AN INTERROGATION OF SERVICE DELIVERY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF AFROPHOBIA WITHIN XENOPHOBIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE DURBAN REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

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DECLARATION

I, Akachukwu Darlington Umeh, declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this is my own work, and all the sources used in this thesis have been properly acknowledged and accurately reported.

I furthermore state that this thesis has never been submitted to any other university.

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ABSTRACT

This study was premised on the knowledge that the positive socio-economic image of a democratic government depends largely upon the humanistic effects of its policy, implementation and conduct of those that implement (those saddled with the responsibility of implementation of the policy) on one side, and the perceptions of its citizenry and immigrants regarding the acceptable standards of services offered by the departments on the other side. The argument of the study is that what is widely regarded as xenophobia in South Africa is way beyond that, as most migrants who bear the brunt of this ugly phenomenon are presumably and mostly people of colour (black African immigrants). It is therefore of crucial importance that government departments act equitably, justly and fairly to all and sundry, and not only pay lip service to transparency and openness. Socio-economic development *vis-à-vis* good governance is an elusive commodity if it does not address the ills of its society such as marginalisation and uneven allocation of the common wealth of the nation.

Adherence to these principles will guarantee the provision of excellent services that meet the people's needs and expectations, enhance customer satisfaction, while upholding the government's promise that access to decent public services is no longer a privilege to be enjoyed by a few, but the rightful expectation of all citizens inclusive of other nationals residing within its borders. What separates non-nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically institutionalised and socially legitimatised. In all cases, it is not only the material acts of marginalisation that matters; imprisonment, denial of services, or harassment (eg. recent 2016/2017 Operation Fiela) but also the nationalist discourse evoked to legitimise and explain them.

From the literature review, it is evident that improved public service delivery depends on several aspects ranging from policy making and implementation, Human Resource Development (HRD), training and re-training, to performance measurement and accountability. The need for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public services cannot be over-emphasised throughout the various pieces of legislation. Questionnaires and interviews were used to generate, collate data and to gain an understanding from the perspective of the black African immigrants. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches as well as

methods triangulation was adopted in the analysis of the collated data, which revealed to a greater extent that the popularly held perception of black African immigrants in South Africa is that they are relatively deprived in terms of quality of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs, as a result of their vulnerability. Hence, the Theory of Relative Deprivation, Social Comparison and Afrophobia informs an explanation for the phenomenon and underpinned issues regarding why, how and to whom xenophobia manifests.

The key findings are that, firstly, migrants' experiences with officials were predominantly negative. Secondly, the primary basis for differential treatment of migrants was their foreignness, regardless of their nationality. The findings are not only beneficial to the participants (black African immigrants), political actors saddled with the responsibility of policy-making, but also to the South African government and all public-sector institutions dealing with migration policy and immigrants in particular. The recommendations of the study are not to negate but rather to challenge for alternative ways to achieve the status quo. The bottom-up approach in engagement with migration policy formulation and implementation is most sacrosanct.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACAP	**African Census Analysis Project**
AFRD	**African Foundation for Research and Development**
AU	**African Union**
COMESA	**Common Market for East and Southern Africa**
DFID	**Department for International Development**
DHA	**Department of Home Affairs**
DRC	**Democratic Republic of Congo**
CSR	**Corporate Social Responsibility**
EAC	**East African Community**
ECOWAS	**Economic Community of West African States**
EU	**European Union**
FGD	**Focus Group**
GDP	**Gross Domestic Product**
HSRC	**Human Science Research Council**
IDP	**Internally Displaced Person**
IMP	**International Migration Policy**
IOM	**International Organisation for Migration**
NEPAD	**New Partnership for Africa's Development**
SMME	**Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise**
SADC	**Southern African Development Community**
SAMP	**Southern African Migration Project**
SSA	**Sub-Saharan Africa**
UN	**United Nations**
UNHCR	**United Nations High Commission for Refugees**
VFS	**Visa Facilitation Service**
WHO	**World Health Organisation**

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1 CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Across all borders around the world, migration and immigration has been a widely acknowledged phenomenon. The post-World War II period has been called the age of migration, since an unprecedented number of people worldwide have been on the move. Hence, the attentive observer of globalisation is at least intuitively aware of the centrality of the issue of migration. As sub-Saharan Africa is not left out in the new millennium, it is currently experiencing challenges and opportunities with respect to the emigration of its skilled professionals, the diaspora links with the country of origin, and migrants' remittances. Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced major changes in migration configurations from within and outside the region.

However, well-managed migration can be a win-win situation for migrants, as well as for origin and destination countries, communities and families. Migration plays a major role in the complex (and unclear) process of change in the international political order as well as in the national/local political order we are experiencing now. It impacts states and regions, their societies, economies, and policies.

> Historically, trans-national migration in Africa took place in the 18th century during European economic crises and eventual European expansion and resulted in the colonisation of the continent. In South Africa, European migration gave rise to apartheid, and shipment of cheap labour from Asia and other parts of Africa by white investors (South African Parliamentary report, 2008 cited in Umezuruike, 2013).

Apart from the issue of migration, service delivery is also a major issue in South Africa. Within both government and outside government circles, South Africans seems to be highly dissatisfied with the inadequacy of it at all levels. Hence, while this has led South Africans to protest on the streets on several occasions, few or none of these kinds of protests have been recorded on the side of the black African immigrants. The major problem is that most studies

on immigrants and migration in South Africa tend to concentrate more on xenophobia, while studies on service delivery tend to focus more on South African citizens receiving poor service delivery. However, this study takes into cognisance that effective service delivery is quite as important to black African immigrants in South Africa as it is to its citizens. In the context of this study, the concern is with service delivery by the Department of Home Affairs, using Durban as a case study in the KwaZulu-Natal Province.

1.2   BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF RESEARCH

The growing concern over the allegedly increasing number of illegal immigrants entering South Africa (Reitzes, 2000, p.62), was the underpinning factor behind a study of this nature. This population influx presents the government and other affected stakeholders with enormous challenges in formulating and implementing appropriate policy responses. Accompanying this influx is an apparent rise in xenophobia, which has become increasingly evident since the April 1994 national elections. Anti-foreigner sentiment at times expresses itself in violent attacks on those who are assumed by South African citizens to be illegal immigrants. No longer able to blame an unrepresentative government for their ills, the poor, homeless and unemployed are shifting the blame to foreigners (Reitzes, 1994b and 1995c; Charney, 1995; Tomlinson *et al.*, 1995). Hence Africans are the most likely to be considered 'illegal' immigrants or foreigners, even before they have crossed the borders (Peberdy, 2001, p.23-24), as South Africans are considerably less concerned with ridding the country of fairer skinned migrants (Landau, 2004, p.6). That this obsession with policing the borders of perceived opportunities is shared by government authorities, immigration officials, the media and the general public indicates the extent to which black African migrants are collectively unwelcome.

However, according to Reitzes (2000, p.62), these alleged illegals are also harassed by state officials and police, imprisoned without trial, and subject to corrupt practices. Many illegal immigrants are compelled to migrate by condition of political turmoil and socio-economic deprivation in their home countries and are drawn to South Africa with the expectation of acquiring political freedom, stability and economic opportunities resulting from the advent of a democratic government (Charney, 1995, p.7). Although it is not new, this phenomenon has been on the increase (Elbourne, 2003, p.46). What is novel is its implications for a recently

enfranchised black majority in South Africa, who now regard foreigners (previously perceived by some as allies in a regional struggle against apartheid) as potential new enemies and a threat to their recently granted civil and political rights and the expectations of socio-economic entitlements as proposed in the Reconstruction and Development programme.

Enshrined in Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) was an end to any form of racism and the entitlement of all citizens to equal rights, privileges and benefits. This would include efficient service delivery from the public services. In 1995, the year before the ratification of the Constitution, the government had released a white paper on transformation of public services, introducing a new framework for the implementation of policies in a new era for improvement of the general wellbeing of South Africans. Another major step was taken in 1997 to introduce a white paper on public service delivery, popularly known as the *Batho Pele* principles, the principles of which were consultation with the customers, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness, transparency, redress, and value for money, all of which were meant to satisfy the customers.

The current South African government responses to immigration are diverse and inconsistent, as politicians struggle to come to terms with a growing and apparently intractable problem which, by their own admission, has taken them by surprise. The majority of state departments affected by the issue are adopting a position of "keep them out and send them home" (Reitzes, 2000, p.63). A more moderate policy towards immigrants, especially those from neighbouring states, which might have been expected as a result of the post-apartheid ideological shift, has not materialised. Consequently, there has been evidence of service delivery protests by South Africans occasioned by poor, inefficient and ineffective service delivery. Although no, or hardly any, protests have been organised by the immigrants, this does not mean that all is well with the plight of those immigrants (whose legal status as regards to residency is the sole responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs), nor is it something to celebrate. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2012), the body is worried about South Africa's long track-record of violence as a means of protest, the targeting of foreigners in particular and the documentation tension over migration policy. While refugees and asylum seekers account for only a small proportion of the global movement of people, they

frequently travel alongside migrants. Many of these movements are irregular, in the sense that they often take place without the requisite documentation (UNHCR, 2012).

According to the South African Migration Project (SAMP, 2005, p.1), the South African Department of Home Affairs is responsible for the implementation and management of the migration policy and legislation, as well as the registration of births, marriages and deaths and the issuing of identity documents and passports. However, it is often criticised in the media and in private conversation for being administratively inefficient, cumbersome and unwieldly. South Africans and foreign customers reportedly and regularly complain about the poor quality of services delivered by the department. Examples of such service delivery needs by immigrants from this department are; study permits, work permits, business permits, temporary residence permits, permanent residence permits as well as asylum seekers, refugee status and registration of birth. Hence, undocumented evidence and media reporting underpins the widely held belief that the department is not easily accessible, is unresponsive to the needs of its customers, and is riddled with corruption to the extent that systems in place to provide efficient and quality services are poorly managed.

The Oxford dictionary (2008) defines xenophobia as an intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries. A clear example of this is the 2008 xenophobic attack in South Africa. The Department of Home Affairs and the Immigration office are South African government recognised institutions that deal with immigrants. However, it can be argued that a new term Afro-phobia has emerged in current scholarly debate to refer to the violence that is being directed towards foreign nationals from other parts of Africa. The scholarship posits that the dislike of foreigners in South Africa is beyond that of all foreigners in question and the term Afro-phobia is specific to African immigrants to complement what is generally regarded as xenophobia in the South African context (Isike and Isike, 2012; Matsinhe,2011; Neocosmos, 2008). In this context Afro-phobia connotes the dislike and fear of African immigrants. On this basis, Afro-phobia appears to exist as a result of the prevailing legacy of the apartheid era where black South Africans were regarded as an unwanted species. For example, it is alleged that although South Africa has recorded a significant rise in immigration from both Africa and Europe, white immigrants seem to have experienced fewer problems as compared to black African immigrants (Kellett, 2002). This includes white immigrants from Europe and those

who were born in another African country but exclude black immigrants born in Europe who have moved to South Africa. Consequently, another outcome of the legacy of apartheid is the continuing conception of white economic power. South Africans were for so long indoctrinated with the idea of white superiority, that even today many find it difficult to see European immigrants as a major problem, unlike black African immigrants (Kellett, 2002). According to Statistics South Africa (2012), the result of 2011 data obtained from the Department of Home Affairs shows that 116,184 was the total number of immigrants documented on the status of both temporary and permanent permits in South Africa. In Kellett's discourse, the wider implication of all economic immigrants seems to be lost in the hangover of apartheid, notwithstanding the sheer number of black immigrants compared to white ones, which justifies the concern of the local community.

There are currently indications that immigrants and South Africans alike continue to complain about service delivery from the Department of Home Affairs. While most recent studies have concentrated on the violent or xenophobic attacks on people of colour, few, if any, have attempted to unearth and address the perceptions and experiences of African foreigners at the Department of Home Affairs in this regard. With the attendant nuance of divergence on nomenclature of xenophobia and Afro-phobia as enunciated and experienced among black African immigrants in South Africa and their perspectives, it was upon this premise that the perception and experience of immigrants in Durban at the Department of Home Affairs was explored by the researcher. Thus, the following research questions were selected as a guide to the study:

1.3   **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**:

i. What are the perceptions of black African immigrants regarding their experiences of service delivery at the Durban Department of Home Affairs?
ii. Does being a black African immigrant applicant affect how they are perceived at the Durban Department of Home Affairs?
iii. Does the nature of the behaviours (Afro-phobia) exhibited by staff affect the quality of services delivered to black African immigrants at the Durban Department of Home Affairs?

1.4   STATEMENT OF TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES

    i.   The lack of good customer service as experienced by black African immigrants at the Durban Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the negative attitudes of its officials.

   ii.   Most often, officials of the Durban Department of Home Affairs are in doubt regarding the documents black African immigrants present to them for application purposes.

  iii.   There is a strong relationship between Afro-phobia and the nature (quality) of service delivery to black African immigrants at the Durban Department of Home Affairs.

1.5   RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND OBJECTIVES

Research objectives;

This research study attempts to ascertain the perceptions among black African immigrants that black African immigrants are relatively deprived in terms of the quality of service delivery at the Durban Department of Home Affairs, in relation to South African nationals as well as white immigrants.

1.6   BROADER ISSUES INVESTIGATED

  1) The role of the Visa Facilitation Service (VFS) and challenges therein in immigration to South Africa.

1.7   PREVIEW OF STRUCTURE OF CHAPTERS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the introduction, statement of research problem, research questions, research objectives, statement of hypotheses and overview of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents the literature review relevant to the study. Hence, relevant scholarly debates and postulation were critically reviewed to ascertain the point at which this study fits in to fill the gaps in knowledge.

However, this chapter also presents the theoretical framework that revolves around the subject matter which assisted in providing answers to the research questions highlighted. Three theoretical foundations were thematically analysed in relation to the three hypotheses raised to synthesise with the empirical study.

CHAPTER 3: DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS SERVICE PROVISION

This chapter unpacks the Department of Home Affairs as an entity or department of the South African government with the sole responsibility of managing migration in and outside its' territory. Thus, explanation is given regarding the legislative framework that underpins the responsibility of the department and the challenges hindering its' service delivery function. More light is shed on the newly introduced immigration regulation, emergence of VFS Global and its' role in visa processing, and also on how applications are processed by VFS Consortium, as well as the challenges inherent with the newly introduced VFS.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter focuses on the research methodology, research design, population, sampling frame, the research instrument, administration of the research instrument, procedures used for processing the collected data and the limitations of the methodology.

CHAPTER 5: PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCES OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ON SERVICE DELIVERY AT THE DURBAN DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

This chapter captures both quantitative/statistical and qualitative/thematic data presentation and analysis in alignment with the research questions and objectives, analysis of demographic characteristics of the respondents as well as the test of the hypotheses. Hence, an effort is made to present the data in such a way that it will be easily understood at a glance.

CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION

This chapter provides the summary of the entire the study, conclusions drawn from the findings, as well as recommendations and suggestions for further study.

2   CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review is a conceptual analysis of the body of knowledge as written by others on the subject (Umezuruike, 2013), with the additional aim of positioning the topic being researched within this larger body of knowledge. This chapter provides an extensive and comprehensive literature review in synthesising and analysing what has already been written on the subject matter. However, the organisational scheme of this literature review is built around concepts. For example, the review is organised around the conceptual propositions in the study title, and some of the key constructs in the research questions as derived from the research problem. It unveils various definitions and conceptualisations of service, service delivery issues, immigration, migration and xenophobia in the global world and South Africa in particular, bearing in mind that there are no universally accepted definitions of the concepts by contributors (Umezuruike, 2013).

Instead, the study conceptualises them based on what has already been written on the topic. This chapter aims at bridging the gap between what has been written on the topic, which is in a way conceptually and methodologically insufficient, and what has not been written, in order to clarify the gaps, shortcomings and weaknesses of the existing knowledge (Auriacombe, 2001, p.22). For this purpose, the literature review is of great importance to any resourceful research. Hence, the study critically reviews the scholarship on three related concepts/broad areas namely; Governance/Service Delivery, Migration/Immigration, Xenophobia/Afro-phobia as well as discussion on the theoretical framework that underpins this study.

2.1   GOVERNANCE

There are three conditions that depict good governance and, by implication, effective problem-solving. Firstly, citizen influence and oversight (the means by which citizens can participate in the political process and thereby express their preferences about public policy; how well these preferences are aggregated for effective policy-making; and what means exist for holding the leadership accountable for their decisions and actions (Hyden 1992 as quoted by Venter 2011, p.7). Secondly, responsive and responsible leadership: the attitudes of political leaders towards

their call of duty as public trustees. This speaks directly to the openness of public policy-making or the readiness to share information with citizens and adherence to the rule of law. Thirdly and extremely crucial, is social reciprocity or inter-group tolerance: how far groups demonstrate tolerance of one another in the pursuit of politics and how far voluntary associations are capable of transcending the boundaries of kinship, ethnicity or race.

Ultimately, good governance requires political reform and renewal, and a concerted attack on corruption. This can be done only by strengthening the transparency and accountability of representative bodies, by free elections in a multiparty system, by encouraging public debates, by nurturing press freedom, by developing civil society organisations and by maintaining the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Omoworare (2010) states that for a few states, good governance is conspicuously absent with visible poverty, dilapidated infrastructure, reckless abandonment of the education, health, transport, agriculture, industrial and other sectors with a direct bearing on the life of the people.

The image of a government depends upon the conduct of its employees and the perceptions of its citizenry regarding the acceptable standards of services offered by the departments. It is therefore of crucial importance that government departments act justly and fairly to one and all, and not just paying lip service to transparency and openness. Good governance is an elusive commodity. Bratton and Rothchild (1992) as quoted by Venter (2011, p.1) state that governance is the practice of good government and it remains, essentially a fragile process that depends on "the restraint of the ruler" and "the tolerance of the ruled". The concept of governance refers in a generic sense to the task of running a government (Barkan, 1992 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6). Crisis on the African continent has been identified as one of governance (World Bank, 1989 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6). According to Hyden (1992 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6), there are four major shortcomings that are the causes of bad governance. Firstly, it is the extensive personalisation of power which then encourages customers' relations on a two person or dyadic basis but discourages the growth of wider forms of trust and reciprocity (Callaghy, 1984; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Joseph, 1987 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6). Secondly, it is the denial and often widespread abuse of fundamental human rights by errant rulers. Human rights abuses cause many citizens to withdraw from politics or evade rather than engage political authorities.

2.2   SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA

According to Crous (2004) as cited by Ngidi (2012), it is the implementation of laws and the actual provision of services and products that constitutes governance. The programmes of government should thus contribute towards an enhanced quality of life for all. This implies that the outcomes of public administration are aimed at service delivery and the improvement of the general welfare of the people (Crous, 2004, p.574, as cited by Ngidi, 2012).

From all indication, what this means is that South African public service can be judged based on one major criterion which is: its effectiveness in delivering services that meet the basic needs of all South African citizens. Consequently, South Africa has been dubbed 'the service delivery protest capital of the world' (Rodrigues, 2010), and has one of the highest rates of public protests in the world (Alexanda, 2012). What this service delivery protest in South Africa seems to prove is that something is wrong and needs urgent attention.

It is often argued that the rate of protests has been escalating since 2004 (Alexanda, 2012). The rate of protests rose dramatically in the first eight months of 2012 (Davids, 2012) and it was reported that there were 540 protests in the province of Gauteng between 1 April and 10 May 2013 (Patel, 2013). According to Du Preez (2014), in February 2014 alone, there had been nearly 3,000 protest actions in the preceding 90 days – more than 30 a day – involving more than a million people. Below are a number of reasons given for service delivery protests in South Africa:

- Unequal and segregated distribution of land in both rural and urban areas (Davids, 2012)

- The demand for housing (Benjamin, 2011)

- Poor service delivery (TNS Research, 2011), especially with regard to water (Mouton, 2013) and sanitation (Robins, 2013)

- Rampant crime (Benjamin, 2011)

- Unemployment (Benjamin, 2011)

- Police brutality (De lange, 2011)

- Increases in transport prices (Langa and Magwaza, 2011)

- Electricity disconnections (Damba, 2011), increases in electricity prices (De wet, 2012), and the failure to provide electricity to shack settlements (Stone, 2012)

- Overcrowding in schools (Chauke, 2012)

- Failure to install traffic calming measures on roads adjacent to shack settlements (De wal, 2012)

- Low wages (Polgreen, 2012)

Martin (2003, p.303), is assertive that providing levels of service that fall short of customer expectations carries the risk that customers will take their business elsewhere. Dlamini-Zuma (2009, p,6) equally states that poor service delivery will cause customers to move to anotherprovince for better services which will lead to the ineffectiveness of the Department of Home Affairs in the Eastern Cape. This may lead to closure of the department because there are fewer people who visit the department to get services. It is well documented that there is a great deal of customer inertia when it comes to changing financial service providers. Mapisa-Nqakula (2007, p.3) states that customers may well accept service standards that fall short of their expectations in one or two areas if they feel that the rest of the service they receive meets or   exceeds their requirements. The Department of Home Affairs seem to fall prey to the levels of service expected by the customers as evidenced by the long queues and complaints, demonstrations and at times corruption (Dlamini-Zuma, 2009, p.6).

Mathis and Jackson (2007, p.16) argue that the most important factor to consider is the level (or standard) at which the service is provided. The choice of the level of a particular service is influenced by affordability as well as community needs. However, Park (2003, p.123) submits that when an organisation makes decisions about the level of service, then they should seriously consider the long-term viability of providing a service at that level.

2.2.1   Observations

Prior to 1994, according to Crous (2004) as cited in Ngidi (2012), the South African citizenry has been reluctant to speak out for fear of being jailed or maltreated and instead, has increasingly opted 'to vote with their feet' in order to escape repressive political control. This can be seen from the decisions/instructions from boardrooms, where foot soldiers (policy implementers/workers) decide (*asivume konke, kepha singenzi nokukodwa*) to agree with all decisions imposed upon them and end up not implementing any of its undertakings. Thirdly, the prominence and prevalence of an unelected and unaccountable government which manifests itself in reluctance to decentralise or delegate authority and a tendency to curb any independent political activity outside an institutional network controlled by the ruling party-state. Fourthly, a situation in which the apparatus or resources of the state primarily become the means for elite to acquire wealth, rather than serve as a corrective mechanism to promote social justice and sustainable economic development, consequently this has led to widespread and even endemic corruption.

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, several policies relating to service delivery have been formulated and implemented. One such crucial policy is the *Batho Pele* White Paper gazetted in 1997. *Batho Pele*, 'people first', is an initiative that intends to transform the public service at all levels. The democratic South Africa inherited a public service that was not people-friendly and lacked the skills and attitudes to meet the developmental challenges facing the country. In the struggle to transform the public service, there was a need to ensure that citizens are served properly, that all employees work to their full capacity and to treat state resources with respect (South Africa, White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997). The government regional offices are the real delivery arms of government as they are directly in contact with government services beneficiaries and it is where corruption takes place.

2.3 SERVICE DEFINITION

Stanton (1981, p.441) defines service as those separately identifiable, essentially in tangible activities which provide want-satisfaction, and that are not necessarily tied to the sale of a product or another service. By suggesting that service organisations are those which do not have as their principal aim the production of tangible products which buyers will possess

permanently, this is close to the idea of Gronoroos (1984, p.589) that "the service is the object of marketing i.e. the company is selling the service as the core of its market offering".

Another similar definition is that of Kotler (2002, p.624) who says "a service is any activity or benefit that one party can offer to another that is essentially intangible and does not result in the ownership of anything. Its production may or may not be tied to a physical product".

What these definitions share is their emphasis, directly or by implication, on the essentially intangible nature of a service. Following is a discussion on the distinctive characteristics of a service.

2.4   PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In delivering services, public institutions can either be passive/reactive or strategic/proactive. According to Ghobadian *et al.,* (1993, p.55) passive quality emphasises planning and control, to minimise customer annoyance, rather than customer satisfaction, hence focus and effort is on Herzberg's hygiene factors. In the context of public institutions hygiene factors would place emphasis on aspects such as rationalising functions, structures, legislation and resources, rather than also emphasising the use of non-financial measures such as product quality and customer satisfaction. However, sole compliance with hygiene factors does not ensure customer satisfaction. Alternatively, in strategic or proactive approaches quality is used to differentiate the local authority's service delivery to gain customer satisfaction, rather than mere compliance with legislative requirements, which emphasises basic service delivery (Umezuruike, 2013).

Public institutions were battlegrounds in a contest of power between social groups. Public service delivery is commonly understood to mean the provision of public goods or social (education, health), economic (grants) or infrastructural (water, electricity) services to those who need (or demand) them. In South Africa, given apartheid, the provision of services by government is linked to the larger task of redistribution, social justice, poverty alleviation and economic growth. In this way, the delivery process is strongly associated with development and the notion of the developmental state is associated with the capacity to provide social justice (Mc Lennan, 2007). This conceptualisation of delivery is a consequence of the specific

history and context of South Africa and its apartheid heritage. In Thompson's discourse, the application and maintenance of apartheid led to a questioning of the legitimacy and purpose of all state delivery structures and processes. An increasing authoritarianism from the apartheid government was reacted to with defiant resistance from anti-apartheid activists and liberation movements (Thompson, 1995).

Since the demise of apartheid and eventual inception of democracy and majority rule in South Africa in 1994, the three branches of the government of South Africa; parliamentary, executive and judiciary have reportedly been found wanting in keeping to their promise of accelerated and improved service delivery. This may be due to the wide range of challenges inherent in the system, including the inherited problems from apartheid and various new challenges (Neocosmos, 2008 cited in Umezuruike, 2013). It is therefore interesting to note that there have been analyses from different perspectives to explain the failures and successes of the South African government in service delivery.

The former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, identified a major problem in the South African socio-political economy when he acknowledged that the state had two parallel economies, first world and third world, in other words developed and under-developed. In his analysis, the first world economy of South Africa had features of modernity and produced the majority of the country's wealth. It was also highly globalised and well-integrated into the world political economy. On the other hand, the third world was not developed, but dysfunctional with evidence of an inability to generate growth. Thus, South Africa has laid out developmental targets since 1994, setting a target in 2004 for poverty reduction from 1/3 to 1/6 of households in 2014, unemployment from 30 per cent to 15 per cent, and expansion of services of various kinds (Levin, 2007).

Burger's analysis was centred on the conditions of poverty in South Africa, but he argued that effective service delivery is necessary to South African citizens because of the obvious role it could play in the possible eradication of poverty. His study further warned against short sightedness in policymaking and formulation because such could lead to a possible failure on the part of the government, while admitting that it has caused implementation to fail since the

end of apartheid. If the new democratic South Africa is to succeed, a high level of planning should be undertaken followed careful execution (Burger, 2005).

Karuri-Sebina, Hemson, and Carter examined developmental local government and *Batho Pele* principles, but the common idea was that it is an effort toward alleviating poverty and improving service delivery to the general public in the new era of the country. They agreed that the South African public service will be judged by service delivery efficiency. In their view the essence of good governance is to make life better for the citizens. They also agreed that developmental local government can make a vital change in this direction (Karuri-Sebina *et al.*, 2010; see also Mubangizi and Gray, 2011 cited in Umezuruike, 2013) on putting the public into public service delivery for social welfare.

Mubangizi and Mubangizi examined South Africa's diverse wealth in terms of human and material resources, and the effort of government to use available resources to alleviate poverty. Thus, South Africa explored the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), both of which aimed at improving the lives of the South African citizens as the nation targeted effective service delivery in various ramifications (Mubangizi and Mubangizi, 2005 cited in Umezuruike, 2013).

Mubangizi, while writing on poverty alleviation and service delivery and a possible conceptual framework workable for South Africa's service, argues that the country has made efforts in poverty eradication using poverty alleviation strategies. The paper, using three major reports on poverty and alleviation in the history of South Africa agrees on the link between poverty alleviation and service delivery. The paper further criticises the first Carnegie Commission report of 1929-1930 on the poor whites in South Africa for its lack of vision for the entire country. Rather than being of benefit to both blacks and whites it further impoverished blacks and favoured whites. Nor did the second Carnegie report of 1984 help, as recommendations again excluded poverty alleviation on the part of blacks. The paper agreed that the poverty and inequality report of 1997 was comprehensive as it identified all the inabilities that increased poverty, including those effecting both blacks and whites, such as lack of natural, social, institutional and human assets (Mubangizi, 2009).

Naidoo and Xollie (2011) cited in Umezuruike (2013) examine the critical situation of service delivery in South Africa since the democratic dispensation in the country, pointing out the constant crisis the system has continued to experience in service delivery, despite the steady efforts of the government in the direction of improvement centred on articulated leadership, improved managerial capacity, and workable developmental initiatives. The paper supports the argument advanced by the former president that the socio-political economy is divided into two parallels, the developed and under-developed (rich and poor), on which hope lies in an improved service delivery based on improved leadership, managerial capacity and proper developmental initiatives.

Smith and Vawda examine the transformation that has taken place in Cape Town local government since the 1996 democratic transition to democracy. The major challenge was the inclusion of the majority of the population in the policymaking as the democratic government grappled with poverty reduction. The simple aim was to improve quality of service delivery to South Africans, especially those in the group deprived of a better life during apartheid days (Smith and Vawda, 2003 cited in Umezuruike, 2013).

Regarding the election of the local government of 2006, Booysen's (2007) study asserts that the election was also a referendum as it proved wrong the assumptions that the previous protests of poor service delivery were against the ANC-led government. Rather, it was protests purely against poor service delivery because the election still saw majority support for the ruling party. The study notes that over 900 protests of poor service delivery took place between 2004 and 2006, while the parliamentary report shows that 881 illegal protests were recorded during the same period, but a good point about the system was its ability to recognise the people's freedom to peaceful protests. On the election of 2011, Clark expresses the same view, because the service delivery protests in the country did not prevent the ANC being re-elected (Clark, 2011 cited in Umezuruike, 2013).

Nleya conducted research on the macro-economy of development policies on water delivery, extending it to urban policies in South Africa. He remarked that most urban poor South

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Africans live in informal settlements close to urban areas, but compares it to rural areas of which both have experience of poor service delivery, as in water supply, sanitation and housing, during the apartheid era. The study concluded that the indelible marks of apartheid are still problematic in the service delivery to informal settlements and rural areas, but an improved strategy should be put into place to ensure that water supply is free to the poor South Africans, including those of the informal settlements who have been denied their privileges of a better life under a democratic dispensation (Nleya, 2008 cited in Umezuruike, 2013).

Viljoen (2010) notes that South Africa has a unique environment and topography and is making progress in provision of a safe water supply to its citizens. He argues that the World Health Organisation's (WHO) water safety plan was excellent, as the Rand Water, a large water company service provider approved of the water safety plan. This is a clear move of South Africa to improve service delivery to South Africans as the country tackles poverty in the democratic dispensation. He is of the view that clean water is a life necessity and providing it to South Africans, both the rich and the poor, is a government's responsibility (Viljoen, 2010).

McKechnie and Bridgen, cited in Umezuruike (2013) discuss the burden South Africa is carrying due to the lack of skills and manpower, especially in the engineering sector, and agree on the adverse effects of the situation on service delivery. Their paper highlights confrontations such as the historical education legacy which ensured the under-development of blacks and the development of the white minority, global demand for skills in the engineering sector and the movement of such skills out of South Africa, deficiencies in the present educational system, poor performance in sciences, and the fall in traditional artisans and training. In their view, there is the need for an improved engineering sector, particularly electrical, in order to achieve effective service delivery in the public and private sector (McKechnie and Bridgen, 2008).

Lombard (2008) cited in Umezuruike (2013) investigated the South African government's effort in balancing the injustices of the past, which have led to massive investment in social security with little left for social service delivery. Social development, however, is emerging as a major contributory factor in the second decade of South African democracy, unlike in the first decade in which it did not. His hope is that the state will only be solidly developed if the service delivery is made effective (Lombard, 2008).

Allais researched the educational reform in South Africa after 1994, noting that the government's first step in education reform was a national qualification framework made up of mostly outcomes, but about ten years later the reform was met with too many challenges. However, the reforms were intended to address inequality in the socio-political system. His paper notes the vital roles a high quality educational system could play in the development of a country, particularly in a country with the past of South Africa (Allais, 2007).

AFRIMAP and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa reported a positive change in South African service delivery in the education sector as the country pushed for improved conditions for its citizens. In the first place, the policy framework of education allows for equality of all South Africans in access to learning. The perception is that the Department of Education (DoE) is on course to achieve the target of providing basic education to all citizens by 2015 as mandated. The literacy rate increased for 15 to 24 olds from 88 per cent to 90 per cent from 1990 to 1994, with enrollment rates on the increase, and the pass rate also on the increase. The study used the Western Cape and Limpopo Provinces as relatively well and poorly funded areas respectively (AFRIMAP and Open Society Foundation for South Africa's 2007 report cited in Umezuruike, 2013).

Research on perceptions of service delivery by HIV/AIDS infected persons in South Africa by Giya (2010) observed the negative attitudes of politicians towards the eradication of the disease. Politicians, it found, including grassroots politicians and councillors, are only willing to declare their AIDS/HIV results when they test negative. Their decision is based on the fear of rejection and stigma attached to the disease, which they believe could cost them their jobs, as the expected reaction of the public could be to distance themselves from such politicians. The paper advocates an effective fight against the stigma through prevention, care, treatment and attention to the orphans, and all those who are vulnerable. In this argument, a positive attitude is required from the politicians in a fight against the HIV pandemic (Giya, 2010).

Alexander's (2010, p.26) study on protest action embarked by the citizen of South Africa argues that there are strong similarities linking the Mbeki-era and the Zuma-era protests which

are principally about inadequate service delivery and lack of accountability by local councillors. The study indicates that the significant difference is that the new government has greater legitimacy. The key difference between the apartheid years and the present is the existence of a democratic government retaining widespread legitimacy. In summary, Alexander labelled service delivery protests in South Africa the rebellion of the poor.

However, Manala (2010, p.519) disagrees with Alexander's postulation, and hence opines that while it may be tempting to agree with that description, it would rather be viewed as the exercising of the people's rights in the only way open to them for expression of their grievances, dissatisfaction and demands since they were not given an opportunity and a hearing. According to Manala (2010) the problem of lack of sufficient financial resources which prevents municipalities from paying their bulk suppliers and that of corrupt officials who abuse state funds are reasons for service delivery to be addressed unequivocally.

Koelble and Lipuma's (2010, p.583) study on service delivery issues based on detailed cross-sectional profiles of 18 municipalities across the Eastern and Western Cape indicates that the problem of non-delivery is located not so much in demographic shifts or a general lack of funding in South Africa, but in the lack of state capacity and the unwillingness of the central state to enforce the rules on the law-books on its own operatives in local government. Their argument is that the current wave of political protests in South Africa is not purely one of reacting against poor service delivery but that the protests are multi-dimensional and express a range of issues from poor service to xenophobia and legitimate concerns about the tax-base of some of the municipalities.

AFRIMAP and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, while investigating service delivery in the Health Department admit the grave dangers and challenges of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The millennium goals of the Health Department are in line with those of the WHO (World Health Organisation), which includes reduction of child and maternal rates, with a controlling mechanism for their spread. However, life expectancy is on the decrease, as is spending on healthcare with regards to GDP. The scourge of HIV/AIDS is mostly responsible for lower life expectancy, but government intentions and efforts to improve healthcare are not being taken for granted, which increases in health facilities and

services could better explain (AFRIMAP and Open Society Foundation for South Africa 2007 report).

Booysen (2003) criticises the inequalities which exist in rural-urban health services in South Africa while noting the existence of discrepancies in the urban areas. The problem is over-dependency of those who reside in rural areas on public healthcare, compared to those who reside in the cities, who have higher chances of private healthcare. Apparently, the public healthcare in South Africa is in a poor state; however, decentralisation of healthcare to local level may close the discrepancies. Whittaker, Burns, Doyle and Lynam (1999) emphasise South Africa's position on the continent as the most industrialised country in Africa, with a population of over 40 million. The public and private sector provide healthcare but with a striking dominance of public sector providing healthcare for over 70-80 per cent or more of the total population. The paper argues that healthcare has changed drastically from a hospital base to primary healthcare in recent years. However, the latest trend is a multi-disciplinary approach in its provision. The paper is in agreement with that of Boosyen (2003) on over-dependency of the common people on healthcare in South Africa.

Kuye and Naidoo (2003) were concerned about the impact of modern technology in service delivery in the computer age; however, they agreed on the need to utilise new technology and

to improve the quality of service delivery in the socio-political system of South Africa. And the service delivery strategy in the public sector is aimed at re-engineering government efforts in the current way of running the political economy of the country, by involving the larger sectors, including the private sector and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs), all of which have major roles to play in socio-political development (Kuye and Naido, 2003).

Visser and Twinomurinzi (2008) observe that the failure of e-government and public service delivery in South Africa are not far from what is found in other developing countries. In the effort of governments around the world to seize the ample opportunity provided by the computer age to improve service delivery, attempts have been made to define e-government or e-governance. It is clear that both are methods of using information and communication technology (ICT) to enhance governmental processes. The paper notes that in South Africa the

principle of *Batho Pele,* or 'people first', does not align with e-government or e-governance. However, the paper suggests the alignment of e-government and *Batho Pele* principles to ensure effective use of e-government in service delivery in South Africa (Visser and Twinomurinzi, 2008).

Researchers from the Centre for Sociological Research (CSR) list the following findings after in-depth research in the four areas that they identify as 'service delivery hotspots' namely, Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza and Diepsloot (Sinwell *et al.* 2009, p.1):

- The communities involved in this recent cluster of service delivery protests share many of the same problems and frustrations. Poverty and unemployment levels are high compounded by a lack of basic services including water, sewage systems, street lighting, paved roads as well as adequate and appropriate housing.

- It is clear that the four protests only occurred after unsuccessful attempts by community members to engage with local authorities over issues of failed service delivery.

- The cases of Balfour and Thokoza suggest that the brutal response by police contributed to the violence, rather than the protesters themselves being solely responsible.

- No evidence was found that xenophobia was the prime motivator behind the service delivery protests. While xenophobic attitudes are widespread, these protests have been primarily directed at issues pertaining to local government service delivery.

- Political divisions clearly play an important role in producing frustrations among the masses, particularly in Thokoza where there is an IFP stronghold. In Diepsloot, protests have at least partially emanated from concerns that particular areas of the community are prioritised over others. No evidence was found that people's demands were rooted in a campaign against the Zuma administration or the national policies of the ANC, but rather the failure of the ANC to implement policy at a local level. In fact, the case of Piet Retief revealed that the protestors were in support of the ANC. However, all the communities sampled in this research expressed discontent over what they felt was a lack of communication and accountability at various levels of local government.

