporter 2017: 1). However, interesting in this report was the position taken by the reporter to explain and justify the plan of Cyril Ramaphosa to revive the South African economy. What this means is that the reporter stance in the presentation of these plans simply reflected the biased support that the reporters have in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa's policies.

To illustrate the above assertion, news professionals when reporting an issue are expected not to impose their feeling and emotion or perceptions in this story (O’Neill 2001 cited in Richardson 2007). However, this was not the case in this report. The reporter consciously or unconsciously presented the economic plans in a way that was leading. It would guide the reader on how to think about the economic plans of Cyril Ramaphosa. For example, commenting on the economic plans the reporter said “Ramaphosa revealed his plans to ensure that government avoids an unsustainable debt level. He will exercise fiscal discipline to ensure that resources are utilised for development, instead of servicing the debt.” This manner of reporting explains the extent to which journalist act upon society (Richardson 2007: 115). What this means is that presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate allowed the reporters to engage in the process of producing and reproducing social inequalities that through maintaining the dominant social ideas of the ruling elite. As highlighted earlier, Cyril Ramaphosa was understood as a candidate who represents the ideas of the ruling class.

Moreover, how Cyril Ramaphosa was framed as a capable effective leader as opposed to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma seem to prove the extent to which gender bias lying within the text. Close analysis on how Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as a man with plans and ready to act, can be said to have deep cultural meaning. Now, presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as a capable leader seems to suggest that the press was activating or authenticating the already existing gender assumptions that pervade the South African society. What this means is that this manner of presenting Cyril Ramaphosa confirms the assumption that the man is always ready and able to deliver any task that they are given. The press presents Cyril Ramaphosa as a while men are viewed as ruthless, ambitious, and tough leaders (Nacos 2005: 440).

Therefore, put together the *New24* and *IOL* focus on the economic recovery frame can be said to have been motivated by the need to appeal to its audience and ultimately increase their circulation during an ailing and struggling economy. The economic recovery frame was likely to appeal to a greater portion of the urban population that was heavily affected by the performance of the economy. This portion of the South African society was interested in knowing the future of the economy and how it was going to perform in the next coming years. Their interest in the economic performance inevitably made them interested in who the next president of the country. This was so because the hopes for a better economic performance lied in the capabilities of the president who will replace Jacob Zuma.

Drawing on the above context, the press by emphasizing on the economic recovery frame, it can be said to have been targeting its readers. To add, it also follows that targeting this population could only increase their circulation, sales, and clicks per second and improve their analytics. All this will be a haven for their advertisers. The argument raised here seems to agree with findings from previous research (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Hallin and Mancini 2004) that stress that the need economic competition and the need to increase profit exerts influence on the type of the content a press produces. In this case, it can be assumed that *News24* and *IOL* when they were feeling under so much pressure to increase profits, their content became driven by the need to satisfy the needs of their consumers who in this case were aligned to a certain ideological standpoint. Thus, the press should be understood as a business interested in generating profit.

Chapter 9: Election victory frame

Introduction

This chapter presents qualitative findings on the Election victory frame. It presents, analyse and discusses the findings. The chapter expounded the frames to answer the questions how such frames sought to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and what are the other forces that might have influenced such framing. It is indicated in this study that *News24* and *IOL* made use of the election victory frame. However, the frame was activated differently yet achieving the similar objectives. That is to legitimise or de-legitimise the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.

Following this introduction, the following section presents, analyse and discusses findings on Election victory frame from *New24* and *IOL*. In presenting and discussing the findings, the following questions will be answered:

1. How exactly did *News24* and *IOL* frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress?
2. What are the similarities and differences in how the two *News24* and *IOL* framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders?
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders?
4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa?

Election victory: *News24*

A deeper analysis of *News24* reports showed that the Cyril Ramaphosa's election campaign was packaged as given and inevitable victory. Put differently, the press constantly presented Cyril Ramaphosa to its audience as a candidate who has been endorsed and a candidate who has the

victory even before the final elections. A closer look at this way of presenting issues gives the impression that *News24* labeled and described their reports on Cyril Ramaphosa in a manner that they want their audience to think about the campaign and ultimately assume the press desired course of action. For instance, in a report by Everett and Jennings published on 29 October 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were both referred to in terms of their progress in the campaign. In this case, the reporters referred to surveys conducted by an unidentified Cape Town-based research agency and made extensive use of statistics to explain why Cyril Ramaphosa is the preferred and leading candidate in the build-up to the ANC presidential elections. Initially, the report quoted statistics from the previous national elections where ANC is said to have performed badly with a staggering election victory of 54% (Everett and Jennings 2017). It was highlighted in the report that the ANC members “should be thinking about the effect of their choices” in the coming up elections as they do not need a leader to who does not inspire confidence in the South African population (Everett and Jennings 2017: 1).

Interesting in this report, was the extensive use of figures and statistics that were in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa. For instance, the report indicated that concerning the outcome of the forthcoming election, Cyril Ramaphosa was ahead and leading. This manner of reporting on Cyril Ramaphosa only served to endorse him as the ultimate winner in the election that was not conducted yet. With the use of statistics (to authenticate the subjective position of the journalists Richardson 2007, Chambwera 2016) and metaphors, Cyril Ramaphosa was presented to the audience as someone who was far in front in terms of the support, he was likely to muster. For example, Everatt and Jennings reported that “on the view of who should be president of the ANC, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is streets ahead of all rivals” (2017: 2). The use of the phrase “streets ahead” simply served to make clear and accentuate the extent to which Cyril Ramaphosa was leading the elections. It allowed the reporters to create a feeling among its readers that Cyril Ramaphosa has already won the elections.

More interestingly, the use of such a common phrase and metaphors work because it allows the press and its readers to use the language (making sense of something) that they are both familiar with (McCracken 1986: 71). The use of such a metaphor as the language the press and its reader are familiar with seems to suggest the press did not invent the metaphors when describing Cyril Ramaphosa as “streets ahead”. Instead, the metaphor was taken from the broader society, where

its meaning can be understood with those who operate within that discourse. Therefore, the use of phrases and metaphors to inspire certain type of interpretation of the issue by the reader as applied by in the press has been found to be similar to the argument made by Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli (2001: 7) when they argued that the media choose to frame the kind of stories in a particular way. In this case, what the media does is to provide its audience with images through which they can perceive others. As a result of the images, frames, and catch-phrases that are laden with signifiers that can act as raw materials the readers use to confirm, modify or negate their already existing interpretation of the issue at hand (Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli 2001: 7).

Table 9.1: Linguistic expression in election victory frame: *News24*

<p>“on the view of who should be president of the ANC, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is streets ahead of all rivals in the view of respondents- with 43% approving of him as the next leader compared with 16% for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Everatt and Jennings 2017: 1)</p> <p>"if we look only at black respondents who intend to vote in 2019, Ramaphosa stands at 46%, Dlamini-Zuma manages 20% and the rest remain unchanged". (Everatt and Jennings 2017: 1)</p> <p>"69% of potential black voters in 2019 said Ramaphosa as leader would make them "much more likely" or "somewhat more likely" to vote ANC; 51% said the same of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Everatt and Jennings 2017: 1)</p> <p>"The ANC West Rand region's chairperson Boyce Naledi endorsed ANC deputy president Cyril Ramphosa as his preferred candidates. The West Rand ANC Youth League did the same" (Tandwa, 2017: 1)</p> <p>"In Eastern cape, Ramaphosa received 423 branch nominations against Dlamini-Zuma's 61 branch nominations" (Ngcukana 2017: 1)</p>
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In keeping with findings from previous research (Chambwera 2016; Watkins 2009), results from this study seem to support the argument that the media reports are affected by the political events

and the dominant discourses that are obtaining at a given time. What this means is that the news election victory frame bears some resemblance from the events that were happening during the time of their construction. To illustrate this, it was common knowledge in South Africa that Cyril Ramaphosa was the preferred and potential presidential candidate for most of the ruling elites (Mathekga 2018: 67). For instance, calls for Cyril Ramaphosa to become a future president of the ANC date back to the time of Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki and even Nelson Mandela. During Jacob Zuma's leadership, a certain faction in the ANC and the country were continuously calling for the resignation of Jacob Zuma pointing to Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate. Then in 2012, Cyril Ramaphosa was elected vice president of the ANC and later vice president of the country. These events were all efforts by a group (referred to as white monopoly capital) in the ANC that believed that Cyril Ramaphosa is the preferred candidate and able leader to steer the fortunes of South Africa in the right direction (Mathekga 2018: 78). Put together, these events seem to suggest that *News24* election victory frame was constructed in the manner that was in harmony with the dominant discourses and political statements within society. As a result, their news report was not isolated from the context of their construction. To add, paying reference to the prevailing context seems to suggest that the creators of the content plugged into a larger current social and political discourse which they believe the readers will respond to. This observation lends support to previous findings in the literature that states that the frames used by the news reporters to report on political candidates are profoundly entrenched in the culture, values, philosophies and discursive practices in which they function and in particular historical phases (Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2016; Foucault 1980).

Moreover, by drawing on the “statements” in the prevailing political discourse, *News24* can also be seen to have allowed its audience to engage with the already existing information in their heads and gave them clues (by use of statistics) about who the preferred candidate is. In this case the preferred candidate who happens to be Cyril Ramaphosa. Therefore, it can be safely concluded during and before the elections, that *News24* was consciously or unconsciously involved in the process of amplifying, clarifying and invigorating the prevailing and dominant interpretation that has characterized the South African political discourse concerning the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

From the analysis of data, one interesting result that emerged from *News24* is that of the difference in the use of the election victory frame when reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In simple terms, the campaign of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was packaged as a "loss and shame" even before the actual elections took place. In the same report referred to above (29 October 2017), *News24* presented a statistical comparison of the campaigns of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. While Cyril Ramaphosa's election campaign was packaged as a victory, it was not the case with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's campaign for the presidency. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented as a political candidate who was always second to Cyril Ramaphosa in the run-up to the presidential election. The report highlighted that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was suffering from shameful defeats and was at the verge of losing all the provinces. In this Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was only commanding 16% percent against 46% for Cyril Ramaphosa. In this case, the two political candidates were listed in binary terms and terms of "gains versus losses" and "win versus loss". What this means is that *News24* presented Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to its readers in logical terms (statistics) that either encourages or discourages certain interpretation and course of action among the readers (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1984). This manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma only served to discredit her as the potential leader of the ANC. The fact that her campaign could not attract enough response was given considerable attention and amplified by *News24* reporters. As a result, this focus did not only do harm to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma campaign but also served to discredit her campaign and her potential to win the election on the conference.

Put together, the above scenario divulges the level of bias that pervades the press reports when reporting on female leaders. Clearly, by portraying Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a loser even before the election authenticates the argument raised by previous research that the media plays as a gendered mediator that actively perpetuate the gender double-blind that constrains female political leaders (Wright and Holland 2014:78). What is more is that the press manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a leader who lacks political experience to win the election and attract more voters seems to be in agreement with findings from Gedalya *et al.* 2017, Greenwald and Lehman 2017 and Nacos 2005 who argued that when reporting on female leaders the media always reflects a deep gender bias by means of presenting the female leaders as lacking experience, unable to attract support and unable to make decisions.

The most striking example of how the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political leadership was discredited was seen in a *News24* report that was published on the 29 October 2017 titled "*Mazzotti denies involvement in NDZ campaign*". The report said that "controversial businessman Adriano Mazzotti on Sunday denied being involved in funding the campaign for Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma" (Correspondent 2017: 1). Moreover, the report also stresses that the businessman's company does not support Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's campaign. Interesting to note in this report is how the reporters emphasised the fact that the businessman and other investors are distancing themselves from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political efforts to become president. This is a strong effort to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's campaign and leadership. To add, the reporters choose to focus on certain sets of consideration and overemphasize them over others allowed the press to encourage its readers to interpret the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma within a meaningful context (Cacciatore *et al.* 2016).

To illustrate, text in the report referred above should be understood within the broader context within which the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and the news press were functioning. It can be said that the reports were affected by the obtaining economic and political conditions that characterised the period leading to the conference. What this means is that the reference and emphasis on the "businessman and investors who ditched Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma resemble issues that were taking place during the time of reporting. To demonstrate, during the period leading to the elections, the issue of investors dominated conversation both in the private and public sector (Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017; Marias and Groenwald 2017). It was believed that for South Africa to regain its feet after the weakening of the rand and poor performance in the market, it needs foreign direct investments. To add, it was also assumed that only a leader who is investor-friendly and who can inspire investor confidence was a necessity and should be everyone's preferred candidate (Marias and Groenwald 2017).

Drawing from that context, every individual running for the presidency of the ANC needed to possess leadership qualities that inspire and attract investor. However, the presentation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the report as someone businessman and investor do not want to align with would create doubt and fear among the audience of *News24*. Simply put, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in this report was presented and discredited as a leader who cannot inspire the confidence among the investors. As a result, the moral interpretation and required course of action is not to

elect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma but lookout for a better candidate who can bring about investment in South Africa. Thus, this manner of reporting did not endorse the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, but it simply served to discredit her as someone who is not investor-friendly.

Moreover, a desire to connect with the concerns of the readers and to do so immediately and in a direct manner almost pushed *News24* reporters to sensationalize the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the presidency of the ANC. The reporters relied on adopting more rhetorically tailored language to represent the problem with the nominations of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For instance, results from the data showed that the press made use of catchphrases and linguistic expressions that had an underlying negative meaning. These phrases and linguistic expressions were rhetoric and discrediting in nature. For instance, in a report titled “*Nomination of Dlamini-Zuma in Free State was a sham*” (Mahlase 2017: 1), the report documents the nomination event that endorsed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in Free State. In this report, the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was portrayed as the problem issue. The reporter said, “Free State branches have threatened to go to court again if necessary, this time to nullify the provincial general council (PGC) that nominated ANC presidential hopeful Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Mahlase 2017: 1). More so, in the report, Ngcukana attempted to sensationalise the actual event and eventually discredit the character of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Simply put, throughout the report Ngcukana repeatedly referred to the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma using a phrase like “nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma a sham”, “illegal”, “irregular and unacceptable” (Mahlase 2017: 1).

This manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's nomination seems to suggest that the nomination was fake and possibly did not happen. Some terms used to refer to the nomination was that it was “illegal”, it was a “surprise” and “flawed”, and that the nomination process was “manipulated”. Moreover, the reporter also said, “the meetings in the branches, leading to the elective conference were irregular, unlawful, unconstitutional”. Similarly, Zulu in a report of 29 November 2017 said that “the complainants claimed that the branch meeting which ended with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma being nominated included several procedural irregularities” (Zulu 2017: 1). Put together, the use of negative phrases seems to perform the role of vilifying the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To the reader, the only moral interpretation that can be deduced is that, do not support Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma because she could not be nominated fairly and constitutionally. To add, the phrases carries with them underlying meaning

(replete with the power to influence voters' choices) that suggest that as a candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma cannot be fairly and legally elected by the people unless she employs illegal tactics to manipulate the process (Foucault 1980: 56). This manner of reporting has within it the ability to discrediting the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To illustrate, what this means is that the reports were not only successful in using sensational words to connect the reader to the problem, instead they were also successful in discrediting the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to its readers by presenting it as questionable and lacking legitimacy drawn from the endorsement by all members who participated in the nomination process. Thus, drawing on this line of thinking, one it can be assumed that the press text communicated knowledge that carries with it the power to influence the attitudes of its readers (Foucault 1980: 89).

