The Implementation of Housing Policy in Msunduzi Municipality.

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Abstract

This research project aims to explore the implementation process of the low cost housing policy, over the period from 1994 to 2001 in the, Msunduzi Municipality area. There are problems with the implementation of the housing policy by local government and this is causing delays in the delivery of the low cost housing for the poor. The findings of this research project will show that these problems have many sources. These include: firstly, the funding and the budget allocated for the housing projects. Secondly, the interference of the provincial government and the power play to control the housing policy. Thirdly, the uniformity of the houses in the projects; these houses can be related to the social and township houses of the late apartheid era.

The housing policy in Msunduzi is facing many problems in the implementation stages. In order to identify the problems one must first find out what makes a problem free and an efficient policy. The information provided in the background study was gathered from a collection of sources, namely, journal articles, newspaper articles and government papers including the housing White Paper. A major part of the information gathered was through interviews conducted with a handful of members of the housing sector in the Msunduzi area. My interviews were conducted with a member of the Msunduzi Housing Association, a member of the National Home Builders Registration Council, and three members of the local Department of Housing. These interviews have allowed me to analysis the situation in Msunduzi area and come up with certain conclusions, as seen in the final report.

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Introduction

"Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right." Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution, the *Bill Of Rights*, section 26 subsections (1)(2).

The new South African government, after the first democratic general elections in 1994, launched a massive public or low-cost housing scheme, as it is commonly known, a project that promised to house the poor of the country. This project was seen not only as a way to defeat poverty and homelessness but also as a way for the new government to prove itself and to redeem the reputation of the government body in the eyes of the public and the world as a whole. Since the development of the White Paper on Housing in 1995 more than five million people have secured homes due to the fact that more than one million houses have been built.

This research project aims to explore the implementation process of the low cost housing policy, over the period from 1994 to 2001 in the, Msunduzi Municipality area. As implied by this project the South African housing policy is a hopeful one. The mere interest in the success of the housing policy and a background in the ever- changing housing sector prompted this study.

This research project looks at the last stage of the policy cycle, the implementation stage, because this is normally the stage where it is determined whether the policy will be successful or not. The housing policy hit many road bumps on its way to the present day and lots of delays in the implementation stage have caused problems in the low cost housing scheme. These issues include the

funding and the budgeting. Mid way through the projects the Department of Housing started facing a lack of funding and this meant that there were deals made, amongst the role players housing sector, which allowed for the compromise in the provision of the houses. As seen earlier the Constitution states that every individual has the right to adequate housing and that, that accessibility should be within the availability of government resources. The mere fact that the project started facing financial strain so early is evidence that the policy design did not take into account the street-level problems that would be faced later in the programme.

Many people saw the houses that were being built as a way of getting rid of the poor by placing them in areas that could be considered out-of-sight townships, places that others did not have to enter, but merely look the other way when they drove past.

The research portfolio is divided into three parts. The first is the theoretical perspective, which serves as a general description of the policy theory. The second part is the background study, which is a description of the housing policy in relation to the South African context. The third part is the final reports, which is an analysis of Part One and Part Two, and drawing conclusions from the research conducted.

Theoretical

Perspective

Introduction

In the introduction to the portfolio it is stated that the housing policy in Msunduzi is facing many problems in the implementation stages. In order to identify the problems one must first find out what makes an effective and efficient policy. In this part of the research project I will look at the point view of a few authors on what makes an efficient/ effective policy. Implementation plays an important role in the making of a policy. I will look at the views on implementation as expressed by authors such as Pressman and Wildavsky and Wayne Parsons. I will then look at Steven Lukes' interpretation of, what he calls, the three dimensions of power. This will serve as an introduction to investigating the power relations within governmental departments and other private institutions. Attention will also be paid to the political environment surrounding policy formulation and how this plays a part in effecting the policy-makers' decisions, when making an effective policy; here I will look at the work of John Kingdon.

I will firstly give very brief definitions of and a background to policy implementation. Implementation as defined by Pressman and Wildavsky is: "to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce, and complete" a task according to the rules and regulations set out by the policy, (Pressman and Wildasky, 1973: xiii). The first generation of implementation researchers started their analysis with clarifying the goals for a policy, and then followed the chain of command to see how these goals were transformed into action. The later generation of implementation researchers concentrated more on a careful analysis of how the final parts of the chain from principle to action developed. This analysis is commonly known as backward mapping, as described in more detail in the following paragraphs. Certain researchers the position of the street-level bureaucrats; street-level bureaucrats are the lower level workers/ people in the

government agencies who interact directly with the public. While others followed actors in the locality, no matter what their formal relationships to the implementation procedure were, they all followed the same process of implementation, which were the newly developed "bottom-up" approaches. These approaches were used as points of departure by the new generation of implementers for institutional analysis of collective data (W. Parsons, 1995: 468).

To my understanding a policy cycle can very briefly be described as a way in which policy happens. A policy cycle is made up of five basic, yet very important stages, which are: issues/ problems, alternatives, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation. It is believed that this linear model of the policy cycle can be problematic. It is assumed that policy always begins with a problem/ issue and proceeds with those steps to the evaluation stage, however in reality things do not always happen in that fashion. The stages can become intertwined.

As I am concentrating on the implementation process I will also give a brief understanding of it, as I see it. Implementation is the point of interface between government and the people. It is the point at which government meets its obligations to the people who created it. It is, in short, delivery. In general, "once a policy proposal is enacted, its provisions must be implemented via some type of performance agency," (Knoke, 1996: 17). "Because no legislation, regulation, or court ruling anticipates and mandates every iota of activity for a performance agency, many holes for discretionary implementation remain"(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 144). This enables policy implementers, such as government bureaucrats, to use these loopholes to their best advantage and to decide which parts of the policy are best suited to their task at hand. As suggested by Knoke, implementation events are a vital part of every policy cycle (Knoke, 1996: 17).

Decision-making is an underlying aspect in all the various stages of the policy cycle, from the agenda setting stage to the implementation stage. The following section looks at the effect power has over decision-making in the agenda setting stage, as set out by John Kingdon (1984), in his book <u>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy.</u>

Agenda setting can be seen as visible exercise of power and power relations. People see agenda setting as a visible indicator of underlying power relations. Agenda setting gives us events and situations that allow us to see how power is used to arrange policy to the best advantage.

1. <u>Agenda Setting:</u>

Steven Lukes quotes Wayne Parsons as he suggests that power "involves the control over ways of thinking and access to the agenda as well as over behaviour," (Lukes, 1979: 27). Agenda setting plays an important role in the policy cycle. Questions like why does a government need a particular policy and will this policy benefit its people, are often asked when a policy is being formulated.

Kingdon argues that there are many issues that influence the position of a policy on the agenda of decision-makers. Kingdon describes three streams, which play an important role, when combined, to help a policy proposal reach a government agenda (Kingdon; 1984: 197). One of these streams is politics; this issue plays an important part in the formulation of policies. Politics can very easily be described as power because politicians govern a country giving politics the power to make the decisions. One should also bear in mind that politics is

about people who possess this power. Also it is important to look at the political events and the political environment in which the policy is formulated.

The way a policy is formulated in the political context depends largely on the national mood at the time of formulation. As Kingdon states, the political stream of the process whereby ideas become agenda items is composed of "such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in congress, and changes in administration" (Kingdon: 1984: 145). These matters have a powerful effect on agenda-settings. "People in and around the government sense a national mood. They are comfortable discussing it, and believe that they know when the mood shifts" (Kingdon, 1984: 146). National mood is when the majority of the public/people in a particular country is thinking along the same lines and feels similar about the magnitude and seriousness of a particular issue. This helps them to promote certain ideas and to oppose others. The changes in public mood relate to the attitude of the people in the country to the present government.

"People in and around government believe quite firmly that something like national mood has important policy consequences. It has an impact on election results, and on the receptivity of governmental decision-makers to interest groups lobbying" (Kingdon, 1984: 149). A shift in the national mood can render one policy idea viable, while crippling another. It is therefore very important for a good policy maker to be able to read the national mood and should be able to use such an opportunity that arises for him/her to manipulate the national mood for the good of his or her idea.

In order to be successful, they, the policy makers, need to be able to make use of national mood. If the national mood is not favourable to their ideas they should present their ideas at every available opportunity, until the mood becomes

altered to their idea. It will also be favourable for a good policy maker to adapt to the changing national mood and be able to flow with the public opinion rather than fight against it.

Agenda setting also involves the mood or the environment of the government role players. This can take on two personas. Firstly when a person in power changes his or her ideas and tries to push a new idea and secondly when there is personnel turnover in the government. If a person leaving office had a policy idea on the agenda then his or her idea is disregarded as there are new ideas coming in with the new personnel (Kingdon, 1984: 153-4).

The next stream is problems, which catch the eye of government officials in three different ways, which are indictors, focusing events and feedback. As Kingdon state, "sometimes, a more or less systematic indicator simply shows that there is a condition out there. Indicators are used to access the magnitude of these conditions" (Kingdon; 1984: 197). Focusing events are things like a disaster, crisis, personal experience, or powerful symbols, which catch the attention of government official. Sometimes a government official can learn about a condition by receiving feedback of a formal or informal programme, which exists already.

The last stream can be described as the policy stream. Kingdon describes this stream as a selection of policy, which floats around in the government environment. There selection of a policy idea can depend on certain criteria; this includes technical feasibility, similarity with the values of community members, and the anticipation of future constraints, which are budget constraints, public acceptability, and politicians respectively (Kingdon; 1984: 201). When these streams come together and combine, sometimes when there is a problem, which catches the attention of the public, and a policy is combined with a problem as its

solution this can be described as a policy window. When this policy window opens officials must push for attention of their policy proposals.

As seen above there are many issues and events that can cause problems in the policy process that can delay or possibly cancel a policy. In the next section I will discuss the two systems of command available for policy design. These are the top-down approach and the bottom- up approaches.

2. Top-down/ Bottom-up

I will discuss Parsons' interpretation and criticism of the top-down system. Parsons defines implementation as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them. He implies that a common failure of implementation stems from the assumption that implementation requires a top-down system of control, communication, and resources to do the job. The top-down model has been greatly criticized for not taking into account other actors, such as the street-level bureaucrats who actually implement the policy.

Wayne Parsons suggests that the control over people that the rational control (top-down) model evokes is not the way forward to effective and efficient implementation (Parsons, 1995: 464). Criticism was voiced regarding the top-down perception of a policy process, especially the lack of an understanding of the process as a negotiation process, and correspondingly a lack of understanding the possibilities for implementing agencies to respond to prescribed goals.

Bottom-up models emphasize the fact that street-level bureaucrats have discretion in how they apply policy to a particular case. Often individual cases do not exactly fit established rules; often more than one rule might be applied to the same case, resulting in different outcomes, as mentioned earlier. Professionals have a key role in ensuring the performance of a policy; they all have opportunities and responsibilities of control and the right method of delivery of a service. Individual bureaucrats can be friendly and helpful, or hostile and obstructive.