- The findings presented confirm that the frustrations with government service delivery, and protests which result from this will remain part of the South African political landscape as long as people do not have access to basic services and are unable to find effective channels through which to express their demands.

From the abovementioned findings enumerated by the Centre for Sociological Research, it seems that their conclusion is that the core causes of service delivery protests could be attributed to the continuing poverty, unemployment, inability of the ANC to implement policy and lack of participation by communities in local government structures and systems. They remarked that communities are not given an opportunity to express their grievances and demands and are not given a hearing by local government authorities. The police brutality in dealing with protests is not helpful either; it instead fuels the frustration and anger of communities leading to further violence (Manala, 2010).

On effective service delivery, Whittaker *et al.* (1998) argue in favour of seemingly closing the gap between the private and public sector in a practical sense, because of the steady efforts being made to achieve effective service delivery in the right directions. Government of democratic states often involve the private sector in the service delivery through public sector-private sector partnership or direct employment of the private sector by the public sector to deliver much desired service to the general public. The paper reiterates that the essence of a state is to ensure the stability of the system both politically and economically, in other words the welfare of the citizenry. In view of this function, the state would have to harness its resources to ensure effective service delivery. In South Africa, there are clear cases of private sector participation in the public service delivery (Whittaker *et al.,* 1998).

Elhiraika (2007), while writing on fiscal decentralisation and service delivery in South Africa, argues in favour of fiscal and financial autonomy on the part of sub-national government in South Africa and African countries. He observes that the political autonomy in the sub-national government of South Africa contrasts with the lack of fiscal and financial autonomy in the sub-national government. Decentralisation is favoured in different countries for different reasons, but a constant reason is effective service delivery at the grassroots. Centralisation has hampered development and service delivery in South African. It has also affected accountability, since

monitoring inter-governmental transfers has increased corruption in Africa through lack of transparency in such inter-governmental relations. Using provincial government to theorise, the paper argued for improved accountability, transparency and effective service delivery to the people through greater revenue and fiscal autonomy on the part of lower levels of government (Elhiraika, 2007).

Raga and Taylor (2005) researched accountability and ethics on public service delivery from South African perspectives but agreed that the principles are commonly used to promote good governance and effective service delivery. The paper agrees on the simple goal of accountability, which is giving account and being responsible for accounts. Ethics, on the other hand, underpin boundaries between rights and wrongs. The paper argues that ethics and accountabilities produce transparency and openness in the public sector, which apparently increases productivity in service delivery (Raga and Taylor, 2005). For failures of the democratic dispensation since 1994 on facts, fictions and fabrications of service delivery in South Africa, see Khosa (2001).

Maserumule's (2007) study on public service delivery in South Africa simply centred on the impact of misunderstandings between the director-general and ministers often negatively reported to the general public by the media. The paper notes the administrative roles of the director-general, whom the civil service rules agree are the administrative heads of the departments and part of the civil service, while the ministers are the political heads of the departments, though appointed by the President, who is the head of the Cabinet. The study further calls for the contribution of scholars in solving this problem of misunderstandings between the political heads and administrative heads, arguing that the assumptions of the media that both political and administrative heads adhere to their traditional roles cannot solve the problem. They rather call for postulations and theories that could be workable.

Mc Lennan (2007) emphasises that since delivery is associated with redistribution, the stakes of non-delivery are politically high. Most state-driven delivery processes, while apparently technical or managerial, are political, as they define a power relationship between the state, its citizens and the economy. They are essentially about who gets what, when, in what ways and for what reasons. In South Africa, defining access denied by apartheid is central to this process,

given that apartheid was explicitly about limiting public services and economic opportunities to a select group. However, the emphasis on access gives primacy to the politics of distribution and a struggle over the proverbial slice of the pie. Service delivery improvement is seen in linear input-output terms as a more efficient or effective provision. The key improvement tactic is better management and strategies concentrated on speeding up supply chain routes, providing capital, better project management or improved distribution of resources. Often considerable effort is put into the development of systems and the restructuring of governance, management or policy implementation processes, with very little payoff. This is because these new systems are overlaid on institutionalised practices and routine 'ways of doing things' which disrupt delivery.

Thompson (1995) observes that while the operational aspects of delivery cannot be ignored, improved access does not, on its own, secure a better life for all. In highly unequal societies, improving delivery has to do more than provide entry rights or reallocate the pieces of the pie. For example, electing women into parliament may redistribute a few limited positions, but it does not put rape or women's impoverishment onto national agendas. In all societies, but particularly in unequal ones, the expectation is that improved delivery will shift established patterns of deprivation and improve life chances.

Improvements then require a focus not only on distribution, but on the established social institutions, norms and practices that condition the citizens' ability to control their lives and livelihoods. These practices define the politics of the delivery process - the unwritten rules, symbols, social constraints and power dynamics that define distribution. These institutions' pattern distribution, by establishing boundaries for acceptable practice that mediate people's ability to act, result in a growing distance from the resources necessary to sustain survival. Societies come to accept unequal, poor or uneven delivery outcomes as 'the way things work'.

Mc Lennan (2003) observes that, in practise, service delivery improvements are usually technical and focus on visible obstacles, while the less visible constraints, such as established social, economic and cultural patterns of social interaction are overlooked. If delivery is understood in terms of historically developed sets of practices through which social actors engage around the production and distribution of public goods, then improving delivery

requires an awareness of both operational and political processes. However, improvement strategies which focus on access only are insufficient to ensure that those historically excluded are integrated into government policies and programmes. A focus on access only gives primacy to having, rather than doing. Solutions are focused on giving. Simply giving, however, overlooks the extent to which social norms, structures and institutions authorise certain actions and processes and not others.

Service delivery strategies need to disrupt established practices and institutionalise new ones in order to shift patterns of authority, access and distribution. This requires an understanding of the politics of delivery and an exploration of the political-institutional (government-citizen) interface as a contested space where public officials, citizens and institutions negotiate the legitimacy and value of decisions and processes related to service delivery (Mc Lennan, 2007).

2.5   CHALLENGES FACING SERVICE DELIVERY

Schwella, (2001, pp.367-368) states that the extent and effectiveness of service delivery is influenced by societal contextual realities and the needs of the client base. He argues that South Africa is a world in one country, characterised by diversity, pluralism, and inequality. The policies of the past, apartheid and 'separate development', contributed to the fragmentation of South African society through their emphasis on forced separation. In conjunction with diversity and pluralism, this has contributed to the deeply divided and unequal state of South African society. A deeply divided society is generally and technically regarded as difficult to govern and administer. South Africa is no exception to this generalisation (Schwella, 2001, pp.367-368). Higgins (2008, p.54), states that unauthorised expenditure and under-spending hamper service delivery, and he argues that there is no reason why the public should not be serviced, given the fact that, each year all three tiers of government approve and vote for the budgets of departments and municipalities throughout the country.

 Higgins (2008, p.54) argues that it is difficult to govern and administer a divided society. His argument is evidenced by the following reports. Shiba (2011, p.10) reports that Tatane (33) was killed by the police during a service delivery march. He died struggling to get government

to provide a simple necessity, water. Shiba further reports that the Setsotso municipal manager admitted that Tatane's death made them double their efforts to deliver the services to the community. Wallis (2011) states that when people riot for service delivery, they are fighting for the quality of life. Booysen (2007, pp.21-32) concurs with Wallis when he says that the rising number of local protests against poor service delivery reflects a tension between delivery and democratisation. Booysen (2007, pp.21-32) further states that managing the strain of securing "a better life for all" is difficult given that the apartheid legacy is not easy to eradicate.

Ramoo (2008, p.60) indicates that, even though government has very good policies, government's efforts to deliver on projects are being affected by a number of inhibitors. According to Ramoo (2008, p.60), the main factor working against government at the moment is a lack of skills and capacity in terms of its own employees implementing the policies and decisions made by the upper echelons in government. In the area of administration alone, numerous departments lack the skills needed to keep corporate services efficient and up-to-date.

Milazi (2007), as quoted by McLennon and Munslow (2009, p.7), concur with Ramoo's statement. He states that efforts to match skills shortages by attracting foreign professionals were not pursued with sufficient vigour and were hampered by incompetence and rule complexities in government departments like the DHA. Ramoo (2008, p.60) highlights that the absence of a "culture of delivery" is noted especially among lower level employees. Although definite commitment and action from middle management and senior management in departments may be visible, he states that, there is lack of both at ground level. According to Ramoo (2008, p.60), improving work ethic needs to become a priority. He further states that people need to understand how they, as individuals, can enable delivery and to take pride in making things happen in their departments.

In general, government's strategy in managing poverty and unemployment has been to increase the number of social grants available to the poorest and neediest (Mc Lennan and Munslow, 2009, p.7). This is not always completely successful due to the failure of the DHA in providing birth and identity documents (ID) timeously. Dlamini (2011, p.5) confirms that the DHA gives customers a hard time. According to Dlamini's report, a 42-year-old man was classified as a woman in his identity book. The man felt his life was on hold. Dlamini (2011, p,5) further

states that Jabulani Ngcobo, of Itshelimnyama near Marianhill, experienced difficulties when it came to doing anything that required his identity document. The DHA records (ID book) reflected that Jabulani Ngcobo's gender is female. The greatest challenge Jabulani Ngcobo faced was that he was required to go to the doctor and get a confirmation letter that stated that he was really a man. According to Dlamini (2011, p.5) Jabulani's life was affected at work because he could not get his salary deposited in his account because he could not open an account. This difficulty confirmed that if any government department fails to offer effective and efficient services, the citizens ultimately suffer.

McLennan (2007), as quoted by McLennan and Munslow (2009, p.9), suggests that South Africa should build capacitated administrative machinery capable of delivering to the poorest of the poor. The machinery is premised on the assumption that service delivery is best left in the hands of professional managers who are clear about their objectives and have the technical expertise to deliver. According to Mc Lennan and Munslow (2009, p.9), this created challenges for delivery, in the following areas:

- It is not possible to assume that technical expertise always exists in the delivery system;

- Challenges in capacity that undermine effective delivery, as a result of an over-reliance on consultants;

- A lack of application of administrative due process and regulations; and

- Inappropriate outsourcing or poor decision-making.

Ramoo (2008, p.60) explains that exacerbating "the people inhibitor" is the fact that government is required to "do far more with far less". Government does not have the resources required to deliver on its mandate. He adds that the myriad of complex legislation it has to adhere to in-terms of systems and processes compounds the situation of non-delivery that much more. Instead of focusing on getting the job done and actually delivering, officials often become bogged down in red tape. Mc Lennan and Munslow (2009, p.9) believe that effective management and political leadership emerged as key issues for the system to address and there is a general and worrying tendency to develop systems of patronage to get the job done.

Ramoo (2008, p.60) cites a disconnection between political promises and realistic operational delivery capacity and resources as another inhibitor of delivery. He further states that despite the promises politicians make, what is actually delivered is not according to expectations. This is due to expectations created by politicians that cannot often be met by officials as a result of financial constraints, lack of skills and capacity, procurement bottlenecks, limited timeframes and infrastructure realities on the ground and even corruption (Ramoo, 2008, p.60).

2.6   IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON SERVICE DELIVERY

Corruption and its effects, "Corruption is the enemy of development and of good governance" (Patil, 2011 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.1). Fraud and corruption are interchangeable terms and therefore their effects on government and beneficiaries are more or less the same. Fraud is a crime of deceiving people in order to get money, while corruption is dishonest or immoral behaviour, by people in official positions. The political cost of corruption is that it undermines democracy, weakens the developmental state and undermines responsibility, accountability and legitimacy. Corruption engenders perverse political dependencies, negates opportunities to improve the general wellbeing of the citizenry and fosters a climate of mistrust, particularly of public officials. Corruption erodes the 'common good' and the 'people's contract'. In eroding the 'people's Contract', corruption alienates citizens from the very officials they have elected and also alienates people from each other.

Corruption distorts and undermines the value systems of all societies. It also overrides any sense of the common good (Fraser Mokeleti, 2008, p.46). Corruption impedes a state's ability to use its available resources to progressively achieve the full realisation of socio-economic rights as resources are instead diverted into the pockets of public officials, or development aid is mismanaged, misused or misappropriated. Corruption is costly; the state loses revenue from abuse of taxes, customs levies, licensing fees and traffic fines. It also leads to high spending due to corrupt loadings and fronting on state contracts.

According to Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4), the most common cases of alleged corruption relate to fraud and bribery, mismanagement of government funds, abuse of government resources and procurement irregularities. The distortion of policy and resource allocations increases inefficiency. Corruption also impacts on investment and growth, especially in countries where there is need of foreign productive capital. Foreign investors, especially those likely to make long term contributions to development, are discouraged, although some investors looking to make fast profits through questionable schemes may try their luck. Furthermore, corruption in aid programmes means less for those most in need and may compromise future funding.

Corruption is costly, not only for the general public but mainly for the poor, as resources are diverted away from them. Service delivery and related policy is distorted if allocation and prioritisation are determined by bribes. It means a few benefits at the expense of many, which reinforces existing socio-economic inequality and makes the poor even more vulnerable. Structural inequality leads to many being denied access to education, information, and therefore to knowledge about their rights that could enable them to challenge abuse of power.

Good governance is a fundamental right in a democracy and it implies transparency and accountability. Good governance entails an administration that is sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people and effective in coping with emerging challenges in society by framing and implementing appropriate laws and measures. It includes strict rules of accountability. Corruption exists in both democratic and nondemocratic states, but it develops "into an automatic by-product of the latter system and the chances for corrupt practices to be exposed, protested against and punished become much diminished under it". Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4) states that the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the Department of Correctional Services in the Republic of South Africa are the most corrupt departments as per reports based on calls by anonymous whistle blowers to the National Anti-Corruption Hotline between 2004 and 2010. Democratic governance is thus a necessary requirement to fight corruption.

Corruption undermines the rule of law, democratic governance, accountability and sustainable development. It breaches the contract between citizens and public officials, and this has grave consequences for any government. Moreover, it is a recipe for the collapse of governance and is a cause of continued failure. Given that the Department of Home Affairs is the arm of

government that is needed by everybody who naturally enters, lives and exits South Africa through various processes, fraud and corruption are quite pervasive in these departmental regional offices. Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4) states that the Public Service Commission reported that the majority of cases lodged against the DHA involved the bribing of officials to obtain fraudulent identity documents, passports, marriage certificates and the sale of identity documents to illegal immigrants. Of the 3,554 cases reported to the hotline since 2004, the largest number involved the DHA, with 781 reported but only 142 resolved (Mbanjwa 2011, pp.1-4).

The Public Service Commission expressed concern that the lack of action on reported cases of corruption by senior managers and director-generals is a 'trend' which compromises the integrity of the hotline and weakens the public's confidence in government's commitment towards fighting fraud and corruption (Mbanjwa, 2011, pp.1-4). Fraud and corruption are rife in the Department of Home Affairs and this is evidenced by the arrest of six officials and a marriage officer (Padayachee, 2011, p.6). Padayachee states that these arrests are part of an ongoing investigation aimed at rooting out corruption in the Department of Home Affairs. The officials arrested were suspected of facilitating 'marriages of convenience' between South Africans and foreign nationals (Padayachee, 2011, p.3).

The Public Service Commission (2007), as quoted by Dorasamy (2009, p.58) states that concerns regarding service delivery can be attributed to the performance of public officials. Dorasamy (2009, p.58) argues that sustained efforts to improve standards while expanding services have failed in many of the government departments because of person-to-post mismatch, lack of skills and a lack of performance standards. She further argues that these contributory factors can be linked to egoistic leaders who assumed positions without giving consideration to performance based on accountability and responsibility (Dorasamy, 2009, p.59).

The then Minister of Public Service and Administration, Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) states that corruption violates the laws of the country. She further states that it flouts international conventions and treaties and undermines democratic values and ethos (Fraser-Moleketi 2008, p.46). Chinua Achebe and many other writers, as quoted by Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) point

to the significance of fighting corruption because it erodes the social fabric of society like undermining communities, perpetuating poverty, inequality and under-development. As a country, people must be resolute and steadfast in the fight against corruption in all spheres of society. Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) states the following important premises relating to corruption as outlined in the Africa Forum on Ant- Corruption held in March 2007. The first premise is that while corruption manifests itself in the relationship between individuals and institutions, corruption, as a practice, is rooted in the operation of market forces, the pursuit of individual prosperity and gain as opposed to the common good. This possessive individualism has undermined the goals and objectives of national and community level development.

The second premise is that corruption is fundamentally undemocratic; it undermines the legitimacy and credibility of democratically elected governments and of responsible and accountable civil servants. The third premise is that corruption is about the interface of political and economic elites at a global, national and regional scale. The fourth premise is that the intentional preoccupation in the global corruption discourse with bribe-takers and bribe-givers, and particularly with bribe-takers, is disingenuous, ideologically loaded, and simplistic and certainly serves other agendas that are not linked to developmental goals. This discourse needs to be challenged precisely because it overlooks the complexity of the social forces, systems, processes and structures which underpin acts of corruption.

The fifth premise is that corruption is a direct impediment to Africa's development. The sixth premise is that corruption distorts and undermines the value systems of all societies and their peoples and possessive individualism and overrides any sense of the common good; and the seventh premise is that an anti-corruption strategy must be articulated by leaders in the political, economic and civil society spheres and must engage all sectors of society on the basis of a core set of leadership practices and values. The anti-corruption strategy must articulate an alternative ethos and value system.

Unethical behaviour in the South African public service is characterised by the following: the lack of responsiveness to the needs of clients; tardiness in the discharge of duties; manifestations of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and corruption (Mafunisa 2008, p.5). According to Mafunisa (2008, p.9), unethical behaviour often starts at the top of public service

leadership, where public service values are not personified and promoted. He attributes this largely to a lack of accountability for promoting quality public service. It can be argued that by placing greater accountability on adhering to rules and procedures instead of a similar focus on quality public services, effectiveness and efficiency in the South African public service has been negatively affected.

The government of the day has an overwhelming task to do all things necessary to ensure effective and efficient public service delivery. However, achieving government's mandate is greatly challenged by the prevalence of corruption, thereby placing severe constraints on the governance of this country (Heath, 2010). According to Heath (2010), corruption undermines our constitutional rights to human dignity, quality and freedom. It endangers the stability and security of our societies. It also undermines the institutions and values of democracy. He further states that corruption seriously jeopardises sustainable development, the rule of law and the credibility of our governments. It provides a breeding ground for the violation of the fundamental principles of *Batho Pele*.

Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4) reports that the Public Service Commission (PSC) Report revealed that fraud and corruption are rife in most government departments. Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4)) further reports that the Home Affairs and Correctional Services departments are the most corrupt departments as per reports based on calls by anonymous whistleblowers to the National Anti-Corruption Hotline between 2004 and 2010.

According to Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4), the most common cases of alleged corruption relate to fraud and bribery, mismanagement of government funds, abuse of government resources and procurement irregularities. The Public Service Commission expressed concern that the lack of action on reported cases of corruption by senior managers and director-generals was a 'trend' which could compromise the integrity of the hotline and weaken the public's confidence in government's commitment toward fighting fraud and corruption (Mbanjwa, 2011, pp.1, 4).

Heath (2010) believes that corruption distorts the allocation of resources, thereby sharply increasing the cost of goods and services. Diverting scarce resources to non-priorities, largely

neglects fundamental needs, particularly basic needs such as food, health and education. He further states that corruption can act as a disincentive, possibly deterring prospective economic activities and investment. It increases the likelihood of committing other crimes. Corruption, therefore, becomes both the cause and consequence of under-development and poverty, in general which can be attributed to South Africa as well. According to Hassim (2007), the country we live in is engulfed in fraud and corruption and an escalating diminishing service to its citizens.

Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) argues that corruption reinforces the banality of evil and its conceit lies in its ability to implicate, its complicity and its ability to violate the laws of the country. She further states that it flouts international conventions and treaties and undermines democratic values and ethos.

> Corruption as an anarchy, has been loosed upon the world in which we live. The significance of fighting corruption erodes the social fabric of society like undermining communities, perpetuating poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. As a country, people must be resolute and steadfast in the fight against corruption in all spheres of society.

The corrosive effect of corruption is experienced not only where corruption is perpetrated, but simultaneous reverberations of its effects are felt throughout the global economy and society at large. She further states that corruption is a global problem that affects both the developed and developing world, but it is in the developing world that it's effect is most destructive.

> "It was Plato, who warned us to "do no service for a present". Aristotle once said, "we become just by doing just acts". Both the scholars quoted are addressing corruption of values, the corruption of the soul of the nation, the corruption of the institution of democracy, and the corruption of the individual (Fraser-Molekati, 2008, p.6).

The researcher faced a number of people who would come to his office and say, "please help me, I have R200.00". The people needing help are always people requesting letters that confirm that children receiving grants are enrolled in the institution. Some would be people who intended bribing the researcher to issue letters that state that they started schooling in the researcher's institution, and issue late birth registration as well as identity book applications.

Giese and Smith (2007, p.54) concur with the above statement when they say that desperate clients are forced into a situation where they pay bribes to officials in order to bypass the inefficiencies in service delivery. Here, perpetrators of corruption are the customers apart from the employees.

Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) states the following seven important premises relating to corruption as outlined in the Africa Forum on Anti-Corruption held in March 2007:

- The first premise being that while corruption manifests itself in the relationship between individuals and institutions, corruption, as a practice, is rooted in the operation of market forces, the pursuit of individual prosperity and gain as opposed to the common good. This possessive individualism has undermined the goals and objectives of national and community level development;

- The second premise is that corruption is fundamentally undemocratic, it undermines the legitimacy and credibility of democratically elected governments and of responsible and accountable civil servants;

- The third premise is that corruption is about the interface of political and economic elites at a global, national and regional scale;

- The fourth premise is that the intentional preoccupation in the global corruption discourse with bribe-takers and bribe-givers, and particularly with bribe-takers, is disingenuous, ideologically loaded, and simplistic and certainly serves other agendas that are not linked to developmental goals. This discourse needs to be challenged precisely because it overlooks the complexity of the social forces, systems, processes and structures which underpin acts of corruption;

- The fifth premise is that corruption is a direct impediment to Africa's development. Corruption hurts the many and benefits the few. It inhibits the ability of government to respond to citizens' needs and to utilise scarce resources in the most efficient and effective manner. It also hampers the continent's efforts to instill sound political, socio-economic and corporate governance;

- The sixth premise is that corruption distorts and undermines the value systems of all societies and their peoples and possessive individualism and overrides any sense of the common good; and

- The seventh premise is that an anti-corruption strategy must be articulated by leaders in the political, economic and civil society spheres and must engage all sectors of society on the basis of a core set of leadership practices and values. Anti-corruption strategies must articulate an alternative ethos and value system.

Corruption engenders perverse political dependencies, lost political opportunities to improve the general well-being of the citizenry and fosters a climate of mistrust, particularly of public officials. The losses that accrue from a culture of permissiveness with respect to corruption include a loss of revenue, loss of trust, loss of values, loss of credibility and legitimacy and a loss of the democratic ethos and impulse within institutions and organisations. Fraser-Moleketi further states that;

> …corruption erodes the 'common good' and the 'people's contract'. The political cost of corruption is that it undermines democracy, weakens the developmental state and undermines responsibility, accountability and legitimacy. Therefore, the state needs to take a lead in combating, preventing, managing and eliminating corruption (Fraser-Moleketi, 2008, p.46).

In eroding the 'people's contract', corruption alienates citizens from the very officials they have elected and also alienates people from each other. Corruption destroys trust and erodes both the sense of global citizenship and the sense of shared responsibility as well as national citizenship and the sense of social cohesion. As opined by Fraser-Mokeleti:

> The time for complacency is over. Every day of inaction is a missed opportunity to create a more prosperous and transparent world. The greatest challenge is for those international commitments made on paper to become concrete action in order to eliminate corruption. South Africa's fight against corruption can only be effective if government works in partnership with civil society and the business sector. The fight against corruption is growing and new manifestations of corruption show gaps in the application of existing legislation and policies (Fraser-Mokeleti, 2008, p.46).

2.7 TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE TO SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The term *Batho Pele* comes from the Sesotho language and its literal English translation is 'people first' (Russell and Bvuma, 2001, p.245). *Batho Pele* is set out in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Government Gazette No 18340) dated 1 October 1997. This White Paper advocates that departments deliver responsive, quality services according to eight national service delivery principles referred to as the *Batho Pele* principles.

The ultimate aim of this public service delivery transformation initiative in South Africa is to improve service delivery and emphasise the criticality of a customer or citizen-focused ethos in public service delivery and monitoring. The White Paper on Transforming Service Delivery, 1998 *(Batho Pele)* provides a practical framework and implementation strategy for the transformation of service delivery, to encompass the recipients of services. It focuses on 'how' services are provided, allows 'customers' or citizens to complain and advocates a continuous improvement strategy in the quantity and quality of services. It also focuses on customer needs and responsiveness. Thus, *Batho Pele* principles reinforce a customer's right to complain. Furthermore, they reinforce a customer's right to courteous behaviour, transparency and openness at all times. The *Batho Pele* principles also emphasise redress, especially when a customer is not satisfied with the service provided (Russel and Bvuma, 2001).

The *Batho Pele* principle of service standards thus sets important benchmarks for monitoring service delivery in all departments and state entities. It seeks to achieve this ideal by setting a baseline for customers to complain when service standards are not met. The seventh principle, for example, is quite explicit about the nature of redress customers are entitled to. It states that if the promised standards of service are not delivered, citizens should be offered a speedy and effective remedy, and when complaints are made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, positive response.

The whole notion of *Batho Pele* demands a new approach to handling customers and citizens; many public servants often see complaints as an irritation and intrusion in their working lives.

Where complaints procedures do not exist, they often tend to defend or justify a department's problems. By offering redress, *Batho Pele* not only appeases irate or unhappy customers, but aims to change the mind-set of service providers from a preoccupation with the processes of service delivery to a focus on deliverables and outcomes. It thus puts in motion a process of improving service delivery and ultimately continuous improvement and quality service delivery.

While the White Paper on Transforming Public Services, 1998, among other things, stipulates that the public service would strive to provide services that are accessible, responsive, efficient and of good quality (Diphofa, 2002, p.24), evidence from a survey on compliance with the *Batho Pele* principles (Public Service Commission, 2000, p.17) suggests evidence to the contrary; customers are often not consulted about the level, quality and choice of service delivery they would expect.

Another matter of concern is the fact that measurable targets are usually not specified to increase access to services, and in the case of the *Batho Pele* principle of ensuring courtesy, very few departments put a courtesy charter in place, in which courtesy standards are specified. According to the Public Service Commission (2000, p.110) and contrary to *Batho Pele* principles and vision, redress as promised is often not delivered. If this finding is anything to go by, the practice is grossly inconsistent with the *Batho Pele* requirement to provide citizens with full, accurate information about public services that they are entitled to receive.

However, South Africa is inhabited by both citizens and migrants as well as immigrants (both white and people of colour) who equally depend on the South African service delivery departments (eg. Department of Home Affairs), and to whom *Batho Pele* principles were also meant to cover, though to a lesser degree as it seems that there is an ongoing debate about the supposed line between a citizen and others. Since South Africa is not an island, and even if it is South Africa cannot be excluded from the wave of human mobility around the globe, and this leads the study to migration conceptualisation.

2.8   THE PHENOMENA OF MIGRATION AND DEFINITION

There is no single definition of migration that could easily be applied in all contexts. In essence, migration should involve change of residence, and must accompany the crossing of the boundary of a migration-defining area (Kok *et al.,* 2003). Skeldon (1990) settles for a much simpler definition of migration where he sees it as referring to the spatial movement of people at various times of their lives for various reasons. That is, migration involves relocation within geographical space, and as such is characterised by a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence (Skeldon, 1990). Migration therefore takes into account simple events in the life cycle of the individual, such as moving from one place to another. Distance covered, or borders crossed qualify one as a local, national, regional or international migrant.

2.9   MIGRATION IN AFRICA: THE BROAD VIEW

The issues addressed in the postcolonial and post-apartheid migration literature are quite diverse. They include, among others, the following relationships between migration and other social phenomena;

- Poverty and diversification of coping strategies;

- Health and diseases (including HIV/AIDS);

- Crime, prostitution and issues of social morality;

- Social cohesion and fragmentation;

- Entrepreneurship;

- Xenophobia and identity.

In addition, current migration debates deal with the use of space in both ideological and geographical terms, and the influence of migration in disrupting the planning and implementation of programmes and of sustainable development.

2.9.1   Early Trans-National Migration: Africa as a Receiving and Sending Region

Much of the population movement that took place between the years of European expansionism and the end of colonisation/apartheid in Africa could be arrayed chronologically as commencing with trade, followed by slavery, and later on by the migration of Europeans to Africa. These episodes were followed by, and to an extent ran concurrently with, the shipment of indentured labour from India and other parts of Asia, as well as from central and southern Africa, to South Africa. To some extent, these movements were accompanied by some voluntary indigenous migration from the same source areas. This period was followed by the establishment of the migrant labour system, which existed together with the movement of individuals and families within and between Africa and other continents, before and during the struggle for independence.

2.9.1.1 Slavery and Colonialism

Slavery involved the capture and shipment of Africans to the Americas and Europe, where they arrived as commodities or commercial cargo (Becker, 1999). Involuntary migration under these conditions was akin, in a number of ways, to present-day human trafficking. Most of those who were abducted came from west and central Africa. This forced out-migration of Africans took place on a vast scale, with serious social consequences, and established a kind of early diaspora in Latin America, North America and the Caribbean in particular.

The export of enslaved people was followed by in-migration of European colonisers, who scrambled for Africa and scattered themselves across the continent (Pakenham, 1990; Rodney, 1973). However, the wide-scale occupation of Africa by European immigrants was preceded by the Dutch colonial occupation of South Africa, which began after the 1652 landing at the Cape. This period of occupation and colonisation brought European languages and metropolitan linkages, which have endured, with today's African countries strongly linked to each other and to Europe by the Lusophone, Francophone and Anglophone connections.

2.9.2 Trans-National Migration after the Formation of Colonies

Trans-national migration in colonised African countries worked differently for their black (native) and white (settler) people. The white population moved freely between countries, and regimes in recipient countries readily gave full citizenship to those who wanted to settle. At the same time, the citizenship of the black population was partial, and movement for them was minimal and heavily regulated to better support colonial control (Mamdani, 1996). Control measures notwithstanding, a great deal of illegal migration occurred away from the eye of power, and this movement followed social network lines. At the same time, most African women were more immediately confined and marginalised by the patriarchal principles of both the state and to a lesser extent, their own societies, which defined them as minors.

There was little inter-regional migration during the days of colonialism in Africa because there was little direct socio-economic relationship between the African regions; communication and transport networks were not readily supportive of mobility. However, some intra-regional migration did take place, often related to trade and to mobile labour.

2.9.2.1   Migration in Colonial West Africa

Trade between localities and regions is a well-established economic strategy in West Africa that was fully developed long before colonial boundaries were drawn. As a result, the people of West Africa have a strong affinity for travelling, and migration levels were high even during colonial days. Ethnic relations transcended national borders and movement across borders was widespread. For instance, Benin and Nigeria have long had large Yoruba populations, which engaged in continued interaction and cross-border movement even during colonial days. Movement within the region was also exacerbated by the stronger economies of Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana which pulled migrants from the region.

2.9.2.2   Migration in Colonial Central Africa

Most of the central African countries such as Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Gabon, and Cameroun were members of the French Equatorial African Federation and this enhanced migration between these countries since communication. economic structures and institutions,

and a common language were in place (Adepoju, 2002). However, migrants also came from and went to other regions in search of work, or as forced labour migrants.

2.9.2.3   Migration in Colonial East Africa

After World War II, East Africa was united under British control into British East Africa. In the post-colonial era, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya were quick to form a three-nation bloc, the East Africa Community (EAC). These ties enhanced migration between these countries during and after colonialism. Migrants moved within the region to take up employment, trade, visit or join relatives, herd animals or engage in religious practices.

The creation of national boundaries that separated communities of one ethnicity also ensured that trans-national migration would continue to exist regardless of state policies. People from ethnic communities such as the WaMaasai, the Hutu and the Tutsi continued to move across formal national borders in East and Central Africa since they had long-term, well-established relationships (Chachage, 2003; Mamdani, 2001). Uganda was also a prominent destination for many young Africans looking for university education because of its famous Makerere University, which attracted African migrants from all regions of sub-Saharan Africa.

2.9.2.4   Migration in Colonial Southern Africa

The countries of Southern Africa were basically English and Portuguese speaking from colonial times and were characterised by large-scale migrant labour exchanges from early in their written history. Originating with farm labour, labour migrancy exploded throughout the region with the rise to dominance of South Africa's mining industry. As early as 1850, migrants from the Mozambican districts of Gaza, Inhambane and Lourenco Marques were moving onto farms in the Western Cape as seasonal workers (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). However, large-scale migration began with the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in the 1860s; although migration's early diamond-mining boom was quickly overshadowed by the organised migration that followed the opening up of the gold mines on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s.

For close to a hundred years, massive migration from the Southern African Chamber of Mines established the Rand Native Labour Association and its successors to co-ordinate recruitment of labour and ward off competition (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). Most of the unskilled labourers who were brought to the gold mines in those days were sourced from Mozambique.

2.9.3   Intra-National Migration in Colonial Africa

Large-scale relocations of indigenous populations under state control occurred in settler colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa, where laws were instituted to create separate geographical spaces for different races as a form of legal ethnic cleansing. Big internal displacements were involved in this kind of process. These racial restrictions also affected indigenous populations well beyond the boundaries of the countries actually involved. In response, people continued to make formally illegal moves openly or secretly in order to contest or invalidate these imposed boundaries, and in order to bring home livelihoods as best they could. Control of internal migration was therefore a central issue of the colonial period, with indigenous people using migration as a weapon against the state. During and after colonialism, internal migration in Africa therefore included rural-urban, intra-rural, intra-urban, and urban-rural population movement, as well as within-country displacement of different kinds.

The occupation of land by whites usually promoted the overcrowding and impoverishment of the so-called native reserves, which colonial interests wanted entrenched so as to ensure a reservoir of labour (Ranger and Peel, 1982). Expulsions for the creation of reserves or tribal trust lands in Zimbabwe and the invention of Bantustans in South Africa's large-scale urban movement also occurred during the destruction of established native townships such as Sophia town. Administrative policy also ensured the movement of 'natives' from land earmarked for development, including land for towns, industries, mines, commercial farms, dams and military bases. All of these processes contributed to overcrowding of the indigenous population. Today the impact of past state-enforced migration still remains an issue in many African communities, as indigenous populations continue to fight to regain the lost land, and identity issues continue

to surface in the struggle for resources. The wide-scale compression of settlement and loss of resources under colonial rule has also reinforced the current growth of the problem of xenophobia (Mamdani 1996, 1998; Neocosmos, 1999).

2.2.1.1 War-Related Migration in Colonial Africa

During the height of the liberation struggles in Africa in settler colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique, large numbers of people fled rural areas to seek refuge in towns. The remaining rural populations in places such as Zimbabwe found themselves being moved by the state into 'protected villages' where activities were closely monitored by security forces (Ranger, 1982). Rural-to-rural migration also increased as people moved from war-ravaged territories to relatively peaceful areas.

The liberation struggles in places like Angola, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and northern Algeria also brought with it the intensification of women's hitherto suppressed migration, just as it intensified the movement of men (Fanon, 1965, 1967; Ranger, 1982). Capitalising on their apparent harmlessness in the eyes of the state, women moved from place to place as they actively participated in the liberation struggle in various capacities, including a role as armed guerrillas.

2.10 MIGRATION IN AFRICA AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE

As country after country attained independence in the 1960s and thereafter, migration patterns changed and the economic and political terrain of Africa changed as well. Both shifts in internal migration and in cross-border migration were involved.

2.10.1 West Africa

Independence broke barriers and increased migration across borders in West Africa. It is remarkable that West African countries managed to form an integrated sixteen-member country

regional economic community, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by 1975, despite the fact that they were colonised by different colonial metropoles (Adepoju, 2002). This was also a remarkable achievement considering that other member countries such as Nigeria and Ghana were under military rule, but more importantly, because they managed to overcome linguistic barriers, as nine members were Francophone, five Anglophone and two Lusophone (Adepoju, 2002). The founding of the ECOWAS led to increased regional socio-economic interaction and subsequently heightened intra-regional migration. The ECOWAS ensured, among other things, the free movement of persons without visas within the region (Adepoju, 2003).

However, rising post-colonial conflict likewise influenced migration patterns in the region. The conflicts that emerged in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia destabilised these countries, throwing refugees and asylum seekers across their borders. Nigeria had its own Biafra war and conflict with Cameroun, and these created massive movements of Nigerians across the world. For Nigeria, these conflicts also created many IDPs. In Mali and Burkina Faso, seasonal labour migration was a way of life for many who worked in the agricultural industry. However, the West African wars disturbed the economic performance of all the affected countries, giving rise to the out-migration of numbers of economic refugees of diverse socio-economic standing. Those who were formerly colonised by the French largely went to French-speaking countries, and former British subjects mainly went to English-speaking countries.

2.10.2 Central Africa

As a region, Central Africa has suffered more from war and conflict than any other part of the continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has had little peace after its liberation war, beginning with the assassination of its first head of state, Patrice Lumumba, which ushered in an era of political instability and misrule. The country quickly became a major source of out-migration despite its rich natural resource endowment. Refugees and asylum seekers from the DRC, or Zaire as it was formerly known, could be found scattered in large numbers in countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi. Very large numbers of people were also internally displaced, and many were left

without care as refugees or IDPs. Although Cameroun enjoyed relative stability after independence, it later found itself in a territorial conflict with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. This fighting destabilised the lives of many people who fell back into migration. Some left for France, while others went to many African countries (including South Africa), but many were left as IDPs. Professionals, students, job seekers, women and children were among those who left the country due to political instability and insecurity.

However, Gabon enjoyed relative stability after independence and its economy grew with each passing year. It rapidly became a popular migration destination, for migrants from the region and those from West Africa (Stalker, 1994), and has remained so up to the present.

2.10.3 East Africa

East Africa continued to experience economic migration within the region as well as from other regions, particularly from Southern Africa. Internal migration is considered to be generally high in Kenya, and it is estimated that during the 1980s one-third of rural household heads migrated (Sander, 2003). Though the post-independence period conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia resulted in refugee populations moving continually from one country to another, as well as the internal displacement of larger populations in these countries. In addition, the liberation wars in Southern Africa drew intensive support in Tanzania. A large population of exiles from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa found refuge in this country, which due to its university was seen as the intellectual heart of the anti-apartheid struggle.