As suggested by Richardson (2007) and Watkins (2009), findings from the data point to the fact that what was selected, packaged, disseminated and received as the news was mediated by organizational processes, ideological beliefs, and power relations. To illustrate the point, deep analysis of data showed that the news reports that focused on the political candidates were partly opinion pieces and commentaries from the various people most of which were part of the newsreaders. The single most striking example is the commentary that was authored by Dr. Sean Gossel titled "*Breaking Zuma's Kleptocracy is up to all of us*" (Gossel 2017: 1). This report is a typical example of how societies values, beliefs, and opinion constitute the new production process. In the commentary, Gossel (2017: 1) adopted a negative stance in which he blamed Jacob Zuma and those aligned to him for running South Africa like a Kleptocracy. This writer articulated that the ANC was captured by a "powerful, corrupt, and predatory rule" of Jacob Zuma (Gossel 2017: 1). For the writer, it is Jacob Zuma's rule that needs to be dismantled and replaced by a good and moral leader.

However, what is striking in the above commentary was the fact that the author suggested that Cyril Ramaphosa was the best and ultimate candidate to dismantle the Kleptocracy that was established by Jacob Zuma and his cronies. Gossel said Cyril Ramaphosa has all the resources to dismantle "Jacob Zuma's Kleptocratic system" (2017: 1). Moreover, he also said Cyril Ramaphosa can "reinforce the renewed anti-corruption stance of parliamentary committees and appointing the state capture inquiry" (Gossel 2017: 1). To add, the writer also emphasised that "Cyril Ramaphosa can rally the power of his anti-state capture of the ANC behind his campaign" (Gossel 2017: 1).

Moreover, the most remarkable thing in these quoted statements is the use of phrases that indicate that Cyril Ramaphosa possesses the ability to dismantle the corrupt system of Jacob Zuma. For instance, suggestive phrases like “Ramaphosa has the ability”, “Ramaphosa can”, “Ramaphosa will” and “Cyril Ramaphosa possesses” point to the fact that the author was consciously or unconsciously endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader with abilities to change the situation. To that end, the impression given was that Cyril Ramaphosa has done that before, he will do it and has been doing it.

Now, turning to the issue of how the society affects the news content. It can be argued that the position that any specific writer took to endorse Cyril Ramaphosa leadership resonates with that of the media institution in question. The stance taken by the writer in this article fits well with the ideologies that inform content production and distribution at *News24*. This is so because reporters and journalists often avoid publishing content from the public that does not resonate with their editorial policies and the ideologies that inform their news content (Richardson 2007: 82).

Thus, drawing on the argument above, it can be assumed that the press content was influenced by the beliefs of its readers (who are also content contributors) in the same way as the news content influence how the society perceive the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through its content produced by the members of the society. This observation provides additional support to the findings from Richardson 2007 and Wagner and Meyer 2017 that argued that the media text is affected by a myriad of factors like its production and its relation to the society that provides it with information. The ideas of the society are so integrated and so strong that it is difficult for the media to resist or separate them from its text (Wagner and Meyer 2017; Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2001).

Further analysis showed that a great deal of attention was placed on endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership and discredited Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For example, in a report of 29 December 2017 titled “*no women leaders, but throwing chairs allowed*” (Ngcukana 2017: 1). Ngcukana embarked on a journey of documenting the events that had happened in the ANC in the previous two weeks. The reporter began by explaining the progress and identifying the poor performance of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the branch election. Ngcukana indicated that Cyril Ramaphosa was performing better in the primary elections, giving the impression that he was the most preferred candidate. Of note in this report was the emphasis that was placed on the relationship

that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had with the traditional leaders of the AbaThembu nation. The report made quick reference and reminded the readers that "South Africa is not ready for a female leader". It did so by quoting Mpendulo Sigcawu a traditional leader when he told Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 2015 that "South Africa was not ready for a female leader"(Ngcukana 2017: 1). This statement reflects the nature of patriarchy that pervades South African society. Essentially, the fact that the reporter referred to the statement that was made in 2015 concerning female leaders begged careful analysis. What is clear from this manner of reporting is that the reporter evoked the statements that were historically specific and unique to the patriarchal discourse Foucault (1980). Additionally, the reporter reminded the reader of the patriarchal statements that already existed in their minds. This is so because the discussion of a female leader in South Africa has roots in the patriarchal discourse that have been ongoing.

Also, the way the reports presented the experience of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma with the Amathembu Kings, and how these Kings could not endorse her as leader played a role as a discrediting strategy. This can be better explained by referring to the context within which these reports were produced. To illustrate, South Africa is understood to be composed of the most patriarchal and conservative communities. In a patriarchal system like South African societies, leadership is sacrosanct and remains a domain reserved for male figures. From the family unit to the national level, leadership is dominated by males. Therefore, any attempt by a woman to assume leadership can be simply interpreted as a threat to the male position in society. Now, by placing the reader's attention to how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was condemned by the Kings, the reporters allowed the reader to refer to their cultural frame that already exists in their heads. In this case, referring to this frame will allow the reader to see Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as one who is defying their culture by threatening the position of the male figure in society. Therefore, it seems in this case that *New24* reporters were aware of the cultural discourses and the patriarchal ideology. They evoked the patriarchy frames which were effective in reminding its readers that South Africa was not ready for a female leader. Evoking the patriarchal ideology amongst its reader could only serve the purpose of discrediting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership as weak. It allowed the readers to interpret the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through the patriarchal lenses evoked in their memory by the reporters. Consequently, in keeping with previous research, this manner of reporting seems to confirm the argument that in many instances, females are regarded as inconsequential inside the political domain and incompetent of bringing constructive

transformation, only because of the stereotypical positions dispensed to them by culture and society which encumbers them in sundry spheres (Gedalya *et al.* 2017; Vos 2013; Narcos 2005).

Moreover, the most striking result that emerged is that news reports made extensive reference to cultural leaders in a bid to endorse and discredit the political candidates. This approach suggests that the press engaged in an active process of selecting a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connection among them to promote a predetermined interpretation (Gitlin, 2003, 1980). To illustrate, in a report on 27 October 2017, Mngadi said that the ANC Women's league visited the place of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. This visit according to Mngadi was meant to introduce Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the Zulu king ahead of the ANC elective conference. Moreover, it was also highlighted in the report that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and some leaders of the youth league presented the king with various gifts. These include a cow and "a brown envelope" with tea for the king. Interesting to note in this report is how the press paid focus on some specific negative aspects of the event. It was highlighted in the report that after the king received the gifts from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, he immediately expressed his concern about the violence that was rocking the whole province of KwaZulu-Natal. In this case, the press paid a blind eye on the response of the king to the visit by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Perhaps, what the reader was expecting to hear was whether the King endorsed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the leader or not. Regrettably, the reporter in this case was quick to draw the reader's attention to the matter of violence that was unrelated to the objectives of the visit. The report reads "the king used the visit by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as an opportunity to express how heart-breaking it was to see ANC members killing each other in KwaZulu-Natal" (Mngadi 2017: 1). This way of focusing on certain aspects of the story over other seems to confirm the arguments raised by various framing theory scholars that framing is the type of persuasion technique in communication where the media focuses on those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Cacciatore *et al.* 2016; Entman 2007, 1993).

In addition, the press can be said to sought to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in two ways. Firstly, by not reporting what King Goodwill Zwelithini said about the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the salience can be interpreted to mean that the visit was not considered important by the king of the Zulus that's why he did not respond or endorsed the purpose of the visit and instead decided to focus on the violence that has rocked the province. To add, silence on the

response of the king and choosing to focus on the violence seems to suggest that the press focused on a specific aspect of an issue and decided to give prominence to that aspect. The quick focus to the issue of violence allows the reporters to direct the reader's attention to exactly those properties of the story that are intended to be treated and acted upon by the reader (McCracken 1986: 75). In this case, the press decided to focus on violence and link it directly to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The press amplified the issue of violence more than the purpose of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's visit. Secondly, the media by giving prominence to the issue of violence as the king's response to the visit of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma can be said to have been discrediting the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by linking her to political violence that has affected the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma visit to King Goodwill Zwelithini seems to suggest that the press was determined to assassinate the campaign efforts of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The emphasis on the involvement of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the KwaZulu-Natal politics and need to control bears resemblance with arguments that were raised by various scholars in Chapter 4 (Mathekga 2018; Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa 2017; Du Plessis 2017). For instance, Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma belonged to the KwaZulu-Natal syndicate that was associated with patronage (2017: 1). Thus, this resemblance found in the text seems to suggest the extent to which the press reports were intertextual in nature. In simple terms, they reverberate pre-existing discourses.

Turning to the notion of how the press reports could not be isolated from the context of their construction, deeper analysis of the data proved that the press digs deeper into the prevailing discourse to create a narrative that will encourage its readers to reach a certain interpretation of the events. To illustrate, the media when referred to violence and how it was denounced by the Zulu king, it actively participated in the KwaZulu-Natal political violence discourse. In simple terms, what this means is that the media used the person of the Zulu king to denounce the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by attaching her name to the political violence that has affected KwaZulu-Natal. To demonstrate, the report said, "Zwelithini used the visit to express how heart-breaking it was to see ANC members killing each other in KwaZulu-Natal" (Mngadi 2017: 1). Drawing on this manner of covering the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, one is tempted to argue that the media amplified the gender bias that is typical of the media when reporting of female political leaders. This argument fits well with findings from previous studies that argued

that the modern bias facing women in politics is that the media simply use traditional frames- that is constructed around the dominance of men- in coverage of women, making it difficult for women politicians to be presented as anything other than political outsiders (Fountaine and McGregor 2001: 59).

Furthermore, the emphasis on political violence and linking it to Nkosazana-Dlamini-Zuma seems to suggest *News24* applied the technique of sentimentality to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political leadership. Put differently, the press consciously or unconsciously engaged in a process of reminding the reader of his or her emotional past; a past the reader was not happy to confront. In this case, the readers were reminded that one of the leaders (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) who has a vested interest to control KwaZulu-Natal has come home and the King has taken a chance to discipline her. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is one of the ANC leaders who has been involved in the battle to control ANC (Hartley 2018: 88). Her involvement and other powerful leaders in the control of KZN has led to political killings and outbreak of violence in the province. These killings left some part of the province traumatized (Pauw 2017: 89). Thus, by reminding the reader of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's involvement in the violence, the press inevitably did a disservice to her personality and her political ambitions by evoking past a negative emotional feeling among its readers. The way *News24* reported on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's link to violence in the province seems to suggest that it engaged in the process of explaining the present by referring to the past discourse (Chambwera 2016 and Khuluse 2014). To illustrate the above, the press can be said to have employed the styles of presenting information in a manner that reverberates with prevailing underlying schemas amongst their audience, and thus allowing them to think of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma within the interpretive framework presented to them (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 56). Moreover, because the issue of political killings was not new, it is clear that *News24* presented the issue of political killings in a vivid manner that evoked the memory of its audience and allowed them to think of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma within the context of political killings and violence that was condemned by the king of the Zulu nation when he met her.

Furthermore, a close analysis of the context within which this report was produced seems to suggest that the construction of the reports that focused on violence were not independent of the unfolding and prevailing social events. To place this matter in context, the KwaZulu-Natal province was burning with political violence at the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma visited the King of

Zulu nation. Much of the violence was said to be perpetrated by influential political leaders who were competing to control the province. Before 1994, the violent killings were more prominent between the ANC cadres and the Inkanda Freedom Party supporters (Pauw 2017: 99). However, more recently, the political killings in the province have been reported to be more between the political players of the same party as opposed to the members of different parties, ANC party members had leaders have been directly engaged in violence that has seen the hordes of its leaders (Mathekga 2018: 76). This violence was blamed on the factional fights and the battlers for a leadership position within ANC structures and the government. More so, conversations (public perception) concerning the violence suggested that most of the violence that took place in KwaZulu-Natal was orchestrated and masterminded by those in leadership positions (Butler 2017: 101). These leaders like Jacob Zuma and his faction was placed at the heart of the battle to control the province and thus they were also linked to the violence. Moreover, there were also speculations that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was in the faction of Jacob Zuma and that she also had vested interest in controlling the province (Pauw 2017: 99). Therefore, *News24* overtly discredited the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by presenting the issue of violence and the response of King Goodwill Zwelithini in such a way as to convey a negative value judgment that was not immediately apparent, to create an inherent bias (Gofman 1978).

Furthermore, *News24* framing of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa can be said to have been affected by repeated reference to the cultural power dynamics its audience could resonate with and understand. To illustrate this assertion, a comparison of the report of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma visit to the king explained in the previous section can be made with the visit by Cyril Ramaphosa to the Zulu king and the Venda king in the same period. In a report of 5 November 2017, *News24* reported that thunderous cheers and ululations greeted Cyril Ramaphosa as he received a royal spear, cattle and hide shield from the Venda king. Moreover, the reporter in this news article interpreted this act as a sign that the Venda king has signified solid support for Cyril Ramaphosa ahead of the ANC presidential elections. An interpretation of the cultural activities by the newspaper reporter allows one to assume that the news reports were artefacts that conveyed meaning and that the reports were also influenced by the cultural context within which the news media was operating. This is so because the interpretation of the event and its meaning would require one who is familiar with that culture. Otherwise, a foreign person would not have been able to draw out the connotative meaning symbolised by the act of the Venda king when he

gave a spear to Cyril Ramaphosa. As a result, it can be stated that the prevailing cultural context influences the news and frame production allowing certain cultural meanings to be embedded in the media content (Van Gorp 2007).

To add, comparing this report to the one Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma met with the Zulu king, one is tempted to conclude that *News24* report was embedded in the culture that was personified by the powerful kings. Therefore, power wielded by the kings was used to legitimise and delegitimise the leadership of the two political candidates. In this case, *News24* can be said to have reflected on culture and used the powers of the kings to present the two leaders. What this means is that *News24* denounces the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by referring to the Zulu king who is the highest figure in the culture within which Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is part of. Thus, it follows that if the most powerful figure in a culture denounces Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the course of action that follows from the subordinates of the same culture is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is condemned, and his practices are not accepted to this culture. On the other hand, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa by the kings of Venda can be interpreted to mean that the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa is accepted by the highest voice in the Venda culture, as such all the subordinates of that culture were therefore bound to endorse and follow what their cultural leaders have said. Therefore, drawing on this analysis, it can be stated that *News24* in reporting the two political candidates was not oblivious of the prevailing cultural context. Instead, it used culture to create structures of meaning and practices and performances that work concomitantly to construct reality around the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa (Terre Blanche *et al.* 2006: 286)

Moreover, a deeper analysis of the data showed that the press legitimated Cyril Ramaphosa by use of the authoritative legitimacy strategies. In this case, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa was presented to the readers to legitimate him as the chosen. A case in point is the endorsement by the Aba Thembu kings. The endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa by people who are powerful leaders in society shows how the different aspects of this manner of legitimation were embedded in the culture. The use of cultural leaders to authenticate the presidential ambitions of Cyril Ramaphosa was different from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who was at the receiving end of the embarrassing rejection by the traditional leaders. The greatest among which came from the king of the AmaXhosa who condemned her and told her when she visited that the country was not ready for a

female leader. This condemnation by the traditional leaders based on gender and sexuality reflects the deeply rooted patriarchal cultures that pervade South African societies. This then was transferred into the public domain and amplified by the media to remind the people of their long-held beliefs. Clearly, *News24* delegitimized the leadership and personality of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by making use of powerful cultural authorities that people respect and listen within the Zulu and Venda culture. Because of that, the news reports of *News24* can also be viewed as cultural artefacts that played a vital role in communicating the deeply rooted patriarchy that cuts across the political culture in South Africa.

