TOWARDS A DECOLONISED PHILOSOPHY OF AFRICAN HISTORY: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE HISTORY ACADEMICS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY

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DECLARATION

I Mlamuli Tabhu declare that:

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(ii)   This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Mlamuli Tabhu   Dr. MT Maposa

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DEDICATION

This field of study finds its basis, in large part, to my family whose particulars are yet to be discussed in the pages that follow. With this thesis, I tender my precious thanksgiving for giving birth unto me upon this planet. Had it not been for you I would not have made it. Out of nothing you raised me. In the absence of monetary means, you prioritised my academic well-being and I am forever appreciative. From these considerations, it is befitting to dedicate this Master of Education in History Education to both my parents Nkosibonile Wiseman Tabhu and Bukiwe Eunice Hlabe. More so, this liberating literature is also dedicated both to my late grandfather Tshula Tabhu and my late grandmother Nomsa Asiyena Tabhu. The spiritual universe itself reminds me how we are all one soul, one and the same, one with God's infinite wisdom, one with nature, and one with all that is. It is in consideration of this oneness that I pay homage to both of you with this dissertation which invokes the frequency of thoughts I emit to the universe.

Inhloso yalo mbhalo ukwethula kabanzi injulalwazwi mayelana nomlando wezwekazi i-Afrika. Ngokumelene nalesi sizinda, ngihlaziye imibono yezifundiswa zomlando mayelana nenjulalwazi yomlando wezwekazi i-Afrika. Ngifisa ukudlulisa ukubonga bazali bami ngokungipha ithuba lempilo, nangokungikhulisa phansi kwesimo ebesinzima. Ngalo-mbhalo ngidlulisa ukubonga kwami. Sengiphetha, ngifisa nokubonga umfowethu: Mpendulo Tabhu ngokuba insika engincika kuyo ngaso sonke isikhathi. Ume njalo!

In a wider sense, since this dissertation is part of the continued search for higher knowledge of self or African consciousness. More so, this study is also a reflection of my vow to the radical literature of all African intellectuals at home and abroad who stood before me and made it possible for me today to carry the spear forward with specific reference to African struggles for a decolonised African philosophy of history. The list incorporates a community of African scholars within the continent and in the diaspora such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Theophile Obenga, Dani Wadada Nabudere, John S. Mbiti, John Henrik Clarke, Marimba Ani, Yosef Ben-Jochannan, Marcus Garvey, Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, Wole Soyinka, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Chinweizu Ibekwe, Walter Rodney, Jacob F. Ade Ajayi, Bethwell Allan Ogot, Eisha S. Atieno-Odhiambo, Kaba Hiawatha Kamene, Lwazi Siyabonga Lushaba, Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, and Marshall Tamuka Maposa.

ABSTRACT

This study sought to investigate the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history through the theoretical reflections of the designated history academics in South Africa. The research was informed by the quest to revisit the philosophical question extended on the Africanness of African history, encapsulating the epistemic predicaments confronting history academics as they propound African history. The literature search covered in the study leaned more on the African archive since the study is designed from an African-centred worldview, and which in the main incorporated the succeeding themes with an attempt to unearth the epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical nature of philosophy of African history: the nature of history, modernist theory, and African history, neo-liberalism and African history, the conceptual meaning of African history, the philosophy of African history, academia in South Africa, the role of academics in African philosophy, decolonisation in Africa. African philosophy and decolonial theory as a conceivable decolonised philosophy of African history was closely considered in an attempt not only to frame the study from a particular dimension but also to make sense of the theoretical contributions made by the designated history academics in South Africa. The main endeavors of this research were to explore how history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality of the philosophy of African history and to understand how they also theorise a decolonised philosophy of African history. The study followed a qualitative research approach and a conceptual research design. This dissertation also closely considered an Afrocentric paradigm with an attempt of seeing, writing, and interpreting the philosophy of African history from an African centred worldview that views reality to be a construction of a community of learning. The five designated history academics in four different universities in South Africa were considered through convenience sampling. To generate the data from the designated participants the study employed semi-structured interviews. The findings revealed that the academics viewed the coloniality of the

philosophy of African history through a modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis, Africa as ahistorical. They also depicted that concerning a decolonised philosophy of African history can be theorised through an Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and African self-consciousness. It is within the consideration of the above research findings that the study aimed at contributing to the looming and continued debates in Africa and precisely South Africa concerning the nature of the philosophy of African history in this age of decolonisation discourses with specific reference to History Education.

Key Words: History, African history, Philosophy of African history, African philosophy, Coloniality, Academics and Decolonisation.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAPS	Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement
CODERSIA	Council for Development of Social Research in Africa
FMF	Fees Must Fall
JIAS	Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Studies
MSIR	Makerere Social of Institute Research
RMF	Rhodes Must Fall
RPE	Radical Political Economy
UNESCO	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

For the present study, it is of great interest to introduce the dissertation through a discussion of the generational questions that I grapple with from the outset of the research. This is done through the contextualisation of the study calling into question the philosophical debates presented about African history. This is followed by the rationale and motivation for this study, the research objectives, research questions, and the focus and the purpose of the study. The fifth section well-defined the location of the study. This is then followed by a problem statement which examines the situation and scholarly arguments on the ground and their implications for this research. My personal positionality and identity is illustrated in the seventh section. The next section depicts the significance of this study to the community of knowledge economy in History Education. Before concluding Chapter 1, I provide a chapter-by-chapter overview of this dissertation.

Throughout this dissertation, I took cognisance of the argument by Asante (2019) that a lot of work in history and History Education draws upon extensive research by European scholars. I have, therefore, tried to place the work of African historical scholars at the centre of this research with an endeavor to conceptualise the philosophy of African history. In Wa Thiong'o's (1993) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2018c) terms, the attempt is about moving the centre, which means shifting the geography of the conceptualisation of the philosophy of history whose metaphysics is defined as a philosophy of African history theorised from within the continent of Africa. Wa Sekake (2021) describes this important intervention of moving the centre as the meditation from the gutter. Along those lines, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b, p.80) argues that "this entails two moves: restoration of Africa as a legitimate epistemic site of history and taking seriously the philosophy of African history as a departure point without necessarily throwing away the philosophy of history." Here too, this study should not be understood as a shouting match among African and Western philosophical approaches of being, and ways of philosophising African history, but should be understood as an attempt to evolve a new, philosophy of African history as Africans tell it themselves, concerning their being in and the world as well as their own responsibility towards self-defining themselves. This philosophy is informed by Africanist or Afrocentrist thinking, which is why the two conceptual categories are employed interchangeably throughout this dissertation.

1.2 Background and contextualisation

Ever since the advent of Western colonialism in Africa, which according to Eze (1997) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020a; 2020b; 2020c) largely dates from 1492 up to 1945s, the philosophy of African history has experienced an academic assault. For a very long time, a series of studies in Eurocentric literature search was documented projecting the idea that Africa is beyond the grasp of history. An example of such literature is by the prominent German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who, in a vital manuscript entitled *"Philosophy of History,"* pointed out that:

> At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit. What we properly understand by Africa, it is the unhistorical, underdeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as a threshold of the world's history. Historical movement in it – that is in its northern part – belongs to the Asiatic or European world (Hegel & Sibree, 2004, p. 117). [1]

It is obvious in the manuscript *"Philosophy of History,"* that Africa and African history is demarcated at the contradictory pole to Europe, as its ideal and historical antithesis. Not only did he conceptualise Africa as ahistorical, but also argued that Africa is the land of childhood (Hegel & Sibree, 2004). Responses to such philosophy include *"Writers in Politics"* by Wa Thiong'o (1997, p. 9), where he states:

> As late as 1960 the Hegelian racist formulation could be paraphrased by Trevor Roper, an eminent English historian at Oxford, into a statement of the fact that prior to European adventure in Africa, there was only darkness, and darkness was not a subject of history.

Another input against this Eurocentric philosophy of history is from Ogot (2009, p.4) who looks at "the way in which Africa appears in Hegel's argument, showing how Africa is excluded totally from the historical process, through which, according to him, the human spirit fulfils itself." In the same way, Ajayi (1969) and Lushaba (2015) appear at first, to be much

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[1] "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy of history is amongst celebrated scholarship of European self-affirmation in opposition to non-Western societies engrained in the modernist theory" (Ogot, 2009, p.5).

more concerned with how the philosophy of African history over stresses the degree to which activities of Europeans can be seen as the central events of African history from which all others derived. "It equates the response of Africans to European activities with the reality of African history, thus neglecting African civilisation throughout African history" (Lushaba, 2015, p.40). To further highlight this point, Chimee (2018, p.1) laments the dominance of the colonial philosophy of African history, which argues "that there was no such thing as African history and, that the history of Africans began with the history of Europeans in Africa."

Another example of this colonial philosophy of history is how the periodisation of African history was associated with events that are associated with Europe, leaving out the contributions of Africans. Lushaba (2009, p.12) points out that "all human societies are periodised into three periods – ancient, medieval (or pre-modern), and modern – all abstracted from the history of Europe."

With the above discussion in mind, this research joins the decolonisation discourses, particularly in Africa, wherein some Africanists are questioning neo-colonialism in a wider scope and the philosophy of African history specifically (Nkrumah, 1965; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Wa Thiong'o, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c; 2020a). Nevertheless, studies on decolonisation done by scholars such as Wa Thiong'o (2005) and Mbembe (2015) focus mainly on the reversing coloniality of literature produced in universities in Africa. These discourses are currently under focus in South African education but are not necessarily new. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a, p.15) discloses that the 1960s instituted the "golden age" for the Africanisation of African history advocated "by leading scholars such as Cheikh Anta Diop, an African nationalist scholar based at the University of Dakar, who dedicated his entire scholarship producing African-centred history." To elaborate on the point, in his foreword to a book entitled "*The History of Africa; The Quest for Eternal Harmony",* Molefe Kete Asante begins by stating that in the "1950s and 1960s, the Senegalese Cheikh Anta Diop, scientist, linguist, and historian proposed the essential thesis that Africa was not only the cradle of humanity but also the cradle of civilisation" (Asante, 2019, p.7). Simply put, the concern for historians at the University of Dakar was not only the centrality of Egypt in African history but underlines that there is no world history without African history (Osha, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Even more profoundly, Cheikh Anta Diop brought together the historical, archaeological, and anthropological literature to support his thesis that for African history to make sense it ought to begin from spaces such as Ethiopia and Kemet with an attempt to find

linkages in Africa's long history (Diop, 1991; 1993). Also, Nabudere's work not only foregrounds the significance of Kemet as the cultural fountainhead, but he establishes that other parts of Africa such as Ethiopia contributed to the eventual flowering of Egypt as a beacon of civilisation (Muchie, Osha, & Matlou, 2012, p.2).

More engagements with decolonisation and Africanisation of African history were at Ibadan School of Social History that developed with luminary historians such as Bethwell A, Ogot, Jacob F. Ade Ajayi to mention a few (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a; 2020c; 2020d). Nonetheless, the key to the Nationalist School of Social History of the University of Ibadan was a historiographical shift from Western actors to African actors in African history without necessarily challenging the metaphysical foundations of the philosophy of African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c). In line with the above claim, Osha (2018) extends the debate that unlike most other historians and Afrocentrists, who have stopped with the task of proving the primacy of the Egyptian past and its numerous historical achievements, equally, the present research persistently attempts and takes on the urgently much-needed dialogue about the philosophy of African history. To further highlight this conversation about the philosophy of African history, Maposa (2018) suggests that African history should not have the same philosophy as other histories, on the basis of its uniqueness orally, culturally, conceptually, philosophically, and experientially.

Therefore, it is based on the above context that this dissertation attempts to shed a light on the decolonisation of the philosophy of African history. This study is worthy of careful attention considering the resurgent struggles for a decolonised university in South Africa, which were sparked by the presence of an offensive statue of foremost British imperialist Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town, with the protests spreading to several other institutions of higher learning such as the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). This movement has seen universities in South Africa develop into sites of debates that point out to skewed demographics, disappointing monetary circulation, preservation of students, Westernised curriculum, escalating admission to the university by black students (Mngxitama, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c; 2020d). Of particular interest was how students go to question the metaphysics of history and African history that they have been exposed to in the South African universities. In light of all these debates, it is necessary to consider the issue of a decolonised philosophy of African history as part of the debates in History Education despite little or no evidence, so far, of theorisations of decolonisation discourse concerning the philosophy of African history.

1.3 Problem statement

From the above background, it has been evidently shown that scholars like Hegel and Sibree (2004) deem Africa as ahistorical. This view is centred on the conception of the philosophy of history, which Africanist historians such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Terence O. Ranger, Bethwell A. Ogot, Eisha S. Atieno-Odhiambo and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni grapple with. The philosophical question can be extended to the concern on the extent to which African history can be considered African (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020a; 2020b; 2020c). Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2020c) have identified the major challenge to be the conviction of African philosophy of history cascading from the dawn of Euro-modernity that renders African history into "ahistory", "prehistory", and history (with capital "H"). Building on this argument, yet another encounter is that "what exists today as a conventional philosophy of history and academic discourse of history produced within modern universities is still normatively Eurocentric, neo-Enlightenment, neo-Marxist, and neo-Modernist" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.1). Further to this, Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) brought into question whether history academics in Africa can evoke this historic time and reconstruct the philosophy of African history to give special attention to African agency. It is in consideration of such complexities that this study is situated in a South African context that is currently engaging with discourses of decolonisation with specific reference philosophy of African history. History teachers continue to teach African history in the milieu of all these questions. This study, therefore, is set to explore what the designated history academics in South African universities consider as the colonial and decolonised philosophies of African history.

1.4 Rationale and motivation for the study

There are personal, professional, and theoretical reasons that led me to consider this study. At a personal level, I consider my identity to be a composition of many aspects. First of all, I am an African. Being an African to me is not just in terms of colour, ancestries, and positionality, although these are important. It is also part of a larger search – a quest for knowledge of self as a black man (Cesaire, 2000; Garvey, 2009; Mbembe, 2017). This personal search has led me to conclude that being an African implies having a particular African consciousness. Born in South Africa, I experienced my country adopting the notion of democracy, and yet to my sight, and to the sight of discerning scholars such as Wa Thiong'o (2005), Lushaba (2009), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a), and Mngxitama (2018), present-day South Africa is experiencing imperialism in its neo-colonial stage. As a result, I have personally been a victim of racism on

several occasions, confirming the neo-colonial nature of South Africa. I view this racism to be embedded in the Cartesian metaphysics whereby one's humanity is considered reflective of one having a body of thought. It implies that the denial of epistemic virtue automatically disqualifies one of his or her being (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). I link my experiences as an African to the point captured by Mbembe (2001; 2017) and Lushaba and Lategan (2018) that being Black is still a subject of scorn and the extent to which it amounts to nothingness, and above all that which appears when one wants to see nothing.

Exposure to the above debates has driven me in a deeper sense and sharpened my quest for understanding the decolonisation ideal, and left me asking myself generational questions such as: Why is it that whenever African history is taught, colonialism and slavery are always at the center of the talk? Why is it that African history is always associated with primitivity, patriarchy, and many other negative issues? Why are topics that enhance pride in Africanness given little or no attention in African history?

At a professional level, I am a history teacher in pursuit of my postgraduate studies in History Education in an institution that calls itself as a "premier university of African scholarship" (Maposa, 2014). The African scholarship ideal would make one expect a decolonised curriculum informed by an Africanist philosophy of African history. Nonetheless, there is evidence of limitations to school history in South Africa, as guided by the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) which is largely neo-liberal and social constructivist (Maposa, 2018). This raises concerns about how much of African philosophy informs the teaching of African history in South Africa. Therefore, this research can contribute to the philosophy that informs the practice and pedagogy of history teachers, myself included, and of various departments of history.

At a theoretical level, this study is piloted at a time when a generation of students and scholars are raising sharp debates with new pieces of knowledge previously "not part of the learning experience and new unconventional forms of philosophising African history which do not exteriorise knowledge from the knower" (Lushaba, 2016, p.5). Simply put at a theoretical level, this study draws on a decolonial theoretical positioning that suggests "that every human is born to a legitimate and valid knowledge system" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a, p.1). Therefore, along this line of thought, Africa has a history, contrary to claims by the colonial philosophy that circulated the image of Africa as a "dark continent," while crediting any historical process on the continent to outsiders, such as the mythical Hamites or Caucasoid people (Ogot, 1992).

Building on this argument, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c) draws on to purvey his thesis that modernity brought about coloniality which colonised the knowledge, language, and history that Africans had about themselves and unto them, Eurocentric knowledge was given.

Along such a path, a philosophy of African history that projects Africa as being ahistorical has been critiqued by many revisionists, some of whom are Africanists. For example, Nabudere (2011; 2012), Iliffe (2017), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b), and Osha (2018) debunked such a flawed philosophy of history, through which, Africa is viewed as a continent without a history. What this reveals is that applying a universalist philosophy of African history will lead to continued manifestations of coloniality in the discipline. This study will, therefore, contribute theoretically to such debates on the philosophy of African history.

1.5 Objectives of the study

1.5.1   To explore how history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality of the philosophy of African history.

1.5.2   To explore how history academics in South African institutions theorise the decolonised philosophy of African history.

Critical research questions of the study

1.5.3   How do history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality of the philosophy of African history?

1.5.4   How do the history academics in South African institutions theorise the decolonised philosophy of African history?

1.6 Focus and purpose of the study

Research on the philosophy of African history attempts to examine how the designated history academics in South Africa theorise the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history. This is done through a critical review of their understanding of the philosophy of African history. African history as has long been the case, entails the contributions, stories, and images that Africans have of themselves in their immediate environment and in the universe that is embedded in the literature, scrolls songs, culture, linguistics, archaeology, philosophy, and oral history (Wa Thiong'o, 1997; Shillington, 2005). Nonetheless, my attention will be on the philosophy of African history, which according to Ruch (1973), Falola (2017) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c) concerns itself with the metaphysics informing the existence and knowledge of African history and attempts to order African history within an overall framework of laws, theories, and ways of seeing which are intended to give meaning. In plain

language, the philosophy of African history is the extent to which present research is concerned not only with the metaphysics of African history but also with images and ways of seeing in which Africans tell their history in conversation with themselves, their immediate environment, and other-selves in the universe across time and space.

1.7 Location of the study

This thesis is positioned in South Africa with considerable attention to four universities. Two of the institutions are in KwaZulu-Natal province while the other two are located in other provinces of South Africa. The nature of some of these two institutions is such that they attract students from all over the world, however, the majority of students are predominantly whites and few Africans (More, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). Furthermore, because of their dynamic history from previously advantaged to inclusive, they have been at the centre of the calls for decolonisation.

On the other hand, some of the institutions in this study were historically disadvantaged. Nevertheless, they have transformed into comprehensive institutions that attract students internationally, even though the majority are Africans. They also have a heritage of vibrant struggles faced by previously disadvantaged institutions. The two universities have different histories and circumstances, but they have shown some evidence of engagement with Africanist and/or decolonial thought Africans (More, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a).

1.8 Personal positionality and identity

This thesis considers the work of Cassim (2011; 2016; 2021) in her postgraduate toolkit which clearly states that it is not encouraged to use the pronoun "we", "us" in the writing of the thesis. Nonetheless, throughout this study, I employed pronouns such as "we," "us," "ourselves" and "I." It is therefore important to explain my positionality and identity in this research so that the reader would know to whom the above pronouns refer. Since this study is from an African philosophical standpoint, it assumes that literature and knowledge are a reflection of the conscious acts of men and women in view of their being and the universe (Wa Thiong'o, 1997; Mbiti, 2015). This means that literature and even its writers do not belong in isolation but are products of a human encounter with the universe which in turn produces literature. An author attempts to convince his readers, not only to immerse themselves in certain suppositions but also to take a certain outlook (Wa Thiong'o, 1997; 2005). As noted in the rationale for this study, I consider myself an African. So, it is within the considerations of African philosophy

and Afrocentric paradigm that I employed pronouns such as "we" to signify myself as African and I am part of African knowledge production within an institution that prides itself as being a foremost school of African academia. "This epistemological assumption implies that I, as a researcher, I am not divorced from the knowledge and the universe. As part of society, I am, therefore, an active participant in the construction of knowledge" (Maposa, 2014, p.122).

1.9 Significance of the study

This thesis documents several key theoretical contributions made to the field of History Education concerning the philosophy of African history with a contextual focus on South Africa and Africa at a broader dimension. More precisely, the present study makes several noteworthy contributions to the growing body of literature since it is conducted at a time when South Africa grapples with post-colonial questions on the issues such as epistemic decolonisation, economic decolonisation, patriarchy, political leadership and Afrophobia. Further still, this research contributes not only to the field of History Education but also to African Studies and African Philosophy in the sense that a good understanding of African history and its philosophy can contribute immensely to debates on such contemporary conceptual maladies.

1.10 The organisation of the study

The overall structure of this thesis takes the form of six chapters.

Chapter 1 is an outline, providing the background, context, rationale, objectives, and main research enquiries. The first chapter also examined nearly all of the foremost theoretical perspectives about the philosophy of African history beginning with Georg Hegel and Hugh Trevor Roper. This chapter shows that the research joins the struggles for epistemic freedom in Africa according to which Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018c, p.11) points out as an "academic and intellectual process of centring Africa as a legitimate historical unit of analysis and epistemic site from which to interpret the world while at the same time globalising knowledge from Africa."

Chapter 2, is an overview of the central claims arising in the reviewed literature with an attempt to locate the research problem and to identify a theoretical framework, line of inquiry and examine the research gaps. Key to the chapter is not only the African conception of the most important themes such as an academic, history, African history, philosophy of African history,

decolonisation, and Africanist theoretical framework, but also an attempt at centring and inviting the African archive into a dialogue with the philosophy of African history.

Chapter 3 examines the theoretical framework utilised for the present study. Crucial to the entire chapter, African philosophy, and decolonial theory was employed with an intention to discuss the research findings.

Chapter 4 discusses the research design and methodology for this research. The key concern for this chapter is the necessity of a decolonised research methodology that allows the philosophy of African history to be theorised and interpreted from the African-centered worldview. Such an attempt is consistent with the last chapter of "*The Wretched of the Earth*", where Fanon (2007, p.300) deploys his useful injunction of self-creation, as such he makes this worth mentioning observation "for Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try set afoot a new man."

Chapter 5 presents the findings of the research, focusing on the six themes in the theorisation of the coloniality and a perceived decolonised philosophy of African history. First is the modernist conception of the philosophy of African history. The second theme relates to an emphasis on the African crisis. The idea of Africa that is ahistorical is presented in the third theme. Concerning a decolonised philosophy of African history, a discussion of the Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history is addressed in the fourth theme. The fifth theme examines the emphasis on African agency. Questions concerning African self-consciousness are discussed in the sixth theme.

Chapter 6 starts with a discussion of the findings. The chapter also draws upon the entire study, tying up countless academic and empirical components with the intent to map out perceived new images and bodies of thought of philosophising African history. Areas for further research are also identified.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The aforesaid chapter covered issues pertaining to the introduction of the dissertation, the study's context and highlighting the problem statement and questions that this study seeks to answer. This chapter throws more light on the study's key concepts and themes through a literature review. Vithal and Jansen (2012) consider a literature search as an incorporation of what has previously been inscribed about the subject. Mafa, Gudhlanga, Manyeruke, Matavire & Mpofu (2015) and Omeje (2015) highlight that the literature review is a significant means of locating contextual facts pertinent to the enquiry topic and defining what investigation has already been completed as well as revealing research strands that have been left out.

Questions about what actually literature is in the African sense have generated considerable interest since the research project is decolonial and oriented through African philosophy. The debate on African literature is resembled by the "historic meeting of African writers at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda in 1962" (Wa Thiong'o, 2005, p.5). The debate raised the following questioning the Africanness of literature produced in Africa: "was the literature about Africa or about the African experience? Was the literature written by Africans? What about a non-African who wrote about Africa: did his work qualify as African literature?" (Wa Thiong'o, 2005, p.6). With this in mind, the above perennial questions concerning African literature points to whose framing, whose narrative, whose language, whose terminology, whose worldview, and definitions of reality are used in the African literature? (Godsell, 2019). To gain a sense of appreciation for the above questions this study returns to Wa Thiong'o (1997) for whom, African literature is not only limited to written artistic published work, although these are imperative. African literature refers to the "images people have of themselves in history and in the universe" (Wa Thiong'o, 1997, p.29). It resembles, "an artistic plane, a community's wrestling with the environment to make it yield the means of life – food, clothes and shelter" (Wa Thiong'o, 1997, p. 4). Put simply, African literature is a product of an actual process of eating, drinking, learning, loving, and hating and which encompasses not only writings but proverbs, riddles, language, oral literature, African music, culture, and other forms of being and cognising. For Africans, literature is not restricted to scholarly work to be found in the libraries and archives but extends to it being the

embodiment of "people's consciousness of their twin struggles with nature and another" (Wa Thiong'o, 1997, p.5). In the widest sense, African literature is "both a reflection of people's collective reality and also an embodiment of that people's ways of seeing the world and their place in its making" (Wa Thiong'o, 1997, p.5). This is consistent with what has been found in previous research by Mbiti (2015, p.31) that "as they went through life, African peoples observed the world around them and reflected upon it. They looked at the sky above with its stars, moon, sun, and meteorites; with its clouds, rain, rain bows and the movement of the winds." In another light, African literature denotes to these experiences "stimulated them to reflect upon their life and the universe in which they lived. The result was a gradual building up of African views or ideas about the world and the universe at large" (Mbiti, 2015, p.31). It is in the consideration of the above that, African literature emphasises harmony not only with knowledge and writers but also with the universe (Salami, 2020).

The literature review for this dissertation was meant for four reasons. Firstly, such literature is intended at recognising the gap in the literature and developing a problem statement as well as theoretical considerations (Blanche, Durrheim, Painter, 2006). Thirdly, literature was reviewed to empower the study to attain a far-reaching analysis of the subject under investigation (Mafa et al., 2015). Fourthly, literature was considered to see how academics elsewhere have articulated positions of examination within History Education (Mafa et al., 2015). This literature review smoothed this research project to avoid fruitless approaches to research that could have been done over some time, all of which deployed roughly identical methodological considerations, which were ineffective previously (Omeje, 2015). This dissertation designated a thematic literature review which, according to Booth and Sutton (2016), was meant to review the fundamental themes or perspectives that are essential for a theorisation of the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history.

Apart from this introduction, this chapter is composed of eight themed parts: the nature of history, modernist theory, and African history, neo-liberalism, and African history, the conceptual meaning of African history, the philosophy of African history, academia in South Africa, the role of academics in philosophy, decolonisation in Africa. These sections are informed by the fact that this research employed a thematic literature review that was organised around diverse standpoints in the literature which often encouraged this study to view things thematically (Blanche et al., 2006).

2.2 The nature of History

The importance of this section is to revisit the description of history with an aim to get a conceptual and theoretical understanding of the discipline, for it has implications in the theorisation of both the idea of history, African history, and the philosophy of African history. As has been attested to in the previous chapter that every single human is raised to a genuine and effective profound literature and therefore everyone has a history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). This is why this study departs from the Western conception of Africa as ahistorical.

History is a dynamic discipline which makes it problematic to have one agreed-upon definition. Nevertheless, the generally agreed Western conception of history descends from a Greek word "historia" attributed to scholars such as Herodotus whose meaning has to do with inquiry designed to prompt truth (Philips, 2005; Chang'ach, 2015). Considering this dynamism, Burkhart (as cited in Chang'ach, 2015) says that history is conceptualised to be the record of what one age finds worthy of note in another. The basic understanding, according to Ogot (1974), is that history is the study of the past. In the widest sense, disciplinary history is concerned with time and space. In other words, History is concerned with space, individuals, nations, institutions, and groups in time and in their geographical environment (Chang'ach, 2015).

Nevertheless, history has been marred by certain aspects over time. For instance, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2005) suggests that history as a discipline and practice has suffered severely from gender-blindness and gender bias. Simply put, not only did disciplinary history concern itself with "his" story more than "her" story but it also ignored the contributions made by ordinary civilians (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005). This has been the case not only in History Education but also in African studies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c, p.35). According to Bhambra (2007) and Chakrabarty (2008), this is because academic history, as a discipline and discourse, was produced in the modern institutional universities with the focus on Europe as its theoretical and sovereign totality. Depelchin (2005) warns that by the time African historians accepted the notion of disciplinary history in the 1960s, they had disciplined it to Western coordinates of history. Nothing could exemplify this better than the obsession of African historians in the 1950s and 1970s with the search for powerful kingdoms and key figures with which to equate to European prototypes (Depelchin, 2005; Mamdani, 2018).

The Western conception of history as merely the study of the past has been challenged in many ways, such as how Ogot (1974) would later paraphrase his statement that history is about how people organised their lives in the past or history is what comes to us from the past. Another view of history is that it is a form of created literature, broader than fiction, but has to do with the interpretation of the past in the present (Philips, 2005). In the opinion of Philips (2005), history is the interpretation is the sense we humans make of our past. Garvey (2009) highlights the need to look at history as the landmark by which we are directed into the course of life. In simpler terms, history is the study of developments and progress in humanity over a certain period (Stephenson et al., 2015). This relates to the view of history as a conversation the present holds with the past and this inquiry raises what, how, and why questions (Philips, 2005; Chang'ach, 2015).

The African conception of history refutes the linearity of history and emphasises history that moves from the now-period, which is a point in time where people's concerns lie since it is when they exist towards the past (Mbiti, 1990; Chang'ach, 2015; Diagne, 2017). Furthermore, history is the human compass that indicates who they are and who they have been from the beginning of time and where they should go (Asante, 2019). This is further explained by leading African history luminary John Henrik Clarke, according to whom history in the African conception carries not only conceptual meaning but also philosophical weight. Along such a path, history entails the following:

> History is not everything, but it is a starting point. For Africans, history is the clock that people use to tell their time of day. It is a human compass they use to find themselves on the map of human geography. It tells them where they have been, who they are, where they are, but most importantly, what they must be. The relationship of history to the people is the same as the relationship of the mother to her child (Clarke, 1996).

This debate was echoed eloquently by Garvey (2009) that a people without this human compass or history is like a tree without roots.