The rational control (top-down) model implies that when implementing a policy the implementers are often confronted by conflict and to achieve the right goals they would have to cut corners or make deals to provide an effective and efficient implementation process. However, Pressman and Wildavsky see this conflict as something that is essentially dysfunctional and in need of co-ordination. An effective and efficient implementation process, which takes on the approach of backward mapping, has methods and systems of controlling conflict so as to bring about compliance, because these conflicts are predicted at an earlier stage in the policy process (Parsons, 1995: 470).

3. Design and Backward Mapping:

When most policies are designed it is assumed that there is a linear process that needs to be followed. However the first step to achieving an effective and efficient policy is to correct the process that divides design and policy implementation into two separate stages. Pressman and Wildavsky believe that policy design and implementation should not be two different stages in the policymaking process. They suggest that the designers of the policy and the implementers should have an equal say in the decision-making. They can be

quoted saying that: "[T]he great problem, as we understand it, is to make the difficulties of implementation a part of the initial formulation of policy" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 143). Implementation must not be conceived as a process that takes place after, and independent of, the design of policy. Means and ends can be brought into somewhat closer correspondence only by making each partially dependent on the other (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 144).

This point was also highlighted by Wayne Parsons as he suggests implementers of a policy should have a say in the development of a policy, as it is they who would eventually shape the policy to suit not only their own routine but also the needs of the public that the policy was formulated to serve. Implementers are in a better position if they participate in the decision-making stage of policymaking because they are able to decide what is needed in terms of resources and whether or not they will be able to work with the budget allocated to them for the implementation of the policy (Wayne Parsons, 1995: 463). This is also helpful when it comes to the viability of the policy in reality/ the ground level as opposed to a policy that is great only on paper.

A way of making policy design and implementation dependent on each other is to create an organization that not only launches a policy or program but also one, which can execute such a policy or program. According to Pressman and Wildavsky, the fewer the steps involved in carrying out a policy or program, the fewer the opportunities for a disaster to overtake it. This means that the policy is more likely to achieve its goal if there is simplicity in the policy. However they also argue that simplicity is not an end in itself, meaning that if not formulated properly then a policy that is simple can also lead down the road of failure (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 145).

Wayne Parsons (1995), in his book Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis; suggests that a policy 'is best implemented by a backward mapping of problems and policy. This involves defining success in human or behavioural terms rather than as the completion of a "hypothesis" (Parsons, 1995: 468). Instead of starting at the beginning and working to the end when writing a policy, in the process of backward mapping the drafter of the policy firstly looks at the ultimate goal and moves back to the policy writing stage.

Backward mapping is a helpful concept when it comes to solving problems. When the goal of the policy is looked at first the researchers are able to work out whether or not the policy is going to experience problems at an early stage. They are then able to step back and anticipate these problems before they cause delays in the implementation of the policy. This is important also to identify variables that are essential parts of the programme that are needed to ensure that the programme is a success. Variables like resources, both human and otherwise that are going to be needed to complete the policy or program must be identified. This process prevents or limits problems that can cause delays at a later stage in the policy cycle.

The best-planned policy, one, which has even included implementation in the planning process, can still be subject to external influences. One of the major external influences, which very few implementers take into consideration, is the issue of power relations. Implementation is very rarely carried out by a sole agency- there are usually as many implementing agencies as there are aspects of implementation.

As implementers of policy, street-level bureaucrats play an important role in the policy process and as a result there is a need to discuss them in greater detail. The next section discusses the role and some of the problems of street-level bureaucrats as seen by Michael Lipsky. It should be noted that Lipsky is an

American writer and most of the functions and situations described below are from the American context.

4. Street-level Bureaucrats

Bureaucratic organisations receive only broad and vague policy instructions in the legislation. They must decide themselves on the vital details of the policy, which is most helpful when implementing the policy. This means that much of the actual policymaking process takes place within the various governmental departments, and other bureaucratic organisations. Policy implementation often necessitates the construction of recognized rules and regulations by bureaucracies. Rule making by the bureaucracy is central to the policy process.

Street-level bureaucrats tend to use loopholes to their own advantage. Lipsky refers to this as discretion. Lipsky deems that unlike other lower-level workers street-level bureaucrats have "considerable discretion in determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies" (Lipsky, 1980: 13). However Parsons argues that this discretion has limits. Street-level bureaucrats might be able to adapt the policy to their environment but they are unable to make major changes to the policy as a whole, since this privilege is reserved for the policy makers and decision-makers.

Much of the work of bureaucrats is administrative routine. But bureaucrats almost always have some discretion in performing even routine tasks. Street-level bureaucrats develop ways of implementing the policy, which actually results in outcomes, which are quite different to those intended or desired by

policy-makers. Implementation involves a high margin of discretion. Whether the mode of implementation is top-down or bottom-up, those on the front line of policy delivery have varying bands of discretion over how they choose to exercise the rules, which they are employed to apply (Parsons, 1995: 463).

Bureaucrats decide on the rules and regulation of the policy once the policy elites and political and senior administrative officials decide upon that policy. Rule making is a central function of the bureaucracy in the policy process. Street-level bureaucrats have discretion because the jobs they do are not uniform and one case is not necessarily the same as the next. This constitutes a situation where a bureaucrat can decide on the best path to take to achieve they goal in the long term. Street-level bureaucrats are the government's link to the citizens of the country and therefore they present government with a face.

In Michael Lipsky's book <u>Street-level Bureaucracy</u> (1980) he argues that the functions performed by the street-level bureaucrat constitute the service delivery of the government. The functions of the street-level bureaucrats are to interpret and carry out the public policies that they implement. This means that the decisions, routines and the devices practised by the street-level bureaucrats are what make a public policy; it is their input into the implementation of the policy that creates the foundations of the policy (Lipsky, 1980: 3). An example of this is when street-level bureaucrats in the housing sector process applications. Street-level bureaucrats will tend to put the people they consider as most deserving at the top of the list of applicants, while those not as deserving will be placed closer to the bottom of the list.

In Lipsky's book he describes the functions of the street-level bureaucrats in America. There are some similarities to that of the street-level bureaucrats in South Africa. These street-level bureaucrats are faced each day with the task of

dealing with masses of the public. However this is a difficult job because they have to work in an environment where corruption might be rife and where the public can take them for granted. Street-level bureaucrats are among the lowest paid personnel in the government and/or the country as a whole (Lipsky, 1980: xiii).

This environment causes the bureaucrats, as Lipsky argues, to retire early or suffer from burn out. Those who do stay on became masters at the jobs and do their best to serve the public. They are the part of the government that has the most intimate contact with the public/ citizens. The public considers the bureaucracy to be too big and most jobs in the bureaucracy are seen as being redundant. Generally bureaucrats believe firmly in the value of their policies and the importance of their occupations. But in addition to these professional motives, bureaucrats, like everyone else, seek higher pay, greater job security, and satisfaction, and added power and prestige for themselves. This as Lipsky suggests is one of the many reasons why a bureaucrat's discretion to make decisions about policy implementation will not be reduced (Lipsky, 1980: 5).

Professional and personal ambitions meet to motivate bureaucrats to increase the powers, functions, and budgets of their organizations. The demand of new projects and functions placed on bureaucrats has developed into an increase in the size of the bureaucracy. New personnel and organisations had to be developed in order to keep up with the growing workload that faced the new government to rectify the mistakes of the past apartheid era.

W. Parsons suggests that in the Lipsky model consideration be given to the fact that implementation often involves human and organizational limitations, and these must be recognized as a resource or rather the lack thereof (Parsons, 1995: 468). Effective and efficient implementation involves the input given by

these human resources; these human resources can be built, from the knowledge and experience of the bureaucrats at the front line of service delivery. These include all the people who are involved in the face-to-face interaction with the public. These street-level bureaucrats provide the government with a face that the public can relate to and come into direct contact with each day.

The framework of policy implementation consists of various concepts such as coordination, communication, multiple participants and multiple decisions, cultural effects, authority, resources and policy flexibility, which often are riddled with problems. The ability of a policy or program in accomplishing its goals are dependent on these concepts and on a host of other aspects such as the compatibility of the policy regulations with the interests of the group or organisation it was initially designed for.

5. Coordination and Communication.

The implementation process is associated with problems, most of which are unanticipated, resulting in delays, which sometimes prove detrimental to all parties involved. Problems in the implementation process include the lack of co-ordination and administration, and delays in the decision-making process. According to Pressman and Wildavsky, to achieve coordination actors must be united in a common purpose. This simply means that all key participants involved should agree on the established goal and should not work at cross-purposes to each other. In Pressman and Widavsky's words 'A should facilitate B to attain C', thus a common understanding of the problem, its consequences and its solutions. However devastating, should be looked at intently by all parties concerned (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 133).

Good coordination also depends on good communication between participants, both in the same organisation and in different organisations. Communication plays a very important role because when the participants fail to communicate the reasoning and co-operation at the time of conflict will be unsuccessful. However certain impediments such as ignorance about the problem could prevent harmonious interaction and coordination.

Coordination can easily transform into coercion, where policy implementers try to force certain people or groups into complying with policy regulations. Often, a policy has to be modified because of swift changes in the public opinions or environmental sphere or in order to achieve coherence in the implementation process. Moreover Pressman and Wildavsky also state that achieving coordination means achieving unity in divided areas. Coordination is also getting groups or individuals on the periphery of the policy process to become involved in implementation because they are a core element in the process of a program's success (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 134-35)

In many cases there are events and opinions, which demonstrate the lack of coordination. These events and opinions can work against the implementation of a policy as they prevent coordination. One of the criteria of why implementation fails is a dependence on others who almost always do not share the implementer's sense of urgency. The little power the implementer has to control the events to influence the process in his or her favour must be used to evoke enthusiasm for the policy. Sometimes, in order to achieve coordination and a united consensus in implementation, the original policy is modified to fit any changes that might occur. In fact the greater the flexibility of a policy, the greater the chances are that it will survive.

For implementation to be successful, the implementation process has to be as simple as possible. According to Pressman and Wildavsky's framework, a multiplicity of actors or participants decreases the potential success of implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 142). The more implementation depends on the decisions of other organisations and even governmental agencies, the less likely the success of implementation. This is because of the increasing possibilities for disagreement and delays.

Pressman and Wildavsky suggest, "a designer of policy should understand the length and unpredictability of decision sequences and should be able to design the policy to avoid these stoppages" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 147). This simply means that if a policy has to go through various organisations or governmental departments for number of different officials to make a decision there is the likelihood that the policy would be buried under bureaucratic red-tape, thus causing delays in the implementation process.