Apart from reporting negatively on the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the sampled data also showed that *News24* also had some few positive reports on the leadership and personality of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In a report of 26 October 2017, *News24* report that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was "her person". In this report, though much of the effort was placed on describing the factional battles that were triggered by the battle to replace Jacob Zuma with a female president, the report gave a fair and positive picture of the political leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To demonstrate, the reporter explained the experience of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the three political administration. It was highlighted that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma always maintained a professional relationship with his former husband Jacob Zuma. For example, the report stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma attended a birthday of Nelson Mandela in 2003 after her divorce with Jacob Zuma, according to the report, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma maintained her professional gesture when she came face to face with Jacob Zuma. Moreover, in 2007 she campaigned with Thabo Mbeki for the top position in the ANC, but when it became clear that he was being ousted she threw her lot with Jacob Zuma. Though her initial tethering to Thabo Mbeki could have been out of principle, her switching sides proved that she could abandon her political senior when necessity dictated. The report said, "the fact that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood against her ex-husband and father of her children in a fierce power battle is a testament to the fact that she is her person, who does not make decisions according to the sentiment" (*News24* Opinion 26 October 2017). Moreover, the report also reads that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has never defended her former husband or any of his allegedly corrupt dealings. Put together, the press focus on the positive aspects of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma can be interpreted as a means by the press to be impartial and reduce bias in their reportage. However, the most striking thing about this assertion is that it contradicts with the findings from previous studies that emphasise on that in all

cases the media portray female leaders in the negative light. For instance, Cukeir *et al.* argued that “women are less likely to be framed as leaders or experts and are less likely to hold news host or anchor positions” (2016: 45). Results from the analysis presented in this section are in stark contrast with this observation. In our observation, it seems that the press afforded Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma a bit of fair coverage.

To add, results from the analysis further strengthen the argument that the press also endeavoured to strike a balanced coverage when reporting on the political candidates. Results from *News24* showed that apart from presenting Cyril Ramaphosa in a positive light, the press had some reports that negatively portray Cyril Ramaphosa. This should be understood as a means of balanced reporting. For example, in a report titled “*Ramaphosa is an ‘American puppet’*”, *ANCYL says in response to Kwezi remarks*", Gerber quoted the ANCYL leader who commented that Cyril Ramaphosa was a puppet of the Americans (Gerber 2017: 1). The reporters' emphasis on the allegations of Cyril Ramaphosa as a ‘puppet of the Americans' can be said to have the potential to delegitimise the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by referring to a comment that resonates with beliefs and views of some sections of the South African society both in political cycles and public discourse. Gerber in *Daily Sun* said, "He is a perfect front because he is a darling of big business, moralists and those pretending to be moralists" (2017: 1). Gerber in *Daily Sun* described Cyril Ramaphosa involvement with the west are as follows:

Also, it will be interesting to observe how long it takes Ramaphosa to rebel – thanks to pressure from his capital friends and benefactors, most of whom are masters of corruption – and betray the unity and the Zuma slate that made him the next president of South Africa (Gerber in *Daily Sun* 2017: 1)

This manner of reporting seems to suggest that despite the positive coverage that the press has unceasingly shown on Cyril Ramaphosa, it endeavoured to strike a balance on how it portrayed political figures.

Moreover, a deeper analysis of the reports that focused on Cyril Ramaphosa's relation to western countries supports previous studies that revealed that news frames are cultural artefacts that are deeply embedded in the context of their construction (Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2016; Khuluse 2014). To illustrate this, the notion that Cyril Ramaphosa was a puppet of the west has been a matter of concern as indicated by the scholars in Chapter 4. What this means is that over

the years, there has been discussions and fears in the South African society that Cyril Ramaphosa's presidency will only serve to extend and benefit the interests of the western countries (Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017; Butler 2009). This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa has vested interest in the private sector (as highlighted in Chapter 4) where the western countries and the Americans have vested interest. According to Butler Cyril Ramaphosa has shares and financial interest in a variety of companies that are involved in business across a variety of sectors (2017: 235). For instance, he is involved in Puma Sport Cars (50 shares), Ntaba Nyoni Estates Game farming (100 shares), Mondi LTD Paper packaging (7500 shares) and Ntaba Nyoni Freedlot Cattle Ranging (100 shares). Cyril Ramaphosa is in partnership with various foreign investors where he is a director and a majority shareholder in some of the companies. For instance, Cyril Ramaphosa's Puma Sports Cars has a Brazilian origins and close link to Volkswagen and General Motors. Puma Sports Car has also business interest in the Puma North American distributors who supplied the company with spare parts and other accessories for their cars. To add, Cyril Ramaphosa's involvement in the Mondi LTD places him in the heart of a web and network of American and European investors. To illustrate, Mondi LTD⁹ is an international packaging company and paper group that has a more than 100 production sites in more than thirty countries. Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa's close link to the private sector that is allegedly dominated by the western investors directly presents him as one of their own. For instance, Hartley said Cyril Ramaphosa had relations with the western companies even before end of apartheid in South Africa 1994 (2018). Cyril Ramaphosa was involved with the western business owners during the negotiations process. He was an active participant in the restructuring of the Anglo. In this case, Cyril Ramaphosa negotiated the transfer of Anglo assets to black ownership (Hartley 2018). Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa also had relations with the owners of London's Pearson who are the owners the *Financial Times*, *Cape Argus*, *The Star* and *Pretoria News*. Therefore, drawing on his proximity to western investors it is safe to assume that his efforts to become president of the ANC and South Africa is nothing but a decoy by the Americans and the western countries to maintain their control the economy and the resources of South Africa. Therefore, one can conclude that the terms like 'American puppet',

⁹ "Mondi is formerly owned by the Anglo-American plc. In 2000 the company expanded its holding in Neusiedler AG, both Austrian businesses, to 100% and 70% respectively. The company has interest in Poland. It is organised in various global divisions including fiber packaging, consumer packaging and fine paper. It also controls various forests and paper mills. It produces fine paper and industrial and paper packaging in plastic and paper" (BusinessTech 2018: 1).

‘Agent of the West’ and ‘Compromised leader’, that was used by *News24* were nothing new but familiar terms that already existed in the South African political and economic discourse. Thus, drawing on this, *News24* can be said to have evoked the “discourse of white monopoly capital” where most of these terms have found a residence.

Election victory: *IOL*

In keeping with previous research, findings from the data seem to suggest that the press consciously support certain individuals based on their ideology and their proximity to the powerful groups in society. For instance, in a report by Mahlati and Ana, Cyril Ramaphosa’s campaign was endorsed and presented as a victory. For instance, Mahlati and Ana said: “the outgoing chairperson of the ANC, Baleka Mbete, has endorsed Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa”(2017: 1). Moreover, in the same report, the ANC chairperson was quoted as boldly and publicly announcing his endorsement for Cyril Ramaphosa's election. Baleka Mbete said, “what we are announcing is that we publicly endorse comrade Cyril Ramaphosa” (Mahlati and Ana 2017: 1). Now, a reference to powerful people like the ANC National Chairperson allowed the reporters to authenticate the position that Cyril Ramaphosa was the preferred candidate. In other words, the reporters endorsed the dominant ideology within South African society by referring to one of the most powerful people within the political circles in South Africa. To substantiate, the dominant ideology and voices in South Africa were pro-Cyril Ramaphosa's victory. The dominant ideology was made up of the most powerful and rich people in the South African society. These people identified with Cyril Ramaphosa who is also understood as one of the richest people in South Africa (Butler 2017: 67). Therefore, the placing of considerable attention by the reporters on how powerful people like Baleka Mbete endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa seems to suggest that the news reporters at *IOL* were aware of the dominant voices in the society. More so, not only were they aware of these dominant voices, but they allowed their content to be influenced by these voices of the powerful people. As a result, the dominant ideology was infused in their reports and became the position of the press allowing it to legitimate the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa.

Table 9.2: Linguistic expressions on election victory: *IOL*

<p>“the outgoing chairperson of the ANC, Baleka Mbete, has endorsed President Cyril Ramaphosa to take over from Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC” (Mahtlati and Ana 2017: 1)</p> <p>“what we are announcing is that we publicly endorse comrade Cyril Ramaphosa” (Mahtlati and Ana 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Ramaphosa who is a presidential hopeful was given a standing ovation by the former freedom fighters” (Mahtlati and Ana 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Various detachments of uMkhonto WeSizwe including famous Luthuli Detachment. Others came in wheelchairs and were among those rooting for Ramaphosa’s ANC leadership”</p> <p>“Dlamini-Zuma endorsed by Free State in ANC leadership race” (Mkokeli 2017:1)</p> <p>“Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s bid to lead the African National Congress received a boost when a majority of branches from the Free State endorsed her” (Mkokeli 2017: 1)</p>

In another report published on 8 October 2017, Ndaba and Makati reported that “the Umkhonto WeSizwe Military Veterans’ Association, President Jacob Zuma’s staunch allies have taken a swipe at Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa” (2017: 1). Though the previous statement may seem to discredit the leadership or conduct of Cyril Ramaphosa, a close look into the context within which the report was produced helps to unveil the hidden ideological meanings informing the report. To substantiate the findings, the reporters said Cyril Ramaphosa was condemned by the “Jacob Zuma’s *staunch allies*”. Considering that in the period leading to the conference Jacob Zuma and his allies had become despicable characters in South African political circles owing to their corrupt governance, it follows that being condemned by Jacob Zuma and his allies was not condemnation at all. Instead, it was a blessing in disguise. This is so because who so ever Jacob Zuma and his allies condemned was against the corruption and Jacob Zuma’s poor governance. Thus, *IOL* reporters by emphasising how Jacob Zuma ‘staunch allies’ were not in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa, they were able to present Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader whose leadership would threaten corruption and the beneficiaries of Jacob Zuma’s administration. Such an approach to reporting on how the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa was threatening Jacob Zuma and his stalwarts allowed the reporters to legitimate Cyril Ramaphosa. It did so by elevating him as a leader who

was hated by those who were corrupt because he was going to dismantle or put an end to their disastrous rule.

Moreover, in the same report, the reporters also indicated that "Cyril Ramaphosa was given a standing ovation by former freedom fighters" (Ndaba and Makati 2017: 1). This was another splinter group of the ANC that was known for its distaste of Jacob Zuma's rule. Within the South African liberation discourse, this group was understood as those who stood for good governance and was not aligned to Jacob Zuma. Therefore, *IOL* reporters by focusing on how Cyril Ramaphosa was endorsed by the "moral" group in the ANC, it was actively engaged in the process of legitimating his leadership by upholding the approval done by the powerful in the ANC. Now, to understand better how the approval of Cyril Ramaphosa by the freedom fighters meant to the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and the effect it had on *IOL* readers, one must consider the role this group of people occupies in South African society. The freedom fighters in South Africa are some of the respected people (Hartley 2018: 45). They draw their respect from their role in fighting the apartheid government that segregated against the non-white groups in South (Butler 2017: 89). Additionally, the freedom fighters are also respected for ending the minority rule and winning freedom for the majority in South Africa. Drawing on this contextual knowledge, it follows that who so ever endorsed by this group of people will inevitably be accepted by the people of South Africa owing to the respect they command. Therefore, reference to the endorsement of the freedom fighters as seen in the reports did not simply allow the reader to think of Cyril Ramaphosa within the parameters presented by press, rather it also allowed the press to stimulate stocks of existing political knowledge within its readers minds and thus create a context within which the political knowledge can be interpreted.

Turning to the notion of underlying ideologies, one can observe that, the media reporters repeated emphasis on the fact that Cyril Ramaphosa was endorsed by War Veterans seeks to uphold a certain ideology; in this case, the ideology of the ruling elite. Firstly, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa never came from the poor or working classes. Instead, sampled data revealed that Cyril Ramaphosa was endorsed more by those who occupy powerful positions with the South African society. As a result, the dominant underlying ideology that the reporters were reinforcing when they were endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa was the dominant of the ruling elite. Thus, drawing on this observation and indications from the sampled data, it can be assumed that the news reports of *IOL* were

artefacts that sought to produce and reproduce the ideologies of the ruling elite and thus uphold the pre-existing social inequalities that characterised the South African society. South Africa is understood as one of the most unequal societies in the world. It is characterised by a huge gap between the poor and the rich. The rich control the large stack of the resources of the country including all means of production. Moreover, most media houses are owned by the same people who control the means of production.

Conclusion

Sampled data from *IOL* showed that the election victory frame was extensively utilised by the reporters in the period leading up to the ANC elective conference. Like in *News24*, the election victory frame was also used to package the campaign of both candidates either as a given victory or a loss. A common usage of the frame was seen in how both presses referred to powerful figures in society to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and legitimate Cyril Ramaphosa. However, what was more interesting in the sampled data from *IOL* is that unlike in *News24* where reference to culture and cultural leaders were quoted, the reference to cultural leaders was employed differently in *IOL*. The difference in the use of the election victory frame was noted in the way *News24* made use of metaphors and businessman and statistics to endorse and discredit and legitimate the leadership of the two candidates, sampled data from *News24* indicate that there was extensive reference to culture, tradition and powerful figures in the African communities to endorse and discredit the leadership of the two political leaders. There was no emphasis or reference to culture and kings in *IOL*.

Chapter 10

Jacob Zuma & state capture, Factionalism & unity and Corruption frame

Introduction

This chapter presents the qualitative findings of the study obtained from the qualitative secondary data. The chapter sought to address the research questions based on exploring the nature of frames that were used by *New24* and *IOL* when reporting on the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in the period leading to the 54th ANC national conference. Three broad frames are presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter. These are, Jacob Zuma & state capture, Factionalism & unity and Corruption frames. In the presentation of these frames, the discussion and analysis are interwoven with theory and previous literature. Frames in this chapter were formulated using Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis approach. Analysis was done using Richardson (2007) critical discourse analysis approach. For the evidence, the chapter, direct quotations from the news articles of *News24* and *IOL* are presented in the form of tables.

Following this introduction, the following section presents, analyse and discusses findings on Jacob Zuma and state capture frame from *New24* and *IOL*. In presenting and discussing the findings, the following questions will be answered:

1. How exactly did *News24* and *IOL* frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress?
2. What are the similarities and differences in how the two *News24* and *IOL* framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders?
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders?
4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa?

Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: brief overview

The Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame was used by both *News24* and *IOL* albeit in a different fashion. For instance, the frame was extensively used in *IOL* by linking Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma through their marital relationship. To illustrate, the reporters in *IOL* continuously referred to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Jacob Zuma's ex-wife. This manner of reference was deeply rooted in the African traditional discourse of marriage. On the other hand, the Jacob Zuma and state capture frame as utilised by the *New24* had its roots in the prevailing political and economic discourse. It also sorts to justify the ruling class ideas through vilifying the character of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her relationship to Jacob Zuma. For instance, sampled data showed that the content in the *New24* reports were heavily influenced by the prevailing political and economic situation in South Africa. However, interestingly, the most remarkable observation was that both presses utilised the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame to achieve similar objectives, that is, to legitimate the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa while discrediting the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

It is interesting to note that sampled data from *News24* and *IOL* the media revealed that reporters relied on sentimentality to justify the presidential candidacy of Cyril Ramaphosa. Sentimentality refers to the tendency by the news-press to represent an issue from an emotional position. Data sampled from *News24* revealed that sentimentality was instilled in the news reports through continuous reference to the emotional past. To illustrate this point, it was clear that the reference by the reports to the deteriorating economic situation and poor economic policies by the Jacob Zuma administration played a vital role of evoking the emotions that people had concerning how their country was being run by the Jacob Zuma government. Being emotional in nature as it is, the issue of our "democracy is being trampled, our economy has been destroyed and our country is under attack from the Jacob Zuma and his Gupta friends" played a pivotal role in evoking the feeling of national pride, implying that things were better without Jacob Zuma and that things can still be better without Jacob Zuma. Thus, instilling messages of sentimentality allowed the press to justify why anyone who was aligned to Jacob Zuma should not be voted.

Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: *IOL*

Sampled data revealed that *IOL* reporters made use of the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame before and after the conference to align Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma's corrupt leadership while disassociating Cyril Ramaphosa from Jacob Zuma. Moreover, the results from *IOL* also showed that whenever Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was mentioned, an immediate reference and link was made that connect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma. Further analysis of the data within its context of construction proves that the strategy of associating Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership to Jacob Zuma's manner of leadership was a subtle way of discrediting her leadership qualities. To illustrate this, *IOL* reporters engaged in an active process of delegitimising the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by creating an unbreakable link between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma who was known for all bad reasons in the political discourse in South Africa (Pauw 2017: 88). To explain, Jacob Zuma's leadership was marred by a lot of controversies ranging from corruption, maladministration, and poor economic performance (Mathekga 2018: 36). Therefore, the press by referring to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Jacob Zuma ex-wife served only to remind its audience of the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had with Jacob Zuma.