A critical development in the study of history, is the contention that it is not the past itself, but linguistics, archaeology, oral history, and anthropology are some of its sources (Ogot, 1974; Philips, 2005; Stephenson, Mbansini, Frank, Pillay & Hlongwane, 2015). This conception refutes the view that history is only studied through written documents. Ki-Zerbo (1981)

declares that for Africans, owing to the lack of writing in many instances, history's special feature is that it is seen less as science and more as a form of wisdom. Clearly, these are the issues whose importance did not go unnoticed in the writings of the *General History of Africa*. As Ki-Zerbo notes:

> Man is a historical animal. He visualises his history as being a design in the making and, after it has come to pass, he sees it as a memory pregnant with meaning, as a model consciousness or the parts is accordingly marked by the very nature of that past (Ki-Zerbo, 1981, p.10).

From this premise, therefore, it can be argued that history should not be just framed within European conception, but should be understood contextually, which is why there is a field of study called African history.

2.3 Modernist theory and African history

2.3.1 A critique of the modernist idea of History

It is sufficient to point out that the consulted literature in this section examines the modernist theory and what it means for the idea of history. As will be shown, even though the modernist theory and its idea of history were progressive in Euro-America (Global North), on the African continent (Global South) it disseminated a darker side which entails characterised by genocides, liberalism, coloniality, exclusion, and racism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c). More than in any other region, the darker side of modernity in Africa stands out to be the "obsession about the absence, lack, none-being, paradigm of difference – in short of nothingness" (Mbembe, 2001, p.4).

According to Lushaba (2009, p. 6-8) refers to:

> An eighteenth-century theory of enlightenment. It is often said the enlightenment was an age of reason, for example as illustrated by the withdrawal from the idea that the laws governing the nature and social existence could only be derived from the theological doctrines. So, we may define the enlightenment as a pedagogical movement to build a new, rational, scientifically ordered discourse of nature and virtually everything in the universe; it symbolises the victory of reason in its struggle against faith."

A more comprehensive description can be found in Osha (2011a) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a; 2013b; 2013c) that modernist theory derives from a European idea of the Enlightenment, which saw the contemporary revision of democracy premised on faith and progress. Lushaba further states:

> Together with these political and social transformations, the European society unfolding at the time developed a body of knowledge we now refer to as the discourse of modernity or modern social theory. In line with the goals of the Enlightenment, modern social theorists sought to develop universally valid theories of social development, history, and progress. The fact that these theories were mainly analyses of the history and progress of European societies did not prevent them from being presented as universally valid narratives of human history and development (Lushaba, 2009, p. 11-12)

In the light of the above-mentioned argument, Europe at this phase was at a zero base in terms of knowledge production. One modernist scholar, Descartes (2013) writes in "*Discourse on methodology*" that he wanted to dispute all knowledge that he had previously held, including theologically ensuing descriptions. Significantly, he concluded that "I think; therefore, I am," implying that the circumstances for men's being are founded on their capability to reason. It is on this proposition that, according to Lushaba (2009), modern thought finds its basis. In modernist thought, men came to substitute God. For example, instead of depending on scripture to explain why rain fell, men started to use their minds to come up with theoretically derived explanations. Furthermore, "the Western epistemic traditions are traditions that claim detachment of the known from the knower" (Mbembe, 2015, p.9). "They rest on a division between mind and world or between reason and nature as ontological priori" (Mbembe, 2016, p4). That is to say, the knowing subject (Europe) is thus able to know the world without being part of that world (Mbembe, 2016). It is through these modernist conceptions that African history was studied, assuming "knowledge to be universal and independent of the context" (Mbembe, 2015, p.9).

Another feature of modern thought was metaphysical, whereby the modern being thought of itself as God-like, and since it could not exercise its God-like power over Europe, it had to find other people to be subservient beings to it (Lushaba, 2009). He further explains that modernism is manifested by the obsession by Europe to deny the colonial world the capability for thought. As a result, Africa was denied of its history, in order to validate the claim of the colonial project

of the civilising mission. Modernist thought developed over time, concluding that African people in the sixteenth century

> Lacked writing, to the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century of "people without history," to the twentieth-century characterisation of "people without development" and more recently, to early twenty-first century of "people without democracy (Grosfoguel, 2007, p.214).

Simply stated, this conception deep-rooted from the idea of history invokes that African people were not worthy of humanity for they lacked being, history, civilisation, and democracy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c).

According to Wynter (2003), knowledge in the contemporary universe is born in Europe was meant for people considered as human beings; implying that the others outside Europe were sub-human. Writers such as Amin (2009, p.13) have confronted how modernity "portrays the supposition that human beings armed with secular thought and science individually and collectively, can and must make their own history." It is from the above considerations that Eurocentric academics, who believed Descartes's thesis of "Cogito ergo sum/I think, therefore, I am," thus deprived of African people that could reason and produce history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a; 2013b; 2019b).

Significant scholarship in Latin America has made it explicit how modernity goes hand in hand with coloniality (Mignolo, 2018). It should be stressed, as argued by Torres (2007, p.243) that

> Colonialism is a political and economic bond in which the dominion of a nation or a people rests on the power of the other nation. Coloniality, in turn, denotes a long-standing design of control that arose as a result of colonialism, but that describes the culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the severe limits of colonial administration. Thus, coloniality endures after colonialism. It is preserved in the books, in the criteria for academic performance, in a cultural pattern, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples and aspirations of self.

A key aspect of the Renaissance and Enlightenment was European rationality. According to Imbo (1998, p.45), it was during these periods that claims of universality developed especially explaining reality, history, and philosophy. Accordingly, this rationality is now associated with

Western thought or modernist theory, and this meant the consignment of non-European wisdom and viewpoints to the realm of external positive knowledge and the length to which they were considered unreasonable (Imbo, 1998; Lushaba, 2009). To emphasise the point, Kenyan novelist, Wa Thiong'o (2005, p.1) turns our attention to how the study of African history within the idea of history has for some time been viewed through tribal lines. "Whatever erupts in Zaire, Nigeria, Liberia, and Zambia is considered to be because of traditional enmity between tribe D and tribe C and there can be no other explanation for it." Mamdani (2018) takes the discussion further by elaborating that the idea of history never thought of Africa to have nations, but Africa was conceived in terms of tribes, natives, and subjects. This is an example of how modernist theory and its links with coloniality of the idea of history has participated in denying Africa its history. That is why up to the 1960s, scholars like Trevor Roper disputed the existence of African history (Philips, 2005). This can be underlined as a Hegelian-Conradian-Hugh Trevor Ropian racist imperial discourse of writing Africa out of human history and relegating Africa to the site of darkness (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015d; 2018b; 2018c). No wonder at the heart of the idea of history was the obsession with "irrational" rationality within history as a knowledge system" which was crystallised by the overrepresentation of Europe in human history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.19).

Literature raises concerns over the coloniality of historicism (Chakrabarty, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). What underlies historicism, is the Eurocentric impression of olden times as the rational and nonspiritual discipline (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c). To that end, Chakrabarty (2008) postulates that at the core of this idea of history was the "spirit of science", "rational outlook" and "faith in progress." The drawback of this Eurocentric idea of history is the linear modernist thought that renders human development this way: "ahistory," "prehistory," and history with capital ("H") (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020a). Another challenge is the use of the modernist vocabulary and transhistorical concepts in understanding even pre-colonial history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). A key area of interest in the idea of history was the obsession with Europe as the medium and a marker of history elsewhere (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c) further spells out that its essence was the downgrading of human history within the Western episteme, and this led to the idea of history emerging as identical to Europe in what was known as transcendental history with capital H. Essentially, the "idea of history is concerned primarily with the actions and motivations of man whereas what obtains in the colonial context does not approximate the interaction among humans" (Lushaba, 2015, p.36). This view was further reinforced by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018c)

who observed that the dominant fact to the idea of history was the story of Europe as a "microhistory" of humankind.

Modernity also has a bearing on how development is viewed. According to Zeleza (as cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a, p.4), "the post-1492 period was a tale of how Europe appropriated world history and subordinated African history to the Western hegemonic and imperialist philosophical account." Simply put, "from the eighteenth century onwards, the idea of development became identical with European modernity and its capitalist mode of production and social relations. In terms of the idea of history, there emerged the notion of universal historical time and a world with a single-center, Europe" (Lushaba, 2009, p.12). Modernity and the idea of history were critiqued by Cabral (2008) as having imposed a notion of universality which usually assumed that it was the Western world who brought Africans into history, thus forcing Africans to leave their own history. Simply stated, this usurpation of world history involved the colonisation of space, time, knowledge, and being (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). And this usurpation of history is commonly detailed as modernism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c).

The conventional idea of history rest on dividing all human societies into three-time epochs – ancient, medieval (or pre-modern), and modern – taken from Eurocentric conception of history (Lushaba, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). "For those used to thinking in Marxian terms, these can be represented as three different modes of production, the slave/Asiatic, feudal, and capitalist, equal with the same three time periods" (Lushaba, 2009, p. 12). The foregoing meant that for African history to fit into the idea of history, it must acquiesce to the logic of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial time periodisation – or the above mentioned. What this does in academic circles is to consider colonialism as the centre of thought in the philosophy of African history. The consequence of this is that it becomes impossible to comprehend African history without citing colonialism (Prah, 2018). This reveals the coloniality of relegating the history of Africa to Eurocentric coordinates (Ajayi, 1969; Lushaba, 2015).

Symbolic to this usurpation of world history was the re-writing of the whole history of humanity theorised as continuing from the Greek and Roman conventional world to European capitalism, right to the triumphalism of the United States of America as the sole world giant (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a). Amin (2009) teaches us that coloniality is a twin task of Eurocentrism or modernity which is one of the "ideological deformities" of the modern age. In a sense, the darker side of the idea of history according to Hendricks & Lushaba (2005) and

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) deposited mercantile slave-trade which in turn led to the underdevelopment of Africa.

It can, therefore, be argued that the advent of coloniality of knowledge has had a remarkable effect on the idea of history. As cautioned by Ajayi (1969) and Lushaba (2015), there is a threat in writing African history from the European conception of the idea of history as is the tendency prevalent until today in African studies as well as in History Education. This is especially so within South African studies where there are tendencies to want to examine the history of the continent such as topics like colonialism through considerable attention to European activities without considering the African initiatives and how they survived colonialism (Ajayi, 1969; Lushaba, 2015).

2.3.2 Neo-liberalism and African History

African history in South Africa is taught from a neoliberal perspective. Neo-liberalism is one of the strands of liberalism, and its relationship with modernity has had a bearing on the philosophical ways of seeing, thinking, writing, and discourse about African history. While there is no absolute agreement on the origins of liberalism, Rosenblatt (2020) claims that John Locke is frequently looked upon as the founding father, even though other names that are thrown around include Adam Smith, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and even Plato. Deneen (2019) contends that liberalism was actualised in the United States of America with the idea that humans possess civil liberties which could engineer for themselves a decent life. Liberalism is an Anglo-American tradition concerned primarily with the protection of ones' civil liberties and pursuits, autonomy, fairness, the rule of law, civil liberty, and personal autonomy (Mbembe, 2013; 2017; Rosenblatt, 2020). This means that neo-liberalism relates to modernism since it is centered on the individual, based on Descartes's (2013) proposition that "I think; therefore, I am."

It rests on the power of international and, to a lesser extent, domestic capital (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015; Tabhu, 2019). Because of the domination of the "industries of Silicon Valley and digital technology, in the current era of neo-liberalism, time passes quickly and is converted into the production of money-form such that even world events can be assigned some market value" (Mbembe, 2017, p.3). Neo-liberalism sees history as a linear process, which societies shift from primitive to modernity. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b), this perspective dilutes the liberation into emancipatory struggles, as was the case with post-1994

South Africa, whereby independence or liberation was theorised as "democracy" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). This is also why Mngxitama (2018) argues that #FeesMustFall was a retreat moment from the larger question of decolonisation into the "bread and butter issues" of fees and outsourcing.

2.4 African History

It is important in this study to gain a clear understanding of what is meant by African history for it has a bearing on the philosophy of African history. Concerns have been raised by Parker and Rathbone (2007) about whether African history should comprise the history of the entire landmass of Africa, or it should differentiate between sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, traceably including peoples, who are not demonstrably black. This question is dealt with in the heated debate on Africanness or Africanity between Nigerian scholar Wole Soyinka and Kenyan scholar Ali A. Mazrui leading to the former to question the latter's Africanness to the point of concluding that Mazrui was "an acculturated Arab" (Soyinka, 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014; 2015c). In response to that discussion, Mazrui (1986) considered the concept of "A Triple Heritage", classifying Africans into two categories- "Africans of the blood", and "Africans of the soil" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.119).

Philips (2005) continues from that epistemic line to claim that African history is more than just writing about the ancient Egyptians who were black but is about African people and the changes they have gone through. Therefore, what distinguishes African history from European history, for Philips (2005), is that it must connect to the history of Africa and the diaspora more than it connects to any part of the world. This means that African history must resonate with African forms of cognising, modes of being, cultures, songs, and heritage of African people that constitute knowledge. This is why Maposa (2018) states that African history involves understanding the lives and stories of people who are African, focusing on what they have experienced and contributed, not just to their personal lives but to their communities and continent. Additionally, Asante (2019) argues that African history is the story of Africa as Africans tell it themselves, and as they see the grand movement and personalities that constitute people of heroes who have traversed that history.

At another level, African history differs from other histories in terms of space, such that if something happens in Europe, it becomes European history. Counter-arguments to this notion point out that there are also stories and experiences of African people regardless of where they

are found (Maposa, 2018). Most of the preceding arguments were conceptualised by Nkrumah (1978) who contended that African history is to be written and theorised as the history of African society, not as a story of European adventures. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a) raises the significance of African agency in history and postulates that African history has to do with "resistance" than it has with "conquest". This means that European contact with Africa must only find expression only as African experiences (Nkrumah, 1978). The above claim is critical for the rewriting and re-orienting of African history by Africa for itself, as itself, from its own perspectives (Asante, 2019).

Nabudere (2012) points out that a myth had long been held that Africa did not have a history even though this myth was objected to by the African achievements such as in Egypt, Nubia, and Ethiopia. Even the Timbuktu manuscripts with volumes of poetry, philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, geography, physics, and medicine reveal African contributions to history (Ham, 2008). This is why Ki-Zerbo insists that:

> Africa has a history. Unfortunately, for far too long, little was known about it and the little that was known was misunderstood. Yet the history of Africa, like the history of mankind, is really the story of awakening. That story needs rewriting, for it has been considerably distorted by ignorance or self-interest (Ki-Zerbo, 1981, p.1).

One of the key scholars in refuting Africa's lack of history is Diop (1955, p.401) in his book entitled, "*Nations Negres et Culture*", for whom, African history was and is a history of Black people who had invented, amongst other things, "mathematics, astronomy, the calendar, sciences in general, arts, religion, agriculture, social organisation, medicine, writing, technique, architecture." The same is true with Asante (2019, p.46) that the first books of mathematics are Kemetic books. Many other scholars still hold the position that no volumes on mathematical theories existed in the world earlier than African manuscripts produced in the Nile Valley, now known as Rhind Papyrus (Nabudere, 2011; 2012; Osha, 2018; Asante, 2019).

The reason these developments were ignored, as Lushaba (2013) points out, is that at an intellectual level, colonial rule was underwritten by a biased colonial philosophy of African history. From this viewpoint, Manning (2013) adds that the philosophy of African history had to grapple with the modernist thought that the continent was historically and socially behind. As a result, African history was only recognised as a discipline relatively recently. As

Zimmerman (2013, p.322) states, "African history became a conventional field in the late 1950s and 1960s when historians, following African independence broke with a type of imperial history that depicted the history of the continent as the history of its coloniser." Depelchin (2005) stresses that African history has endured two-fold methods of subduing: "denial" of being straight up to the 1960s and "acknowledgment" ever since then. Briefly, this brings to attention the understanding that African history as a field can be discerned to have begun around the 1950s, and yet, African history has been there from since the beginning of time (Diop, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

One of the major debates concerning African history since the 1970s, was centred on the question by Terence Ranger, the British liberal Africanist historian, who asked: "How African is African history?" Ranger sought to base his question on pedagogy that informs approaches as thematic concerns emanating from Eurocentric history and their adequacy as devices for analysis and writing the history of the continent of Africa (Ranger, 1968; Falola, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Ranger's argument is captured below:

> There was a necessity to examine whether African history was sufficiently African; whether it had developed the methods and models appropriate to its needs or had developed upon making use of methods and models developed elsewhere; whether its main themes of discourse had arisen out of the dynamics of African development or had been imposed because of their overriding significance in the historiography of other continents (Ranger, 1968, p.x).

Sometime in the late 1970s, a prolific African historian from Kenya Bethwell A. Ogot revisited the debate and advocated for the development of the philosophy of African history (Ogot, 1978; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). One aspect that puts into question the Africanness of African history is the method of writing African history by analogy, thus reducing it to Western coordinates of history through drawing out comparisons between the two histories (Eze, 2010; Falola, 2017; Mamdani, 2018). This has led to calls "for a paradigm shift from African historiographies to African philosophy of history" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c, p.1). An example of what would constitute the philosophy of African history is periodisation. As discussed in the previous section, chronology and periodisation are contentious regarding the notion of a colonial interlude as the key time holder of "precolonial," "colonial," and "postcolonial" (Prah, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). This periodisation format implies that the whole of African history is pigeonholed into three slots: each of them conceptually

revolving around the colonial encounter (Prah, 2018). Yet, Congolese historian Jacques Depelchin (as cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c) cautions on the dangers of using modernist vocabulary and transhistorical concepts in understanding even pre-colonial history.

2.5 The Philosophy of African History

Considering the argument in the previous section that African history is unique, it should be considered that it also has a unique philosophy. According to Chang'ach (2015), the philosophy of African history is concerned with thought and its relations to the object. Simply put, the philosophy of African history is concerned with the discourse or the thinking behind how African history is taught, written, and narrated, that is how historians apprehend the African past. Falola (2017) teases out that the philosophy of African history at the preliminary level is concerned with the nature of African history, and at a higher level, it deals with the metaphysical aspect of African history. In this connection, Cheikh Anta Diop was convinced that the philosophy of African history should encompass a system of theories and ideas through which Africans have come to make sense of their past (Gwiyani-Nkhoma, 2006). In the light of the above, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c) designates the philosophy of African history as a right to think, theorise, interpret the world, develop own methodologies, and write from an African centred worldview and unencumbered by Eurocentrism.

Building on arguments from the previous sections, there are some Eurocentric conceptions of the philosophy of history. On such conception is the argument by Hegel (as cited in Jeppie & Diagne, 2010) that Africa is a continent that was primitive and without history or agency. This view of Africa is clarified by Hegel and Sibree (2004) who state that:

> Africa must be divided into three fronts; one is that which lies South of the desert of Sahara-Africa proper- the Upland almost entirely unknown to us; the second is that to the North of the desert – European Africa (if we may call it); the third is the river Nile, the only valley-land of Africa, and which is in connection with Asia (Hegel & Sibree, 2004, p. 109).

With this context in mind, according to Hegel (as cited in Jeppie & Diagne, 2010, p.23), the idea of Africa being incapable of the agency "did not apply to all of Africa, but only to what he called "Africa proper", namely Sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt and its civilisation were then

attributed and linked to Asia while the rest of North Africa, the Maghreb, was also detached from it and linked to Europe."

The second argument advanced by the colonial philosophy of African history says history began with the arrival of white people on the continent. Whatever else went on before is denied (Jeppie & Diagne, 2010). Amadou-Mahtar M'bow, in his preamble to the eighth volume of the *General History of Africa*, elaborates that "Africa was hardly ever looked upon as a historical entity. However, the emphasis was laid on everything likely to lend credence to the Maghreb, which they called "white Africa" (Mazrui & Wondji, 1993, p, xxiii). Even Egyptologists were involved in the debate on whether Egyptian civilisation was a "Black" civilisation or an "Asian" one (Nabudere, 2012).

An antithesis to the colonial philosophy of African history is laid down by Diop (1993), who claims that the Nubians are the accepted ancestors of most African black people, to the point that the words Nubian and "negro" are synonymous. There is also evidence of ancient historians considering Egypt (Kemet) to be anything but a part of Africa, such that Diodorus Siculus says that Egypt (Kemet) was populated from the interior by Ethiopians (Asante, 2019).

Furthermore, Diop differs from the second argument that history in Africa began with the arrival of Europe in Africa. He stated that:

> Once again, a modern reminds us that the Ancients, the very scientist and philosophers who have transmitted present-day civilisation to us, from Herodotus to Diodorus, from Greece to Rome, unanimously recognised that they borrowed that civilisation from "Blacks" on the banks of the Nile: Ethiopians or Egyptians (Diop, 1993, p. 57).

Diop (1991) and Nabudere (2012) demonstrated convincingly that historical, archaeological, linguistic, and anthropological evidence all supported the theory that the civilisation of ancient Egypt, the first history that was recorded in writing, was actually Negroid in origin and continued to be so for many years.

The tendency to explain Africa to be without history or civilisation was invalidated by several attempts that have been made and demonstrated Africa as the cradle of humankind and civilisation (Diop, 1993; Nabudere, 2012; Asante, 2019). Simply put, "Africa had thriving centres of reading, writing and knowledge production. Throughout the northern parts of the

continent, across the Sahara, and along the whole of Sudanic Africa – from Senegal to Ethiopia – and down the East African coast as far as northern Mozambique, is rich and copious evidence of Africans engaged in reading and writing as far as the earlier centuries of pre-history" (Jeppie & Diagne, 2010, p.26). Yet within the colonial philosophy of African history, there are attempts to theorise the philosophy of African history to have always been limited to oral history.

The philosophy of African history is also conceptualised by other theories such as Marxism, which considers an African as a victim without the capacity of agency. Accordingly, Mbembe (2002) notes that African history is presented as governed by forces beyond Africans' control. For example, he is convinced that in the Marxist notion of history, the African is not theorised as an agent of free action, but rather, what happens in the African continent is as a result of world dynamism and disorder of the world.

Another issue on the philosophy of African history concerns the uniformity – or otherwise – of African history. For example, South Africa and its history are sometimes argued to be exceptional, such that the country was conceived as a "little Europe" in the lowermost tip of Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015d; 2017a). According to Nabudere (2012), Mbembe (2015; 2016), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015d) and Mamdani (2018), South Africa has defined itself as an appendix of European supremacy in an otherwise Dark Continent. These scholars refute the tendency in the philosophy of African history to theorise what happened in South Africa as unlike the history of other African countries, but rather, analogous to Western countries. In refuting South African exceptionalism, Hendricks and Lushaba (2005) and Mamdani (2018) argue that Apartheid was nothing peculiar, but it was colonialism in the form of indirect rule as employed in all British colonies in Africa. Another example of exceptionalism in African history is seen when the whole thing in Africa was observed to be bizarre and inexplicable if equated with other parts of the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). More precisely, if the discourse about Africa and its attributes is not considered weird, it is likely to be considered as a continent of lesser value, little importance, and poor quality (Mbembe, 2001). "As soon as the subject of Blacks and Africa is raised, words do not necessarily represent things," and "the true and the false become inextricable" (Mbembe, 2017, p.13).

The philosophy of African history also considers social relations such as gender with the predominant representation being that of Africa as a patriarchal society. Africanist scholars argue that while contemporary Africa is patriarchal, it has never been so throughout African history. An example is given by Prah (2004, p.28), "that women in pre-colonial Ghana played

various roles, depending on the particular organisation and historical circumstance of their society." Shamase (2014) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019b) underscore that women have always had a great role in shaping African history by different means in different epochs as was the case in South African history, where characters such as Queen Regent Mkabayi KaJama (1750 – 1843) and Queen Nandi kaMbengi are attributed to have shaped the Zulu kingdom. Even in Ethiopia, the Queen of Sheba is said to have ruled over the Ethiopian kingdom (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Furthermore, for Nabudere (2012) and Salami (2020), it was no coincidence that women were deeply involved in the struggles for independence in the early-mid 20th century, and in later struggles in countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and South Africa. More precisely, women in many African societies were not domesticated as wives but they were politicians, traders, farmers, artists, goddesses, prophetesses, queens, and rain queens (Salami, 2020). The patriarchy that is now synonymous with Africa is better historicised by scholars such as Oyewumi (1997), Prah (2004) and Mamdani (2018) who trace it back to the superimposition of Victorian values and morality on traditional order by colonialism, which defined men as heads of household, and hard-pressed women to a marginal status.

Ideally, Africa also had matriarchal societies (Mbiti, 1990; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). "Oyeronke Oyewumi's decolonial feminist sociological work broadens our understanding of the problems of using Western thought in understanding African reality and demonstrated empirically and theoretically how the "women question" emerged as an imposition on such societies as the Yoruba in Nigeria" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.27). The contributions made by Oyewumi (1997) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) to the critique of patriarchy is of wide interest in this study since it reveals the following.

> The Yoruba case shows that the human body need not be constituted as gendered or be seen as evidence for social classification at all times. In pre-colonial Yoruba, body-type was not the basis for social hierarchy: males and females were not ranked according to anatomic distinctions. The social order required a different kind of map, not a gender that assumed biology as the foundation for social ranking (Oyewumi, 1997, p.xii; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p. 18).

Nabudere (2012) continues to observe that African societies were characterised by the matrilineal family system throughout the continent. To prove the point, he observes:

African women have always played a notable role in the family, the inheritance of material wealth and rights to royal succession and governance generally. This kinship system through the female line came directly from the prehistoric times (Nabudere, 2012, p.149).

The above reveals that the social status of people in African societies such as Yoruba was centred amongst other things on seniority which was determined by the good formative years of age and experience (Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b).

In response to modernist colonialism, the philosophy of African history draws out two schools (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015b; Lushaba, 2015). First, is the epic school of thought, which stressed the long-term consequences of colonialism in African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015c; 2018b). In their eyes, Mazrui (1986) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015b; 2018b) revealed that colonialism was not just an event but an unjust system that incorporated Africa into slavery, exclusion from sovereignty, or colonialism and Apartheid. Apart from this, Aime Cesaire in his volume entitled, "*Discourse on Colonialism*," sustained the philosophy of the epic school that colonialism had disrupted the history of Africa, looted its resources and brainwashed Africans all over the world into inferiority complex (Cesaire, 2000). Ngugi Wa Thiong'o was also part of the epic school, and for him, colonialism meant the subsequent on the minds of Africans:

But the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of the cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievements. It makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples' languages rather than their own (Wa Thiong'o, 2005, p.3).

Amongst other things, Fanon (2007) was part of the epic school and saw colonialism as mental or psychic madness taking up a political form, causing psychic injuries in the minds of the oppressed. For analytical purposes on the epic school on colonialism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020b, p.118), "introduced the notion of three empires: the physical empire; the commercial non-territorial empire; and the metaphysical empire." The physical empire refers to that which

concerns itself with physical conquest and the domination of the conquered nations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020b; 2020c). The continued exploitation of Africa's strategic resources after independence best describes the commercial-military-non-territorial empire which was spoken eloquently by Kwame Nkrumah as neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c; 2020c). Further still, the empire assumed the character of metaphysical formation which survived through the invasion of the mental universe and the removal of the hard disk of previous memory of the colonised people and downloading into them a software of European memory (Wa Thiong'o, 2005; 2009a; Biko, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c; 2020c). Concerning the above, African thinkers would ultimately conclude that "what Africa knows about itself, what different parts of Africa know about each other, has profoundly influenced by the West" (Mazrui, 1986, p.13). This shows that African intellectuals saw colonialism not only as an episode in African history, but as a system of power that over the last four hundred years underdeveloped Africa (Rodney, 1973; Mbembe, 2017).

Criticism of the epic school came from the episodic school, which ascended from the African Nationalist School of Social History at the University of Ibadan through the illustrious Nigerian historian Jacob F. Ade Ajayi and highlighted colonialism as a mere an episode in African history (Ajayi, 1969; Lushaba, 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015c; 2018b). Ajayi's point is explained:

> In any long-term view of African history, European rule becomes just another episode. In relation to wars and conflicts of people, the rise and fall of empires, linguistic, cultural, and religious change and the cultivation of new ideas and new ways of life, new economic orientation […] in relation to all these, colonialism must not be seen as a complete departure from African past, but as one episode in a continuous flow of history (Ajayi, 1968, p. 78).

The drawback of this is that while the episodic school is accurate in emphasising African agency in African history, the danger is in removing colonialism from the broader wave of Euro-North American-centric modernity that negatively affected Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015b; 2018b; 2020d). In some instances, too, this argument amounts to a very complacent view of colonialism as a system of power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020b, p.5). At the University of Ibadan itself where Ajayi was based, the episodic school was profoundly criticised by Peter P. Ekeh (Lushaba, 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020d). Ekeh (1983, p. 4-5) understood

colonialism to be "a social movement of epochal dimensions whose enduring significance, beyond the life-span of the colonial situation."

The philosophy of African history informs how the agency is viewed in contentious topics such as slavery and the *Mfecane*. Page (2001) points out that the colonial philosophy of African history purveys that Africans enslaved Africans before the slave-trade or mercantile period. Slavery in its true sense is best explained by Mbembe (2017, p.2) to be fifteenth to nineteenth-century philosophy, through which men and women from Africa were transformed into human objects, human-commodities, and human money. Also, not only were they deprived of their own names and their own language but extends to their lives and their work to be owned by those who shared the conviction that they are fewer human beings (Mbembe, 2017; 2019). Nonetheless, Africanists argue that Africans were seen as servants more than slaves, and those African servants who were not deported often enjoyed living conditions that were far better than those of white slaves in Europe (Diop, 1988). Furthermore, these servants enjoyed certain rights such as the right not to be separated from their families, they could acquire property and they could get married and raise free children (Page, 2001). To validate the point, Diop (1988) asserts that a freed slave was entitled to a deed of manumission drawn up in the proper legal form. This was the case of an old woman who was part of the legacy of the dianngo Mussa Sagansaro, who, according to Diop (1988) was freed by Askia Daud. In other words, the Western version of slavery that has been in existence in Europe is conceptually and philosophically different from African forms of being. This is illustrated clearly by the very fact that there was something different with forms of being in Africa prior trans-Atlantic slave-trade in the sense that all that was expropriated was labour. The humanity of a person was never taken or denied as it is the case for the Trans-Atlantic slave-trade. There was nothing that said if you were a slave, you should be a sexual object.