Important in policy design is a consideration of what Pressman and Wildavsky term "clearance points", these are point/stages that a policy has to go through checks and re-checks before being passed for the next process. A policy or program has to go through various stages where clearance is needed. These clearance points often cause delays in the implementation process. In times of controversy and conflict, it is at these points within the implementation process that power games come into play. People in power use the lower level agents to do their bidding. If authorities decide that they dislike the policy or the program, pressure is placed on lower level personnel to either decide against the policy at the clearance points or to delay the process. However if authorities are in favour of a particular policy or program then pressure is placed on personnel to ensure that the paperwork at the clearance points flow as quickly as possible (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 145).

The power relationship between actors in the implementation process can often spell disaster for implementation, and this is why a fuller understanding of power relations is of vital importance to understanding the implementation process in South Africa. In the South African context, due to the multiplicity of political organisations and governmental departments, it is evident that many of the players within the implementation process exert power to gain the support of others.

6. Power Relations:

Steven Lukes (1979) suggests, in his book <u>Power: A Radical View</u>, that there are three types of power. He calls these three types of power the three dimensions of power. Each serves as an explanation of the process of how power is being exerted by individuals and/or groups in organisations and/or governmental departments. Steven Lukes believes that the underlying notion of power is the formula: "A in some way affects B" (Lukes, 1979: 26).

6.1. The One-Dimensional View of Power.

The first is known as the One-Dimensional view of power. In this dimension power is seen as being shared across a magnitude of governmental spheres and departments. Lukes believes that this one dimensional view of power is taken from the pluralist school of politics in the United States, which reaches all the levels of interaction in government and therefore this dimension of power is commonly known as the 'pluralist' view of power. This view of power is limited to behaviourism. Behavioural habits of people are seen as the central concept of the one-dimensional view of power (Lukes, 1979: 11).

There is a simple formula that commands this one-dimensional view of power: power is seen as a tool used by A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do in the same situation. A is seen as having power over B. This view of power is very important in the process of implementation. The decisions of those in power effects the decision or actions of those below their command. This is evident in all policy or program processes, where the people who possess power get those who are not in possession of this power to do their bidding. The underlying concept of this view of power is "who prevails in decision-making..." (Lukes, 1979: 12)

Lukes believes that in order for power to be exerted there has to be conflict present in the decision-making process of a key issue. Conflict over issues is seen as an indicator of the necessity for decision-making. Lukes concludes his discussion on the one-dimensional view of power by stating that: "power involves a focus on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interest..." (Lukes, 1979: 13).

6.2. The Two-Dimensional View of Power:

The Two-Dimensional view of power is seen as a critique of the first dimension of power, even though there is certain agreement with the ideas argued by the pluralists.

It is believed that power can be taken a step further, through the concept of non-decision making. Steven Lukes quotes Bachrach and Baratz who agree with the first dimension of power but believe that it can be taken further. However

they still believe that a person has power only in the way that he can influence decision-making. They believe that person B also has power and can use it to influence person A to do something he would not ordinarily do (Lukes, 1979: 16). The person more likely to have power is the one who has the power to move a decision in his favour.

However to Lukes this is not seen as being power but rather is seen as being a form of power that can be likened to coercion, force, manipulation, and influence. In South Africa, especially in the implementation of the housing policy, such coercion is easily recognised. Many political heads use their influence to help determine the outcome of many decisions. Lukes sees the importance of this view as entailing both decision-making and non-decision-making. Non decision-making is the ability of a person in power to provide an obstacle in the process of decision-making. This simply means as I see it as a situation where a person can suppress a policy issue so that no decision is made on that issue. When a decision maker does not want to be challenged on a certain policy issue he makes a decision to block any issue that would cause a problem or a challenge for him. (Lukes, 1979: 17). Also when leaders or decision makers have their agendas or issues, which they feel they want heard they often refuse to make a decision until their issue is heard or decided on.

6.3. The Three-Dimensional View of Power:

The Three-Dimensional view of power serves as a criticism of the previous two dimensions of power and sees the two-dimensional view of power as being too behavioural, even though the second dimensional view is a critique of the one-dimensional view of power. In the third dimension Lukes does not see power in the limits of decision-making only, but as power over the policy process

as a whole. This view of power shows that a decision-maker has such power or control over a situation that he/she is capable of removing any obstacle in his or her way. This means he or she is able to remove any opposing issue from the minds of the public and other challengers. The people who possess the power in this dimension are those who make the decisions (Lukes, 1979: 21-24). Decision-making is an indicator of power, argues Lukes. Power plays a very vital role in the decision-making process. Power relations are not a visible notion that can be seen and investigated. One can only see the power relation impact on situations and events.

7. Conclusion:

It is my belief that the change from the apartheid era to democracy has had an impact on the formulation of a policy in the field of housing. The history of a country, be it good or bad, plays an important role in the formulation of a policy and South Africa is no different. In addition it will be important to examine the way in which the spheres of government exercise their power and how they interact in the field of the housing policy. Who has the power and how they use this power to favour whom is important.

Exercising power has played an imperative role in a policy plan. It is my aim to examine the role of the key players in the implementation of housing policy. Are they so busy fighting for their own personal or political gains that they have left the policy to function unattended? Is it so easy for these players to exploit the situation, politicking to promote their own. On the other hand we could be optimistic and say that the implementation of the housing policy is running smoothly and no obstacles have caused delays or other more serious problems in reaching the country's housing targets. Can we really blame the

policy makers when a programme runs out of funds mid way through the project? Are the street-level bureaucrats using their discretion to make the policy more user friendly?

Background

Study

Introduction:

The information provided in this background study was gathered from a collection of sources. Firstly, I reviewed the Housing Act (No 107 of 1997) and other government documentation on housing to give an overall view of the structure of the government in South Africa and the functions and powers the three spheres of government have in regard to the delivery of housing to South African citizens. Secondly, a literature review of the various journal articles and books that are associated with this issue will be explored. Even though these journal articles deal with housing policy in relation to the national sphere of government in general and only a small portion describes the happenings in KwaZulu-Natal and especially Msunduzi, certain information was extracted from them for the purposes of this study. The books deal with other more international housing policies and the problems and successes they experienced, and all relevant information was extracted.

Lastly, I decided to conduct an examination of newspaper articles, which appeared in the local Natal Witness newspaper. This information was retrieved from the library of the Natal Witness. The articles ranged in content, from the decisions and actions taken by the various spheres of government to the criticism levelled at the housing organisations by various political parties. The newspaper supplements also conducted educational programs to educate people about housing policy and their human rights. These newspaper articles were used to understand the recent situation of housing policy in Msunduzi Municipality.

The Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) provides for a system of decentralised government that moves away from the traditional hierarchy of tiers of government and recognises three spheres of government that are "distinctive, interdependent and inter-related", National, Provincial, and Local

government (section 40 (1)). These national, provincial and local spheres are recognised for their uniqueness and enjoy equal status, functioning with concurrent and exclusive responsibilities and powers that are ultimately aimed at improving the quality of life of all the citizens of South Africa. Chapter Three of the Constitution provides for the concept of co-operative governance and requires the separate spheres to "operate in good faith and mutual trust" and to "co-ordinate their actions with one another"(section 41(1)(h)). The three spheres of government have different roles and functions to perform in order to ensure that the housing policy is successful.

In South Africa the government structure is divided into three separate but interlinked spheres, namely, national government, provincial government and local government. Each of these spheres plays an important role in the delivery of housing to the poor and disadvantaged of the country. In the Housing Act (No 107 of 1997) the roles of government are set out clearly, giving each sphere of government its specific functions and powers. In the next few paragraphs I will spell out the functions, which are relevant to this paper, of each sphere of government and the private sector plays in housing delivery.

National Government:

According to the Housing Act (No107 of 1997) part (2) the functions of national government is to

3. (1)   The national government acting through the Minister must, after consultation with every MEC and the national organisation representing municipality as contemplated in section 163(a) of the Constitution, establish and facilitate a sustainable national housing development process.

3. (2)   For the purpose of subsection (1) the minister must-

(b) Set broad national housing delivery goals and facilitate the setting of provincial and, where appropriate, local government housing delivery goals in support thereof;

(c) Monitor the performance of the national government and, in co-operation with every MEC, the performance of provincial and local governments against housing delivery goals and budgetary goals;

(d) Assist provinces to develop the administrative capacity required for the effective exercise of their powers and performance of their duties in respect of housing development;

(e) Support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and perform their duties in respect of housing development;

(f) Promote consultation on matters regarding housing development between the national government and representatives of-

(i)   Civil society;

(ii)   The sectors and sub sectors supplying or financing housing goods or services;

(iii)   Provincial and local governments; and

(iv)   Any other stakeholder in housing development

Provincial Government

Provincial government has a large-scale role to play in the delivery of housing in South Africa as a separate yet as powerful sphere of government. Provincial government has to ensure that the delivery of housing in South is effective and efficient.

According to the Housing Act (107 of 1997) it is envisaged both institutionally and constitutionally that the following housing functions be executed at a provincial level:

7 (1) Every provincial government must, after consultation with the provincial organisations representing municipalities as contemplated in section 163(a) of the Constitution, do everything in its power to promote and facilitate the provision of adequate housing in its province within the framework of national policy.

7(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) every provincial government must-

    (a) Determine provincial policy in respect of housing development;

    (b) Promote the adoption of provincial legislation to ensure effective housing delivery;

    (c) Take all reasonable and necessary steps to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to effectively exercise their powers and perform their duties in respect of housing development;

    (d) Co-ordinate housing development in the province;

    (f) When a municipality cannot or does not perform a duty imposed by this Act (107 of 1997), intervene by taking any appropriate steps in accordance with section 139 0f the Constitution to ensure the performance of such duty; and

    (g) Prepare and maintain a multi-year plan in respect of the execution in the province of every national housing programme and every provincial housing programme, which is consistent with national housing policy and section 3(2)(b).

The Housing Act (107 0f 1997) makes it clear that the provincial government is accountable to the people who democratically voted for them in the province. It also recognised that the Provincial MEC of Housing is accountable to

the Provincial and National Parliament for overall sectoral performance. A balance between the functions and powers at national and provincial level to reflect these accountabilities will be vital to success.

Local Government.

In the Housing Act (107 of 1997) the role and functions of the local government are described as the physical processes of planning and housing. The role of local government in enabling, promoting, and facilitating the provision of housing to all segments of the population in areas under their jurisdiction, can therefore not be over emphasised. The Hosing Act recognises the fact that in the absence of legitimate, functional and viable local authority structures it will jeopardise both the pace and quality of implementation of housing programmes (National Housing Act 107 of 1997).

According to the Housing Act the following functions are envisaged on the local government:

9. (1) every municipality must, as part of the municipality's process of integrated development planning, take all reasonable and necessary steps with the framework of national and provincial housing legislation and policy to-

(a)   Ensure that –

    i. The habitants of its areas of jurisdiction have access to adequate housing on a progressive basis;

    ii. Conditions not conducive to the health and safety of the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction are prevented or removed;

iii. Services in respect of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, storm water drainage and transport are provided in a manner which is economically efficient:

(b) Set housing delivery goals in respect of its area of jurisdiction;

(c) Identify and designate land for housing development;

(d) Create and maintain a public environment conducive to housing development which is financially and socially viable;

(e) Promote the resolution of conflicts arising in the housing development process;

(f) Initiate, plan, co-ordinate, facilitate, promote and enable appropriate housing development in its area of jurisdiction;

(g) Provide bulk engineering services and revenue and generating services in so far as such services are not provided by specialists utility suppliers; and

(h) Plan and manage land use and development.