Creating a link can be interpreted as an attempt by the reporters to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by evoking the stocks of cultural morals and values that its readers were familiar with (Jamieson and Campbell 1997: 72). To demonstrate the above assertion, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma were married and divorced legally. Though divorces are legally acceptable in South Africa, according to many African cultures, legal divorce has no place in its traditions (Du Plessis 2017: 46). Thus, drawing on the morals and values of the Zulu culture, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma divorce only meant legal separation while these two still share a lot in common. As a result, the fact that Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were separated did not occupy any significance within the broader African culture. Drawing on this line of reasoning, *IOL* reporters then went on to evoke the stocks of cultural values and morals dominant in the African marriage discourse and remind their readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-

Zuma was customarily married and thus, had an unbreakable link to Jacob Zuma which was evident by the continued use of his surname. Consequently, this manner of evoking the moral and values operating in a certain culture to remind readers of the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has with Jacob Zuma allowed the reader to perceive Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma using the reference and framework given to them by the press.

Furthermore, the link that was created to present Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as similar to Jacob Zuma seems to be detrimental to the character and leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This so because by reminding its audience of the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma enjoyed with Jacob Zuma, *IOL* reporters evoked on the dominant statement within the post-Jacob Zuma discourse. The dominant sentiments were that who so ever is related or connected to Jacob Zuma should not be trusted or allowed to occupy any leadership position in ANC. Put together, the technique of evoking the past when reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership seems to suggest that the press used the past not only to contextualise the report but also to connect with the reader who can easily relate with the discourse of customary marriage and divorce within the African societies.

Table 10.1: Linguistic expressions on Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: *IOL*

"Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, former African Union commission chair, and Zuma's ex-wife" (Mahr 2017: 1)
"Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, a wealthy businessman who has been increasingly critical of the president" (Mahr 2017: 1).
"On Saturday, Zuma made a surprise announcement that the government would fully subsidise tertiary education for "poor and working-class "students, some observers read the move as the last minutes push to help the campaign of Dlamini-Zuma"
"Ramaphosa is going to deal with the thorny issues of state capture and corruption, as he is likely to face resistance from the pro-Zuma bloc in the top six" (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1)

“Ramaphosa said his administration would drive economic transformation, and land redistribution, but unlike President Jacob Zuma, he did not elaborate on how radical he would be in his approach to transformation” (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)

“The Umkhonto WeSizwe Veteran’s Association, President Jacob Zuma’s staunch allies have taken a swipe at Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa” (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)

“Probe #StateCapture immediately, urges Ramaphosa” (Maqhina 2017: 1)

“Ramaphosa said he had stated a number of times that the Hawks, NPA and other state organs should investigate wrongdoing immediately” (Maqhina 2017: 1)

“Ramaphosa will want Zuma removed from office, so as to negate the president’s influence, as soon as possible” (Meyer 2017: 1)

Findings revealed above seem to corroborate the findings from previous studies (Oyesomi, Salawu, and Onyenankeya 2019). Oyesomi, Salawu, and Onyenankeya argue that the news is presented in favour of certain individuals and presented in a manner that seeks to legitimise or delegitimise most influential political candidates over those they regard as not so powerful (2019: 89). This assertion fits well with findings shown above that revealed that the press was more in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa than Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This could be because of how influential Cyril Ramaphosa is as an individual. Cyril Ramaphosa is well known for his influence in the making of democracy in South Africa. He is also known for his business interests that cross all sectors of the South African economy. When compared to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa commands a lot of influence as a politician and businessman.

To illustrate how Cyril Ramaphosa’s influence might have affected the coverage he was afforded by the press, a close look at some of the reports will suffice. Data sampled showed that *IOL* presented Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader who despised Jacob Zuma's approach to leadership. For instance, in a report by Seale and Mbanjwa, Cyril Ramaphosa's victory was presented as a direct threat to the Jacob Zuma corruption and state capture (2017: 1). What this means is that Cyril Ramaphosa was now packaged to the readers as someone different to Jacob Zuma is known for corruption and state capture scandals. For example, Seale and Mbanjwa said that “Ramaphosa is going to deal with the thorny issues of state capture and corruption, as he is likely to face resistance from the pro-Zuma bloc in the top six” (2017: 1). Further analysis of the previous quote showed

that the meaning conveyed here is that Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership was contrary to that of Jacob Zuma and his leadership posed a threat to Jacob Zuma and all his allies. Clearly, by presenting Cyril Ramaphosa in contrast to Jacob Zuma, *IOL* can be said to have credited the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by distinguishing it to the bad leadership of Jacob Zuma whom they said was presented by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the race to take over the leadership of ANC.

Moreover, *IOL* can be said to have made continuous reference to the disastrous leadership of Jacob Zuma to present the Cyril Ramaphosa leadership as credible. Thus, drawing from this assertion, it can be argued that the press' reference to the past bad leadership of Jacob Zuma when reporting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa does not merely serve as a way of contextually events, but it helps create direct connection with the reader who can easily relate to the topic at issue. These readers were simply reminded that Cyril Ramaphosa was different from Jacob Zuma who is the author of their suffering. As a result, such form of presenting issues only served to credit the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa while discrediting Jacob Zuma and anyone aligned to him, in particular, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Moreover, in terms of underlying ideologies, the sampled data revealed that *IOL* journalist highlighted the support of the pro-Cyril Ramaphosa (ruling class) ideology. What this means is that the tone of the reports and the picture painted when the reporters linked the Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was driven towards presenting a negative picture of the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, thus discrediting her leadership qualities and her ideologies. While the impression of Cyril Ramaphosa as opposed to Jacob Zuma help *IOL* reporters to position the press in the same camp that was in support of Cyril Ramaphosa. Put together, how the reports were constructed seems to suggest that the reporters were in favour of the pro-Cyril Ramaphosa ideology as opposed to the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma ideology.

To add, how the press supported the ruling class ideology seems to suggest that the press was a political instrument whose reports were artefacts that conveyed meaning meant to communicate ideologies of the powerful to the readers. To illustrate, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa as seen in the reports cannot be isolated from the power. The reports were artefacts of power in that they were meant to influence, shape and determine the attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of the readers (Richardson 2007: 31). Therefore, put together results from *IOL* seem to be in complete agreement with findings from previous studies that news media tends towards being biased towards certain

candidates (Kostadinova 2017; Iyengar and McGrady 2007). For instance, Iyengar and McGrady argued that news media tends to cover the strategy of campaigns and personality (2007: 55). By strategy of campaigns, the media is normally biased to follow and give more coverage to a candidate who is leading in the campaign or the political figure who appears to be the favourite of the public.

Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: *News24*

The Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame was extensively used by *News24* to legitimise the political leadership and political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa while delegitimising Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For instance, each time Jacob Zuma was mentioned in relation to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, it was made clear that the two are inseparable and come a long way. On the other hand, when Cyril Ramaphosa was presented with Jacob Zuma, he was distanced and presented as a leader who shuns everything that Jacob Zuma's approach to leadership. The most striking result to emerge is that the media did not focus on issues of policies or campaign messages when they were reporting on the Jacob Zuma frame. Instead the reportage was founded on personality reporting. This observation corroborates with findings from previously studied that argue that the print media does not focus on ideological priorities of political candidates and their parties but are more disposed to report on their economic pledges and personalities (Kostadinova 2017: 636)

More so, results from the data showed that the press created a context by which their reports will be interpreted within the framework of that context. To substantiate, when referring to Jacob Zuma in their reports, the reporters did not only present him side by side with Cyril Ramaphosa. Instead, reports of Jacob Zuma were followed by a brief explanation of how much damage the leadership of ANC and government has destroyed the economy and the lives of the poor South Africans. His leadership was linked to Gupta corruption. This kind of presentation it can be assumed gave a context and framework to the readers and allowed them to refer to the leadership of Jacob Zuma and see how much damage they have suffered. In this case, the press reporters can be said to have consciously or unconsciously hand-picked common statements about Jacob Zuma from the innumerable political discourse reserves of frames that are readily available (Van Gorp 2007). These statements were thus used to highlight how despicable Jacob Zuma is in comparison to Cyril

Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa was framed as a leader who has no tolerance for corruption. This way of presenting the two leaders allowed *News24* sanitize intentions of Cyril Ramaphosa. He was given to the audience as a person who shuns corruption and this corruption that was epitomized by Jacob Zuma. For instance, in the report Vecchiatto said

Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the centrepiece of his campaign and made attacks on Zuma, who's been implicated in a series of scandals, including allegations that he allowed members of the Gupta family to loot billions of rand from state companies. Zuma and the Guptas, who are in business with the president's son, deny wrongdoing (Vecchiatto 2017: 1)

Furthermore, the Vecchiatto stressed that "Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the centrepiece of his corruption" (2017: 1). Drawing on this statement and other of the same kind that was seen in the sampled reports. It can be assumed that *New24* reports on corruption were predicated and informed by the popular political discourse of that time and previous years. This is so because the reports were replete with statements that are like those that were dominant in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse. Hence, *News24* can be said to have referred to the frame reserves that are readily available in the minds of its audience (Van Gorp 2007). These frames were thus revived by certain cues that the media presented to the audience allowing them to process they are existing images in their mind about the political leaders. *News24* evoked memories of Jacob Zuma in the minds of its audience by highlighting all the negative things that Jacob Zuma's leadership has done over the years. These negatives were thus used to present Cyril Ramaphosa as the only possible alternative to the messy that Jacob Zuma has caused on the nation.

To further illustrate how press reports relied on the post-Jacob Zuma discourse to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, a close analysis of statements in the reports will suffice. For instance, in a report by the Cohen and Vecchiatto, it was said that "Ramaphosa pledged a crackdown on graft, which has become increasingly rife during Zuma's almost nine-year administration" (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1). Simply put, this report helps to illustrate the notion that in a bid to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, the reporters juxtaposed him to Jacob Zuma's failure to lead and corruption scandals. This approach on reporting Cyril Ramaphosa helped exposed Jacob Zuma's failures with a clear message that distanced the two leaders. What this means is that Cyril Ramaphosa stood out as an anti-corrupt leader who is ready

to go all out to decimate and a crackdown on Jacob Zuma orchestrated corruption and establish an anti-corrupt government that does not tolerate corruption at all levels of government.

On the contrary, results from the data showed that the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame as used by *News24* only served to discredit the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Evidence from sampled news articles revealed that most reports on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma mentioned Jacob Zuma. However, when Jacob Zuma was mentioned in these reports, there was less positive information about him. For instance, the mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's rephrased to "Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma's ex-wife". In one report *News24* reported that

Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma's ex-wife, also secured election to the committee, alongside Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba and former central bank Governor Tito Mboweni, who appeared on her faction's list. (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1)

Furthermore, Cohen and Vecchiatto said:

His main rival is former African Union Commission chairwoman Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the president's ex-wife and favoured successor (Vecchiato 2017: 1)

In this case, it can be assumed that *News24* by framing the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa by associating them (positively and negatively) with the name of Jacob Zuma applied the "moral evaluation" delegitimizing strategy was used. In using moral evaluation, the *New24* tried to use the paint of "good and bad". Jacob Zuma, in the prevailing political discourse, was perceived as a bad leader. Therefore, borrowing from that prevailing discourse, if the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was linked to Jacob Zuma, it is logical that she was also as bad and Jacob Zuma her former husband. On the other hand, presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader who despised the leadership of Jacob Zuma, *News24* was able to present of a good Cyril Ramaphosa who is moral and committed to doing away with anything bad (Jacob Zuma and his faction) that has corrupted South Africa.

Moreover, to further illustrate how the reports were constructed to delegitimize the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. On 14 October 2017 Stone reports that "*Zuma supporters rally around Dlamini-Zuma*" (2017: 1). In this report, it was highlighted that staunch supporters of President Jacob Zuma threw their weight behind Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The report said that "Zuma's allies in the ANC also lambasted those criticising ANC presidential candidate Nkosazana Dlamini-

Zuma's campaign by linking her to the president". (Stone 2017: 1). Moreover, it was also highlighted that one of the closest allies of Jacob Zuma, Kebby Maphatsoe, president of the uMkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA), backed the candidacy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Of note in this report is the link that the report created between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma and the allies of Jacob Zuma. The link was grounded on economic ideology. The report made it clear to the readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was aligned to the Jacob Zuma based on the economic approach they both subscribe to. It was highlighted in the report that "Dlamini-Zuma's policies are land redistribution, free education, skills revolution, women emancipation, youth development, and rural development" (Stone 2017: 1).

These policies were like those that were being implemented by the Jacob Zuma administration. Now, placing this into context, it is common knowledge that Jacob Zuma radical economic policies were losing popularity in South Africa. As such, most South Africans were not happy with the direction that was taken by Jacob Zuma's administration. This was evident in the number of protests that erupted across the country. These protests were calling for Jacob Zuma to resign (Pauw 2017: 78). Now, placing Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the picture, it can be argued that aligning and equating her policies to those of Jacob Zuma was going to produce undesired consequences for her campaign. In this case, it seems that *News24* reporters deliberately created the link between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob in order to tell its audience of the potential danger that follows if they choose to elect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as their next president. Therefore, this approach by *News24* has an underlying meaning that may not be evident at first view. The meaning, in this case, was to remind its readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a simple appendage of the Jacob Zuma disastrous administration.

Furthermore, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's link to corruption was also extensively reported by *News24* during the primary election that was held by the branches in the period leading to the December conference. According to the ANC constitution, the ANC branches across the country were responsible for nominating the candidates they will be voting for in the national conference. However, the most striking result to emerge is that the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was always contested based on corruption allegations. The press frames her nomination as marred by irregularities. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's supporters were reported to be engaging in

the process of vote-buying and vote-rigging. For instance, in a report of 29 November 2017, Zulu argued reports that "the ANC Sweet Waters branch are fighting to nullify the meeting at which it chose Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as its preferred candidate" (2017: 1). Further in the same report, election rigging, and procedural irregularities were cited as the reason why the election results that were in favour of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was supposed to be nullified. As though it was not enough, it was again cited in the report that over 244 members were deprived of their voting right and this has led to the victory of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Drawing on the above example, the narrative that was constructed by the reporters is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma would not have won the election had all the members participated. Moreover, the reporter also linked Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership to the corruption that was prevailing in South Africa. What this means is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented as a leader whom electability is compromised. She could not win the election without rigging or the manipulation of the elections processes. Put together, this manner of framing the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma seems to suggest that the press was communicating the statements were dominating political discourse in South Africa in the period leading to the conference. To illustrate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership has been constantly under scrutiny in South Africa. She has been on the spotlight for all wrong reasons. Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was under attack for the Sarafina II drug deal that included millions of Rands (Du Plessis 2017: 43).

Table 10.2: Linguistic expressions on Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: *New24*

<p>"Besides tribalism and factionalism, President Jacob Zuma leaves the ANC with a legacy of corruption" (Tawengwa 2017: 1)</p> <p>"Cyril Ramaphosa and his supporters who generally thought that voting for Cyril Ramaphosa would mean an end to Jacob Zuma's legacy of corruption" (Tawengwa 2017: 1)</p> <p>"Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the centrepiece of his campaign and made attacks on Zuma, who's been implicated in a series of scandals, including allegations that he allowed members of the Gupta family to loot billions of rand from state</p>
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companies. Zuma and the Guptas, who are in business with the president's son, deny wrongdoing" (Vecchiato 2017: 1)

Recently, before the national elections in 2017, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also under public scrutiny after she was assigned presidential security at her homestead. Thus, the readers with all these previous knowledge and experiences in their minds, any mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma involvement in any other "immoral" political manoeuvre would rekindle the thoughts they have of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, drawing on this expression, *News24* rekindled and amplified the corruption frame in the minds of the audience and allow them to think of the candidature of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma using that as a reference point. These findings fit well with the findings from previous studies that suggest that frames activate knowledge, stimulate "stocks of cultural morals and values, and create context" (Jamieson and Campbell 1997: 72). By so doing, frames occupy a central position in communication as it is.