The final example in the philosophy of African history which has led to heated debates is deep-seated on the idea of *Mfecane.* At a conceptual level, the term *Mfecan*e is said to have been coined by E. A Walker and "it is a contentious term whose linguistic origin is not clear, but it was used to define a time of a deepened conflict and violence that began in the coastal areas occupied by Nguni speaking" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020b[2], p.62). Blaut (1993) draws on an

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[2] Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020b), The Ndebele Kingdom of Mzilikazi Khumalo. at Makerere Social Institute of Social Research at Makerere University in Uganda: Public Lecture 2.

extensive range of sources to support the claims of the colonial philosophy of African history that pre-colonial Africa was an empty space and if occupied, it was occupied by nomadic wanderers with no claims to territory and who were clueless to issues of property rights. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013c) draws our attention to Pieter Mulder, leader of Freedom Front Pluss (FFP) who in 2012 rearticulated the "empty land" thesis which is used to deny that Afrikaners ever dispossessed black people of their land. Emblematic to the empty land thesis is the colonial philosophy which pushes the idea of the coming of both black people and white people of South Africa as migrants from somewhere in the seventeenth century (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). A more detailed analysis which earns a mention on this notion of emptiness is elaborated and countered by Julian Cobbing (1988) in a piece of paper phrased, "The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolopo", and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni in his book titled "*Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa*", as such writes Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b):

> This proposition of emptiness makes a series of claims, each layered upon the other: First, a non-European region is empty of people (hence settlement by Europeans does not displace any native people). Second, the region is empty of the settled population: the inhabitants are mobile, nomadic, wanderers (hence European settlements violates no political sovereignty since wanderers make no claim to territory). Thirdly, the cultures of this region do not possess any understanding of private property - that is, the region is empty of property rights and claims (hence the colonial occupiers can freely give land to settlers since no one owns it (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b, p. 17).

This view on emptiness has, however, been disputed and placed on the shelf by extensive historical and archaeological evidence that Bantu-speaking people had established in Southern Africa 2 000 years ago particularly on the plateau between Limpopo and Zambezi river what was known as Early Iron Age Civilisation (Moyana, Sibanda & Gumbo, 1984; Huffman, 2004; Mellet, 2020; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b;2018b; 2020a; 2020b). An archaeologist has demonstrated that places such as Limpopo, Transvaal, Eastern Cape, and Natal-Swazi borders were homes of early hominids known as ancestors of homo-sapiens (Klein, 1984; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; Asante, 2019). In other words, rich archaeological literature disputes the colonial discourse of Europeans and Bantu (Africans) arriving in South Africa at the same time in the seventeenth century. Yet, at another level, the philosophy of nomads and wanderers is sharply debated by Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2020a) seminal paper presented at Makerere Social Institute of Social Research (MSIR) at Makerere University in Uganda, that is the philosophy

of African history there has been the idea of mobility which underscores the voluntary and gradual but frequent movements and migration that has to do with forced-fast paced movements. This view finds further evidence in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019b[3], p.11) in his piece of paper presented at Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Studies (JIAS), University of Johannesburg, South Africa, where he mapped out that "even though Nguni-speaking people constantly moved around, but they valued their cattle, their grazing, agricultural lands, and their political sovereignty." What stands out from the literature are two epic forms of mobilities and migrations of Nguni-speaking people. The first is their movement which history and archaeology affirms have taken place in the Early Iron Age phase dating from 1000 AD from North-Eastern Africa to South Africa which is part of what was portrayed as the Bantu migration (Hammond-Tooke, 2004; Huffman, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019b; Mellet, 2020). Omer-Cooper (as cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a) posits that the second movement from the South to the North is what is commonly credited to *Mfecane*, which produced Nguni distributions of the nineteenth century.

Curiosity about the causes of the *Mfecane* upheavals and the nature of the African leaders such as Mzilikazi of the amaNdebele, Zwangendaba of the amaNgoni, Soshangane of the amaShangane and Shaka of the amaZulu is a subject of in-depth conversation in the philosophy of African history. In the academic circles of conventional philosophy of history, it is perceived that the upheavals of the 1820s to the 1830s which included wars, conflicts, violence, and migration is informed by the rise of King Shaka, however, it was part of state-formation and nation-building (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019b). And yet, perhaps this is true for John D. Omer-Cooper who was part of the Ibadan School of Social History as they sought to counter the Eurocentric philosophy of history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; 2020a). An even greater source of concern on the topic is credited to John D. Omer-Cooper's intervention of which was to name the *Mfecane* and its consequences as the nineteenth-century revolution in Bantu Africa and underlining that Mzilikazi, Zwangendaba, Soshangane and others as genius leaders who demonstrated capacity for state-making and agents in African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

In the 1980s, Julian Cobbing introduced a radical revisionist philosophy of *Mfecane* through elaborating on deeper issues pertaining to the "Zulu aftermath thesis" (Cobbing, 1988; Ndlovu-

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[3] Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019b), Revisiting Nguni Formations, the Mfecane and Migrations in South-Eastern Africa. Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Studies at University of Johannesburg: Public Lecture 4.

Gatsheni, 2019b). "Cobbing argued that the notion of *Mfecane* (traditionally dubbed Shakan wars of conquest) that caused the depopulation of the interior regions of South Africa was an alibi for white invasion, conquest occupation of land" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a, p.23). For Cobbing, *Mfecane* was not caused by the rise of King Shaka and the Zulu kingdom but by the slave trade from the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay, the Dutch and the English based at the Cape Colony (Cobbing, 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 2019b; 2020a). What Cobbing's thesis points out is that the *Mfecane* was entangled in the rise of mercantilist and proto-industrial capitalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). On the other hand, this raises questions about the periodisation of African history, in terms where we can really draw lines in terms of pre-colonial history and post-colonial history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). What is more rewarding in Cobbing's insight is that the upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s do not fall to the usual pre-colonial African history characterised by trading with other parts of the world without a threat of being invaded or colonised (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019b). In its place, what emerged obviously was that the calamitous events from the 1790s to the events of 1820s to 1830s were part of colonial encounters, which date as far back as the fifteenth century (Cobbing, 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). Key to the periodisation is how the social history of South Africa is relegated to the 1652 paradigm which presents itself as the genesis of history in South Africa (Mellet, 2020). However, the abundance of research exposes the fallacy of this paradigm (Mellet, 2015). At another level, Julian Cobbing at a philosophical level concluded that the idea of *Mfecane* was an alibi for colonialism (Cobbing, 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

2.6 Academia in South Africa

The participants in this study are the designated history academics in South Africa. In view of the foregoing, I will start by explaining what this means for my study. According to Matolino (2015), the debate about the profile of academics has gained fresh prominence more recently in the age of decolonisation. What is not clear yet is whether one becomes an academic by virtue of his or her qualification, level of study affiliation to a university – or lack thereof. Seti (2019) added her voice to the discourse that being an academic in the Western tradition is limited to one who has undergone formal training in a university or college. Nonetheless, there has been little agreement on what it means to be an academic. To problematise the issue, Mbembe (2016, p.3) states that being an academic in Western discourse "is measured through the compilation of extensive files demonstrating preferably in statistical terms, productivity,

such as number of publications, number of conference papers presented and number of advises."

The study conducted by Oruka (1997) and Nabudere (2011) emphasises that in African societies, there were, and still are, independent thinkers who lived and still live by what reason dictated. They, therefore, illustrated a form of African philosophy and can be considered academics. Moreover, Oruka (1990) and Nabudere (2012) indicates the intellectual constitution of such academics is better understood in the following manner:

> These are men and women (sages) many of whom have not had the benefit of modern education. But they are, nevertheless, critical, independent thinkers who guide their thought by the power of reason (Oruka, 1990, p.11)

While taking into account the above, it becomes clear that to the reviewed literature, being an academic through African philosophy goes beyond qualifications. However, in Western philosophy to be an academic is not just about "one's wisdom, but it is a matter of going through a university course, reading on certain academics, and showing the ability to engage with those thoughts" (Matolino, 2015, p.405).

Nevertheless, if one were to consider university education as a criterion, it can still be questioned which level of education should be considered. In other words, would undergraduates be considered as academics? An example would be Stephen Bantu Biko who was a student at the University of Natal's Medical School in 1966, but never completed his course, yet became known for his philosophical publications of Black Consciousness philosophy compiled in a book titled "*I write what I like*" (Biko, 2017). On the basis of his writings, he has become one of the most cited people in South African academia, thus proving his worth as an academic. This can be linked to Achebe's (2009, p. 166) and Maposa's (2018) understanding of Ubuntu-based educational. Loosely translated to the notion of "I am because we are," or" one's humanity is contingent on the humanity of other fellows" Ubuntu entails that the class is one community and the teacher, as an elder, has a responsibility to share wisdom. Nonetheless, the community shares knowledge in a round table sense and both learners and academics thus contribute to the knowledge economy. Therefore, although Biko was a student, he contributed significantly to the knowledge economy just as academics do.

It can be seen from the above discussion that being an academic in African societies can be considered to be broader than the bureaucratic standards of the universities (Matolino, 2015; Mbembe, 2016). Nevertheless, since my study focuses on academics in South African institutions, it is important to give a general profile of an academic for my research. The available scholarship by Mignolo (2003) and Ndlovu (2014) critically argues that the identity of academics in South Africa should not be limited to nationality and geography but be extended to them being from the global south. Mahler (2017) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018a) consider the term "Global South" as a successor term to the "Third World", designating those areas which were victims of slavery, imperialism, apartheid, and colonialism. Over and above that, the concept is about power and positionality within asymmetrical global power relations, i.e., those from the Global South have less power. To capture the precise delineations of this line of thinking, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi (2016) conclude that some Africans are generally located in the zone of non-beings of the colonial difference, however, they think epistemically like the ones in the zone of beings. Such consequences are an invention what Bhambra (2007, p.10) termed as the "historicity of human condition, whereby we are born into pre-existing conversations regarding our pasts and presents, necessarily shapes the position where we think and argue."

Further still, Wa Thiong'o (2005, p.88) is probably the best critic of this epistemicides, as he insists throughout his work that "how we view ourselves, our environment even, is very much dependent on where we stand in relation to imperialism in its neo-colonial stage." From this perspective, the literature argues that academics in South Africa are those academics who are teaching in South African institutions of higher learning irrespective of their nationalities, but whose thinking is theoretically, socially and geopolitically is entrenched in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2020c).[4] "This entails taking the African archive as a starting point in their research, teaching and learning" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c, p.i). More precisely, Wa Thiongo's (2005) often refers to academics in South Africa as that which designate the length of seeing, analysing and interpreting the world for ourselves and those who place Africa at the centre of their scholarship. Wa Thiong'o (2005, p.94) is in a deep conviction that academics in South Africa are individuals who, in their teaching and learning, truthfully cognise that "education is a means of knowledge about ourselves, after we have examined ourselves, we radiate out-wards and discover peoples and worlds around us." This means that

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[4] This was taken from the public lecture delivered by Professor Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018a) on the following topic: How Historians Address the Legacy of Colonialism?

having Africa at the centre results in seeing things from an African perspective (Mbembe, 2015; 2016). Further to this, in the literary genre, history academics in South Africa are best designated as those who cognise that education is a mirror unto a people's social well-being, and it is also the means by which that being is replicated and passed unto the next generation (Wa Thiong'o, 1997; 2005).

The academic landscape of Africa and South Africa particularly has been multifaceted and dynamic politically, theoretically, and socially (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005). Hendricks and Lushaba (2005) in their introduction to a book titled "*From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa*", provide a comprehensive description of the "academic landscape of Africa and South Africa. From the 1950s, the scholarship on Africa focused on analysing the birth of nationalist thought and the rise of African nationalist movements" (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005, p.2). "With the attainment of independence in the 1960s appeared a post-colonial philosophy of African history positioned within the continent but with significant external liberal support" (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002, p.17). In the South African context, this played itself out in movements like the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). According to Maposa (2014), one of the objectives of BCM was for black South Africans to identify their being and values. Another defining feature of that time was the fact that historians were involved in contesting the hegemony of the colonial philosophy of African history. The philosophy of African history of that time-shifted its focus to the intensification of national liberation movements (Ogot, 1992). The Ibadan Nationalist School of Social History emerged at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, led by historians such as Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, B.A. Ogot, A. A. Boahen, D.T. Niane, T. Obenga, J. Vansina and A.A. Mazrui and many others who contributed to the United Nations Education and Scientific Council's (UNESCO) *General History of Africa* (Nabudere, 2012). Through introducing oral tradition to their writing of African history, this school aimed at giving agency to Africans who had been denied a history through the provision of alternative history to challenge the Western philosophy of African history (Ogot, 2009).

In addition, the School of Ibadan marked the first African scholarly effort to counter systemically the epistemic violence of the colonial philosophy of African history and the Western discourse of colonial difference (Lushaba, 2015). Nonetheless, one of the major pitfalls of the Ibadan Nationalist School is that while they were exceptional in writing the long

history of Africa predating colonialism but failed to raise metaphysical questions about the idea and philosophy of African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c).

Since the 1970s to the 1980s, the gaps in this nationalist delusion have been noticeable (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; 2013c; 2018b). In the light of the perception of the betrayal of independence, some scholars began to cross-examine the picture of nationalist struggles (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005). By this time, Ogot (1992) argues that the decade of economic development had failed because most of these programs were based on neoliberal economics. According to Hendricks and Lushaba (2005) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a), this revisionist method promoted by scholars like Walter Rodney, and Samir Amin, became known as Radical Political Economy (RPE). The Dar es Salaam School of History was, in fact, an attempt by African historians in Tanzania to write history that had meaning to the people concerned with African history (Nabudere, 2012). At the core of Dar es Salaam University's interest was the recovery of the African initiative (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). The Dar es Salaam School of History, while nationalist in nature, also gradually became the base of Marxist thought and political economy attempts (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Hendricks and Lushaba (2005, p.3) further point out that RPE was an important theoretical contribution to the debates of development in African states. However, it suffered from some of the same ills that plagued modernisation theory, namely, creating a false dichotomy "between modern and traditional," and centrality to the significance of the state of the development process. At this time, the Marxist philosophy of African history rose with the triumph of national liberation movements (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005).

In the last three to four decades from the 1980s to 1990s, the world observed the downfall of the Soviet Union and the rise of neo-liberalism (Zeleza, 2003; Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005). A key problem at that time was resembled by the failure to create an African university instead of the university in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). The idea to create African universities ceased as Washington Consensus, neo-liberalism and global finance invaded Africa, pushing forward plans of Europe and North America underpinned by the need for the rule of global markets forces (Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). The university in Africa was therefore compelled to transform into a commercial university in the 1980s and 1990 due to neo-liberalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c; 2020d). Corporate university in Africa is the extent to which education is reinforced by the sense of the coloniality of market places with its motives benefitting business models (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). The new discourse on the development

began to focus on free markets and democracy (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005). Amongst other things of that time, the liberal philosophy of African history had portrayed race relations in South Africa as irrational and contended that economic development was key to transformation and reconciliation (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005). In plain language, the liberal scholarship of this period concerned itself with not only with issues of democracy, human rights, reconciliation, and linearity of history but concerned itself with scholarship needed in the marketplace (Zeleza and Olukoshi, 2004; Mbembe, 2017).

Despite the apparent triumph of neo-liberalism, the years 2015 and 2016 saw renewed calls for decolonisation in South Africa. This was driven by philosophical and political questions raised by students across the length and breadth of South Africa through the narratives #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall that emanated from at University of Cape Town and went across to most of the South African universities from 2015 to 2016 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a; Mngxitama, 2018). This movement which was spearheaded by university students tabled not only issues of free education but the need for African universities in the quest for epistemic freedoms (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020d). In the pages that follow, mention will be made concerning decolonisation discourse in the quest for epistemic freedom in Africa.

2.7 The role of academics in African philosophy

As was discussed above, the literature has acknowledged that from an African worldview academics are not limited to studying certain scholars – although these are important. Nonetheless, to be an academic is to be treasured for the ability to reason and wisdom. This meant that academics contribute to philosophy. Nkrumah (as cited in Wiredu, 2008, p.149) claimed: "that philosophy does not occur in a void but arises from a social milieu." Therefore, philosophy is contextual. This means that African scholarship refers to all academic activities chiefly by African scholars, and for the benefit of the African continent (Mapaya, 2016). It is within this context that this section looks at the role of academics in philosophy and African history.

Prior to the 1960s, universities in South Africa were segregated along racial lines. There were institutions for Afrikaners (Potchefstroom, Orange Free State, and Stellenbosch) and for English-speaking people (Rhodes, Witwatersrand, University of Cape Town) and for Black people, which were further divided according to tribes. There was the University of Zululand for Zulu people, the University of Fort Hare for Xhosa people, and the University of North for

Tsonga, Venda, and Tswana people (More, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Nevertheless, all these institutions privileged the same Western thought or philosophy, showing that they were built to create African managers of the colonial system (More, 2005; Mngxitama, 2018). This scenario was not limited to South Africa, but applied across African universities, whose curricula was informed by Euro-American philosophy (Matolino, 2015). This is why Appiah (1993) argues that the result has been a production of philosophers in Africa instead of African philosophers. Such African academics epistemologically think from Europe while geographically located in Africa (Mngxitama, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). As a result, Wa Thiong'o (2005) asks:

> What directions should an education take in an Africa wishing to break with neo-colonialism? What should be the philosophy guiding it? How does it want the "New Africans" to view themselves and their universe? From what base: Afrocentric or Eurocentric? What then are the materials they should be exposed to: and in what order and perspective? Who should be interpreting that material to them: an African or non-African? If African, what kind of African? One who has internalised the colonial world outlook or one attempting to break free from the inherited consciousness? (Wa Thiong'o 2005, p. 101-102).

What arises out plainly from these questions is the material that students are exposed to and the consciousness of the academics in the delivery of the material (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Several African scholars have sought to theorise the role of academics in philosophy. Mkandawire (1995) suggests that since independence, there have been at least three generations of African intellectuals. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c) reminds us that Mkandawire (1995) pursued to examine and rationalise the theoretical outlook of African academics and the inherent logic behind their prominence on distinct topics concerning Africa. The first generation was largely produced abroad through programmes such as the African students' programmes in American Universities and other Cold War-persuaded airlifts of African students to Europe and America. The academics included Mahmood Mamdani, Thandika Mkandawire, Dani Wadada Nabudere, Samir Amin, Bade Ominonde, Sam Moyo, and Bernard Magubane (Mkandawire, 1995; Lushaba, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a; 2018b; 2018c).

"This first generation was self-consciously anti-neo-colonial and considered decolonisation of national institutions, and some intellectual terrain" (Mkandawire, 1995, p.75). They were the first to occupy academic positions in the universities after political independence (Ndlovu-

Gatsheni, 2018b, p.14). This generation took its scholarship as a societal task to produce native scholars in their respective countries (Lushaba, 2017[5]). This revisionist group which was popularised and was largely influenced by the Radical Political Economy especially through (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c; 2020c). They posited that colonialism was influenced by economic motives and therefore Marxism was relevant in providing more theoretical answers to Africa's problems (Lushaba, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). What was distinctive about these intellectuals was not only their full commitment to Marxist and political-economic thought, but they were at the same time critical of the neo-colonial state Africa was taking (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.14). According to Mkandawire (as cited in, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.183), "this generation was responsible for setting Pan-African research networks and institutions like the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)."

Mkandawire (1995) posits that the second generation of African scholars was also largely trained from abroad usually after undergraduate studies at their national universities. Unlike the "earlier generation, however, many of this generation stayed abroad while those that returned did not stay long" (Mkandawire, 1995, p.78). "Reasons for dissatisfaction were many. First, in several countries especially those in West Africa, by the time this second generation was ready to return home, the indigenisation programmes had been virtually completed. This meant that promotion would be more competitive than for the first generation" (Mkandawire, 1995, p.78). Also, with "this new African professoriate being relatively young, upward mobility would be slow" (Mkandawire, 1995, p.77). There was also an economic crisis that resulted in high inflation rates and devaluation of currencies, which led to reduced local salaries (Mkandawire, 1995). Therefore, the second generation contributed little to the promotion of African scholarship.

According to Mkandawire (1995) and Mapaya (2016), the third group of African academics were more and more produced in the vicinity. They surfaced as an immediate consequence of the disappointments of the first generation. They "were produced by African universities as well as non-African institutions and have imbided neo-liberal, post-colonial and post-modernist thought" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b, p.14). Mkandawire (1995) and Mapaya (2016)

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[5] This was taken from a series of lectures on Decolonial thought delivered by Prof. Lwazi Siyabonga Lushaba at University of Cape Town during the student's demands for a decolonised university.

argue that this third generation began to take the fate of their universities seriously politically and philosophically. Most of them became critical of African nationalism, particularly its hostility towards democracy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). They also argued that decolonisation discourses were never complete. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a, p.337) is an example of this third generation, and he argues that the struggles of decolonisation as led by the first generation "proceeded as claims for the inclusion of Africans in the post-1945 normative order." These scholars also called for total decolonisation of society and ultimately of knowledge production. Simply stated, the generations are about generational intellectual tasks and issues preoccupying them at a time.

Additional to the above generations, Mapaya returns to Mkandawire's seminal article and produced the fourth and fifth generations of African scholars. What signifies the profile of the fourth and fifth generation of African scholars are the subsequent pertinent questions (Mapaya, 2016).

> First, in which category would you place yourself as an African academic? Second, where did you pursue your degree? Third, what was the political environment at the time? Fourth, can you summarise your rise to your current position both as a scholar, professor, and administrator? Fifth, how different are you from your supervisor, and what drives your academic work? Is your scholarship for yourself or the benefit of Africa?

Mapaya (2016) posits that the fourth generation of African scholars emerged out of the post-1994 era, transformation necessities required institutions of higher learning into a long process of change. For him, this meant merging in most cases, institutions of different historical and ideological backgrounds applied into the South African context. The fourth generation of African scholars received their qualifications in South Africa and have been subjected to adversities, together with having to conform to their white supervisors' repressive attitude (Mapaya, 2016). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) goes on to say these include the class of 1976, which, in the main, adopted the Black Consciousness Movement philosophy, today embodied by, among others, Stephen Bantu Biko, Barney Pityana, Njabulo Ndebele. These are the academics who today are grappling with the philosophical questions concerning the significance of Black Consciousness philosophy in the age of decolonisation discourse. What stands out about this generation was that they became the first black chancellors in the reconfigured South African academic landscape (Mapaya, 2016: Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi,

2016). The limitation of this generation was that they were few, which enabled white academics to continue dominating African scholarship be it is supervision, teaching, writing, and publishing (Mapaya, 2016).

What is obvious about the fifth generation of African scholars is that they are grappling with post-colonial theories (Mapaya, 2016). To unravel this, we turn to Achille Mbembe's book titled, *On the Postcolony,"* which is an attempt to theorise the present African situation which according to him is entangled in slavery, colonial and post-colonial predicaments at one time (Mbembe, 2001). Postcolony evokes the interpretation of "epochs – that is, pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Africa in one historical juncture, and it should not be confused as the aftermath of colonialism but understood as a period of entanglement" (Sthole, 2014, p.viii). What is reflective about the fifth generation of African academics is the increasing number of African academics from other parts of Africa who prefer to work at South African universities compared to elsewhere (Mapaya, 2016). Among others, this generation encompasses scholars such as Achille Mbembe and Kwesi Kwah Prah. Apart from post-colonial theory, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018c) mentions the special situation in decolonial research where the key concern is with epistemic freedoms in Africa. Epistemic freedom as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) turns a new leaf of concepts refers to cognitive justice and it draws attention to the content of what it is we are free to express and on whose terms. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018c) offers some insight that epistemic freedom is different from academic freedoms. His research has gone some way towards broadening our appreciation that academic freedom has to do with that which speaks to the institutional independence of universities and the right to express diverse views including those of universities and political leaders (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). On another level, epistemic freedom in Africa is about the struggle for African people to see, think and write from where they are located, unencumbered by coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c, p.18).

The categorisation of these generations is not fixed (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). In fact, there are shared experiences and generational interests that cut across all these groups. As noted by Thuynsma (1998):

> Africanists have never been able to afford scholarship for its luxury. In whatever field, we have worked with an unwritten command to tell our people about our people. We have had to work our way out under some historical boulders rolled over by foreign interests (1998, p. 45).

At the core of African scholarship has always been the quest for six core demands but not only limited to this: complete African self-rule, self-regulation, self-understanding, self-definition, self-knowing and self-articulation of African scholarship (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

The struggles for epistemic freedom in Africa have grown in importance in the light of decolonisation discourse and have to be understood through a five-way-forward process (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). At the outset, is a demand to "return to the base" (Wa Thiong'o, 2016). That is to say, Africa has to be at the centre of this epistemic repositioning of the world which deepens and pursues taking African scholarship as a point of departure of seeing for ourselves, thinking from where we are and as a means of writing the world from an African metropolis (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004; Wa Thiong'o, 2009b; 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c; 2020c). Subsequent to the above is a quest for shifting the geo-and bio-of knowledge / moving the centre (Wa Thiong'o, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). This emerges from a context whereby what masquerades as the global knowledge economy radiates and circulates from one centre – and that centre is Europe and North America (Hountondji, 1997; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c; 2020c). From this viewpoint, the endeavour is to remedy the marginality of bits of knowledge from Africa within the so-called global knowledge economy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c; 2020c). The third struggle hints at decolonising the normative foundation of critical theory. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018c) joins thinkers such as Edward E. Said in questioning the normative idea of critical theory. Arguably, they observed that the age of critical theory resembles de-humanisation, enslavement, colonialism, and oppression while masquerading as means to progress, modernity, development, and emancipation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; 2018b; 2018c). Fourth, alludes to rethinking thinking, which designates a direct critique of the very idea of history and philosophy of history in which Europe is seen as the centre (Falola, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c). Fifth, learning to unlearn to relearn. Here too, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018c, p.41) denotes predicaments of "desocialisation and re-socialisation in the domain of knowledge as well as teaching and learning." This stems out from miseducation and negative perceptions of ourselves and our continent (Wa Thiong'o, 2005; Mngxitama, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c). Therefore, learning to unlearn in order to re-learn symbolise what Tlostanova and Mignolo (as reported in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c, p.42) designated as "forgetting what we have been taught, to break free from thinking programmes imposed on us by education, culture, and social environment."

2.8 Decolonisation in Africa

According to Mbembe (2016, p.36), "today, the decolonisation project is back on the agenda worldwide." In fact, the struggles for decolonisation have a long lineage in African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020d). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a), South African students who headed the #RhodesMustFall (RMF) and #FessMustFall (FMF) movement ought to be recognised largely as heirs to the long-standing strides for an African university and the wider decolonisation of Africa. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015b, p.485) contends that decolonisation "is not only an enduring political and epistemological movement intended for the liberation of the (ex) colonised peoples from global coloniality but also as a way of thinking, knowing, and doing." Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013c) further asserts that at an ideological level, decolonisation of higher education refers to the attempt to abandon the Eurocentric colonial paradigm that continues to lessen African people into objects rather than as subjects of knowledge. Other observations indicate that decolonisation at a sociological level, has to do with Africans taking the initiative of academic life to produce knowledge that is reflective and relevant to Africa (Mbembe, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c). This being so, decolonisation entails inseparably entangled ethical, methodological, epistemological, and political questions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c).

Noting the long history of decolonisation in Africa, Wiredu (2008), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013c; 2017a) and Njoku (2017) point out that early African educated elites like Edward Blyden, James Africanus Beale Horton of Sierra Leone, and J.E Casely Hayford of Ghana, agitated for the establishment of universities in Africa from as early as 1868. These African educated elites fought for a very particular "African University" (rooted in African cultural and intellectual sail and climated the reluctant colonial regimes imposed the "university in Africa" relocated from Europe). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013c; 2018b; 2020c), Blyden argued for an African university that was free from the grip of the oppressive "Europeanising" influences that had enclosed and devastated the African mind (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020d). His concern was mainly on the imposition of Western education in Africa, which he saw as destruction to the black race's genius and talents. In the same vein, Hayford, a pioneer of African nationalism, was very critical of a university that was a mere replica of European institutions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c; 2017a).

The early movement for decolonisation largely failed to achieve its generational call. According to Wa Thiong'o (2005), Wiredu (2008) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a;2020c), early educational institutions established in Africa, such as Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone

(1867) emerged as colleges of overseas universities, which would later turn into university colleges such as Ibadan in Nigeria, Legon in Ghana, Khartoum in Sudan, and Makerere in Uganda. The university colleges in the University College of Rhodesia/the University of Zimbabwe, the University of Nairobi and the University of Dar es Salaam emerged later, but as part of the Asquith Colleges imperial tradition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). It is no wonder, therefore, that universities in Africa today are considered a colonial construct, despite the evidence of the existence of universities well before European colonisation (Mngxitama, 2018). The founding of university colleges by colonial administrations in colonised African lands resulted in what we refer to today as universities in Africa (Ndofirepi & Cross, 2017). The basic assumption of the "Asquith Doctrine," as noted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a, p. 46) "was that university system appropriate for Europeans brought up in London and Manchester was also appropriate for Africans brought up in Lagos, Kampala, and Dar-es-Salaam."

Calls to decolonise education peaked again with the African post-colonial experiences in the 1960s and 1970s (Mbembe, 2015; 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). Now decolonisation was spoken of in the same breath as Africanisation (Mbembe, 2015). The Africanisation project of the 1960s was about inclusion in the European game (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c; 2020d). This is why Lushaba (2013, p.5) argues that "decolonisation was often defined by the twin-task of reforming the indirect rule state as well as re-writing colonial history which underpinned colonial enterprise". For instance, Kwame Nkrumah was convinced that political decolonisation was key to all other perfections in African conditions which is why he boldly declared that "seek ye political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you" (Mazrui & Wondji, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). And in 1957, when Ghana became independent that Kwame Nkrumah promised a university that was going to emulate African forms of knowing and traditions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c).

Decolonisation in the 1970s entailed more than political independence; it was rather an invitation to nation-building even though there were inadequate resources in terms of institutions and personnel (Osha, 2011a). As noted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi (2016) Africanisation ended up meaning cosmetic changes of names of the university from colonial names to vernacular names and substituting white scholars with black scholars. This did not necessarily mean that the syllabus stopped being colonial (Mngxitama, 2018).

Fanon (as mentioned in Mbembe, 2015; 2016) also deeply criticised the nationalists on their route to Africanise. In principle, Fanon never believed that nation-building could materialise

under the nationalist middle class, for he thought they are parasitic and lacking in spiritual depth because they had assimilated the colonialist thought in a most corrupt way (Mbembe, 2015). To put it more bluntly, instead of challenging the asymmetrical power relations of a colonial state, they have, assimilated into the colonial state built in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c). Fanon (2007) fundamentally argues that decolonisation, which sets out to change the order of the world, is clearly an agenda for a total disorder. He goes to an extent to say: "decolonisation is the encounter between two congenitally antagonistic forces, which in fact owe their singularity to the kind of reification secreted and natured by the colonial situation" (Fanon, 2007, p.64).