The Private Sector:

The Housing Act (107 of 1997) does not provide the role of the private sector in housing delivery; I therefore referred to the National White Paper on new Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa, 1994 as a source for the role of the private sector. It is general knowledge that the government has to spread its resources amongst all the different departments that provide a public service to the citizens of the country. This is acknowledged in the national White Paper, which declares that, "state resources and capacity to deal with the massive housing backlogs and the process of reconstruction and development in the housing sector are severely limited (National White Paper on a New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa, 1994)."

According to the White Paper, "the concept of a broad partnership between the State and the non-State sectors in addressing the housing challenge in the country is central to Government's approach" (National White Paper on a New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa, 1994). As far as the investment of the private sector is concerned there are 4 main areas/issues in which the private sector will be influential. These are namely: in the supplying of materials and services to the Housing Sector, the construction sector, the finance sector, and the employers.

By May 2000, South Africa's housing backlog stood at three million houses. Between 1994 and December 2000, some 1 129 612 houses had been delivered or were under construction, while 1 323 205 subsidies were allocated. Of the 1 323 205 subsidies allocated since 1994, only 515 560 were allocated to female-headed households, bringing the number of subsidies allocated to women since 1994 to 36% (South African yearbook, 2001/2002: 367).

By March 2001, the Government had spent R14 844 billion to deliver a total 1 167 435 houses and 1 351 260 subsidies since 1994. National Government also spent R40 million in 15 areas in all the nine provinces in human settlement programmes (South Africa yearbook, 2001/2002: 368).

South Africa's national policy on housing began in the apartheid era in the late 1980s. The apartheid government started the housing reform in an effort to generate a more politically established black middle class group. The foundation of the policy rested on a promotion of state houses to accommodate the influx of blacks into the historically white cities owing to urbanisation. The policy

suggested a self-help strategy that benefited only a minority of middle-income blacks (Natal Witness, 12-11-2000).

The African National Congress (ANC), in preparation for the 1994 general elections (and the first democratic elections) started drafting a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which promised the delivery of 1 million houses by the end of 1999. This can be seen as a policy window as described by John Kingdon. Kingdon believes that a policy window is a situation that allows a policy proposal to enter the government policy agenda (Kingdon, 1989: 166). In this situation the problem of a lack of housing for the poor citizens of South Africa and the change in administration allowed for the decision makers to look for a solution to the problem.

The policy proposal of the housing programme is a combination of all three streams, namely, problems, policies and politics. The problem was the lack of housing, the solution was to create a policy that will allow the government to provide low-cost housing for the poor, the politics was that the ANC was the favourite political party in South Africa at the time and it was predicted that they would win the 1994 elections and in order to guarantee a victory the ANC proposed a policy that no poor South African without secure housing would not vote for.

After the elections and the victory of the ANC, the first democratic Minister of Housing, Joe Slovo, encouraged the apartheid government policies by guiding the housing policy toward a "site and service" model. This was at odds with the recommendations of the Reconstruction and Development Programme report, which promised mass provision of formal houses to the poor. Instead, the policy made provisions for the allocations of sites provided for by the statutory housing subsidies, while the responsibility of construction falls on low-income

households, banks, and housing developers (RDP Development Monitor, 2001 Vol. 7: 32).

In 1995 Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, Joe Slovo's successor, moved away from the previous policy, as the policy was too closely related to the housing policy of the apartheid government's housing policy (Natal Witness; 12-11-2000). Two months later, however, Mthembi-Mahanyele changed course and ended the RDP "housing- for- all" policy and adopted for "incremental housing" (RDP Development Monitor, 2001: Vol. 7: 32), a dextrous phrase assumed by the new government in 1994 to lower mass expectations for rapid delivery of housing. The Minister, from a report written by the National Business Initiative and Urban Foundation Policy Work on informal settlements, adopted this attitude. Due to the budgetary problems the government was experiencing in the rapid production of houses they eventually decided to opt a market-centred approach to housing delivery (RDP Development Monitor, 2001Vol. 7: 33).

A year later in 1996, former deputy president at the time, Thabo Mbeki announced the government's new macro-economic policy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (Gear). Gear's economic austerity measures placed constraints on the allocation of the national budget for housing and other social services. In an attempt to rectify post-apartheid housing policy, the housing department and banks signed a "housing pact", which stated that the government would use the limited housing subsidies to insure banks against mortgage defaulters. In return, the banks would provide 50 000 new housing bonds a year, for people who previously did not have access to the housing market.

Less than a year later, however, in 1997 the banks did not live up to their part of the pact. According to a report in the Natal Witness it was believed that

the delivery of formal houses on sites allocated for development did not reach more than twenty percent (Natal Witness, 12-11-2000). Despite the fact that government announced that large allocations of funds would be given to service sites, the banks continued to only grant loans to sixteen percent of the households that applied for subsidies. The reason for this shortcoming on their part, argued by the banks, was simply that mortgage boycotts and non-payment of the loans were producing negative investment rates (Natal Witness 12-11-2000). South Africa National Civics Organisation, the civic movement, insisted that housing be considered a human right and demanded that the government return to the policy recommended in the mandate of the RDP (RDP Development Monitor, 2001 Vol. 7: 32).

According to a report in the Natal Witness, Housing Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, acknowledged to Parliament that the housing department would not be able to reach the target of one million houses by 1999 (Natal Witness 12-11-2000). Blame for this problem was placed in the hands of provincial government, who were said to have failed to spend the allocated budget. However, the Minister failed to take responsibility for the failure of the incremental housing policy adopted by her department in 1995. The RDP target would have cost twenty percent of the national budget as compared to the mere 2.5 percent allocated for housing (RDP Development Monitor Vol. 7: 2001).

In 1999 a total backlog of three million units convinced government to rethink their strategy. Government amended its position by opting for the 1996 ministerial task team's recommendation to allow for state rental houses as a means of overcoming the problem of the housing backlog and the problem of non-payment of mortgage loans. Sanco and various NGOs backed this position. The rethinking on the part of the government served as proof that the market failed the ordinary poor people on the street. As the writer of this article stated: "All in all, the government's white paper on housing and a report released in 1998

on short-term housing represented a sustained commitment by the government to the market as a mechanism of the delivery of the low- cost houses".

In 2000 the quality and affordability of the houses delivered became of central importance. The Housing Department's new strategy toward the housing policy is about ensuring homes for the poor on a sustainable basis, and at a price they can afford. Such houses must be of a good quality, located in neighborhoods offering security, services, and access to facilities and jobs. The housing policy focuses on creating a wholesome living environment conducive to attracting private investment, from both individuals and collectives, into the housing sector. It is believed that investor confidence holds the key to a vibrant housing economy (RDP Development Monitor, 2001 Vol. 7: 36).

According to the RDP Monitor, even with all its faults and failures the housing policy increasingly appears as one of the success stories in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. As the number of units constructed passes the one million mark despite the fact there still remains a long list of backlogs. Regardless of the substantial backlogs, attention is now going to move more towards the quality of housing and community life, with greater emphasis on housing as a development tool. Wider options are being explored and there are now many ways of linking housing provision to individual saving and investment. Nevertheless, the overall picture of South Africa's general housing programme is of a world leader, and marks a substantial transfer of assets into individual hands (RDP Development Monitor, 2001 Vol. 7: 32).

The South African housing policy is formulated in such a way that the government assistance is given in the form of a capital subsidy grant to households. However this process of providing grants only is contributing to the housing backlog. In order to alleviate this problem government is now

considering providing free land to the households in addition to the subsidy grants, (Green Paper on Land government: 1996). According to the Green Paper it is suggested to government that the land owned by government be divided into one hectare each for the rural households and 200 square meters each for the urban households and this land be distributed to the homeless in South Africa.

It is believed, according to investigations done for the green paper that the South African government owns 32 plus million hectares of land through out South Africa that is not being used, if the land in divided in the manner suggested above than the government is still left with 31 million hectares of land. Under this policy which is known as the one-family-one-plot policy it is believed that there will be no need to wait for social and physical infrastructure for housing to be financed or built, for costly and time-consuming surveying and deeds registry formalities. Under the proposal presented in the green paper land would be transferred into full ownership of the homeless (Green paper on land government 1996.

This information was gathered from the library at the University of Natal, Msunduzi. As mentioned above, this information was used to get a better understanding of housing policy from people who are able to understand the ins and outs of the policy and the workings of the government from a more bird's eye view.

In an article in the RDP Development Monitor (2001; Vol. 6: pp5), the housing ministry was reported to be concerned over the capacity of the local government to deliver the target of one million low-cost houses. The biggest problem that local government faces is the lack of professional skills and capacity. As a solution to this problem, local government embarked on difficult transition process from the old to the new, in 2001.

This process required structures to be put together, both financially and in terms of training and support, to ease the change. Even though these structures were to be put into place concern was still evident as to whether or not the "new, rationalised system will work effectively and efficiently enough and quickly enough" to make a difference in the delivery of low-cost houses. These changes came about as an attempt by government to overcome the poor image of local government and the bureaucracy. Minister of Housing Ms Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, in an interview with the RDP Development Monitor (2001; Vol. 6: pp3), agreed that there should be a greater "focus an the role of local government, and that city councils in particular must play a greater role in social housing, treating housing as an asset in which owners have equity".

In an article in the journal Construction World (October 2000), it was reported that many people who have received housing subsidies from the government are now selling these homes at low rates to move back to the informal settlements. Why, one may ask? Many factors could contribute to these strange behaviours: one of the more important reasons, however, is that many of the housing projects are being developed at the fringes of the city itself, far away from resources and facilities essential to the people awarded these homes.

The president of the Institute for Housing of South Africa, Themba Mthethwa, recently admitted that no study had been conducted on the needs of the people who lived in the informal settlements and qualified for the government housing subsidies, *before* these people could be granted subsidies for the houses in the low-cost housing projects. Speaking in an interview with SA Construction World (October 2000), Mthethwa said had this study been conducted maybe people would not be selling their homes to return to the informal settlements. Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, the National Minister of Housing, announced in the

national media that drastic steps would be taken against people who sold their subsidy houses.

After this journal article, and in response to the selling of the houses Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele announced amendments to the Housing Act 107 of 1997 to prohibit the resale of RDP houses, often for a fraction of their cost, by owners were made. As stated above, no study was conducted on the part of the policy designers to find out what was need and what was necessary for the people who were receiving the subsidies for low-cost housing. This, as Wayne Parsons (1995: 468) would argue is one of the major mistakes made by policy designers when formulating a policy. Wayne Parsons suggests that a process of backward mapping must be done to best implement a policy.