Moreover, a close examination into why *News24* was incessant on painting a bad picture of Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, can tempt one to think that the owners of *News24* were trying by all means possible to distance them from the Gupta scandal they were involved in between 2015 and 2017. The owners of *News24* were on the drive to regain their reputation that was affected through their involvement with the Gupta linked ANN7 news channel. As highlighted in Chapter 3, *News24* is controlled by the Naspers Group. Naspers group is the one that controls MultiChoice. Between 2015 and 2017, Multichoice was under public scrutiny for its involvement with the ANN7. In 2017 it emerged that Multichoice agreed to pay the Guptas 'infinity Media Network a "once off" payment of R25 million. According to Groenewald "Multichoice agreed to increase its annual payment for infinity's ANN7 news channel from R50 million to just over R140 million" (2018: 1). After details of Naspers and Multichoice involvement with the Gupta family who were known to be allied to Jacob Zuma, criticism mounded on the company (Multichoice). To illustrate, Groenewald stressed that "criticism has been heaping for the company for funding a channel with dwindling viewership which essentially became a propaganda machine for the Gupta and Zuma families" (2018: 1). In the same year (2017), there were also allegations that Multichoice advanced a payment to SABC in return of political control over government policy on digital migration. Now, all these scandals tarnished the image and reputation of the Naspers and

Multichoice. As a result, the only way Multichoice and Naspers could regain its trust in the public and government was to try to distance itself from the leadership of Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To add, the need to present itself as anti-Jacob Zuma motivated the owners through their newspapers to present themselves as anti-Guptas, Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, drawing on this illustration, it can be deduced that the framing of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as closely linked to Jacob Zuma and the Guptas was an effort by the media owners to have their interests and ideas put through to the public that was slowly becoming suspicious about the credibility of Naspers and MultiChoice.

Factionalism and unity frame: brief overview

The factionalism and unity frame was employed by both *News24* and *IOL*. Though used differently, the frame ultimately achieved the same purpose in both presses; it delegitimised Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by presenting her as leader of a despicable faction that was a mere extension of Jacob Zuma's interest. On the other hand, though Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as a leader of a factional group, attention in both presses was placed more on his ability to unite the ANC and the deeply divided nation. Put another way, Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership was framed as a leader who will revive unity in the ANC and South Africa. An interesting finding that emerged in the analysis of data that paid attention to factionalism and unity is that the Factionalism and Unity frame was not an invention of the news reporters. Rather, the reporters deliberately hand-picked frames drawing from the unenumerable cultural reserves of frames that are readily accessible (Van Gorp 2007: 109). For example, the role of Cyril Ramaphosa as a unifier was extensively discussed by various scholars in Chapter 4. Following this section, the following section focuses on the data on *News24* and *IOL*.

Factionalism and unity frame: *News24*

From the sampled data, strong evidence was found that in the period after the conference, Cyril Ramaphosa's win was framed as a victory over a Nkosazana-Dlamini-Zuma faction. To explain,

in a report by the Cohen and Vecchiatto, the reporters said: "the faction, led by the candidate he beat in the presidential race, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, probably has the loyalty of about 45 of the 86 NEC's voting members" (2017: 1). This serves to illustrate that the defeat or loss of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa was interpreted as the fall of factional group. Also, in the same report Cohen and Vecchiatto said:

The power of the ANC presidency, the bandwagon effect, and individual calculations have all changed. And the scope of new deals is vast," he said. "So, given that in large measure Jacob Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma are yesterday's figures, the paradigm has shifted as well (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1)

In this report, the impression given is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's loss was a loss of a bigger faction, a faction that had an invisible but loud voice; Jacob Zuma.

To add, the reporters said Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were things of the past. What is more interesting here is that the reporters tie Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's efforts to become president as the efforts of Jacob Zuma's faction to continue its reign behind the scenes. Put together, what this seems to suggest is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's loss to Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as the loss of Jacob Zuma and his faction. Additionally, it also gives the impression that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for the same agenda that Jacob Zuma stood for in his presidency. This had the potential to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This is so because, in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse, sentiments were that anything associated with Jacob Zuma was not worthy of leading ANC.

Drawing on the above assertion, it can be assumed that *News24* reporters delegitimised the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by emphasising how much she falls within a factional group more than areas she spoke about uniting the party. What the press did, in this case, was to focus on aspects of the relationship that exist between Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana. Generally, the public only understood Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma as divorced persons (Du Plessis 2017: 35). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political inclinations were neutral and thus not pronounced in the period leading to the conference. Though it was assumed that she belongs to a faction, it was not clear whether Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was in the same faction with Jacob Zuma. Thus, their factional relations were non-recognisable to the public. However, through placing salience and emphasis, the media was successful in turning the unclear factional ties and

nonrecognisable relations into noticeable occurrences (Gamson and Modiglian 1987: 37). It did so by amplifying the factional ties that were already present but non-recognisable in the minds of the audience by reminding them that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not her person. Instead, she was pushing a factional agenda; an agenda to prolong the leadership of her former husband, Jacob Zuma.

As indicated by Watkins (2009), the evidence that emerged from the data points to the fact that the political events and culture obtaining at a given time determines what the media focus on (2009: 45). To illustrate the above, the discourse of factionalism and unity dominated the ANC political space in the period leading to the conference (Mathekga 2018: 89). The relationship of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to a Jacob Zuma led faction raised fears of having Jacob Zuma return through a back door. Both in ANC and government fears that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's presidency would perpetuate the rule of Jacob Zuma was a cause of concern. As unrecognisable as they were in the public space before the conference, *News24* reporters reignited such fears (return of Jacob Zuma through Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) already existing in the minds of its readers to delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma potential leadership of the ANC. The statements that shaped the Jacob-Zuma faction were also found in the arguments of various scholars discussed in Chapter 4. Scholars like Butler (2015), Du Plessis (2018) and Mathekga (2018) argued that the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a pony in the Jacob Zuma fight to retain power even after his departure from the presidency.

Table 10.3: Linguistic expression from the factionalism and unity frame: *News24*

<p>“the Dlamini-Zuma faction now talks tough – radical economic transformation” (Thokoane 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Ramaphosa said he and Nkosazana are proof that unity is possible” (Gerber 2017: 1)</p> <p>“it is unlikely that the Nkosazana faction will try to remove Ramaphosa after the election” (Gerber 2017: 1)</p>

“Over the past few months, our country has largely been divided into two campaign forces: one supporting Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa to ascend to the presidency, the other Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Each of them has no policies of her or his own. They would presumably implement the policies of the ANC. But why so much emphasis on them as individuals?” (Thokoane 2017: 1)

“Zuma supporters rally around Dlamini-Zuma” (Stone: 2017: 2)

“Zuma’s allies in the ANC also lambasted those criticising ANC presidential candidate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s campaign by linking her to the president” (Stone: 2017: 1)

“She said it is also sexist to say that when voting for Dlamini-Zuma that will create a Zuma dynasty. ‘We are not interested in personal issues of other people in the ANC. Who knows how many ex’s some of them have? So, we must condemn any form of sexism’ (Stone: 2017: 2)

“Ramaphosa said for us it is not about who has the numbers and then that is it, but about whether we have managed to put in a united team. Ramaphosa has been mentioned as the face of the unity campaign” (Stone and Cele 2017: 1).

“The power of the ANC presidency, the bandwagon effect and individual calculations have all changed. And the scope of new deals is vast,” he said. “So, given that in large measure Jacob Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma are yesterday’s figures, the paradigm has shifted as well.” (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1).

“At some point it must have dawned on the NDZ and Msholozzi gang that anyone or anything, including the ANC, associated with Zuma was increasingly losing the trust of a large portion of the general public – the intellectuals, moralists and the greedy investor community” (*Daily Sun* 2017: 2)

Moreover, evidence that emerged from the data provides additional support for the fact that news reports as we understand them, are not isolated to other text that operates within the same sphere (Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2016; Van Gorp 2007; Foucault 1980). The press framing of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa is proof positive to how their reports were

intertextual and resemble previous text. Put another way, the text on factionalism and unity were not independent of other previous text and contextual influences. Evidence from the data showed that sentiments of factionalism and unity date back to 2012 in the ANC (Butler 2009; 2007; Hartley 2018). More so, in the previous year (2016) news reports and discussion about factionalism were on the peak in ANC, culminating in several urgent meeting aimed at addressing factionalism within the party.

Therefore, drawing on the illustration above, it can be concluded that the press reports during the period leading to the conference and after borrowed on though expanded an already existing discourse. To contextualise the previous argument, in the period before the conference the ANC was divided into factional groups (Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017). These factions were led by two main political figures. The first faction was led by Cyril Ramaphosa. This was the faction that was perceived as the group of the morally right. This faction had little involvement in corruption. Its leaders and members were pushing the anti-corruption gospel, thus were viewed as the moral and the most desired candidates to take over the leadership of the ANC. On the other hand, was the Jacob Zuma faction. This faction was thought to be led by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and had the support of the ANC Women's league. The Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma faction was labelled a gang of the corrupt. This is so because most of its alleged members including Jacob Zuma were involved in corruption and were at some point taken to court for corruption activities.

In *News24* the frame of factionalism was also evident in the gendered manner the campaign of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was packaged. Her campaign was presented to the audience as a campaign of the women in South Africa to claim their place in the ANC and South Africa. What this means is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was then going to be the first to the female president in the history of South Africa. To illustrate, in a report of 26 October 2017, *News24* took an extract from a book by Carien du Plessis (2017). In this report, it was highlighted that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was going to be South Africa's first women president after decades of women marginalisation in the echelons of power. Moreover, it was also stressed in this case that the "campaign for a female president became synonymous with her campaign". *News24* was therefore deeply involved in the politics of gender that has always affected the ANC. By reporting on the issue of female leadership *News24* can be said to have focused on these specific gendered issues that evoke the feeling and perceptions that some of its audience already held. Thus, their report is

cultural artefacts that are consciously or unconsciously constructed informed by the broader societal discourse in which they operate.

Strong evidence that emerged from the data showed that the factionalism and unity reports were replete with the gendered connotation that served to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the expense of Cyril Ramaphosa. What this means is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was constantly portrayed as in a negative light. She was given to the readers as a leader who fairs factionalism and despises unity. This was against the positive presentation of Cyril Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa was identified as the champion of unity. The continuous reference to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership as negative suggests that the press reporting was gendered and resembles sentiments dominant in a patriarchal society.

The findings above seem to be in complete agreement with findings from previous studies. In relation to our findings, Wright and Holland argue that these framings as carefully did by the media professionals, "demonstrates the role the media plays as a gendered mediator, perpetuating the gender double-blind that constrains female political leaders, as they negotiate the demand to demonstrate masculine leadership attributed without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of them" (Wright and Holland 2014:78). Similarly, Fountaine and McGregor's study argued that the modern bias facing women in politics is that the media simply use traditional frames – that is constructed around the dominance of men- in coverage of women, making it difficult for women politicians to be presented as anything other than political outsiders (2001: 59).

Further analysis proves that the gendered reports in *News24* were simply cultural artefacts that served to amplify the prevailing ideological battle between patriarchy and feminism that pervades the South African public sphere. They were culturally constructed because topics of gender inequality pre-existed the production of the news reports. To demonstrate this, for years the issue of a women leader has been a subject of debate both in ANC and South Africa. A different section of the ANC leadership was calling for a female president. These calls pitted the ANC leadership into ideological factions and exposed the dominant patriarchal nature that forms the foundations of the ANC. In September 2015, at the conference of the Women's League, it was declared that the party was ready and must have a female president. The group that called for a female president was in direct contrast with the faction that sought to maintain the status quo in terms of the gendered structure within the organisation. This group as it was known thought that a female leader

was too weak for South Africa. It was stated that a country that is so powerful on the Africa continent cannot be ruled by a female president. Also, public conversations in South Africa reiterated that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was too soft to be a president and motherly (Du Plessis 2018: 67).

Therefore, by drawing on the patriarchal discourse that only served to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the press participates in the prevailing patriarchal discourse. As such, it assumes the same position with those sections of the society that were biased towards a female leader. To that end, how the gender bias played out in the press seems to justify the findings from previous studies (Cukier *et al.* 2016: 45). Cukier *et al.* found that apart from the gender bias that exists within the political cycles, there is a great deal of gender bias that exists within the media (2016: 45). This bias is not independent of the patriarchal society within which the media functions and plays an integral part in its constitution.

As opposed to *IOL* that placed the blame of factionalism on both Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, *News24* placed the blame of factionalism exclusively on Jacob Zuma and those that were linked to him. For instance, a report of 20 December 2017, Tawengwa explicitly stated that the ANC was faced with an urgent challenge that needs the attention of Cyril Ramaphosa. This challenge he said was factionalism and tribalism. In this case, the reporter went on to say the problem of factionalism was because of the Jacob Zuma and his allies. Tawengwa said, "unfortunately, President Zuma's reign as ANC president saw tribalism and consequently factionalism permeating the organization like never before" (Tawengwa 2017: 1). Moreover, the report said, "Jacob Zuma's politics at the helm of the ANC can be described as a form of ethnic nationalism where ethnonationalism can be defined as support for the political interests of a particular ethnic group" (Tawengwa 2017: 1). However, interesting in this report is how the reporter created a link between tribalism and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The reporter said it was the same ethnic and tribalism approach that Jacob Zuma camp attempted to use on behalf of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Tawengwa 2017: 1). Aligning Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma strategy of factionalism and tribalism is painting her with the same brush. It serves the purpose of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a mere appendage of the Jacob Zuma political career.

Factionalism and unity frame: *IOL*

The most interesting finding to emerge from *IOL* is that the Factionalism and Unity frame was exclusively used to endorse the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. To illustrate, it was used to present Cyril Ramaphosa as a man who has a strong desire and capacity to unite the ANC and South Africa. For instance, in a report of the 21 December 2017, Naicker said that “Cyril Ramaphosa vows to act, unify” (2017: 1). To add, Naicker reported that unity and action were the key points of Cyril Ramaphosa campaign and his closing remarks. In this report, the reporter stressed that there was nothing important to Cyril Ramaphosa than the unity of the ANC. Naicker said, “the string that wove Ramaphosa's speech together was unity” (2017: 1). In the same report, to emphasize how Cyril Ramaphosa was a man of unity, the reporter said Cyril Ramaphosa reached out to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma after defeating her in the election campaign.

Moreover, in another report of 17 December 2017, Staff Reporter said also embarked on a mission to explain how Cyril Ramaphosa reached out to people who were deemed his enemies. For instance, the Staff Reporter said: “He reached out to COSATU and the SACP, alliance partners who had become estranged under Zuma's reign.” (2017: 1). Similarly, in another report of 17 December 2017, Mahtlati and ANA quoted Baleka Mbete who expressed confidence that Cyril Ramaphosa was the right man to unite the ANC and the country (2017). Baleka Mbete was quoted saying she shares the same view with Cyril Ramaphosa who believes in unity and this unity she described as a unity “with a meaning”(Mahtlati and ANA 2017: 1). On the other hand, there was no direct mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's role in fomenting unity in the sampled reports.

The way the press emphasised Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to unite while keeping silence on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's role or ability to unite the country help explain the how the reporters consciously or unconsciously selected to place emphasis on an aspect of the everyday unfolding reality. The reporters selected some parts of the Factionalism and Unity discourse and organise, package and presented those elements to the readers to make sense of it. This observation is barely distinguishable from Fountaine and McGregor (2001). These scholars found that frames “are central to journalism as they work as routines for journalists that allow them to swiftly identify and organize information and to “package it for efficient relay to the audience” (Fountaine and McGregor 2001: 59).