To decolonise is not to replace "white with black" nor does it call for replacing Western knowledge with African modes of knowing, rather, it is a project which at the extreme, refers to destroying everything if new species of men is to emerge or a project of self-creation (Fanon, 2007; Mbembe, 2015; 2017). Frantz Fanon celebrated the process of bloody birth, and he was convinced that decolonisation can only triumph if we use all means to turn the scale, including, of course, that of violence (Mngxitama, 2018, p.16). Simply put, Fanon's injunction of violence is philosophically justified in the sense that the colonised is in a desperate position where he/she is against the wall, and when the world denies him/her dialogue violence becomes not only the end in itself but a means towards the end (Fanon, 2008). Radical destruction is the metaphysical side of decolonisation, and war is mediation through which this is brought to be (Fanon, 2007; Mbembe, 2017). At another level, Mudimbe (1994) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) are both convinced that decolonisation is about a recognition that every human being is born not only to a valid and legitimate knowledge system, but Africans are legitimate knowers and producers of knowledge. Essentially, Nabudere (2011) accentuated that all sources of knowledge were valid within their historical, cultural, and social context. From this perspective, Africans had their own indigenous and legitimate education system in pre-colonial society (Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a). The result of decolonisation is, according to Fanon (2007), the creation of new men from being a colonised "thing." That is why the debate, in South Africa, should have never been about whether or not Cecil Rhodes's statue should be brought down during the #Rhodes Must Fall movement. All along, the debate should have been about why did it take so long to do so (Mbembe, 2015, p.3).

Mbembe (2016) further posits that decolonising is not about closing the door to European or other traditions. It is about clearly defining what the centre is, and for Wa Thiong'o (2005)

Africa has to be placed at the centre. It is about rejecting the notion that the Euro-America is the mainstream for Africa's consciousness. In the words of Mbembe (2016), this process involves contesting the idea that Africa was and is merely an extension of Euro-America. In fact, Wa Thiong'o (2005) is convinced that decolonisation is not an endpoint. It is, however, the beginning of a new struggle over what is to be taught (Mbembe, 2015). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020c) adds that the decolonisation of the 21st century is unlike the struggles of Africanisation but has to do with questioning the normative rules of the game through rethinking and unthinking thinking.

Among the demands of the #RhodesMustFall Movement was the call for access to higher education. For Mbembe (2015) access does not simply refer to demographic terms, although these are crucial. Access also refers to the possibility to inhabit a space to the extent of seeing it as home. Mbembe (2016) also refers to the decolonisation of buildings, which he says influences intellectual life. Mbembe (2015) further espouses the need to decolonise the structures of access and management as far as they have twisted higher education into a saleable product, appraised, bought, and sold by standard units, measured, counted, and reduced to staple equitable by detached tests. For Mbembe, this discourages students and teachers from a free pursuit of knowledge. It is swapping this goal of unrestricted search of knowledge for another, the quest for credits. Mbembe (2016, p.3) is also concerned with the bureaucratisation of the university. The means of "assessment of faculty include the gathering of wide files demonstrating, rather in numerical terms, his or efficiency – including the number of publications, number of conference papers presented, number of courses taught and number of pieces of advisees."

Mbembe (2015) also lures the reader's attention to the commodification of education. For Mbembe, to decolonise suggests the chain that tends to turn students into clients and consumers. This point becomes even more poignant in Paul Tiyambe Zeleza's "six Cs" which seeks to map out the features of a corporate and commodified university (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). First is the corporatisation of management through adopting business models for organising and administering the university (Zeleza, 2004). Second is collectivising through massification of higher education, continuous learning, and accountability to outside stakeholders (Zeleza, 2003; 2004). The third is the commercialisation of learning through the expansion of private universities, private programmes in public universities and vocational training (Zeleza, 2004). Fourth is the commodification of knowledge through increased

production, sponsorship, and dissemination of research by commercial enterprises, applied research and intellectual property norms (Zeleza, 2003; 2004). The fifth is the computerisation of education through incorporating new information into the knowledge activities of teaching, research, and publication (Mazrui, 1986; Zeleza, 2004). Sixth is the connectivity of institutions of higher learning through institutional corporation and coordination within and across the countries (Zeleza, 2004). Actually, students have become less involved in the search for knowledge and more and more in the material remuneration, which their scholarships and degree have on the open market (Mbembe, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Ndofirepi & Cross (2017) posed the question of whether a university education is a public good or a tradeable commodity. Mbembe (2016) is also cautious with a Westernised university that attributes truth to Western ways and denies other epistemic traditions.

At the centre of South African students' calls, was the decolonisation of the curriculum. On this understanding, Mbembe (2016) notes, too, that what is wrong with universities today in South Africa, in particular, is that they are westernised, in the sense that they are a local instantiation of foremost academic modes based on a Eurocentric epistemic canon. A Eurocentric canon is a canon that locates truth only to the Western way of knowledge manufacture (Mbembe, 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). To capture Mbembe's view coherently, Ndofirepi & Cross (2017) suggest that universities in Africa have often been accused of being resemblances of Western epistemologies pushing a burdening Eurocentric education, characterised by motives to eliminate indigenous presence ways of knowing in higher education. This opinion bargains further support from Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi (2016) where it is suggested that these institutions are westernised in a sense that while located in Africa, they do not produce or inculcate curriculum, space and traditions that value Africa as an intellectual space worthy of attention. Lastly, a critique of the #Rhodes Must Fall and #Fees Must Fall movements relates to their being university-centred (Mngxitama, 2018). It could rather be coupled with other decolonial quests such as the "back to land campaign" Mngxitama (2018). He reminds us of those past generations such as the South African Students Organisation (SASO) led by Steve Bantu Biko understood the key problem to be colonialism, hence they saw themselves as a liberation movement, not a student's movement, and the university was used as an appendix for a much larger problem (Mngxitama, 2018). To simplify the point, the decolonised university is impossible unless it triggers debates on political, economic, and epistemic decolonisation (Mngxitama, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

Evidently, extensive research has been carried out on decolonisation with an attempt to decolonise Africa politically, economically, and epistemically. Nonetheless, few writers have been able to draw on any empirical research concerning a decolonised philosophy of African history. This calls to attention that far too little attention in the reviewed literature has been paid to a decolonising the philosophy of African history. This informed the need for the undertaking of this study.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with what has been done and not done (gaps) that necessitated this study to be done. I commenced with a critical review concerning the debates on the nature of history, the modernist theory, and African history pointing out that African history differs from other histories conceptually, historically, philosophically, and culturally. I went further to examine the philosophy of African history showing how space has been contested for over a decade now. I went further to explore the profile of academia in South Africa and highlighted how contentious the concept is. Also, since the study presupposes that academics have a role in philosophy, the research made a great effort to chronologically illuminate the role of academics in philosophy. Mention was made of how decolonisation discourses are relevant in Africa and the South African context.

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

In this section, I describe and explain the theoretical framework that was used for this study. Along such a path, the first section under discussion begins with a theoretical framework for the philosophy of African history. The second sections examine African philosophy as a perceived decolonised philosophy of African history. The third section delves deeper into decolonial theory as a perceived philosophy of African history.

3.2 Theoretical framework for the Philosophy of African History

Debate continues on whether or not theoretical and conceptual frameworks invokes one and the same meaning (Imenda, 2014). Green's (2014) research has consistently cautioned that while theoretical and conceptual frameworks are often used interchangeably, this has led to a misunderstanding about the difference between the two. In essence, this misperception is elevated by the fact that as with theoretical framework, the meaning of conceptual framework depends on what one means by theory (Ravitch & Riggan, 2017, p.26). In other words, one's conceptual meaning of a particular concept depends on where one stands concerning it conceptually and theoretically. For instance, modernity as a concept in Europe is associated with civilisation, and whereas for Africa, the concept denotes coloniality and exclusion (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c). Nonetheless, literature shows that while there might be identical usage of the theoretical and conceptual framework, there is a thin line that separates the two constructs in terms of "definition and as actualised during the research process" (Imenda, 2014, p.186).

On one hand, a conceptual framework is a sequence of concepts and coherent ideas which are meant for a thoroughgoing understanding of a particular phenomenon (Ravitch & Riggan, 2017). Broadly speaking, the conceptual framework may be described as an end result of bringing together several related concepts to explain a given event (Imenda, 2014, p. 189). A more agreed-upon the convention of a conceptual framework is that that is sought to describe something in less detail by attending to what and how questions (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014). On the other hand, "a theoretical framework refers to the theory that a researcher chooses to guide him or her in his or her research" (Imenda, 2014, p.186). In other words, a theoretical framework is the use of a theory, or a compilation of concepts drawn from the same

with an attempt to explain an event or shed some light on a particular research problem (Imenda, 2014). While the theoretical framework is deductive in its approach as it draws on from literature and theories to make sense of the particular event, a conceptual framework is inductive since it synthesises relevant concepts from various sources to make sense of a particular study under focus (Imenda, 2014). In another light, Larsen and Adu (2021) define theory to be a thorough and systematic lens with which to examine situations, events and experiences.

In view of this, this study worked within a theoretical framework whose description entails a well-developed, coherent explanation for an event that delves into why questions (Anfara and Mertz, 2014; Bertram & Christiansen, 2014). This being the case, I employed an amalgamation of African philosophy and decolonial theory as the theoretical framework for this study. African philosophy is based upon an understanding of ethno-philosophy, professional philosophy, philosophic sagacity, and nationalist-ideological philosophy. The tenets of Decolonial theory that I employed include Garveyism, Negritude, Afrikology, Afrocentricity, Black Consciousness, and Nationalist historiography (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). This study acknowledges the multiplicity of theories that might be utilised to comprehend the theorisation of the philosophy of African history by the designated history academics in South Africa. African philosophy and decolonial theoretical framework were considered for two reasons. First, the attempt was to guide the conceptualisation of the study problem, development of the research purpose and questions, selection of the research approach, data collection methods, and analysis (Larsen and Adu, 2021). Second, African philosophy and decolonial theory as a theoretical framework was deployed for orientation and analytical purposes since it generated facts and specified facts to be observed (Blanche et al., 2006). Simply put, African philosophy and decolonial theoretical framework were a means to carry out research inquiry from an African-centred perspective (Larsen and Adu, 2021).

3.2.1. African Philosophy as a conceivable decolonised theory for a philosophy of African History

This section is influenced by the thoughts of two eminent African scholars, Dani Wadada Nabudere and Sanya Osha. For these two intellectuals, debates about philosophy in Africa go beyond the exhausted debate of whether or not it exists (Osha, 2005). The denial that Africans could ever have developed a philosophy has accepted the view of those who asserted that

Africans had no history, for a people without history could not possibly produce philosophy (Nabudere, 2012). For Nabudere, African philosophy is more ancient than Greek philosophy. Asante (2019, p.45) concurs that in the ancient Kemetic "philosophy it was necessary to explain the physical universe in accordance with the spiritual ideas of the people." Kemetic philosophers, he writes, were many but it is necessary to mention several of the most important ones who predates Greek philosophers (Asante. 2019). *"Imhotep* was the first philosopher to deal with the questions of volume, time, the nature of the illness, physical and mental disease, and immortality. He is thus considered the first philosopher in human history. He lived around 2700 BCE" (Asante, 2019, p.45). *Ptahhotep* wrote around 2414 BCE and was known as the philosopher who wrote the first book on what it means to grow old. His treatise on aging was a deep reflection on the meaning of youth and age (Asante, 2019, p.45). *Merikare* wrote around 1990 BCE, on the value of speaking well and using common sense in human relationships (Asante, 2019, p.45). *Sehotipibre* wrote around 1991 BCE. His concern was with allegiance to the king. He might be called a national philosopher because he argued that loyalty to the king was the most important function of the citizen (Asante, 2019, p.45). *Amenemha*t wrote around 1991 BCE and was called the first Cynical philosopher because he warned his readers of those who called themselves friends (Asante, 2019, p.45). *Amenhotep, son of Hapu,* was a priest, vizier, and philosopher during the Eighteenth Dynasty and was active around 1400 BCE. His wisdom was extraordinary, and he was thought to have mastered all of the knowledge of the ancients (Asante, 2019, p.45). *Duauf* was the philosopher who wrote about the love of books. He was an educational philosopher, one who cherished the idea of learning, and wrote around 1340 BCE that the young must learn to appreciate books (Asante, 2019, p.45). All "these Kemetic philosophers lived hundreds of years before the first Greek philosophers. Indeed, the first Greek philosopher was Thales of Miletus, who studied in Kemet and lived around 600 BCE" (Asante, 2019, p.46).

Further to this, Nabudere (2011; 2012) demonstrates Egyptian influence on Greek philosophy by referring to Plato's thirteen years and Eudoxus's five years stay in Egypt at the place that was the seat of one of the Egyptian schools of philosophy, namely, Heliopolis, where Heliopolitan cosmology was born. Diop (1993) argues that based on available documents on African history, the ancient Greek scientists and philosophers learned much of science and philosophy from Egypt. Nabudere (2012) maintains that when modern Eurocentric discourse poses the question of whether Africa had developed a philosophy, they do so from a point of view of short memory and ignoring authentic history to dislike their contemporary identity.

Despite the complexity of the debate about the nature and existence of African Philosophy, one fact remains undeniable: colonialism removed the continent from history, philosophy, science, and spirituality (Lushaba, 2009). This raises a series of colossal but intellectual questions as to how much of African philosophy is there in Western philosophy?

Philosophy is "abstract because it is essentially about reflection on the human condition" (Matolino, 2015, p.407). Nonetheless, philosophy should not be understood as an abstraction for abstraction's sake. Rather, if there is any "abstraction that goes to philosophy, it is not because philosophy is in the service of that abstraction, but it is because that abstraction is in the service of philosophy – and philosophy is ultimately in the service of humanity" (Matolino, 2015, p.407). Therefore philosophy:

> Seeks to understand what is not only makes humans to be the way they are, either in terms of the constitution, but also what they value, what circumstances favour their existence, what qualitative experience of life could be, what they think about the afterlife, what possibilities of that afterlife is, this environment of their physical existence and how is it relates to another environment of spirits or the unseen world (Matolino, 2015, p.15).

Although the above quotation refers to all humanity, human conditions are different, and so priority has to be given to the localised being (Matolino, 2015). Hence, there is a body of thought known as African philosophy or philosophy in Africa. In the same vein, Matolino (2015, p. 408) maintains that human life is diverse from place to place, and "when this difference is acknowledged it will be clear that some of the most pressing philosophical concerns in one society are not necessarily consistent with those of another society." So, while thought in Europe concerns itself with issues of human mobility, a pressing question in Africa has to do with neo-colonialism which breeds wars, racism, coups, corruption, landlessness and Afrophobia. That does not mean surroundings offer cause for philosophical reflection, but philosophy is an inborn insight that emerges out of an immediate conversation with nature and the world we live in.

Kenyan philosopher John S. Mbiti states that African philosophy refers to the "understanding, attitudes of mind, logic, and perception behind the manner in which African people think, act, and speak in different situations" (Mbiti, 1990, p.2). It is in this setting, therefore, that Masolo (1994, p.1) maintains that "African philosophy in its current form is about resistance to the

western philosophical discourse that denies Africa its contribution to the world knowledge and contributions." Simply put, African philosophy is that which concerns itself with how African people make sense of their being and that of the world they live in (Mbiti, 1990; Matolino, 2015).

African philosophy or Philosophy in Africa since the 1970s has been "dominated by the discussion of one compound question, namely, is there an African philosophy, and if there is, what is it?" (Bodunrin, 2013, p.161). Nonetheless, the recent literature moves beyond the debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy, to focus on metaphysical questions whose essence distinguishes philosophy from non-philosophy (Oduor, 2010). Like Bodunrin before him, Osha (2010; 2011b) indicates that philosophy emerged from the University of Ibadan in the 1970s that eventually produced a distinct orientation in the discourse that is known as African philosophy. Furthermore, the "Universities of Ghana, Legon, and other academic institutions in East Africa (Kenya, in particular) have also been crucial in fashioning the discursive grids on which modern African philosophical practices are based" (Osha, 2010, p.233). In response to this compound question asked in bad faith, Imbo (1998) reasons that to deny the existence of African philosophy is to side with those discourses legitimating colonialism and marginalisation. These discourses, by Africans and Europeans, devalue Africa while on the other hand, exalting Europe.

As will be shown, African philosophy is not a straightforward concept to explain. But Oruka as (cited in Bodunrin, 2013) identifies four approaches, in contemporary discourse on African philosophy as follows:

1. Ethno-philosophy. This is the term "Hountondji uses to refer to the works of anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers, and philosophers who present the collective worldviews of African people's, their myths, folklore, and folk-wisdom as philosophy. What ethnophilosophers try to do is to describe a world outlook or thought system of a particular African community." It is a holistic or communal approach. Representative in this category is Tempels, Senghor, Mbiti, and Kagame (Bodunrin, 2013, p.161).
2. Philosophic sagacity. "This trend implicitly rejects a holistic approach to African philosophy, rather than seek African philosophy by the study of aspects such as general outlooks and customs. The attempt is made to identify men in society who are reputed

for their wisdom." Ogotomeli, in Marcel Griale's work on Dogon religious ideas, belongs to this school of thought (Bodunrin, 2013, p.162).

3. National-ideological philosophy. This is represented by the works of political figures "like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Marcus Garvey, Mobutu Sese Seko and Leopold Songhor. It is an attempt to evolve a new, if possible, unique particular theory based on traditional African Socialism and family hood. It is argued that meaningful liberation must be accompanied by mental liberation" (Bodunrin, 2013, p.162).

4. Professional philosophy. "This is the work of many trained philosophers. Many of them reject the assumption of ethnophilosophy and take a universalist view of philosophy. Oruka identifies Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji, Oruka Odera himself, and P.O. Bodunrin under this group" (Bodunrin, 2013, p.162).

3.2.1.1 Ethnophilosophy

According to Imbo (1998, p. 8) in his famous volume known as "*Introduction to African philosophy*", "ethnophilosophy takes a culture-specific view of philosophy and finds African philosophy in the proverbs, myths, folktales, sculptures, and cultures." Simply put, ethnophilosophy is to be found embedded in the mythical, linguistic, and religious world views of cultures and such philosophy becomes unique to its geographical applications. According to Nabudere (2011), Paulin Hountondji is identified as having coined the concept of ethnophilosophy to refer to the work of sociologists, ethnographers and philosophers who present worldviews of African peoples, their myths and folklores and folk-wisdom as philosophy. More so, Placid Tempels' manuscript entitled, "*Bantu Philosophy,*" initiated ethnophilosophy (Osha, 2010). Tempels sought to address racist views of colonial "anthropology thereby opening up a space for more balanced interventions on African identities and subjectivities" (Osha, 2010, p. 234). Nevertheless, ethnophilosophy is a holistic or communal approach. An even greater source of concern is that "ethnophilosophy is an African philosophical trend that concerns itself with how mythical concepts, ritual practices, language, proverbs, songs, and can form epistemological assumptions and guide the theoretical worldviews of Africans" (Chilisa & Preece, 2005, p.817). What is more interesting about ethnophilosophy is the dialectical relationship it has with Ubuntu philosophy.

For Imbo (1998), in a number of the Bantu languages of the East, Central, and Southern Africa, proverbs reveal the collective, socialising, and participatory emphasis of the culture. The

emphasis is on personhood in the social context. The *Sotho* say, "*Motho ke motho ka batho*," and the *Xhosa*, "*Umuntu ngumntu ngabantu*," meaning "A person is a person through people." The same idea surfaces in the *Kiswahili* saying "*kidole kimoja hakiui chawa*" (A single finger does not kill lice). The idea is that the individual is meaningless in isolation and makes sense only as a part of the totality. This, of course, means that for the philosophy of African history the emphasis is not on individuals but on what Mbembe (2016) coined as horizontal knowledge signified by openness to dialogue amongst different epistemic traditions. More so, even though there are outstanding figures in African history, the focus would be on the collective efforts and contributions to world history by Africans. Thus, Letseka (2000, p.181) puts a great emphasis on commonality to indigenous African life. "This is because a community of people and belonging to a community of people constitute very cloth of indigenous life. This is unlike the western liberal notion of the individual as some sort of entity that is capable and exists in isolation."

In light of this, Maposa (2018, p. 27) become very instrumental in painting what it then means to apply African philosophy for African history:

> I am standing here because you are in this class and equally you are here because the lecturer is here. As an African, I have to appreciate that we are a community. Quite simply, there is a kind of respect that goes both ways between a lecturer and students. We are one community. Yes, I might admit that I am more knowledgeable by virtue of the fact in African philosophy the older you get, the wiser you are. As an elder, it becomes my responsibility to share wisdom but since we are one community it is a round table in some sense.

What the above quotation acknowledges is that, in African philosophy, respect goes in both directions. "Going back to ancient Ethiopia and Egypt there is a close connection between wisdom and consciousness" (Tabhu, 2018, p.27). Therefore, teaching and learning of African history through African philosophy of African history develops consciousness and wisdom at the same time. As observed elsewhere, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) underscores that the essence of knowledge elsewhere is power but insofar as Africans are concerned wisdom is the centrality of any dialogue. Further still, each topic should develop wisdom within us, not just for the sake of knowing, but for growth. Over and above in African society, everybody should contribute in one way or another. In the Western neoliberal worldviews, it is child abuse to tell your child to contribute to the family. Yet in African societies, even children contribute to the family

economy. Similarly, in the African history class, everyone should contribute to the knowledge economy of the class (Tabhu, 2018).

Diop (1991) finds expression in ethno-philosophy discourses in the sense that African history is made from a metaphysical and epistemological framework that presumes an essential unity amongst African cultures. To counter the claims made by Europeans about the lack of technological advancement in pre-colonial Africa, he writes about Africa as distinctive and comparable to Europe in many respects, yet one whose historical, political, and religious wealth has remained a mystery to western observers because of the way the continent's history has been presented to them (Imbo, 1998). In so doing, he provides a philosophy for African history in which Africans no longer have to be ashamed of their rich history.

The study by Mbiti (1990, p.108) notes "what happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual" as captured in the saying "I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am". This provides a philosophy of African history which, for example, views Africa's independence as a result of unity amongst Africans and other parts of the world. So, Nabudere (2005, p.2) argues that Ubuntu as an African philosophy is central because it enables "Africans a sense of self-identity, self-concept. It enables Africans to deal with their problems in a positive matter by drawing on the humanistic value that they have inherited throughout their history."

Mbiti (1990) uses the concept of time as a paradigmatic case study of African philosophy. For Mbiti (1990, p.21), "time is a composition of events, which have occurred, those which are taking place now and those which are immediately to occur." Simply stated, Mbiti provides a comparative analysis of Western and African conceptions of time. According to Mbiti (1990, p.29), "the linear concept of time in Western thought, with an indefinite past, present and infinite future, is practically foreign to African thinking. For Africans, time orientation is two-dimensional which includes present and past but not as it is for Western conception of time." The major reason Mbiti (1990) and Diagne (2017) give is that the future is virtually absent because events which lie in it have not taken place, they have not been realised and cannot, therefore, constitute time. Diagne (2017) further highlights the point that according to this thesis time cannot be understood to be other than what happens; not what happens in it, or what is produced in it.

Mbiti (1990) employed decolonised Swahili words to reckon the concept of past, present, and future. *Sasa* covers the "now-period" and "now-ness;" and it is a period of immediate concern for the people since it is where or when they exist. *Zamani* is not limited to what English is called the past. It also has its own "past," "present," and "future," but on a wider scale. For Mbiti, Zamani overlaps with Sasa and the two are not separable. *Sasa* disappears into *Zamani*. Mbiti (1990) contends that when the time has been realised or actualised from the *Sasa* period, it moves backwards to the *Zamani* period. In plain language, the present is continually in motion towards the past (Diagne, 2017). In other words, *Zamani* becomes the period beyond which nothing can go. Of course, this is not without meaning to the theorisation of the philosophy of African history. For Mbiti (1990, p.23), "the concept of history and pre-history tend to be telescoped in a very compact, oral tradition and handed down from generation to generation." Simply put, if we attempt to fit pre-history into mathematical timescale, they will appear to cover only a few centuries whereas, in reality, they stretch much further back (Mbiti, 1990).

Nonetheless, ethno-philosophy has been critiqued by universalist intellectuals who reject culture-specific philosophy (Imbo, 1998; Matolino, 2008; Osha, 2010). Kwasi Weridu (as cited in Imbo, 1998) from a universalist point of view argues that philosophy is not culture-dependent but is rather a systematic and methodological inquiry that should not be altered by its geographical application. In other words, even though philosophy is not entirely excluded from culture, its universality should be acknowledged. Paulin Hountondji a Beninese philosopher in a volume entitled, "*African Philosophy; Myth or Reality*," insists that ethnophilosophy is no philosophy because it is communal thought and it is not written down (Hountondji, 1996; Osha, 2010; Kanu, 2013). This argument insists that African philosophy is the same as anywhere else and it must be critical, reflective, and written down (Hountondji, 1996). To attend to this assumption a little further, the above notion would question the philosophiness of the ideas of Socrates who never wrote down his thoughts but were later put down by his disciple Plato (Kanu, 2013). More notably, Hountondji (1996) and Dubgen and Skupien (2018) were critical of anthropological material cloth in the philosophical language in the guise of philosophy. To punctuate the point, for Hountondji (1996), ethnophilosophy is some weird hybrid between ethnology and philosophy, and it is neither good as ethnology nor good as philosophy. Therefore, his key critique was that ethno-philosophers such as Mbiti and Tempels handled philosophy from an anthropological and ethnological approach (Hountondji, 1996).

3.2.1.2 Philosophic sagacity

Philosophic sagacity is understood to be one of the approaches to African philosophy. Conceptually, philosophic sagacity is the critical thought, or "individual African thinker highly conversant with their indigenous culture, and who have not gone through the modern school system" (Oduor, 2010, p.92). It sought to sustain that native sages meet the necessary features of philosophy as recognised by a professional school of philosophy (Nabudere, 2012). According to Azenabor (2009, p.16), "philosophic sagacity is a term that describes a reflective evaluation of thought by an individual (not collective) African elder who is a repository of wisdom, knowledge, and critical thinking." In the same vein, Kazeem (2012) sketches out that this method attempts to document the views of indigenous African individuals reputed for their extraordinary wisdom. In simpler terms, this understanding underscores that African philosophy does not start in modern Africa; that even in traditional Africa there were folks who were accomplished for critical thought. Philosophical sagacity is a philosophy that rejects a holistic approach to African philosophy by looking at general outlooks, by which the attempts are made to look for men and women in society who are reputed for wisdom (Matolino, 2008; Nabudere, 2011).

As opposed to the above, Bodunrin (2013) brings to the fore the argument that says African philosophy must be scientific or systematic and must be written. In response, Oruka (1997) argues that literacy is a needed, but not an adequate condition for thinking. In African societies, some independent thinkers lived by what reason dictated. They, therefore, expounded genuine African philosophy. The central point here is that these "individuals do not have to be literate but are known to have in-born insight, which enables them to engage in philosophical activities" (Matolino, 2008, p.23). Additionally, Oruka (as cited in Nabudere, 2011) indicates the intellectual constitution of a philosophic sagacious person in the following manner:

> The attempt here is to identify 'men' in society who are reputed for wisdom. The aim is to show that literacy is not a necessary condition for philosophical reflection and exposition and that in Africa there are critical independent thinkers who guide their thought and judgements by the power of reason and inborn insight rather than by the authority of the communal consensus (Nabudere, 2011, p.149).

Oruka further notes:

Sages-philosophy in my usage consists of expressed thoughts of wise men and women in a given community. Sage is a way of thinking and explaining that the world fluctuates from wisdom, of which others call it 'common sense" (Oruka, 1990, p.51).

What Oruka's philosophy did was to counter the notion that suggests that for anything to count as a philosophy it ought to be written down (Matolino, 2008). To simplify the point, Matolino (2008, p.24) contends that "writing is a good way to store thought and to store philosophy, but it is not thinking, yet philosophy is thinking. Moreover, one can think even if one is incapable of, or has no facilities, for writing."

In many instances too, philosophic sagacity would find expression in African history since it recognises African history as taught orally. This as well tallies well with the argument brought to attention by Maposa (2018) when he argued that African history is embedded in cultures, philosophy, conceptually orientated as well as orally orientated. From this perspective, this will also draw from the rich history of African people that has been left outside of scholarly work i.e., this will draw rich African history from poems, songs, and praises.

Kazeem (2012) mentions the special situation of criticism frequently levelled against philosophic sagacity that includes methodological concerns similar to those elevated counters to ethnophilosophy. For critics such as Hountondji (1996), the major concern lies in the fact that not all the reflections of the sages are philosophical.

3.2.1.3 National-ideological philosophy

According to Bodunrin (1981; 2013), nationalist-ideological philosophy is an effort to develop a new, if conceivable, exceptional precise theory based on traditional African socialism and family-hood. In a related view, Nwosimiri (2017) states that nationalist-ideological philosophy originates from the ideologies of the liberation movements. In short, national-ideological philosophy is the extent to which African statesmen worked out socio-political thought the continent had to take at the time of decolonisation in the 1970s (Oduor, 2010). As noted by Bodunrin (1981) it arises out of the conviction that political independence must be coupled with true mental liberation. In essence, it started a counter viewpoint to colonial imperialist ideologies in Africa. That means it concerned itself not with decolonisation alone, but it went to the extent of providing theoretical analysis for contemporary African experiences. Odour (2010) argues that nationalist-ideological philosophy has to do with the writings of African

statesmen in which they present their thoughts on the socio-political direction of the continent ought to take.

The nationalist-ideological philosophy provided new modes and philosophy to theorise African history. As pointed out by Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru (2013) the list included Nkrumah (1978) who came up with his ideology of decolonisation in Consciencism, Nyerere (1967) who advocated the concept of Ujamaa "familyhood" including education for self-reliance, education for liberation, and Leopold Sedar Senghor who established the philosophy of negritude in which he valorised "certain distinctive morals and aesthetic amongst Africans. Linking it to the philosophy of African history, this line of thinking provided African history concepts rooted in African languages to comprehend their history much better. This includes concepts such as Uhuru and Ujamaa.