In an article in RDP Development Monitor (Vol. 6 pp4 of 2001), it was reported that although housing delivery is one of the key performance areas of the RDP, it is not without fault. There are still problems of affordability, finance, and sustainability. It was stated that one of the greatest areas of criticism of the government's housing policy is that it replicates the segregated past, placing rows and rows of identical basic units on the outskirts of the cities in a social and economic wasteland.

The article also commented on the fact that much greater attention is needed to stimulate local economic opportunities in the housing schemes for the poor, and in designing a key role for local authorities to play within these opportunities. This will serve to provide the bureaucracy, which is the local housing department and the city council, a less offensive and a more helpful and respected reputation, which the public will admire. The top-down approach, which decides on the location of projects, often does so in ignorance of local

needs and constraints, including the ability of households to afford the infrastructure services, and the financial services thrust upon them.

The location of low-cost housing needs much more room for personal initiative and local economic sustainability and development needs. Chasing numbers in housing provision is creating a new trap, which neglects development and removes the poor from economic and social opportunities. It may also seem as though, by placing the poor in these far away communities, we are trying to escape facing the actual problems that are related to poverty entirely.

In the RDP Development Monitor (1999; Vol. 5: 12), it was reported that many of the owners of the government provided low-cost houses are unhappy with their homes. They have problems with the size of the homes and the finishes. This issue is emotionally charged, with suspicion on the part of the homeowners because the RDP houses are seen as being inferior. One of the many reasons for this problem raising its ugly head is that the subsidies of R15 000 per household is too little to provide homes that are of a good quality. The local government cannot deliver its part of low-cost housing without swallowing up most of the R15 000 subsidy, leaving very little over for the actual building of the houses.

In relation to this issue, I will make reference to an article that appeared in the local newspaper, the Natal Witness, dated 23 October 1996. Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele said that she understands that R15 000 maximum housing subsidies have not have not been increased since 1994, and this is having an effect on the size of houses delivered by her department. Therefore, the housing subsidies will be increased by R1000 per household. This increase, however, will only take affect in April 1999. This increase was looked at with much appreciation, and it was said that the increase would improve the delivery of the

low- cost housing. Funding has been the thorn in the flesh of policy implementers since the beginning of the implementation process of the housing policy.

Another reason for this dissatisfaction with the low-cost housing is the problem that quantity is being preferred to quality. There are growing concerns among the role players in the housing society that the obsession with quantity on the part of government is creating unviable, unsustainable urban housing projects of numbing uniformity, without access to jobs or social infrastructure. Policy implementers, such as developers, are so concerned with meeting the challenges of the housing problem that they are starting to sacrifice the quality of the houses to satisfy the promise that was made as an election strategy (Natal Witness: 25-02-1999).

Early in this study, reference was made to the People's Housing Process that appeared in an article in the Natal Witness. This scheme was established to help empower the poor and upgrade informal settlements; further reference was made to this scheme in an RDP Development Monitor article, in November 1999 (Vol. 5: 12). The article stated that the People's Housing Process initiative backed by government as an institution to upgrade informal settlements, directs capital subsidies for people or collectives of people to build their own homes- including technical, financial and administration support. Its brief is to develop a national capacity building programme to help people build their own homes, drawing on a network of housing support centres providing low-cost materials and support.

The article mentioned that all residential builders would have to register with the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) by November 1999, which is in terms of the Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act, to support warrantees to repair housing defects. This is seen as yet another measure

of the ideological u-turn within the ANC government itself (which will be pointed out in more detail later on), and the much greater reliance than before on drawing in the private sector wherever possible, and giving people a personal stake in their housing- and in meeting their debt requirements.

The following information was taken from the RDP Development Monitor Vol. 6 No. 7 July 2000, pp4. It gives us a brief understanding of the statistics of that are involved in the housing policy:

During the year 28 February 1999-31 March 2000 170 000 housing units were completed in the affordable and low-cost housing markets.
The three most frequently occurring blockages to housing delivery in the low-cost and affordable housing markets during the first quarter of 2000. These were environment-related blockages (i.e. adverse weather conditions; heavy rainfall in particular). Provincial Housing Board-related blockages (i.e. insufficient subsidies, delays in the approval and payouts of subsidies; the drying up of Provincial Housing Board funds). Bank-related blockages (i.e. bank's assessment of area risks and affordability; bank's resistance to financing low-.cost housing; and the time taken by banks to payout loans.
The following Acts, impacting on finance, construction, housing, and infrastructure, were passed by Parliament during the first quarter of 2000. The National Land Affairs General Amendment (and KwaZulu-Natal Land Affairs Amendment) Act, 11 of 2000. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 5 of 2000.

The housing problems created by apartheid are many and varied. They include the racial fragmentation of our cities, and the high correlation between housing, poverty and race. A high proportion of the population has poor access to basic services such as water, sanitation, refuse removal and electricity, and there

is a serve shortage of decent, safe and affordable housing. Much of the housing available to the poor is located in monotonous and drabby townships and informal settlements, far from places of work, and poorly provided with community facilities, such as shops, affordable public transport and recreational facilities. The allocation of land in urban and rural areas should not discriminate against people on the basis of race or gender, foster nepotism and/ or corruption and should not involve lengthy time delays (Natal Witness: 30-07-1998).

When South Africa's democratic government came into power, it promised a better life to those people who were disadvantaged under the rule of the previous apartheid government. This study is an investigation into the achievement of government thus far, and it will also look at how local government has carried out the issues present in the policy. It was prompted by the South African government's promises of a housing policy that is more than the delivery of a product, one which is a process, which contributes to the cultural, economic and social development of the entire society and is therefore part of the strategy to improve people's total living conditions.

We start off by looking at the problems that housing policy has experienced since the start of the implementation process in 1994. Articles on the implementation of housing policy at the local sphere of government, in the local newspaper, only date back to 1998. These articles describe problems that range from concern with the implementation process of the policy, to delays caused by illegal occupation of the houses.

In an article in the Natal Witness, dated 30 July 1998, a report stated that the ambitious housing policy was already experiencing problems, only two years into its implementation stage. The African National Congress (ANC) government promised the production of one million houses to the country's poor and homeless

population. However, during the first two years of implementation there was doubt that the one million houses would be built in the allocated five years. The promise of one million low-cost houses in five years, in my opinion, seemed to be a bridge too far to be crossed.

The article quotes Mary Tomlinson, a housing analyst and researcher, as saying that the housing policy "sounded good on paper but we soon found out that things were different on the ground". This brings into mind the point brought forward by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 143), where they argue that the policy design process and policy implementation process should not be two different stages in the policymaking process. They believe that the problems of implementation can be overcome in the initial formulation of the policy. Wayne Parsons also argues that it is the implementer who is able to decide what is needed in terms of resources, both human and material, and whether or not they will be able to work with the budget allocated to them for the implementation of the policy.

Mary Tomlinson also stated that policy formulation is an ongoing process; this issue is associated with the coordination of policy. Here, Mary Tomlinson's concern is to do with the flexibility of the policy. As stated earlier in this research paper, the lack of coordination in policy can later cause problems in the implementation process, and one of the criteria needed for coordination in a policy is flexibility. The greater the flexibility of a policy, the greater the chances are that it will survive. In the article, Tomlinson suggests that the housing policy can and should be modified to achieve the promises made in respect of the houses.

In the same article, the report states that the "promise of the houses was one of the major issues that saw millions vote for the ANC in 1994 and on which

its success will be measured come the 1999 elections". It would seem that this issue is one of the main reasons for the success of the housing policy on the government's agenda in the first place. This issue seems to be associated with agenda setting, and the influence the public has on the government's agenda setting process.

Even with very little money of their own, and no borrowing power, the new government very boldly made a promise that would have been received with great enthusiasm and gusto by the public. According to John Kingdon, a policy reaches and stays on the government policy agenda for almost all the reasons displayed by the housing policy's success on the agenda of the government. These were politics, national mood, organized interest and political forces. It is clear that the success of the new government rested on the delivery of housing policy and more importantly, the delivery of the mass production of houses.

In an attempt to empower the low-income population, the government designed a policy that provided for a project known as People's Housing Process. In an article in the Echo, a supplement of the Natal Witness, dated 25 February 1999, Dorelle Sapere of the People's Housing Partnership Trust was said to have given a brief talk at a local government workshop in Msunduzi, The Urbanisation and Housing Indaba about the government's formulation of a policy the previous year (1998). To give people assistance to build their own houses, which would be of good quality because training, would be provided for the community. She insisted that the new policy would reduce the amount of money used from the subsidies to pay professional contractors, and that the people would be left with a bigger amount for the actual structure of the houses.

She insisted that unlike the commonly known self-help projects, this new process was different, because in the self-help projects the contractor acted as a

project manager and the community merely provided the labour. In the new process the community would manage the project themselves and come up with their own delivery strategy. Sapere said that the subsidies for this project would be the same as the normal subsidies, which is R15 000 per household. However, an extra R570 would be allocated for training, building of storage space and buying of equipment.

Many of the people involved in the housing indaba however disagreed with Sapere's enthusiasm about the project. The article quotes Councillor Radley Keys as saying "the policy will sacrifice the provision of infrastructure such as roads and water to allow more funds for the top structure" (Natal Witness: 05-09-1998). Also in disagreement with Sapere was Indaba chairman Mervin Dirks, who held that even then, with the normal low-cost housing policy, there were limited funds for things such as roads and water. He said that the new policy had the potential to cause problems for the council in the long run, as members of these communities were going to come to council demanding better infrastructure and it doesn't seem likely that the council will have the funds to comply with their demands.

This point was emphasized in an article that appeared two years later in the Natal Witness, dated 7 February 2001. The article described the suspension of a housing project due to a lack of funds for infrastructure and other services of a specified standard. The project required funding of R15 million, and another R2 715 440 for the construction of roads, streetlights and a water-borne sewerage system. Even though members of Technical and Engineering Services committee and the city council believed that it was of the utmost importance to provide these people with homes, it was unclear if they would receive the necessary funding for the infrastructure.

Local ward Cinderellaville Councilor Wally Adams told the writer of the article that these people had been waiting for their homes for many years and they were now living in trying conditions. Councillor Adams also expressed concern over the fact that the president of the day, President Thabo Mbeki, announced that all city councils should have indigent policies that provide for these situations. He believed that if this money were not used, it would simply be returned to the National Housing Department, which is the main funder. Other councillors also expressed their concern over the loss of costs already incurred in this project (Natal Witness: 07-02-2001)

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It would seem as though this problem can be linked to policy design issues. The implementers of the policy were not consulted as to whether or not they would be able to provide the services required of them with the little funds and resources available to them. As Parsons suggests, the policy implementers should be involved in the policy design stage to avoid these delays in the long run.