Table 10.4 Linguistic expression in factionalism and unity: *IOL*

<p>“unity and action were key points of Cyril Ramaphosa’s closing address at the ANC’s 54th national elective conference” (Staff Reporter 2017: 1)</p> <p>“the string that wove Ramaphosa’s speech together was unity” (Correspondent 2017: 1)</p> <p>"He reached out to all South Africans: We must focus on the task of building a non-racial country, guided by the injunction in the Freedom Charter that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1)</p> <p>“He reached out to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who had run against him in the campaign to be elected the 14th president of the ANC. (Staff Reporter 2017: 1)</p> <p>“Ramaphosa reached out to outgoing ANC president Jacob Zuma” (2017: 1).</p> <p>“Ramaphosa said while there was a lot of uncertainty in various sectors, people were looking for a conference that will be a big saviour for the country and emerging out of that conference an ANC that is united, rejuvenated, youthful, honest and has integrity.” (Mokati 2017: 1)</p> <p>“The battle between the two frontrunners for the ANC leader-Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, an ex-wife of Zuma and former chairwomen of the African Union-has battle divided the party that has governed South Africa since the end of apartheid in 1994” (Winning 2017”: 1)</p> <p>“Mkhize is viewed as a compromise candidate in a campaign that has been characterised by the divisions being created by those who support Dlamini and Ramaphosa” (Chetty 2017: 1)</p>
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Furthermore, a deeper analysis of the linguistic expressions above shows points to the fact that the text in *IOL* report was artefact consciously constructed to communicate a set of meanings. The meaning was aimed at endorsing the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. From the data sample, the word unity was referred to more in connection with Cyril Ramaphosa than Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. *IOL* placed a considerable amount of emphasis on how Cyril Ramaphosa "unity" was the

centrepiece of Cyril Ramaphosa's campaign. By so doing the reporters played a pivotal role in creating a positive image of Cyril Ramaphosa.

The observation above fit well with findings from Carlos (2007) and Fiske (1994). For example, Carlson argued that discussion about political events and certain individuals in the media does not only reflect opinion and appraisal about those portrayed, rather they “organise, produce, and disseminate meaning about those events and particular individuals” (Carlson 2007: 267). This assertion is like the argument put forth by Fiske when he argues that “discourse is structured and structuring, for it is both determined by its social relations and affects them” (1994: 3). What this means is that discourse is continuously reproducing and always acting on the society while it is also being acted upon by that same society.

From the sampled data strong evidence emerged that the reports that focused on unity have deep discursive roots within the unfolding political events. To illustrate, *IOL* reporters allowed the readers to give considerable consideration and retrieve the “unity” frame already existing in their memory. To better explain this assertion, one needs to look at how *IOL* reporters create a direct connection between the past and its readers. What this means is that in pre and post-1994 discourse, Cyril Ramaphosa occupied a special place as a man who has unified the country (Butler 2017: 125). Cyril Ramaphosa is hailed in South Africa for his contribution in uniting the country during the period apartheid until South Africa signed the new constitution in 1996. As a negotiator and a politician, he is also known in the South African history for contributing to various peace agreements, most of which resulted in the unifying of ailing parties (Butler 2009: 125). Drawing on the sentiments that already existed, the reporters seem to have borrowed from past discourses and organize them into it can be argued that *IOL* reports on the discourse of unity was not in isolation of the past political discourses. Instead, the reports draw on this political background to reconnect the reader with his memories of Cyril Ramaphosa and thus allowed the reader to see Cyril Ramaphosa using “unity” as the framework of reference.

Findings from the data showed strong evidence of how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was given limited attention in reports that focused on Factionalism and Unity. It also emerged that whenever Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was mentioned, she was portrayed in a negative light. In a report by Winning, it was underscored that “Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, an ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former chairwomen of the African Union-has battle divided the party” (2017: 1). On

the surface, this seems to be a neutral manner of reporting where blame was placed on all candidates. However, an interesting dynamic that emerged from the report was how factionalism was linked to Jacob Zuma and then to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the same report, Winning shifted her attention from explaining how the two candidates have divided the party to how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma and allies were leading a faction that destroyed South Africa. This shift of emphasis exposes the lop-sided reportage that was against the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

Also, a report by Meyer referred to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's faction as "Jacob Zuma's Gupta-aligned wing" (2017: 1). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's faction was also referred to as the "captured ANC with improperly elected delegates" (Meyer 2017: 1). Additionally, the Meyer also stresses that "the captured forces failed by a hair's breadth in their attempt to hijack the party". As if it was not enough, the reporter also stressed that the defeated ANC wing was not going to rest until they can sway the ANC's agenda to suit their agenda of continued looting of state resources. Clearly, this report illustrates the level of bias that pervades the Factionalism and Unity frame as it was used to portray Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma faction in a negative light.

However, this more than a matter of impartiality on the part of *IOL* seems to be a matter of ideology. Simply put, the overemphasis of the one faction over the other exposes the report to as an actively participating in the ideologies contest that was obtained in the period leading to the conference. Two ideological factions were at odds during this period. The capitalist ideology was represented by Cyril Ramaphosa while the socialist ideology was represented by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, by downplaying the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the media should be understood as attacking the socialist ideology. Also, by endorsing the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, it can be assumed that the media was protecting its capitalist interests. This is very likely because the media in South Africa is owned by the elites and a group of people referred to as capitalist. *IOL* is owned by Independent News and Media, South Africa. This company's owners have a close relationship with Cyril Ramaphosa that dates to 1996. This relationship started when Cyril Ramaphosa was involved in the process of establishing the empowerment agreement that saw the unbundling of the Anglo America company. According to Hartley, Cyril Ramaphosa played a pivotal role in the selling of the Anglo-America's assets (2018: 70). Some of these assets included 50% stake of the *Business Day* and *Financial Mail*. Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa also

negotiated the sale of Anglo's Argus Group assets, that included the Cape Times, Cape Argus, The Star and Pretoria News. These were all sold to Tony O'Reilly who were owners of the London's Independent newspaper. Later O'Reilly renamed the company to Independent News and Media. Besides, Cyril Ramaphosa through Tshivase Shares Dealing investment company, he influences in some of the media institutions. For instance, he has indirect control in Independent News and Media company through his chairmanship of Pearson plc. Pearson owns *Financial Times* of London and half of the *Economist* magazine. Therefore, because the media incessantly supported the Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership's it can be assumed that the press participated in the ideological battle that pervades South Africa. Furthermore, not only did it participated in the communication of ideology, it went ahead to legitimate the dominant capitalist ideology that was represented by the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa.

Findings discussed above seems to agree with studies discussed in chapter 5 (Walker and Laughter 2019; Campbell 2011). For example, Walker and Laughter found that commitment to master narratives by the media allows them to legitimise events, individuals and ideologies. To add, Campbell stressed that journalists include terms such as "post-racial America" that serve to let dominant White mainstream off the hook for any further racial introspection (2011:45). This means of communication by journalists, therefore, plays a vital role in legitimising the dominant ideology within society. In relation to that assertion, Shah and Thornton argued that "the press enacts a mass-mediated ritual of social control through its coverage, allowing politicians, reporters, and others with access to the public discourse the opportunity to legitimate specific stories-generally once that reinforces white supremacy" (1994: 144).

From the sampled data, strong evidence that emerged showed that there was a heavy reliance on the technique of sentimentality. What this means is that the reporters overemphasised the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had with the Gupta family. By so doing they discredited her political leadership. By emphasising the link that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had with Gupta through Jacob Zuma, this allowed the reporters to give the impression that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a mere appendage of the Gupta and Jacob Zuma corruption. Further analysis exposed that the reports that focused on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's role in factionalism created an exaggerated connection between her political ambitions and the interest of the Gupta family. Now, the fact of the matter is that members of the Gupta family were close allies of Jacob Zuma

and not Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. According to prevailing discourses in the period leading to elections, members of the Gupta family were so close to Jacob Zuma and his government to an extent of influencing government policy (Pauw 2017: 78). Similarly, because of their corrupt activities, the Gupta family was no longer needed by many in South Africa. The Gupta's were known for "state capture". State capture is "a type of systematic political corruption in which private interests significantly influence a states-decision making process to their advantage" (Pauw 2017: 78). Therefore, because the relation between the Guptas and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not clear cut, it follows that the press when linked the two together they were exaggerating and over-emphasising the extent to which the Gupta's influences Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Simply put, there was not a single piece of evidence produced that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was aligned to the Gupta family. Drawing on this line of thought, it seems that the press constructed reality about the relationship Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had. This was made possible by taking some stocks of frames that are lying in the prevailing social discourse in which the press functions.

Placing the frame of factionalism into the ownership context, one is tempted to argue that how *News24* and *IOL* seem to be the anti-Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma leadership which they align unapologetically to Jacob Zuma also draws its inspiration to the ownership and control structures of the press. To illustrate, *News24* is owned by a group of companies who have a vast interest in other companies. Some of the companies in which Cyril Ramaphosa is a shareholder through his investment company Shanduka Holdings (Hartley 2018). On the other hand, *IOL* has a British pedigree. Its initial owners were from the Republic of Ireland. Now, because Cyril Ramaphosa business interests cut across all sectors including ownership of shares in various media companies it might suggest that a victory for Cyril Ramaphosa in the election would signify the win for those business and media houses in which he has an interest.

On the other hand, the owners of the media could not have felt comfortable with a Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's win owing to her radical economic transformation policy. To put it plainly, the radical economic transformation policies as pushed by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were a threat to media owners' interest. Anything that has to do with radically transforming the economy did not settle well with those who owed companies and were in control of the economy (Pauw 2017: 78). Therefore, delegitimising Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will be logical if we consider the media as a political institution. The local shareholders of *IOL* and *News24* could take the side of Cyril

Ramaphosa while they would not sympathise with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who posed a threat to their business interests. To illustrate, Cyril Ramaphosa has enjoyed years of warm business relations with local shareholder of *IOL*. For instance, Cyril Ramaphosa had shares in Times Media Ltd as its chair and Pearson Plc. (which owns the *Financial Times* of London and half of the *Economist* magazine) jointly own the *Financial Mail* business magazine and *Business Day*. All these companies are closely linked to Independent News and Media that benefited from the 1996 empowerment deal that was presided and facilitated by Cyril Ramaphosa. To add, the Independent News and Media is the one that controls the *Independent Online* South Africa. Therefore, drawing on this background, the newspapers could have every reason to align themselves with the Cyril Ramaphosa faction, which was likely to protect their own business interests. Therefore, what was at issue here was, at least in part, the media seeking to protect its commercial interest more than anything else.

The findings above bears resemblance with the findings of Hallin and Mancini's (2004: 186). These scholars found that commercial pressure can encourage the media to distinguish themselves politically. Put another way, the media content and framing of issues, in this case, has ceased to be influenced directly by political allegiance to a political party. Rather, their content is now driven by the desire to satisfy the needs of their consumers who are inevitably aligned to a political party ideology of political actors (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Corruption frame: brief overview

The corruption frame was used by both *News24* and the *ILO* when reporting on the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In both presses, the corruption frame served to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by presenting him as the alternative to the 'disastrous' Jacob Zuma rule. On the other hand, sampled data showed that there was a common trend in the way Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented. Put differently, there was strong evidence showing that little attention was paid in both presses to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's plans to deal with corruption. The use of the similar frame by the press suggests that the reporters used frames that were purposefully and logically equivalent. However, that logically equivalent information was presented in a certain way that either encourages or

discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2013). Following this section, the next section focuses on the *News24* and then *IOL*.

Corruption frame: *News24*

Table 10.5: The linguistic expression on corruption frame: *News24*

<p>“Corruption has to come to a stop, and it must happen with immediate effect,” Ramaphosa said.</p> <p>“We must confront the reality that critical institutions of our state have been targeted by individuals and families.” (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017).</p> <p>“Ramaphosa pledged a crackdown on graft, which has become increasingly rife during Zuma’s almost nine-year administration” (Tangwena 2017: 1)</p> <p>“voting for Cyril Ramaphosa would mean an end to Jacob Zuma’s legacy of corruption” (Tawengwa 2017: 1).</p> <p>“Ramaphosa has additional resources available to dismantle Zuma’s Kleptocratic system outside of the weak ANC structures” (Gossel 2017: 1).</p> <p>“Ramaphosa has additional resources available to dismantle Zuma’s Kleptocratic system outside of the weak ANC structures. These include his ability to hire the head of the NPA to replace Shaun Abrahams, reinforcing the renewed anti-corruption stance of parliamentary committees, and appointing the state capture inquiry.” (Gossel 2017: 1).</p>

In *News24*, Cyril Ramaphosa was framed as a leader who was against corruption. He was given the status of champion of a just society that has no corruption. Evidence from the data suggests that Cyril Ramaphosa's campaign was packaged as an anti-corruption drive and campaign against Jacob Zuma's 9 years of corruption. In a report by Cohen and Vecchiatto (2017), Cyril Ramaphosa was portrayed to the readers as a leader who was determined to combat corruption. Strong and unwavering emphasis was placed on the fact that Cyril Ramaphosa will put an end to corruption. Cohen and Vecchiatto said, "Ramaphosa pledged a crackdown on graft, which has become

increasingly fire during Zuma's almost nine-year administration" (2017: 1). Similarly, in another report by Tawengwa (2017), the reporter was more explicit when he suggested that "voting for Cyril Ramaphosa would mean an end to Jacob Zuma's legacy of corruption" (Tawengwa 2017: 1). A closer look at this quote proves that the reporters were deliberate and unequivocal in endorsing the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. The reporter made it clear that if the reader-voted for Cyril Ramaphosa, they were guaranteed that corruption will go. It should be noted at this stage that the reporter unapologetically endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate. To add, in a different report by Gossel (2017: 1), Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as the leader with all necessary resources to fight against corruption. For example, Gossel said, "Ramaphosa has additional resources available to dismantle Zuma's Kleptocratic system outside of the weak ANC structures" (Gossel 2017: 1). Put together, the corruption frame as used by *News24* when reporting on Cyril Ramaphosa was explicit in their support of the Cyril Ramaphosa leadership.

Corruption frame: *IOL*

Table 10.6: The linguistic expression on corruption Frame: *IOL*

<p>"throughout his campaign Ramaphosa has repeatedly said that those implicated in acts of corruption and state capture must be prosecuted" (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1).</p> <p>"ANC presidential hopeful Cyril Ramaphosa has vowed that when he takes over, he will deal harshly with corrupt officials and politicians" (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1)</p> <p>"Ramaphosa said he was concerned about the state of Eskom, Transnet, Prasa and various water boards across the country that have lost huge amounts of money through corruption" (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)</p> <p>"without mentioning anyone by name, Ramaphosa said the money had been stolen from the state companies and given to certain people and families. He said he would make sure this came to an end" (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1).</p> <p>"corruption will be brought to an end in our state-owned enterprises, he said" (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)</p>
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Evidence from the sampled reports points to the fact that how Cyril Ramaphosa was presented in *IOL* bears a lot of resemblance with how he was portrayed in *News24* corruption frame. For example, just like in *News24* where Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as an enemy of corruption, this approach was also evident in *IOL* sampled reports. To illustrate, in a report by Seale and Mbanjwa, it was stressed that "throughout his campaign, Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly said that those implicated in acts of corruption and state capture must be prosecuted" (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017). This statement suggests that Cyril Ramaphosa was not tolerant of corruption and was determined to deal with all those who were involved in corruption. This position or standpoint is similar and resonates with the standpoint that is evident in the *News24* reports. The similarity in the standpoint noticed in *News24* and *IOL* seems to suggest two things. Firstly, it confirms the findings that the press reports during the period under inquiry were not isolated from text from other news-press. The most plausible explanation is that the press operating within the same social and political context are likely to borrow frames from the context of their functioning (Chambwera 2016). Secondly, the similarity in endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader who is against corruption serves to confirm the arguments that the press was both in support of the pro-Cyril Ramaphosa ideology.