2.10.4 Southern Africa

The labour migrant system mainly defined patterns in Southern Africa in these years. Governments in the region had agreements with South Africa regarding the shipment of their citizens as labour migrants to South African mines and farms (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). From 1975, Botswana began shifting from being a migrant-sending country to an international destination after the discovery of diamonds and the sudden growth of a mining industry. Many

people from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe migrated within the region after the formation of their short-lived federation. In Zambia, intra-urban as well as state-orchestrated rural-urban migration took centre stage in the 1960s and 1970s.

Post-independence mobility probably hit its peak in Southern Africa when thousands of Zimbabwean and Mozambican refugees went to Zambia and Tanzania during the height of their liberation struggles. From 1975 onwards, Zimbabwe sent thousands of refugees into Mozambique, with a smaller population going to Botswana. State policies together with the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe also led to increased rural to urban migration. The Renamo war that broke out in the late 1970s scattered Mozambicans across the region and Mozambique also experienced high levels of IDPs as it moved in 1975 from one war to another. At the same time, apartheid in South Africa sent many political exiles seeking refuge throughout the Southern African region and beyond.

Later, the resolution of the region's political struggles slowed the outflows and led to return migration on a significant scale. The attainment of independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the return of peace in Mozambique, and the fall of the apartheid state in South Africa, all combined to lead to return migration in the region in this period and beyond. IDPs, refugees, political exiles and many in the diaspora returned home.

2.11 MIGRATION PATTERNS IN AFRICA TODAY

Against this background of both violence and the struggle to institutionalise strong and capable governments throughout the continent, it is possible to locate the migration streams of the present day. These flows include labour migration to both international and internal destinations, and also particularly the involuntary migration flows represented by human trafficking and child migration, which are only now being recognised in the literature.

2.11.1 International, Sub-Regional and International Migration in Africa

Migration patterns, both internal and trans-national, shifted significantly when the last countries of the south joined the rest of Africa in independence. A major change has been the emergence of the south as a migration destination for other African countries in the past 20 years. Migrants to the southern region come from all corners of Africa and range from professionals to traders and job seekers. These migrants come from both rural and urban settings (Chimanikire, 2002). Upon their arrival in South Africa and Botswana, the regions' prominent destination countries, migrants encounter high levels of xenophobia and much of it is institutionalised (Chimanikire, 2002). In these countries cross-border flows are interpreted by most of the population as a serious problem needing redress and prevention. Despite that, South Africa has accepted a number of professionals and intellectuals from elsewhere in Africa into high-level government and private jobs for which there are not enough local candidates.

As this stream moves south, throughout Africa today people are migrating in large numbers from the rural village economy towards towns and cities in their own countries or sub-regions where there are more earning opportunities. This growing migration stream often brings the less educated, as well as women, children, and others who previously would have been unlikely to try migration, into contact with the developed economy, where they struggle to overcome barriers and disadvantages as they try to secure livelihoods and send remittances to their rural homes.

As these movements take place within African countries and sub-regions and across its regions, large numbers of more educated people are also leaving Africa to join the African diaspora overseas. Many of these migrants are encouraged to go by recruiters from the developed world, who offer inducements and rewards. This part forms the greatest risk, as the 'brain drain' carries away the educated elite of a continent that badly needs its professional-level migrants, or otherwise, to help them to invest in their home communities and countries of birth.

2.11.2 Internal Migration and the Rural Sector in Africa

Internal migration is a thriving survival strategy in a country such as Eritrea, which like most African countries, has a large rural sector. A survey conducted in the early 1990s established

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that Eritrean villages relied heavily on income from seasonal migration to nearby towns (Sander, 2003). In Mali, some tribal or ethnic groups are more given to migration than others, fundamentally the small number of available survival strategies have led to the embrace of migration as a tradition (Sander, 2003). Migration among the Bambara, for instance, is higher than it is among the Fulani and the Maure (Sander, 2003). There is also some evidence to support the prevalence of a pattern of replacement migration whereby migrants of rural origin move to towns to occupy positions vacated by nationals who emigrate to other countries. Such replacement migration is seemingly occurring in Mali, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal.

Africa is also a leading world region in respect of the feminisation of migration. Women from the rest of Africa are joining West African women, who have historically been involved in international cross-border trade (IOM, 2003). Migration within and from sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly becoming feminised as women from all walks of life are migrating independently.

Migration could also be seen as having an ethnic element in Kenya when one looks at other practices that are group specific. The WaMaasai, for instance, who are the cattle pastoralists of Kenya and Tanzania, are losing land to agriculturalists and to game parks, and the size of household herds is now a fraction of what it was before independence. Of late they have also started tracking into towns, where the men take up odd jobs while women often fall into prostitution (Chachage, 2003; May, 2004). The tragedy facing the WaMaasai is that they are largely uneducated and therefore excluded from taking up gainful employment as they lose their herding economy.

At the other end of the continent, internal migration is particularly strong in South Africa, which with a cash-based, largely post-agricultural economy is now counted as a middle-income country. South Africans are highly mobile, and move as economic migrants from rural to urban, from urban to urban, and within both rural and urban areas; many or perhaps most of these migrants are of rural origin. However, some destinations predominate, with large populations moving from all corners of the country to Gauteng and Cape Town in search of better life opportunities. Internal migration into and within Gauteng is so high that its population is

considered to be one that is characteristically on the move. However, education levels are again not high enough on average to qualify all migrants for a job.

2.11.3 Overseas Migration and the Diaspora

In recent years, cross-border migration has gained significant attention in high-level policy dialogues in numerous countries. According to the World Migration Report launched by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2010), the estimated total number of international migrants has reached 258 million, constituting over three per cent of the global population (IOM, 2010). Between 1960 and 2005 there was an approximately two-and-a-half-fold increase in the number of people migrating across international borders, from 75 million to almost 191 million (WHR, 2006). The Americas (North, Central, and South America, and the Caribbean) are the largest destination of international migrants, here alone the figures rose from 47 million in 2000 to more than 57.5 million in 2012 (Raus and Lloys, 2012). The same phenomenon was also found in Europe which has seen a consistent rise in the trend of migration since 2005, with migrants now constituting 8.7 per cent of the total European population (Rausa and Lloys, 2012). It is noteworthy that 7–13 per cent of the foreign residents in Europe did not have a legitimate residence permit; as a result, they were often labelled as 'undocumented migrants' (Karl-Trummer *et al.,* 2010; Biswas *et al*., 2011).

So far as the limited migration data allows, it has been established that the trend of emigration from sub-Saharan Africa to developed countries increased during the period 1990—2000 (Sander, 2003).

> The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent years, reaching 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000 (UN, 2017).

An estimated 25 million Africans live in Europe and North America today, and among these there are many professionals (UN, 2017). For instance, Nigeria has about 600 medical specialists working in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and up to 12,000 in the USA. It has also been noted that migrants from Mali, who reportedly see migration as a legitimate way of dealing with poverty, go to France while English-speaking nationals from Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra

Leone migrate to the UK in significant numbers despite the inhibitive xenophobia they encounter there (DFID, 2004; Toulmin, 2000).

It is not surprising that there should be large numbers of West African people in the developed North, since West Africa is perhaps the most easily mobile region of Africa. People from these countries form organisations that help them deal with life in the diaspora (DFID, 2004).

It has also been estimated that compared to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia has the second largest number of immigrants in the USA, after Nigeria. Increasingly, those from the 'Horn of Africa' region are migrating to Australia, especially those from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, although many of them go under the refugee/humanitarian migration category rather than as economic migrants. Of late, 60 per cent of Zimbabwean doctors have moved to Botswana and South Africa as the Zimbabwean economy took a downturn (Adepoju, 2006). Cross-border traders, labour migrants, professionals and apparent asylum seekers and refugees are also moving from Zimbabwe to countries such as South Africa, Cananda, Austaralia, New Zealand, the UK and the USA (Bloch, 2005).

2.12 CONTEXT OF MIGRATION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

Since migration is one of the defining issues of the 21st century, it is an essential, unavoidable and potentially beneficial component of the economic and social life of countries and regions. As numerous research conducted have shown that the question should no longer be whether or not migration should be accepted. Instead, how to deal with it and manage it effectively should be investigated, so that the benefits it has to offer could be fully exploited and its negative effects reduced or minimised (Mckinley, 2006, p.1). Hence, the focus should be on multi-dimensional aspects of international migration in order to identify appropriate ways and means of maximising developments and benefits and minimising negative impacts (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2006, p.2; Crush, 2001, p.1.)

Depending on the context, the term migration can have various definitions, and is applicable to both humans and animals. Throughout the World's history, people have been migrating across continents in search of food, shelter, safety and hospitable weather. Today, people are still on the move for the same reasons, as well as the new reasons arising, such as job relocation and overpopulation. As far as animals are concerned, migration is crucial to their survival, and are mostly dependant on the seasonal changes in weather and feeding patterns, or mating and breeding patterns (Grabianowski, 2008, p.6). Throughout the industrialised west, but also in the relatively rich eastern Asian countries and South Africa, immigration is becoming increasingly difficult (Fragomen, 1997). In South Africa where, during apartheid, large numbers of foreign workers were relied upon, opinions have turned against immigrants, mirroring similar concerns about foreign workers in Europe. It was alleged that Thabo Mbeki had warned, "Our people are just loafing in the street at the expense of foreigners flooding our offices and mines. The Home Affairs Ministry will have to sort this thing out ... I mean, these foreigners have got to go back home" (Layton and Henry, 1992).

In West Africa, with its intensive migration systems, migration opportunities changed with the expulsion of between 200,000 and 1.5 million foreign workers from Ghana in 1969, the expulsion of some two million illegal 'aliens' from Nigeria in 1983, and the 'increasingly xenophobic Ivoirian public' during the last decade (Winter, 1997, p.28).

However, views about migration and migrants are often based on an assumption of sedentarism, that populations used to be immobile and have been uprooted by economic or environmental forces. There is however much evidence to challenge this sedentary bias, and to view population movement as the norm rather than the exception (Skeldon, 1997). In historical Europe, pre-colonial developing countries, and current developing countries, migration has been an essential element in the livelihood strategies, of poor as well as better-off people. An emphasis on forced migration is warranted but should not be based on an assumption (which colonial authorities at times propagated) that before the entry of forced migration, populations were immobile.

Furthermore, migration is not limited to the 'rural-urban' transition: much migration remains within rural areas (Mollett, 1991), and migrants to urban areas tend to maintain close links with

their areas of origin. For example, it is commonly argued that the history of Africa is a history of migration. Richard Waller describes East Africa, before the advent of colonialism, as, "... a frontier region where society was fluid, highly adaptable, and capable of absorbing outsiders easily". Labour, rather than land, was the scarce resource. This placed a high premium on the ability of pioneering groups of individuals to contract and manipulate effectively a wide range of kinship and other ties in order to mobilise the social and political resources necessary for colonisation, as a result of the need for mobility, there were few barriers to the flow of populations from one small-scale unit to another and the definitions of identity tended to be inclusive rather than exclusive (McDowell, 1997).

Migration means crossing the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period (Boyle *et al.* 1998, chapter 2). Internal migration refers to a move from one area (a province, district or municipality) to another within one country. International migration means crossing the frontiers which separate one of the world's approximately 200 states from another. Many scholars argue that internal and international migration are part of the same process, and should be analysed together (Skeldon, 1997, pp.9–10). Rigid distinctions can be misleading: international migration may be over short distances and between culturally similar people (e.g. between the southern Philippines and Sabah in Malaysia), while internal migration can span great distances and bring together very different people (e.g. movements of the Uigar 'national minority' people from the western provinces of China to cities in the East). Sometimes the frontiers 'migrate', rather than the people, making internal migrants into international ones. For instance, the break-up of the former Soviet Union turned millions of former internal migrants into foreigners in the successor states.

The great majority of border crossings do not imply migration: as evidence shows that most travellers are tourists or business visitors who have no intention of staying for long. Migration means taking up residence for a certain minimum period - say 6 months or a year. Most countries have a number of categories in their migration policies and statistics. For instance, Australia distinguishes between permanent immigrants, long-term temporary immigrants who stay at least 12 months usually for work, business or education, and short-term temporary visitors. Yet Australia is seen as a 'classical country of immigration' because of its tradition of nation-building through immigration, and nearly all public debate is focused on permanent

immigration. Other countries prefer to see immigration as essentially temporary. When the German Federal Republic started to recruit so-called 'guest workers' in the 1960s, some were allowed in for a few months only as 'seasonal workers' while others received one-year permits. In time, it became difficult to limit residence so tightly: people who had been resident for a certain time obtained 2-years, then 5-years and finally unlimited permits.

However, Goetz (1999, p.18) and Helton (2003, p.2) both maintain that there is no universally-accepted single definition of migration. Goetz used a compromise definition which concerned only migration across state lines in the USA but excluded changes in residence within a single country. In Goetz's opinion (1999, p.18), the definition of migration in the USA refers to another in order to seek new places of residence. The current research has adopted the above definition with a nuance, to mean 'the movement of people across country (and state) lines within the African continent for the purpose of establishing a new place or seeking peace and stability'.

As noted by both Serrie (1998, p.11) and Helton (2003, p.5), the numbers of immigrants to any nation, and their countries of origin are powerfully affected by the receiving countries' immigration policies and laws, as well as the degree to which those laws are enforced. Colonial economic activities, by accentuating regional inequalities within and between countries, spurred internal and international migrations in varying degrees (Adepoju, 2006, p.32). Amin (1974) quoted in Adepoju (2006, p.32) found that in most Francophone west African countries, the fierce implementation of compulsory recruitment, contracts and forced labour legislation, and agreements to secure cheap labour, all of which the local people abhorred, sparked large-scale clandestine internal and cross-border migration of unskilled adult males required for infrastructural work, especially transport networks in the north and plantation agriculture in the coastal countries.

The way in which government label migration says much more about the nature of government policy on international migration, than the particular motivations and characteristics of the individuals who migrate. These different labels correspond to policies imposed on populations who crossed the borders, almost always with very mixed individual motivations. Only five nations on the planet encourage immigrants to settle permanently and obtain citizenship and

naturalisation: Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the United States. In addition, immigration policies vary from country to country. New Zealand's regulations require proof of family income to prevent the immigrants from placing a burden on the social welfare services, while the United State does not require proof.

Combing the world for opportunities, according to Cohen (1997), has historically been the privilege of the Europeans, who have been encouraged by their imperial governments to settle foreign territories, and who have benefited from fellow whites on the ground, from colonial officers to missionaries through businessmen, journalists and scholars (Cohen, 1997, pp.66-81). Without necessarily being homogenous collectively, whites have always managed to tame their differences in the interest of the economic, cultural and political hegemonies of *west vis-à-vis* the rest (Chinweizu, 1987). Thus, in South Africa for example, the Dutch who first landed in the Cape in 1652 actively encouraged immigration by whites from Europe and practically allowed them free access to the territory. Irrespective of locations, international migration has long been a topic of debate. In the West, questions concerning its causes and consequences have always influenced policy. As a result, much has been written on the historical role of immigration, although this has largely focused on social rather than economic history.

According to Nyamnjoh, (2006, p.28) the price for the European domestication was the systematic insulation and subjection of the indigenous populations by freezing migration from elsewhere, except for slaves or labour zombies, and on terms defined exclusively by the interest of the settler whites (February, 1991, pp.12-39; Cohen, 1997, pp.59-62; Elbourne, 2003, pp.380-88). While virtually 'anyone with white skin was welcome', non-whites, particularly from Africa, 'are unwelcome', and when it suited 'apartheid's pernicious "homelands" strategy of co-optation', the state allowed entry to selected black skilled immigrants and 'honorary whites' from Asia (Crush and McDonald, 2001, p.2). The disintegration of apartheid in the 1990s was accompanied by the scrapping of the whites-only immigration policy and thousands of Africans from the region and countries further north moved to South Africa. A new phenomenon was the inward movement of what can be called 'continental' Africans, Africans from beyond the southern African region (Morris and Bouillon, 2001, p.10).

However, the deepening economic, social and political crisis in a number of African countries (Zaire, Nigeria, Somalia, Senegal, Cameroun, Congo Brazzaville, etc.) meant that thousands of Africans were looking for a new home. In their own postulation, Morris and Bouillon (2001, p.10) suggest that relatively, peaceful and successful democratisation process in South Africa made it an attractive option and tens of thousands of people from other African countries moved to South Africa in the 1990s. It is interesting to note that not one of the thousands of migrant workers from neighbouring countries who spent (and often lost) their lives on South Africa's mines and farms ever qualified for permanent residence let alone citizenship in the country, as the system of contract labour compelled migrants to return home at the end of each contract and at the end of their working days (Crush and McDonald, 2001, p.3). However, in post-apartheid South Africa there has been little, or no progress witnessed in how African migrants are received.

2.13 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

Rogerson (1999, p.2) and Posel (2003, p.5) both note that there has been an increase in movement of foreign migrants into South Africa since 1990. Immigration to South Africa has a long and complex history. It is worthy to note that African immigration is certainly a new phenomenon. The following is a brief sketch of immigration to South Africa. White immigrants arrived from as early as the middle of the 17th century. The discovery of gold and diamonds and the attendant industrialisation greatly increased immigration from Europe and the United Kingdom in the late 19th and early century. Slaves were brought in from various countries: Madagascar, Indonesia, Angola, China and from Gulf of Guinea. Indian indentured labour was used to cultivate sugar from the 1860s.

From the mere fact that African population has a very old immigration history, an archaeological finding suggests that significant movements of population from the Bantu languages and cultures, goes back to the 3rd century AD (Cornevin, 1979, pp.77-95). From the last quarter of the 19th century, Africans from Mozambique and Nyassaland (Malawi), but also from Swaziland, Bechuanaland (Botswana), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern

Rhodesia (Zambia) and Angola, came to work on the mines of the orange free state and the Transvaal. Some farm labour was also drawn from surrounding countries.

By the time the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the basis for the system was already in place. Only whites were allowed to immigrate to South Africa, while black people were allowed to move to South Africa for a limited period of time if they had a job. They were not allowed to bring their families with them. As early as 1913 the law empowered the minister to refuse entry to the territory to any applicants who did not, in his judgement, 'Conform to the needs of the state' as per economic and cultural (linguistic) criteria. Bilateral agreements were concluded with neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Angola, and the protectorates and colonies of the British Empire to supply migrant labour (Peberby, 1997, p.3). Progressively, all the countries of the region were drawn into the migrant labour system. By the early 1970s, in many gold mines, eight out of ten workers came from Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Crush, 1995, p.11).

Workers from surrounding territories could not stay permanently in the country and had to go home at least once a year to renew their contracts. Furthermore, they were not entitled to purchase a property or have their families with them. In the 1960s, the reinforcement of the legislation and controls, which were based on the compulsory carrying of identity documents, resulted in the massive expulsion of nationals from neighbouring countries (Peberdy, 1997, p.12). The increased repression of black foreigners by the apartheid government went hand-in-hand with a massive increase in the implementation of the pass laws. Thus in 1967-68, over a 12-month period, 693,661 persons appeared in court charged with having transgressed the pass law (Horrel, 1971, p.164).

Conversely, with the coming into power of the National Party in 1948, immigration of whites or Europeans was systematically encouraged in order to reinforce the white minority and to provide for the ever-increasing need for skilled labour. Not all whites were welcome. Jews were subject to a good deal of discrimination. A government document issued in 1926 argued that immigration of Jews was incompatible with the reinforcing of the 'white nation' (Peberby, 1997b, p.5). Once she/he could prove his/her capacity to assimilate, the applicant was said to be, according to the Aliens Act of 1937, 'of good reputation and susceptible to being

assimilated by the white inhabitants…', the European immigrant was granted permanent residence. When they took out South African citizenship they were allowed to retain citizenship of their country of origin.

An interesting aspect of the apartheid state's immigration policy was that the apartheid system gave the so-called homelands enough autonomy to facilitate the inward movement of thousands of African immigrants from neighbouring countries. The so-called homelands provided a space in the system for black foreign Africans to move into South Africa. The racial compartmentalisation of urban areas also facilitated inward movement. Urban segregation allows foreign Africans to settle in some black townships without being harassed by the authorities who, by the early 1980s, in many instances had given up endeavouring to regulate settlement in these areas. Thus, despite drastic measures, many inhabitants from neighbouring countries, particularly from Mozambique, were integrated into the local black communities. In the mid-1980s, besides poor immigrants from Mozambique and other African countries, the first wave of middle class professional immigrants started arriving from 'continental' Africa. They were employed mainly as academics and in the public health system. Ironically, the 1990s saw a significant tightening up of the regulations and the flow of professional continental Africans has subsequently slowed. The post-apartheid government vigorously opposed within the SAC the adoption of the protocol project on the free movement of persons', arguing that the internal imbalances in the community would lead to an unbearable number of persons relocating to South Africa to look for employment.

To complete this brief history of immigration to South Africa, an important post-apartheid shift is that the immigration policy is no longer premised on national-racial reasoning, but on the right to control entry based on South African citizenship. However, the system of migrant labour in relation to foreign nationals has not been abolished. The new regime inherited contracts made with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland, and the legislation on the apartheid era. The revisions that have been made have not symbolised a significant shift in policy. In fact, since 1994, obtaining permanent residence status has probably become more difficult and the tracking down of Africans who are not South African and who are suspected of being illegal, and who are often accosted by the police on the basis that they look foreign. Police are supposedly able to identify foreign Africans by their accents, hairstyles or dressing

style, or in the case of Mozambicans, vaccination scars on the left front-arm (Minnaar, *et al.*, 1995, p.11).

The administration of the Home Affairs Department persists in refusing to regularise ex-migrant workers from neighbouring countries, even if they have spent a long time in the country, because according to legislation dating back to the days of apartheid, their presence in the country was not constant. The revising of the Aliens Control Act in 1995 did bring about some improvements. For example, foreigners can no longer be detained for longer than 48 hours without an official renewal and detention cannot extend beyond thirty days without authorisation from a Supreme Court Judge.

However, the revision of the law has done little to protect citizens (various cases have been reported of black South Africans being abused and arrested because they supposedly looked foreign) and non-citizens alike from the risk of arrest and, in the case of non-citizens, from arbitrary deportation (De La Hunt, 1997). Commenting on the revision of the legislation, the Labour Market Commission concluded that the revision had the potential for serious abuses of human rights (Commmission, 1996, paragraphs 541, p.174). Some analysts have argued that social reactions to immigration, especially irregular migration of foreign African nationals, have been shaped by the political discourses on immigration (see for example, Neocosmos, 2006). The tone of the discourses is to a large extent anti-immigration while a great deal of uncertainty and speculation surrounds the real magnitude of undocumented migrants. The public's perceptions on irregular migration remains driven by rumour, mediatised news, unrelated criminal activities or concerns over invasion by outsiders or aliens.

The status of 'illegal' immigrants remains one of the most problematic aspects of South Africa's immigration policy. Their rights are severely circumscribed. The suspicion of crossing a border illegally places the person concerned in an invidious position. If apprehended his/her rights are minimal. The situation creates a fertile climate for abuse and indeed many acts of brutality against foreigners have been reported. Looking at South Africa's immigration history we can see continental African immigration is not only a recent phenomenon, but a phenomenon whose characteristics are dissimilar to traditional immigration, black and white. 'Continental' African immigrants compared to the traditional African immigrants from the

SADC countries, are far more likely to have had a long urban experience and be relatively well-educated. Culturally, the continental Africans will often be fairly distinct in terms of dress, mannerism, modes of life, etc.

2.13.1 Emergence and Rise of Xenophobia

Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in the country, nor is South Africa the only country that is grappling with xenophobia. MacDonald and Jacobs (2005) define xenophobia as specifically referring to a "deep dislike of foreigners." (p.295). According to them the definition describes a discrete set of attitudes that manifest themselves in the behaviours of governments, the general public and the media. They further explain that as a term, xenophobia cannot be separated from violence and physical abuse, but rather, it should be framed so that it includes the word 'practice', since it is not only an attitude, but also an activity. It is not just a dislike of foreigners, but this dislike extends to violent practices that may result in bodily harm and damage (MacDonald and Jacobs, 2005). Xenophobia can also be understood as a bitter outcome of the exertion of collective identity. This identity is characterised by the dominant ethnic, religious, economic, political and cultural demands (Shindondola, 2003).

Xenophobia is a form of attitudinal, affective, and behavioural prejudice toward immigrants and those perceived as foreign. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary's (n.d.) definition of xenophobia is the "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign" highlights that the term has been historically used to emphasise a sense of fright of outsiders. However, more recent definitions of xenophobia suggest that the fear of foreigners and their impact is linked with ethnocentrism, which is characterised by the attitude that one's own group or culture is superior to others (Merriam-Webster Online, n.d.). Reynolds and Vine (1987, p.28) state that xenophobia is a "psychological state of hostility or fear towards outsiders". Crowther (1995, p.138) emphasises that xenophobia focuses on individuals who come from "other countries" and towards whom native individuals have "an intense dislike or fear".

However, scholars have also used the term 'nativism' to describe negative feelings toward immigrants and immigration (Gellner, 1995). Higham (1988, p.2) provides the following definition of nativism in the United States:

> Nativism is an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign (i.e. un-American) connections. Specific nativist antagonisms may and do vary widely in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting conditions of the day; but through each separate hostility runs the connecting, energising force of modern nationalism. While drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life. (Higham, 1988, p.2)

The preference for the term 'nativism' is typically based on the emphasis of the neutrality of the word in contrast to 'xenophobia', which implies the presence of prejudice or fear (Fry, 2001). However, even those scholars who use the term 'nativism' usually highlight the negative implications of nativist attitudes (Fry, 2001; Perea, 1997). Because these attitudes are not neutral, 'xenophobia' as a term, seems to more clearly indicate the presence of attitudinal and behavioural hostility towards non-native individuals. Moreover, the term 'xenophobia' is commonly used by social psychologists, human rights organisations, and the United Nations to describe anti-immigrant sentiments.

As xenophobia is generally regarded as fear and intolerance of foreigners, Wimmer (1997) in his study opines that xenophobia is an expression or struggle over distribution issues. His study shows that downwardly mobile groups of national groups of solidarity appeal to reassure their place in the core of the social fabric. Hence people outside this group are perceived as competitors for state-organised promises of solidarity and security. Apparently, it is argued that xenophobia cannot just be framed as an attitude since there is no comment patterning the effects/consequences of that mind-set (Harris, 2002). However, believing such is misleading since xenophobia in South Africa is not restricted to only fear or dislike of foreigners, but rather xenophobia translates to violence and physical abuse and must be reframed to incorporate practice (Kappan,1999 cited in Harris,2002).

Be that as it may, Abdi's contestation is that xenophobia arises as a result of cultural differences and the inability to assimilate the culture of the host communities which exposes the vulnerability of the immigrants (Abdi, 2011). Hence igniting dominion over them and to the extent that those official power-holders ignite a culture of exclusion through the institutionalisation of cultural social work. In the same way, this situation presents a breeding ground upon which xenophobia thrives. But this postulation does not show the way, form and extent of the exclusion. Research and historical events have indicated that if a majority group is in a perilous economic position they are more likely to feel threatened by minorities, especially if they are foreigners (Pettigrew, 1957; Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995).

2.14 XENOPHOBIA IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Xenophobia is encountered in many contemporary societies. Its targets are different across countries and nations. In 1997, the European Union carried out a study on xenophobia in all member states. It was found that almost 33 per cent of the people interviewed were quite xenophobic or very xenophobic. Most of the responses revealed that the reasons for being xenophobic could be dissatisfaction with their life circumstances, fear of unemployment, insecurity about the future and low self-confidence in the way public authorities and the political establishment worked in their country (Shindondola, 2003).

Xenophobia is a global problem that has been experienced in both industrialised and developing countries, it is not indigenous to any part of the world, nor alien to any. It is a reality in Germany, Japan, Britain, Nigeria and even South Africa. Large-scale migration has grown dramatically in recent years. Around the world, approximately 150 million people live outside their countries of origin, temporarily. Movement across borders is directly related to discrimination and intolerance (Chakma and Jensen 2001, p,111). Internationally, the emphasis on accommodating immigrants is on pluralism and multiculturalism, reflecting greater awareness of cultural diversity. When a society does not appreciate the differences of immigrant groups, such differences are seen as problems to be overcome (Motani, 2002, p.225). Focus will now be directed on other countries such as America, Japan, Germany, Britain and France to see how they have accommodated language and cultural differences in education.

2.14.1 America

"America isn't a multicultural society. It's a melting pot with a tiny minority of radical separatists. The children of immigrants continue to learn English and assimilate despite the excesses of bilingual education, just as they always have" (Weisberg, 1995, p.43). The large-scale entrance of legal and illegal immigrants into America has created economic problems as well as problems relating to social absorption. Marger (1991, p.533) maintains that this issue is debatable, since some argue that immigrants "constitute an added burden to the already swollen labour pool," and others are of the view that "they create as many jobs as they take". The current immigrants are "highly visible, bringing to American society cultural and physical features". In America however, it is assumed that the use of English will encourage social integration. Initially English was promoted in schools and other educational institutions in the hope that the immigrants' languages would be abandoned, if not by the first then by the second generation. Immigrants were permitted to have their own private schools and to publish their own newspapers, which served as a means of preserving culture and language. The language issue is a burning one and language assimilation is being challenged. Greater tolerance in American society has led to providing educational and other services in the languages of the new groups (Marger, 1991, p.535).

An extremely old and familiar theme in U.S. history has been the episodic anti-foreigner xenophobia. So old and so familiar is this xenophobia that at one time it was illegal in 22 states to teach a foreign language. The Supreme Court overturned this policy but by 1954, only 56 per cent of American high schools offered a foreign language as a subject with less than 14.2 per cent enrolled in studying a foreign language. Today, less than 9.3 per cent of Americans are fluent in another language (Bouwer, 2005).

Having emigrated from Iran after the hostage crisis I've endured stereotypes about being a terrorist, hostage taker, suicide bomber, etc. as a school yard taunt. To see a columnist insinuates a school is going to indoctrinate children to become terrorists merely because it teaches Arabic is highly offensive. On the second question of whether the school should exist given that it focuses on teaching students how to speak Arabic, is interesting" (Wolf, 2007, p.29).

Several scholars have noted that immigration in America has become a focal point of heated national debates (Dillon, 2001; Fuentes, 2006; Munro, 2006; Smith and Edmonston, 1997; Toy, 2002). Immigrants are repeatedly associated with the declining economy, overpopulation, pollution, increased violence, depleted social resources (i.e. medical and educational), erosion of cultural values, and terrorism (Cowan, Martinez, and Mendiola, 1997; Munro, 2006). Immigrant individuals are often portrayed as criminals, poor, violent, and uneducated (Espanshade and Calhoun, 1993; Muller and Espanshade, 1985). According to Namtanbu (2012, p.4), in the United States of America, it seems that racial profiling only applies to African-American (black) males. His study also poignantly confirms the truism that "African-Americans are over-stopped, over-frisked, over-searched and over-arrested" by white police officers in America. The 26 February 2012 killing of the unarmed 17-year old, Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida speaks volumes as to the omnipresence of white xenophobia (fear of other races) in America, and it must be pointed out that this putative fear, real or imagined, only targets the African-American (black) males.

Indeed, one may have naively assumed that with the anomalous election of America's first African-American (black) President, Barack Obama, this white xenophobia mind-set would have gradually been relegated to the ash heap of America's societal history, but the reverse was the case.

2.14.2 Japan

Grant in Motani (2002, p.226) says that "an education system will naturally reflect the norms of the host society. For the schools, the question is how far they can or should take account of cultural differences, how much variation they can accept and whether they should seek to assimilate the minorities or encourage them to retain and develop their own cultures". The Japanese government promotes immigration and even went to the extent of relaxing the

requirement to allow immigrants to enter and work in the country. However, when it comes to education, no official policy on multicultural education exists because of the assimilation strategy.

Prior to 1965, educational discrimination against immigrant Koreans was deep rooted and one form of discrimination was the oppression by the Education Ministry; the government systematically suppressed the Korean language and culture by prohibiting the teaching of the Korean language, history and geography in schools (Motani, 2002, p.229). In another instance, media reports about the case of a Peruvian worker, arrested on suspicion of killing a seven-year-old girl, have exposed the vulnerability of foreign workers to Japan's famous xenophobia. A Peruvian child in a Japanese public school talked of the mental pain and sadness she felt when the teacher in her class asked the students to name the nationality of the suspect. Activists contend that the hysteria over the murder fanned a deep undercurrent of distrust of foreigners who the police have linked to the rising crime in the country. Prof. Chikako Yamawaki at Bunkyoku University has launched a programme in two primary schools that teaches Japanese students the Spanish language and Latin American culture in the hope of fostering deeper cross-cultural understanding. "I realised that the policy of teaching the Japanese language and culture to children of migrant workers does not result in equality for foreigners. Japanese people must learn more about the other side for real cooperation and understanding," she explained (Kakuchi, 2005, p. 68).

At the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, held in Geneva in 2001, the Korean delegation maintained that the Japanese government deprived children of foreign nationality of the right to education. While a child of foreign nationality has the option of going to a Japanese school, the problem is that the child will not have the right to a proper Japanese language education, or to learn his or her ethnic language. Consequently, many children cannot cope with the classes in Japanese schools, are unable to find opportunities to foster their identity, and are in reality excluded from education (UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2001).

To emphasise the plight of the foreigners in Japan, the committee highlighted that this was the fourth recommendation by the UN human rights bodies to urge the Japanese government to redress discrimination against the ethnic Korean schools and ethnic education of Korean residents in Japan. Furthermore, the committee expressed its concern about the fact that Korean schools were not officially recognised even when they adhered to the Japanese national

education curriculum and therefore, they neither receive central government subsidies nor are they able to provide qualification for university entrance examinations. The concluding observations also mentioned that "there are very limited possibilities for children in society, particularly in the fields of employment, housing and education" (UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2001).

2.14.3 Germany

Germany has a thoroughly studied history of victimisation. The holocaust provides a unique example of the atrocities, victimisation and genocide against minority Jews. Xenophobia and racially motivated violence in Germany are rooted in this past. In 2001, a proposal was presented for a council framework decision to combat xenophobia and racism. According to this proposal (which has not yet been adopted as law), crimes committed against minority groups with "racist and xenophobia motives, should be made aggravating factors and enhance penalties" (Winterdyk and Antonopoulos, 2008, p.115).

The following words of Veronica, a foreigner in Germany, emphasise the xenophobic behaviour of Germans towards foreigners:

> As an Asian, I felt so much discrimination in all aspects of life, especially in school. I came to Germany at age 16 and was hoping to go to university. Almost all the high schools we went to rejected me solely for the fact that my German wasn't good enough. No matter how I try to explain to people that I have nothing left in my home country and my new life is here, they always treat me as if I am exotic and that everything in German life is still new and novel to me. I have a German name, I have a German passport, but I look Asian, and therefore am a foreigner" (der Spiegel,).

According to a confidential government study on juvenile violence, it is inferred that xenophobia is widespread among German youth (Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, 2008, p.4). Almost a third of all German schoolchildren agreed 'completely' with the statement that there are too many foreigners in Germany; another third of those who were asked 'mostly' agreed. Almost a fifth of the learners in the 9th grade who were asked also had open prejudices against

Islam, and one out of every 13 admitted to committing a hate crime such as spraying a swastika on a wall or damaging the property of foreigners. Gabi Elverich at the Centre for the Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia at the German Youth Institute confirms the findings of the study.

While many schools in Germany are working hard to combat racism and xenophobia, teachers often find it difficult to get to grips with the root causes of the problems. Elverich is of the opinion that "this kind of work (combating xenophobia) is not as easy as doing maths and geography. To teach the issues, teachers have to confront their own attitudes too. And at a time when we have lots of educational reforms, teachers are finding it a strain". According to Elverich, civic education is part of the German curriculum, but little time is devoted to the subject, much of the anti-racism education in schools takes the form of troubleshooting, with little regular attention given to the issue (Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, 2008, p.4).

A study conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in 2004 shows that education systems have implemented new programmes and curricula to meet the needs of a more diverse body of pupils. This includes second language and native language programmes, intercultural education, and multicultural curricula. In addition, special teacher training programmes have been implemented to institute a more diverse teacher body (Luciak, 2004, p.7). The population of foreign pupils has been considerably high, as a result of the migration of foreign labourers from the 1960s to the 1980s. Many pupils with citizenship from Turkey or Yugoslavia attend German schools. In the last decade, the migration inflow decreased but the share of migrant pupils in the school system increased. The enrollment rate of foreign pupils is above nine per cent of the schoolchildren in all schools, but above 12 per cent in primary schools (Luciak, 2004, p.9).

On average, migrant pupils in comparison to German pupils finish school at an earlier age with significantly lower qualifications. In 2001, 74,381 migrant pupils with a foreign citizenship finished schools that offer general education (Hauptschule, 2005, p.7). While 20.3 per cent of these pupils left without any formal qualifications, this is true for only 8.6 per cent of the German pupils; 40 per cent of the migrant learners (compared to 24.2 per cent of the German pupils) left *Hauptschule* with a certificate; 29 per cent passed *mittlere Reife,* which is

comparable to a General Certificate of Secondary Education, (compared to 41.7 per cent of the German pupils). Only 10.7 per cent of the migrant pupils compared to 25.5 per cent of the German pupils obtained the right to study at universities. Prejudice, which tends to be expressed in harassment, racial slurs and scapegoating, results in migrant and minority pupils perceiving themselves as either not being accepted or being excluded by members of the dominant culture (Luciak, 2004, p.46).

To further highlight the discrimination towards foreigners in Germany, in Bremen, the law aims at banning not only Muslims from wearing headscarves, but also nuns from wearing habits. Nevertheless, according to the Bremen Senator of Education, Christian and Jewish symbols are allowed provided they are shown in a 'discrete and non-provocative way'. In Berlin, the wearing of all noticeable religious symbols, no matter whether Muslim, Christian or Jewish, is banned completely (Bosch and Peucker, 2005, p.33). Despite the xenophobia in Germany, the German school system promotes a policy for the integration of children from minority groups. A well-received campaign is the "Fairness and Understanding" campaign, which is aimed at informing and educating the young as they are vulnerable to the propaganda of right wing extremists (Europe's Commission Against Racism and Intolerance – Report on Germany, 1998, p.9).