Politics plays an important part in the problems experienced in policy formulation and implementation. It is clear from an article entitled "IFP Urges Government to Focus on Rural Housing" in the Natal Witness dated 20 June 2001, that political parties can play a very pressuring role when it comes to the implementation of housing policy. In the article, members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) are quoted as condemning the manner in which housing policy was being implemented. They believed that more attention should be paid to rural housing, and that the housing department in Msunduzi Municipality should not only focus on housing the people in urban areas.

Local IFP spokesperson Bonginkosi Dlamini accused government of only focussing on urban areas, which would, in the long run, be detrimental. He

warned that rural housing programmes are a major issue among rural traditional leaders, and in order for those rural housing projects to be successful, the co-operation of these traditional leaders was needed. In the article, it was implied that if no progress were made toward focussing on the rural housing projects, then the co-operation of the traditional leaders would not be granted easily. This problem seems to be associated with power relations. According to Lukes (Lukes, 1979: 17) this would be known as exercising the second dimension of power. One party is using their power to coerce another party into doing something.

Also of interest in the role of politics in the policy cycle is an article in the Natal Witness, dated 13 May 2001. In this article, the Democratic Alliance (DA) accused the Msunduzi Housing Association (MHA) and the Local Housing Department of intentionally excluding the Democratic Alliance from the housing board. The Democratic Alliance insinuated that the Msunduzi Housing Association was only serving a particular party-political segment of the population. This argument came about after the CEO of the Msunduzi Housing Association requested a sum of nine million rands from the Msunduzi Municipality.

In a letter, entitled "Housing Association" (unfortunately there was no available date), to the Editor of the Natal Witness, from Councillor Judy Lawrence of the Democratic Alliance concern was voiced over the request for funding because the Msunduzi Housing Association presented the facts (to the Economic Development and Planning Committee and later to the full council) that the funding was supposed to be used to renovate existing unsold houses in the Sanctuary Road and Gardens area, so that these houses could be rented out to the public. The Democratic Alliance noted that since there are only seventy-five houses, R120 000 would be used for each house. These houses could not be sold

for that amount on the open market, and therefore it is natural for the Democratic Alliance to be concerned about the operations of the Msunduzi Housing Alliance.

In the same letter the Democratic Alliance, which is responsible for nine wards within the Msunduzi municipality, implied that since the Msunduzi Housing Association is a Section 21 company and is not for gain; it is easy for the Association to "hide the profits in huge payouts to the directors instead of running the business as cost effectively as possible". Councillor Judy Lawrence of the Democratic Alliance argued that the money requested belongs to the ratepayers, and is entrusted to the municipality to be used in an efficient way and to the best advantage of all the people of the city.

In a response letter to these comments, Mayash Chetty, Chief Executive Officer of Msunduzi Housing Association, stated that the Association wishes not to enter the political debate, but would rather clarify that the Msunduzi Housing Association does not represent any political party. He held that the "prospective tenants of the Association belong to all walks of life and that no individual is accepted or rejected on the basis of race, religion, gender, creed, or political party".

Mayash Chetty also stated that the Democratic Alliance should "confine its political battles to the political arena and not allow its unhappiness to taint the delivery of housing in this city". This is a common example of how politics is used to derail the purposes of the policy. Political parties and organisations are too concerned with waging war on each other, rather than working together to achieve a common goal. The housing policy was designed to serve the purpose of the poor levels of the population. However, the role players used it to score points against each other.

At a local level, even though housing policy and housing delivery is experiencing a number of problems, an article in the Natal Witness, dated 3 September 1998, shed a brighter light on the subject. The article, quoting a report provided annually by the National Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency (Nurcha), said that the tempo of housing delivery had picked up substantially right across the country. Nurcha is a non-profit company that makes possible low-income housing development by assuring loans from commercial banks. The report stated that housing delivery, for the first time, was keeping pace with the growing rate of family formulation. The delivery of housing had, until recently, not been able to match these demands.

The article also stated, however, that the problems of "housing delivery were not over," and lists three emerging trends that could put the brakes on future progress. These trends include government belt-tightening, the emerging of contractor learning curve, and credit availability. Firstly, it is believed that government belt-tightening could lead to smaller allocation of subsidies, as the funding of the housing policy will sooner rather than later start lessening. The article noted that the national government budget of R4, 7 billion in the year 1997\98, fell by R1 billion to R3, 6 billion in the year 1998\99.

Secondly, the article stated problems arising from the use of "emerging" contractors are seen as a factor that could lead to a short-term blockage in housing delivery. These emerging contractors are still learning the trade, and are building up experience from the low- cost housing projects. While these contractors are building their skills, housing projects are suffering and the backlog of homeless people starts to increase steadily.

Thirdly, the article stated the problem is associated with credit availability. Each year inflation increases, and since the introduction of housing subsidies the inflation rate has levelled at around 10%. However, housing subsidies are not likely to increase in the near future. In the long run, the R15 000 subsidies that the people receive will be able to buy lesser and even lesser. This means that there will be an increase in the people's reliance on credit, saving schemes, and community self-help, and it seems as though these funds are starting to become less. In an attempt to rectify this problem, Nurcha has started to run an innovative way to structure small personal loans to be used for housing purposes.

Final

Report

Introduction:

Msunduzi is a small city of wide diversity and beauty. However it is also the centre of an unstable situation. Msunduzi after great opposition has finally been named the capital of KwaZulu-Natal by the provincial legislature with Cabinet sittings still taking place in Ulundi. In Msunduzi, like all around South Africa, housing is a major problem and the area is populated with homeless poor people in need of suitable housing. The climate in Msunduzi varies from winters to hot summers with temperatures ranging from approximately 15 degrees C to 35 degrees C (KZN Tourism website: www. Kzntourism. co.za). This means that the housing in this area has to be constructed to suit the climate. However the low-cost houses built to accommodate the poor are small houses, and seem to generate heat in summer and trap the cold in winter.

Currently there is a demand for 17 000 low-cost housing units. There are 49 new projects in the identified in Msunduzi. However, only 38 of these projects have approved funding from provincial government with no alternative or additional funding available. The 49 housing projects will deliver 35 000 units when completed, which exceeds the demand for the houses. The houses are mostly one-room houses with a shower and toilet, one door and two windows and are not bigger than 12 square metres. Many of these houses have no sinks. Most of the projects pending approval form provincial government are located on the outskirts of the city itself.

In Msunduzi the housing environment is currently undergoing the same problems faced in the rest of the country. Almost half the black population in Msunduzi, which is 23% of the population of KwaZulu-Natal, is homeless or on the waiting list for housing. Those who have received housing in the past nine years are experiencing problems due to the fact that the buildings are of inferior quality (Natal Witness 7-02-2001). My aim in the final report is to state my

findings of the research carried out through the months in respect to the theoretical perspective.

Methodology:

A major part of the information gathered for the research paper was from interviews conducted over a period of time through September and December 2001. This allowed me to get an understanding of the policy from the perspective of the personnel in the various local departments and organizations involved in the implementation of housing policy. The decision to conduct interviews was due to the fact that open-ended questions allowed me to observe the respondents in their surrounding. This gave me an advantage, as the respondents were more responsive when answering the questions put forward in their own environment. It also allowed the respondents to view the interviews in an approachable manner.

I was also able to watch for nonverbal communication and visual aids such as facial expression and attitude change throughout the interview. In the interview certain standard questions were asked during the course of each interview, to give the interview a fixed structure. However, for majority of the interview I allowed the respondent to give me their personal feel of the policy. This open-end interview was particularly helpful as the respondent were able to go into detail about things I did not consider and probably would have missed completely had I opted for a questionnaire. These questions will be supplied at the end of the pilot study.

Interview Questions

The first section will apply to the organisations other than the City Housing Department. The second section will apply to all interviewees.

Section A:

1.1) Does your organisation have any sort communication with the City Housing Department?

1.2) Does your organisation receive funding from the City Housing Department or any other part of the City Council?

1.3) Are there any delays when it comes to the granting of the funds from the City Council?

1.4) If your department does receive funding from the City Council, has that funding ever been refused?

1.5) Other than the funding received from the City Council do you receive any other funding?

1.6) Do you have representative from the Council on your board?

Section B:

2.1) Does the Provincial Government exercise any power over the implementation process in Msunduzi?

2.2) How would you describe the implementation process in the housing field in Pitermaritzburg?

2.3) Can you see any changes in the running of government since 1994?

2.4) Do you believe these changes are for the best?

2.5) Do find the amount prescribe for the housing subsidies fair?

If not, how much in your opinion should it be increased by, to better help with the delivery of the low- cost housing?

Problems:

During all the interviews, I experienced a few minor problems. Even though these problems did not obstruct the research too drastically, I did however feel that it needed to be mentioned. The first and most important problem happened to be the simple fact that most of the people in the housing sector, mainly official from the implementing agencies, Local Government and Provincial Government, were just not interested in being interviewed.

The housing sector, even without considering the local housing department, forms a large part of the organisations in Msunduzi Municipality. However, as stated above, I barely managed to secure interviews with only seven individuals. This problem was caused mainly because people excused themselves as being too busy. Others were happy enough to pass me on to the next person or told me that they will call back when they had the time and possibly just forgot to do so.

Many reasons can be assumed for these excuses: they could have been telling the truth and had no time, or they were afraid to speak to me because they feared that their jobs were going to be jeopardised. It is also possible that the thought of sitting through an interview with a boring university student just did not appeal to them. Then there were those that were more inclined to pass me off to someone else. They probably just imaged that the person they recommended was more equipped and knowledgeable to help me, and felt that being helpful in that way would be more appreciated than an interview that did not help at all. Nevertheless, we will never know the true reason, as I was not able to question them on the matter.

The second issue did affect my research to an extent. I found that the interviews I did secure duplicated each other. The impression I received during the interview was that all the personnel in the housing sector were coached. However, when I asked one of the respondents about this phenomena, he assured me that this was not the case at all, but that the questions asked just prompted similar answers from all the people in the housing sector, and that there was nothing that they were hiding from the public.

The third issue was that a few of the people I did manage to interview refused to let me use their names or the name of the organisations they belong to on paper. Often, when I asked a question, they would simply say that they could not comment on the issue. They felt that the things they said, even though it did not differ very much from the other respondents' answers, would lead them to either lose their jobs or just get them into trouble with the people in "power". Many of these people are just clerks or project workers who depend on these jobs to support their families. So I decided not to mention those interviews at all, because very little was gained from them, and I did not want to create unnecessary problems for those people.

Interview Transcripts:

With the knowledge given in the background study in mind, I will now proceed with the transcripts of the interviews. As mentioned earlier, a major part of the information gathered was through interviews conducted with a handful of members of the housing sector in the Msunduzi Municipality area. My interviews were conducted with a member of the Msunduzi Housing Association, members of the National Home Builders Registration Council, and a few members of the local Department of Housing and officials from the Provincial Department of Housing.