According to Nkrumah (as cited in Akpokabayen, 2020), the term Consciencism suggests the new collective consciousness that would not only be cognitive but also practical. Alongside these developments, this was realised through nationalist historiography to promote self-concept and self-reliance. In other words, such philosophy becomes relevant for African history in promoting familyhood amongst Africans in instances such as Afro-phobia in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda and wars in South Sudan (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru, 2013).

The reviewed literature largely shows that part of the Nationalist-ideological philosophy was the Black Consciousness philosophy. Phalad (2015) explains the Black Consciousness philosophy to be an ethical theory that stresses the existence of the individual person as an accountable agent defining their own purpose of life and their modes of being in the world. More (2008) adds that the Black Consciousness philosophy is concerned with issues of the emergence of black selfhood, black suffering, embodied agency, bad faith, racism and sought to encounter it through promoting self-concept and awareness. It has been claimed that the Black Consciousness philosophy sought to conscientise black people about the inferiority complex imposed by colonialism/Apartheid (More, 2017). Stephenson et al., (2015) demonstrate convincingly that Black Consciousness is a philosophy that advocates black pride and the idea that black people should liberate themselves from discrimination. Amongst the prominent Black Consciousness intellectuals comprise Frantz Fanon, Stephen Bantu Biko, Chabani Manganyi, Mabogo Percy More and Andile Mngxitama just to mention a few (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

Black Consciousness did not evolve as a fully developed philosophy in Biko's head, but it was part of discussions in university – which Biko was part of (Mngxitama, Alexander & Gibson, 2008). Black Consciousness was heavily influenced by Pan-Africanism, and Negritude philosophy (Stephenson et al., 2015). Both Fanon's classics, "*Black Skin, White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*," became grounding texts of the Black Consciousness philosophy in South Africa (Mngxitama et al., 2008). Thus, the Black Consciousness philosophy is a cultural and political revival of the oppressed people (Mngxitama et al., 2008). On these grounds, Biko himself saw Blackness, not as a matter of pigmentation but as reflecting mental attitude (Biko, 2017). The bottom-line for Biko was the "realisation by the black people about the need to rally together to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude" (Biko, 2017, p.49).

At the centre of Black Consciousness was a re-humanising philosophy that sought to encourage black people to look at themselves as human beings (Biko, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Black Consciousness stressed that co-operation between black and white South Africans could not materialise once there is a return of the land which is a basis towards epistemic decolonisation (Stephenson et al., 2015; Mngxitama, 2018). Greater racial pride and self-confidence among black people were encouraged (Stephenson et al., 2015). In the widest sense, Biko (as cited in Stephenson et al., 2015, p. 229) had the following to say:

> The blacks are tired of standing at the touchlines to witness the game a game they should be playing. They want to do things for themselves-by-themselves decolonisation.

In lay terms, Black Consciousness was used as a philosophical device to ask radical questions concerning Africans as well as a responsibility towards themselves. For its part, Black Consciousness philosophy was part of the struggles for epistemic freedom in Africa and philosophical rebellion of colonial invasion of the African mental universe (Biko, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c).

3.2.1.4 Professional philosophy

Professional philosophers are philosophers who have gone to universities and have gotten degrees in philosophy (Matolino, 2008). From this background, Hountondji (1996, p.33) displays how, African philosophy, in professional school, is described as a "set of texts, primarily the set of texts written by Africans and explained as philosophical by authors

themselves." According to Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru (2013), this school consists of that philosophy illustrated by Western-trained African philosophers such as Henry Odera Oruka, Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji and many others involved in philosophical discussions in Africa. For Wiredu, African philosophy should be understood within the context of its development with its associative socio-cultural and political milieu (Eze & Metz, 2015).

Much of the available literature on professional philosophy rejects the particularity approach of ethnophilosophy and takes a universalist form of seeing, thinking, and writing philosophy (Wiredu, 2008; Osha, 2008; Eze and Metz, 2015). They argue profoundly that philosophy has the same meaning everywhere, so what should differ are the problems under investigation (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru, 2013). The debate on the nature of African philosophy has always been about the controversy between universalism and particularism, and it is as Oduor (2010) insists throughout his work that universalism is one way of securing the contribution of African philosophy in the global marketplace. Professional philosophers, such as Kwasi Wiredu and Paulin Hountondji "argue that philosophy is the same everywhere and uses the same methodology, and thus African philosophy should be a critical and not a descriptive record of African beliefs" (Kanu, 2013, p.392). To paraphrase Wiredu in Eze and Metz's view, philosophy has "no borders, by which Wiredu encourages a wide breadth of investigation into different intellectual traditions and openness to learning from other traditions" (Eze & Metz, 2015, p.75). Bodunrin (as quoted in Matolino, 2008) also joins the discussion, and points out that philosophy must have the same meaning in all cultures although subjects that prioritise, and perhaps the method of dealing with them, maybe dictated by cultural bias and existential conditions within which philosophy operates. Even more so, universalists contend that philosophy cannot be limited by cultural contingencies but should be critical and assessed through objective lenses (Oduor, 2010).

The drawback of this school of thought as Matolino (2008) and Osha (2010) reveal is that professional philosophy seeks to best capture and apply the methods of doing philosophy that is essentially Western to African philosophy. To delineate the point further, "professional philosophers formulate their objections to ethnophilosophy without acknowledging that they are using certain methods of philosophising from a certain context" (Matolino, 2008, p.31). More so, reflection on the nature of African philosophy over the last five decades has demonstrated that one's conception of African philosophy depends on where one stands not only geographically but intellectually concerning the subject matter (Oduor, 2010).

Research on the subject of African philosophy besides countless efforts done by African scholars has been mostly restricted to the limited comparison of African philosophy versus Western philosophy. What has not been questioned are metaphysical foundations of Western philosophy by professional African philosophers which at the center lies Cartesian metaphysics according to which is a distinction between body and soul. Further research should be done to investigate and ground a decolonised metaphysics of African philosophy. Further still, the ongoing contestation between universalist and traditionalist schools on African philosophy resembles the unresolved problem of metaphysics (Agwuele, 2009; Osha, 2010).

To round up, the essential impression has been that African history is unique, and therefore it deserves a unique philosophy. Therefore, I amalgamated the four trends in African philosophy– a professional philosophy, philosophic sagacity, ethnophilosophy, and nationalist-ideological philosophy – to theorise how they would work to decolonise the philosophy of African history. The argument by Hegel & Sibree (2004) that Africa was primitive and ahistorical is thus not sustained since African philosophy in the study conducted by Nabudere (2012) proves that Hegel's argument was objected by African achievements in Ethiopia, Nubia, Egypt and from the rest of the continent. As Chimee (2018) noted the there is also a problem with the periodisation of African history based on European discourse such as pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. As further argued by Mbiti (1990) the linear concept of time in western thought, with an indefinite past, present and infinite future are practically foreign to African thinking. As such, for him, a decolonised periodisation of African history would be what he termed the [now-ness] *Sasa* and *Zamani* [past]. Simply stated, instead of giving credence to colonialism, for Mbiti, it is better to use ancient Africa or pre-history when referring to the past.

Moreover, African philosophy can work best in the teaching of African history by promoting Black Consciousness. Biko (2017) argued that black consciousness is an attitude of mind and a way of life. As Biko insists throughout his work, this state of mind would provide African history analytical lenses or rather conscientise black people to see themselves as human beings, not some subservient beings. For example, when teaching about the Soweto Uprising this theory would establish the fact that these were struggles for decolonisation which was underlined by the generation of 1976s which at the centre was the refusal of white liberal education that was colonial in nature. They accentuated a decolonial dictum which profoundly suggested: "liberation first, education later" (Stephenson et al., 2015). Furthermore, this

philosophy would work better for African history in explaining issues of identity and racism. More (2008) in an article written "Biko: Africana existentialist philosopher," argued that Biko would have defined racism as "discrimination by a group against another for the purpose of subjugation." Firstly, to discriminate involved the acts of exclusion and inclusion processes and this also entails the notion of power (Mngxitama, 2009).

More so, African philosophy, as shown by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a), dismisses the Marxist discourse of Africa being a victim without agency in a sense that African history has to do with "resistance" than it has with "conquest" as part of the recovery of African agency in history. The idea of patriarchal Africa in the discourse of African history brings the Nabudere's work into conversation with his Africanist peers such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a). For these scholars, Africa was not patriarchal but matriarchal where to some extent mothers were primary teachers in the African indigenous educational system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). A passage from his book explains the role of African women in the history of the continent, Nabudere writes: "women have always played a notable role in the family, the inheritance of material wealth and rights to royal succession and governance generally" (Nabudere, 2012, p.149).

Finally, Nyerere's (1967) work attempts a quite difficult task with his idea of Ujamaa in which he provides the philosophy of African history new prisms with which African history is theorised through African languages. This shows that all four forms of African philosophy can be used in understanding the philosophy of African history.

3.2.2 Decolonial Theory as a conceivable decolonised theory for Philosophy of African History

The origins of the decolonial theory is attributed to Latin American scholars such as Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Mbembe, 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Nevertheless, the employed decolonial theory for this study leans more on African decolonial thinkers such as Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, and Achille Joseph Mbembe since the study is centred from an African centred perspective. There exists a considerable body of literature on the decolonial theory which, according to Mignolo (2000), Quijano (2000), Grosfoguel (2007), Maldonado-Torres (2007), and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) implies a collective name for all those anti-slavery, anti-racism, anti-colonialism, anti-patriarchy, anti-Eurocentric hegemonic epistemology initiatives and struggles emerging in different geo-political sites haunted by coloniality in its physical, institutional, ideational and metaphysical

forms. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, decolonial theory from an African viewpoint is not only an enduring political and epistemological movement intended for the liberation of the (ex) colonised peoples from global coloniality but also as a way of thinking, knowing, and doing (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015b). Moreover, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013c) asserts that at an ideological level, the decolonial theory is an attempt to abandon the Eurocentric colonial paradigm that continues to lessen African people into objects rather than as subjects of knowledge. Other observations indicate that decolonial theory at a sociological level, has to do with Africans taking an initiative in academic life to produce knowledge that is reflective and relevant to Africa (Mbembe, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c). This being so, the decolonial theory is an inseparably entangled ethical, methodological, epistemological, and political questions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). It is against this background, therefore, that I considered decolonial theory with an emphasis on Africa and its intellectual struggles dates back before it was even coined decolonial theory. Over time, an extensive literature has developed on decolonial theory by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b, p.49) which revealed that decolonial theory in Africa derives from the intellectual strands in the pages that follow:

The first intellectual strand focuses on Ethiopianism/Rastafarianism propounded by leading theorists such as Leonard Howell which is centred on the primacy of Ethiopia, racial pride, Pan-Africanism, and revolutionary music entitled reggae (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). The second considers Garveyism which concerns itself with Pan-Africanism, back-to-Africa, and Africa for Africans derived from thinkers such as Marcus Garvey and Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). The third is Negritude intellectual tradition which concerns itself with African arts, culture, and African ontology or being Black in the world, which is encompassed in the writings of Aime Cesaire, Leopold Sedar Senghor, and Souleymane Bahir Diagne (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). The fourth strand of decolonial theory in Africa closely follows Afrocentricity which concerns itself with classical African civilisation, African centred knowledge, and the primacy of African history led by scholars such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Molefi Kete Asante, and Mobutu Sese Seko (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). The fifth strand examines Black Consciousness which closely reviews issues of epistemic or mental liberation of black people from the inferiority complex imposed by coloniality and it is evident in the work of intellectuals such as Steve Bantu Biko, Aime Cesaire, and William E.B Dubois (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). The sixth strand is Afrikology which evokes that Africa is the cradle of mankind as well as Africa-centred knowledge as theorised by Dani Wadada Nabudere (Nabudere, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). The seventh strand is

Nationalist historiography which has to do with restitution of African history, the primacy of African factor in human history, oral methodology, and Africanisation of history as theorised by Cheikh Anta Diop, Jacob F. Ade Ajayi, Theophilus Obenga, Terrence Osborne Ranger, and Bethwell Allan Ogot (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

Concerning the teaching and learning of African history, the decolonial theory will be considered to end institutional cultures such as patriarchy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a; 2020c). Furthermore, the decolonial theory will be employed to offer Africa-centred history which in the main underline African agency than a crisis (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). In another light, the decolonial theory will be considered in the teaching of African history with an attempt to rehumanise Africans who have been excluded from history itself (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2018c).

3.3 Conclusion

I described and explained how I applied African philosophy and decolonial theory as the theoretical framework for my study. African philosophy as a theoretical framework was used as a primary theory while the decolonial theory was considered as a secondary theory. I needed a second theory in the sense that some of the pitfalls of African philosophy particularly professional school had applied methods of philosophy as it is done in Western philosophy. This, in turn, had a serious implication for the theorisation of the research findings from an African-centred view with a philosophy which to some extent is an appendix of Western philosophy. In these circumstances, the decolonial theory was considered in the sense that despite its origins in Latin America, it has extended itself to debates concerning knowledge production and decolonisation of African history in particular. Amongst the compelling issues behind the use of decolonial theory was that it sought to deal with the metaphysical foundations of African history with an attempt to underscore African agency. It sought to write a long history of the continent that predates colonial encounters which reveals linkages between Africans.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Key to Chapter 3, I examined what ought to be the theory and which theories were employed in this field of study. In this chapter, I carry on addressing the methodological considerations of this study. Apart from this preface, this chapter comprises eight sections. According to Cassim (2016; 2021) research design and methodology refers to how I will design this study and which data generation methods and methods of analysis I will employ to answer the research questions. The first section addresses the paradigm by exploring what a paradigm is, which paradigm I elected and why was it considered for this study. The subsequent section explores the research approach and why was it considered. The third section focuses on the research design. To illustrate further the methodological consideration of this study, I commence by presenting a critique of the research methodology and then described and advocated for a decolonised research methodology. In the succeeding section, methods of sampling, data generation, and data analysis are explained to make sense of how they were used to address the main questions for this study. Section six discusses issues of trustworthiness by taking a closer look at concepts such as dependability and credibility, confirmability, and transferability. Section seven discusses the ethical considerations for this research project. Section eight presents the limitations of this study and explains what was done to enrich their effects.

4.2 Research Paradigm

The research paradigm is a broader philosophical view about the social world (Barnes, 2018). A paradigm represents a basic system or worldview that guides how a researcher views the world (Shah & Al-Bargi, 2013). Along the same lines, a paradigm for Bertram, and Christiansen (2014) denotes a certain philosophical worldview that denotes what is acceptable to research and its procedures. Furthermore, a research paradigm has been pronounced as a way of explaining a worldview that is rooted in ontological and epistemological suppositions about the nature of reality and knowledge (Chilisa & Kawulich, 2012).

The Afrocentric paradigm was considered for this study since the research is framed from an African-centred standpoint. The consulted literature by Mkabela (2005, p.180) shows that the

Afrocentric paradigm originates from several books published by Molefe Kete Asante. The "Afrocentric paradigm suggests cultural and social engagement as opposed to scientific distance as the best approach to understanding the philosophy of African history." Asante (as cited in Mkabela, 2005) states that the Afrocentric paradigm is the theoretical outlook used to convey the profound need for African people to be re-located historically, economically, socially, and philosophically. That is to say, this study worked within the Afrocentric lenses which encourage world outlooks or research that are contextually based on where we are (Zondi & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c).

Since this research is framed within an African philosophical and decolonial theoretical context, the Afrocentric paradigm was appropriate since it permitted to focus on Africa as the cultural centre for the study of African experiences and interprets research data from an African perspective (Mkabela, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c). Asante (1995) underscores that the Afrocentric paradigm is not color-conscious, it is not a matter of colour but culture. Put simply, despite colour being a part of this study, the key concern is on culture – culture as an embodiment of the African experience that which allows a good theorisation of the philosophy of African history. In Mkabela's (2005) view, Afrocentricity is based on the idea that African people should re-assert a sense of agency to achieve sanity. This paradigm intersected correctly with my study which focused on how history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history from an Afrocentric viewpoint.

With regards to reality and knowledge, Kumah-Abiwu's (2016) work bring into conversation that African people have their unique ideas, cultural values, norms, and actions that shape their worldview. Therefore, the Afrocentric paradigm concludes that the experiences of community members are the ultimate authority in determining what is reality and knowledge and, therefore, the experience of the community is the final arbiter of the trustworthiness of research about their lives. In the light of the reported, it is conceivable that ontology or reality is the epistemic creation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020c). To underscore the point, Reviere (2001, p.713) uses the Ukweli canon which is an Afrocentric canon that emphasises the grounds of the "research in the experiences of the community being researched". For her, truth in an Afrocentric paradigm is to be grounded in the experiences of the community. Simply put, this field of research took cognisance of the decolonised dictum that alludes to the relationship of the study and knowledge and reality in a sense that Africans always had their own valid, legitimate, and useful knowledge systems (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). In this connection, the designated history

academics in South Africa were the ultimate arbiter of knowledge and reality in the theorisation of the philosophy of African history. As was explained in Chapter 1, in view of this, I viewed reality as a social construct. This "epistemological assumption implied that I, as a researcher, I am not divorced from the knowledge and the universe. As part of society, I am, therefore, an active participant in the construction of knowledge" (Maposa, 2014, p.122). Put simply, the Afrocentric paradigm shows very well that my role in this study is that of researcher and participant since I am an active participant in producing knowledge. It is within these considerations guided by the theoretical framework as well as Afrocentric paradigm that in the discussion of findings I will be having personal interpretation concerning designated history academic's theorisation of the philosophy of African history.

4.3 Research Approach

According to Creswell (2009; 2017), an approach is a plan and process that entails steps of broad expectations to the comprehensive methods of data generation, analysis, and interpretation. This study considered the qualitative research approach. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) illustrate the qualitative approach as a located activity that locates the researcher in the world. Patton (2001, p.5) says that "qualitative research includes the generation of textual or verbal data, and it is used when in-depth views about the phenomenon are essential." A qualitative research approach was implemented to explore and understand the meaning of history academics concerning the philosophy of African history (Cresswell, 2009). The qualitative approach was appropriate for this dissertation because I worked with verbal data which entailed multiple meanings of the coloniality and a decolonised philosophy of African history instead of figures that denote quantity. Put simply, the attempt was not to treat the results of this research project demographically but aimed at a conceptual and theoretical understanding of the matter under focus which is the philosophy of African history. It is for the same reason that Naderifar, Goli and Ghaljaie (2017) argue that qualitative research concerns itself with a deep and thorough overview of a phenomenon through data generation and presents deep description using flexible methods. Similarly, Adams and Smith (2003) claim that a qualitative approach observes the meanings, insights, experiences, and understanding of those involved in the study or being studied. Hence, "qualitative research tries to reveal the perspectives of the subjects that the research question regards" (Haven and Van Grootel, 2019, p.233).

Through the qualitative approach, the study was able to get an in-depth understanding of how the designated history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history. This qualitative approach was aligned well with the Afrocentric paradigm that underscores a focus on Africa as the cultural center for the study of African experiences qualitatively (Mkabela, 2005).

4.4 Research Design

Durrheim (as quoted in Bertram & Christiansen, 2014, p.40) stresses that the "research design is a strategy of how the researcher will systematically gather and examine the data that is needed to answer the research question." The research design is sometimes equated with a plan which moves from the underlying philosophical assumptions to specifying the selection of participants, data collection and data analysis methods (Maree, 2007). Bertram and Christiansen (2014) drive the point further to say that a research design is a deliberate nature of observation that differentiates research from other observations. In a new light, research design refers to a choice of philosophy which boils to which research methods I will consider for this study (Cassim, 2021).

A conceptual research design was adopted in this field of study. It is detailed by Maree (2007) that conceptual research design's defining feature is that it engages with the understanding of concepts with an attempt to add and contribute to knowledge production conceptually. The literature review shows that conceptual studies tend to be abstract, philosophical, and rich in their theoretical underpinning (Maree, 2007). In simpler terms, they are generally descriptive. What best explains the abstractness of this study is that it is entrenched in a decolonial theory, African philosophical theoretical framework, and Afrocentric paradigm. Even though concepts may have different meanings, this investigation leaned towards concepts that are Afrocentric. Moreover, concepts that are not necessarily Afrocentric were conceptually engaged in the form of critiquing them which equated to rethinking thinking itself (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c; 2020d). This study employed a conceptual research design that enabled an understanding of history academics' theorisations of the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history. In this way, the conceptual research design for this study was both a way of thinking, writing, and analysing from an Afrocentric standpoint that privileges Africa and the philosophy of African history as a starting point of subjectivity and analysis thereof (Sithole, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

4.5 Methodology

4.5.1 Decolonised research methodology

When the subject of decolonising research methodology is examined, it reveals the quest "for epistemic freedom involving rethinking and unthinking conventional ways of producing knowledge" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019a, p.2). Fearing this label of being perceived as anti-research or epistemic disobedience "modern scholars have been responsible for compelling students to adhere to religiously to existing ways of knowing and understanding the world" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017b, p.187). Accordingly, no research proposal or dissertation can pass without meeting particular methodological conventions. The methodology has become a straitjacket that every researcher has to wear if they are to discover knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017b, p. 188). Expanding on decolonising research, Ndlovu-Gatsheni reminds us:

> Research methodology exists to block any attempt to know otherwise than what is already laid down as legitimate ways of knowing. We continue today demanding from- students to us a priori how new knowledge is to be discovered through the presentation of clear methodology which tells new researchers that there is a highway of discovering and presenting knowledge and nothing more (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019a, p.10).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019a) further reinforces the view that research methodology has assumed the position of a disciplinary tool. As a disciplinary instrument, it makes it impossible for new knowledge to be revealed and generated. Whatsoever is discovered has to be well-organised into an existing methodology in the process, draining it of its profundity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019a). Taking this analysis into account, this study partly intended to provide methods of researching and knowing that are deep-rooted contextually to Africa with an attempt to see ourselves clearly concerning ourselves and other-selves in the universe as voiced by (Wa Thiongo, 2005).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017b; 2019a) shows his interest in questions concerning the context in which research methodology is planned and deployed. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017b) mentions the special situation about the relationship between methodology and power, the imperial/colonial project as well as the implications for those who happened to be researched. Simply stated, the

main concern is about how conventional research is still wrapped up in the Euro-North America-centric worldview. He states that:

> Researching continues to give the "researcher" the power to define. The "researched" appear to be "specimens" rather than people. And research methodology becomes a process seeking to know the "other," who becomes the object rather than the subject of research and what it means to be known by others (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017b, p. 186).

Within this framework, Mbembe (2015, p.6) dwells extensively on decolonising research, as such, he notes that there is a "need to reinvent classroom without walls in which we are all co-learners; research that is capable of convening various publics in new forms of assemblies that become points of convergence and platforms for redistribution of different kinds of pieces of knowledge." A second injunction, decolonising research is a search for pluriversity – by which knowledge production is open to epistemic diversity (Mbembe, 2015). More so, "it is a process that does not necessarily abandon the notion of universal knowledge for humanity, but which embraces it via a horizontal strategy of openness to dialogue among different epistemic traditions" (Mbembe, 2016, p. 37)

Adding to the debate, Keikelame and Swartz (2019) posit that a decolonised research methodology concerns itself with power with rather than power over, to underscore equal power opportunities between the researcher and the researched. In this study, I dealt with power dynamics by acknowledging that both parties – the "researcher" and the "researched" – contribute to the theorisation of the philosophy of African history, and therefore should be accorded the same status (Chilisa, 2017).

A decolonising methodology for this study entails deconstruction and renewal, that is, dismantling the myths about the philosophy of African history and retelling the philosophy of African history concerning Africa and to the universe ultimately (Wa Thiongo, 2005; Chilisa, 2012). Such a methodology must begin with unmasking the modern world system, and global order, as a broader context from which research and methodology are cascading (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017b). According to Prior (2007), Chilisa (2017) and Keikelame and Swartz (2019), decolonising research methodology is an approach that is used to counteract the Eurocentric research methods that disregard indigenous forms of knowledge and experiences of the marginalised people from the global south. For a proper understanding, Ndlovu-Gatsheni

(2017b; 2018b) observes that the critique of the methodology is understood as being anti-research itself, but he continues to purvey it to intensify struggles for epistemic freedom. On these grounds, this line of thought calls to the attention that this research study is not just a contribution to the philosophy of African history but aimed at contributing to research methodology as well.

4.5.2 Methods of sampling

Previous studies have shown sampling comprises making choices about which people, settings, and events to include in the study (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014); Cassim, 2021). The research sampling in this investigation is drawn from a convenience sampling method through which I selected five history academics in different South African institutions of higher learning because the study is concerned with rich and in-depth data than figures. As mentioned earlier on, history academics in South Africa were nominated based on their continued versatility to write not only African history, but the philosophy of African history. To demonstrate the point, Tuckect (2004) states that whilst there are no binding rules for sample size, sampling in conceptual research usually relies on small numbers to study in-depth details and seek rich data. As pointed out by Bertram and Christiansen (2014), convenience sampling means selecting a sample which is easy for the researcher to reach. Besides getting participants who are within my reach but of interest or definitive aspects of this study was that participants were elected on the merits to which they generated relevant and comprehensive data with regards to the theorisation of the philosophy of African history. Additionally, convenience sampling for this research project underscored not only the idea of participants that were within my reach in terms of locality and in monetary considerations but highlighted the state of readiness by research participants to contribute to the theorisation of the philosophy of African history.

The five history academics were cautiously selected from South African institutions of higher learning. Participants were recruited primarily by getting their emails through their university websites. From this moment, emails attached with consent forms were then sent requesting them to participate in my study (Cohen et al., 2000; 2018). In circumstances where I could not get responses from participants, I went back to the very same university website to take their contact numbers and contacted them telephonically. Throughout the recruitment process gender, race, and nationality was not considered. Nevertheless, the worthiness criteria required the designated participants to be at least a history academics in South African higher education.

Convenience sampling is linked to a decolonised research methodology and Afrocentric paradigm in a sense that it provided new unconventional forms of research not limited to history academics' will to participate but the extent to research being a space of co-search, co-learning and community of learning (Mbembe, 2015).

At another level, the above argument posited the idea that the research was convenient to the great length such that participants were the ones who defined the time, space, and will for the intellectual discourse concerning the theorisation of the philosophy of African history.

4.5.3 Data Generation Methods

The data generation method that was adopted for the study is semi-structured interviews. Bertram and Christiansen (2014) pronounce that an interview is a conversation between the researcher and the participant. Nevertheless, it is different from an everyday conversation in that the researcher is the person who sets the agenda and asks questions. The available literature explains that semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to generate a lot of descriptive data from a few participants (Myende and Chikoko, 2014). Denscombe (2014, p.176) states that "semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to be flexible in terms of the order in which topics are considered, and, perhaps more significantly, to allow the participant to develop ideas and speak widely on the issues raised by the researcher."

This study employed one-on-one semi-structured interviews through skype and emails with an understanding that semi-structured interviews endorsed probing and clarification of answers (Maree, 2007). Semi-structured interviews through skype were also deployed due to the Codvid-19 pandemic which did not permit direct contact with the designated history academics in South Africa. Open-ended questions were asked, and participants were encouraged to respond freely, and follow-up was done through probing questions in Appendix E as advised by Maree (2007). Each interview took about 60 minutes. The data generation method that was utilised corresponds with my theoretical framework, the Afrocentric paradigm, and the qualitative approach which worked together to attain an in-depth description of how the designated history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history (Mkhize, 2017). Guided by African philosophy and decolonial theory as a theoretical framework meant that the dialogue of the semi-structured interview had to be conducted with an Afrocentric approach. This entailed the idea that the research semi-structured interviews were not just simple interviews but were entrenched by

African forms of interaction between two people especially when power dynamics are such that the participant has achieved significant academic milestones while the researcher has achieved less, yet the attempt was to speak at the same level. The nature of engagement in the semi-structured interviews was deep-rooted in the Afrocentric paradigm, meaning that the dialogue dismantled the uneven power dynamics to an extent that everyone in the project was a teacher while, at the same time, being a student (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019b; Keikelame and Swartz, 2019). Nevertheless, by virtue of them (participants) being history academics, they were more conversant and well-informed compared to me, and therefore shared wisdom and guidance in the theorisation of the philosophy of African history (Nabudere, 2005; Achebe, 2009; Maposa, 2018).

4.5.4 Data Analysis Methods

The generated data, as earlier alluded to, were analysed through content analysis in the sense that the findings were based on arguments raised by the participants (Jackson, 2003; Wald, 2014, Cassim, 2021). Typically, content analysis as shown in Cohen, et al., (2000; 2018) is the procedure of summarising and presenting written data, the most important contents of data, and their messages. Content data analysis permits the generated data to be transcribed and be coded with the endeavour to come up with themes (Ezzy, 2013).

African philosophy and decolonial theory as the theoretical framework were adopted for analytical purposes through which content modes of analysis permitted the researcher to reflect upon transcripts taken during the semi-structured interviews through skype as well as emails to come up with findings. This was due, in large part, motivated precisely by the fact that through content analysis the researcher drew out the main themes from codes categories (Cassim, 2016). Primarily, the generated data informed by theoretical framework was recorded verbatim from an audiotape into printed form and subjected to content analysis techniques which included creating codes of meaning and organising into themes (Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit, 2004). According to Ezzy (2013) coding is the process of defining what the data are all about. The study followed qualitative inductive reasoning wherein themes and findings were drawn from the empirical data (Ezzy, 2013). By coding, I went through the entire data looking for analytical units and interesting features of data that talk to the theorisation of the philosophy of African history (Mayring, 2000). Subsequently, this thesis made a list of codes and organised them into some sort of order in the pursuit of themes in comparison to the theorisation of the philosophy of African history (Mayring, 2000). The inductive approach which is aligned with

the Afrocentric paradigm and research design in the sense that it subjectively viewed reality in a sense that its underlined ontology to be constructed by a community.

4.6 Trustworthiness

To begin with, Bertram and Christiansen (2014, p.190) note that under "qualitative research the concern is with trustworthiness, not validity." This line of thinking is broadened by Shenton (2004) and Cassim (2021) who say that qualitative researchers pursue trustworthy issues by considering, dependability, credibility, transferability, and confirmability.