2.14.4 Britain

In Britain, the most widely researched aspect of education pertains to the under-achievement of minority groups. Tomlinson in O' Donnell (1991, p.63) states that the ethnocentric nature of the curriculum, inappropriate curriculum materials, selection processes in schools, and subject selection in secondary schools has an effect on the educational performance of minority groups of immigrants in Britain. Raising the achievement levels of these learners is a complex issue that does not have simple answers.

Archer and Yashamita (2003) are quoted in Murji and Solomos (2005, p.107) for their findings on working class 15 and 16-year olds who were not performing well at school. The teenagers had the notion that they were 'not good enough' and that they knew 'their limits'. Caroline

Howarth (2002) found that 12 to 16-year olds from various ethnic groups recognised that they were stereotyped because of their area of origin. Many teenagers indicated that they became conscious of colour because of name-calling and racism. The following quotation depicts how an immigrant child felt at school: "There were quite a few black children in my school. I think it was in the second year – I had quite [a] racist teacher. I was very good at maths and I was kept back because – I don't know, but I did have a – she was racist, a racist teacher and my mum had to go up and see the headmaster" (Murji and Solomos, 2005, p.115).

Researchers focused attention on policies to change the situation for foreigners. The 1991 census included a question on ethnicity to monitor 'ethnic disadvantage', and academics turned their attention to the impact of victimisation on immigrants. Chahal and Julienne, in Chakraborti and Garland (2004, p.86), interviewed 74 people and found that "racist victimisation ... turns normal, daily activities into assessments of personal safety and security". It was concluded that immigrants were feeling "threatened, isolated and vulnerable". In his research, Nizhar, in Chakraborti and Garland, (ibid) identified that government officials were also unresponsive to complaints from foreigners. One local government officer stated that "they should give up their identity and image and take on board white culture". Chakraborti and Garland (2004, p.171) maintain that the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) primarily aims at ensuring that education establishments are aware of policies and procedures to tackle xenophobia and racism effectively. In spite of legislation, research portrays a failure to stem the growing problem of xenophobia and racism in the education system. The lack of attention paid to the needs of minority ethnic groups in the classroom is well documented where "Lessons are habitually taught from a white perspective; leaving minority ethnic pupils feeling disillusioned and isolated" (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004, p.171).

Researchers and academics emphasise that there is a clear case for ensuring that existing policy, guidance and examples of good practice are implemented across the entire education system from the central government down in a consistent and coherent manner. Regional conferences, held in 2003, examined issues relating to eradicating racism and xenophobia through education. The Stephen Report makes recommendations using the code of practice and outlines specific procedures to be followed for recording and dealing with racist incidents on school premises and on journeys to and from school. Young people are also empowered to address racism,

intolerance and xenophobia in schools. They are encouraged to support each other by being assertive, as opposed to being aggressive or submissive, when incidents occur at school. A further recommendation is to cover interpersonal relationships (including racism, xenophobia, bullying and name-calling) within the curriculum of learning for citizenship (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004, p.173).

2.14.5 France

France is no exception to racist and xenophobic ideas. Xenophobia exists amongst a substantial portion of the population, and manifests itself in the attitudes towards immigrants, minorities and foreigners. Immigrants are blamed by the majority of French citizens for the increasing unemployment and crime and decreasing educational standards. They are seen by nearly three quarters of the population as more likely to commit crimes than the average French person is. Nearly 40 per cent of the population supports forcible repatriation of unemployed immigrants, and 22 per cent supports forcible repatriation of all immigrants. Subtle forms of racism are reflected in the educational system because there is no disputing the fact that the most prestigious universities and graduate schools recruit almost all their students from a "limited sociological pool of the white, the wealthy and the well-connected" (Randall, 2001, p.86).

In 2004, there was an unprecedented surge in xenophobic acts which increased by 25 per cent. Consequently, this resulted in an increase in intimidation and threats, which undoubtedly led to an increase in xenophobic acts committed in schools. Only 12per cent of the offences committed constituted violent racist threats or acts. These statistics indicate that xenophobic crimes increased by 20 per cent in 2004 and may not be a true reflection of xenophobia due to under-reporting. Bullying of foreigners was reported 210 times more than any other form of racism. It must also be pointed out that the emphasis is on inclusiveness of culture and that 36 per cent of the French population have foreign parents or grandparents which may attribute to the reduction in intolerance in France. Attitudes of intolerance are "more widespread among men and the older generations" (Winterdyk and Antonopoulos, 2008, p.107).

According to the RFI (2013) report, the French are increasingly intolerant of and unwelcoming to immigrants, the CNCDH argues in its annual report on racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. As in many European countries, it stated that the financial crisis has boosted resentment towards immigrants, while last year's Toulouse killing spree by Islamist gunman, Mohamed Merah, and the row following the publication of caricatures of the prophet Mohamed, also helped feed anti-Muslim sentiment. According to the report, it also found a 30 per cent rise in Islamophobic incidents as well as resentment of Roma and immigrants, with 69 per cent saying that there are too many immigrants in France and believing that they do not want to integrate into French life, a rise of 10 per cent on 2011. Chen (2013, p.5) equally states that racism in public discourse has become especially conspicuous in recent years. In the political arena, politicians are no strangers to dealing with xenophobia. This turmoil can be attributed in part to the influx of immigrants from post-colonial Africa. The floundering economy has prompted nationalists to protest that the immigrants are taking away opportunities from domestic candidates. Not surprisingly, the wave of political refugees from northern Africa, as a result of the 'Arab Spring', only exacerbated these concerns.

HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA

The growing trend of migration has been mirrored by a demand for a reorientation of health policies to better protect migrants' health (Macpherson *et al*, 2007). This fact is reflected by the content of a number of recent high-level, health-related international activities/meetings. In 2006, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Global Commission on International Migration and the high-level dialogue called for a more collaborative and cohesive global response to the challenges of migration. In 2009, the Programme Coordination Board (PCB) of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) held its 24th meeting in Geneva, highlighting HIV-related needs for people on the move. The Board also articulated that the improvement of HIV information and services for migrants would buttress the development and implementation of international healthcare strategies (UN, 2009). The issue of the health of migrants has expanded from disease-specific care to health promotion and disease prevention. For example, the annual European Public Health Association (EUPHA) Conference in 2014 underlined the need for adaptation of health promotion and disease prevention interventions for migrants and ethnic minority populations (WHO, 2015).

In addition, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has been acting as a catalyst between various stakeholders, in addressing the health of migrants. Its action is visible through a number of relevant World Health Assembly Resolutions (WHR), for instance, WHR60.26 on 'Workers health, global plan of action', urging member states to work towards full coverage of all workers including migrants (WHO, 2007), and WHR61.17 on the 'Health of migrants', which calls for migrant sensitive health policies and practices (WHO, 2008).

Challenges concerning the health of migrants cannot be tackled straightforwardly since the issue is highly dynamic and complicated, involving various stages of migration, from pre-departure to early and late migratory status (Ullmann *et al*., 2011; Lassetter and Callister, 2009). Furthermore, this matter is tightly intertwined with several social determinants, which are related not only to migrants' characteristics (such as, different gender roles, cultural diversity, migration experiences, and precarious legal status), but also the contextual environment of migrant destination countries (such as, idiosyncratic health systems and cultural values) (Spallek, Zeeb, Razum, 2011; Malmusi, 2010).

Though there exists some literature exploring the health status and perception migrants have towards service utilisation in many receiving countries (De Maio, 2010; Almeida *et al.* and Brewin, 2006), there is still little evidence that deeply examines the health services which migrants receive in actual practice from the viewpoint of service providers. This study could not systematically review the literature which has investigated the perceptions and practices of healthcare providers in managing care for migrants, as well as the challenges and barriers that health personnel faced.

2.15 POPULATION OF FOREIGN-BORN IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the 2016 survey, StatsSA explained that, since the onset of democracy, "research has anecdotally reported more immigration numbers [migration into South Africa] relative to emigration [emigration outwards]StataSA, 2016, p.9". This assumption appeared to be borne out by the data from the three census reports that followed 1994, conducted in 1996, 2001, and

2011. The 1996 census reported 958,188 foreign-born people in South Africa. By 2001 this figure had grown to 1,03-million. A decade later, census 2011 showed the number of foreign-born migrants had more than doubled, to just over 2,1-million, people.

However according to the 2016 survey, South Africa's foreign-born population has now declined to 1,6-million. Diego Iturralde, chief director for demography at StatsSA, told Africa Check that the decline was "unexpected" and that StatsSA was investigating "to see what may have informed this change". Hence, StatsSA suggests in the report that the decline could be as a result of foreign-born people lying about their nationalities, which may highlight an "instilled fear of disclosure of one's origin". The report also states that there was a need to investigate the enumerators' capability to get correct answers on people's countries of origin.

In addition, the recorded number of foreign-born people in the 2016 Community Survey is also almost half the number of migrants estimated by the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). DESA in the Africa Check (2017) estimates that, in 2015, there were over 3,14 million international migrants living in South Africa. Pablo Lattes (2017), a population affairs officer from DESA's population division, states that their estimates were based on the 2011 census figures, indicating 2,1 million international migrants. To this they added a rounded-up figure of 600,000 asylum seekers and refugees – based on the 2015 UNHCR [the UN Refugee Agency] data – which then "puts the total foreign born to around 2,7 million. The number of foreign born has been steadily growing in South Africa," according to Lattes, "so we consider our estimate of 3,1 million to be a very likely estimate for the country" (Lattes, 2016). "The UN [estimate] is based on a model with a series of assumptions which in the past has tied up nicely with our data but this time round we seem to have diverged in our numbers," as Iturralde argues (Iturralde, 2016).

DESA's report in Africa Check (2017) states that in 2000 there were just over 1 million international migrants in South Africa, or 2.25 per cent of the population. This figure ties in with previous numbers released by StatsSA, which found, in the 1996 and 2001 censuses, and the 2007 community survey, respectively, "2.1 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the enumerated population", were foreign born. The 2011 census was the first survey to estimate a significantly larger proportion of international migrants, at 4.2 per cent of the country's

population (confusingly, some older StatsSA reports incorrectly cite this proportion as 5.7 per cent).

2.15.1 Population, Gender and Age of Migrants

Hence, both the 2016 Community Survey and Census 2011 found that there are more male than female migrants in South Africa – a 60:40 ratio – and that most migrants were of working age (between the ages of 15 and 64 years old).

Figure 2. 15. 2: Population and Gender of Foreign Born Immigrants in South Africa

POPULATION OF FOREIGN BORN IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Source; Africa Check (2017)

2.16 XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

Unfortunately, the increasing diversity of post-apartheid South Africa's population has not been welcomed by a large part of the population and xenophobia has become an increasingly

serious issue (Morris and Bouillon, 2001, p.10). The media is constantly reporting verbal and physical attacks on immigrants and of course many go unreported. A disturbing proportion of attacks involve excessive violence and even murder. Anti-immigrant sentiment is not only strong in South Africa, it is widespread (Danso and McDonald, 2001, p.116; Neocosmos, 2008, p.14; Gordon, 2010, p.46). It is on record according to Nyamnjoh (2006, p.38) that Black African migrants with whom very few South African nationals have had a 'great deal of contact' are negatively perceived by nearly all South Africans, and 75 per cent of whom associate them with all sorts of ills (Danso and McDonald, 2001, pp.115-117). With the exception of the occasional intervention of the Human Rights Commission, the failure of the South African constitution and authorities to protect the rights of non-citizens is clearly at variance with all claims that South Africa is building a culture of human rights (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.41).

Hence Peberdy's (2001, pp.28-29) submission that by limiting entitlements only to national citizens, the South African state has shifted the emphasis to "keeping out those who do not belong and preventing anyone else from joining", especially those who have the "wrong citizenship". Harris (2001, p.85) summarises the reasons for such negative perceptions towards black Africans to include the fact that they compete for scarce resources and public services such as schools and medical care, infrastructure and land, housing and informal trading opportunities, and with citizens who are already living in poverty and below the breadline. Sichone (2001, p.10) argues that the desperate economic positions of most African migrants mean that they accept lower wages and undo the bitter struggles of South African trade unions, by working as scab labour.

Researching on a larger scale than before, Gordon (2010, p.46) observes that the victory over racial segregation and other aspects of apartheid only created a new era of contestation over social and economic rights, the product of which is a new discriminatory system that ensures exclusion of African immigrants from socio-economic rights in the political system. In his own submission, Gordon (2010, p.78) describes the law guiding immigration as 'draconian', and most are derived from apartheid rules and regulations. Hence the xenophobia which exists in the public is fuelled by a state policy that has failed to exhibit inclusive policy for foreigners. According to McDonald and Jacobs (2005, p.84), xenophobia seems to have fully matured and

is widespread in Southern Africa, and also that Southern Africa shows an extraordinary consistency in their antagonism towards foreigners, most especially those from other countries in Africa and particularly those deemed to be illegal immigrants in the region.

Not only did migration during apartheid provide means of recruiting cheap labour from neighbouring countries, it also served to fuel the political and public debates around the formation of citizenship in South Africa (Klarreen, 2008; Belvedere, 2008; Neocosmos, 2006; Kabwe-Segatti and Landau, 2008). In the post-apartheid South Africa, as was in the apartheid era, migration is very central to the various entitlements to public goods and services through citizenship. A noticeable fact is the way in which entitlement has got entangled in xenophobic attitudes directed to African foreigners. Lesser expressed in the past, its virulence has gradually reached a level that one would qualify tense. However, the tension arising from the politics of entitlement goes beyond the 1994 elections. Neocosmos (2006) strongly argues that xenophobia in South Africa is a direct effect of a particular kind of politics, a particular kind of state which was forged in opposition to the manner in which the apartheid state interpolated its subjects. In the post-apartheid state, politicians and state institutions have their parts in the making of a culture of xenophobia, and this has filtered down to the whole of society.

This statement echoes as well in Belvedere (2008) who problematises the state as a key player in reproducing xenophobia. To Belvedere, xenophobia is the effect of the ongoing and contradictory process of state formation in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. In this process, two ideologies are at work: on the one hand, the affirmation by the South African 'state' of its existence and sovereign character, and on the other hand the definition of a national identity for itself both in relation to 'inside' others (including civil society groups) and those perceived to be 'outside' others (including undocumented migrants and refugees). Klaaren (2008) too concurs that permanent residence, which finds its starting point in 1986 with the abolition of the Influx Control Act of 1986, is arguably the paradigmatic migration status for South Africa. What the above views suggest is the centrality of migration in the attribution of the resident status in the formation of South Africa as a state.

Neocosmos found that those in government and positions of authority have made comments or statements which suggest that they are also xenophobic, for instance former Home Affairs

minister, Mangosotho Buthelezi, who said that if South Africans would have to compete with millions of aliens it means sacrificing the reconstruction and development programme of the country (Neocosmos, 2008 p.14). For a person at ministerial level to make such a xenophobic statement is an indictment of the political culture of South Africa. There are also indications implicating the democratic government in their failure to fulfil their political promises to the citizens and instead turning an accusatory finger at aliens as being responsible for unemployment, diseases, a high crime wave and general social instability. The police also engage in exploitation of immigrants, while the experience in the Lindela detention centre is that of exploitation and clear ill treatment of immigrants (Neocosmos, 2008, p.50).

In most instances, media reports about immigrants are subjective as African immigrants are labelled as criminals. Researchers like Neocosmos, Danso and McDonald argue that the electronic and print media incites xenophobia in a society that already holds a negative view of foreigners (immigrants). The media has a responsibility for reporting to the general public about immigration and the cost of it to the South African society, but it must also balance such reports with positive aspects of immigration, including their contribution to the economy. For instance, immigrants compete with South Africans for jobs, but they are also wealth creators. Immigrants use basic facilities such as water, housing, electricity and basic amenities, but they are willing to pay for them, and to pay taxes (Danso and McDonald, 2001, p.60).

Dodson and Oelefse (2000) make the point that the "xenophobia debate" in South Africa needs to be framed in terms of a "nesting of scales" from the local to the global, identifying which processes operate at what scale. They caution that there is a tendency to "generalise" xenophobia, to see all South Africans as complicit, "extending to the national scale competition and conflict which are far more localised in causation, character and extent" (p.126). Nevertheless, local case-study evidence to date suggests a remarkable similarity of attitude and perception amongst South Africans that is not place-dependent. Similarly, there is no suggestion in the literature that attitudes vary significantly by race, gender, age or educational level (though several have commented on the particular hostility of black South Africans to West and Francophone Africans).

However, even in the public domain, immigrants are subjected to steady verbal and physical abuse; the popular way of insulting immigrants is by calling them '*Makwerekwere*'. By so saying, citizens use the pejorative term to show outright rejection of aliens in their country. It amounts to rejection and humiliation, not far from terms in Namibia and Botswana (Morapedi, 2007, p.23). There has been a new debate among scholars about what constitutes xenophobia in South Africa. Most of these scholars do argue that what is generally regarded as xenophobia in South Africa is also inclusive of Afrophobia to denote outright resentment of African immigrants.

DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA IS XENOPHOBIC, OR ARE THESE JUST ACTS OF CRIMINALITY?

There is currently a debate as to whether South Africa's xenophobia or criminal problem is back in full force, including denials. With the recent violence in Pretoria (March, 2017), there seem to be traces of incoherence regarding how to understand what actually happened in Tshwane. One aide of the story says that the march that was organised against foreign nationals in Tshwane townships had nothing to do with a specific attitude of xenophobia that some South Africans tend to show towards foreign nationals in the country.

Those who are set on making sure that communities look as angelic as possible have maintained that the march was aimed solely at highlighting the scourge of crime, and that it was not meant to target foreign nationals residing and doing business in the affected areas. When pressed for further details, those who drive this line of thinking, however, fail to explain why those who marched seem to believe that foreign nationals are solely responsible for crime in that area. If indeed this is the case, why did the march not also target local collaborators and enablers? The main problem with South Africa's debate on xenophobia, or any debate on the issue, is that people believe that those who show xenophobic attitudes are justified in doing so because they have real socio-economic challenges such as unemployment and political or social destitution. The existence of socio-economic challenges is therefore taken to mean that the main problem is not xenophobia; it is rather these problems that cause the reaction by communities. Local leaders are then blamed for preying on the socio-economic challenges as they drive xenophobia. This explanation seeks to excuse communities that get involved in such activities.

It is so incoherent that it only seems aimed at protecting the image of South Africans and South Africa. It fails to properly explain a specific attitude displayed by some of the communities towards foreign nationals living in South Africa.

It is impossible to resolve the problem of xenophobia if the nation continues refusing to acknowledge it exists in the first place. Of course, the existence of xenophobic attitudes will always be triggered and enabled by socio-economic challenges. Xenophobia is not a hobby or a pastime activity that people engage in only when they are bored. Xenophobia is anchored in real life challenges. When it is triggered by observable concerns such as crime and unemployment, it does not make the attitude any less xenophobic. The issues that trigger xenophobic attitudes may be genuine, but what is problematic and purely xenophobic is the belief that those problems can be addressed by getting rid of foreign nationals. This is when the presence of foreign nationals is seen as the cause for the socio-economic ills, which are genuine.

It is plausible to state that it is dishonest for South Africans to blame their problems on the presence of foreign nationals in South Africa, especially when most of these problems are due to policy failures on the part of the ANC-led government. Even worse is the attitude by figureheads such as the DA's Herman Mashaba, who seek to gain political mileage by blaming foreign nationals for causing crime and soiling the City of Johannesburg. If indeed some foreign nationals are involved in illicit business such as operating brothels and selling drugs, South Africans are actively playing a bigger role as enablers of such activities. Hence, it is the sole responsibility of law enforcement agencies to root out those that are involved. Therefore, it makes no sense to target foreign nationals as the sole root cause of the problems.

When it comes to government's claim that there is no xenophobia but only common acts of criminality, it calls for answers. Of course, South Africa generally has the problem of violent crime. Instances of looting businesses are also common when people gather and protest in South Africa. This means that patterns of xenophobia in South Africa will naturally attract criminal elements, but it does not mean that because crimes get committed during xenophobic instances such instances should be seen as mere criminal activities with no connection to xenophobia.

To put it differently, it is unrealistic to expect crime to stop during the days that xenophobic outbreaks take place. Xenophobia, in fact, takes the shape of some of the local challenges such as crime. In the USA, for example, it is hidden in the local right-wing agenda that seeks to expel foreign nationals and block some from travelling to the USA. Xenophobia is a parasitic attitude that preys on genuine local concerns, real or perceived.

The Department of Home Affairs is charged with the popular functions of managing, making, and implementing immigration laws and policies by the Constitution, but the Department is regularly accused by the media and general public of not being accessible to the customers and media. Other functions that the Department is charged with include registration of births, deaths, and provisions of identity documents, including passports. The former Director-General (Barry Gilder) of the Department concurred with the accusation in 2003 when his nationwide tour revealed inefficiency and the ill-equipped state of the system (SAMP, 2005).

The discovery by the director-general led to a 'Turnaround Strategy' in the Department's service delivery, which among other things was intended to make it accessible to the customers. However, the survey sample showed that the Department's officials were not conversant with the internal Turnaround Strategy; rather they were conversant with the popular *Batho Pele* principles of service delivery. However, the major deficiency in service delivery in South Africa has traditionally been the inability of the political system, policy makers, civil servants, and contributors on service delivery to strike a balance between the service delivery to South African citizens and African immigrants in South Africa.

Policymakers have often been accused of making xenophobic statements, while writers and proponents of effective service delivery have often concentrated on the delivery, only with regards to South African citizens. In the case of the Department of Home Affairs the emphasis has continued to be in line with delivering to the South African citizens. It is only a handful of literature and policies that have been directed towards enhancing delivery to African immigrants, who have suffered humiliation in the form of xenophobia and diverse deprivation at all levels.

This study is therefore directed towards addressing service delivery to African foreigners in South Africa in general, as balance is required between service delivery to South Africans and migrants. As long as the Department of Home Affairs continues to be in charge of immigration and migration policies, effective service delivery cannot be achieved without inclusive policies towards foreigners, whose documentation is the responsibility of the Department. This study aims at addressing the issue by providing relevant research that could change from the conservative literature, which previously addressed service delivery from the point of South African citizens at the expense of migrants.

It is of importance to address the issue since South African citizens have been able to express their feelings on what they perceive as poor service delivery through labour unions, strikes, protests including peaceful, violent, legal and even illegal means, but the most unfortunate direction taken was the violent protest against African foreigners in South Africa in 2008, which was xenophobic (Dodson, 2010). The attack on African foreigners, who experience even worse service delivery than their South African counterparts, is a clear indication of the alienation of migrants in the South African socio-political system. It is also unfortunate that African foreigners do not have any chance of protesting against poor service delivery.

Consequently, Matsinhe (2011) contends that the asymmetries produced by the painful socio-emotional situation of apartheid gave rise to a colonised self of black South Africans and argued that the psychosocial syndrome is used to exclude black African immigrants in socio-political terms. It is based on this aforementioned exclusion that the perception and experience of African immigrants regarding service delivery at the Durban Department of Home Affairs is explored in this study. Hence, this study searches beyond xenophobia and also investigates the phenomena via Afro-phobia, which has been referred to above. Hence, this study stands to be of immense benefit and contribute to the already existing body of knowledge and policy making with regards to migration.

2.17 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theories and Models of Migration

In attempting to explain the causes and consequences of migration, scholars have come up with a number of explanations. The longest-established models put economic gain first, emphasise rational choice, and define out other considerations. Alternatives have come from the political left, emphasising international power relations or stressing the internal workings of the household. Most recently, concern for human rights issues in migration has widened the sphere of the migration debate.

2.17.1 Choice and Utility: Neo-Classical Economics

The most famous migration theory within the neo-classical economic tradition is probably the classical Harris-Todaro model. It is a migration decision-making model, with Todaro postulating that an individual makes a rational choice to increase his/her welfare or utility by moving to another place where he/she expects to earn a higher income. Todaro defines expected income as the average income in the destination area multiplied by the probability of finding employment. According to neo-classical models, individuals search for places of higher potential advantage, and if any known place offers such an advantage compared to the present locality, then the individual takes a decision to migrate (Skeldon, 1990). Many other authors have since followed this economistic approach.

According to this theoretical perspective, migration impacts positively upon all stakeholders, evidenced by the fact that sending sites and the migrants themselves benefit because migrants gets jobs, develop their skills, earn some money and remit part of it to their places of origin, while destination sites benefit from the skills and labour they get from the migrants. On the one hand, migration removes extra labour from one society while providing it to another causing insufficiency. However, sending sites benefit from remittances, which sometimes help in supplementing incomes, and in so doing ensures some kind of resource redistribution. As such, migration has the potential to contribute towards the development of receiving sites and of assuaging economic suffering at the place of origin. Looked at from this perspective, migration potentially leads to redistribution of resources and maintains social institutions (Jones, 1992).

Migration also has an unintended consequence in that it maintains social stability by allowing for the departure of those dissatisfied by what the immediate environment offers, thereby preventing the rise of more discontent and as such, functions as a safety valve (Dasgupta, 1981). However, the choices of individuals to migrate are not unlimited, for states could either support or curtail such, depending on what they see as best. The Harris-Todaro model's argument is that, the state could intervene to limit movement or to lend its support and evidently so, as travelling within or between countries is sometimes made easier or difficult by state laws and policies governing such.

However, it is not fully accurate to argue that migration results largely from well-calculated rational choice, for there are circumstances that do not leave individuals or groups with any other choice but to migrate. In most instances, choices are very limited for marginalised communities, or for communities faced with war, famine, floods or any other man-made or natural disasters. Lastly, this model pays little attention to the complexities of the social economic context, or to structural disparities and institutional arrangements that compel individuals or groups to migrate.

2.17.2 Reaction: Dependency and Disadvantage

During and after the 1970s migration theory was expanded by the anti-capitalist dependency perspective, which took up the impact of structural and institutional arrangements on the lives of migrants. It criticised the neo-classical view that migration is caused by the individual's choice to relocate to places of possible maximum utility. Dependency theorists argued that migration results from economic forces of a western-dominated world system characterised by structured inequalities, including the continued under-development of regions in the excluded periphery (Wallerstein, 1974).

Under such circumstances, migration tends to entrench marginalisation in that labour and brains move to better-off areas and participate in the development of these, instead of developing their own places of origin. As such, peripheral areas exist as suppliers of natural resources and labour to the core, and hence the two are related in an unequal and exploitative

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manner, locked in a negative power relation. Therefore, rural to urban migration disadvantages rural areas because it is characterised by the departure of younger, more innovative, educated, ambitious, skilled, more resourceful and more enterprising people, and represents a form of 'brain drain' (Dasgupta, 1981). As this happens migration diminishes rural human capital, thereby causing the disempowered peripheral areas to fall far behind the centre (Dasgupta, 1981; Jones, 1992).

The dependency approach argues that the benefit that goes to the individual migrant has to be viewed in relation to the social costs incurred by the sending community. For instance, communities that send out trained and energetic personnel do not readily benefit from this population transfer as much as those that receive. It has been argued by neo-classical theorists that both sides benefit, since migration offers migrants what they need, and also reduces the chance of conflict within the sending region; however, it can also be counter-argued that this process forms a vicious circle, as it perpetuates the marginalisation of places of origin while developing destination sites.

Much depends, however, on whether the migrants are skilled or unskilled, and whether enough opportunities exist for them at the receiving end. If most migrants are unskilled and there is not enough work for them, then the spread of shack settlement is only one of the potential disadvantages for the destination area. The share of skilled people in any migration stream relates in turn to the distances involved. Skilled people have resources to travel further looking for advantages, so that they form a larger share of international migration than of rural to urban, or rural to rural migration.

2.17.3 Back to Economics: The Role of the Households

More recently, the new economics of migration approach has emphasised the point that decisions to migrate are not always made by isolated individual actors *per se*, but sometimes by larger units of related people such as families, households and even communities (Massey, *et al.* 1998). Migration is not necessarily informed by the need to maximise expected income, but also by the need to minimise risks and to loosen the constraints threatening individuals,

families and communities. Migrants are not mere 'labour units' and 'entrepreneurs' and when migration is undertaken, be it by individuals or otherwise, it is usually practised as a household strategy and not as isolated individual behaviour (Cruch, 2001). More importantly, even when migration is primarily economically motivated, it takes place within a social context wherein family and gender relations influence migration behaviour. Coming from a somewhat different angle, the work of de Jong (2000) and his collaborators (de Jong and Gardener, 1981) balance the economics work by stressing the direct role of non-economic factors in triggering or attracting migration and strive to quantify these effects.

2.17.4 Beyond Utility and Power: War and Human Rights

None of these theoretical positions deal well with forced migration resulting from war, conflict and natural disasters, or from political and administrative decisions. The lack of theories addressing forced migration is evidence of the fact that such migrants have been left out of the migration debate for so long and as such many amongst those who found themselves mobile and adrift under these circumstances have suffered in obscurity. Although there are institutions which address forced migration – in particular the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) – migration scholars have had little interest in studying how refugees are given refuge or support, or how peacekeeping forces relate to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), or to similar questions. It is likely that many of the injustices in access to assistance by the displaced traces back to how poorly their movements are understood by the larger world outside the conflict zones. It is only recently that interest has started to rise since it has become evident that IDPs who are not covered by the mandate of the UNHCR are often left without help in miserable conditions, and that some refugees and IDPs become victims of human trafficking, prostitution and drug dealing, while unrecognised displaced children may be forced to become child soldiers.

It is only now, after these concerns have started to surface, that migration studies are expanding towards the creation of an understanding of these issues. The migration debates have begun to extend beyond a preoccupation of these individual and group interests, to decision-making and utility maximisation. There arises a new dimension in the debate, which is concerned with human rights, and in particular with the rights of refugees and IDPs who usually find

themselves with very little in the way of rights to talk about. However, it is important too to recognise that the focus of the migration debate continues to shift as other categories of migrants continue to gain prominence and to impact more on governance.

2.17.5 Theory of Relative Deprivation

Davis (1959), proposed the first theory of relative deprivation by drawing from Stouffer *et al.* (1949) who used the theory of relative deprivation to explain some of their unexpected findings, suggesting that comparisons with in-group versus out-group members leads to different kinds of emotional reactions. Essentially, Davis proposes that comparisons with in-group members can produce feelings of relative deprivation or relative gratification (depending on whether one's outcomes are worse or better than the referent persons) whereas comparison with out-group members can produce feelings of relative subordination or relative-superiority. Thus, Davis explicitly limited the concept of relative deprivation to comparisons with 'similar others' (in-group members) who possess some desired object to which the deprived perceiver feels entitled.

Runciman (1966) introduced a distinction between egoistical versus fraternal deprivation, both of which are presumably 'relative' in the sense described above. Egoistical deprivation refers to the perception that one's own outcomes fall below a subjective standard (usually based on other individuals' outcomes), whereas fraternal deprivation refers to the perception that one's reference group as a whole is deprived (usually relative to other groups). Hence the experience of being deprived of something to which one believes to be entitled. Within this study, it refers to the discontent people (African immigrants) feel or perceive when they compare their positions to others (South African nationals) and they realise that they have less of what they believe themselves to be entitled than those around them. Thus, generally this study considers Davis thesis and particularly Runcimans theoretical version in arguing that immigrants (in-group) are relatively deprived in terms of quality of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs in relation to South Africans (out-group) as a result of their vulnerability. The relative deprivation theory in this circumstance equally portrays a view of social change and movements, according to which people take action for social change in order to acquire

something (for example, opportunities, status, or wealth) that others possess and which they believe they should have, too.

The relative-deprivation theory offers a psychological explanation for scapegoating. Concepts of frustration and aggression are interpreted as subjective, intrapsychic processes. In this way, the theory understands xenophobia from the inside out. The psychoanalytic theory similarly offers an intrapsychic explanation of scapegoating as a projective and defensive process. For both these theories, De la Ray points out that, "The cause of social unrest cannot be simply located within subjective perceptions of reality. The search for causes of social action must extend beyond the subjective psychological realm to include its complex inter-relatedness with objective social reality" (De la Ray, 1991, p.41).

However, critics of this theory have pointed out that this theory fails to explain why some people who feel discontent fail to take action and join social movements. However, this study contends to justify its relevance as regards to the plight of black African immigrants who presumably could not take action against the South African Government as a result of their vulnerability.

Hence, this theory of relative deprivation is more relevant and appropriate in a study of this very nature for the mere fact that most participants are not citizens of the state. And to juxtapose this assertion, is the persistent civil disobedience by the citizenry who also complain of poor service delivery in the form of massive protests that engulf the state which are appropriately demonstrated *ab initio* in the literature review section.

2.17.6 Social Comparison Theory

This theory is construed from the concept of relative deprivation. According to Festinger (1954), the fundamental postulation of the social comparison theory is that humans have a drive to evaluate their opinions and abilities. Presumably, this motive has developed because erroneous appraisal of important opinions and abilities can have serious consequences for the individual. The theory specifies how perceivers will make these evaluations; in the absence of

objective, physical reality, people will evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparing with others. A central feature of the theory concerns who these comparative others are likely to be. According to Festinger, we maximise information and achieve stable and precise judgements when we compare to similar others (i.e. others who are close to us on the particular opinion or ability in question). Sometimes, though we must compare with dissimilar others, and according to the theory, this produces pressure toward uniformity. The theory specifies how these pressures differ for abilities and opinions and how these differences affect affiliation and group behaviour. Hence this study considers this theory in arguing that black African immigrants, irrespective of different nationalities and categories upon which they apply for status, are of the belief that by their uniform judgement they are treated unfairly by officials of the Durban Department of Home Affairs simply because they are black African foreigners in contrast with how they perceive white immigrants are treated.

Tshitereke's (1999) psychological interpretation of scapegoating must not be divorced from the socio-economic realities of contemporary South Africa. He reminds us that the psychological process of relative deprivation rests on social comparison. Generally, the scapegoating theory explains xenophobia in terms of broad social and economic factors. Tshitereke (1999) introduces a psychological level of explanation to supplement this sociological interpretation. He conceptualises xenophobia in terms of frustration and relative deprivation. Relative-deprivation theory suggests that "a key psychological factor in generating social unrest is a sense of relative deprivation. This arises from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to. When there is a gap between aspirations and reality, social discontent is likely to result" (De la Rey, 1991, p. 41). Tshitereke states that violence is not an inevitable outcome of relative deprivation. The anger caused by deprivation and perceived or real threats by immigrants as it relates to service delivery at the Durban Department of Home Affairs does not directly cause the nationals to commit violence, but it frustrates them. Political scientist, Annette Seegers states that, "frustration breeds anger, yet angry people do not always commit violence" p.31. They could turn their anger inwards and commit suicide.

2.17.7 Afrophobia (Makwerekwere) Theory

Matsinhe, drawing from Elias's dynamics of colonial relations, developed the '*Makwerekwere*' theory to argue that what is called 'xenophobia' today in South Africa is very much beyond that. He prefers the term 'Afrophobia' and further contends that the asymmetries produced by the painful socio-emotional situation of apartheid gave rise to a colonised self of black South Africans. Matsinhe (2011); Neocosmos (2008); Isike and Isike (2012) cited in Umezuruike (2013) have argued that the psychosocial syndrome inherent in black South African nationals as a result of the apartheid system is used to exclude foreigners and mostly African foreigners in socio-political terms.

This Afrophobic concept was equally alluded to by the ex-Police Minister, Nathi Nhleko (whilst addressing journalists in parliament on 14th April 2015) when he suggested that the term xenophobia, which had been used to describe the violence against black African foreigners in eThekweini, be renamed 'Afrophobia'. As many of the black African immigrants attacked in the recent anti-immigrant violence in eThekwini were from other sub-Saharan African nations, such as Zimbabwe and Somalia.

The HSRC research indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment in KZN was a little above the national average even though people in Limpopo, Gauteng and the Northern Cape also voiced strong anti-immigrant sentiment (HSRC, 2013). In order to better understand whether South Africans generally, and residents in KwaZulu-Natal specifically, exhibit a particular aversion to certain types of immigrants, respondents to the SASAS 2013 survey were asked, 'which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?' The results for KZN in comparison to the rest of the country are portrayed in Figure below:

Figure 2. 17. 7. 1: The Most Disliked Foreign Groups in South Africa

MOST DISLIKED FOREIGN GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2013(PERCENT)

Chart data:

Group	KwaZulu-Natal	Rest of the country
Nigerians	20	19
Zimbabweans	6	12
Somalis	4	6
Other African Countries	12	19
Asia	10	6
Returning South Africans	8	3
Europe and America	9	4
Other	9	4
None welcome all groups	23	25

Source: HSRC SASAS, 2013.

People in KwaZulu-Natal are more likely than those in the rest of the country to select groups from sub-Saharan Africa as their least tolerated foreign group. The results show that more than 57 per cent of all adult respondents in KwaZulu-Natal selected a group from sub-Saharan Africa, compared with approximately two-fifths (42 per cent) in the rest of the country. The most mentioned foreign African groups were Nigerians (20 per cent), Zimbabweans (12 per cent) and Somalians (6 per cent), all of which tended to be associated with entrepreneurship and commerce in the province. Only a minority of those in KZN selected groups from Asia (6 per cent) or from Europe and North America (4 per cent). The finding suggests that foreigners from Africa are not the only foreign groups that South Africans are hostile towards. The findings shown here raise questions about the existence of 'Afrophobic' attitudes among people in the province as well as the country as a whole.

Other studies that share the same conceptual framework of analysis include Musuva (2015), in the study conducted in Cape Town with regards to the Department of Home Affairs. Given that the majority of migrants' experiences with state officials were negative, that study inferred that black African immigrants generally experience poor treatment from state officials. According to the researcher,

…her finding which implies xenophobia based only on foreignness is not necessarily inconsistent with that of other researchers but rather it is a question of a different methodology and research question. The researcher did not ask South Africans for their opinions of different nationalities of migrants, which would likely have been similar to popular stereotypes such as those mentioned. Instead, this research was based on migrants' experiences of state officials (Musuva, 2015).

When it comes to DHA officials there is an apparent difference in the poor treatment they extend to foreigners based on their legal category. Migrants that are served at the RRO – asylum seekers and refugees – are treated differently from temporary and permanent residents who are served in the DHA offices. Interestingly, administering migrants in different offices based on whether they fall under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act translates into different treatment of migrants on this ground. Those black African migrants with asylum seeker and refugee permits are treated worse than those with various categories of temporary residents and permanent residents.

> This implies that there is a hierarchy of migrants in the eyes of the DHA officials with temporary and permanent residents at the top and asylum seekers and refugees at the bottom (Musuva, 2015).

However, the findings show that the treatment of migrants has less to do with the extent of the rights they are entitled to and more to do with which DHA office they receive their services from depending on whether they are classified under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act.