The first organisation, which I researched, was the Msunduzi Housing Association. I was fortunate to secure an interview with the Chief Executive Officer of the Msunduzi Housing Association, who proved to both helpful and extremely knowledgeable of the low-cost housing schemes in the Msunduzi area. The Msunduzi Housing Association was set up in 1999 by the city council. A variety of circumstances compounded to bring about the establishment of the Msunduzi Housing Association. According to Mayash Chetty, "the National housing department made various subsidies available for the delivery of the houses. The most commonly known one, being a one-off payment of R15 000 per household for the low-cost housing schemes. Mayash Chetty also stated that around the lines of 40 000 of these subsidies had been used in the Msunduzi by the end of June 2001.

In the second subsidy strategy the government made available a larger subsidy, of between R16 000 to R18 400 plus, 15%, to institutions, such as Section 21 companies, which are non-profit making companies, communal associations, and co-operatives. City councils are not able to apply for these subsidies. However, the Msunduzi city council wanted to access these subsidies to build houses that could be rented out to people who cannot afford to buy their houses or who want to rent while they are saving up the funds to buy a house. These people include those who do not qualify for the normal R15 000 per household subsidies because they earn above the maximum rate, which is R2 000-R3 500 per month bracket, but still cannot afford their own houses.

Council decided to set up a task team to explore the aspects of the housing system that would best suit the situation. This task team was headed by the then city Mayor Siphwe Gwala, and received technical assistance from the National Social Housing Foundation. After investigating, the task team filed a report, which advised the city council that, the establishment of a Section 21 company would be the best route to take, thus, the start of the Msunduzi Housing Association. The Msunduzi Housing Association is one of a number

of vehicles responsible for housing in Msunduzi. It focuses on those people who earn in the 2 000-3 500 rands per month bracket.

The Msunduzi Housing Association is a quasi-governmental organisation, which serves as an extension of the local department of housing, but exists separately from the department. The Association is to serve as a helping hand to the City Housing Department, to help it cope with the backlog of homeless people in the city. It also should be noted that the Msunduzi Housing Association is a purely rental stock housing organisation. They employ new housing projects and build houses that are later rented out, or they renovate existing houses that are titled to the city council and rent those out.

The Association has only three full time employees, which includes Mayash Chetty who was appointed CEO, because he has a masters degree in urban and regional planning from the University of Natal (Durban), Councillor Francis Grantham, who was appointed as the operations manager, and Judy Vather, who is the finance administration officer. There is also support staff from the city's estates department, who act as seconds to the organisation. When asked why he keeps the organisation so small, Mayash commented that by keeping a small staff component, the Msunduzi Housing Association aims to concentrate funding on housing delivery.

The next organisation that I interviewed was the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC). The NHBRC is a housing consumer protection body, created in terms of the Housing Consumer's Protection Measures Act 42 of 1998. The mission of the NHBRC is to protect housing consumers by working in partnership with homebuilders to maintain and to improve the construction quality of new homes, ensuring that they will meet the housing needs in South Africa. The NHBRC is, as yet, not involved with low-cost housing schemes but due to the complaints of homeowners and the

apparent poor quality of the low-cost houses, it started to play a watchdog role by 1 April 2002.

The NHBRC is a quality control and regulation-enforcing organisation. The National Home Builders Registration Council is intended, via the registration of builders, to meet some of the concerns lodged by the residents of the low cost housing communities. The Housing Consumer's Protection Measures Act was extended to all new government subsidised housing schemes, and it requires all developers to provide a five year guarantee against structural defects, and sets minimum technical standards and guidelines. The role, therefore, of the NHBRC is to oversee these processes. Even in the new People's Housing Process, where residents build their own homes, all resident will have to register with the NHBRC to support warranties to repair housing defects.

I was also extremely lucky to secure an interview with the Director of the Local Housing Department Mr. Tony Erasmus, and a member of his staff, a project manager from the local housing department who wants to be referred to only as Lawrence. The local housing department is the government's link with the public. It consists of the public implementers who carry out the policy implementation process. Pressman and Wildvsky would describe them as the bureaucracy. The local bureaucracy provides the face of the government to the public. These people have the discretion to adapt the policy to best suit the environment that they work in.

In response to comments made by the local interviewee I was able to secure three interviews with officials from the provincial Department of Housing, these were with Mr. Enoch a administrative officer, Ms Soodeyal Assistant Director in Project Management and Mr. Chetty, Assistant Director in Planning.

Findings:

While conducting the interviews, it was easy to spot that particular questions were receiving similar answers. These questions surrounded issues such funding and budgets, problems with policy implementation and interference, the uniformity of the houses, and the creation of housing schemes that are made available for people suffering with AIDS/ HIV.

The first of these issues is related to the **amount allocated to the subsidies per household**. All of the respondent to my interviews are policy implementers and are responsible for the delivery of safe and good quality houses in some way or another. There was common agreement that the subsidies were too small for local government to implement the policy.

The national government and the Housing Code, which is a comprehensive document that sets out clearly the overall vision for housing all the country's poor, call for environmentally sound low-cost housing. However, there is no mention as to what these environmentally sound houses are, and there is no mention of an increase in the subsidies to build these new environmentally sound houses.

Most of the respondents in my interviews seemed to agree on this point, Mayash Chetty, believed that subsidies are too low, and that there is a need for a larger increase. He believes that without the increase, the target to house all the poor in South Africa will not be reached. Mayash Chetty also believes that the subsidies should be increased to R25 000 per household, and the income band should be increased as well. This means that, instead of allowing people who earn within the income bracket of R2 000-R3 500 to qualify for the government

subsidies, it should now be between R2 000 and R6 000 per month. This, as he suggests, will better influence the payments to banks and other financial institutions who loan people the amount used to fill in over and above the housing subsidies.

My second respondent, from the Local Government Department of Housing in the Msunduzi Municipality Mr Tony Erasmus, agreed that the houses are too small to accommodate the large families that apply for the subsidies. He believes that if the subsidies are larger, then the city council will be able to provide the necessary infrastructure and would not eat up most of the subsidies as is happening now. He was not specific as to how much the subsidies should be increased, but just believes that it should. He argued that with inflation going up and bank interest rates increasing, it would be difficult for the people to pay for the 'fill in' amount I should at this point explain what the 'fill in' amount is.

The government provides a subsidy the individual who applies and succeeds a one of payment of R15 000. If that individual earns within the income bracket of R2 000 and R3 500, then they are liable if they wish to apply for a loan from a bank or other financial institution, or use their own money to instruct the local city council that they want a bigger house and fill in the amount that is over the subsidy. Mr Erasmus believes that the increase in the subsidies will help these people get bigger houses and not have to pay off loans with increasing interest rates.

The same conclusion was drawn from my interview with the respondent from the National Home Builders Registration Council. The respondent, Gary, was concerned about the social life that would be created in the small houses. He stated that the houses were too small, and that the national government should reconsider the amount of the subsidies per household. He was not eager

to suggest an amount that the government should increase the subsidy by, but he did believe that there should be a change when it came to the funding.

According to officials from the provincial government, the subsidies are insufficient. However this allows for the self-help scheme, whereby the consumer has the starting blocks provided and thereafter can improve on the houses as the years go by. There is a general belief amongst the provincial official interviewed that, if the consumer invests time and money into their own homes, they will be more inclined to take care of the living environment.

The second issue that was ever present in my interviews was the **relationship between policy implementation and the interference that causes problems within the policy implementation process.** All the respondents seem to be interested in just one particular form of interference. When I asked my first respondent (Mayash Chetty) about role that provincial government plays in the implementation of housing policy on a local level, his reply was simply that provincial government causes delays.

In explanation, Mayash Chetty stated that provincial government is in control of the allocation of land for the housing schemes under the town and regional planning functions. This means that the officials at the provincial level will tell local government where the particular housing project should be situated. Mayash Chetty believes that he has no problem with this arrangement for purposes of overall planning and co-ordination. However, when it does become a problem is when provincial government does not allocate the right sites for the projects.

Mr Erasmus, of the local city council, also saw the interference of the provincial government on this level as a problem. He stated that the provincial government more often than not allocates the wrong sites. The housing sites should have access to a water source, and a public transport route, so that the

residents can have an access to shops, schools and work. However, many of these sites are allocated at points far away from these things, and the developers have to build these facilities. This means that the cost of the project is hiked up, and most housing projects are left incomplete or they take long periods of time to complete.

On approaching the department of housing on a provincial level about the apparent delays in housing delivery caused by the provincial government, I found that people were reluctant to speak openly to me for fear of being discriminated against for letting out information. According to Mr Enoch the problem lies not at a management level. He believes that members of staff do not carry out the duties fast enough and often ignore deadlines knowingly. When asked if he could offer a reason for this attitude ho simply replied that public servants/ or street-level bureaucrats are underpaid and often are not motivated enough to work. He also added that the amount of work given to certain street-level bureaucrats is so huge that they find it difficult to cope.

Ms Soodeyal, Assistant Director: Project Management, explained that provincial government provides the municipalities with the funding for the projects and provide a monitoring and evaluating role, so as to ensure that the Provincial Government are provide with the best quality services for the funding. She stated that there are problems that are related to policy design that influence the policy implementation. Firstly the policy is a National policy, which provincial and Local Government have to comply with. She states that the National policy is too stringent and rigid, which is often too lengthy and bureaucratic. She also emphasised that funding plays a major problem. There is insufficient funding for the KwaZulu-Natal province to house the homeless.

At a provincial level one of the main challenges for the implementation of the policy is the lack of stability at administrative leadership level. Every time there is a change at this level, the department undergoes some or other

changes and this has a negative impact on the staff morale, which in turn causes delays in the allocation of funding and therefore the payments are not made to local municipalities.

My third respondent is a project manager, who is in charge of the applications for housing subsidies. He says that provincial government, which is also in control of the allocation of funding for the housing projects, often causes delays in the projects because provincial government takes too long to approve the applications he sends to them. He believes that if the local government had a say in the process, it would go faster and the projects would be completed faster.

The top-down approach, which often decides on the location of housing projects, does so in ignorance of local needs and constraints. The provincial government sitting at a regional does not know all the pertinent issues and dynamics at local level, and often this can cause problems, not only for the members of the households, but also the constructors. These constructors have to travel to the sites, and the material needed for the building has to be transported to the sites. This causes delays, as there is a waiting period for the material, and there is an increase in cost for the delivery of the material, which is deemed unnecessary by local government and the constructors. An increase in cost for the delivery of material often means that there is little left over for the actual structure of the house.

The National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) representative was also concerned about the delays the provincial government causes in housing projects. He stated that even though they, the NHBRC, are not involved in housing delivery at the moment, they are aware of the delays and problems that provincial government have caused. He believes that the local government are better acquainted with the area and are therefore more equipped to allocate the land and the funds for the projects.