4.6.1 Dependability

Dependability has to do with the issue of respondent validation, whereby the researcher takes back their research report to the participants and records their reactions to the report (Cohen, et al., 2018). As such, dependability was observed by taking back the key findings of the study back to the designated history academics in South Africa to ensure that the findings are dependable. To substantiate this, dependability was enhanced through revisiting the data generation phase and examining it for circumstances that could have contradicted the findings of this study (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014; Cassim, 2021). This research also observed consistency through checking that findings with regards to the philosophy of African history are thoroughly grounded in the data (Cohen, et al., 2018).

4.6.2 Credibility

Traditionally, credibility has to do with confidence in the truths of the findings (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014; Cohen et al., 2018; Cassim, 2021). To further illustrate the point, Bertram & Christiansen (2014, p.190) point out that "credibility refers to the degree to which findings of the study are reflective of the reality and lived experiences of the participants." To ensure credibility this research utilised appropriate methods that ensure honesty by making use of record tapes during interviews to gather raw data. Moreover, content analysis was also employed to come with the findings rooted in the interviews, which entailed the theorisation of the philosophy of African history (Shenton, 2004). Credibility was also observed through "a thorough and persistent rereading of the data, and through giving the transcripts back to the history academics to review and comment on whether the study is an accurate reflection of their proposals with regards to the philosophy of African history" (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014, p.190). Leaving an audit trail which refers to records used in the study that entails

transcribed data and records of analysis as a means of safeguarding credibility (Cohen, et al., 2018).

4.6.3 Transferability

Bertram and Christiansen (2014) and Cassim (2021) postulate that transferability concerns itself with the extent to which the research can transfer to another extent. Cohen, et al., (2018) indicates transferability as the length to which research can be generalised to another context with a similar situation. Transferability was heightened through extensive reading of the theoretical framework, African philosophy in particular, which largely informed how data was analysed, and this warranted the possibility of applying the study to other situations with similar contexts (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014). The soundness of my research design which is conceptual and Afrocentric in nature ensured that unsupported generalisability was avoided through persistent observation of generated data and thus enhancing transferability (Cohen, et al., 2018).

4.6.4 Confirmability

Confirmability is the length to which the findings of the researcher can be confirmed by other researchers, either a different researcher or a reader (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014, p.201). Confirmability was augmented and increased by making the research process transparent, data analysis in particular, through the use of intercoder reliability as a measure of how similar two or more analyses, or codings of the data with regards to the philosophy of African history (Cohen, et al., 2018). Also, confirmability was observed through enough details for the reader to pursue a line of inquiry and check if they would have reached the same conclusion (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014, p.190).

4.7 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations in the literature search are sometimes equated with what researcher's ought and ought not to do in their research (Cohen et al., 2018). Ethical considerations were maintained throughout the whole study to be conducted. To safeguard that the study sustains the proper status, the letters were sent to the four different institutions of higher learning registrars requesting permission to conduct the study which is known as gatekeeper's approval (Cohen, et al., 2018). After receiving the gatekeeper's approval, documents were also sent to the ethics research office for ethical clearance. Ethical considerations were observed through

writing consent forms requesting participants to participate in my study. Bertram & Christiansen (2014) define informed consent as the prospective participant's agreement to participate voluntarily in a study. Voluntarism meant that this piece of research certified that participants freely chose to take part or not in the research (Cohen et al., 2018). King, Horrocks, and Brooks (2018) emphasise the importance of gaining the informed consent of participants before taking part in the research. The respondents' consent was obtained before they were interviewed. The participants were informed of their rights to voluntarily consent or decline to participate and to withdraw participation at any time without penalty (Cohen, et al., 2018). And anonymity and confidentiality were observed by using pseudonyms in ensuring that the data generated from five history academics in South Africa in no way should reveal their identity (Cohen, et al., 2018).

4.8 Limitations of the study

This study prepares the platform for a long-standing theorisation of the coloniality and decolonised philosophy of African history. The scope of this study was limited in that using the Afrocentric paradigm meant a need to attain extensive African scholarship to justify the appropriateness of the paradigm, since it is not yet fully accepted in research compared to other research paradigms such as interpretivist, critical and post-positivist.

A serious drawback in this research lay in the data generation methods. The data generation method was semi-structured, with one-on-one conversations through skype and emails. A key problem with the interviews was that physical contact was not allowed due to the Covid-19 protocols of social distancing. As such, the data was then generated through skype which was another nightmare in terms of finding the participants as some said they were keen but were busy with online learning and they had no time. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that data generation is traditionally a challenge even in pre-Covid-19 times in the sense that participants tend to agree today and then withdraw the next day. The pitfall of my data generation method is that it worked well with the designated history academics in South Africa who were willing to say a lot, yet some were not prepared to speak much. Perhaps the most serious drawback of this study is that while the university and research conventions do not allow old literature, nevertheless, due to the insufficient latest literature on the philosophy of African history the study had to rely on some dated literature. This limitation is due to the fact that modern universities in Africa are Eurocentric, which attributes truth to Eurocentric forms of

researching, writing, and thinking, which in large part, disregard other epistemic traditions (Mbembe, 2015; 2016).

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter engaged the research design and methodologies considered with an attempt to answer the research questions for this study. I began by exploring the Afrocentric research paradigm, which emphasised African outlooks and lenses that were utilised to come to analytical grips with the philosophy of African history. Also, since this study dealt with history academics perspectives, and theorisation of the philosophy of African history which foreordained that the research approach had to be qualitative. For analytical purposes, the conceptual research design was also utilised in an attempt to get conceptual insights from history academics concerning the philosophy of African history. At the core of research methodologies, I closely examined and considered decolonised research methodologies which included what would it mean to decolonise research methodology for the following: convenience sampling, semi-structured interviews, and content data analysis. Pointing to the emergence and importance of issues of trustworthiness, I provided an overview of issues of trustworthiness through considering issues such as confirmability, dependability, transferability, and credibility. This chapter also highlighted the ethical considerations and how they were applied in this research. In the subsequent section, limitations of the study were indicated.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

The essence of the previous chapter was to describe and explain the research design and methodology of this study by concentrating on the research paradigm, approach, design, and decolonised methods of sampling, generating data, and data analysis. All this was deep-seated in Africanist and decolonial theoretical framework to make sense of the coloniality and ultimately a decolonised philosophy of African history. In this chapter, consistent with the critical research questions, I present the research findings from the data analysis described and explained in Chapter 4. The findings are organised into themes responding to the two research questions.

In response to the first critical research question, which is an attempt to understand how the history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality philosophy of African history, the following themes arose from the analysis of the data:

- Modernist conception of the philosophy of African history
- Emphasis on African crisis
- Africa as ahistorical

In response to the second research question, which sought to address how the history academics in South African institutions theorise the decolonised philosophy of African history, the analysis of data generated the following themes:

- Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history
- Emphasis on African agency
- African self-consciousness

5.2 History academics' theorisations of the coloniality of the philosophy of African history

The principal issue addressed within this section concerns itself with how the coloniality of the philosophy of African history is theorised by the research participants. The analysis of data shows that coloniality is perceived in terms of findings which are organised into the following

themes (some of which incorporate subthemes): modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis, and Africa as ahistorical.

5.2.1 Modernist conception of the philosophy of African history

Since the modernist conception of the philosophy of African history is the main theme, which is divided into subthemes, it refers to a philosophical worldview for African history whose metaphysics according to Participant A is rooted in the conception of "I think; therefore I am." This is linked to the coloniality of modernist thought in a sense that it is theorised in terms of it being a philosophy that is derived from outside the continent of Africa and whose structure of thought does not fully capture African history since it observes reality in an individualistic way rather than a communal manner. The findings identify Europe as the birthplace of both modernist theory and colonialism. To elaborate on this, the data analysis revealed that the coloniality of this modernist conception of the philosophy of African history is theorised in terms of following the sub-themes: modernist conception of time, disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history, a modernist conception of gender studies in Africa and Cartesian metaphysics in the philosophy of African history.

5.2.1.1 Modernist conception of time

The most striking results to emerge from the data concerning the coloniality of the philosophy of African history were in reference to the modernist conception of time. According to Participant A, "it is obvious to me, for as long as we think of disciplinary philosophy of African history as occurrences that happens in time, and time as we know it there is a large part of our life that we are not going to be able to write as African people." The participant suggests that time in the modernist conception is oriented in a linear fashion as pre-modern, modern, and post-modern, and this conception has been applied to African history despite its modern Western origins. To unravel the point, Participant B confirms the above that "the philosophy of African history still subscribes to the notion of modern time such as: pre-modern, modern and post-modern or to the notion of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial." The pitfall for this Western periodisation of African history, according to Participant A, lies with the idea whereby "you cannot study African history without thinking about the history of Africa as pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial." It means the philosophy of African history would never escape colonialism. This creates a colonised philosophy because, even when Africans want to

explain themselves and their history, they have to view themselves through the lens of colonialism.

Concerning the use of such philosophical time markers in African history, Participant B further theorised in this way:

> This is also very revealing in the Eurocentric idea of history and philosophy of history that is permeated by linear modernist thought that can be rendered this way: 'ahistory,' 'prehistory,' and 'History' (with a capital 'H').

The above modernist conception of time shows how the participants link the conceptions of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern to pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial and to ahistory,' 'prehistory,' and 'History.' Participant B underlines the argument that the above periodisation comes from a Eurocentric linear conception of time and thus underpins the coloniality of the philosophy of African history since African conceptions of time are not linear. As such, the coloniality of the modernist conception of time is revealed through South African Social history such as *Mfecane* events which is referred to as pre-colonial encounters Participant B. Not only did Mfecane events were periodised into pre-colonial history but according to Participant B the entire South African Social history, Political history, and Economic history is said to have begun with the arrival of the Dutch in 1652. Participant A makes this clear by referring to Hegel's conception of time in history. He states that "For Hegel, history begins with Europe. It is the spirit that emanates from Europe. But also, Hegel somewhere says the highest form of history is when men conceive of the state. Hegel is referring to European states." This suggests that if African history continues to follow this Eurocentric philosophy of temporality, it means it will continue to fall into the trap that Africans have no history.

5.2.1.2 The disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history

Another marked finding from the data analysis is how the participants link the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history to coloniality. With respect to Participant A, the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history refers to a systematic body of knowledge with its own vocabulary, methodology, and methods. As such, this disciplinary nature according to Participant A had the following bearing on the philosophy of African history:

The coming of modernity structured people's life not only on paper but in reality, in certain ways. So, you had a psychological aspect to your life, you had a social, religious, political aspect, and some institutions were created to give expression and perhaps not to give expression but to guard those aspects of your life. Church looked after your spirituality, psychiatry looked after your psychological well-being, the school looked after your educational well-being. Social institutions looked after your social well-being.

The central argument in the above quotation is that modernist philosophy created certain categories of human life which include psychology, spirituality, and educational well-being. Of particular interest is how the educational well-being was to be catered for through subject disciplines within the modern schooling system. It is to these subject disciplines that African history has had to conform in order for it to be considered worthy of study. According to the perspectives of Participant E, Europe relied heavily on these disciplines such as anthropology and sociology which in the main included scholars such as E. Durkheim, Auguste Comte, James Frazer, Sigmund Freud, Malinowski, Max Muller, Herbert Spencer, Edward Tylor, and even Levy Bruhl, with an endeavour to answer what is to be African. From these considerations, the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history as in the West means one must be able to explain the African life, complex as it may be, within these disciplinary categories since that is how Western life is desegregated. To gain a deeper understanding of the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history Participant A illustrates the following:

As long as orienting parameters of disciplinary philosophy of African history as we have it today that has its own methods, vocabulary, the methodology is not going to be able to help us, we are going to remain as prisoners of Modernist/Western thought [sic].

The above quotation refers to the coloniality of the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history through categorising African history into Western conceptions of methods, vocabulary, and methodology, which were imposed on Africans through colonisation. The assumption is that disciplines, from a modernist perspective, consist of these three identified aspects.

In relation to the coloniality of the philosophy of African history through disciplinary methods, Participant A continued with his contention thus:

> To demonstrate the coloniality of the historical methods, when historians say, oh well our methods are not as colonial, we also integrate oral history because this is how knowledge was passed in the past. Do you know who they refer to? They refer to an American historian called Vansina. The point is that methods we use in modern disciplines are all geared towards justifying or establishing veracity [sic].

The point articulated by Participant A in the above quotation does not imply that someone who is not African cannot purvey a decolonised or African philosophy. Rather, it illuminates how Western disciplinary methods exclude other forms of seeing, writing, and theorising African history, such that for anything to be taken as rational it should be supported by empirical evidence, which is usually in writing. Disciplinary methods are geared towards the empirical world. Nonetheless, the participants did not mention any other method, besides oral history, to demonstrate the coloniality of the disciplinary nature of history.

It should be noted that the data does not offer a clear illustration of the differentiation between the disciplinary methodology and methods, despite Participant A referring to them separately. Nevertheless, Participant A stresses that methodology has to do with the "structure of thinking which informs methods." The above-mentioned critique of disciplinary methodology of the philosophy of African history points to the idea that disciplinary methodology offers a blueprint that African history should be segregated into disciplines which implies the splitting of the totality of the African experience.

What can be referred to as methodological concerning the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history is the outpost pedagogy which, according to Participant A denotes a blueprint which informs the methods and activities of teaching and learning of African history. This point was made with reference to the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), which is the current curriculum in South Africa. A more practical response to the question was put forward by Participant B:

> There is no new definition of what history is in the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement. There is no clear articulation of the idea of history and philosophy of African history itself. African history is subsumed under universal European history

and that is to say, they had only changed the actors in a stage that is already set. More so, they had colonised African history because they are doing history as it is done in Europe.

The above citation demonstrates the coloniality of the structure and methods of teaching African history in South Africa as entrenched in the pedagogy in the sense that African history is framed within a curriculum policy that is Western in thought. This, as far as Participant C is concerned, has a bearing on African history because it means not only the content but also the pedagogy is drawn from Western thought. This confirms the coloniality of the outpost pedagogy in the sense that it added forms of teaching in African history that are basically rooted in the modernist worldview. Nevertheless, the data did not come out clearly as to who is it referring to as "they. More so, the participants did not give examples of such forms of teaching which are rooted in the modernist worldview.

Another feature of the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history was identified to be disciplinary vocabulary. This is the case for Participant E who argued that African history concerns itself with Pre-Socratic African philosophy and modern-day debates discussing the early history of Western philosophy, and post-colonial writing in Africa.

In essence, the coloniality of the above conceptual categories is structured such that Socrates becomes the center point which nothing can go. This is supported by Participant A, who had the subsequent to say:

All disciplines pride themselves on having their own vocabulary. The conceptual categories are not just the vocabulary as in everyday use. It is the concepts and categories that are colonial. You cannot study African history without thinking about the history of Africa as pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial.

With that knowledge in mind, it should be noted that the concepts of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial were mentioned in the earlier subtheme on modernist conceptions of time. Here too, they are meant to theorise not just time, but vocabulary in African history. Although the participants did not give any additional disciplinary concepts to demonstrate the colonial nature of the modern discipline of history, the given conceptual vocabulary tends to be considered cast in stone, such that they are not questioned when studying African history.

5.2.1.3 Modernist conception of gender in African history

The analysis also revealed how the participants link the concept of patriarchy in African history to coloniality. According to Participant B, patriarchy refers to a system in a society in which the male is always the dominant figure. Participant B provides evidence of patriarchy as a manifestation of coloniality in African history in the following sense, "patriarchy, as we understand it today, is a product of Western modernity in the sense that the naturalisation of the fundamental difference between women and male is a modern concept." The above quotation shows how the participant views the notion of patriarchy as foreign to Africa since it emphasises the difference between male and female conceptions. This is supported by Participant A who had the following remarks concerning patriarchy:

> The problem of patriarchy is European because in Africa that distinction was not a man and woman distinction. We know it could happen in African history that you are entered by grandmothers spirits you become a grandmother. Where does this inequality begin if a grandmother can decide that I am going to use either a female or male figure.

Simply put, the coloniality of patriarchy for Participant A, is that it transposes modernist categories to gender issues in Africa creating an epistemology that misses the complex nature of African being, such as spirituality. To elaborate on this point further, Participant B points out that "the inferiorisation of females is a modern concept in a sense that it derives from Christian patriarchy which is synonymous with modernist thought." Concerning the above account, the participant refers to how in the Christian patriarchy it is articulated that a female was created from the rib of a male and which underscores the dominion of males. Participant C confirms the above that "patriarchal norms were documented in the history of the so-called big nations. They were retrieved and documented during the 1950s in the United States of America. Britain is no exception during both Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions." These are the norms that the participants claim to have been transposed into the philosophy of African history, making it patriarchal too. This is best illustrated by Participant A that "the last European country to legislate the vote for women in Switzerland in 1975. By 1974 women in Switzerland were not allowed to vote. But all of the sudden patriarchy is branded as the problem of tradition." In simpler terms, the problem of patriarchy as we know it today is a problem of Europe. "The benefit the West has is that it can offload its problems to Africa. What are the

actual problems it can export to other parts of the world? And it is now free of those problems and begins to criticise Africa for those problems" claims Participant A.

This role of modernism in the continued coloniality of the philosophy of African history is further elaborated by Participant E who points out that:

> Although the relative absence of both women and feminism from the canon, practice, and institutions of the philosophy of African history is widely recognized, little has so far been undertaken to rectify or address the situation. The problem is compounded by facile yet pervasive assumptions that "feminism," often viewed as a single (and moreover Western) movement or school of thought, is a Fremdkörper, an import, in Africa.

Considering this, feminism, thus understood, is often rejected on suspicion of acting as a colonising force, an imposition of Western frameworks onto Africa. The result is unfortunately that the discipline of African history remains largely silent on the issues of gender, sex, sexual difference, and women's social and political status.

5.2.1.4 Cartesian metaphysics in the philosophy of African history

The final subtheme on the issue of coloniality deriving from modernity/Westernisation is the application of Cartesian metaphysics to the philosophy of African history. According to Participant A, Cartesian philosophy is modernist and colonial in the following sense:

> By Cartesian I am referring to Descartes. Descartes is considered the father of modern thought because he is the one who said that man literally is the source of all knowledge. But this was a man in the sense of being male, but this man was European.

It should be noted that the above emphasis on male domination supports the argument in the previous subtheme on patriarchy as fundamentally modernist and Western. This theme further underlines the Cartesian metaphysics' conception of human beings as distinct individuals. For Participant A, Cartesian metaphysics is the basis for modern thought, and at its centre lies the conception that all questions could be answered by man. This then translates to the idea that man is the reason or thought itself, meaning that man took the place of God as conceptualised in Europe. The growth of this thought in modern times coincided with the European

colonisation of Africa, in the process introducing it into the philosophy of African history, amongst other disciplines. More precisely, "now it is where Europe begins colonial mentality. Where it believes that since we are actually God, we have the responsibility for the whole world" explains Participant A. It means that coloniality implied that Europe could do and undo everything in the world, philosophy of African history included.

Participant A identifies Cartesian metaphysics to be an impediment to the study of African history by declaring that "for as long there is a Cartesian duality of spirit and body which remains the foundation we are not going to succeed much." The influence of Cartesian philosophy is in its obsession that if one wants to know anything, including African history, one must separate herself/himself from herself/himself. According to Participant A, this is highlighted by the idea of "I think; therefore, I am which refers to the idea that the important part is the thinking being compared to holistic human being." This notion is colonial in the sense that in the philosophy of African history the emphasis is on the collective rather than on individuals Participant D.

5.2.2 Emphasis on African crisis

The theme of emphasis on the African crisis focuses on how perspectives on African history were heavily influenced by early colonial perceptions which emphasised crisis over any positive developments. Participant B draws attention to the emphasis of the African crisis by giving the example of the *Mfecane*. He points out that content such as "*Mfecane* in the colonial discourse is given a lot of prominence as pre-colonial South African history." From another standpoint, this emphasis on the African crisis is best exemplified and condemned by Participant B in the following sense:

> The rise of King Shaka KaSenzangakhona to power caused a lot of warfare and created a powerful Zulu kingdom. Which during the process of its creation pushed other people away to Drakensburg, Pretoria, and Zimbabwe?

The above-mentioned example of history content emphasising the African crisis clearly shows how the focus on crisis continues to be the dominant outlook in African history. Further still, according to Participant B, this history content on *Mfecane* and migrations has been used to construct a colonial discourse of empty lands in South Africa emanating from the crisis. Participant C contributes to this argument by saying that the "myth of the empty land indicates the level of greed on the side of colonial powers." The above passage exposes the coloniality

of the colonial discourse on how history content such as *Mfecane* was used to push the agenda of the African crisis saying Africans were killing each other to extinction to the point that land was left empty. Participant D agrees with this assertion:

> Settler histories propagated the myth of an empty land ideology. The empty land ideology was a submission in writings that when Europeans landed in Africa the land was empty. This claim foregrounded the inauguration of the principles of apartheid. It afforded the Afrikaners the 'right' to claim the land as theirs. It has been referred to as a myth by nationalist, liberal and radical writers of the second half of the twentieth century.

Participant E contributes to this point by spelling out that "*The Empty or Vacant Land Theory*" is a theory that was propagated by European settlers in nineteenth-century South Africa to support their claims to land. The myth of the empty land became particularly destructive in the hands of the Apartheid Government." Although the participant did not come out clearly on the particular narrative, he was raising on the empty land thesis, it could be either the claim that Africans had killed each other into extinction or the one criticised by Participant D that the "Bantu had not arrived in southern Africa when the whites arrived."

The data further reveals how the African crisis was promoted through other colonial discourses, such as an ethic of domination. The ethic of domination also refers to the issues of the African crisis in the sense that it denotes wars and conquest as a process of establishing dominance. To underline this point of emphasis on the African crisis, Participant A explains the following:

> The philosophy of African history is still trapped by the ethic of domination that is at the centre of the Modernist/Western philosophy of history. It is about conquering wars, leaders of conquest. You could write about other things that went on in the world other than those things at the foundation of Western philosophy of history.

The argument above is that this focus on domination in modernist history was transferred to the philosophy of African history through the colonial history curriculum. As a result, African history tends to focus on the crisis as well. According to Participant B, no wonder "in the 1960s that in African history there was an obsession to search for powerful kingdoms and important people, and as such King Shaka became Africa's, Napoleon Bonaparte". Put simply, the participants show how colonial the focus on powerful individuals and empires is, because it is

rooted in modernist thinking which excludes the experience of the collective, with a keen focus on key individuals and their feats.

Further on the emphasis on African crisis and ethic of domination lies the conception that Africans had enslaved each other before the trans-Atlantic slave trade. A response to such coloniality comes from Participant A who had the ensuing to say:

> Slavery has been in existence in all societies. But there was something different with slavery in Africa prior to the trans-Atlantic slave-trade in the sense that all that was expropriated was labour. The humanity of a person was never taken or denied. There was nothing that said if you were a slave, you should be a sexual object.

In view of the above quotation, forms of power in Africa never denied humanity and whereas with the trans-Atlantic slave trade humanity of Africans was taken away. This confirms how the emphasis on the African crisis was carried out to justify slavery. Nevertheless, not all participants commented on such an issue.

5.2.3 Africa as Ahistorical

Although the concept of Africa as being ahistorical was referred to earlier on, it features here as a separate subtheme in the sense that the focus is no longer about periodisation but on the existence and nonexistence of African history. Along the lines of Participant E, Africa is ahistorical, "from Hegel's perspective, Africa is said to be unhistorical; undeveloped spirit – still involved in the conditions of mere nature; devoid of morality, religions, and political constitution." From these considerations, Africa is not among Hegel's four cultures or civilizations. An extensive analysis carried out by Participant B on Africa being considered ahistorical, enunciate the forthcoming:

> Denial of humanity has many markers. People have no souls, civilisation, history, development, democracy and therefore they are not human beings. In other words, when it was said Africans have no history, they were equated to animals that have no history.

Related to the previous subtheme, the participants explain how the colonial view of the African crisis was extended to question the actual humanity of Africans. Participant C expands the analysis to posit that:

> Arguments by Hegel and Trevor-Roper are examples of first-grade colonial expressions calculated at undermining and stripping Africans of their uniqueness in

many walks of life. Africans had identifiable ways and means of communal living and co-existence many years before the African colonial conquests by European powers.

The point in the above quotation is that the emphasis on Africa as ahistorical was used to push colonialism in Africa as a civilising mission to people without a history. According to Participant D, this helped enforce the coloniality of the philosophy of African history. Like Participant B and Participant D, before him, Participant E illustrates very well how colonial is the assumption of Africa lying beyond the day of self-conscious history. This is well supported by the pages that follows:

> Does it make any geographical, historical, or cultural sense to divide Africa into three parts? European ethnocentrism traps itself in contradictions by racially implying "that the real Africa is south of the Sahara," while geographically asserting that Africa is a continent. Africa is indeed a continent. In addition, the term "European Africa" is non-existent. Europe and Africa are two distinct continents. Thus, as stressed by Cheikh Anta Diop, Egypt is neither connected to nor influenced by Asia. Since prehistoric times, Black Africans have been in existent in the territory north of the Sahara.

In view of this, upon a critical examination of Hegel's thoughts on Africa, the analysis establishes contra-Hegel that Africa is part of the World Spirit on a higher level than Hegel presumes.

While all the participants provided a strong critique of the colonial discourse which says that Africa is ahistorical, Participant A also contemplates a different take on the subject matter and argues that:

> There is a view that I am still formulating. Maybe Hegel was right. Right in a sense that what we did not have is the disciplinary philosophy of African history. Indeed, we could not have the disciplinary philosophy of African history as in the Western sense of the term because African life was never disaggregated as modernity did to Western life.

This argument is evidently related to the participants' earlier claim that disciplinary history is a manifestation of the coloniality of history in Africa and the philosophy of African history in particular. This bears witness to Participant E that "Trevor-Roper's argument was not, as he insisted immediately, that nothing had happened in Africa. It was (to use an old distinction) African history as 'discipline' that he was declining to acknowledge, not the goings-on—the res gestae of the African past. From these considerations, unlike Hegel and Trevor-Roper in African societies' epistemologies were different from the modern Western ones, such that they

could not be understood and accepted by historians, and philosophers in Europe. Therefore, those who viewed Africa as ahistorical came to Africa expecting to see African history that is organised into disciplines as in Europe, but could not comprehend what they found, such as the fact that in Africa, knowledge is not individually generated but is communally shared. To further analyse this mixed reaction concerning Hegel's statement Participant A continues:

> What we could accuse him of is having a very narrow view of the world, thinking the whole world was like Europe. We know that Hegel was racist, but racism was a science. It was a science that said these other people are not human beings, because they cannot think, and evidence for thinking is the disciplines, writings that belonged to the disciplines. He was influenced by race science. You see people who are capable of thought who are therefore human by having a body of thought that could be called philosophical, historically, and psychologically.

The above reference reveals the conception that while Hegel's view of Africa residing outside history is colonial in nature, "it actually confirms the Western conception that you see people's history through their civilisation" Participant B.

5.2.4 Summary of findings on History academics' theorisations of the coloniality philosophy of African history

The principal issues which were addressed in response to the first critical research question are the notion that as long as the philosophy of African history is modernist in orientation, and as long as African history is viewed as ahistorical and emphasis is on the African crisis, it can be considered colonial in nature. The findings on coloniality as informed by modernism relate to the modernist conception of time which structures time for African history based on conceptions from European history. The findings also showed how the participants linked the coloniality of the philosophy of African history to the modernist philosophy of subject disciplines which subjected African history to modernist methodologies, methods, and vocabulary. Furthermore, the findings revealed how the participants identified the coloniality of the philosophy of African history as informed by the thinking of Africa as in perpetual crisis and Africa as ahistorical. What is evident is that the participants refer to modernity and Western as interchangeable in the sense that they are the basis of the colonisation of the colonial philosophy of African history. It is also evident from the presentation of findings above that some participants did not respond adequately to all questions, which resulted in the findings being, to some extent, dominated by one or two participants over others.

5.3 History academics' theorisations of a decolonised philosophy of African history

Unlike the previous section on the coloniality of the philosophy of African history, the findings presented here address the question of the decolonised philosophy of African history. The findings will show that a decolonised philosophy of African history tends to be used to refer to a structure of thinking, writing, and seeing which considers the African worldview as a unit of analysis and interpreting of the world from an African metropolis. Put simply, a decolonised philosophy of African history denotes critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality and how African people of the past and present make sense of their destiny and of the milieu in which they live. The following are the themes in this section: an Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and African self-consciousness.

5.3.1 Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history

To start with, an Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history here signifies not only people who are Africans but also refers to the thought itself that Africans have about themselves which takes into cognisance their worldview about African history. More precisely, the philosophy of African history can be explained as philosophical discourse produced in Africa or by Africans at home and in the diaspora. This conception will be presented under the following sub-themes: Africanist conception of time, the holistic nature of African phenomena, the Africanist conception of gender in African history, and Ubuntu metaphysics. Most of the findings presented here are in direct contrast to the ones in the first theme of the previous section.

5.3.1.1 Africanist conception of time

This finding offers a philosophy of African history an opportunity to unthink the colonial conception of time and, particularly, consider ways of reperiodising African history. This is confirmed by Participant B in the passage that follows:

> In the philosophy of African history, there is no pre-history or ahistory. It is not stagiest. In the philosophy of African history, those who came before us are ahead, we are moving towards them. But it is different from the modernist time whereby you cut time into pre-modern, modern, and post-modern.

In so doing, this implies that in a decolonised philosophy of African history, there should be unique time-markers showing how African people define themselves across temporalities. With this view, Participant D underscores that part of the Africanist conception of time is the shift from the following periodisation:

> History does not start with Columbus looking for the route to the east and mistakenly bumped into the Americans. Africa has a long history although it tends to be ignored or turned upside down to suit empirical motives.

This being said, the Africanist conception of time does not begin with the arrival of Europeans in Africa or in the diaspora. This analysis finds further evidence in Participant B who advocates rethinking the periodisation of South African Social History in the sense that "*Mfecane* is not a pre-colonial story, rather it is a story of colonial encounters because King Shaka was born in 1787 two centuries after the arrival of the Boer." In the view of the foregoing, for Participant B, part of decolonising philosophy of African history is the need to map out African time where South African history does not begin in 1652 because such periodisation creates an impression that prior to the arrival of the Dutch there is no South African history.