> …the mostly negative experiences of migrants can be linked to the prevailing negative discourse on black African migrants which casts them as a danger to the South African nation (Musuva, 2015).

Experiences with DHA officials at their offices were singled out as being particularly appalling. With regard to the above, the findings of Musuva (2015) indicate that the basis for state officials treating specifically black African immigrants poorly, is simply their status as non-South Africans.

However, in addition, Kollapan's (1999) discourse warns that xenophobia cannot be separated from violence and physical abuse. In this sense, a rewriting of the dictionary definition of xenophobia is necessary. 'Xenophobia' as a term must be reframed to incorporate practice. It is not just an attitude: it is equally an activity. It is not just a dislike or fear of foreigners: it is equally a violent practice that results in bodily or psycho-social harm and damage. More particularly, the violent practice that comprises xenophobia must be further refined to include its specific target, because, in South Africa, not all foreigners are uniformly victimised. Rather, black foreigners, particularly those from Africa, comprise the majority of the victims. It is also important to explore why 'the unknown' represented by (largely black) foreigners should necessarily invite repugnance, fear or aggression. These questions and a revised definition of xenophobia was borne in mind throughout the study.

This study in the same line of concept and application considers this 'Afrophobic' theory in arguing that poor service delivery, which foreign and mostly black African immigrants receive, is caused by the same syndrome exhibited by officials of the Department of Home Affairs. Hence, Afrophobia informs an explanation for the phenomenon and underpinned issues regarding why, how and whom xenophobia targets.

However, it will be pertinent to delve into DHA with regards to what its service delivery function according to the act establishing such institution is all about based on their mission, legislative framework, mandate and challenges.

3 CHAPTER THREE: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS SERVICE PROVISION

This chapter unpacks the Department of Home Affairs as an entity or department of the South African government with the sole responsibility of managing migration in and outside its territory. Thus, explanation is given regarding the legislative framework that underpins the responsibility of the department and the challenges hindering its service delivery function. More light is thrown on the newly introduced immigration regulation, emergence of Visa Facilitation Service Global and its role in visa processing, and also on how applications are processed by the VFS Consortium.

However, operational processes of VFS are equally unpacked and some of the challenges of VFS as encountered by black African immigrants are also briefly explained as it relates to this study eg; waiting times, ease of getting appointments and attitudes of the staff of the VFS who are not public servants that are subjected to *Batho Pele* principles.

Each and every government department in the Republic of South Africa is guided by its vision, mission and value statement. According to the Department of Home Affairs Strategic Plan (South Africa, 2010/11-2012/13, p.2), the department is guided by the following:

Vision

A safe secure South Africa, where, all of its people are proud of, and value, their identity and citizenship.

Mission Statement

The efficient determination and safeguarding of the identity and status of citizens and the regulation of migration to ensure security, promote development and fulfil our international obligation.

Value Statement

The DHA is committed to being: people-centred and caring, patriotic, professional and having integrity, corruption free and ethical, efficient and innovative. In the spirit of *Batho Pele*, the department is guided by the following principles: ethical conduct, accountability, transparency, flexibility and professionalism.

3.1 DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

The Department of Home Affairs has two core responsibilities (South Africa, 2010, pp.14-15):

- Civic services: To administer citizenship and provide enabling documents to South African citizens; and

- Immigration: To facilitate the movement of people in and out of South Africa.

There are five core civic services, namely (South Africa, 2010, pp.14-15):

- Issuing of birth, marriage and death certificates and this includes:

    o Registration of births up to 15 years, marriages and deaths - this information is captured on the National Population Register (NPR);

    o Applications for abridged birth, marriage or death certificates;

    o Applications for unabridged birth, marriage or death certificates;

    o Rectification of personal particulars – this includes alteration of forename, surname, amendment of date of birth etc.

- Late registration of births for persons over the age of 15 years (late birth registration for applicants over the age of 15 years are always accompanied by an application for a first issue of an identity document);

- Issuing of ID books:

    o Application for an ID document for persons over the age of 15 years;

    o Application for re-issue of ID book; and

    o Temporary ID.

- Citizenship

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- Passports.

3.1.1   Legislative Framework

The DHA mandate is derived from numerous pieces of legislation, which creates a complex legal framework. Amongst the documents, the work of the DHA is governed by the following (South Africa, 2010, pp.14-15):

- Births, marriages and deaths;
  - Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, No. 66 of 1998.
  - The Births and Deaths Registration Act No. 61 of 1992 subsequently amended in Act No. 67 of 1997 and in Act No. 43 of 1998.
  - The Regulations promulgated in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act No.61 1992 as amended.
  - Delegation by the Minister in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act No. 61 of 1992.
  - The Marriage Act No. 25 of 1961.
  - The Regulations promulgated in terms of the Marriage Act No. 25 of 1961.
  - Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998, that came into effect on 15 November 2000.
  - The Regulations in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998 (Government Gazette No. 21700, 1 November 2000) that came into effect on 15 November 2000.
- Identity documents and Identification;
  - Identification Act No. 68 of 1997. This Act repealed previous Identification Acts (Act No. 72 of 1986, Act No. 21 of 1991, Act No. 4 of 1993 and Act No.47 of 1995).
  - The Regulations in terms of the Identification Act No.68 of 1997.
- Citizenship;

- o The South African Citizenship Act No. 88 of 1995 as amended.

- o The Regulations in terms of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 as amended.

- o Delegations in terms of Section 22 of the South African Citizenship Act No.88 of 1995.

- Travel documents and passports;

  - o South African Passports and Travel Documents Act No. 4 of 1994 as amended.

  - o South African Passports and Travel Documents Regulations, 1996 as amended.

- Immigration;

  - o The Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998.

  - o The Regulations made in terms of the Refugees Act No.130 of 1998.

  - o The Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002.

  - o The Regulations made in terms of the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002.

  - o The Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977

- Other relevant mandates include:

  - o The South African Constitution;

  - o The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

  - o The Public Service Act No. 103 of 1994, and associated regulations;

  - o The Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000;

  - o The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, Government Gazette No. 1227, 24 November 1995;

  - o The White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery: *Batho Pele*, government Gazette No. 18340, October 1997;

  - o The White Paper on an Integrated National Disability Strategy, 1997;

  - o Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000; and

o The Intergovernmental Relations Framework, Act No.15 of 2005 (Giese and Smith, 2007, pp.15-16).

All government departments are directly or indirectly linked to the Department of Home Affairs since failure of this department to perform a certain function may result in another department suffering. A practical example is if a person fails to get an ID book, the Department of Human Settlement and Social Welfare cannot provide a service to the needy citizen.

According to Zuma (2009), The *Batho Pele* principles require public servants to be cautious and responsive by offering good quality and value for money services. He further states that, as a country we must move faster and make our public service to begin to embody and practise these noble principles. This is highlighted in the following statement: "We are pressing ahead with the implementation of services, coupled with service delivery improvement mechanisms internally in the public service. We have to continue with our efforts to re-orientate our public service toward putting people first. Well-crafted policies mean nothing if they do not change the lives of ordinary people" (Zuma, 2009, p. 43).

Despite being a public-sector institution with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the Department of Home Affairs is still reputed for "being one of South Africa's most dysfunctional departments" (Msimang, 2009). This suggests that the Department of Home Affairs is not effective in its day-to-day operations. The Department of Home Affairs Annual Report (South Africa, 2008, p.26) reveals problems that include the lack of a properly functioning Electronic Document Management System (EDMS) which assists with record management and the lack of efficient information services (IS) systems. Xenophobic violence, causing significant backlogs at the Refugee Appeal Board (RAB) and the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs (SCRA), have resulted in cases not being finalised and clients returning repeatedly to centres for extensions. The aforementioned report suggests some of the reasons that influence customers to bribe officials from DHA to fast-track the processing of documents and obtain documents illegally.

3.2 CHALLENGES HINDERING SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

Giese and Smith (2007, p.52) state that in South Africa the demand for legal and illegal citizenship documents is large and growing. They further state that some DHA officials are clearly torn between keeping illegal immigrants out and facilitating access to enabling documents for legitimate applicants. According to Giese and Smith (2007, p.52), the dual mandate of immigration and civic services places pressure on departmental officials, which ultimately impacts on service delivery and access for clients. The former Minister of the DHA, Dlamini-Zuma highlighted the following challenges (2009a):

- How people are channeled into queues;

- Bribing of officials to avoid queues;

- Lack of floor managers who assist to ensure a smooth flow of people;

- Forms are not filled in correctly and people have to come back;

- Large volumes of paperwork on a daily basis and loss of some documents; and

- Attitudes of employees.

Msimang (2009) cites the following challenges:

- In 2009, the department had a backlog of some 600,000 identity document (ID) applications; and

- Over 144,000 refugee applications backlog.

Msimang (2009) cites the following as the common cases:

- Misappropriation of state funds;

- Aiding and abetting illegal immigrants;

- Illegal issuing of documents;

- Selling fraudulent documents;

- Abscondment;

- Soliciting bribes and theft of face-value documents;

- Fraudulent marriages;

- Marriages of convenience; and

- Crime syndicates.

Corruption, being an act of dishonesty and accepting of bribes, is prevalent in the department. Padayachee (2009, p.4) reports that two female teachers from the Clermont Schools in Durban allegedly misled DHA officials and obtained a death certificate fraudulently. A sum of R25,000 was claimed and paid out by insurance companies. Padayachee further reveals that the victim found out that she had been declared dead when her government grant was not paid to her. This is further supported by the Home Affairs Annual Report (South Africa, 2008, p.80), which states that corruption is the single highest challenge to the department. According to the World Bank (1992, p.16) corruption hinders efficiency in service delivery, for instance, the bribing of officials to avoid queues, fraudulent marriages and selling of fraudulent documents. Poor customers end up not being attended to because officials want quick cash, which results in them attending to those who will pay.

Giese and Smith (2007, p.53) state that challenges to obtaining proof of birth and maternal identity leave many applicants at a loss. They argue that it might seem that legitimate applicants are caught between a rock and a hard place. Being unable to negotiate their way through the bureaucracy, many are forced to resort to fraudulent means of obtaining documents. According to Padayachee (2011, p.6) seven officials were arrested for fraud. These seven officials included a marriage officer and six DHA officials at the Durban Regional Office. Padayachee (2011, p.3) states that these arrests occurred during a police raid at the offices in Umgeni Road on Wednesday, 6 April 2011. Padayachee states that these people were arrested as part of an ongoing investigation aimed at rooting out corruption at the Department of Home Affairs. The investigation was carried out following a tip off from citizens. It is further revealed that officials arrested were suspected of facilitating 'marriages of convenience' between South Africans and foreign nationals. The so-called marriages aimed at helping foreign nationals to get South African citizenship (Padayachee, 2011, p.3). This has necessitated the department recently appoint a new investigator to deal with fraudulent activity at the Department of Home Affairs (Padayachee, 2011, p.6).

Dorasamy (2009, p.58) argues that by being manifested with widespread corruption, the subordination of public interest has negated the requirement for accountability and responsibility in this department. She postulates that the influence of personal advantage over the general desire to do what is right or what is in the best interest of the public has resulted in people's rights being violated, leading to a loss of credibility for this department. Klitgaard (1995) states that the following three factors are particularly critical in creating opportunities for officials to engage in corruption:

- The monopoly power of officials;

- The degree of discretion that officials are permitted to exercise; and

- The degree to which institutions are accountable and transparent.

The aforementioned challenges, especially corruption related, highlight the gross violation of service delivery and the *Batho Pele* principles of consultation, service standards, redress and courtesy. Such acts, like the bribing of officials and selling of fraudulent documents deny citizens of good quality service because customers, who matter most, are likely to be the people who do not have money. Therefore, the DHA needs to monitor the implementation of *Batho Pele* principles of openness, accountability and transparency in an attempt to eradicate corruption. Further, it would also contribute to ensuring that consultation, service standards, redress and information requirements are not compromised.

3.3 NEW SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION REGULATION

On 16th May 2014, after months of speculation and anticipation, the Department of Home Affairs made the new immigration laws official. President Jacob Zuma and the former Minister of Home Affairs, Naledi Pandor, signed off on new immigration regulations in a move that marked the first time since 2004 that the law had been adjusted. The changes officially came into effect on Monday, 26 May 2014, and the amendments to the act impacts foreigners looking to visit, study, work, live and own a business in South Africa.

In the course of this research, the study turned to expert consultancy Integrate Immigration which helped to unpack the 272-page government gazette that stipulates the modifications. As one of the largest service providers in South Africa, the company is well-versed in navigating the Department of Home Affairs' (DHA) web of legislation and visa requirements.

3.3.1 Applying for Visas/Permits

- The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has officially outsourced the handling and processing of visa applications to a company called Visa Facilitation Services (VFS).

3.3.2 VFS Role in Immigration to South Africa

Many people have started to question the role of the VFS in immigration to South Africa. As a background, the Department of Home Affairs on the 16th May 2014 announced the decision to outsource certain parts of the application process for obtaining a visa or permit for South African immigration. The reason behind this decision to choose VFS as the service provider as stated by the Department of Home Affairs was as a result of a lack of budget.

The decision to outsource was in line with that of governments all over the world, but with one big difference – whereas the international trend was to seek a third-party provider only for applications made 'outside' of their borders, the South African Department of Home Affairs made the decision to outsource these functions 'inside' its borders.

The apparent rationale behind this was a lack of budget and a seeming admission from the DHA that current processes were ineffective. Kudos are deserved for this frank admission. Apart from the additional cost factor to applicants, the news was generally welcomed by those in the industry and applicants alike. There was a hope that this would lead to a more welcoming environment, better service and quicker turn-around times.

The role of VFS as they describe it on their website:

- VFS Global manages Visa Facilitation Centres for the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa, where you should submit your completed application form, supporting documents and biometric data.

- Your visa application will be processed and decided by the Department of Home Affairs, Head Office in Pretoria. VFS Global does not play any part in or influence the outcome of your application process.

- The company will not render any advisory services but merely technical services relating to the submission of applications which includes compliance with the checklist of requirements as instructed by the Department of Home Affairs.

- In addition, VFS Global will hand over outcomes to applicants in the form of visas and permit labels, rejection letters, appeals and any other documents destined for the clients.

3.3.2.1   How VFS Process Applications?

- The VFS has opened 11 offices which are referred to as Visa Application Centres (VACs), around South Africa beginning on 2 June 2014.

- At the VACs, applicants can submit their applications and biometric data for processing.

- Once the applications have been thoroughly checked, they will then be scanned and forwarded to the Head Office of Home Affairs in Pretoria.

- The VFS operates strictly as a processing operation and does not offer potential immigrants any advice on immigration rules etc. Therefore, prospective immigrants will still have to seek advice from immigration consultants, and the consultants will be able to accompany applicants.

- Zimbabwe nationals on the Special Dispensation for Zimbabweans Project, Asylum and Refugee cases will still be directly handled by the Department of Home Affairs.

- The VFS does not have the authority to grant or refuse visas as that decision still lies with the DHA.

- The VFS charges an additional service fee of R1350, including VAT per application. (Do note that this amount excludes the standard DHA application fee).

- Submission timings are between 8am and 4pm (Monday to Friday).

3.4 CHANGING TO ANOTHER VISA WHILST IN SOUTH AFRICA

- New regulations also state that one cannot change from a Visitor's Visa to another type of visa; these applications for change of conditions must be made at a mission abroad, i.e. an embassy or consulate, where the applicant is an ordinary resident or holds citizenship.

- However, exceptional circumstances include if an applicant is in need of life saving medical treatment or is an accompanying spouse or child of a business or work visa holder who wishes to apply for a study or work visa.

3.5 LIFE PARTNER AND SPOUSAL VISA

- Life partners looking to apply for temporary residency in South Africa based on a life partner visa will need to prove that they have been together for two years; those applying for permanent residency will need to prove that they have been together for five years.

- Spouses looking to apply for temporary residency in South Africa based on a spousal visa will NOT need to prove that they have been in a previous relationship for a certain number of years.

- If a partner or spouse was in a previous marriage, it is necessary to provide official documents that prove the dissolution of such marriage either by divorce or the death of the other spouse.

- The updated regulations also state that life partners will need to attend separate but simultaneous interviews to determine the authenticity of the existence of their relationship.

3.6 ERADICATION OF EXCEPTIONAL SKILLS AND QUOTA PERMIT CATEGORIES

- The DHA has officially eradicated the Exceptional Skills and Quota permit categories.

- It is unclear whether those who have submitted an application under one of these categories will still have their application processed. Consult your nearest DHA branch for specifics.

- Current Exceptional Skills and Quota Permit holders will not be able to renew their permits going forward.

3.7 RENEWING A VISA WHILST IN SOUTH AFRICA

- Those looking to renew their visa while in the country must do so 60 days before the current one expires. This change was reportedly made due to the DHA's inability to process an application in the previous time period (30 days).

3.7.1 General Work Visa

- Applications for this visa will have to include a certificate from the Department of Labour confirming the following:

    - Despite a thorough search, the prospective employer could not find a South African employee with the skills and experience equivalent to those of the applicant.

    - The applicant has proven skills and experience in line with the job offer.

    - The salary and benefits of the applicant are not inferior to those of citizens or permanent residents.

> > - The contract signed by both the employer and applicant stipulates conditions that are in line the labour laws of South Africa.

- You will also need a document to prove that your qualifications have been approved by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). This document must be translated into one of the official languages of South Africa by a sworn translator.

- The work visa will be valid for a maximum of five years.

3.7.2 Critical Skills Work Visa

- This visa is based on a list of occupations that are considered critical (examples include Agricultural Engineers, Land Surveyor and Forestry Technicians) in South Africa.

- To apply for a visa in this category you do not need a job offer, but within one year of being granted a visa, you do need to prove that you're gainfully employed within your field.

- This visa replaced the Exceptional Skills and Quota Visas.

3.7.3 Visitor's Visa

- Visitor's Visa holders who wish to change the terms or status of their visa must submit an application no less than 60 days prior to the current visa's date of expiration.

- It is no longer possible to change from a Visitor's Visa to another visa category within South Africa.

3.7.4 Business Visa

- It will now be a requirement for businesses to get a recommendation letter from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

- The DTI will conduct a thorough forensic assessment of the feasibility of the business entity as well as the contribution to the national interest of South Africa.

- A minimum of R5 million must be invested into the book value of the business.

- Any accountant registered with the South African Institute of Professional Accountants or the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants can verify the availability of funds for a business visa. Previously, this would have to have been done by a chartered accountant (not just any professional accountant).

- Sixty per cent of the business owner's workforce must be South African or must be permanent residents employed permanently in various positions.

- Business visas will be granted for no longer than three years at a time

- No business visa will be issued to a foreigner who intends to establish or invest in a business that is listed as an undesirable business undertaking.

3.7.5 Intra-Company Visa

- The employee in question must be employed with the foreign office/business for a minimum of six months before being eligible for transfer to South Africa.

- This visa will now be available for four years but is non-renewable.

3.7.6 Study Visa/Exchange Visa

- Holders of a Study Visa may not conduct part-time work exceeding 20 hours of labour a week.

- Both Study and Exchange Visas will only be issued for the duration of the study period or exchange programme respectively.

- An exchange visa (for persons under 25 years) will not be granted to conduct work pertaining to an undesirable work as published by the Minister in the gazette, after consultation with the Minister of Trade and Industry.

3.7.7 Retirement Visa

- There are no age limitations on the retirement visa.

- Applicants have to prove a R37,000 monthly incomes per person per month from pensions, retirement annuities or property rentals. Alternatively, applicants can also prove they have a capital sum in the bank that is equivalent to R444,000 per annum (R1,776,00 for the full four years). For an additional R3,000 per month, a pensioner can put his or her life partner onto the retirement visa.

3.7.8 Asylum/Transit Visa

- An Asylum/Transit Visa issued at a port of entry will be valid for a period of five days to enable the holder to report at a nearest Refugee Reception Office.

3.7.9 Fines

- Fines will no longer be charged for overstaying. Persons who overstay for a prescribed number of times will be declared as undesirable.

3.8 CHALLENGES IN VFS AS ENCOUTERED BY BLACK AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS

However, three years in, there are a number of issues that have arisen:

3.8.1 The Fees

It did not start well with the fee of R1350 being announced – payable in addition to the normal DHA fees.

The fee, which was agreed on with the department, covered the cost of 11 new VFS centres across the country, the 100 or so staff needed, as well as the provision of biometric services. The fact is that this charge is not just more expensive than any over visa application centre provider but is also far more expensive than what VFS charge applicants for other countries.

Let us take for example the below VFS fees in South Africa (Intergate, 2017):

- For a visa to New Zealand ZAR 546

- For a visa to Sweden ZAR 390

- For a visa to Greece ZAR 280

The charge (ZAR 1,350) for South African immigration applications is significantly higher. According to Intergate Immigration (2017), even the VFS in the UK offering a Belgium visa charge is just GBP 24. VFS generated about R2.4 billion in revenue from all of its contracts last year, according to its parent company's annual report (Intergate Immigration, 2017). That revenue came off the back of 18 million visa applications, meaning that the average revenue was a relatively paltry R135 per application. That figure and the R1350 charged locally are "not comparable at all", says chief operations officer for Africa, Jiten Vyas (Intergate Immigration, 2017). Accordingly, the price follows the complexity of the solution with regards to infrastructure, staff and the technologies requested.

> There are some contracts where there are very low requirements for these factors. In fact, for one major contract we do not even have an application Centre Intergate immigration, 2017, p. 1)

The study argues that what can be agreed on is that the fee attached to the VFS is a huge negative as it is a 200 per cent increase and deviation from the status quo at the Department of Home Affairs. The requirements for a visa application centre are very similar and there is no rational explanation as to why the fee levied for a South African application is so high. The contract with the Department lasts five years and promises about 100,000 applicants a year. That amounts to about R650 million in revenue or R135 million a year before income from additional services, such as a premier lounge at an additional R500 per applicant – which incidentally has a much reduced waiting

time for an appointment. These figures do not include the recent Zimbabwean Visa applications which could be as much as another 250,000 applications.

Former Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, has dismissed questions around the new fee by insisting that foreign citizens applying for visas are in any case supposed to prove a certain income and that R1350 is 'actually nothing' in many foreign currencies. Again, this study cannot agree and also stands to remind the Minister that many of these applicants are married to South African citizens. However, with cognisance of the fact that the requirements are the same, it is not plausible to justify the fee. When one considers that it costs less than R500 to apply for visas to Greece and Sweden from within South Africa at the time, one can understand why this new fee for South African applications are viewed as exorbitant and inhumane by black African immigrants.

3.8.2   Waiting Times

Maybe the justification is in the waiting times, surely ZAR 1350 would see applicants in and out in 15 minutes as the large fee would surely mean that VFS can overstaff in terms of resources. After all, with a ZAR 135-million rand a year budget to play with there is ample room to train and recruit adequate staff. The reality is that some applicants are waiting hours and hours, with young children as they make their applications. The record to date being an astounding seven hours, where out of ten or so counters only three were manned!

3.8.3   Ease of Getting an Appointment

It was also hoped that making an appointment might be a quicker process, but going by records here are the waiting times in reality:

Cape Town - Regular fee service: 19 January 2015 and Premium lounge: 1-2 weeks
Johannesburg - Regular fee service: March 2015 and Premium lounge: 3 weeks

Port Elizabeth - Regular fee service: 19 February 2015 and Premium lounge: in N/A

Durban - Regular service: 1 week and Premium 2 days

In essence these lack of appointments are placing people who need to renew visas in a situation where they will become illegal, not because of their own fault but because VFS cannot give them an appointment. It is also severely threatening the South African tourist trade with visitors who would like to extend their stay beyond three months now highly unlikely to be able to do so.

3.8.4   Attitude

When there are issues and applicants look for a response, applicants allege that they got none. Another example was when VFS announced that they would be closing their offices from 22 December 2014 - 5th January 2015. They made provision for two 'collection only' days on the 22nd and the 23rd of December 2014. Rather than open for extra hours or extra days and put right what was wrong they closed for the holidays. It would seem applied only to the South African Visa Centres they run though:

VFS visas for Sweden

VFS visas for New Zealand

3.9   WHAT A VISA CENTRE IS NORMALLY OBLIGED TO PROVIDE

3.9.1   Pricing

Tender documents for applying to run a visa centre are readily available, and are normally quite specific in terms of what the provider must supply and what they may charge. In fact, the price is an absolute must when it comes to any tender application. When it came to South Africa, and the announcement of the awarding of the tender document, the price apparently, was still under discussion and would be announced later. This was confirmed at meetings held in Johannesburg and Cape Town attended

by immigration practitioners with presenters from both sides (Intergate Immigration, 2017). It must be questioned as to how this is possible when pricing plays such a major role in the decision as to who to grant the tender to and one also wonders at what price the other companies who tendered for the contract desired. Furthermore, there is normally a limit as to what charges can be made and the increases over the period of time of the contract.

3.9.2 Service Standards

- Typically, phone calls for advice are to be free of charge and answered within one minute.

- Applicants must be processed in a certain time period in the application centre (standard 20 - 30 minutes).

- Opening hours – include extended hours to facilitate applicants wishing to submit in the evenings.

- Days of closure – typicality just weekends and official holidays.

- Service fees should be lower than DHA fees.

- Urgent applicants always need to be accommodated within the same day.

- The list goes on…

   The main point here is that because the market for visa application centres is extremely competitive, the DHA was in a position to dictate the standards they expected, the penalties if not met and ultimately to a large degree the pricing.

However, given what has been uncovered from all of the above, it is plausibly a given that some of the responsibilities expected of the Department of Home Affairs by the legislative framework have been outsourced to a third party, and this outsourcing has its own challenges as it relates to black African immigrants that frequent this office. The responsibility with regards to the mandate of the department was gauged as it affects black African immigrants' resident precisely in KwaZulu-Natal and the rest of South Africa in general.

Thus, it is in line with this anticipated phenomenon that this study has come to unravel the discrepancies and challenges of black African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs *vis-à-vis* VFS Global. Another critical issue that arose is the fact that the outsourcing of some of the responsibilities of the DHA to VFS Global on its own is found wanting, given the fact that the *Batho Pele* precepts that regulate public/civil servants' operations and responsibilities are not applicable to the employees of VFS.

The succeeding chapter explains the schemata, and underlying organisational pattern or structure upon which this study was conducted.

4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

4.1 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

This study has three limitations. The first limitation is that it is not representative of the entire Departments of Home Affairs and the whole black African migrant population. The second limitation is that although it is about the state, it relies heavily on the experiences of black African migrants and key informants, because of the challenges of gaining direct information from state officials. Related to this is the fact that not all immigrants of all races were sampled. So, while it is guaranteed that this study relied on the experiences of black African immigrants, the experiences of their counterparts (whites) who might have had different or similar experiences with the DHA, were not captured due to challenges on how to access them. The third limitation is that generalisability is difficult. However, Bryman (2008, pp.391-392) points out that "the findings of qualitative research are to generalise to theory rather than to populations". Furthermore, Williams (in Bryman, 2008, p.392) argues that it is possible to make what he refers to as *moderatum* generalisations "in which aspects of the focus of enquiry can be seen to be instances of a broader set of recognisable features".

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The case study approach was used, and the study applied a mixed-method approach, which is qualitative and quantitative in nature. White (2000, p.39) defines a case study as an extensive study of a single situation such as an individual, family or organisation. He further states that a case study employs a variety of different techniques that include questionnaires and interviews. According to Sekaran (2007, p.125), case studies that are qualitative in nature are, however, useful in applying solutions to current problems based on past problem-solving experiences. He further states that they are also useful in understanding certain phenomena and generating further theories for empirical testing (Sekeran, 2007, p.125). Black African immigrants accessing the services at the regional office of the Department of Home Affairs in Durban were used as a case study. Quantitative research aims to determine how one thing affects another in a population, by quantifying the relationship between variables (Altinay and

Paraskevas, 2008, p.75). The study used questionnaires distributed to black African immigrants making application at the Department of Home Affairs Durban regional office to explore their perception and experience of service delivery.

According to Creswell (2008, p.3), a research design are the plans and procedures for research that spans the decision from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis. Mouton (2001, p.55) defines a research design as a plan or blue print of how one intends conducting the research. Mouton (2001, p.55) further states that the research design focuses on the end product. He views research design as a point of departure which equates the research problem or question and believes that it focuses on the logic of research. According to Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2010, p.78), research design is governed by the notion of 'fitness for purpose'.

In essence, this research study adopted methods advanced for collecting the relevant data and the techniques used in their analysis, keeping in mind the objectives of the research study. As a good research design is often characterised by its flexibility, appropriateness, efficiency and economy, this research study was not an exception, hence the case study approach was chosen as the research design suitable for this project. Two approaches were used to collect data *viz.*, a survey via questionnaires (quantitative approach) and semi-structured interviews and document analysis (qualitative approach). This can be referred to as a mixed method approach.

Mixed method studies are those that combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches into the research methodology of a single or multiphase study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.17).

An overview of the mixed methods and its advantages is that qualitative research generates rich, detailed and valid data that contributes to in-depth understanding of the context. Quantitative research generates reliable population based and general data and is well suited to establishing cause-and-effect relationships. The advantages of the mixed method research include:

- Increased validity: confirmation of results by means of different data sources;
- Complementary: adding information i.e. words to numbers and vice-versa;

- Research development: one approach is used to inform the other, such as using qualitative research to develop an instrument to be used in quantitative research; and

- Creating new lines of thinking by the emergence of fresh perspectives and contradictions (UK Geocites, 2007, pp.2-3).

Qualitative research deals with data that are verbally presented while quantitative research deals with data that are numerically presented (de Vos, 1998, p.15). Document analysis provides a secondary source of information. According to McNeill and Chapman (2005, p.131), secondary data is evidence used that has been produced either by organisations such as the state or by individuals which usually takes the form of official statistics and various types of documents.

4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research methods are a variety of techniques that are used when studying a given phenomenon. They are planned, scientific and value-neutral. Research method is deliberately employed in a way that is designed to maximise the accuracy of the results (Methods Tutorial, 2008, p.1).

The case study approach was used because the study is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. White (2000, p.39) defines a case study as an extensive study of a single situation such as an individual, family or organisation. He further states that a case study employs a variety of different techniques that include questionnaires and interviews. According to Sekaran (2007, p.125), case studies that are qualitative in nature are, however, useful in applying solutions to current problems based on past problem-solving experiences. He further states that they are also useful in understanding certain phenomena and generating further theories for empirical testing (Sekeran, 2007, p.125). The regional offices of the Department of Home Affairs in Durban were used as a case study.

Quantitative research aims to determine how one thing affects another in a population, by quantifying the relationship between variables (Altinay and Paraskevas, 2008, p.75). Hence,

the study utilised responses derived from questionnaires distributed to black African migrants who accessed services at the Durban regional Department of Home Affairs to identify and analyse their various experiences and perceptions on effective and efficient public service delivery. According to Cooper and Schindler, (2008, p.162), qualitative research is designed to tell the researcher how (process) and why (meaning) things happen as they do. It aims to achieve an in-depth understanding of a situation. Penzhorn (2002, p.244) states that the qualitative approach involves investigating individuals and phenomena in the natural settings to gain a better understanding of the area under research. White (2000, p.28) believes that qualitative research is a descriptive, non-numerical way to collect and interpret information. Hence, the study equally utilised excerpts derived from interviewed black African clients that patronise the Durban regional offices of the Department of Home Affairs to determine their perceptions of customer service.

Although the sample of black African migrants that patronise the Durban regional offices of the Department of Home Affairs was cited as a case study, the implementation of *Batho Pele* principles in government departments is bound to differ within each regional office. This means that the findings of a study of this nature may not necessarily apply to all regional offices in a generalised manner. Thus, a case study approach was most appropriate as it strived to portray 'what it is like' to be in a particular situation, to catch the close-up reality and give a 'thick description' of participants' experiences and thoughts (Geertz, 1973). The advantage of this case-study approach is that it assisted the researcher to not depend solely on already published works, as White alludes to (White, 2000, p.39). This also reinforced the use of multiple sources of data which, in turn, facilitated the validation of data derived from this research study as opined by Descombe (2003, p.38). Hence, the research design combined the adoption of both questionnaires and interviews for use in this study.

As evidenced by the sample below, it is pertinent to reiterate that officials of the Department of Home Affairs were deliberately not interviewed because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, as well as the plausible practical difficulties this might pose for the researcher to gain unhindered access. Additionally, getting the perspective of 'white immigrants' might also have proven cumbersome for the researcher to obtain access to them and their version of their perceptions of the department for correlation purposes. The fact that the study was piloted by

a black African had its own challenges. Hence, it would have been more useful to get the perspective of staff of the Department of Home Affairs and white immigrants. It is presumable that this might impose some degrees of limitation in generalising the outcome of the study at the conclusive stage of this project. But all the same, this is a grey area that this study is recommending for further research study.

To summarise the findings pertaining to the second research question, an inference must be made from the findings of the previous research question as the research question here is an extension of the first question. Given that the majority of migrants' experiences with state officials were negative, it can be inferred that migrants generally experience poor treatment from state officials.

According to the researcher, the finding which implies xenophobia based only on foreignness is not necessarily inconsistent with that of other researchers, but rather it is a question of a different methodology and research question. The researcher did not ask South Africans for their opinions of different nationalities of migrants, which would likely have been similar to popular stereotypes such as those mentioned. Instead, this research was based on migrants' experiences of state officials.

When it comes to the DHA officials there is an apparent difference in the poor treatment they extend to foreigners based on their legal category. Migrants who are served at the RRO – asylum seekers and refugees – are treated differently to temporary and permanent residents who are served in the DHA offices. Interestingly, administering migrants in different offices based on whether they fall under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act translates into different treatment of migrants on the ground. Those with asylum seeker and refugee permits are treated worse than those with various categories of temporary residence and permanent residence. This implies that there is a hierarchy of migrants in the eyes of DHA officials with temporary and permanent residents at the top and asylum seekers and refugees at the bottom.

However, the findings show that the treatment of migrants has less to do with the extent of rights they are entitled to and more to do with which DHA office they receive their services from, depending on whether they are classified under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act.

From the two research questions discussed so far, the mostly negative experiences of migrants can be linked to the prevailing negative discourse on black African migrants which casts them as a danger to the South African nation.

Experiences with the DHA officials at their offices were singled out as being particularly appalling. With regard to the above, the findings indicate that the basis for state officials treating migrants poorly is simply their status as non-South Africans.

4.4 POPULATION

The population of the study was international migrants resident in South Africa, particularly the city of Durban, with a clear choice of black African migrants being selected from seven nationalities. Thus, nationals from two countries were selected from each of the three regional economic communities in Africa, and nationals of one country from one inter-regional economic community in Africa, which represented seven countries in total. In the Southern Economic Development Community (SADC) the study selected nationals from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Malawi. In the East African Community (EAC), Tanzanians were selected, and in the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the study selected Ghanaians and Nigerians, whilst in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Somalians were selected, and Ethiopians from Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa were equally selected. The reason why aforementioned nationals were chosen was because of their relatively large numbers in relation to other African nationals resident in South Africa in general, and the city of Durban in particular. Malawi (74,180), Swaziland (33,151), Zambia (27,163), Ethiopia (25,578), Congo (25,031), Nigeria (23,757) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (22,538) also counted as having some of the largest numbers of nationals residing in South Africa (Stat SA, Census Report, 2011). Additionally, in 2008 the United Nations equally estimated that 72 per cent of international migrants to South Africa came from African countries (United Nations, 2008). In 2009 the total number of migrants was estimated

to range between 1.2 million and 1.7 million, or less than four per cent of South Africa's population by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) (Landau, Polzer and Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2010, p.220). These migrants enter and remain in the country through both legal and illegal means.

This population of black African migrants comprised of all those who patronised the offices of the Department of Home Affairs for all documentation related purposes eg. registration and collection of certificates of any type that the offices issues, application for status on Temporary Resident Permits (TRPs) and Permanent Resident Permits (PRPs) at the Umgeni and Moore road Department of Home Affairs offices. Black African migrants applying for such status on Temporary Resident Permits (TRPs) include those in the following categories: relative, visitor, work, study, medical, business, retired-person, treaty, corporate, exchange and asylum seeker. While those on Permanent Resident Permits (PRPs) involve the following categories: relative, work, business, retired-person and refugee. Black African migrants applying on Temporary Resident Permits and Permanent Resident Permits were chosen for the mere reason that these are basically the critical bases upon which migrants apply for documentation at the Department of Home Affairs. Besides, according to Statistics South Africa (2012), immigrants are documented on the status of Temporary and Permanent Resident Permits.

In the 2016 survey, StatsSA explained that, since the onset of democracy, "research has anecdotally reported more immigration numbers [migration into South Africa] relative to emigration [emigration outwards]". This assumption appeared to be borne out by the data from the three census reports that followed 1994, conducted in 1996, 2001, and 2011. The 1996 census reported 958,188 foreign-born people in South Africa. By 2001 this figure had grown to 1,03-million. A decade later, census 2011 showed the number of foreign-born migrants had more than doubled, to just over 2,1-million, people.

However according to the 2016 survey, South Africa's foreign-born population has now declined to 1,6-million. Diego Iturralde, chief director for demography at StatsSA, told Africa Check that the decline was "unexpected" and that StatsSA was investigating "to see what may have informed this change" StatsSA, 2016, p. 18. Hence, StatsSA suggests in the report that the decline could be as a result of foreign-born people lying about their nationalities, which

may highlight an "instilled fear of disclosure of one's origin" p. 20. The report also stated there was a need to investigate the enumerators' capability to get correct answers on people's countries of origin.

In addition, the recorded number of foreign-born people in the 2016 Community Survey is also almost half the number of migrants estimated by the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). The DESA in Africa Check (2017) estimates that, in 2015, there were over 3,14-million international migrants living in South Africa. Quoting from a report, Pablo Lattes (2017), a population affairs officer from DESA's population division, states that their estimates were based on the 2011 census figures, indicating 2,1-million international migrants. To this they added a rounded-up figure of 600,000 asylum seekers and refugees – based on 2015 UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) data – which then "puts the total foreign-born around 2,7-million. The number of foreign-born has been steadily growing in South Africa," according to Lattes, "so we consider our estimate of 3,1-million to be a very likely estimate for the country" (Lattes, 2016). "The UN [estimate] is based on a model with a series of assumptions which in the past has tied up nicely with our data but this time round we seem to have diverged in our numbers," (Iturralde, 2016).