This observation fits well with the argument raised by Iyengar and McGrady's (2007: 55) and Foucault (1980) that the dominant groups in society maintain the status quo through their use of the mass media. This mass media is used as apparatuses that represents the dominant ideology and, in that process, constructing conformists' identities. To illustrate this, the press' for active support of the Cyril Ramaphosa suggests support of his ideological standpoint. Referring to the brief history of Cyril Ramaphosa discussed in Chapter 4, it emerged that Cyril Ramaphosa is an elite leader whose interest is synonymous to capitalists' interest. Therefore, because of his capitalist nature, it follows that by supporting the Cyril Ramaphosa campaign and leadership, the media was also engaging in the process of qualifying the capitalist ideology. This can be explained by looking at two things. Firstly, the press in South Africa is controlled by a few individuals who own a variety of printing and publishing companies. These individuals and their establishments are profit motivated. They also want to ascertain that their interests are protected. As a result, they were likely to support the leader whose ideology resonates very well with their publication policy and agenda. Secondly, drawing on Marxist theory of ideology, the interests of the media owners are

not independent to the editorial policy of their newspapers (Marx 1896). To that, it follows that the reporters' stance when reporting on Cyril Ramaphosa was affected by the editorial policy that is arguably a true reflection of the owners' interests and ideology. Therefore, drawing on this illustration, one can safely conclude that the reports that sought to legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa sought to legitimise the ideologies of the political and economic elites whose interests were like those of Cyril Ramaphosa. The findings discussed here concurs well with Iyengar and McGrady's (2007: 55) findings. These scholars found that media coverage of events and individuals is driven and affected by the interests of political elites. The elite interests are naturalised and portrayed as universal when they are presented to the public.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the qualitative findings of the study obtained from the qualitative secondary data. The chapter address the research questions based on exploring the nature of frames that were used by *New24* and *IOL* when reporting on the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in the period leading to the 54th ANC national conference. Three broad frames are presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter. These are, Jacob Zuma and state capture, Factionalism and unity and Corruption frames. In the presentation of these frames, the discussion and analysis are interwoven with theory and previous literature. Frames in this chapter were formulated using Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis approach. Analysis was done using Richardson (2007) critical discourse analysis approach.

Chapter 11: Summary and conclusions

Introduction

This chapter summarises and concludes the research. It sums up on the key ideas that guided the framing, development and presentation of this thesis. Developing new knowledge is always the most important aspect of conducting every research. Therefore, this study was conducted with the purpose to examine the frames used by *News24* and *IOL* to legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Data were purposively gathered from *News24* and *IOL* online news archives. The initial sample consisted of 100 news articles. 50 news articles were selected from *News24* and *IOL* respectively. The inquiry spans from 1 October to 31 December 2017. The framing theory and Michael Foucault (1980) concept of discourse and knowledge/power formed the conceptual framework upon which the study was premised. Data were analysed using both thematic analysis and critical discourses analysis. To provide a detailed conclusion, this chapter first summarises each chapter. Secondly, it revisits the key findings that emerged from this study to summarise and briefly discuss them. Lastly, an overall conclusion on the key ideas of this thesis is presented summing up how the research questions were answered and the new study contribution is justified.

Summary of the chapters

Chapter one introduced the study. The chapter focused on the background and introduction of the study. It further outlined the research question, objectives and the significance of the study. The chapter also introduced the key components that were later discussed in the thesis. For instance, it highlighted the research methodology that the researcher employed and theoretical and conceptual framework upon which this study is based. Furthermore, the chapter also defined the key terms. These are legitimisation and de-legitimation. In this case, different literature that defined the two terms were discussed. It was highlighted that the discourse of legitimisation and de-legitimation is complex and functions in various ways.

Chapter two looked at the background of the 54th ANC national conference. To that end, the events leading up to the conference were presented. The conference was seen to be of significant impact on the future of South Africa and ANC. For instance, it was indicated in this chapter that the conference had both political and economic implications on the future of South Africa. On one hand, the conference was perceived as the last hope that the South African economy must regain after the so-called “decade of waste”. On the other hand, the conference was viewed by most South Africans as the most decisive stage for the ANC and the country since 1994. Moreover, it was also indicated in this chapter that our knowledge of the organisation of the ANC National Elective Conference is limited to what is stated in the constitution of the ANC. To that end, rule number 10 of the ANC constitution was outlined.

Chapter three discussed the background and brief ownership set up of *News24* and *IOL*. The chapter paid specific attention on understanding the background of the two press. Moreover, detail on the control structure of the press was also given considerable attention. The relationship between *Media24*, *News24* and Naspers was unpacked. Also, the relationship between *IOL* and Independent News and Media was also discussed. The chapter also unpacked the complex nature of control that the *Media24* and Independent News and Media has on different newspapers in South Africa.

Chapter four discussed the biographies of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. The history of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was traced and presented. Additionally, the chapter discussed the various leadership attributes of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The review on literature on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma showed that there is general negative perception about the leadership from the scholars. The chapter also unpacked the history of Cyril Ramaphosa. Various literature that focused on his background and leadership were reviewed. Overall, it emerged that Cyril Ramaphosa is a favourite of most scholars. This is because of the various leadership attributes that are attributed to him. The chapter highlighted the significance of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa background to this study.

Chapter five reviewed literature that is relevant to the study. This chapter is significant because it placed the study in focus. Four sets of literature were reviewed. Firstly, the chapter reviewed literature on media and legitimation strategies. Secondly, it reviewed literature on the media framing of political leaders. Thirdly, it also reviewed literature on the framing and presentation of

female political leaders. Finally, the chapter discussed literature that focuses on the various factors that influence media frames and news content. It was also indicated that there is limited literature that focused on the media legitimisation and de-legitimisation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.

Chapter six unpacked the theories and conceptual framework that informed the study. It explains the framing theory and the concepts of discourse power/knowledge as formulated by Foucault (1980). The origins of framing were explained. It was highlighted in this chapter that framing has both sociological and psychological roots. Moreover, the difference between agenda setting and priming, and framing and agenda setting is discussed in depth. The relationship that exists between framing, culture, power and its elements is unpacked and linked to the key research questions. Further, the Foucauldian discourse of power/knowledge was employed to explain how frames as every so often unspoken and unacknowledged form part of the discourse which construct and is produced by knowledge. It is also highlighted that news power and knowledge are dependent variables.

Chapter seven chronicled the research methodology employed by the researcher in carrying out this study. It was explained and justified in this chapter why the researcher chose to use the constructive qualitative research paradigm. Moreover, the methods of collecting data used and the sampling technique employed by the researcher were explained. It was made clear that the study used purposively selected electronic archival material that was retrieved from *News24* and *ILO* news websites. Additionally, the methods of data presentation and analysis were detailed. It was highlighted that the researcher used both thematic and critical discourse analysis. Thematic analysis was important as it helped to categorise emergent frames and themes and paved the way for detailed analysis of the themes through critical discourse analysis. However, the following chapter presents, interprets and analyse the research findings. Findings in the following chapter were organised and analysed by the sequence of the themes that emerged in the coding of data.

Chapter eight presented qualitative findings on the two key frames that emerged from the thematic analysis of data. Firstly, data from the Rand & Market frame were presented, analysed and discussed. It was revealed in this chapter sampled reports from *News24* showed that in the Rand and Market frame, the press paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to steer the rand and market performance in a positive direction. Moreover, findings from the *IOL* on rand and

market revealed that that the rand and market frame was mainly employed to expose how the rand and the markets were performing in response to the nomination processes in the period leading to the ANC election.

Chapter nine presented, analysed and discussed qualitative findings on the Election victory frame. The chapter expounded the frames to answer the questions how such frames sought to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and what are the other forces that might have influenced such framing. Critical discourse analysis was employed to analyse the data. The discussion of the findings was interwoven with previous literature and theory. It was indicated in this chapter that *News24* and *IOL* made use of the election victory frame. However, the frame was activated differently yet achieving similar objectives. That is to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Following this introduction, the following section presents, analyse and discusses findings on Election victory frame from *New24*.

Chapter ten presented the qualitative findings of the study obtained from the qualitative secondary data. The chapter sought to address the research questions based on exploring the nature of frames that were used by *New24* and *IOL* when reporting on the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in the period leading to the 54th ANC national conference. Three broad frames were presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter. These are, Jacob Zuma & state capture, Factionalism & unity and Corruption frames. In the presentation of these frames, the discussion and analysis were interwoven with theory and previous literature. Frames in this chapter were formulated using Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis approach. Analysis was done using Richardson (2007) critical discourse analysis approach. For the evidence, the chapter, direct quotations from the news articles of *News24* and *IOL* are presented in the form of tables.

Summary of key findings and conclusions

In response to the study's research questions and objectives, the following key findings and concluding statements can be made:

Question 1:

How did *News24* and *IOL* frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress?

Findings

Findings from the study showed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership was framed in terms of contrasting and binary terms. In both presses, it emerged that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was portrayed as a villain while Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as the hero who would save South Africa. To achieve this, the press placed emphasis and gave salience to those aspects of Cyril Ramaphosa leadership traits that were positive. While emphasising on those aspects of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership that were not positive. Additionally, the manner of framing the leadership of these two candidates served to downplay the potential of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma while accentuating the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to improve the state of the country. Moreover, the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was framed in terms of losses while that of Cyril Ramaphosa was packaged as a given victory.

There is a similarity in the press framing of female leader between the present study and findings described in previous literature that focused on media framing of female leaders. Previous studies found that there is a gender bias that exists in the media that allows it to place more emphasis on male political leaders while downplaying female leaders (Guha 2018; Cukier *et al.* 2016). For instance, Guha found that women leaders are not portrayed positively in the news media as compared to their male counterpart (2018). To add, Cukier *et al.* found that women are underrepresented and are less likely to be portrayed positively or on leadership/expert positions and are more often represented as victims (2016: 45). Cukier *et al.* argued that "women are less likely to be framed as leaders or experts and are less likely to hold news host or anchor positions" (2016: 45). Moreover, though findings from this study confirm that women leaders are seldom portrayed positively. Findings from this study are in stark contrast with the findings of Vos (2013).

Vos argued that women leaders are given little coverage. The difference is that Vos's study was focused on the number of times a female leader could appear in the front paper of the newspaper (2013). Thus, establishing the frequency of appearance as opposed to how the female is presented when they appear in the press.

Question 2:

What was the similarities and differences in how the two *News24* and *IOL* framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders?

Findings

There was no significant difference between the frames *IOL* and *News24* used when reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. One of the most remarkable finding to emerge from the data is that both *News24* and *IOL* used similar framed when they were reporting on the ANC conference and leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. To substantiate, six frames emerged from the press (Rand and Markets, Economic Recovery and Growth, Corruption, Election Victory, Factionalism and Unity, and Jacob Zuma and State Capture). However, what is more striking is that the frames were used in totally different ways (except for the Corruption frame) yet yielding similar results. To illustrate, the Factionalism and Unity Frame from in *News24* was operationalised using different delegitimizing strategies and legitimization approaches. However, the same frame was also operationalised in *IOL* by use of totally different techniques from that applied in the *New24*. The difference in the use of frames can be explained by the difference in the institutional structures or editorial rules that govern each press.

The Rand and Markets frame was used by both *News24* and *IOL* extensively in the period leading after the elective conference. In both *News24* and *IOL*, the frame was used to report on Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa abilities to change and build confidence in the ailing South

African currency and poor performing markets. Sampled reports from both news-press revealed that the press utilised the persuasion techniques that allowed it to focus and place emphasis on those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Cacciatore *et al.* 2016; Scheufele 2012; Entman 1993; Entman 2007; Goffman 1979). In this case, the rand and market frame paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to transform the markets and strengthening the rand. On the other hand, sampled reports also revealed that in both presses little and negative attention was placed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's ability to transform and inspire confidence in the rand and market. Drawing on this observation, it can be deduced that the press emphasized on certain sets of consideration (Cyril Ramaphosa) over the others (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) (Secheufele 2012). To add, the fact that the media places negative attention on the female candidates seems to agree with findings from previous studies (Guha 2018; Cukier *et al.* 2016). For instance, concerning the observation that a female leader was portrayed negatively and given less attention, Cukier *et al.* (2016: 45) argued that more often in the press, women leaders are underrepresented and less likely to be portrayed positively. Guha also observed that female political candidates across the world are frequently misrepresented in various media platforms (2018: 67).

Sampled data from *IOL* and *News24* the Election Victory frame was extensively utilised by the reporters in the period leading up to the ANC elective conference. Like in *News24*, the election victory frame in *IOL* was also used to package the campaign of both candidates either as a given victory or a loss. A common usage of the frame was seen in how both presses referred to powerful figures in society to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and legitimate Cyril Ramaphosa. However, what was more interesting in the sampled data from *IOL* is that unlike in *News24* where reference to culture and cultural leaders were quoted, the reference to cultural leaders was employed differently in *IOL*. The difference in the use of the election victory frame was noted in the way the *News24* made use of metaphors and businessman and statistics to endorse and discredit and legitimate the leadership of the two candidates, sampled data from *News24* indicate that there was extensive reference to culture, tradition and powerful figures in the African communities to endorse and discredit the leadership of the two political leaders. There was no emphasis or reference to culture and kings in *IOL*.

The Jacob Zuma and state capture frame was used by both *News24* and *IOL* albeit in a different fashion. For instance, the frame was extensively used in *IOL* by linking Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma through their marital relationship. To illustrate, the reporters in *IOL* continuously referred to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Jacob Zuma's ex-wife. This manner of reference was deeply rooted in the African traditional discourse of marriage. On the other hand, the Jacob Zuma and state capture frame as utilised by the *New24* had its roots in the prevailing political and economic discourse. It also sought to justify the ruling class ideas through vilifying the character of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her relationship to Jacob Zuma. For instance, sampled data showed that the content in the *New24* reports was heavily influenced by the prevailing political and economic situation in South Africa. However, interestingly, the most remarkable observation was that both presses utilised the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame to achieve similar objectives. That is to legitimate the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa while discrediting the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

The Factionalism and unity frame was employed by both *News24* and *IOL*. Though used differently, the framed ultimately achieved the same purpose in both presses; it delegitimised Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by presenting her as leader of an of a despicable faction that was a mere extension of Jacob Zuma's interest. On the other hand, though Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as a leader of a factional group, attention in both presses was placed more on his ability to unite the ANC and the deeply divided nation. Put another way, Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership was framed as a leader who will revive unity in the ANC and South Africa. An interesting finding that emerged in the analysis of data that paid attention to factionalism and unity is that the Factionalism and Unity frame was not an invention of the news reporters. Rather, the reporters deliberately hand-picked frames drawing from the unenumerable cultural reserves of frames that are readily accessible (Van Gorp 2007). For example, the role of Cyril Ramaphosa as a unifier was extensively discussed by various scholars in Chapter 4.

The Corruption frame was used by both *News24* and the *ILO* when reporting on the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In both presses, the corruption frame served to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by presenting him as the alternative to the disastrous Jacob Zuma rule. On the other hand, sampled data showed that there was a common trend in the way Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented. Put

differently, there was strong evidence showing that little attention was paid on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's plans to deal with corruption in both presses. The use of the similar frame to by the press suggest that the reporters used frames which are purposefully and logically equivalent. However, that logically equivalent information was presented in a certain way that either encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2013).

The similarity in the use of the same frame can be justified by the cultural context within which the press was operating. Culture occupies a crucial place in the framing of the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa (Van Gorp 2007). Because frames form part of the culture, it is, therefore, possible that *News24* and *IOL* applied the same frames since they are socially shared (Rees 2001 and Chambwera 2016). Thus, even though they may be different types of controls and regulations in *News24* and *IOL* newsrooms, because they together with their audience share the same cultural symbols and memories, frames of Economic Recovery and Growth, Corruption, Election Victory, Factionalism and Unity and Jacob Zuma and State Capture were common to both presses, although understood from different standpoints.