The Africanist conception of time for Participant A also entails the subsequent epistemic questions such as South African Exceptionalism and viewing African history transhistorical:

> It is that when we have written our history from the vantage point South African exceptionalism will fall off. At that time, it will be impossible to exceptionalise South Africa. I do not imagine if were writing the history of the Khumalo's which encompasses not only South Africa but also Zimbabwe. By doing so, you have escaped the boundaries of the modern political category. If you began writing African history from the beginning, one of the things you going to find is that your categories are not going to be the categories of modern history. But you are also going to find different kinds of linkages. African history antedates these modern categories for history.

In view of this, the Africanist conception of time enables African history to move away from the idea that South Africa is separate from the rest of Africa but also underscores linkages between modern South Africa and the rest of Africa. Also, the Africanist conception of time will allow African history to move away from seeing things with today's eyes or viewing African history trans historically. Nevertheless, the participant does not give more examples of

these linkages with the rest of Africa except Zimbabwe. Contrary to the above, Participant E employs post-Apartheid as a time marker to underscore how South Africa is exceptional from the rest of Africa. His views are as follows:

> This unique status is based on three well-known factors. Firstly, South Africa was the last African colony to achieve independence from a metropolitan power. This did not, however, mark the end of the institutionalised colonial state. Secondly, white minority rule was perpetuated through settler colonialism, which was largely achieved through segregation legislation, which included the Natives Land Act of 1913, Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, and the Native Administration Act of 1927. Thirdly, the ideology of segregation was institutionalised as "apartheid" after 1948, under white (and specifically Afrikaner) minority rule.

On the basis of the above, the analysis reveals that, unlike other participants, for Participant E South Africa is exceptional on the basis that it was the last country to attain independence. Second, it experienced settler colonialism with segregation legislations and was ruled by the minority as early as 1948. Nonetheless, the participants link the above to a decolonised conception of the philosophy of African history, focusing on time through a focus on temporalities, cycles and writing African history from a vintage point.

Participant B further argued that a decolonised conception of time for the philosophy of African history is concerned with temporalities that denote whatever life Africans were living regardless of colonialism and modernism. Participant B clarifies his position concerning what he calls African time:

> Again, by temporalities, we are referring to particular times. How Africans journey across temporalities, how they defined themselves across temporalities, and how they wished to be known across those temporalities.

For a further understanding of the Africanist conception of time, Participant A concurs with the above in the following manner:

> African time does not move in a linear direction. There are cycles in the African conception of time. The notion of time for us is the notion of cycles which refers to

a cycle of birth, initiation, and death. Our lives are marked by cycles that shade and overlapped with each other.

This is to say that the participants view the Africanist or decolonised conception of time for African history as an attempt to perpetuate life, rather than domination. Therefore, the perpetuation of life happens in cycles. Nonetheless, the participants could not clearly explain how this philosophy would work when actually studying African history. Neither did they give explicit suggestions of what replaces the ones they say do not work.

5.3.1.2 The holistic nature of African phenomena

This finding on the holistic nature of phenomena in relation to the philosophy of African history refers to the conception that African beings see themselves as not separate from other phenomena including nature and history. This view is propounded by Participant A, who points out that:

> In the philosophy of African history, life was never organised in disciplinary terms. Ceremonies or institutions that are religious are at once political, at the same time social, and at the same time educational.

This simply means a decolonised philosophy of African history acknowledges that African forms of life are all-inclusive, be they historical, spiritual, social, or anthropological. This also means that African history would not be organised as a single and stand-alone discipline as is the case when it is colonised. To further underline how this interconnectedness decolonises the philosophy of African history, Participant A further explains that:

> Nobody went to formal school, but people sat around but as they conversed, they learned about history. They first learned of the history of the family. Many ceremonies are initiation schools that people went through were at once social, determined how politically you could participate because of your age but they were also educational.

The above reference demonstrates that part of decolonising philosophy of African history entails a serious shift from disciplinary knowledge to a holistic conception since the African experience is viewed in its totality. Nevertheless, the participants again did not reveal when and how this would work in the current school system in relation to the decolonised study of African history.

5.3.1.3 Africanist conception of gender in African history

Another finding which emerged from the data analysis points to gender neutrality/fluidity and matriarchy in contrast to patriarchy. This finding symbolises a situation where, as Participant A puts it, "African life was mutual and how African people depended on each other equally." The above was also exemplified by Participant B, who enunciated that "in African societies like Yoruba in Nigeria there was no organising principle called gender. Societies were organised according to the principle of seniority. A man could be called woman and woman called man depending on circumstances." With this in mind, in African history gender distinction was not the case of concern as compared to the emphasis on respect for elders. According to the participants, these identified examples can be used to drive the point that gender in Africa was neutral and fluid.

With the above discussion in mind, concerning the modernist conception of gender in African history, participants also referred to African cosmology and spirituality. For example, Participant A insists, "if you are a man but entered by the spirit of grandmother you become a grandmother or grandfather." In supports Participant B's argument that a decolonised "philosophy of African history has no inferiorisation of the female gender." Furthermore, the fluidity and neutrality of gender is best exemplified by Participant B who seems to suggest that Africa at some point was matriarchal since it was dominated by goddesses than gods. Nonetheless, the participant did not give particular examples of the said goddesses. The use of the concepts of matriarchy and fluidity as interchangeable for Participant B lies from his understanding of the conception of matriarchy itself as explained as alluded to below:

> Matriarchy indicates that it is not true that patriarchy in African history was the only common power structure and that women were always subordinate to men. It speaks to a plurality of forms of power before colonialism and indicates that heteropatriarchy is a modern power structure rather than a pre-colonial tradition.

This underlines the fact that according to Participant B "most African societies were matriarchal in a sense that was open to forms of power that were determined by the agency of the day, and which emphasised fluidity which was determined by the situation of the time." It should be noted that the participants did not give many examples to justify the claim that most societies were matriarchal. However, the above analysis disputes the patriarchal nature of Africa, and shifts focus to the complex nature of gender studies in African history by emphasising that gender issues in the African past were interchangeable fluid, and matriarchal.

5.3.1.4 Ubuntu metaphysics

The participants also refer to how African metaphysics is key to a decolonised philosophy of African history. Participant D identified the African metaphysics to be based on the concept of Ubuntu. Building on this point, Participant A notes that "at the centre of a decolonised philosophy of African history is the need to map out a different metaphysics of African life. That Ubuntu conception is a metaphysics to perpetuate life." In the analysis, "Ubuntu is herein explained as a philosophy that guides the way with which Africans have to be in the world" Participant A. Further still, Participant D refers to Ubuntu metaphysics as that which is concerned with the dictum of "I am because we are and since we are, therefore I am." This highlights that according to the participants; in African philosophy, a human is not a human unless there are other people. According to Participant E, Ubuntu metaphysics is embodied in the following statement:

> We actually say the whole education process centres around Ubuntu as a philosophy or set of ethical principles that capture the belief system of the South Africans according to which people take responsibility for others and accept the authority and guidance of others in order to progress.

In light of this, these values summon all of the African forms of being in the world to take up the responsibility and challenge of building a humane and caring society for everyone which also emphasises the concept of Ubuntu with the society by including everyone within the society no matter of their identity, be it gender or the colour of skin. It should also be noted that the participants did not reveal how Ubuntu metaphysics can be practically linked to the philosophy of African history.

Furthermore, in accordance with Participant D, Ubuntu metaphysics "underlines the interconnectedness of members of the community, based on shared beliefs, values, rituals, and expectations in African history." Considering this, African life and history from Ubuntu metaphysics is centered on the collective as opposed to individuals. Additionally, for Participant A, Ubuntu metaphysics has the following bearing on African history:

> Ubuntu permeates every aspect of our life. How do we think about African history. As a person guided by Ubuntu you think of African history as not just me dated from birth and having been involved in certain activities. African history for me is a continuation of life that does not begin with me. It begins with my ancestors and

will continue after me. That is why I have a responsibility to the ones that came before me and the ones to come after me.

In view of the above passage, Ubuntu metaphysics is decolonising in the sense that it is an attempt to perpetuate life in its totality, unlike modernist metaphysics. More precisely, the participants view Ubuntu metaphysics to be decolonial in the sense that at the preliminary level, a life that begins ancestors to the descendants which at a broader level includes the rest of the community. As Participant A states, "This lived reality underscores that in the philosophy of African history food cannot be something to make a profit out of and the endeavour will cease from the ethic of domination but entailed humanity and respect among its people."

From the above discussion, the participants consider Ubuntu metaphysics to be decolonial in the sense that is an attempt to return to African forms of life which underscore co-belonging in the teaching and learning of African history. They also argued that Ubuntu metaphysics without epistemic or mental freedom is incomplete. Lastly, the participants presented Ubuntu metaphysics as different from Cartesian thought since the concern for the former is on interconnectedness rather than separation which is the heart of the latter. This theme is therefore related to the earlier theme on the holistic nature of African phenomena.

5.3.2 Emphasis on African Agency

Another finding from the data analysis is that African agency is of importance to the decolonisation of the philosophy of African history. According to Participant B, African agency can be understood in the following example:

> The entangled is the nature of the history content such as *Mfecane* through underscoring the historical developments from the 1790s to the 1830s that they were caused not by Shaka but by pressures Portuguese based at Delagoa Bay, the Dutch and the English based at Cape Colony, the British based at Port Natal and missionaries who were involved in slave-trade.

In the light of this, the radical changes which took place in the 1820s are not because of Shaka as per the analysis but refer to how Africans responded to the encirclement complex which was coming from all angles. This analysis is decolonial for Participant B in the sense it frames "the cataclysmic events of the 1820s and 1830s as part of colonial encounters, which dates as far back as the fifteenth century, and that this issue is used as an alibi for colonisation." The above discussion supports how events of *Mfecane* can be understood from an Africanist perspective

in that Shaka is seen as having reacted to the encirclement complex rather than blaming him for the cataclysmic changes of the 1820s. This argument is the case for Participant E, for whom African agency concerning empty land thesis enunciates the following:

> Today a decolonial perspective described this as a myth because there is no historical or archaeological evidence to support this theory. Despite evidence to the contrary a number of parties in South Africa, particularly right-wing nationalists of European descent, maintain that the theory still holds true in order to support their claims to land-ownership in the country.

From this point of view, the above quotation supports African agency in a decolonised philosophy of African history in the sense that it reveals that the historical and archaeological evidence calls into question and invalidates the very narrative of the empty land thesis. This, in turn, shows the African initiative that land was occupied by Africans prior empty land thesis.

Further analysis carried out on African agency refers to how African societies should focus on self-defining rather than an ethic of domination as is in the modernist worldview. This is explained by Participant B in this way:

> In the philosophy of African history, the concern is not about civilisation or conquering but about people self-defining themselves and whatever they did in order to live, and about how people dealt with the environment, domestication of animals and plants, and history of self-improvement and self-definition.

With this in mind, emphasis on African agency is a decolonial for the philosophy of African history to the extent to which the main concern is with one's growth and personal development of the individual as well as their society.

5.3.3 African self-consciousness

Further analysis revealed the importance of the development of African self-consciousness as one of the characteristics of a decolonised philosophy of African history. Conceptually, Participant D defines African self-consciousness in the following terms:

> African self-consciousness entails the quest for African personality that gave rise to African philosophical trends of famous African/nationalist leaders such as Julius

Nyerere's African socialism, Kwame Nkrumah's Consciencism, and Leopold Senghor's negritude.

Bearing in mind the above, African self-consciousness carries the worldview of Africans concerning their history and life. With that knowledge in mind, the data analysis revealed the role of the philosophy of African history as a vehicle towards African self-consciousness. More precisely, African self-consciousness for Participant E signifies the following:

> The term African self-consciousness refers to critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality. The African self-consciousness may be defined as that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and present make sense of their destiny and of the milieu in which they live.

In view of this, African self-consciousness is a species of African thought, entailing theoretical questions raised by critical engagements with ideas in African cultures and their hybrid, mixed, or creolised forms worldwide. Such is the case for Participant B who postulates the ensuing:

> For Africans, history is not the past. For Africans, history is a human compass of where they are coming from and where they are going. For Africans, history defines who they are. It is not the study of affairs but a study of who they are.

What stands out from this passage is a clear articulation concerning the purpose of history in relation to the student of history from an African history perspective. Further to this, Participant C concurs that:

> African history is a mirror that tells a story of who Africans are, what they value, and what they believe in as individuals, families, societies, and nations. African culture is unique and may not be divorced from the rich African stories that accord Africans unique identity and heritage.

This shows how African self-consciousness can be developed from the study of African history in a way the study of Western history cannot. This is why Participant B argues that there is little or no chance for one to understand the philosophy of African history without a clear articulation of what African history is. This argument on African self-consciousness is taken further by Participant C who states that African self-consciousness is incomplete without the struggles for epistemic or cognitive justice. He points out that:

We need the total destruction of current trends in our basic and higher education systems. Decolonised philosophy demands the entrenchment of ideas and practices that are biased towards Africa. Mental transformation across government and business is also a necessary requirement, only then shall we begin to impact positively on realising decolonised African philosophy in the domain of historical studies.

The above passage refers to how the agitation for decolonised philosophy of African history is centred on freeing the minds of the Africans at a preliminary level and ultimately free them holistically. This is also true for Participant E whose understanding of African self-consciousness points to the disruption of Eurocentric consciousness, and notions of meritocracy within education and society that have privileged some, to be challenged.

Given this circumstance, it is quite revealing that Participant D has a different take on the issue of oral history as viewed in a colonial paradigm of difference as was discussed under the theme on the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history. He argues that oral history does not resemble the coloniality of disciplinary methods, but it represents the word of mouth passed on from generation to generation which is not only limited to schools but extends to the views of ordinary people. In other words, Participant D is opposed to the theorisation of oral methods as colonial as he underscores them to be a decolonised treasure that Africans employed over ages to pass African history through a word of mouth. The above point relates to the issue of African self-consciousness as explained by Participant B below:

All human beings are born into valid and legitimate knowledge systems. Therefore, there are no people without history. The idea of people without history is a problem of Eurocentrism.

This implies that all societies, including Africans, have higher knowledge of self as informed by their history which is a mirror that reflects an image of the individual. At a broader level, African self-consciousness as per Participant B deals with the very being of Africans since the African crisis pushed them out of self and humanity through a derogative statement such as Africa is the land of childhood.

The participants explain how the national curriculum is used for self-consciousness. Participant C points out that:

> The good thing about CAPS is that it is the latest version of the National Curriculum Statement. This is a type of curriculum that is grounded on the constitution of the land which in turn is grounded on the ideals of ordinary men and women of South Africa that is enshrined in the Freedom Charter of 1956. While I believe it needs to be more relevant to the current landscape, it did well to enforce the nation-building agenda.

Simply put, the analysis reveals how the curriculum has been instrumental in the promotion of a particular agenda through the creation of a particular self-consciousness. This contributes to why the participants view the development of an African self-consciousness as decolonial since it remembers Africans who were dismembered from the very notion of history.

5.3.4 Summary of findings on History academics' theorisations of a decolonised philosophy of African history

Taken as a whole, it was clear from the analysis that a decolonised philosophy of African history is that which concerns itself with the Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African Agency and African self-consciousness. Key to research findings was how analysis shows that a decolonised conception of time is unlike the conventional one of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. The findings rather purveyed that decolonised conception of time focuses on temporalities and cycles which underscores particular times without ever featuring colonialism. More so, a decolonised philosophy of African history is that which emphasises African agency which refers to the contributions of Africans concerning their history with a focus on positive development. Building on the above analysis, the research findings confirm that a decolonised philosophy of African history is an attempt to remember Africa which was dismembered. Considering this, the necessity of a decolonised philosophy of African history has to do with the restoration of being since Africans were denied humanity by colonialism. This also talks about rehumanising Africans from the zone of non-being since the question of having or not having history refers to the very being of Africans. The key drawback of this analysis as mentioned before is that some participants felt the questions on the philosophy of African history were difficult such that it created a situation where the analysis to some extent was dominated by one or two participants over others. In another light, some responded extensively but did not answer the questions.

5.3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, guided by African philosophy and decolonial theory as a theoretical framework, content data analysis, and critical research questions I began with co1ding which ultimately gave the study codes that culminated into themes. As such, concerning the coloniality of the philosophy of African history findings encompassed modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis, and Africa as ahistorical. In another respect, concerning a decolonised philosophy of African history, the analysis of data generated the following themes Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African Agency, and African self-consciousness.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY

6.1 Introduction

This dissertation began with Chapter 1, which was an attempt to introduce the study through investigating what is at stake concerning both the coloniality and a decolonised philosophy of African history through the lenses of the designated history academics in South Africa. Key to Chapter 1 was the endeavour to unearth the research problem that reviewed the situation on the ground as well as scholarly debates concerning the present research. The study then proceeded to Chapter 2 which, in the main, was a literature review. In Chapter 2, the literature search identified the research gap, the research possibilities that have been left out, and brought the philosophy of African history into dialogue with Western literature in general and African literature, in particular, to better articulate the epistemological, metaphysical, and ontological aspects of African history defined within the continent of Africa. The literature search showed that although extensive research has been carried out on decolonisation discourses, few studies have been able to draw structured research into the philosophy of African history. Chapter 3 went further to identify and explain the chosen theoretical framework for the study. For a detailed methodological undertaking of the research, the dissertation continued to Chapter 4, which offered a blueprint of decolonised forms of research methodology. This was not only consistent with the theoretical framework but also permitted the philosophy of African history to be theorised from an African-centred worldview with an intention to answer research questions. At the heart of Chapter 5 – and of the research at large, was an attempt to present the research findings from the data analysis described and explained in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 is the final chapter of this dissertation, and it is not only limited to the discussion of the research findings which were presented in Chapter 5 but also ties up the entire dissertation and maps out the reflections as well as implications of the study to the body of knowledge.

6.2 Discussion of the Research Findings

While the study appreciates that there is no fixed way of discussing the research findings and concluding the study, I employed the same themes that are found in Chapter 5 to ensure coherence throughout the study (Cassim, 2016; 2021). In fact, the discussion of research

findings in this chapter begins with the first critical research question, which is an attempt to comprehend how the designated history academics in South African institutions theorise the coloniality philosophy of African history. The findings discussed under the following themes, which arose from Chapter 5 points to the following: modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis and Africa as ahistorical. The discussion of the research findings advances to the second research question, which sought to address how the designated history academics in South African institutions theorise the decolonised philosophy of African history. The research findings on this question as presented in Chapter 5 are: Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and African self-consciousness. This study closely followed the literature which includes folk wisdom and proverbs and the theoretical framework considered in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to discuss and theorise the research findings with an attempt to explain whether or not the findings address research questions and confirm the literature search or not (Wa Thiong'o, 1997; 2005; Cassim, 2016; 2021). Additionally, as was mentioned in Chapter 1 with regards to my personal positionality and identity that I viewed reality as a social construct. This epistemological assumption implied that I, as a researcher, I am not divorced from knowledge and the universe. As part of society, I am, therefore, an active participant in the construction of knowledge (Maposa, 2014). Put simply, the African-centred theoretical framework, as well as paradigm, shows very well that my role in this study is that of researcher and participant since I am an active participant in producing knowledge. It is within these considerations guided by the theoretical framework as well as Afrocentric paradigm that in the discussion of findings I will be having personal interpretation concerning designated history academic's theorisation of the philosophy of African history.

6.2.1 History academics' theorisations of the coloniality of the philosophy of African history

What stands out in the research findings as mentioned in the previous chapter is that emblematic to the designated history academics in South Africa, coloniality of the philosophy of African history lies in the succeeding: modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis, and Africa as ahistorical. The designated history academic's theorisation of coloniality is sustained by the literature search with specific reference to it as being the cognitive empire that deprives other modes of knowing, producing knowledge and perspectives (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c).

6.2.1.1 Modernist conception of the philosophy of African history

The key finding as mentioned in Chapter 5 was expressed in terms of the modernist conception of the philosophy of African history. The designated history academics in South Africa explained as a philosophical worldview for African history whose metaphysics is in the conviction of "I think; therefore I am." This finding is linked to the coloniality of modernist thought in a sense that it is theorised in terms of it being a philosophy that is derived from outside the continent of Africa and whose structure of thought does not fully capture African history since it observes reality in an individualistic way rather than a community of learning which views nature of knowledge and reality to be a product of the collective. This is consistent with the literature as was mentioned in Chapter 2 by Lushaba (2009) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b), that due to the predicaments relating to modernity in Africa, the philosophy of African history has been produced in academic circles as it is done in Europe. That is to say, what exists as the philosophy of African history within African universities continues to be modernist both in form and content. The discussion of the modernist conception of the philosophy of African history will be done under the following subthemes: modernist conception of time, the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history, a modernist conception of gender studies in Africa, and Cartesian metaphysics in the philosophy of African history.

6.2.1.2 Modernist conception of time

As was reported in Chapter 5, the research finding on the coloniality of the philosophy of African history unveiled the first sub-theme to be the modernist conception of time. According to designated history academics in South Africa, the modernist conception of the time is framed from a Eurocentric conception of time. The designated history academics in South Africa view this modernist conception of time to be oriented linearly, such as pre-modern, modern, and post-modern and this conception has been applied to African history. This finding reinforces the argument posited in the literature review that African history is rendered to the general frameworks of periodisation of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern which are also linked to ahistory, prehistory, and History (Lushaba, 2009; Prah, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020a). The coloniality of this Western periodisation of African history, according to the designated history academics in South Africa, lies with the idea whereby you cannot study African history without thinking about the history of Africa as pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. This is in line with the conception from the literature that one of the problems of this colonial interlude of time is that colonialism becomes central to African history (Ajayi, 1969;

Lushaba, 2015; Prah, 2016; 2018). This is of concern for the philosophy of African history since colonialism and modernity are just a mere episode in Africa's long history which dates far back even before the birth of Europe.

As reported in Chapter 5, another aspect relating to the use of such philosophical time markers in African history, according to designated history academics in South Africa is how African history is subsumed into a linear Eurocentric conception of time. This fits well with scholars' critiques, as was cited in Chapter 2, that a modernist conception of time concerns itself with the idea of progress and emancipation and which reinforces linearity (Mbiti, 1990; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). The impression of such a European conception is that time linearly moves in one direction. The above underpins the coloniality of the modernist conception of time since that time that can be called African does not move in a linear motion but moves backwards (Diagne, 2017). Nonetheless, there is less evidence from the designated history academics in South Africa on how this can be applied in the study of African history.

Another finding in Chapter 5 relates to how the coloniality of modernist conception of time stated by designated history academics in South Africa structures South African Social history, Political history, and Economic history to have begun with the arrival of the Dutch in 1652 and also frames *Mfecane's* experiences as the pre-colonial story. This proved to be a colonial mindset from the literature by Asante (2019) and Mellet (2020) since historical, archaeological evidence proves beyond doubt that no one can dispute the indigeneity of Africans in the continent and South Africa which stretches far back colonial encounters. Such is true for *Mfecane's* experiences which can be discerned not as a pre-colonial encounter but as a story and experiences of Africans during colonial times. Nonetheless, designated history academics in South Africa failed to give satisfactory data concerning coloniality of the modernist conception of time besides the example of time markers and the 1652 paradigm.

6.2.1.3 The disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history

The findings in Chapter 5 revealed that the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history was a manifestation of coloniality. According to the designated history academics in South Africa, this systematic body of knowledge imposes on African history particular vocabulary, methodology, and methods. Key to the designated history academics' theorisation is how modernist philosophy created certain disciplinary boundaries of human life which include psychology, spirituality, and educational well-being. Of particular interest is how the educational well-being was to be catered for through subject disciplines within the modern

schooling system. It is to these subject disciplines that African history has had to conform for it to be considered worthy of study. This finding brings into conversation the arguments posited by Depelchin (2005), Henricks & Lushaba (2005), and Bhambra (2007) that when in the 1960s Africans accepted disciplinary history, they had disciplined it to Western coordinates of history.

With regards to the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history, the findings stressed the concern with disciplinary methods. For the designated history academics in South Africa, one of the issues with disciplinary methods is that African history is geared towards the empirical world through writing and to a lesser extent oral history. As evidenced from the literature review, Nabudere (2012) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019a) indicate that both the Dar es Salaam School of Social History and Ibadan School of Social History sought to map out methods in an attempt to recover African initiative which was silenced by disciplinary methods.

A further finding revealed in Chapter 5 on the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history was on methodology, which refers to the structure of thinking which informs methods. This, according to designated history academics in South Africa, is best illustrated by the outpost pedagogy, which refers to a blueprint that informs methods and activities of teaching and learning of African history but whose metaphysical foundations relates more to Europe than the African continent. The designated history academics in South Africa argued that the South African Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) lacks a new definition of what is history and has no clear articulation of the idea of history and philosophy of African history itself. To explain further what the designated history academics were saying, for example, in (CAPS) history is sometimes referred to as "learning how to think about the past, and by implication the present, in a disciplined way." This substantiates the literature claiming that African history was incorporated into the methodological boundaries of the Eurocentric framework of history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c; 2020c). This also approves the coloniality of the outpost pedagogy in the sense that it added forms of teaching in African history that are basically rooted in the modernist worldview. This has a bearing on the philosophy of African history in the sense an outpost pedagogy only attributes African history to the Western epistemic canon of comprehending history (Mbembe, 2015).

Another feature of the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history was acknowledged to be disciplinary vocabulary. As was expressed by the designated history academics in South Africa, all disciplines, including African history, pride themselves in

having conceptual categories which are applied in the academic discourse. Examples of such vocabulary included pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. This finding is discussed by Depelchin (2005) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020a) who warns about the shortfalls of using modernist vocabulary trans historically in understanding the long history of Africa. One concern about this finding on disciplinary vocabulary is that in History Education, historians must be cautious of using modern concepts in comprehending Africa's past which predates modernism. To illustrate further, according to the history academics, when re-reading of *Mfecane* migrations there is no way one can say Mzilikazi KaKhumalo and Soshangane crossed borders since borders were not there at the time.

Literature search alludes that the major problem with disciplinary vocabulary is that it is produced from the very Westernised universities in Africa which in turn produce professional historians where modernist and disciplinary vocabulary is a medium of intellectual and academic discourse (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). That is to say, even when historians want to map out decolonised conceptual categories beyond the ones in existence, they encounter major struggles since they have to subscribe to certain university conventions. The finding on disciplinary philosophy of African history is directly in line with the critique of the modernist conceptions alluded to in the literature review by Chakrabarty (2008) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2018b; 2018c) that modernity concerns itself with the spirit of science, rational outlook, and faith in progress. This result is broadly in line with coloniality since the vocabulary of rationality was not applied to African history since Africa was considered the site of darkness (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015d; 2018b; 2018c). More precisely, the term progress which gives meaning to the linear conception of history rooted in the vocabulary of premodern, modern, and postmodern is a European conception of history. The above finding on the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history under discussion showed very well the coloniality since it disciplined African history into methods, methodology, and vocabulary which is Western in nature.

6.2.1.4 Modernist conception of gender in African history

As reported in Chapter 5, the findings confirmed the relationship between the concept of patriarchy in African history to coloniality. One of the conceptual features of patriarchy, according to the designated history academics in South Africa, is how to some extent, in particular societies males are always the dominant figures. When the subject of patriarchy was discussed, the designated history academics in South Africa showed how foreign gender

distinction in African societies was. They traced the notion of patriarchy in Africa back to Western modernity, which emphasised physical differences among African people into female and male distinctions with the male as a leading figure. This result ties well with previous studies wherein Prah (2004) stipulates that patriarchy is inseparable from Western modernity. This is also supported by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020d) who argues that the women question emerged as an imposition in African societies such as the Yoruba in Nigeria. This turns out to be even more problematic since the gender issues are linked disciplinary nature of African history as it was concerned with his history compared to her history (Hendricks & Lushaba, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2005). This shows very well how the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history relates modernist conception of gender. Overall, this finding is in accordance with literature reported by Oyewumi (1997) and Mamdani (2018) that patriarchy comes from Victorian values imposed by modernity in African societies which defined men as heads of households and pushed females to the periphery in society.

The above finding and the related literature by Oyewumi (1997) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) explain how patriarchal questions remain European questions in the sense that even when one reads Western literature, it is dominated by fathers without mothers. This is linked to the finding below on Cartesian metaphysics, which depicts knowledge production, history in particular which is exclusively reserved for the man who has shown the capacity to think (Descartes, 2013; Mbembe, 2016).

6.2.1.5 Cartesian metaphysics in the philosophy of African history

Another research finding which was invoked in Chapter 5 pertains to Cartesian metaphysics, which is considered colonial by the designated history academics in South Africa. For the designated history academics in South Africa, Cartesian metaphysics symbolises the Western philosophical assumption of "I think, therefore I am." This implies that African history is not people's history but can only be qualified to distinct individuals who have shown the capacity for reasoning. This, in turn, philosophises history as a human-subject and the basis of this human subject is the capability of the human to think (Descartes, 2013). This, according to the designated history academics in South Africa, is problematic for African history because it does not only offer a Western outlook or structure of thought and the universe but also ensures and justifies the colonial enterprise in African societies since there is evidence for thought through disciplinary history. The consulted literature and theoretical framework confirm this to be problematic for African history in the sense that human beings in Cartesian thought are

subsumed to secular thought which determines their being (Amin, 2009). Even more profound, Wynter (2003) and Lushaba (2009) are directly interested in showing how Cartesian metaphysics denied non-Western people any history because the knowledge, in the modern world, was meant for people considered as human beings; the counterpoint to that argument would be non-humans.

Further literature on this finding reveals that, according to the designated history academics in South Africa, the Cartesian metaphysics had a bearing on African history since it centred on the colonial epistemic difference which classified non-Western people and Africans, in particular, to be (lesser knowers, knowing, and knowledge) and the ontological difference (lesser beings because they know less) (Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a; 2013b; 2019b). This means that the metaphysical nature of Cartesian thought vindicated the colonial enterprise as, through it, Europe saw and thought of itself as the authority of everything on earth. It was also used to justify the re-defining of African societies out of humanness on the pretext that in Africa they could not find disciplines which embodied rational thinking. This is well supported by Mbembe (2015) that the Western epistemic tradition of Cartesian thought claims detachment of the known from the knower. This substantiates the previous argument raised by designated history academics in South Africa concerning how Cartesian metaphysics detaches the thinking part from the emotional part. Cartesian metaphysics rests on a division between mind and world, or between reason and nature as ontological priori (Mbembe, 2016). No wonder the knowing subject (Europe) is thus able to know the world without being part of that world through perspectives of seeing itself as being universal (Mbembe, 2015; 2016).