DESA's report in Africa Check (2017) states that in 2000 there were just over 1-million international migrants in South Africa, or 2.25 per cent of the population. This figure ties in with previous numbers released by StatsSA, which found, in the 1996 and 2001 censuses, and the 2007 community survey, respectively, "2.1 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the enumerated population", were foreign-born. The 2011 census was the first survey to estimate a significantly larger proportion of international migrants, at 4.2 per cent of the country's population (confusingly, some older StatsSA reports incorrectly cite this proportion as 5.7 per cent).

With the aforementioned statistics in mind, the Department of Home Affairs when approached, could not give accurate figures of both documented and yet to be documented black African migrants resident in the city of Durban, since the result of 2011 data from the Department of Home Affairs only shows that one hundred and sixteen thousand, one hundred and eighty-four [116,184] was the total number of international migrants documented on the status of both

temporary and permanent permits in South Africa (STAT South Africa,2012). Out of which, a total of 106,173 temporary resident permits (TRPs) were approved, while a total of 10,011 permanent resident permits (PRPs) were issued at the Department of Home Affairs. Thus, there is no precise reliable/exact number of the documented population of black African migrants residing in the various areas in the city of Durban where samples were to be selected by the researcher. However, given the enormous population of 116,184, though not a certain or exact population, through rule of thumb this research study relied on the figure of one thousand five hundred and sixty-two (1,562), which was a rough estimate of the number of black African migrants (of both documented and yet to be documented status) resident in the city of Durban. This was based on the total number of registered memberships of socio-cultural organisations representing each of the seven (7) nationalities sampled.

Thus, from this figure, a total of one hundred and fifty-nine (159) questionnaires were administered to both documented and yet to be documented black African migrants and this number forms the total respondents for this research study. Ultimately, only one hundred and forty (140) questionnaires were retrieved, and this number became the sample number for the study (quantitative approach). Out of this population of one hundred and forty (140), fifteen (15) research participants were co-opted for an in-depth interview (qualitative approach) which completed the mixed method adopted from the onset.

4.5   METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Data was collected from two major sources namely; the primary sources and secondary sources.

4.5.1   Primary Sources

Most primary data were generated from responses from structured closed-ended questionnaires (eg. frequencies and percentages used for analysis), responses from in-depth interviews (eg. excerpts from respondents used in analysis), some primary statistical figures as reported on Statistics South African websites which was used by this research study in both the presentation and analysis sections, as well as direct observation of events (at the premises of the Durban regional offices of Department of Home Affairs).

4.5.1.1 Questionnaires

The questionnaires were structured in a format that directly addressed the study objectives and which were closely linked to the literature review. The Likert Scale was used because it was appropriate and quick to construct. This produced a real picture of a well-defined sample group. It was also a popular summated scale to express an either 'favourable' or 'unfavourable' attitude toward the object of interest (Cooper and Schindler, 2008, pp.306-309), as well as on Likert's five-point rating scale in the following order (e.g. agreed, strongly agreed, neutral, disagreed, strongly disagreed etc.) in the form of an ordinal scale. The questionnaires were structured and delivered in the English language as it is the medium through which most black African migrants from all walks of life and different backgrounds communicate with each other in South Africa. The questionnaires were accompanied by a covering letter which stated the purpose of the study and the possible use of the findings as well as a promise of confidentiality and anonymity. It included both interview questions and instructions on how to respond to those questions and how to complete the blank spaces.

These questionnaires were distributed through three research assistants who were recruited among familiar black African migrants willing to participate in the study. Hence, this situation assisted the researcher in gaining access to black African migrants. Respondents/research subjects were approached at the premises outside the offices of the Durban regional Department of Home Affairs and were issued informed consent forms after introduction with a request and offer to help fill-in the questionnaires if they are comfortable. In situations where some of the respondents were uncomfortable outside the premises of the Department of Home Affairs, the second option utilised was to approach specific individuals in authority (gate-keepers) such as owners of black African migrants' renowned restaurants, socio-cultural organisations, religious leaders and community leaders in social gatherings for permission to access data from their clients/customers or members.

4.5.1.2 In-depth Interviews

These were conducted with the respondents before (pilot study phase) and after filling in the questionnaire schedule, in an informal way for the sake of familiarity, and also to elicit more information around areas that the questionnaires could not cover initially. Hence, a focus group of twenty (20) respondents were recruited as a sample unit out of the initial one hundred and forty (140) sample of survey participants for this purpose. The bulk of the informants were drawn from the Democratic Republic of Congo (five) and Nigeria (five), the rest were two nationals each of the remaining five countries. Congolese and Nigerian constituted the bulk of this in-depth interview because they are the largest group among other Africa migrants' resident in the city of Durban. The informants in this study all had harrowing tales of prejudices. The discussions examined their experiences and how they perceive and make sense of them with regards to the Department of Home Affairs. The interviewees were found mainly through snowball sampling techniques. In most cases it was only through personal introductions and careful negotiations that people were willing to be interviewed. Of the twenty interviewed, fifteen lived in inner-city (Congella, Central Business District, Point, Berea, South Beach) and five lived in suburban areas. All of them were interviewed in English. They all had sufficient English to make themselves understood.

The persistent reiteration of perceptions and patterns in the interviews indicated that more interviews would not have generated much new data. The informants within these respective African migrant groups, especially those living in inner-city neighbourhoods, had broadly similar perceptions and understanding of their current situations. The informants living in the suburbs were employed in the formal sector and were more settled and affluent than their counterparts in the inner-city. Not surprisingly, their experiences of prejudices in the Department of Home Affairs were less harsh and their perceptions not as damning. The venue and time for the interviews were arranged in conjunction with the interviewees. In most circumstances, permission was granted for the use of a tape/voice recorder as well as detailed notes being taken in a fieldwork notebook. The content of the interviews was transcribed and portions extracted to be used as excerpts. The real names of the participants were not used in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. In-depth interviews were beneficial to this study as they encouraged participants to come out of their shell to articulate their perceptions and also give detailed accounts of their experiences.

The interview format was used because of its flexibility, the response rate, observance of non-verbal behaviour, and control over the environment. Open-ended interview questions were posed to this focus-group of 20 black African migrants to obtain data, gauge/determine feelings, attitudes and opinions in a structured framework, and also to ensure that they were able to lead the conversation so as to alleviate/quash initial fears or suspicions about the research study. According to Bailey (1994, p.120), open-ended questions are useful if the possible answers are unknown or the question is exploratory.

Effort was made to ensure that membership of this focus group discussion, was balanced to reflect the views of both males and females respectively in a ratio of two to one (2:1), with ten (15) males and five (5) females participating. No identifying information about research subjects was recorded and they were equally assured of the confidentiality of their involvement in the focus groups. There were mixed reactions to the research initially as some of them felt that the research was unlikely to change their situation and would therefore be a waste of their time (however, when given the option to leave without participating in the research, none of these individuals chose to leave), while others were eager to participate. At the conclusion of the interviews, almost all participants wanted to receive a copy of the final research report.

4.5.2   Secondary Sources

Secondary data utilised for this study was collected from written books eg. published materials that were relevant to the study e.g. South African policy statements that govern the management of migrants, Statistics South Africa discussion reports/documents, textbooks, journal articles, monographs, newspapers and internet sources, as well as other library materials that were of immense benefit to the study was consulted.

4.6   SAMPLE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

Because the study was interested in precision and thoroughness, it discovered that none of the methods of probability and non-probability sampling technique alone could give the exact

sample size required. Also, since the study discovered that the distribution of the population was so complex, to select its sample, the need for more than one sampling technique arose. However, the study also had to resort to sampling in stages, and this was the principle behind the choice of multi-stage sampling for this research study.

In selecting a sample of 140 respondents from black African migrants resident in South Africa and specifically Durban, the study found it more convenient to divide those black African migrants into nationals from African Regional Economic Communities and Inter-Regional Communities: Southern Economic Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC),Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). This was stratified sampling. Two countries were selected from each of the two regional Economic Communities and one country from the last three Inter-Regional Economic Communities which sums-up to seven countries in total.

These countries were selected purposively because they have large populations in relation to other African nationals resident in South Africa in general, and the city of Durban in particular. Then, from each of the seven countries, the study selected twenty (20) respondents proportionately using a systematic sampling technique to ensure that the entire sample was proportionately a thorough reflection of black African migrants who were on Temporary Resident Permits (categories; relative, visitor, work, study, medical, business, retired-person, treaty, corporate, exchange and asylum seeker), Permanent Resident Permits (categories; relative, work, business, retired-person and refugee), as well as males and females inclusively. The seven nationalities (Ethiopians, Ghanaians, Tanzanians, Nigerians, Congolese, Malawians as well as Zimbabweans) represented black Africa migrants' resident in Durban which sums-up the sample frame based on referral.

4.6.1   Sample Frame

According to Asika (1991, p.41), a sample frame is the working universe which the researcher actually uses for the purpose of sampling. There was no precise figure of black African

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migrants residing in Durban, except the estimated population of 116,184 which was a total number of all international migrants residing in South Africa in general (StatsSA, 2012). However, this research study relied on the figure of one thousand five hundred and sixty-two (1,562) as the sampling frame, which was a rough estimate of black African migrants (of both documented and yet to be documented status) resident in the city of Durban. This was based on the total number of active registered memberships of socio-cultural organisations representing each of the seven (7) nationalities sampled. These reflected those applying for all documentation related purposes such as registration and collection of birth certificates, and those applying for both temporary and permanent resident permits. These black African migrants were resident in South Africa with particular reference to the city of Durban which comprises areas such as; North beach, South beach, Durban central (Central Business District), Greyville, Morningside, Windermere, Essenwood, Sydenham, Overport, Musgrave, Sherwood, Westville, Glenmore, Umbilo, Glenwood, Congella, Bluff, Clairwood, Seaview and Westridge etc. Specific individuals in authority (gate-keepers) in both formal and informal organisations in which black African migrants can be located were approached for their permission and consent prior to conducting the research.

Hence a detailed explanation was given to those gate-keepers concerning the objectives of the study. It was made clear to the members that there would be no victimisation, and that the research participants would be free to participate or opt out should they feel uncomfortable. In most possible situations, the researcher got authorisation from specific gate-keepers to address the congregation or members before commencement of fieldwork in terms of distribution of questionnaires and granting of interviews. It was made known to the participants that participation was absolutely voluntary. Besides, some of the participants were on referral from already existing participants.

The reason why the study used some non-probability sampling techniques in a multi-stage procedure was because with the Statistics South African record of documented migrants in South Africa, the results obtained from 2011 data from the Department of Home Affairs did not give a precise number of black African migrants residing in the city of Durban. However, according to Statistics South Africa (2012) a total number of immigrants in the whole of South Africa documented as at 2011 was one hundred and sixteen thousand, one hundred and eighty-

four (116,184). There is no precise reliable number of documented and undocumented black African migrants residing in the various areas in the city of Durban where samples were to be selected by the researcher. The study equally adopted a cluster sampling technique because of the prior knowledge of locations of some of the black African migrants from certain nationalities in South Africa, and it was pivotal in identifying those clusters in which those nationalities to be studied where located eg. Ethiopians, Congolese, Zimbabweans, Tanzanians, Nigerians, Ghanaians and Malawians.

4.6.2   RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

As reliability is defined as the consistency between independent measurements of the same phenomena, hence it is the stability, dependability and predictability of a measuring instrument. It is the accuracy or precision of a measuring instrument as enunciated (Asika, 1991, p.73). However, the research study was more concerned with the consistency of the results that were obtained with the measuring instrument. Thus, the study ensured that the instrument used would give similar, close to or the same result if the study to which the instrument was applied is replicated. In order to test for reliability, the study conducted a test-retest reliability test. With this test, the same measuring instrument was used to take two separate measurements on the same population at different times and intervals. The higher the correlation between the two measurements, the higher the reliability of the measuring instrument.

Swetnam (2000, p.30) also postulates that validity is about carefully constructing definitions of concepts, hypothesis or prepositions so that they can be translated clearly and predictably into detailed operational methods, down to the level of specific questions and observations. It is about ensuring that there are strong transparent relationships between the conceptual or theoretical part of the research, the phenomenon identified for investigation and the method a researcher intends to use to get access to that phenomenon. Validity refers to the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. Face-to-face interviews and questionnaires are valid instruments of collecting data. The questions in the interview schedule to the customers and the questionnaire administered were compared with the objectives of the study.

However, Mouton (1998, p.156) states that triangulation can be seen as an aspect that combines qualitative and quantitative approaches in research. For several authors, triangulation means the cross validation among data sources. The inclusion of multiple sources of data collection in a research project is likely to increase the reliability of the observation. A content analysis was conducted on the data gathered from the interviews and questionnaires (primary data) and the organisations' reports and other documents (secondary data). Lee and Lings (2008, p.239) maintain that triangulation is one way in which one can try to enhance validity. Therefore, the findings were valid as the study used data triangulation to attempt to corroborate findings according to different approaches.

Validity of measurements is defined in relation to the measuring instrument. The validity of a measuring instrument is defined as the ability of the measuring instrument to measure what it is supposed to measure (Asika, 1991, p.71). However, the validity of the research instrument in this study was conducted using independent research experts with expertise in migration, demography and research methods. In addition, academic input from research scholars with qualifications and vast years of experience in this field of study was equally beneficial.

4.6.3   Pilot Test

The questionnaire was pilot-tested prior to its finalisation. Pre-testing of the questionnaire was done to make sure that respondents could understand and interpret the questions accurately and to enable collection of the required information (Hussey, 2000, p.87). Hence, those questionnaires were pre-tested in-house and pilot tested on fifteen (15) African immigrants residing in Durban (those residing in the central business district to be precise). Thereafter, a review was made and corrections undertaken against identified weaknesses in the questionnaire. The interviews were used because of their flexibility, response rate, non-verbal behaviour, and control over the environment. Open-ended questions were posed to a focus group of fifteen black African immigrants.

4.6.4   Limitations

Vithal and Jansen (2006) as quoted by Naicker (2011, p.55), state that all studies are limited by time, resources, access, and availability of data and credibility of data. This is a small scale, in-depth study that took place in a particular context. The findings may not be applicable to different contexts.

4.6.5   Administration of Research Instrument (Questionnaires)

With a multi-stage sampling technique, a sample size of 159 was finally arrived at. It was these 159 black African migrants that the questionnaires were administered to. The study adopted Yamani's (1964, p.280) formula to analyse the sample technique.

$$n \quad = \quad \frac{N}{1+(N2)}$$

Where   n   =   sample size

N   =   population

e   =   level of significance

I   =   constant

i.e.

n   =   264

N   =   0.05

I   =   constant

$$n \quad = \quad \frac{264}{1+(264(0.05)}$$

$$n \quad = \quad \frac{264}{1+(264*0.0025)}$$

$$n \quad = \quad \frac{264}{1+0.66}$$

$$n \quad = \quad \frac{264}{1.66}$$

n   =   159

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However, only 140 respondents were able to return their questionnaires, hence the researcher relied on these 140 respondents for the information (data). Significantly, 140 stood as the actual sample for the study.

4.7 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

This study engaged in method triangulation, for example, by analysing data collected through both survey (quantitative) and interview (qualitative) methodological approaches. Statisticians insist on the use of non-parametric statistics for the analysis of data gathered through non-probability sampling methods (Asika, 1991, p.47), hence non-parametric statistics were used to analyse the data.

4.7.1 Quantitative Data

Data (derived from survey questionnaires) were analysed with the use of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), and the method of analysis was descriptive because it deals with the study of the distribution of the variables of study (in relation to subjects), such as the profiles of the respondents, groups or any other subjects (Asika, 1991, p.118). As for the questionnaire, respondents were provided with questions, which were framed in such a way as to demand a limited number of definite and readily tabulated answers (closed-ended or fixed alternative questions). This method involves describing the data collected using simple statistical tools such as tables, pie-charts, bar-charts, histograms, means and percentages. The organisation of data using this method of data analysis made the results easy to appreciate and understand.

However, responses to each question from the questionnaire were presented and analysed using separate tables/charts. With this, it is easy to see the opinions of the respondents at a glance and conclusions can easily be drawn. As for the questionnaires, respondents were provided with questions, which were framed in a format that demanded a limited number of definite and readily tabulated answers (i.e. closed-ended or fixed alternative questions). The highest

number/percentage of respondents to a particular option was used to draw a conclusion at that point. Though the study could not determine precisely the strength of the conclusion, it is based on a simple majority of responses to each question (i.e. any alternative response with majority [frequency/percentage] concludes the decision to each question). Data analysis was presented in such a way that it would be easy to see the opinion and pattern of the respondents on different questions raised.

Finally, through a rigorous and painstaking exercise, the hypothesis of the study was tested using the Chi-square (X^2) Test of Independence and Homogeneity with the formula below:

Equation $Eij = \frac{(ni \; x \; nj)}{n}$, was used to compute the expected cell frequencies for all the cells (alternative response to each question as applicable to each hypothesis)

Where *ni* = Row Total

nj = Column Total

n = Actual Sample

4.7.1.1 Chi-square Formula

The following formula was then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data:

$$x^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{nr} = \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$$

Where *Oij* = Observed frequency

Eij = **Expected frequency**

However, Healy's Five Step Model for Hypothesis Testing was equally adopted sequentially:

STEP 1: Making an assumption.

STEP 2: Stating the null hypothesis.

STEP 3: Selecting the sampling distribution and establishing the critical region.

STEP 4: Computing the test statistic.

STEP 5: Making a decision.

Conclusively, with the adoption of the Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity, it is plausible to state precisely and with certainty, the strength of the observed association (proof of hypothesis).

4.7.2 Qualitative Data

Data were analysed using the thematic analysis approach. Thematic analysis is a qualitative analytic method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. The study ensured that the entire procedure engaged and revolved around three critical stages; descriptive, analytic and theorised. It minimally organised and described data sets in detail. However, it goes further than this by interpretation of various aspects of the research topic. Hence, thematic analysis used in the study adopted the following rigor:

- careful transcription of extracts;

- checking of themes;

- ensuring that themes are coherent, consistent and distinctive;

- congruence between extracts and analytic claims; and

- balance between narrative and extracts etc.

Mouton (1998, p.156) states that triangulation can be seen as an aspect that combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches in research. For several authors, triangulation means the cross validation among data sources. The inclusion of multiple sources of data collection in a research project is likely to increase the reliability of the observation. Thematic/content analysis of this study was conducted on the data generated from the interviews and questionnaires (primary data), organisations' reports and other documents (secondary data). Lee and Lings (2008, p.239) maintain that triangulation is one way in which one can try to enhance validity. Therefore, the findings were plausibly valid as the study used data triangulation as an attempt at corroboration of findings accordingly with different approaches.

Conclusively, this research study decided to adopt the triangulation procedure because it maximises the strengths and reduces the limitations of a single method, more especially for a study of this nature.

4.7.3   Ethical Requirement

The credibility and authenticity of the study was imperative such that the research was done in a manner that ensured ethical standards. Prior to the commencement of the fieldwork, the prospective respondents to whom the questionnaires were administered received an introduction from the researcher highlighting the reason for the research. This introduction included an explanation of the importance of a research study of this nature and also sought the permission of the respondents who participated in the research, and was equally accompanied by a statement on the questionnaires to be endorsed by each respondent as indication that they understood the nature of the research. Much effort was made to inform the respondents concerning the voluntary nature of participation. Hence the attachment of an informed consent form for the participants' signature.

Ultimately, the study complied to all the ethical requirements and guidelines of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and also a formal letter submitted to the University's ethics committee for clearance prior the commencement of study was equally approved. All data generated during the research process was submitted to the International and Public Affairs cluster for onward transfer to the school of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

5 CHAPTER FIVE: PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCES OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ON SERVICE DELIVERY AT THE DURBAN DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

## 5.1 SECTION A: ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Figure 5. 1A: Nationality and Gender Representation

The figure above indicates that fourteen percent (14) per cent of the entire sampled population of respondents, which is one hundred and forty (140), constituted each nationality of seven countries, out of which eight (8) per cent males and six (6) per cent of females respectively represent Ghana. Whilst seven (7) per cent of males and seven (7) per cent of females respectively represent the Democratic Republic of Congo, whereas eight (8) per cent males and six (6 per cent) of females constitutes Ethiopia. Six (6) per cent of males and eight (8) per cent of females represent Malawi. Thirteen (13) per cent of males and one (1) per cent of females represent Nigeria. Nine (9) per cent of males and five (5) per cent of females represent Tanzania. Lastly, six (6) per cent of males and nine (9) per cent of females represent Zimbabwe.

However, it is significant that the figure above indicates that whilst the Democratic Republic of Congo percentages of both gender were equally balanced, the Nigerian percentage of female representatives are disproportionate to the male percentage.

Figure 5. 1B: Age Bracket of Respondents

AGE BRACKET OF RESPONDENTS
BETWEEN 50 - 59; 4
BETWEEN 40 - 49; 32
BETWEEN 20 - 29; 65
BETWEEN 30 - 39; 39

The figure above indicates that thirty-two respondents (23 per cent) of the entire sampled population are between the age bracket [40 - 49], thirty-nine respondents (28 per cent) of the entire sampled population are between the age bracket [30 - 39]. Whilst four respondents (3 per cent) of the entire sampled population are between the age bracket [50 - 59], whereas sixty-five respondents (46 per cent) of the remaining respondents are between the age bracket [20 - 29].

However, almost half (46 per cent) of the entire sampled population is of a youthful age. This portrays a significant indication and goes to prove that majority of African migrants residing in South Africa and particularly in Durban are young men and women of a productive age, which includes relatively (28 per cent) young but not so young male and females between the age bracket [30-39].

Figure 5. 1C: Marital Status


MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

The figure above indicates that forty-two respondents, which is 30 per cent of the entire sampled population (140) are still single, whereas ninety-eight respondents, which is 70 per cent of the total sampled population (140) are married, and this number constitutes the majority of the entire sampled population of African migrants. The highest percentage of respondents that are married is located among the Congolese (19 per cent), followed by the Malawians (18 per cent), Zimbabweans (17 per cent), Ethiopians (15per cent) and Nigerians (13 per cent), Ghanaians (9 per cent), Tanzanians (7 per cent]. The highest percentage of respondents of the sampled population that are still single (eligible bachelors) is recorded among the Tanzanians (31 per cent), followed by Ghanaians (26 per cent), Nigerians (17 per cent), Ethiopians (12 per cent), Zimbabweans (7 per cent), Malawians (5 per cent), and Congolese (2 per cent).

It is significant to note that the least/lowest percentage of the entire sampled population of African migrants that are still single (eligible bachelors) is located among the Congolese with two per cent, whilst the majority/highest percentage is recorded among the Tanzanians (31 per cent). However, the majority/highest percentage of respondents of African migrants sampled

that are married is recorded among the Congolese (19 per cent), whereas the least/lowest percentage is recorded among the Tanzanians (7 per cent).

**Figure 5. 1D:** Citizenship of Respondents Spouses

The figure above indicates that thirty-two (33) per cent of respondents out of ninety-eight, which is a sum total of the sampled population of those married, are married to a South African spouse. Whereas sixty-six (66) per cent of respondents are married to a non-South African spouse. It is notable that the highest percentage of respondents from a particular nationality that are married to non-South African spouses is recorded among the Congolese (25 per cent), followed by Malawians (21 per cent), Ethiopians (20 per cent), Zimbabweans (20 per cent), Tanzanians (6 per cent), Ghanaians (5 per cent), Nigerians (3 per cent), respectively. Whereas the highest percentage of respondents from a particular nationality that are married to South African spouses is recorded among the Nigerians (34 per cent), followed by the Ghanaians (19 per cent), Zimbabweans (16 per cent), Malawians (13 per cent), whilst the rest of Tanzanians, Ethiopians and Congolese are at two (2) per centage each.

However, its outstanding to see that the highest percentage of the nationality of the sampled married population that are married to a South African spouse is recorded among Nigerians (34

per cent) which might give credence to the outcry of most South African men that Nigerians are taking their women, and the least/lowest percentage of the nationality of the sampled married population that are married to a South African spouse is recorded among the Tanzanians, Ethiopians and Congolese (25 per cent respectively). Whereas, the most/highest percentage of the nationality of the sampled married population that are married to a non-South African spouse is recorded among the Congolese (25 per cent) and the least/lowest percentage of the nationality of the sampled married population that are married to a non-South African spouse is recorded among Nigerians (3 per cent).

Figure 5. 1E: Level of Education of Respondents

The figure above indicates that among all the African migrants sampled none was without any kind of formal education. Eighteen (18) per cent of the entire sampled respondents completed primary school, whilst fifty-nine (59) per cent completed secondary school, and fifty-nine (59) per cent of the respondents also completed matric, while twenty-three (23) per cent completed tertiary education. It is obvious from the figure that the respondents indicated completed twice for secondary and matric, which stands for the same level with both.

This goes to prove that whilst eighteen (18) per cent, which is the least/lowest percentage of the entire sampled population completed primary, which is the barest minimum in the rung of educational hierarchical system. Whereas the majority (59) per cent of the sampled African migrants completed secondary and matric, which proves that most of African migrants in South Africa are literate, meaning that they can read and write. Even the number of those who completed tertiary (23 per cent) is significantly remarkable.

Figure 5. 1. 2: Participants' Duration of Years of Residence in South Africa?

The figure above indicates that sixty (43 per cent) of the sampled African migrants had been resident in South Africa for a duration of more than ten (10) years. Whereas twenty-three (16 per cent) had been resident in South Africa for a duration of less than ten [10] years, twenty (14 per cent) of the sampled African migrants had been resident for a period of less than five (5) years. Whilst fifteen (11 per cent) of them had been resident for a period of less than three (3) years, and twenty-two (16 per cent) had been residing in South Africa for a duration of more than fifteen (15) years.

Ab initio, during the course of data collection, effort was made to avoid sensitivity of the research subject. However based on trust, via word of mouth, the study kept records of the ratio

of those on Permanent residency status and Temporary visas (5 per cent vs. 95 per cent). However, what this study can conclude from the above is that close to half the percentage of African migrants sampled, which is a greater figure, have been residing in South Africa for more than ten (10) years and still counting. In addition, if the study combines/adds that figure with the ones (African migrants) that have been resident in South Africa for a period of more than fifteen (15) years, which is sixteen (16) per cent, it totals fifty-nine (59) per cent as against the rest that have been resident for less than ten (10) years, which is only forty-one (41) per cent.

5.2 SECTION B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS

Number of times you have gone to Home Affairs within a year for documentation purpose?

Figure 5. 2. 1: Participants Number of Visitation to Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above indicates that within a year, twenty-four (17 per cent) of the entire sampled African migrants (respondents) had gone/visited/or made appearance at the office of Department of Home Affairs for one single application related purposes an uncountable number of times. Whilst fifteen (11 per cent) of the sampled African migrants (respondents)

had gone to the offices of the Department of Home Affairs for single application related purposes on more than ten (10) occasions, sixty-three (45 per cent) had gone there more than five (5) times in a year for one single application related purposes. Whereas twenty (14 per cent) of the sampled African migrants (respondents) had made an appearance twice at the offices of the Department of Home Affairs for one single application related purpose in a year, eighteen (13 per cent) had visited the office once for a single application related purpose in a year.

However, it seems that those who had been to the office on more than five (5) occasions, which is forty-five (45) per cent of the entire sampled African migrants, are the majority. This is in contrast with those who have appeared at the office once (13 per cent) and twice (14 per cent) respectively (which is reasonable, should the study factor-in efficiency and effectiveness in productivity/turn-around time of the office).

In conclusion, it is plausible to state that this attests to the fact that there is no doubt about the inefficiency of the office as experienced by African migrants in South Africa, which used to be a peculiar widely held view in the South African society (Dlamini-Zuma 2009, Msimang 2009, Dorasamy 2009 and Musuya 2015). Hence, this situation can be attributed to debateable factors from the office of the Department of Home Affairs' perspective and specifically that of an African migrant's perspective which this study is all about.

From below how can you rate your experience at the Department of Home Affairs, for example; the way you were spoken to, time spent in a queue, abuse from officials….?

Figure 5. 2. 2: Participants Rating on Degrees of Their Experience at Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above indicates that the view/opinion of twenty-three (16 per cent) of the entire sampled African migrants (respondents) rated the degree of their experiences of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs as very poor. Whilst the opinion of sixty-four (46 per cent) of the sampled African migrants rated the degree of their experiences of service delivery of the office as poor, the views of twenty-six (19 per cent) rated their experience as fair. The opinion of seventeen (12 per cent) of the sampled African migrants rated their experiences of service delivery of the Department of Home Affairs as good, whereas the views of ten (7 per cent) rated theirs as very good.

So, it's probable to state that the majority (45 per cent) of the sampled African migrants' experiences of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs are of the view that it is poor. Which is in contrast to the minority (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants who are of the view that their experiences of service delivery of home affairs is very good.

Did the officials attend to you professionally?

Figure 5.2. 3: Participants Rating of Degrees of Professionalism at The Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above indicates that thirty-one (22 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that there is evidence of professionalism at the offices of the Department of Home Affairs, whereas twenty-four (17 per cent) strongly agreed, forty-two (30 per cent] of the sampled African migrants were undecided about the statement that there is evidence of professionalism at the office. Whilst forty-three (31 per cent) disagreed with the statement that there is evidence of professionalism, none of the African migrants strongly disagreed with the statement.

Since forty-two (30 per cent) were undecided and the greater per cent of sampled African migrants, forty-three (31 per cent) which are in the majority, disagreed with the statement in contrast to those sampled African migrants twenty-four (17 per cent) who strongly agreed, it could be concluded that African migrants are of the view that there is a minimal rate of professionalism at the offices of the Department of Home Affairs.

In your opinion, do you think you are treated in the same way as other immigrants (white) at Home affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 4: Participants Perception on Whether Their Application is Treated in A Similar Way as other Migrants.

Figure: RESPONDENTS PERCEPTION ON WHETHER THEIR APPLICATIONS ARE TREATED IN A SIMILAR MANNER AS OTHER MIGRANTS(EG. WHITE COUNTERPARTS)

The figure above stipulated that fifty (36 per cent) of sampled African migrants strongly disagreed with the statement that their applications are treated in a similar manner as other migrants' (white counterparts) applications in South Africa. Whilst seventeen (12 per cent) disagreed with the statement, fifty-three (38 per cent) were undecided with the statement that their applications are treated in a similar manner as their counterparts. Whereas ten (7 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that their applications are treated in a similar manner as others (white counterparts), ten (7 per cent) agreed with the statement.

Thirty-six (36) per cent of sampled African migrants strongly disagreed and thirty-eight (38) per cent, which is the majority were undecided, in contrast with seven (7) per cent who strongly agreed with the statement that applications of African migrants are treated in a similar manner as others (white counterparts). It is tenable to conclude that in as much as the greater percentage of African migrants were undecided, the majority proves their perception on the existence of

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doubt concerning the equality of treatment of their applications in relation to other migrants (white counterparts) by the Department of Home Affairs.

Are you worried regarding the situation at the Home Affairs office?

Figure 5. 2. 5: Participants Concern on Whether they Are Worried About Situation of Things at Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above specified that ten (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants (respondents) strongly agreed with the statement that they are worried about the situation at the Department of Home Affairs. Whereas ten (7 per cent) disagreed with the statement, eighteen (13 per cent) of the respondents were undecided with the statement that that they are worried about the situation at the office of the Department of Home Affairs. Whilst eighty-five (61 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, seventeen (12 per cent) agreed with the statement that they are worried about the situation at the Department of Home Affairs.

Conclusively, since sixty-one (61) per cent of the sampled African migrants, which is the majority, strongly agreed that they are worried about the situation at the Department of Home Affairs is in contrast to only seven (7) per cent who strongly disagreed, it is pertinent to state

that the situation with regards to applications of African migrants at the Department of Home Affairs does not inspire confidence.

Before your visit to the Department of Home Affairs, did you expect to be treated differently from others (whites) with regards to quality of service delivered by the staff members?

Figure 5. 2. 6: Participants Opinion on Whether they Expected to Be Treated Differently from Others.


The figure above shows that ten (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that they are aware ab initio (knew beforehand) that their applications would be treated differently from other migrants' (white counterparts) applications. Whilst eight-two (59 per cent) strongly agreed, fifteen (11 per cent) were undecided about being aware that their applications might be treated differently from others. Whereas nineteen (14 per cent) disagreed with the statement that they were aware that their applications would be treated differently from others, fourteen (10 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement regarding their applications.

Since fifty-nine (59) per cent strongly agreed with the statement, which is the majority, is in contrast to ten (10) per cent, who are in the minority, that strongly disagreed with the statement,

it is plausible to conclude that the perception of African migrants is that their applications are not given the same attention as the applications of other migrants (white). However, the study did not discount the fact that it seems that most black Africans are coloured by their prior expectations that they would be treated in a discriminatory way.

Do you agree that the officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for the manner in which they attend to you?

Figure 5. 2. 7: Participants Response to Whether Officials of Department of Home Affairs Are to Be Blamed for How African Migrants Are Treated At Their Offices.

The figure above indicates that ten (7 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for how the applications of African migrants are treated at their office. Whereas sixteen (11 per cent) disagreed with the statement, fifty-four (39 per cent) were undecided. Whilst twenty (14 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for how their applications are treated, forty (29 per cent) agreed with the statement.

Thirty-nine (39) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, were undecided and twenty-nine (29) per cent agreed with the statement that the officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for how the applications of African migrants are treated at their offices. This is in total contrast with seven (7) per cent who strongly disagreed with the statement and are in the minority. It is hence plausible to state that African migrants are in doubt that officials of the Department Home Affairs are to be blamed. Hence, the significant effect of this doubt opens a Pandora's box.

Do you think they are not the ones to be blamed?

Figure 5. 2. 8: Participants Opinion on Whether Officials of Department of Home Affairs Are Not to Be blamed Regarding How African Migrants Applications Are Treated.

The figure above shows that none of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are not to be blamed for how their applications are treated at their office. Whilst forty (29 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, eighteen (13 per cent) were undecided. Whereas eighty-two (59 per cent) disagreed with the statement, none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are not to be blamed for how their applications are treated at their offices.

Fifty-nine (59) of the sampled African migrants who disagreed with the statement are in the majority, and this is in contrast with twenty-nine (29) per cent of those who strongly agreed. It is therefore plausible to state that African migrants disagreed with statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are not those who decide how their applications are treated at the office. Hence, the significant effect of this opens another Pandora's box just like the preceding results.

It is generally agreed that there is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 9: Participants Response to General Agreement that there is A Huge Evidence of Good Customer Service at the Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above depicts that none of the respondents either agreed or disagreed with the statement that there is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs. Whilst forty-eight (34 per cent) of respondents were undecided, none of them disagreed with the statement. However, ninety-two (66 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed

with the statement that there is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs.

Conclusively, this portends that there is a general perception among African migrants that there is little or a significant lack of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs.

If you strongly disagree with the above, would you then agree that lack of good customer service is often linked to the negative attitude of officials of the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 10: Participants Thought on Whether Lack of Good Customer Service is Often Linked to the Negative Attitude of Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above shows that fifty-nine (59) per cent of sampled African migrants agreed that the lack of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the negative attitude of its officials. Whereas none of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, thirty-eight (27 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whilst twenty (14 per

cent) disagreed with the statement, none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that the lack of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs is often linked with the negative attitude of its officials.

Fifty-nine (59) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority agreed with the statement that the lack of good customer services at the Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the negative attitudes of its officials, in contrast with fourteen (14) per cent of the respondents, who are in the minority. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the generally held perception of African migrants is that the lack of good customer services at the Department of Home Affairs can be attributed to the negative attitudes of its officials.

Are you proud of your identity (as a black African migrant) in South Africa in relation to how you are received and treated by the officials at the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 11: Participants Response to the Proudness of their Identity with Regards to their Presence at the Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above indicates that eleven (8 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed that they are proud of their identity as black African migrants in South Africa in relation to the services at the Department of Home Affairs. Whereas nine (6 per cent) strongly agreed with

the statement, twenty-four (24 per cent) were undecided. Whilst thirty-two (23 per cent) disagreed with the statement that African migrants are proud of their identity in relation to the services at the Department of Home Affairs, thirty-nine per cent strongly disagreed with the statement.

Fifty-five (39 per cent), which is the majority strongly disagreed with the assertion that African migrants are proud of their identity, in contrast with six (6 per cent) who strongly agreed with the statement. Hence, it is plausible to state that African migrants are not proud of what their identity will fetch them in relation to service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs.

If you Agreed or Strongly Agreed, is it because your applications are treated professionally by the officials of Department of Home Affairs?

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ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Agree	7	5
Strongly agree	3	2
Undecided	23	16
Disagree	61	44
Strongly disagree	46	33
TOTAL	140	100

Figure 5. 2. 12: Participants Response that Applications Are Treated Professionally Due to Having a Black African Identity in Relation to Services at the Department of Home Affairs

The figure above shows that forty (40) per cent [the sum of those that both agreed and strongly agreed with the preceding statement] strongly disagreed with the succeeding statement that the reason why African migrants are proud of their identity is because their applications are treated professionally. Whilst twenty-five (25) per cent disagreed with the statement, twenty (20) per cent were undecided about the statement. Whereas five (5) per cent strongly agreed with the statement, ten (10) per cent agreed with the statement which is because their applications are treated professionally.

Conclusively, forty (40) per cent of the sampled African migrants, which is the majority, strongly disagreed and twenty-five (25) per cent disagreed with the statement, as opposed to five (5) per cent who strongly agreed, and ten (10) per cent, which is the minority agreed with the statement. It is therefore plausible to state that some African migrants' resident in South Africa are still proud of their identity irrespective of the kind of treatment they got from offices of the Department of Home Affairs.

Do officials of the Department of Home Affairs honor the documents you present for your application?

Figure 5. 2. 13: Participants Response that Officials of Department of Home Affairs Do Honor Documents They Tendered for Documentation Purposes.

The figure above indicates that twenty-five (18 per cent) of African migrants agreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs honor documents tendered for application purposes. Whereas fifteen (11 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, forty (29 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whilst thirty-nine (28 per cent) disagreed with the statement, twenty-one (15 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement.

Since twenty-nine (29) per cent of the sampled African migrants were undecided, which when combined with those twenty-eight (28) per cent that disagreed with the statement, and is in contrast with eighteen (18) per cent of those who agreed with the statement, it is plausible to conclude that African migrants have the perception that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do not honor some of the documents they tender for applications. Further clarification was sought during the course of the qualitative study where most undecided respondents were of the view that they could only give assurance for themselves that they present genuine documents, meaning that they can't vouch for others.

Most times, if not always, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the documents you present for your applications?

Figure 5. 2. 14: Participants Response to Statement that Most Times, Officials of Department of Home Affairs Are Often in Doubt of Papers Tendered for documentation Purpose Prior Formal Verification.

ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Agree	59,62	44
Strongly agree	0	0
Undecided	30,32	23
Disagree	43,46	33
Strongly disagree	0	0
TOTAL	140	100

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT THAT MOST TIMES, OFFICIALS OF HOME AFFAIRS ARE OFTEN IN DOUBT OF PAPERS THEY TENDER FOR DOCUMENTATION PRIOR FORMAL VERIFICATION

The figure above indicates that thirty-three (33) per cent of the sampled African migrants disagreed with the statement that most times officials of the Department of Home Affairs are often in doubt about the papers they tender for documentation purposes prior to formal verification. Whilst twenty-three (23) per cent were undecided about the statement, none of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. Whereas forty-four (44) per cent of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that most times officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in-doubt of the papers they tender for documentation purposes prior to formal verification, and none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement.

Conclusively, since forty-four (44) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, as opposed to thirty-three (33) per cent, which is the minority, who agreed with the statement, it is plausible to state that most times African migrants have the perception that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are always suspicious of some of the papers African migrants submitted for documentation purposes even before such documents are placed under formal verification.

Would you rather contract an agent for your application if you have the resources/money?

Figure 5. 2. 15: Participants Response to Whether They Would Consider Contracting an Agent to Make Application on their Behalf Should They Have the Means.

The figure above depicts that eight (6 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that African migrants do consider contracting an agent to make application on their behalf should they have the means (money). Whereas ninety-two (66 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, ten (7 per cent) were undecided with the statement. Whilst seven (5 per cent) disagreed with the statement that African migrants do consider contracting an agent to make applications on their behalf, twenty-three (16 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement.

Since sixty-six (66) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with the statement which is in contrast with sixteen (16) per cent, which is the minority, it is plausible to conclude that African migrants have the perception that if they have the funds, it is far better and productive to contract the services of agents who, according to them, have strong connections and networks within the Department of Home Affairs.

In your opinion during the course of presenting documents for application, do you think that black African immigrants are treated in a similar manner as their counterparts (white)?

Figure 5. 2. 16: Participants Response that African Migrants' Application Are Treated in a Similar Manner as their other Counterparts.

AFRICAN MIGRANTS APPLICATIONS ARE TREATED IN A SIMILAR MANNER AS THEIR COUNTERPARTS (WHITE MIGRANTS)

The figure above indicates that seventeen (12 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that applications of African migrants are treated in a similar manner as others (white counterparts). Whilst ten (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants strongly agreed with the statement, forty-one (29 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whereas twenty-five (18 per cent) disagreed with the statement, forty-seven (34 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement.

Conclusively, since thirty-four (34) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly disagreed with the statement that African migrants are treated in a similar manner as their counterparts (white), and twenty-nine (29) per cent are in direct contrast and with seven (7) per cent of the respondents in the minority, it is plausible to state that African migrants have the perception that their applications are treated differently as compared to their counterparts (white migrants). Hence, they believe that they are relatively deprived of the kind of attention/treatment their counterparts get.

If you strongly disagree with the above, does it mean you think that other counterparts (white immigrants) are treated with dignity and less suspicion of presenting fraudulent/fake documents for application at the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2 17: Participants Reason for Disagreement with the Preceding Statement is Because they Believed that the Application of other Counterparts is Treated Differently with Less or No Suspicion.

The figure above shows that twenty-four (17 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that their reason for rejecting the preceding statement is because their counterparts' (white migrants) applications are treated differently and with less/no suspicion at all, unlike theirs. Whilst thirty-five (25 per cent) of respondents strongly agreed with the statement, thirty-five (25 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whereas twenty-six (19 per cent) of the respondents disagreed with the statement, twenty (14 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement.

However, since twenty-five (25) per cent of respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with the statement and twenty-five (25) per cent were undecided, as opposed to fourteen (14) per cent of the respondents, which is the minority, it is effectively significant to state that African migrants have the perception that their applications are not treated on an equal footing as their counterparts (white migrants) who are often perceived by South Africans as investors/job-creators whereas they (African migrants) are perceived as competitors/job-takers.

Do you agree that most times, if not always, black African immigrants do present/submit fraudulent documents for applications?

Figure 5. 2. 18: Participants Response that African Migrants Do Submit Fraudulent Papers for Documentation Purpose.

The figure above indicates that twenty-two (16 per cent) of the sampled African migrants strongly disagreed that African migrants do submit fraudulent papers for documentation purposes. Whereas thirty-one (22 per cent) disagreed with the statement, fifty-four (39 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whilst seventeen [12per cent] per cent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, sixteen [11per cent] per cent agreed with the statement that African migrants do tender fraudulent papers.

Conclusively, since thirty-nine (39) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, were undecided as against sixteen (16) per cent of the respondents who strongly disagreed and twelve (12) per cent of the respondents who strongly agreed with the statement, are in the minority, it is plausible to say that what the study can draw from this is that each African migrant is of the opinion that they can only answer for themselves, meaning that they could not accuse their fellow migrants of submitting fake papers for documentation purposes because they do not have concrete evidence to support their claims or assumptions.

In your opinion, do you agree that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do assume/associate black African immigrants with the tendency of tendering fake/fraudulent documents?

Figure 5. 2. 19: Participants Response that Officials of the Department of Home Affairs Do Associate African Migrants with Fraudulent Documents.

The figure above indicates that twenty-two (16 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do associate African migrants with fraudulent/fake documents. Whilst forty-one (29 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, twenty (14 per cent) of the respondents were undecided about the statement. Whereas twenty-eight (20 per cent) disagreed with the statement, twenty-nine (21 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement.

Since twenty-nine (29) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with the statement, as opposed to twenty-one (21) per cent, which is the minority, who strongly disagreed with the statement, it is plausible to conclude that African migrants have the perception that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do associate them with submitting

fraudulent papers for documentation purpose just to demonise them because they don't project anything that will go in the African migrants' favour.

Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to African immigrants is as a result of discriminatory practices of officials of the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 20: Participants Response that the Quality of Services Rendered to African Migrants Is as A Result of the Discriminatory Practices of Officials of Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above depicts that forty-one (29 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that the quality of services rendered to African migrants is as a result of discriminatory practices of the officials of the Department of Home Affairs towards them. Whereas fifty-two (37 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, twenty (14 per cent) were undecided with the statement. Whilst eight (6 per cent) of the respondents disagreed with the statement that the quality of services rendered to African migrants is as a result of the discriminatory practices of officials of the Department of Home Affairs, nineteen (14 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement.

However, since thirty-seven (37) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with the statement as opposed to fourteen (14) per cent of the respondents, which is the

minority, strongly disagreed, the study concludes that the quality of services rendered to African migrants at the Department of Home Affairs is directly proportionate to discriminatory practices of its officials which might seems not different from how other governmental agencies treat black African migrants in South Africa as opined by most black African immigrants.

Do you agree that officials of the Department of Home Affairs at the frontline desk do speak an indigenous language to African immigrants without first getting to know whether they understood the language?

Figure 5. 2. 21: Participants Response that Officials of the Department of Home Affairs Speak to African Migrants in Isi-Zulu Language Without Asking First if they Do Understand.


The figure above shows that twenty-five (18 per cent) of the sampled African migrants strongly disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do communicate to them in Isi-Zulu without first asking if they understand the language. Whilst fifteen (11 per cent) of the respondents disagreed with the statement, thirty-seven (25 per cent) were undecided. Whereas thirty (21 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, thirty-three (24 per cent) agreed with the statement.

Conclusively, since twenty-six (26) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority were undecided as opposed to eighteen (18) per cent of those who strongly disagreed and twenty-one (21) per cent of those who strongly agreed with the statement, it is plausible to state that the practice of officials of the Department of Home Affairs speaking to African migrants in the Isi-Zulu language without first asking if they understand the language might no longer be taking place. Hence kudos to officials of the Department of Home Affairs for this improvement.

Are you okay with how officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive (think) of you before taking a decision affecting your application?

Figure 5. 2. 22: Participants Response that they Are Comfortable with How They Are Perceived by Officials of the Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above indicates that none of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that African migrants are comfortable with how they are perceived by the officials of the Department of Home Affairs. Whilst none of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, fifty-one (36 per cent) were undecided. Whereas fifty-six (40 per cent) disagreed with the statement that African migrants are comfortable with how they are perceived by officials of the Department of Home Affairs, thirty-three (24 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement.

Forty (40) per cent of respondents, which is the majority disagreed with the statement and thirty-six (36) per cent were undecided about the statement as opposed to twenty-four (24) per cent of the respondents, which is the minority. It is plausible to state that African migrants are not comfortable with how officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive them in relation to their applications at the office.

Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to black African immigrants could be improved if the officials of the Department of Home Affairs could change the way they see them by treating them professionally with a spirit of *Ubuntu* (brotherhood) and are well-trained to make informed decisions?

Figure 5. 2. 23: Participants Response that Service Delivery at the Department of Home Affairs Could Be Improved Should Officials Change their Perception of African Migrants.

The figure above shows that none of the African migrants sampled strongly disagreed with the statement that service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs could be improved should the officials change their perception about African migrants. Whilst fifteen (28 per cent) were undecided about the statement, (38 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. Whereas (34 per cent) of them agreed with the statement, none of the respondents

disagreed with the statement that service delivery in home affairs could be improved should the officials change the perception they have about African migrants.

Conclusively, since thirty-eight (38) per cent of the sampled African migrants, which is the majority strongly agreed and thirty-four (34) per cent agreed with the statement as against twenty-eight (28) per cent of respondents, which is the minority, it is plausible to conclude with the statement that service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs could be improved should the officials change the perception they have about African migrants.

Do you think that you can achieve the dreams you had before coming to South Africa if treated fairly, as well as a positive improvement at the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 24: Participants Response that they Can Still Achieve the Dreams and Aspirations they Had Prior Arrival to South Africa.

The figure above indicates that forty-seven (34 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that they can still achieve the dreams and aspirations they had before coming to South Africa. Whilst fifty-four (39 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, and

thirty-nine (28 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whereas none of the respondents disagreed with the statement nor strongly disagreed with the statement.

However, since thirty-nine (39) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with the statement and thirty-four (34) per cent agreed with the statement, as opposed to none of the respondents strongly disagreeing, it is quite significant to conclude that African migrants believed that they can achieve the goals and aspirations they had in mind before venturing into South Africa, which proves the assertion that a lot of African migrants residing in South Africa have the perception that the lack of proper channels or hurdles in documentation with the Department of Home Affairs is limiting their potentials.

Would you agree that there is a strong relationship between being seen as a black African first (Afrophobia) and the quality of service delivery to African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs?

Figure 5. 2. 25: Participants Response that there Is a Strong Relationship Between Afrophobia and Quality of Service Delivery to African Migrants at the Department of Home Affairs.

The figure above indicates that ninety-seven (69 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of services delivered to African migrants in the Department of Home Affairs. Whilst none of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, thirty (21 per cent) were undecided. Whereas thirteen (9 per cent) disagreed with the statement, none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivered to African migrants in the Department of Home Affairs.

Conclusively, since sixty-nine (69) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, agreed with the statement as opposed to nine (9) per cent of the respondents, which is the minority disagreeing with the statement, it is plausible and significant to conclude that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of services delivered to African migrants at the Department of Home Affairs. In as much as there is evidence of Afrophobic attacks and negative attitudes towards African migrants within the South African society, one cannot rule out that there are bound to be traces of such Afrophobic tendencies experienced by African migrants among officials of the Department of Home Affairs as well.

5.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS

5.3.1.1 Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity [FIRST HYPOTHESIS]

In application of this statistical technique one starts by stating the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two variables, that is, the two variables are independent of each other thus this study states:

Research Question : If you strongly disagree with the above, would you then agree that a lack of good customer service is often linked to the negative attitude of officials of the Department of Home Affairs?

H0: The lack of good customer service experienced at the Department of Home Affairs has no link with the negative attitudes of its officials.

H1: The lack of good customer service experienced at the Department of Home Affairs is linked to the negative attitudes of its officials.

In application of the equation $Eij = \frac{(ni \; x \; nj)}{n}$, the study computed the expected cell frequencies for all the cells as follows (n = 140)

	AGREE		UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	GRAND TOTAL
RESIDENT IN S.A BELOW TEN YEARS	30		20	21	71
RESIDENT IN S.A ABOVE TEN YEARS	52		17	0	69
R. TOTAL	82		20	38	140

$AGREE = \frac{82 \; X \; 69}{140} = 40.41$ $\frac{82 \; X \; 71}{140} = 41.58$

$UNDECIDED = \frac{20 \; X \; 69}{140} = 9.85$ $\frac{20 \; X \; 71}{140} = 10.14$

$DISAGREE = \frac{38 \; X \; 69}{140} = 18.72$ $\frac{38 \; X \; 71}{140} = 19.27$

Expected Frequencies are therefore given as:

Responses	Respondents	
	Resident in SA above Ten years	Resident in SA Below Ten years
Agree	40.41	41.58
Undecided	9.85	10.14
Disagree	18.72	19.27

The following formula is then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data:

$$x^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{nr} = \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$$

Where Oij = Observed frequency

Eij = **Expected frequency**

Values for $\frac{(OiJ - EiJ)^2}{Eij}$

For $(n1_1 - n1_2) = \left(\frac{52 - 40.41}{40.41}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{30 - 41.58}{40.58}\right)^2$

For $(n2_1 - n2_2) = \left(\frac{0 - 9.85}{9.85}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{20 - 10.14}{10.14}\right)^2$

For $(n3_1 - n3_2) = \left(\frac{17 - 18.72}{18.72}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{21 - 19.27}{19.27}\right)^2$

The summation $\sum_{i=1}^{nr} \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$ **then gives us:**

3.33 + 2.23

9.85 + 9.59

0.16 + 0.16

= 26.32

$X^2 = 26.32$

Decision Rule

The study rejected the null hypothesis of independence at $\alpha = 0.05$, as the computed value of the test statistic, X^2, exceeded the critical (tabulated) value of X^2 0.95 for (r-1) (c-1) degree of freedom and accepted the alternate hypothesis.

But, before the study took a decision, the study computed (r-1) (c-1) degrees of freedom, where:

R = number of rows

C = number of columns, thus;

(r-1)(c-1) = (3-1) (2-1)

$$= (2) (1)$$

$$= (2) \text{ two degrees of freedom.}$$

Decision:

Since the chi-square calculated ($X^2 = 26.32$) is greater than the chi-square critical/tabulated (**X^2 0.95 = 5.991**) and therefore falls into the critical region, **the study rejected** the null hypothesis of no association. This is done because it is known that the computed value of 26.32 of no association will occur by chance (**<5 per cent of the time**) at the 0.05 level of significance.

However, the study therefore concluded (drew inference) that the two variables (customer service and attitudes) are not statistically independent (based on the above Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity). Accordingly, the research hypothesis (**H1**) **which states that lack of good customer service experienced at the Department of Home Affairs by black African migrants is linked to the negative attitudes of its officials, is hereby supported. Hence, the study drew inference from this by validating the first hypothesis of this research study.**

Research Question : Most times, if not always, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the documents you present for your applications?

H0: Most often, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are not in doubt of the documents African immigrants present to them for their application.

H1: Most often, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the documents African immigrants present to them for their application.

5.3.1.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity [SECOND HYPOTHESIS]

In application of the equation $= \frac{(ni \ x \ nj)}{n}$, the study computed the expected cell frequencies for all the cells as follows (n = 140)

	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	GRAND TOTAL
■ RESIDENT IN S.A BELOW TEN YEARS	29	23	21	73
■ RESIDENT IN S.A ABOVE TEN YEARS	30	20	17	67
■ R. TOTAL	59	43	38	140

$$AGREE = \frac{59 \ X \ 67}{140} = 28.23 \quad \frac{59 \ X \ 73}{140} = 30.76$$

$$UNDECIDED = \frac{43 \ X \ 67}{140} = 18.19 \quad \frac{43 \ X \ 73}{140} = 22.42$$

$$DISAGREE = \frac{38X\ 67}{140} = 18.19 \qquad \frac{38\ X\ 73}{140} = 19.81$$

Expected Frequencies are therefore given as:

Responses	Respondents	
	Resident in SA Ten years Above	Resident in SA Below Ten years
Agree	28.23	30.76
Undecided	20.58	22.42
Disagree	18.19	19.81

The following formula is then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data:

$$x^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{nr} = \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$$

Where Oij = Observed frequency

Eij = **Expected frequency**

For $(n1_1 - n1_2) = \left(\frac{30 - 28.23}{28.23}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{29 - 30.76}{30.76}\right)^2$

For $(n2_1 - n2_2) = \left(\frac{20 - 20.58}{20.58}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{23 - 22.42}{22.42}\right)^2$

For $(n3_1 - n3_2) = \left(\frac{17 - 18.19}{18.19}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{21 - 19.81}{19.81}\right)^2$

The summation $x^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{nr} = \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$ **then gives**

0.11 + 0.10

0.01 + 0.01

16.22 + 0.07

=16.52

X^2 **= 16.52**

Decision Rule:

The study rejected the null hypothesis of independence at $\alpha = 0.05$, as the computed value of the test statistic, X^2, exceeded the critical (tabulated) value of X^2 0.95 for (r-1) (c-1) degree of freedom and accepted the alternate hypothesis.

But, before the decision is taken, one must compute (r-1) (c-1) degrees of freedom, where:

R = number of rows

C = number of columns, thus;

(r-1) (c-1) = (3-1) (2-1)

$\quad$ = (2) (1)

$\quad$ = (2) two degrees of freedom.

Decision:

Since the chi-square calculated (X^2 =16.52) is greater than the chi-square critical/tabulated (X^2 **0.95 = 5.991**) and therefore falls into the critical region, **the study rejects** the null hypothesis of no association. This is done because it is known that the computed value of 16.52 of no association will occur by chance (< 5 per cent of the time) at the 0.05 level of significance.

However, it can therefore be concluded (the variables are not statistically independent) and inference drawn (based on the above Chi-Square Test of independence and Homogeneity). Accordingly, the research hypothesis (**H1) which states that most often, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt about the documents that black African migrants present to them for their application, is hereby supported. Hence, the study drew inference from this that the first hypothesis of this research study has been validated.**

**Research Question :** Would you agree that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivery to African immigrants?

H0: There is no strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivered to African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs.

H1: There is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivered to black African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs.

5.3.1.3 Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity [THIRD HYPOTHESIS]

In application of the equation…………., the study computed the expected cell frequencies for all the cells as follows (n = 140)

	AGREE	UNDECIDE	DISAGREE	GRAND TOTAL
FEMALE	33	19	8	60
MALE	64	11	5	80
ROW TOTAL	97	30	13	140

$$AGREE = \frac{97\ X\ 80}{140} = 55.23 \frac{97\ X\ 60}{140} = 41.57$$

$$UNDECIDED = \frac{30\ X\ 80}{140} = 17.14 \frac{30\ X\ 60}{140} = 12.85$$

$$DISAGREE = \frac{13\ X\ 80}{140} = 7.42 \frac{13\ X\ 60}{140} = 5.57$$

Responses	Respondents	
	Male	Female
Agree	55.23	41.57
Undecided	17.14	12.85
Disagree	7.42	5.57

The following formula is then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data:

$$x^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{nr} = \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$$

Where Oij = Observed frequency

Eij = Expected frequency

$$For\ (n1_1 - n1_2) = \left(\frac{64 - 55.23}{55.23}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{33 - 41.57}{41.57}\right)^2$$

$$For\ (n2_1 - n2_2) = \left(\frac{11 - 17.14}{17.14}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{19 - 12.85}{12.85}\right)^2$$

$$For\ (n3_1 - n3_2) = \left(\frac{5 - 7.42}{7.42}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{8 - 5.57}{5.57}\right)^2$$

The summation $x^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{nr} = \sum_{j=1}^{nc} \frac{(Oij - Eij)^2}{Eij}$ then gives

1.40 + -0.60

0.35 + 2.69

0.32 + 0.64

= 2.65

$X^2 = 6$

Decision Rule:

Thus, the study rejects the null hypothesis of independence at $\alpha = 0.05$, as the computed value of the test statistic, X^2, exceeds the critical (tabulated) value of X^2 0.95 for (r-1) (c-1) degree of freedom and accepted the alternate hypothesis.

But, before taking the decision, it must compute (r-1) (c-1) degrees of freedom, where:

R = number of rows

C = number of columns, thus;

(r-1) (c-1) = (3-1) (2-1)

= (2) (1)

= (2) two degrees of freedom

Decision:

Since the chi-square calculated ($X^2 = 6$) is greater than the chi-square critical/tabulated (X^2 **0.95 = 5.991**) and therefore falls into the critical region, **the study rejects** the null hypothesis of no association. This is done because it is known that the computed value of six (6) of no association will occur by chance (< 5 per cent of the time) at the 0.05 level of significance.

However, it can therefore be concluded (the variables are not statistically independence) and inference drawn (based on the above Chi-Square Test of independence and Homogeneity). Accordingly, the research hypothesis (**H1) which states that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivered to black African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs is hereby supported. Hence, the study drew inference from this that the last hypothesis of this research study has been validated.**

**5.3.1.4 Correlation of Demography to Indicate Variation of Severity of Perception of Discrimination and Negative Experiences with Frequency of Visit to the DHA**

Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 1: Demography of Response that there is a Linkage Between Bad Quality of Service and Negative Attitude of Department of Home Affairs Officials.

The figure above depicts that 65 per cent of the entire Congo DRC nationals sampled agreed that the lack of good quality of service delivery at the DHA is linked to the negative attitude of its officials, whilst 35 per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 86 per cent of the entire Ghanaians sampled agreed to that assertion, 14 per cent disagreed.

Whilst 74 per cent of all Ethiopians sampled agreed with the statement, 26 per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 67 per cent of the Malawians sampled agreed with the statement, 33 per cent of them disagreed with the statement.

Also indicated and shown above, 85 per cent of Nigerians equally agreed with the perception, whereas 15 per cent disagreed. Whilst 58 per cent of all Tanzanians surveyed also agreed, 42 per cent disagreed with the statement. And finally, whereas 58 per cent of the Zimbabweans agreed with the statement, 42 per cent of them disagreed.

Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 2: Demography of Response that Officials of the Department of Home Affairs Are in Doubt of Documents Tendered by African Migrants.

The figure above indicates that 67 per cent of the entire Congo DRC agreed that officials of the DHA are always in doubt of the documents they tendered for documentation purposes, whereas 33 per cent of them disagreed. Whilst 67 per cent of Ghanaians agreed with the statement, 33 per cent equally disagreed.

Whereas 63 per cent of the entire Ethiopians sampled agreed with the statement, 37 per cent of them disagreed. Whilst 58 per cent of the Malawians polled agreed with the statement, 42 per cent disagreed.

Whilst 60 per cent of all Nigerians surveyed agreed with the statement, 40 per cent of them disagreed with the statement. Whereas 56 per cent of the Tanzanians sampled agreed with the statement, 44 per cent of them disagreed. And finally, whilst 57 per cent of all the Zimbabweans sampled agreed with the statement, 43 per cent of them disagreed.

Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 3: Demography of Respondents' Strong Relation of Afrophobia and Quality of Service Delivered to Black African Migrants.

As the figure above indicates 93 per cent of the entire Congo DRC sampled agreed with the statement that there is strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivered to black African immigrants by the DHA, seven per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 83 per cent of the Ghanaians agreed with the statement, 17 per cent of them disagreed.

As also indicated, 93 per cent of the entire Ethiopians sampled agreed with the statement, whilst seven per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 88 per cent of the Malawians polled agreed with the statement, 12 per cent of them disagreed.

Whereas 85 per cent of the Nigerians sampled agreed with the statement, 15 per cent disagreed. Whilst 85 per cent of all Tanzanians surveyed agreed with the statement, 15 per cent of them disagreed. And finally, whereas 90 per cent of the Zimbabweans sampled agreed with the statement, ten per cent of them disagreed.

Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 4: Correlation of Extremely Negative Experiences with Frequency of Visits to the Department of Home Affairs.

As depicted by the figure above, out of the entire number of those who visited only once a year and had negative experiences at the DHA, 50 per cent reported their experience to be fair whereas 50 per cent also reported their experiences to be poor, and none (zero per cent) reported their experiences to be very poor.

In the same breath, among those who visited twice a year, whilst 69 per cent reported their experience to be fair, 15 per cent reported their experiences to be poor, and 15 per cent also reported their experiences to be very poor.

Whereas out of those who visited the DHA more than five times a year 16 per cent reported their experiences to be fair, a whopping 74 per cent reported their experiences to be poor and 10 per cent reported their experiences to be very poor.

Whilst out of those who visited the DHA more than ten times in a year, 20 per cent reported their experiences to be fair, 47 per cent reported theirs to be poor and 33 per cent reported theirs to be very poor.

Finally, whereas out of those who couldn't account for how many times they visited DHA none (zero per cent) reported their experiences to be fair, 52 per cent reported their experiences to be poor and 48 per cent reported theirs to be very poor.

Conclusively, it seems that those who frequent the DHA for documentation purposes more than others are presumably those that are not be attended to successfully, effectively or efficiently. Hence, this study can authoritatively deduce from the above that extremely negative experiences correlate with frequency of visits to the DHA.

5.3.2   Thematic/Conceptual Presentation and Analysis

In this section, data analysis commenced with a process of organising data into key themes and sub-themes. The themes were developed according to the objectives of the study. Although new themes later emerged during the course of the study, they were later incorporated into earlier themes.

The themes covered: frustration, unlawful detention, delays and lack of commitment to service delivery (ineffectiveness/inefficiency), rampant corruption and extortions, ignorance and lack of adequate education, discrepancy in perception of immigrants (Afrophobic tendency).

FRUSTRATION

Commencing with an extract from one of the study participants;

> *I moved here in 2003. I applied for a work permit, and then permanent residency, but it was all drawn out and frustrating, with a lot of back-and-forth and waiting. The overall experience was really unpleasant. The counter staff were rude, unhelpful and uncaring* (Participant A).

Participant 2 from the Democratic Republic of Congo:

> *…meanwhile, I have been trying to get my relative permit for more than four years. The department mishandled my application more than once and I have had to resubmit my paperwork more than three times now and [it] is still not out now. Right now, I'm still waiting for my visa to be sorted out. I call them fortnightly. I have not been able to do anything almost for four years now. Luckily, I am involved with Herbalife and that is how I make my money because there is no requirement of a visa for it* (Participant 2)

Participant 3's application took 45 days to get to Pretoria. Because the help line was not specific about the status of his application at each stage, he began to panic. The application returned to Durban after 85 days, but he was told that he couldn't collect it until he received an SMS.

> *I never actually received an SMS, but the online tracker finally indicated it was ready for collection. 120 days after submission, I had my visa outcome in hand. If Home Affairs don't even know where applications are in their building, how do they know where immigrants who may be in breach of immigration rules are?* (Participant 3).

Participant 12 also narrated how his older brother John applied for a work permit straight after his marriage in January 2010 so that he would be able to apply for permanent residency as soon as possible. His brother received his work permit seven months later, after many hassles with Home Affairs officials who, he said, implied several times that a bribe would speed up the process. When he eventually received it, he was surprised to find that it came in the form of a handwritten sticker.

> *Our immediate reaction was that it looked fake. The validity was one year and 11 months, versus the three or five years we heard are standard, and coincidentally just short of the two years he needed before he could apply for permanent residency* (Participant 12).

Further complications arose when he tried to apply for permanent residency, without which he could not secure loans in order to buy a home or a car. Frustrated with the process, he and his wife opted instead to move to the USA, where they were soon approved as permanent residents through an immigration process that was "comparably easier" according to Francis. For some though, the situation is so bad that they believe a bribe is the only way to resolve matters.

Another participant emphasised that he is in a state of confusion right now because he is not aware of how to sort out his permit. He says:

> *I came here in 2005 with a work permit to teach computer and math's literacy. Luckily for me I got a job in a high school. The problem now is that when I went to apply for permanent residency, I was told to get a letter from the school principal indicating that I am a permanent staff of the school and when I came back to the principal demanding*

such [a] letter, he literally told me that it's not possible unless I want him to lose his job (Participant 3).

Participant 7, a Somali who has a temporary residence permit while his application for asylum is considered, said he has been beaten and refused legal representation at a police station. He has been waiting for a permanent decision on his application for more than two years.

You worry each time you leave your house that the police will stop you. Sometimes they ignore your permit and you have to pay or be arrested. Police stations and Lindela are not good places. Bad people there. You don't know if you will come out alive. (Participant 7).

UNLAWFUL DETENTION/DEHUMANISATION

Another participant, a Nigerian who was part of the focus group this study interviewed complained he was illegally arrested - a case he took to court, to which the court eventually found that law enforcement officials had broken the law. He said he subsequently faced more intimidation and physical attacks. Police and their immigration colleagues raided the Nigerian's home in the middle of the night and took him to the police station where he was kept for 36 days.

A month into my detention an immigration officer revoked my visa, saying it had been illegally obtained (Participant 4).

With his visa revoked, he became an illegal immigrant. The immigration authority sent him to Lindela, the detention centre in Johannesburg. There he spent the next six months (court documents show), well beyond the maximum declared by law. The judge ruled that the police and the government had "dismally failed to comply with the applicable requirements of the Immigration Act" and he had been unlawfully detained.

One should applaud the joint efforts of the South African Police Services and the Department of Home Affairs immigration unit to rid the country of undocumented and illegal foreigners. Whilst it is clearly understood and respected that the doors of the Republic are open to those

who enter the country legally, there is concern that the manner in which some of the raids have been conducted has left a lot to be desired. For example, one cannot expect, in an open and democratic society, to be woken up at 2am in the morning by immigration officials. As one of the participants in this study complained, the officials arbitrarily broke into their house at night in the name of trying to check their immigration status in a bid to arrest illegals. Claudine [not real name] has this to say:

> *They [officials] always barge into our house in the middle of the night without permission. Where is the privacy...where is the human right or just because we are foreigners means nothing, that's why they can do as they please neh? It is not good at all; it is very bad. And when they discover that we are not illegal, they don't even apologise or show sign of mistake. We therefore plead with these units to be mindful of the rights to both liberty and privacy of the documented all those who are in the Republic. The raids can continue to be carried out, but in a manner that promotes the spirit and purport of the human rights as enshrined in the bill of rights* (Participant 1)

DELAYS AND LACK OF COMMITMENT (INEFFICIENCY)

> *Need something from Home Affairs? Prepare to wait unless you get the right network.*

That was a statement from an unknown individual parading himself as a Home Affairs agent. One would expect that the recent outsourcing to VFS would necessitate a turnaround strategy in the handling of visa applications but with this kind of admission by an alleged agent, one stands to wonder what is really going on in the Department of Home Affairs in Durban. As a lack of budget was among the reasons for outsourcing, the cost shifted to the applicants as the exorbitant fee of VFS has not translated to maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

While some clients might have experienced good service at VFS lately, most of their clients can hardly tell the difference between the Department of Home Affairs and Visa Facilitations Services. Participant 4 from Malawi has this to say:

> *I agree it is way simpler now to know how to apply and it really guides, the waiting times are so poor, and the prices are not just worth it for the services they rendered. On my previous experience, already a month, I am yet to receive any kind of update on*

my application. I spent the whole day at Visa Facilitation Service in Musgrave Durban and had to return the next day to complete my application (Participant 4).

Another immigrant who had made an application through the Visa Facilitation Service and has been living in Durban since 2002 had this to say:

I submitted an appeal visa application with Visa Facilitation Service Durban branch since 11th December 2014 till today being 28th April 2016 I have not gotten the outcome (Participant 15).

It is alluded that some immigrants definitely do sometimes become the exception to the rule. Participant 13, a Cameroonian wife to a South African who renewed her Temporary Resident Permit had no difficulties when working through the Department of Home Affairs. According to her, though the lines were sometimes long, processing time took two months and stated that she has been living in South Africa for eight years. When she went for a standard renewal at VFS for the first time and after waiting (in nicer offices, but still a 3-hour wait) got a denial due to her not including her bank statements and a lack of a Police Clearance for her 15-year-old daughter [as she stated]. However, bank statements are clearly stated as not needed for spouses on the DHA website and Police Clearances are not required for under 18. According to her:

Within the required ten days I paid all our fees again (only benefiting VFS) and gave them bank statements. To this day I've been waiting seven months for a response and unlike before where you could speak to the DHA directly you now are completely blocked from speaking with anyone involved. VFS is very polite and says it's not up to them only the DHA, and the DHA says they don't know the tracking number so can't look into anything handled by VFS (Participant 13).

She sounds ironic with her statement by highlighting the importance of sitting in a "nicer office" in the Visa Facilitation Service unlike the Home Affair's office while her application is not making any headway. Thus, she continues:

I'm unable to travel till this is sorted and the latest news is that appeals (which have been an overwhelming number due to situations like mine with one paper missing or

Police Clearances that weren't issued due to strikes) are now taking up to a year to process. It's a horrible system trapping many residents and costing a fortune to sit in a nicer office. (Participant 13).

Participant 8 confessed that she always thought the Department of Home Affairs was the worst, but that it's not, the so-called Visa Facilitation Service is the bigger culprit since she faced so many problems by all the complicated cold electronic systems.

I decided to go relaxed through the renewal of my visa this year. But this is a joke for the Visa Facilitation Service. Every step went[was] difficult. Constantly hiccups. Questions. Worries. And the application day was a nightmare (Participant 8).

A distinction was made between what it normally cost for submission and the collection process during the period it was handled by the Department of Home Affairs and what it costs currently through VFS. While it used to cost an average applicant around four hundred (400) to five (500) hundred Rand, its' cost is now approximately one thousand, three hundred and fifty (1350) Rand. This is a cost that African immigrants are complaining about saying that it is too expensive for them. This is what participant 1 has to say:

What they are charging us is too high, even the price for appeal is not helping matters more especially when the fault or mistake is not from us. And yet no improvement in their services…it's horrible[experience]. That is to show you that this people…[VFS] are just out to milk us dry which is not good (Participant 1).

Another participant has this allegation to make when he stated emphatically:

I got information that these Gupta family owns VFS and they had a deal with President Zuma and that is why they are robbing us because no one will talk for us or question them…after all we are AmakwereKwere [exclusion tendency] (Participant 14).

Though the study cannot verify the authenticity of this allegation, this goes to show how far black African migrants can go to arrive at a uniform judgement or conclusion regarding issues affecting them in South Africa.

RAMPANT CORRUPTION AND EXTORTION

A Ghanaian, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said he found a simple solution to his immigration problems.

> *I approached a Home Affairs branch, and someone offered to organise a South African passport for me for R10000. Within a year of coming to South Africa, I am now a South African citizen* (Participant 8).

Sometimes it seems that the inefficiency and ineffectiveness witnessed at the Department of Home Affairs is a systemic arrangement, and this has fostered extortion. More than 12 refugees or migrants interviewed by this study said they had suffered corruption and worse at the hands of police and immigration officers. A clear example is the opinion of participant 15 from Zimbabwe:

> *All they want is to collect bribes from us, even though they know that most of us have not got jobs [being able to secure any reasonable employment] because of our condition [as a result of immigration status]* (Participant 15).

A 2015 report by Lawyers for Human Rights and the African Centre for Migration and Society, two South African NGOs, found that one-third of immigrants' experience corruption at South African Home Affairs offices. Another report, published last November by the NGO Corruption Watch, found that more than 300 foreigners complained of extortion, threats and solicitation from government officials. Almost all the black African immigrants the study interviewed affirmed that corruption and extortion were part of their daily lives. A group of Tanzanians living in Point Road, a Durban street popular with black African migrants, described a well-organised system established by the police in conjunction with immigration officials.

> *When they raid our area whether your paper is right or not, you must sort them out otherwise they will take you to their cell in the police station until immigration officials come to verify your papers. And most times they deliberately don't come. And if you have something you are doing you must make a plan to pay big money this time around* (Participant 5).

Officers in their area always come to collect money each week, the migrants narrated. Those who didn't pay were arrested, they stated, and they might eventually send you to a Johannesburg migrant detention centre, Lindela, where thousands of people are still awaiting a decision on their immigration applications.

> *"If you pay, you're fine. If you don't have money then you're arrested or beaten up until you can pay,"* said 28-year-old taxi driver (Participant 6, from Congo DRC).

According to participant 11, a Democratic Republic of Congo national who admits he has been paying bribes to extend his stay in South Africa for three years.

> *No one really cares about your immigration status if you have money to sort yourself [bribe]. It doesn't really benefit anyone to change things. Immigration officers and police got money and we don't got deported. We work with the system we've got* (Participant 11).

A Somalian said police shot him because he refused to pay them bribes. This indicates that all the officials cared about is the money they will make from them. There are many other similar claims of official corruption echoed by hundreds of African immigrants in South Africa. Some are resigned to paying out, so that they can stay in the country.

IGNORANCE AND LACK OF PROPER EDUCATION

The experiences of the informants had contributed to them having strong stereotypes of the Department of Home Affairs and South Africans. This stereotype had various features. Besides the feeling that South Africans are prejudiced and parochial, a prominent perception was that Department of Home Affairs, especially their officials look down on them:

> *At Home Affairs, they are very, I mean, they give you attitude. Not even sign of friendly look. As if we are cursed, they talk any-how to you. I blame our government, if things were better back home, what will I be doing here?* (Participant 6).

Another informant said:

> *Home Affairs is not a good place to go, if not that we don't have option. Because they will make you look and feel bad about yourself. Even our struggle to survive here (South Africa) don't bother them at all….* (Participant 9).

The Department of Home Affairs was portrayed as the official institution used by the South African government to frustrate black African migrants living in South Africa, so as to force them to go back to their country:

> *What they do there (Home Affairs) is to make you suffer and life becomes hell for you. So that you will decide to go back home on your own. But they will fail.* (Participant 2).

A common view was that officials of the Department of Home Affairs were poorly educated and ignorant. A Zimbabwean informant felt that the level of education of some of the officials is very poor:

> *They know nothing, sometimes the kind of foolish questions they ask you, will force you to laugh at them, but when you remember your situation, you will be forced to swallow your laughter. Most of them are dumb. In a normal situation in some countries, most of them can only be employed as office cleaners* (Participant 2).

Another informant narrated her own ordeal:

> *Some of the manners of the officials are unbearable. They make you feel uncomfortable by reminding you that you are not in your country, that you are a foreigner. If you don't like it here (Department of Home Affairs) you better go back home.* (Participant 13).

Participant 5 from Nigeria has this to say:

> *South Africa is a nice country, but most people there (Department of Home Affairs) aren't nice at all. There is no difference between them and their brother/sisters on the street, concerning how they make us black foreigners feel* (Participant 5).