The third issue of interest is the uniformity of the houses. It was a concern that these houses will eventually begin to resemble the apartheid era townships and social houses. My respondents seemed to have different views on this point. Mayash Chetty of the Msunduzi Housing Association says that low-cost houses do have certain differences, which include size and colour. He stated that low-cost houses have two different sizes. They can either be two-bedroom houses or three- bedroom houses. He believes that low-cost houses are not replicas of apartheid era social houses. He suggested that these houses have certain differences that can be used to the advantage of the community. These differences include; the colour the houses would be painted. As a way to move away from uniformity, the developer is requested by the government to offer the residents a choice of colours to paint their homes. He also stated that these low-cost houses would be provided with small gardens. The residents would have access to a landscape specialist, who would provide a garden for the homes and would maintain these gardens as well.

The final issue deals with the creation of housing schemes for people who are suffering from HIV/ AIDS and the influence provincial government has on local government. The HIV/ AIDS epidemic has impacted strongly on housing delivery in Msunduzi. Mr Erasmus seemed to emphasize the fact that National government needed to make extreme amendments to its current housing delivery plans to include suffers of HIV/AIDS. It is a belief that the most likely to contract this disease is the breadwinner and head of the family. This would eventually lead to non-payment of loans and the abandonment of the houses because the dependents of the household would move closer to the CBD in search of work, food and money.

Mr Erasmus believes that the HIV/ AIDS pandemic would undoubtedly leave millions of South African children orphaned, and their families abandoned in state homes over the next few years. The national government and decision

makers need to restructure current low-cost housing delivery programmes to ensure that it provides real housing communities that are able to sustain families affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Mr Erasmus' concern is centred on the fact that eventually the breadwinner will leave the responsibilities he/she will usually fulfil to a family that will not be able to help themselves, like the young children of the family or an old widow. He states that if the government can set up communities, which will allow these families to depend on them, then the blow of losing a breadwinner will not be so drastic.

Mayash Chetty of the Msunduzi Housing Association stated that the focus of the government up to now has been to provide houses at a rate of one housing subsidy per household. However, the rise of HIV/AIDS places different demands on the housing process. HIV/AIDS differs from other health concerns, in that it usually results in the loss of economically active people in the prime of their lives, usually the homeowner and breadwinner.

This means, as he suggest, that people living with HIV/AIDS will ultimately be the owners of the state homes who, when they die, will not only leave their houses empty, but will quite possibly leave their children or older relations abandoned and unable to provide for themselves. He also informed me that the government has already approved an HIV/AIDS policy to provide cluster care homes for HIV/AIDS children orphaned by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Two of these projects were launched in KwaZulu-Natal in late 1999.

In the exact words of my third respondent, Lawrence, "I am from a previously disadvantaged background and I know how that in my race like in many other races the people suffering for HIV/AIDS are treated. They are tossed aside and treated like outsiders. We need to give them a community that

will support them when they are needy of that support and care". It is the general belief among my respondents that the government needs to be more understanding towards the plight of HIV/AIDS suffers, and that housing policy should be amended to benefit these people.

Policy Analysis:

The issue I which to analysis first is the implementation stage. As mentioned before, housing policy was experiencing problems two years into the implementation stage. There was doubt that the housing department would reach the target point of one million houses by 1999. Policy design plays an important role in the success of the policy. It was also of concern that when the policy was put to the test on the battlefield, it was not able to stand the pressure. The housing policy was good on paper, but was not as good on the ground. Pressman and Wildvsky (1973: 143) argue that the policy design and the policy implementation process should be brought together and not be separate. They believe that the problems of a policy can be solved before they cause delays, if the policy implementers are involved in the policy design process and the decision-making process. Wayne Parsons also emphasized this point when he suggested that the people best equipped to make decisions about the resources needed for the implementation of a policy are the policy implementers themselves.

A policy designer has to make sure that a policy is robust enough in terms of basic, and must be able to be changed to suit it's environment or it must adapt to the changes around it. This is a point that is emphasized by Pressman and Wildavsky, who believe that a good policy must have flexibility. From the problems that housing policy was experiencing, it is clear that modification are needed to allow the housing policy to change with the environment.

A policy designer or a person who is lobbying a policy or a modification of a policy must be able advocate his /her idea to make sure that the idea is received and backed by other decision-makers. Sapere, of the People's Housing Partnership Trust believes that the People's Housing Process was a good idea for housing policy, and even though many people disagreed with the views of the People's Housing Partnership Trust, this modification to the housing policy nevertheless was passed and was being implemented. This shows that People's Housing Partnership Trust used the little power it possessed to influence the course of their idea.

Problems in a policy can come in all shapes and sizes; especially problems caused when opposing political parties interfere with the implementers' jobs. In Msunduzi, opposing parties could have played an important role in delaying housing delivery in the city. When the Democratic Alliance become involved in a spitting match with the Msunduzi Housing Association, it was clear that if the accusations that they made against the Association were proved right, it would cause a delay in the implementation of housing policy.

Let me try and explain myself more clearly. The Democratic Alliance believed and implied in the newspapers that the Msunduzi Housing Association could be using funds that were supposed to be used for the building of houses to line the director's pockets. If these implications when taken seriously by the local government and a probe (and to my knowledge none was made) was made into the running of the Association, all housing schemes that the Association were involved in would have been delayed until the probe was over. This would have meant that even if the implications were false, there would have been a delay in housing policy implementation.

When looking at the housing policy, many of Kingdon's ideas are prominent. Housing policy, as mentioned before, was a very successful feature on the governmental agenda. One would have to ask what led to the success of housing policy on the governmental agenda. In the pilot study, I made mention of the fact that politics plays an important role in the setting of a policy. This, as Kingdon would call, it is a political stream. The events and the environment of the political world have an impact on the policy setting arena.

The political mood of this country since the 1994 election has been one of transformation, and issues that would not have been of focus in the apartheid era had come to light. The new government wanted to change the country's priorities, and it did manage to change the attitudes of many people toward the government. As Kingdon states, the political stream of the process whereby ideas become agenda items is composed of "such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in congress, and changes in administration". In my opinion, these factors have played a major role in the agenda setting of housing policy in South Africa as a whole, and the Msunduzi local council's agenda as well.

One of these reasons is the national mood. The national mood played a large part in the housing policy of South Africa. Before the 1994 elections, the African National Congress promised a 'housing for all' policy if they were to be elected. The ANC won that election by a landslide, and many believe that the promise played an important part in the results of the election.

The ANC targeted the part of the public that was poor and disadvantaged because of the previous government. The public was begging for a better life, with the possibility of housing, running water, education and better health care. It was a definite possibility that the promise of delivery of these issues would be a helping hand in the election results. It is my opinion that the ANC knew that if this promise just simply faded after the elections, then their

success as the country's leaders would also just fade away. This would account for the success of the housing policy on the government's agenda.

Another situation that contributes to housing policy's formulation and success on the governmental agenda is the issue that John Kingdon refers to as organized pressure groups. Pressure groups can include NGOs, who help support the implementation process. In South Africa, it is clear that NGOs are very active when it comes to the support given to the development of projects and processes. The work put in by groups like the Development Action Group, commonly known as DAG, toward the creation of an enabling, community-sensitive policy environment was remarkable. They have been in existence since 1986, with a mission to protect the poor from the other stakeholders in the housing policy sector.

Unfortunately this group is only active in the Cape Flats area, and to my knowledge there are no such groups actively working to assist the people in areas surrounding Msunduzi. The NHBRC could be able to play a watchdog role as promised, and actively protect the consumer.

The third situation that plays a part policy formulation and policy success is the role government itself plays. As mentioned above, this can happen in two ways. Firstly, it occurs when a person in power changes his or her mind about a particular policy or the content of a policy. As seen, the government's housing policy has taken many turns in its short life, especially under the supervision of Housing Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, when the policy moved from a 'housing for all' policy to an incremental housing policy.

The fourthly way is through personnel turn over. This is when a person in office either leaves or is transferred to a different portfolio. This happened

when the Housing Minister, Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, took over the running of the housing department. She very easily criticised her predecessor's policy, and added her own that was scraped two months later in favour of a policy that was similar to that of her predecessor's itself.

On a more local setting the Msunduzi local council formulated and created a new organisation to adopt national government's subsidy policy to actively gain more funding to provide more housing in the city. This can also be linked to policy manipulation, were the implementers are able to use their discretion and find the loopholes in the policy so that they can use the policy to their advantage and perform their jobs more effectively.

Finally, the issue of jurisdiction comes into play. The South African government is divided into three spheres each with power vested in them. However, more often than not these lines of power become blurred. The provincial sphere decides on issues that would be more appropriately made by the local sphere, such as the location of housing schemes. There is a need for lines to be drawn, and roles and responsibilities clarified, because at this point provincial government is perceived as interfering. This will ensure that implementation of housing policy will be more effective and efficient, as the local government will play a more hands-on approach in the housing of the people.

The National Housing policy sets out objectives and targets, which provincial government and local government/ municipalities have to follow. However, even with the support and funding received from provincial government municipalities are unable to reach these unrealistic targets. The housing programme in the Msunduzi Municipality is continuously facing financial difficulties because the government's policy makers did not take resource and delays into consideration when the policy was being drafted. The

housing policy needs more officials who are dedicated to the delivery of houses to control the implementation stages.

At the end of the theoretical perspective I put forward certain questions, which I wished to pursue in this research paper. After spending time gathering information and looking long and hard at the situation of the housing sector in Msunduzi I have come to the conclusion that the key role players in the implementation of housing policy are all power hungry and are playing their own games in a highly political town. The aim of the housing programme in this town is not about providing shelter for the poor or trying to uplift the quality of life it is about gaining power and fighting for personal gain.

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➢ R1000 hike in housing subsidy	23/10/1996
➢ Delivery of homes going slowly	30/07/1998
➢ Housing delivery record in 1997/98	03/09/1998
➢ Shot in arm for housing project	05/09/1998
➢ Housing project threatened	10/09/1998
➢ Conference takes a hard look at housing	29/10/1998

- Better quality homes under new scheme   25/02/1999
- Co-operation leads to speedy delivery of serviced sites   25/02/1999
  for 980 homes
- Govt subsidies for rural home owners   01/04/1999
- Housing project lacks funding   07/02/2001
- IFP urges govt to focus on rural housing   26/06/2001
- Rates clearance frees R26 million for new houses   No available date

Letters to Editor concerning Housing:

Title of letters	**Author of letters**	**Date**
➢ Housing association	Mayash Chetty	25-06-2001
➢ Housing association	Judy Lawrence (Cllr)	24-06-2001

Editorial in response to letters

Title of Editorial	**Date**
A place to call home	27/6/2001

List of Interviewees:

Mayash Chetty, Chief Executive Officer of Msunduzi Housing Association, Msunduzi 25 September 2000.

Mr Erasmus, Managing Director of Msunduzi Local Municipality (Department of Housing), Msunduzi 3 October 2000

Other project managers and clerks of the Local Municipality that preferred to remain anonymous, Msunduzi, (Between the period 25 September 2000 and 19 November 2000.

Members of the NHBRC, Durban, 12 October 2000.

Mr Lester Enoch Office Administrative, Provincial Housing Department, Msunduzi 5 July 2002.