The findings in this thesis can be equated to findings in Chambwera (2016). This scholar found that when a similar frame can be used by the different media but in a different manner. However, an interesting difference was identified between findings that emerged from this study and Chambwera (2016: 62). Differing from Chambwera's argument that a similar framework can be used differently to achieve a different end, findings from this study revealed that similar frames were utilised differently by *New24* and *IOL* to achieve similar objectives.

Moreover, another remarkable finding that emerged from this study is that the media frames carried with them elements of gender bias. To illustrate, frames were constructed to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma based on the gender biases that were predominant with the context the press was operating. For instance, strong evidence emerged from all frames that in most stories that focused on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a trend of negative portrayal was evident in most of the reports. Simply put, *IOL* and *News24* downplayed and misrepresented Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by selecting to emphasise on those gendered elements of her leadership that they thought would discredit her campaign to become ANC president.

The findings discussed in the previous section correlates well with findings of Wright and Holland 2014; Omari 2008; Ross 2002; Tendi 2011 and Thou 1999. For instance, Wright and Holland found that the press uses various gendered frames to vilify the speech and person of female leaders. These include strategic attack, uncontrolled emotional outpouring, and hypocrisy (Wright and Holland 2014: 588). In this case, the scholars argue that these framings as carefully did by the media professionals, "demonstrates the role the media plays as a gendered mediator, perpetuating the gender double-blind that constrains female political leaders, as they negotiate the demand to demonstrate masculine leadership attributed without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of them" (Wright and Holland 2014:78). Tendi argued that the Zimbabwean media instituted a gendered high-tech surveillance on Joice Mujuru in 2014 (2011: 13). This surveillance was aimed at vilifying the character and leadership of Joice Mujuru in her battle to succeed Robert Mugabe. Tendi said "Mujuru was accused of plotting to assassinate Robert Mugabe in the state media" (2011: 13).

To add, Omari (2008) and Ross 2002 found that women politicians in their entirety are tremendously underrepresented in the political sphere, and in instances where they are represented, the importance is positioned on trivialities like the type of dressing and not on policies and ideologies (Ross 2002: 92). However, a sharp contrast was identified between previous findings and those of this present study. Unlike previous research (Nacos 1997) that revealed that the newsprint media coverage of women in politics is low and that their stories placed in the inside pages and rarely do their names hardly make it to the headlines making them invisible. The findings from this study could not confirm that assertion. This is because of the difference in the type of methodology and data collection used. Studies that indicate that coverage of female leader in press pages are low have widely applied the content analysis to their studies where they were only limited to the counting of the number of appearances of female leaders in the newspaper pages. This study has gone beyond counting the number of appearances to an analysis of text beyond the surface.

Question 3:

What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders?

Findings

Strong evidence was found that the news frames were culturally constituted communication artefacts. Put another way, *News24* and *IOL* reports were heavily influenced by the prevailing societal discourses that shaped politics and economy in the period leading and during to the ANC election. For instance, a deeper analysis of data points showed that the Rand and Markets draw from the economic conditions and prevailing political discourse. Statements and meaning that were found in the press reports were in a culturally constituted world. What this means is that beyond the sentences and the writer, there was meaning that resembled the statements that were dominant in the prevailing discourses. For instance, the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame borrowed statements from the post-Jacob Zuma discourse that characterised the period leading to the conference. The meaning that was communicated by these frames was not constructed by the journalist. Instead, it was rented from the culturally constituted world. These findings confirm the findings of Friedland and Zhong (1996). This scholar argued that from previous research that revealed that frames are bridges that connect the broader social and cultural spheres and everyday understandings of social interaction (Friedland and Zhong 1996: 35)

The press reliance on the analysts points to how the journalist discursive practices are influenced and constituted by society. Findings from the data indicated that there was a heavy reliance on the opinions of the external sources. For instance, in the Rand and Market frame, *News24* reporters relied extensively on the opinions of their external sources. However, the reporters use of sources serves two objectives. Firstly, it allows the press to abide by the principle of objectivity. Secondly, the use of sources helps the reporters to inset their subjective opinions within the reports without them compromising the principle of objectivity (Richardson 2007; Wodak 2011; Chambwera 2016). This serves to authenticate the press position and the situation that has affected South Africa

and allow its audience to hear from a trusted and objective source who is an expert in the field of economics.

Furthermore, the most striking results from this study are how the newspaper discourse was constituted by society as it constitutes society in the same way. *IOL* and *News24* are the online versions of the various newspapers owned by the two presses. Their publications are in English and appeals most to the working class and the elites in South Africa. These two groups in society are the most economically active and do understand the issues of politics and economics in South Africa. Their interest in the issues of the economy can be said to be the performance of the markets and the performance of the economy. Such issues have a direct impact on their lives. As such, the emphasis on the frames on rand and markets and the positive reports on the candidate of Cyril Ramaphosa by the press should be seen within this light. What this means is that the press emphasis and packaging on Cyril Ramaphosa's campaign as an economic recovery campaign was well informed by the interest of its readers. The reports were effectively used as marketing artefacts by the media because its content resonates with the interest of its readers. As a result, the reader's beliefs and values affected the content and the type of reports that were published by *IOL*. Thus, drawing from the above point, it can be postulated that in the period leading, during and after the conference, news content was constituted by the beliefs of the middle class and the ruling class, as such the news discourse was socially constructed by the beliefs of the dominant groups in society who are also *IOL* and *News24* audience (Wodak 2011: 52).

The findings from this study further strengthen the argument that media text does not operate in isolation of the context of its production. Evidence that emerged from this study showed that media frames are used to organise and package meaning that the readers can interpret. This meaning is borrowed from the already existing discourses. To illustrate, evidence that emerged from this study suggest that the frames used by the media shared semblance with prevailing economic and political events that were unfolding in the period leading to the elections. Remarkably, these findings substantiate previous findings of Chambwera (2016) and Khuluse (2014) discussed in the literature review. Chambwera (2016) and Khuluse (2014) found that the press when reporting political candidates, it evokes cultural discourses that serve the purpose of reminding readers and allow them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed reality as a frame of reference. Similarly, Rees found that when the press report events and individuals it does not just create and

impose their worldviews on their audience, rather they evoked time-tested worldviews and paradigms that were in sync with those of their intended audience (Rees 2001).

In keeping with previous studies, findings from this study also showed that economic competition and pressure exerts influence on the type of media frames. What this means is that selecting on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma appeared to be a deliberate attempt to improve profits by *IOL* and *News24*. The circulation of newspapers has been declining in South Africa over the years. The newspapers sales were recorded to have declined by 80% in the year 2016. Competition has increased over the years and there is an incessant growth of a myriad of small online news outlets. Twitter and other instant news applications possess a threat to profits. Now the audience is shared by a lot of news outlets. Therefore, as a remedy, the reporters were determined to focus on specific issues that are intriguing to their readers and make sure that the readers are continuously intrigued by their content. Sensationalism and puffery in the content became the order of the day so that the press remain relevant to its customers and ultimately increase profit. Therefore, drawing on this assertion, it can be argued that how *IOL* and *News24* covered the election was in response to the prevailing (capitalist) social practice and the discursive practices of the newspaper industry. Effectively, what this means is that news content as products are created and marketed considering the determining economic forces (Richardson 2007: 116).

These findings corroborate Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Hallin and Mancini's (2004) findings that the media are businesses who are interested in generating profit. Because of that, the nature of their content is driven by the need to retain readers and viewers test. Moreover, the argument that economic pressure exert pressure on the type of frames fit fairly well with findings in a study by Chibwe (2016: 1660). Chibwe argued that the hunt for profit also influenced *Daily News*' framing of the two cases. In addition, this scholar also found that the news editor stated that consideration of whether the story will sell influences the slant given to their stories. The differences in how the two newspapers framed the cases are a result of different ideological inclinations/positioning, the hunt for profits, and control and ownership dynamics (Chibwe 2016: 1660). Newspapers are business. Most newspapers exist to make a profit and under the current conditions of capitalism, the continued existence of a newspaper depends on selling its product and doing so in the most profitable manner. By such a view, the news is a product, a product that must be made attractive and appealing to its consumers. As a result, this will make the reporters

produce news that overly emphasises issues, amusing, pleasurable and engaging to these identified consumers since stories that achieve "audience appeal" form the basic, most fundamental gauge of what to put into the paper (Franklin 1997 cited Richardson 2007: 78). The situation has been made worse by the fragmentation of the audience. Fragmentation of the audience can be understood as a division of the audience between ever-increasing numbers of media options. When presented with a variety of options the audience becomes more dispersed amongst different media options. The ultimate results of this process are that each media option will be eventually left with a smaller share of the audience. Since the amount that an advertiser is willing to pay is directly related to the audience share a media has the fragmentation of the media a negative effect of reducing revenue and resources. In the case of South Africa, audience fragmentation has affected media institutions a lot. There are now thousands of channels that are available through satellite, digital, and cable. Each media option serves the role of satisfying preferences of a certain audience.

The single most conspicuous observation to emerge from this study is that apart from communicating ideas and information to the people, the press assumed the role of a political institution where it communicated and endorsed certain ideologies while discrediting others. Strong evidence of underlying ideologies was found in *News24* and *IOL* reports that were consciously endorsing the leadership and possible victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. What this means is that the press propagated and accentuated the dominant ideas (pro-Cyril Ramaphosa) and sentiments. Both presses were in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa's presidents as they were against the candidature of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa is understood as a rich and wealthy person. He owns a lot of companies and control business. It, therefore, follows that his interest is the interest of the elites. Whereas Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is understood as representing poor and the disadvantaged groups in South Africa. However, the media by downplaying the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, simultaneously downplayed the interest of the poor and suffocated their voices before they even before they are given a chance to make decisions. On the other hand, the press by supporting the campaign and leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, it endorsed the interest of the ruling class. It made its readers accept the Cyril Ramaphosa as the best and preferred candidate. As a result, this had an effect of endorsing and perpetuating the dominance of the ruling elite whose interest was represented by Cyril Ramaphosa. The findings here agree with the findings of Chong and Druckman (2007). These scholars argue that in a major political contest like elections, the news-press serves as a campaign tool that

communicates ideologies of the most dominant and powerful ideologies in society (2007: 120). To add, these findings also corroborates with findings in a study by Chibwe that focuses on *The Herald* and *Daily News*’ framing of the leaked Zimbabwean Draft Constitution and Vice President Joice Mujuru’s fall from Grace. In his findings, Chibwe argued that news framing in the two publications is influenced by powerful interests in society.

In keeping with previous research (Maseng *et al.* 2018, Chambwera 2016, and Davies-Laubscher 2014), findings from this study showed that the press reports were artefacts that communicated power through knowledge. To illustrate, the press reports not only transferred meaning from the culturally constituted world (McCracken 1986: 72). Instead, the press was successful and instrumental in communicating the power of the dominant groups in society. This power can be understood as the two-dimensional power (Richardson 2007: 31). This is the type of power that is used by social groups in making "non-decisions". What this means is that the power to make "non-decisions" is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voices or killed even before they gained access to the relevant decisions making arena (Richardson 2007: 31). Suppressing the potential of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was tantamount to creating a group of “non-decision” in the society. The press rendered irrelevant the interest of the all those whom Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for. The press reports also exercised power through influencing how the readers would think about Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and led to the reader to accept the social conditions that were not in the interest of broad segment of the population (Richardson 2007: 31).

Contribution to research and future research

The present study contributed to the existing body of literature. It contributed to the current understanding of how the press evokes cultural discourses when reporting on political candidates, to remind readers and allow them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed reality as a frame of reference. The holistic analysis of this study added to existing research by identifying the different common culturally constructed frames that the South African media use to legitimate or delegitimize Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership. No previous research that exists has ever holistically analysed the culturally constituted frames used to legitimise or delegitimise political leaders in the election event such the ANC 2017 December

elective conference. Moreover, the study also confirmed results from existing studies that emphasised that the newspaper and journalistic discourse is constituted by society as it similarly constitutes society (Van Gop 2007; Chambwera 2016). Additionally, the critical and holistic analysis of this study added to the body of research that focuses on the presentation of female political leaders in Africa and South African in particular. Findings from this study confirm previous research that emphasised that there is a gender bias in favour of male political leaders that is pervasive in most African media (Guha 2018; Cukier, Jackson, Elmi, Roach and Cyr 2016; Mavin, Elliott, Stead, and Williams 2016). This study has revealed that the gender bias that is prevalent in the news frames is borrowed from the patriarchal systems that shape society in which the media is functioning. The present study revealed that the *IOL* and *News24* strive for objective and fair reporting as they fairly present a somewhat balanced reporting that placed more focus on policy issues and candidate manifestos as opposed to candidates' personalities or their gender. This is a complete departure from previous studies that emphasised that the media in Africa when reporting on female political leaders, the absolute emphasis is placed on downplaying their personalities by amplifying culturally constructed gendered predispositions (Guha 2018; Cukier, Jackson, Elmi, Roach and Cyr 2016; Mavin, Elliott, Stead, and Williams 2016; Thou 2012). Furthermore, the study contributed to prior theory by applying, validating and extending the application of Van Gops' (2007) framing theory and Michael Foucault (1980) concept of knowledge/power and discourse. The theories have been extended to analyse the frames used to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. The results showed that the media select some aspects of the pre-existing discourse and frame them in a manner that conveys their preferred meaning. This meaning is not neutral, but it is laden with power and ideologies meant to serve the interests of the ruling elite and maintain the status quo. Findings from this study have shown that apart from communicating ideas and information to the people, the press assumed the role of a political institution where it communicated and endorsed certain ideologies while discrediting others. Also, existing research often separately depended on framing analysis or thematic analysis. The present research contributed by linking a variety of approaches in its methodology. The research included the case study, cultural studies approach, thematic analysis and critical discourses analysis. All the approaches were complementary to each other. A case study of the ANC 2017 election was covered with specific focus on the leadership and political

qualities on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The study contributed to existing case study research on ANC politics.

The application of the discourse analysis to the published newspaper text specifically focuses on the outcome of the news processes as opposed to the different dynamics that inform the process of news gathering, selection and news discourse. Cape and Benkaret argued that “applying a discursive approach to published news stories focuses on the outcome, not the process, and thus does not address the influence of proprietors, managers and editorial executives unless it is combined with ethnographic analysis – a combination of approaches that we would highly welcome” (2016: 435). A remarkable route for future research is to conduct longitudinal cases studies that apply a combination of approaches that will seek to analyse the whole process of news production. This will include in-depth interviews with news personnel in the various news institution. Additionally, a discursive news values analysis of news stories will also assist future research because it can provide insights into how news values are constructed through different resources and practices, including across different platforms (print, online, radio, TV) and in different types of news discourse (such as hard news, soft news, business, sports).

Conclusion

The purpose of the present research was to examine the frames used by *News24* and *IOL* to legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This study has identified that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership was framed in terms of contrasting and binary terms. The second major finding was that there was no significant difference between *IOL* and *News24* manner of framing Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. One of the most remarkable finding to emerge from the data is that both *News24* and *IOL* used similar frames when they were reporting on the ANC conference and leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that media text does not operate in isolation of the context of its production. Evidence from this study showed that media frames are used to organise and package meaning that the readers can interpret. This meaning is borrowed from the already existing discourses. Culture occupies a crucial place in the framing of the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and

Cyril Ramaphosa (Van Gorp 2007). Because frames form part of the culture, it is, therefore, possible that *News24* and *IOL* applied the same frames since they are socially shared. The contribution of this inquiry has been to confirm that the newspaper discourse is constituted by society as it similarly constitutes society. Besides the comparatively limited sample, this work offers valuable insights into how the news frames are culturally constituted and reliant on the prevailing and dominant discourses in society. More broadly, more cross-national studies in the form of mixed methods is also required to determine how the media uses frames to legitimise or de-legitimise political candidates.

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