Ignorance and lack of education are linked to holistic and mental themes of closure of South Africa and officials of the Department of Home Affairs as a result of the legacy of the Apartheid policy prior to 1994. Hence, one can go down memory lane to articulate the reason, as some black South Africans have not been exposed to the international environment and are therefore limited in their thinking. Participant 13 from Ghana observed:

> *It's true, they did not give them the opportunity to open up to the outside world. They cannot stand foreigners. We are like intruders in their country. They don't even know where Ghana is* (Participant 13).

But if the theme of closure applies in a general manner to the country and its inhabitants, it refers to the black population, in as much as they were the principle victims of apartheid particularly in the realm of education. Informants felt that the lack of an adequate, formal education has resulted in many South Africans being anxious and insecure in the company of black Africans from other countries:

> *They are not too educated because of the previous system. When they see other black people who know their rights, are open, who challenge them when they feel that they are being deprived of their rights, who have degrees, who are able to say, "I have travelled around the world", this could lead to jealousy and an inferiority complex* (Participant 14- a Doctoral candidate in UKZN).

Most of the informants were convinced that they were much better educated than them (officials of the Department of Home Affairs) and thus better equipped to defend themselves when they felt that their rights are trampled upon:

> *They only learn the geography and the history of South Africa. We learn about the world, which gives us an opening* (Participant 8 from Malawi).

African migrants are appalled at the official of the Department of Home Affairs lack of knowledge of Africa:

Even among the intellectuals, you know you have history teachers, geography teachers who cannot situate any country of Africa other than (those in) Southern Africa (Participant 14)

They feel that the lack of proper education is limiting the capacity of officials of the Department of Home Affairs in handling their documentation processes. They felt disappointed by the dysfunctional education system as evidenced by the disposition of the officials.

Some of the African migrants feel that they are the new victims at the Department of Home Affairs, that they are deliberate targets of 'hostility' rather than mere differences. This hostility is driven by xenophobia manifesting itself in the form of Afrophobia. Those whose economic and legal situation makes them particularly vulnerable resent the Afrophobia experienced so intensely that, like participant 1 from Ghana, they argue that old-style apartheid has been replaced:

By an apartheid against African migrants. This is what we feel. We are the target now (Participant 1 – Ghana).

Participant 2 concurred:

In a way it looks like intense hatred (Participant 2).

DISCREPANCY IN PERCEPTION (DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS)

Many of the informants commented on the differences in the perception that officials of the Department of Home Affairs have about them which is quite the opposite to how their white counterparts (white migrants) are perceived. They felt that African migrants are treated with disdain while the reverse is the case with white migrants. African migrants' perception is that the Department of Home Affairs officials are more pre-disposed to welcome white migrants unlike their counterparts (African). The general held narrative that white migrants are here

(South Africa) to create jobs, whilst African migrants are here (South Africa) to take or compete with South Africans with scarce jobs seems palpable. Participant 7 has this to say;

> *That is a fact. It is known by all, not only in theory but in practice. What do they say? They say: "you left your country, maybe you committed crimes there and now you have come here." I don't want to generalise. I don't say that all officials behave like that, but with the experience we have, we have noticed that those people [officials of the Department of Home Affairs] don't want any African. They are Afrophobic, it is in them, you can see it* (Participant 7).

Participant 15 interjected immediately with the statement below:

> *Those of them that are working in Home Affairs, they are more educated than those in the township. At least they are supposed to be more reasonable, but you should see how they address us…how they behave here [officials of the Department of Home Affairs]! What would you say about that? Black South Africans are xenophobic [Afrophobic]. They don't want any black foreigners* (Participant 15).

Participant 10 had a similar view:

> *There is an abrupt break between us and them [officials of the Department of Home Affairs] which prevents us from settling into the country, even to clarify something to you, she just looks at you, like that. This person sees you as a foreigner, a makwerekwere! I am well aware of the fact that those who live in Europe experience the same thing, but it is obviously difficult to live through this as a black person, especially when you have the feeling of being neglected because you are black and the worst of it all, is that it is from a fellow black person like you.* Participant 10).

Participant 4 became a bit irritated:

> *Officials [black South Africans] do not behave like that to white migrants. Why? There are quite significant number of White migrants in this country, and when you see how they [officials] attend to them when they ask for something there [office], just because they don't have black skins like us* (Participant 4).

Another participant from Tanzania concurred:

> *The first question they [officials of the Department of Home Affairs] ask a white migrant is if they like his/her country, whilst the first question they ask black Africans is, "when are you leaving?* (Participant 9).

Participant 4 from Ethiopia felt that ironically many South Africans are more hospitable and welcoming to white migrants than black foreigners.

Hence, there is a clear discrepancy in the way that officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive black African immigrants as compared to white immigrants. And this goes to enforce the narrative that there appears to be different strokes for different folks, depending on the colour of their skin.

CULPABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT

Such are the themes which dominate black African migrants' descriptions of their plight at the Department of Home Affairs. Based on direct experiences, and an observed pattern of negligence of governmental actions or inactions, rumours and stories, the accumulations of such narratives arguably make the South African government culpable. Common assertions by migrants who participated in this study are:

> *They [government] know what they are doing. They [officials] are just acting out the script written for them by their employer [government]. Have you seen any of them [officials] sacked or lost job because of how they treat black Africans other than unless a South African citizen is affected. They are like that. They [government] have it [xenophobia] in their blood just like their people on the street* (Participant 9).

These perceptions about the South African government were often presented in an essentialist fashion – '*what do you expect….*'; '*that's their plan…..*'; *they know what they are doing…..*', *they just don't want us…..*', etc. There is this outcry that if people who are in positions of government/authority and those at the helm of policy-making are making some unguided

utterances and remarks which are directed at black African migrants, how much more could African migrants be exposed or subjected to at the hands of the Department of Home Affairs officials? This could also be argued as a clear indication of the unwritten policy of the government, just like the Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, who has been accused by the South African Human Rights Commissions of stoking xenophobic tension with his remarks about African migrants:

> *I will do everything possible to provide accommodation, but the City of Johannesburg will only provide accommodation to South Africans. Foreigners, whether legal or illegal, are not the responsibility of the city. I run the municipality* (Mashaba, 2017).

And Deputy Police Minister, Bongani Mkongis' comment:

> *How can a city in South Africa be 80 per cent foreign nationals? That is dangerous. South Africans have surrendered their own city to the foreigners* (Mkongis, 2017).

How can these remarks from the Mayor and the Deputy Police Ministers' questions be discussed in-view of the aforementioned perceptions that African migrants have about the government? Otherwise it could create an avenue for the plausible validation of the perception of black African migrants.

IN CONTEMPT OF COURT ORDER

Immigration lawyers have also accused the Department of Home Affairs of being in contempt of a High Court order (Evans, 2015). This comes after the Department withdrew an instruction allowing asylum seekers and refugees to apply for permanent residence without giving up their asylum or refugee status. The Department also withdrew an instruction allowing asylum seekers and refugees to apply for temporary residence without a valid passport.

Temporary residence visas include relatives' visas and work visas. The effect or implication of this is huge, as asylum seekers are struggling to get married and register the birth of their

children with South African spouses. Another effect is that asylum seekers who did not have temporary residence could not open a bank account. This made them vulnerable to crooks who preyed on them because they carried cash. However, there is an accusation that constantly emerges that the Department of Home Affairs has a pattern of just appealing matters to frustrate clients as justice is expensive, in the hope that the clients will run out of money.

5.4   SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

- Among all the black African immigrants sampled, none was without any form of formal education.

- A relatively high proportion of black African immigrants have gone to the DHA consecutively five times in a year for one particular documentation purpose. And it is pertinent to emphasise here that the reason for repetition of their visit was because the office in question neglected their duty, which prompted the repetition of their visits time and again.

- A relatively high proportion of them rated their experiences as very poor, giving credibility to their initial assumption that their visits shouldn't have exceeded twice had they been attended to without any fault of theirs.

- A relatively high proportion were of the perception that there is discrepancy in how they are treated from their counterparts (white). Hence, they attributed the negative attitude and poor quality of service they received from the DHA to their blackness.

- A greater number of black African immigrants had expected ab initio to be discriminated against.

- Majority of black African immigrants were of the opinion that officials of the DHA are acting on behalf of the scripted instruction of their institution/government.

- Majority were of the opinion that there is little or no good customer service at the DHA.

- A relatively high proportion of black Africans are not proud of their blackness as a result of their perception that prior to routine authentication, the officials of the DHA associate their blackness with the presentation of fraudulent documents for documentation.

- Most prefer contracting an agent should they have the resources required.

- A relative proportion of black African immigrants sampled were undecided as to whether they collectively present fraudulent documents for documentation purposes. However, during the course of focus group discussions, all in unison strongly opined that the reason was because they could only vouch for themselves as individuals and not on behalf of all black Africans. Hence, this study admitted that maybe this is one of the limitations of the framing of the questionnaire as it should have been framed in a manner that addressed directly to each individual, and that would have check-mated this assumption.

- Virtually all black African immigrants sampled subscribed to the notion that they are presumed by the DHA officials as fraudsters.

- Many were of the view that they can still achieve the respective dreams they had prior to arrival in South Africa should officials of the DHA be well trained and apply the spirit of *Uhbuntu* to them.

- A relatively high proportion relate the colour of their skin to the quality of service rendered to them at the DHA office.

- Most black African immigrants are experiencing frustration at the hands of the recently outsourced agency (VFS) who exercise some of the responsibilities of the DHA, and most times, those African immigrants are caught-up in-between these two entities as to who takes ownership of issues that emanate.

- Most times, officials of the DHA don't comply with the applicable requirements of the Immigration Act that guides their functions.

- Most times, there are delays and a lack of commitment to services delivered to black African immigrants.

- The existence of rampant corruption and extortion among the DHA officials.

- The manifestation of ignorance and lack of adequate education and training of officials of the DHA.

- Most times the DHA are in contempt of court orders when they unlawfully arrest and dehumanise black African immigrants.

- The discrepancy of officials of the DHA in their perception of immigrants (different strokes for different folks).

- Also, based on direct experiences, and observed pattern of negligence of governmental actions or inactions, rumours and stories, and the accumulations of such narratives, arguably makes the South African government culpable.

- And finally, contracting of some of the responsibility of Department of Home Affairs to the VFS is inconsiderate and irrational. The nature and kind of function outsourced to those VFS is insensitive, because they are not civil/public servants who are subjected to *Batho Pele* precepts.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The findings seem to have ratified the hypothesis which stated that a lack of good customer service as experienced by black African immigrants at the DHA is linked to the negative attitudes of its officials as a result of the vulnerability of black African immigrants in South Africa and KwaZulu-Natal to be precise. This was explored within the theoretical foundation of relative deprivation. Hence, this theory offered a psychological explanation of the perspective of black African immigrants based on their experiences that they are deprived of good quality service by the DHA. This psychoanalytic theory similarly offered an intrapsychic explanation of scapegoating as a projective and defensive process. However, the research implication is that until a study of this nature is conducted in the entire country, it might not be plausible to generalise the result to the entire country, as there is a limitation.

Secondary, findings confirmed the second hypothesis which stated that most times, if not all times, officials of the DHA are in doubt of the documents that black African immigrant present to them for application purposes in South Africa. This was explored within a social comparison theory that humans have a drive to evaluate their opinions and ability by comparing with others. The implication of this is the fact that black African immigrants expected that they would be treated in a discriminatory way, so it is possible that their perceptions of their treatment might have been coloured by their expectations.

And finally, findings validated the third hypothesis which stated that there is strong relationship between Afrophobia and the nature (quality) of services rendered to black African immigrants at the DHA. This was explored within the Afrophobia theory which argued that the psychosocial syndrome is used to exclude foreigners, and mostly African foreigners in socio-political terms. Hence, drawing from Afrophobia informs an explanation for the phenomenon and underpinned issues regarding why, how and whom xenophobia targets. The implication of this is that with regards to this study, it would have been more useful had white immigrants been asked about their experiences of service delivery at the DHA, to see if their perceptions of their treatment are more or below what black African immigrants are experiencing or have experienced. And this is where this study is proposing or recommending for future research.

The black Africans' experience of service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs is presumably discriminatory in nature from the perspective of black African immigrants sampled for this study, but the extent to which this perception can be ascertained is subject to unlimited study. Though the perception of most black African immigrants might be coloured, it seems their experience at the DHA might be different from the white experience, which in turn is different from the Chinese or Bangladesh or Pakistani experience. Indeed, we can't even generalise about all blacks in South Africa, since the experience of black natives is different from the experience of black immigrants from the rest of Africa. However, that doesn't mean the group cultural traits that show patterns of success or failure should be ignored.

This study argues that even if a perfect apples-to-apples comparison cannot be made, that doesn't mean one can't make any comparisons or conclusions. Many different racial and ethnic minority groups have experienced various degrees of hardship in South Africa and in other countries all over the world. How those groups have dealt with those circumstances is something to study closely and draw lessons from going forward, even if the only lesson is to manage expectations. This is where the Afrophobic tendency in the Department of Home Affairs in Durban comes into play. Reflection on how the Department of Home Affairs in Durban functions in reality is nothing to write home about as testament of this study's participants/interviewees. The Department of Home Affairs in Durban is expected to be made aware of these issues, and efforts made towards addressing them with VFS. VFS is a commercial company and the whole point of outsourcing the submission and collection process

was to improve efficiency. This, to date, is not happening as it should be. Commercial companies that do not perform are supposed to be penalised and even their contracts withdrawn. The study sincerely hopes for improvement in the service delivery of the Department of Home Affairs as well as information on what the Department is doing to manage an outsource which is clearly and currently not keeping up to the standards of a normal visa application operation.

One of the clear lessons from history is that human capital has proven to be far more important than political capital in getting ahead, and that reality helps to explain why black African migrants fared the way they did, not only in the post-Apartheid era but also in the preceding decades.

6 CHAPTER SIX: TRIANGULATED FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

This section provides a summary of the entire research study. It summarises the hypothetical foundation upon which the study was underpinned. This, then goes on to draw summary conclusions and recommendations about the study. The conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings. The study investigated the experiences of black African migrants on the service delivery of the Department of Home Affairs and explored the perceptions they had about the department.

There seems to be elements of plausibility that the post-apartheid state has employed similar techniques of the apartheid regime to alienate and isolate non-nationals and mostly black African immigrants. In both, there have been means of gaining a legal foothold in the city, largely through fraud, dissimulation, or playing to the state's instrumental logic. Nonetheless there are at least three areas of political action that illustrate the state's legal and coercive efforts to exclude the threatening aliens: legal status and documentation; arrest, detention, and deportation; and a general lack of access to constitutional protection through the court and political processes. On their own, none of these exclusions are unique to non-nationals; many of the poor are similarly marginalised and are popularly considered less than full citizens. What separates non-nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically institutionalised and socially legitimate. In all cases, it is not only the material acts of marginalisation that matter – imprisonment, denial of services, or harassment (eg. recent 2016/2017 Operation Fiela) – but also the nationalist discourse evoked to legitimise and explain them.

As much as it is official state policy to exclude and remove unwanted outsiders (non-nationals and slum-dwellers), local officials and quasi-governmental actors retain enormous discretion in how they fulfil such imperatives. In places, this means police and officials of the Department of Home Affairs can decide on how to dispense their duty, they can choose to do little about

the alien invasion or capitalise on opportunities to develop protection rackets that allow them to stay. The daily practice of migration management has also been regularly controversial and, in some instances, sanctioned by Government's internal control structures. These dysfunctional management practices have had three obvious manifestations: inconsistencies in temporary and permanent residence permits leading to litigation cases; parliamentary monitoring of the Department of Home Affair's budgetary mismanagement and finally, rampant corruption. However, the study came up with a triangulation of findings emanating from both theoretical and hypothetical summaries of the research which are:

1. The lack of good customer services as experienced by black African immigrants at the Durban Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the negative attitudes of its officials.

2. Most often, officials of the Durban Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the documents black African immigrants present to them for application purposes.

3. There is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the nature (quality) of service delivery to black African immigrants at the Durban Department of Home Affairs.

4. The outsourcing of responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs is irrational because of the sensitive nature of the duties stipulated by the legal framework that are instituted and subject to *Batho Pele* precepts, whereas VFS Global that handles this responsibility is a private enterprise with the sole purpose of maximising profit.

5. Currently mismanagement, corruption, poor productivity and limited strategic vision have led to the discrediting of the new permit system being handled by VFS. The official immigration system fails to facilitate the importing of workers with much-needed skills, instead generating an unofficial economic immigration process (Segatti, *et al*., 2008). Corruption remains rife throughout immigration services and 'prices' for services (from the renewal of temporary permits to asylum applications, marriage certificates and airport 'passage') are regularly updated in NGOs reports. It is against this backdrop of dysfunctional public-sector management that the Turnaround Strategy emerged.

6. Recent work in anthropology has shown that individuals who seek the support or services of state institutions, such as protection by the police or financial assistance, as well as immigration departments, do apprehend the state not as a rational-bureaucratic ideal but precisely as the opposite: a dangerous and inscrutable entity, guided by rules but staffed by officials with ulterior motives. Anthropologists have termed this contradictory phenomenon 'the magic of the state'. Hoag (2010) has shown, however, that such 'magic' is relational: from the perspective of the Department of Home Affairs bureaucrats, it is the public and upper-level administrators that are perceived as dangerous and illegible, the not street-level public servants. These sorts of impressions no doubt complicate the delivery and reception of directives, suggesting that even sound plans could be met with scepticism. For example, officials do point out with irony that they are charged with carrying out the DHA's *Batho Pele* (People First) initiative aimed at improving customer service, and yet when requesting information or resources from Head Office they are often met with delays and indifference, and in most cases, black African immigrants are not aware of this. Despite an emphasis on changing the Department of Home Affair's institutional culture, divides between upper-management and street-level bureaucrats endure.

7. This suspicious perspective was directed 'upwards' towards management and 'outwards' towards the public (black African immigrants). It is alleged that often, if not most of the times, officials perceived members of the public (black African immigrants) to be dangerous and untrustworthy, always ready to cheat the system by submission of fraudulent papers for documentation purposes. Officials' responsibility, they stated, was to protect themselves and the broader South African public against these threats. However, it is ironic for example, that when asked about accusations in the media that the Department of Home Affairs officials take bribes to marry South African women to non-national men who want to obtain a 'spousal accompaniment' permit, officials always roundly rejected the assertion. Instead, they said that the immigrants were paying South Africans to marry them and were therefore responsible. The Department of Home Affairs officials also stressed that weak institutional capacity in foreign states was undermining their own systems. This mistrust of the populace (black African

immigrants) was pervasive at almost all of the offices visited, where most officials viewed all 'clients' as potential suspects.

The criminalisation of applicants was another way that officials contributed to building the perception of a 'magical' public. Most black African immigrants were presumed guilty until being proven innocent. This has a wider ramification as black African immigrants stated that they are never given a fair judgement when making an application at the Department of Home Affairs. Just as Peberdy (2008) notes, "the state's restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies include all immigrants – black and white – in order to protect the new members of the 'new" South Africa" (Peberdy, 2008, p.35). Indeed, throughout its post-colonial history, South African policy has regularly spoken of the nation as a body that could be bolstered or, more regularly, contaminated by outsiders – native or foreign. Many government leaders, regardless of race or political affiliation, privately (and occasionally publicly) share a former Minister of Home Affairs' sentiment that:

> South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country (Buthelezi, 1997).

8. It has often been alleged that officials conceive some of the public (black African immigrants) as a dangerous object by what might be called the pathogenisation of migrants. For example, one official of the Department of Home Affairs, when asked about the challenges of his job, declared that health issues were foremost, something mentioned by others as well. He said that they are not given enough vaccinations by the Department of Home Affairs, given their close contact with some immigrants and asylum seekers from all over the world. Oddly, though perhaps indicative of the potential irrationality of these fears, the illness he feared contracting was malaria. While recognising that these mechanisms of reification and demonisation of the public are widely shared by immigration officials worldwide and not necessarily emblematic of some specific South African construction of the aliens (Spire 2005).

The implication of these perceptions of the public as threatening and irrational are certainly not specific to the Department of Home Affairs and can be found in other sectors of public administration. However, they are certainly strongly reinforced by the fact that the Department of Home Affairs officials face a non-national public and participate in a legal culture that questions the legitimacy of foreigners' presence in South Africa. The demonisation of outsiders and human mobility; ineffective, arbitrary, and often extra-legal efforts to ensure socio-spatial separation; and the state's inability to affect a post-1994 national rebirth all appear to be strategies to achieve specific objectives. Nevertheless, it is these continuities and trends that have created and demonised the 'aliens' while encouraging and empowering the citizenry to alienate and liquidate in the name of political self-actualisation.

9. By enforcing compliance with quantitative metrics of performance, the Department of Home Affairs encouraged its junior officials to view civilians, and particularly foreign African immigrants, as problems to be solved rather than clients to be served. This seriously undermined the adoption of a genuine service-oriented organisational culture (Segatti 2012). With *Batho Pele* and the Turn-around Strategy, no doubt, its implementation has undeniably resulted in an overall improvement of services across the Department as well as better financial management at the top levels, resulting in the Department's first clean audit since 1995. However, most empirical evidence available to date indicates that immigration services, particularly in the areas of corruption, work permit allocation, treatment of undocumented migrants and of asylum seekers and refugees, remains largely unchanged.

Borrowing from Grindle's (1997) analytical framework, this study has argued that if some intentions of the Turn-around Strategy and of previous transformation initiatives did address core problems (such as recruitment and performance expectations), these missed out on one crucial dimension, the creation of a shared sense of mission. In doing so, it increased most officials' sense of institutional instability and antagonism towards the public (black African immigrants), two points which prevent the learning processes that have actually taken place from spreading beyond certain individuals and certain sections of the Department. This in turn raises the question of the degree to which a

public-oriented reform can succeed in the absence of a political will to serve a specific public.

It is rather the failure of the political leadership to address the lack of a shared sense of mission and the range of unintended, counter-productive effects, elicited by the reform itself which explain the overall incapacity to amend perceptions and behaviours among civil servants.

6.2 SUMMARY

The arrival of international migrants in South Africa, particularly those of black African origin, has been met with intense intolerance. Xenophobia remains one of the negative and widespread features of post-apartheid South Africa. It is not only racialised, but it is also Africanised, with black African foreigners being disproportionally the targets of xenophobia (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.49). It is within this context that some authors such as Matsinhe (2011, p.298), Everatt (2011, p.7) and Mngxitama (2008, p.195) use the terms 'negrophobia' or 'Afrophobia' to refer to the racialised xenophobia directed towards black African migrants, which they view as a more accurate term to describe xenophobia in South Africa. Bekker (2010, p.136) alludes to a hierarchy of belonging of the different races based on a ranking of races and stereotypes of the different racial groups.

Black African foreigners in South Africa are often referred to by the derogatory term *amakwerekwere*. The term, coined by black South Africans, is loaded with negative connotations and symbolises the sound of the unintelligible languages other Africans speak (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.39). The *amakwerekwere* are regarded as a deep threat to personal and community security (Vale, 2002, p.10), and a danger to the South African nation (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.39). Thus, the African migrant is construed as the 'other'. According to Vale (2002, p.13), this 'othering' was "derived ironically from a sense of superiority and inflated by the celebration of the success of South Africa's transition, but it simultaneously constructed another underclass around the same conceptual primitives upon which apartheid once rested". Nyamnjoh (2006, p.51) underscores how

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ironic it is that black Africans should be the victims of racial profiling in a new democratic dispensation.

In practice, xenophobia in South Africa is manifested in the prejudice, discrimination, hostility and violence directed towards foreigners. Incidents of physical xenophobic attacks have been reported in the media since the mid-1990s. In 2008 South Africa was in the international spotlight following a wave of xenophobic violence, the worst violence witnessed in the country since the end of apartheid. Over a period of two weeks, violence spread across townships in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg and left 62 dead, hundreds injured, tens of thousands displaced and a lot of property destroyed (Worby, Hassim and Kupe, 2008, pp.1-2). Although the attacks were targeted at black African migrants, some South Africans from smaller ethnic groups were also victims.

After an initially slow reaction to the 2008 xenophobic violence, the government attributed it to a 'third force' and denied the existence of xenophobia. A year prior to the attacks the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) had noted the poor treatment of migrants by South Africans. It noted that African foreigners were being subjected to brutality and detention and that the rising tide of xenophobia should be stopped (African Union, 2007, p.286). However, in its response, the state denied the existence of xenophobic tendencies (African Union, 2007, p.377). Misago (2011, p.96) argues that, alongside the denial, the state had allowed a culture of impunity in relation to perpetrators of xenophobic violence to prevail. This is despite the existence of a legal framework guaranteeing international migrants more rights than ever before (Landau *et al.*, 2010, p.222). In short, the South African state has not only downplayed the seriousness of xenophobia but has allegedly also been guilty of fostering it.

In March 2012 the South African government was accused of being xenophobic by the Nigerian government after Home Affairs deported 125 Nigerians who, upon landing at the airport in Johannesburg, allegedly produced fake immunisation cards (Butunyi, 2012). The Nigerian government retaliated by deporting 84 South Africans from Nigeria, sparking off a diplomatic spat between the two countries. The South African government then issued an apology to the Nigerian government, which resolved the

issue. But later South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister admitted that the yellow fever certificates had not been checked properly by South African immigration officials and the Nigerians should not have been deported (BBC, 2012).

The key arguments and assumptions that the researcher makes in this dissertation can be summarised as follows. The author asserts that the negative perceptions of migrants and the concern with state sovereignty in South Africa have led to a discourse that construes African migrants as vectors of insecurity. He argues that in response to the assumed threat posed by migrants to the wellbeing of South Africans, some state officials use their authority to disregard their own laws with impunity in order to constrain and exclude migrants with serious consequences for their wellbeing in South Africa.

6.3   RECOMMENDATIONS

This study is advocating for revision of the role played presently by the expensive and apparently inefficient/ineffective private agency called VFS.

1.   The Department of Home Affairs should overhaul its core business applications, technology infrastructure and overall operations for improved service delivery. Hence, the officials of the department should equally be capacitated to ensure that African immigrants perception of them is improved positively.

2.   Effort should be made by top management to ensure that officials of the Durban Department of Home Affairs are adequately trained to handle applications of African immigrants that depend on their valued and informed judgement in making decisions that affect their lives. They should refrain from casting aspersion on the validity of documents tendered before them until such documents have been subjected to routine confirmation checks.

3.   The South African government should endeavor to nip in the bud some of the unwarranted perceptions of people of colour in the country. Hence, the principles of justice, equity and fairness should be applied across the board without any fear or favor in rendering services at the Department of Home Affairs.

4.   The Department of Home Affairs outsourcing of some of its responsibility to VFS Global is irrational, expensive, and still evidenced with traces of inefficiency to the black African immigrants. This outsourcing should be reassessed/evaluated, improvement made to curtail the present condition of affairs and if possible, VFS should be entirely scrapped. Otherwise how will this private entity be subjected to *Batho Pele* precepts that governs public institutions like the Department of Home Affairs? Currently VFS is unprofessional, unresponsive, insensitive and worse still not subject to *Batho Pele* precepts.

5.   The South African government should put up all measures necessary to curtail and apprehend corrupt practices/officials at the Department of Home Affairs. This will go a long way to root out corrupt officials who bring disrepute to the image of the department from the genuine officials who should also be rewarded periodically for good conduct to ensure continuity. Hence, this will also serve as a deterrent measure for the corrupt officials. There should be greater awareness of the presence of service standards within the regional government office, so that all employees are educated on its value and relevance for public service delivery. This can be achieved through displays, workshops and developmental programmes.

6.   Top management at the Head Office of the Department of Home Affairs should endeavour to speed up turn-around time when officials at the regional offices are requesting information, confirmation or resources from the Head Office. This will go a long way to alleviate the plight of black African immigrants, who most of the time presume that the Department just intentionally wants to frustrate them to go home to where they came from. Most of them are not privy to information regarding the status of their applications. Hence, an appropriate institutional policy that is effective and efficient should be adopted. The Department's internal customers' concern of redress is impossible to apply fully because some of the functions are centralised and they really don't have a say, and yet those functions are the

ones that have many errors in processing documents and the turnaround time can therefore not be predicted. So de-centralisation of functions may be the solution, because the regional office will be able to take ownership of errors. Management teams play a pivotal role in providing strategic leadership and leading by example. There should be greater monitoring in terms of management 'walking the talk'. This will motivate staff to follow the principles underpinning the 'people first' approach.

7.   There should be a total recalibration of the mind-set and perception of officials of the Department of Home Affairs directed towards black African immigrants as being dangerous and untrustworthy. This prejudice should be condemned in the strongest terms by top-management in the Department of Home Affairs in its entirety and political leaders inclusively. Officials of the Department of Home Affairs should always endeavour to officially confirm documents presented by black African immigrants before they are discredited. Also, political leaders from all political spectrums should equally refrain from making unfounded statements which they deliver in the public domain, as some of these statements have the capacity to embolden prejudices among citizenry and staff of the Department of Home Affairs in dispensing their official duties. When an activity is allowed to take place time and time again without any hindrance from the government and its departmental service agency, more especially when those affected are black Africans, it means that it is tacitly condoned by the government authorities. This becomes a norm and according to international law this can portend an accepted activity of such given society.

8.   There is an urgency in the need to change the narrative perception of demonising and pathogenising black African immigrants as a threat. This is irrational and is enforced by the fact that the public whom they are dealing with are a non-national public and is based on their (official) capacity of questioning the legitimacy of black African presence in South Africa. This point cannot be over-emphasised. This will go a long way to discontinue the continuing trends of the Apartheid regime. There is a need for adequate training and re-training of the Department of Home Affairs officials, which is important not only for career development, but also for motivation of staff in respect of service delivery initiatives. There is also a need to consider staff complaints, as this provides valuable input that can transform performance in the department. Since staff are also customers and are often directly involved with the public, their

complaints often constitute primary data which should not be ignored for any service delivery improvement initiatives.

9. The call is upon the South African government to put appropriate measures in place to ensure that quantitative metrics of performance as expected from officials of the Department of Home Affairs go beyond just seeing black African immigrant applicants as a problem to be solved, but rather as clients to be served with human dignity and respect. Hence, the need for a re-alignment of human rights with already existing performance criteria for officials of the Department of Home Affairs. The South African government should deploy, and ensure the sustenance of cultural diplomacy in order to make it more effective in bringing our peoples together.

As Croucher (1998, p.64) emphasised, "immigration in South Africa and elsewhere, is a complex social, political and economic issue that poses numerous policy challenges for even the most stable democratic states", official policy toward illegal immigrants have also sometimes been confusing, incoherent and contradicting because the government had "been caught unawares by the enormity, complexity and seeming intractability of dealing with large-scale black immigration" (Mercury, October 26,1995).

However, this study is advocating for a migration policy that is humane and consistent and which can foster the spirit of *Ubuntu,* contribute to economic development, taking cognisance of global realities, and which should be consistent with the constitution of the Republic, the Bill of Rights as well as ensuring respect for human dignity as espoused and enshrined in the charter of Fundamental Human Rights.

6.4 CONCLUSION

In as much as the country's majority opposes further assistance or incorporation of immigrants into South African life, the government's legitimacy is at stake, as is the universalism of the post-Apartheid constitutional order. This is well encapsulated as can already be seen in the

words of a police officer at Denver police station during the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic attack, a space of safety for displaced migrants immediately after the attacks. As he explained, "We have worked for the past fourteen years to be seen as legitimate among a community that had good reason to distrust the police. Now if they see us protecting foreigners, all we've done will be lost" (Hornberger, 2008, p.12). Unless the South African government and its citizens find ways to address the ethical and practical tensions reflected in these views, and to reconcile the two demons within South African society the possibility of abetting some of the findings of this study may not soon be realised.

6.5   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The study was conducted with black African immigrants residing in KwaZulu-Natal province and specifically within the Durban metropolitan areas. It would be interesting to compare black African immigrants' perceptions and experiences of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs with the perceptions and experiences of other black African immigrants from the rest of the provinces in South Africa.

As corruption has been equally identified as one of the hindrances to service delivery, determining the effectiveness of mechanisms used by the Department of Home Affairs in rooting out corruption since it is quite high, is worth pursuing.

Centralisation of the functions to Head office has been cited by some of the respondents/interviewees as among the main causes of delays in processing and accessing enabling documents. A study on the pros and cons of de-centralisation of core functions of the Department of Home Affairs to provincial offices should be pursued and is worthwhile.

It would also be interesting to conduct another study on white immigrants to ascertain their experiences and perceptions of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs.

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APPENDIX ONE

Informed Consent Form

Dear Participant,

I am currently conducting a Doctoral study titled 'An interrogation of Service Delivery by the Department of Home Affairs towards immigrants, exploring the possibility of Afro-phobia within Xenophobia: A case study of the Durban Department of Home Affairs'.

You are kindly requested to consider and respond to the questions attached herewith. Details of the project appear below. Information provided by you will be treated with the strictest confidentiality and your identity will not be revealed to anyone, unless you give consent. Participation in this survey/interview is voluntary and you may withdraw if you should choose to do so, at any time. Your time and effort in participating in this project are greatly appreciated.

Name of Researcher: Akachukwu Darlington Umeh.

Title of Project: (An interrogation of Service Delivery by the Department of Home Affairs towards immigrants, exploring the possibility of Afro-phobia within Xenophobia: A case study of the Durban Department of Home Affairs)

Investigator: Name: Akachukwu Darlington Umeh.

Address: Political Science (UKZN)

Tel :0846433149

E-mail: 212554282@stu.ukzn.ac.za.

For further information please contact: Dr. Lubna Nadvi

UKZN

Tel: 031 260 7124 / 7336

Reason for Selection as a participant: To elicit information on the above topic.

I_____(full name of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

Signature _____ Date _____

PLEASE KINDLY INDICATE, TICK OR CIRCLE THE CORRECT ANSWER THAT IS APPLICABLE TO YOU

1) Sex and Nationality

    i.   **Male**

    ii.   **Female**

    NATIONALITY --

1b) Please indicate your age bracket.

    i.   20----29

    ii.   30----39

    iii.   40----49

    iv.   50----59

1c) Marital Status

    i.   Single

    ii.   Married

    iii.   Divorced

1d) Nationality of your spouse if married.

    i.   South African

    ii.   Non-South African

1e) Highest level of Education.

    i.   No formal

   ii.   Completed primary

  iii.   Completed secondary

  iv.   Completed matric

   v.   Tertiary

2) How long have you been in South Africa?

   A. Less than three years.

   B. Less than five years.

   C. Less than ten years.

   D. More than ten years.

   E. More than fifteen years.

3) How often do you visit Home Affairs within a year for documentation purposes?

   A. Once in a while.

   B. Twice.

   C. More than five times.

   D. More than ten times.

   E. Uncountable.

4) From below how can you rate your experience at the Department of Home Affairs for example; the way you were spoken to, time spent in a queue, abuse from officials….?

    A. Very good.

    B. Good.

    C. Fair.

    D. Poor.

    E. Very poor.

5) Did the officials at the Department of Home Affairs attend to you in a professional manner?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

6) In your opinion, do you think you are treated in the same way as other immigrants (whites) at the Department of Home Affairs?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

7) Are you worried about the situation at the Department of Home Affairs office?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

8) Before your visit to the Department of Home Affairs did you expect to be treated differently from others (whites) with regards to the quality of service delivered by the staff members?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

9) Do you agree that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for the manner in which they attend to you?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Disagree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

10) Or, do you think that they are not to be blamed?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

11) There is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs. What is your position with the above statement?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagreed.

E. Strongly Disagree.

12) If you 'Strongly Disagree' with the above, would you agree that lack of good customer service is often linked to the negative attitude of officials of the Department of Home Affairs?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Disagree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

13) Are you proud of your identity (as a black African immigrant) in South Africa in relation to how you are treated at Department of home Affairs?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

14) If you 'Agreed' or 'Strongly Agreed' with the statement above, is it because you are treated professionally by the officials of the Department of Home Affairs?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

15) Do officials of the Department of Home Affairs honour the paper documents you present for your application with dignity?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

16) Most times, if not always, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the documents you present for your application?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

17) Would you rather contract an agent for your application if you have the resources than make the application yourself?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

18) In the course of presenting documents for application, do you agree that black African immigrants are treated in a similar manner as their other counterpart immigrants (whites)?

A. Agree.

B. Strongly Agree.

C. Undecided.

D. Disagree.

E. Strongly Disagree.

19) In your opinion which is subject to verification, if you 'Strongly Disagree' with the above statement, does it mean you think that other counterparts (white immigrants) are treated with dignity and less suspicion of presenting fraudulent/fake documents for application at the

Department of Home Affairs?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

20) Do you agree that most times, if not always, that black African immigrants do present/submit fraudulent documents for application?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

21) In your opinion, do you agree that most times, if not always, that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do assume/associate black African immigrants with the tendency of tendering fake/fraudulent documents?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

22) Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to black African immigrants is as a result of discriminatory practices of the officials of the Department of Home Affairs?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

23) Do you agree that most times officials of the Department of Home Affairs at the frontline desk do speak an indigenous language to black African immigrants without first getting to know whether they understand the language?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

24) Are you okay with how officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive (think) of you before taking a decision affecting your application?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

25) Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to black African immigrants could be improved if the officials of the Department of Home Affairs can change the way they see you by treating you professionally with a spirit of Ubuntu (brotherhood), and are well trained to make informed decisions?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

26) Do you think that you can achieve the dreams and aspirations you had before coming to South Africa if treated fairly, as well as a positive improvement at the Department of Home Affairs?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree.

27) Would you agree that there is a strong relationship between being seen as a black African first (Afro-phobia) and the quality of service delivery to African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs?

    A. Agree.

    B. Strongly Agree.

    C. Undecided.

    D. Disagree.

    E. Strongly Disagree

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. What are the challenges you face applying for a permit as a black African immigrant in South Africa?

2. What was your experience of the service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs?

3. Give examples and cite cases of your experience at the Department of Home Affairs?

4. What is your opinion of the service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs towards immigrants?

5. What do you think will be the implication or consequence of these to the Department and to yourself?

6. It is alleged that the Department of Home Affairs is unresponsive to the needs of its customers, what is your view on this?

7. Does it make any difference being a black African immigrant or a white immigrant at the office of Department of Home Affairs?

8. Do you understand any South African languages like IsZulu, IsXhosa, Tsonga, Sotho etc. and if not, does it make any difference at the Department of Home Affairs?