Nonetheless, the designated history academics in South Africa did not escalate to discuss the broader effects of Cartesian metaphysics with respect to the study of African history. More than justifying colonialism in Africa, Cartesian metaphysics as referred to in the above discussion of findings through designated history academics in South Africa and literature search by Descartes (2013) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) ensured a Western individualistic way of looking at the universe. This, in turn, proved to be problematic in the African philosophical theoretical framework since African history or knowledge and humanity are viewed to be the same. There was never a way for African people can separate the thinking part from the emotional part just as they could not separate the African from the universe. The idea of separating human beings from themselves and the universe for them to know anything about their history thereby creating an object is fundamentally Western in nature. Due to this,

no wonder the episteme in African philosophy of history is neo-liberal since the concern is with individuals who have demonstrated capacity for thought.

6.2.2 Emphasis on African crisis

The finding on the African crisis as was mentioned in Chapter 5 entails debates on the empty land thesis in South Africa, the ethic of domination, and slavery, all showing the coloniality of the philosophy of African history. According to the research finding, emphasis on the African crisis denotes a special situation on how African history is represented and redefined in terms of calamity and negative aspects than contributions to world history at large. The designated history academics in South Africa claimed that the empty land thesis invokes the idea that the *Mfecane* wars with King Shaka KaSenzangakhona as a leading figure led to Africans killing one another to the extinction such that Afrikaners found empty land upon their arrival in South Africa. A similar conclusion in the literature search was reached by Cobbing (1988) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b; 2013c; 2018b; 2020d) that the African crisis was used to deny that Europeans ever dispossessed Africans of their land and it was used as an alibi for colonisation.

From the results in Chapter 5, it was clear that according to the designated history academics in South Africa, the African crisis was also centred on the idea of the ethic of domination. The designated history academics in South Africa alludes that one of the definitive aspects of the ethic of domination is the obsession about being victorious in battles, great leaders, and powerful kingdoms. This substantiates the concern within the literature where Depelchin (2005) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) warn that when African history was accepted as a discipline, it was incorporated into the European worldview concerned about great empires, great leaders, and seizing certain kingdoms. This worldview is problematic for African history since it silences other contributions that went on in African societies and only looks for 'great men' such as Mansa Musa and Shaka Zulu as was the case in Western history concerning figures such as Adolf Hitler and Napoleon Bonaparte (Depelchin, 2005).

Further findings on the African crisis related to the notion of slavery. The finding reveals that although slavery happened everywhere, there is something different about the Western trans-Atlantic slave trade, particularly how it took people's humanity. This relates to the emphasis on the African crisis as coloniality of the philosophy of African history since it justifies the ethic of domination in a form of slavery. This is denied by Page (2001), who points out that Africans also enslaved each other prior to the Western trans-Atlantic slave trade. Nonetheless, slavery, according to Mbembe (2017), denotes a process, through which Africans were reduced

into human objects, human commodities, and human money. Also, not only were they deprived of their own names and their own language but extends to their lives and their work to be owned by those who shared the conviction that they are fewer human beings (Mbembe, 2017; 2019). Once more, forms of governance in Africa by Diop (1988) and Page (2001) underline that Africans were seen more as servants because they enjoyed some liberties such as getting married which were not found in mercantile philosophy in the West. What stands for this study, is the pitfalls as warned in the previous theme of employing Western conceptual categories transhistorical in understanding African forms of being and cognising which stretches far beyond the encounter with Europe. That is to say, in the vocabulary of African forms of life the concept of slavery was not in existence. This shows how Emphasis on African crisis relates to disciplinary vocabulary. This, in turn, points to the necessity of the philosophy of African history to cleanse itself from European concepts.

6.2.3 Africa as Ahistorical

This research finding foregrounded in Chapter 5 tackles the often-controversial issue of Africa as ahistorical. The designated history academics in South Africa argued how the supposition that there is nothing that can be called African history is colonial for the philosophy of African history. The designated history academics in South Africa posited that the denial that Africans could ever have a history dismembered Africa and denied the humanity of Africans. This finding found evidence in the literature claiming that Africa had no history (Hegel & Sibree, 2004).

A critique of Hegel comes from Grosfoguel (2007) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c) that the denial of both history and humanity has many markers such as people having no souls, civilisation, history, development, democracy. In other words, when it was said Africans have no history, they were equated to animals that have no history. This is despite the argument by Diop (1954, 1991, 1993), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a; 2018b), and Asante (2019) that Africa is not just a cradle of civilisation, but a cradle of humankind. This in large part, displays, how Western academics such as Hegel and Trevor-Roper were part of the colonial body of thought of the Western world, which began from Greece-Roman times, right up to modernity.

Unlike the critique against Hegel in above, Participant A and Participant E presented a refreshing analysis concerning the conception of Africa as ahistorical. For them, it could be true that Africa is ahistorical for scholars like Hegel in the sense that he was looking for disciplinary history in Africa using Western analytical tools, such as seeing people through

disciplines like history, philosophy, and anthropology. My literature search has not confirmed that to some extent Hegel was correct to articulate that Africa was beyond the grasp of history because he was in search of disciplinary history as informed by Western literature. Even more profound, this reinforces the same argument used in the above themes about colonial knowledge being disciplinary. This validates the findings to be an uncommon view in the academic circles of History Education. To exemplify the coloniality of this, designated history academics in South Africa revealed that Hegel is clear about where history begins. For Hegel, history begins with Europe. It is the spirit that emanates from Europe. Symbolic to this usurpation of world history was the re-writing of the whole history of humanity posited as progressing from the Greek and Roman classical world to European capitalism, right to the triumphalism of the United States of America as the sole world superpower (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a).

6.3 History academics' theorisations of a decolonised philosophy of African history

This section discusses the research findings on the second research question about what ought to be a decolonised philosophy of African history. The research findings according to the designated history academics displayed that a decolonised philosophy of African history tends to be used to refer to an unconventional body of thought with new modes and ways of seeing, writing, and discerning African history from an African centred worldview. The above is well substantiated by a literature search by Mbembe and Nuttall (2004) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020c) that a decolonised philosophy of African history refers to the writing, thinking, and interpreting of the world from an African-centred worldview. The discussion of the research findings is in accordance with the following themes: an Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and African self-consciousness.

6.3.1 Africanist conception of the philosophy African history

Considerable insight was gained in Chapter 5 concerning an Africanist as a decolonised conception of the philosophy of African history according to the designated history academics. A pattern of this key finding was obtained in the literature by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c; 2020c) that the Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history refers to a right to think, theorise, interpret the world, develop own methodologies, and write from an African centred worldview and unencumbered by Eurocentrism. At the core of this African-centered worldview is Africa as a base of historical analysis as clearly long-established in these sub-

themes: Africanist conception of time, the holistic nature of African phenomena, the Africanist conception of gender in African history, and Ubuntu metaphysics. Evidently, the research findings under discussion in this section are in direct contrast to the ones in the first theme discussed earlier in this chapter.

6.3.1.1 Africanist conception of time

The Africanist conception of time is the leading research finding identified in the previous chapter under this theme. The finding, according to the designated history academics in South Africa, implies not only a critique of the colonial conception of time but attempts to theorise African time. The findings referred to a need for a re-periodisation of the Africanist conception of time. The critique offered an insight concerning time in an African-centred worldview, which is not stagiest but denotes temporalities and cycles. This, for the designated history academics in South Africa, embodies how Africans carried and defined themselves across time and space. According to the designated history academics in South Africa, the notion of cycles in Africanist time demonstrates the complexity of African life which begins long before the birth of a child and continues long thereafter. The literature on the subject matter by Mbiti (1990) and Diagne (2017) confirmed through the use of Swahili words *Sasa* (nowness) and *Zamani* (past) that time, when actualised in the present form (Sasa), disappears into *Zamani* (past). The present is continually in motion towards the past, meaning that time is not linear, but it moves backward to *Zamani*. This is partly because time in Africanist centered worldview is a composition of the things that have occurred, those which are taking place, and those that are immediately to occur, but it differs from European linear conception since future carries events which have not yet occurred (Mbiti, 1990; Diagne, 2017). The benefit of the Africanist conception of time according to designated history academics in South Africa is that at first, it disputes the Eurocentric lie of South African history beginning in 1652 paradigm falls off because conceptual categories of time are no longer the Western transposed categories of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial but talks to particular times and cycles. That is to say, African's focus is on how Africans self-defined themselves without ever featuring colonialism since colonialism is just a drop in an ocean in African history.

According to the designated history academics' theorisation, the Africanist conception of time contradicts South African exceptionalism. Through the Africanist conception of time, the designated history academics in South Africa contends that South African exceptionalism does not find expression in the sense that the writing of the history of the continent from the vintage

point, the modern colonial political and conceptual categories will inevitably give way to the narrative of temporalities or cycles. Such is the case with the early Iron Age civilisation in the Southern part of Africa where people were not organised into border names such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, and many others but human nature determined where they could be at what time. This is not to present Africa as a homogeneous entity but is the necessity to point out linkages in African history. The exceptional part of South Africa to the rest of Africa was by scholars such as (Nabudere, 2012, Mbembe, 2015; 2016, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015d and Mamdani, 2018). Contrary to the above literature, Mamdani (2018) demystifies the argument for South African exceptionalism by proving that Apartheid was nothing peculiar, and it was, in fact, colonialism. To attend to this viewpoint a little further, Hendricks & Lushaba (2005) and Mamdani (2018) concluded that indirect rule employed by Apartheid was a generic form of rule for all colonies in Africa. This relates to decolonised philosophy of time since it debunks South African exceptionalism which points to the idea that throughout time and space Africa has had linkages from North to South, West to East.

This research shows how the notion of time as cycles can be utilised in a decolonised philosophy of African history. The notion of a cycle is not only limited to birth, initiation, and death; rather it refers to the totality of the African experience. This is decolonising in the sense that the focus is on Africans and whatever life they were living and how that cycle of life moved on without factoring in colonialism. The attention is on Africans irrespective of whether they were going to be colonised or not. Nonetheless, a number of questions regarding a cyclic conception of the Africanist conception of time remain to be addressed since designated history academics in South Africa did not attend to the issue that a cyclic conception implies that history repeats itself. This was not discussed in terms of what it implies for African history.

6.3.1.2 The holistic nature of African phenomena

As presented in Chapter 5, another way of decolonising the philosophy of African history, according to the designated history academics, relates to acknowledging the holistic nature of African phenomena. Unlike the disciplinary nature of African history, the holistic nature of African phenomena according to designated history academics in South Africa symbolises the totality of African forms of life and history thus included. This complex but inclusive holistic nature of African phenomena which can include the physical, spiritual, educational, historical, and political is confirmed by Wa Thiongo (1997; 2005) that what becomes African literature for academic discourse is a result of an actual process of eating, drinking, loving, singing,

poetry and politics which happens as Africans give meaning to life and universe. More literature on the holistic nature of African phenomena comes from Mbiti (1990; 2015), Maposa (2018), and Salami (2020) that as they went through life, African peoples observed the world around them and reflected upon it. It is in consideration of the above that knowledge production and African history in particular is a result of the experiences of human beings with their immediate environment. This finding is decolonial since it offers the philosophy of African history lenses which in the main do not end with the contributions of Africans in the empirical world only but focus also on metaphysical features concerning the history of the continent which is not part of the mainstream study of African history. For these reasons, designated history academics' theorisation of the holistic nature of the African phenomena makes sense since the holistic nature of African phenomena is integrated such that it becomes impossible for one's life, in a day, in twenty-four hours to discipline it into sociological, historical, philosophical, and religious. All of those things are intertwined in African forms of life. In other terms, this finding is also decolonial in the sense that Africans gain meaning through the relationship with the universe, history, and spirituality since they are a part of a whole.

The designated history academics' theorisation of the holistic nature of African phenomena enhances the quest for a decolonised philosophy of African history since, at the outset, it begs a question as to how the Africans saw their place in nature or the universe. It also answers where Africans saw themselves in history and how they expressed their concept of epistemology, ontology, and how all these were the same. This finding is linked and essential to the ancient African proverbs which allude to *Africa Know Thyself.* That is to say, an African is a microcosm of the universe. The universe exists within them and thereby studying yourself through history, folklore, music, and proverbs one comes to know the universe. This is something of great concern for this research since the part of decolonising philosophy of African history are the struggles for Africa to know thyself. Nonetheless, there exists little or old literature on the subject matter which reveals that discussions of the holistic nature of African phenomena have not received much attention in the mainstream discourses.

6.3.1.3 Africanist conception of gender in African history

The findings in Chapter 5 also linked decolonisation to gender neutrality/fluidity in contrast to patriarchy. In other terms, the above signifies the complex nature of gender studies in African history by stressing that gender in African philosophy was interchangeable, fluid, and matriarchal. The fluidity and matriarchal nature of the Africanist conception of gender in

African history tally well in the search of the literature since matriarchy does not refer to societies whom the female figure was always at the centre but denotes to balance societies that were beneficial to both male and females (Diop, 1988). Nonetheless, the designated history academics did not offer conceptual categories for societies where women were dominant over men. Reasoning from these facts, designated history academics demonstrated that in African society the gender question of patriarchy is foreign in the sense that in nearly all African societies gender was not only limited to the physical features but was also spiritual. It is the decolonial literature search of Oyewumi (1997) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) that social classification in societies such as Yoruba was not in terms of anatomic distinction or body-type, but the foundation of social ranking was in terms of seniority which was defined by relative age. They emphasised that in African societies identities were fluid and life was mutual. The finding by, designated history academics makes sense that Africans depended on each other equally. African spirituality as one of the features mentioned by designated history academics in South Africa as amongst features that determined one's role in society irrespective of gender makes sense since if society needed a healer, somebody had to be a healer. More so, that healer did not have to be the older one, male or female but it could be anyone. Human nature was not just the physical or skin born and flesh decision but also metaphysical or supernatural in the sense if the stars fall on anyone regardless of his/her gender the faith of that society is determined by that somebody. The issue of defining the position of the one in society by saying he or she did this because of their gender is from a modernist perspective of viewing African history. The designated history academics in South Africa explained this argument by saying that, in African societies, the male was not always at the leading front, as climbing the social ladder was sometimes dependent on supernatural issues and to some extent seniority. On the basis of this, the history academics in South Africa concluded that gender-related issues in African societies were fluid and matriarchal. The literature review confirms the above finding on the fluidity and matriarchal part of gender in African history. It is Prah (2004) whose research proves that in societies like Ghana women had contributed to various roles depending on the context and historical circumstances of the time. Nonetheless, the literature is not clear as to whether it is referring to which Ghana? The empire or the country. Such was the situation in Southern Africa where societies like the Zulu are said to have been shaped by women such as Queen Regent Mkabayi kaJama, Queen Nandi kaMbengi (Shamase, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019b). Another example is Ethiopia, where the Queen of Sheba is said to have been a significant figure (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). Unfortunately, the designated history academics did not clarify whether these examples show

the norm or the exceptions. With that being said, the finding by designated history academics makes sense since in African societies one's role in society was never about gender and masculinity but was also spiritual in the sense that nature and stars determined who was to lead if society needed a leader. If it is not stars, it could be the ancestral world that determined one's role in society. This is true since in African societies if there is a level of reality that gives meaning to everything else is the universe that is spiritual in nature.

Chapter 5 also revealed that at the center of decolonised gender studies in Africa referred to matriarchy. Nevertheless, the matriarchal part of African societies in this research is employed not to refer to societies with a female as a leading figure but talks to the societies in which where there is a balance that is complementary to both the male and the female. This finding confirms the literature review by Diop (1988), Mbiti (1990), Shamase (2014) and Salami (2020) that most African societies were matriarchally exemplified by figures such as Charlotte Maxeke, Queen of Sheba, Queen Nandi. Nonetheless, the literature, as well as designated history academics in South Africa, did not explain explicitly what they did that was a manifestation of matriarchy. While the finding is decolonial but the theorisation from history academics did not reveal other parts of African societies to prove the matriarchal nature of Africa. The use of matriarchy sustains the research finding on fluidity since literature search and theorisation by designated history academics in South Africa denotes matriarchy to be a society centered on domination by females but a society but denotes to balance societies that were beneficial to both males and females.

6.3.1.4 Ubuntu metaphysics

In the quest for decolonised philosophy of African history, another key finding which emerged clearly in Chapter 5, is the acknowledgment of Ubuntu metaphysics. The designated history academics in South Africa emphasised how, in African philosophy, a person is not a person unless there are other people or, in other words, a person is a person through people. This Ubuntu metaphysics offers forms of looking at African history, not from a singular perspective, but through a community of learning. Furthermore, designated history academics in South Africa showed how through Ubuntu metaphysics history is a cycle that begins from the ancestral world, and which continues long after one's death. This is consistent with the argument by Mbembe (2015; 2016) that we need to reinvent the classroom without walls where the classroom of African history becomes a community of co-research and co-learning between a lecturer and students. This is supported by Nabudere (2005), Maposa (2018), and Tabhu

(2018) that Ubuntu metaphysics entails the class as one community that shares wisdom in a roundtable sense and whereby both learners and teachers contribute to the knowledge economy.

The above finding by the designated history academics in South Africa is essential for decolonisation in a sense it suggests a different set up of lecture halls and classrooms form a linear format towards circles. The notion of circles is well substantiated by a literature search in Tabhu (2018) that emphasises the idea that such classrooms are rooted in the ideals of one community that shares wisdom in a round table. This also entails how the study of African history through Ubuntu metaphysics goes beyond studying for knowing but the attempt is to develop consciousness and growth. This in turn does not only create a situation where a teacher is at once a learner and a learner is at once a teacher, but it creates an environment that is open to debates.

6.3.2 Emphasis on African agency

The findings in Chapter 5 also posed African agency at the heart of a decolonised philosophy of African history. The finding referred to a focus on African initiative in the study of African history. In emphasising African agency, the designated history academics in South Africa gave the examples of the cataclysmic changes in Southern Africa in the 1820s to have been not due to King Shaka KaSenzangakhona, but as part of the nation-building process resulting from pressures from the Portuguese based at Delagoa Bay, the Dutch and the English based at Cape Colony, the British based at Port Natal and missionaries who were involved in slave-trade. Simply put, the designated history academics in South Africa link the resistance and the survival of Africans against the colonial expansion to the events of *Mfecane*. Literature confirms that African leaders, such as Mzilikazi of the amaNdebele, Zwangendaba of the amaNgoni, Soshangane of the amaShangane, and Shaka of the amaZulu in the academic circles of conventional philosophy of African history were not the causes of the *Mfecane* upheavals, and they should be perceived as capable leaders for the state-formation and nation-building (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019b). An even greater source of concern on the topic is John D. Omer-Cooper's naming of the *Mfecane* and its consequences as the nineteenth-century revolution in Bantu African and underlining that Mzilikazi, Zwangendaba, Soshangane, and others as genius leaders who demonstrated capacity for state-making and agents in African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Such was the case for the revisionist philosophy on African history that according to Cobbing, the *Mfecane* was not caused by the rise of King Shaka and the Zulu kingdom but by the slave trade from the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay, the Dutch and the English

based at the Cape Colony (Cobbing, 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 2019b; 2020a). What Cobbing's thesis points out is that the *Mfecan*e was entangled in the rise of mercantilist and proto-industrial capitalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a).

The designated history academics in South Africa also emphasised the necessity to debunk the notion of Africans arriving in South Africa in the 17th century at the same time as their White counterparts. What the designated history academics in South Africa argued was that denying African existence in what is now South Africa before the 17th century equates to denying the agency of Africans in South African history. Literature confirms the above finding the debunking the myth of Africans being foreign to South Africa. This myth has been disputed and placed on the shelf by extensive historical and archaeological evidence that Bantu-speaking people had established in Southern Africa 2 000 years ago particularly on the plateau between Limpopo and Zambezi River what was known as Early Iron Age Civilisation (Moyana, Sibanda & Gumbo, 1984; Huffman, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b;2018b; 2020a; 2020b). Archaeological evidence has also demonstrated that places such as Limpopo, Transvaal, Eastern Cape, and Natal-Swazi borders were homes of early hominids known as ancestors of homo-sapiens (Klein, 1984; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; Asante, 2019). In other words, rich archaeological literature disputes the colonial discourse of Europeans and Bantu (Africans) arriving in South Africa at the same time in the seventeenth century, thus giving the Africans agency by acknowledging their history.

The third way of acknowledging African agency, as given by the designated history academics in South Africa, is a need to write African history beyond analogy. Chapter 5 revealed a significant finding that the philosophy of African history is not concerned with either ethic of domination or the writing of African history with which is centred on a comparison between African history and Western history. The consulted scholarly work of Ugandan luminary thinker Mamdani (2018) also warns about humans whose history is not to be written by analogy to compare with others but is silent on the ethic of domination in African history. This finding makes sense that history for Africans is not only limited to civilisation and ethic of domination as it is the case in the West but refers to how Africans self-defining themselves and whatever they did to live, and that history is about how people dealt with the environment, domestication of animals and plants and history of self-improvement and self-definition.

6.3.3 African self-consciousness

The final finding on the philosophy of African history, as presented in Chapter 5, is on African self-consciousness. According to the designated history academics in South Africa, African self-consciousness encompasses philosophical lenses upon which Africans see their history for themselves which in the main, carries African personality and form of awareness or consciousness. According to the designated history academics in South Africa, African self-consciousness joins the struggles for epistemic freedoms in Africa. The quest to return to the base which designated history academics in South Africa is explained to be an epistemic repositioning of the world through which the African worldview concerning their history is a departure point. The literature is in line with the above finding that part of the struggles to return to the sources points out the fact that Africans had their own indigenous and legitimate education system in pre-colonial society (Nabudere, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017a). This argument views Africans as legitimate knowers and producers of knowledge. More literature on the subject matter underlines that Africa has to be at the centre of this epistemic repositioning of the world, which implies taking African scholarship as a point of departure for Africans to see themselves and where they are from (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004; Wa Thiong'o, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c; 2020c). Subsequent to the above is a quest for shifting the geo- and bio-of knowledge or moving the centre (Wa Thiong'o, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). This finding points out that part of a decolonised philosophy of African history is an attempt to write history for Africans, by Africans with an aim to give meaning to their existence in the material world and cosmic universe.

Further debates on the finding of the quest for African self-consciousness are identified in Chapter 5 by designated history academics in South Africa in the quest for a new definition of history and philosophy of African history. The consulted literature affirms that part of the epistemic struggles for African self-consciousness is a much-needed new definition of history and the philosophy of African history. According to designated history academics in South Africa, for Africans, history is the clock that people use to tell their time of day. It is a human compass they use to find themselves on the map of human geography. It tells them where they have been, who they are, where they are, but most importantly, what they must be. The relationship of African history to the people is the same as the relationship of the mother to her child (Clarke, 1996; Asante, 2019). This finding by designated history academics in South Africa is essential since in the academic discourse history is made to be the unattractive study of things that happened ages ago – and whenever mentioned it is disciplined to key leaders,

powerful kingdoms, and who conquered who. Nonetheless, this finding views history and African history through the eyes of African self-consciousness which denotes it to be not just the dates about one from birth and having been involved in certain activities but is a continuation of life that begins with the ancestors, and it continues long after one being. That is to say, history through African self-consciousness is a study of the self, which allows the African personality to appreciate responsibility to the ones that came before him or her and to the ones to come after him or her.

The finding foregrounded in Chapter 5 refers to rehumanising philosophy. The designated history academics in South Africa mentioned a special case that is integral to a decolonised philosophy of African history is the one that restores the being of Africans through the inclusion of Africa as a historical site of intellectual discourse. The reviewed literature confirms that the key to decolonising the philosophy of African history is to rehumanise Africans. As such, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017a; 2018b) notes that denial of epistemic virtue automatically disqualified one of his or her being. It is against this background that Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b) posits that as a people, Africans were always there in human history. They were never creatures of discovery but were always present and Africa was never a dark continent or a continent without history. Africans always had their own valid, legitimate, and useful knowledge systems and education. This is the argument of Diop (1955), Nabudere (2011;2012) and Asante (2019) that African history was and is a history of Black people who had invented, amongst other things, "mathematics, astronomy, the calendar, sciences in general, arts, religion, agriculture, social organisation, medicine, writing, technique, architecture." This confirms that there is a need for a rehumanising philosophy of African history which includes Africa, contrary to the postulations of Western scholars such as Hegel, and Roper who contended that African history begins when Europeans come to the shores of Africa. While history is linked with Western civilisation, the decolonised philosophy of African history should not be about civilisation but about people self-defining themselves across time and space.

6.3.4 The summary of the discussion of findings

The research findings presented in Chapter 5 have been discussed above using literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The discussion of research findings shows that a modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on the African crisis, and viewing Africa as ahistorical confirmed the coloniality of the philosophy of African history. These tenets of coloniality were seen to be theoretically derived from the Western conception of the philosophy

of history which excludes African modes of interpreting, writing, and theorising African history.

The discussion of research findings also revealed that the Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and promotion of African self-consciousness confirmed the decoloniality of a decolonised philosophy of African history. These tenets of decolonisation motivated unconventional modes of thinking, writing and theorising African history by Africans, for themselves in an attempt to self-define themselves.

6.4. Theorisation of the research findings through African philosophy

In this section, I theorise the research findings on the philosophy of African history by means of the theoretical framework of African philosophy and decolonial theory as discussed in Chapter 3. As was explained in Chapter 3, the considered theoretical framework of African philosophy and decolonial theory is mainly employed for the subsequent motives: First, the attempt was to guide the conceptualisation of the problem study, development of the research purpose and questions, selection of the research approach, data collection methods, and analysis (Larsen and Adu, 2021). Second, African philosophy and decolonial theory as a theoretical framework was deployed for orientation and analytical purposes of the philosophy of African history (Blanche et al., 2006). Simply put, African philosophy and decolonial theoretical framework were a means to carry out research inquiry from an African-centred perspective (Larsen and Adu, 2021). Simply put, I elected to theorise the history academic's findings concerning the philosophy of African history through African philosophy since the study is decolonial. Along this line of thought, I will theorise the research findings through two strands of African philosophy, which are: professional philosophy, and ethno-philosophy since the findings by the designated history academics in South Africa seemed to fall on the two strands. Moreover, I will make meaning of the research findings by explaining how they either tallied or did not tally with each of the strands of African philosophy. Where African philosophy did not tally with the findings, I employed decolonial theory. With regards to decolonial theory, as has been said in Chapter 3, while this study is aware of the pluriversity nature of decolonial theory and that the main concern is that decolonial theory actually started in Latin America with Latin American scholars such as Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano and Boaventura de Sousa Santos to mention a few (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b). However, the employed decolonial theory for this study leans more on African decolonial thinkers such as Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Achille Joseph Mbembe, Ibekwe Chinweizu, Valentin Y.

Mudimbe, and Ngugi Wa Thiong'o to mention a few since the study is centred from an African centred perspective (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c).

6.4.1 Professional philosophy

The first key findings on the coloniality of the philosophy of African history with respect to designated history academics in South Africa can be understood as a modernist conception of the philosophy of African history. Importantly, the results provide evidence for the modernist philosophy of African history to be organised in terms of the modernist conception of time, the disciplinary nature of the philosophy of African history, a modernist conception of gender studies in Africa, and Cartesian metaphysics in the philosophy of African history. The bottom line raised by the finding was in terms of it being entrenched in the Western philosophy of history, which is individualistic, linear, disciplinary, and patriarchal. These findings are consistent with the professional philosophy which is a set of texts written by Africans and explained a philosophical by the authors themselves (Hountondji, 1996; Matolino, 2008). This theory is aligned with the modernist conception of the philosophy of African history in a sense that professional school alludes that philosophy has the same meaning everywhere, what differs are the problems under investigation (Osha, 2008; Wiredu, 2008). It is against these considerations that the modernist conception of the philosophy of African history is linear, disciplinary, and patriarchal because it is rooted in professional philosophy which supports Western philosophy of history which is self-determining. In other words, it is capable of giving itself its own laws. Such is a case for modernist conception for the philosophy of African history that Europe came to a logical conclusion of thinking about knowledge in the individual I. Simply put, knowledge is possessed by individuals since African history is done as is the case in Western thought.

This theme which linked the coloniality of the philosophy of African history to an emphasis on African crisis is also aligned with professional philosophy as a theoretical framework in the sense that professional philosophy lies on the metaphysical values of being universal across time and space and begins to look at other events outside of Europe in a paradigm of difference or crisis (Hountondji, 1996; Wiredu, 2008; Osha, 2008; Eze and Metz, 2015). That is to say, since Europe is entrenched in metaphysical values, it now thought about itself as God-like, it could not exercise its God-like power over Europe; it had to find other people to be subservient beings to it. It is within these considerations that African history has always been understood in terms of crisis since it is the history of subservient beings. This assumption was also extended

to the third finding of Africa as ahistorical. This in large part, is due to the fact that professional philosophy theory was convinced that the academic discourse and methods of doing philosophy should be the same as it is in the West (Matolino, 2008; Osha, 2010). It is against this background that Africa is said to be ahistorical since thinkers such as Hegel and Hugh-Trevor Roper were in search of disciplinary African history which was not the case in the continent. In other words, while professional African philosophy is derived from the African continent, but its metaphysical foundations support a colonial philosophy as well.

6.4.2 Ethno-philosophy

With regards to what is at stake with the decolonised philosophy of African history through designated history academics in South Africa, the study mentioned the first findings with reference to the Africanist conception of philosophy of African history. It is also well acknowledged that the Africanist conception of African history denotes modes of seeing, writing, and interpreting African history from an African centred worldview through the following: Africanist conception of time, the holistic nature of African phenomena, the Africanist conception of gender in African history, and Ubuntu metaphysics. At the heart of the above finding lies that time entitled African which is cycles and temporalities. It also includes the holistic nature of the African phenomena which views African history in totality. All these findings bring into dialogue the ethno-philosophy, which is a school of thought that concerns itself with the worldviews of Africans, their myth, folk-wisdom, aesthetics as philosophy (Osha, 2010; Nabudere, 2011). Ethno-philosophy takes a holistic approach to knowledge production (Letseka, 2000; Chilisa and Preece, 2005). Overall, this theory is in accordance with the findings that from the African conception of the philosophy of African history, knowledge is discerned through horizontal lines which signify openness to dialogue amongst different epistemic traditions (Imbo, 1998, Mbiti, 1990, Mbembe, 2015; 2016). That is to say, through this theory the Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history shares wisdom in a round table since the emphasis is on the community of learning (Achebe, 2009; Maposa, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; Tabhu, 2018). With regards to the time, the theory finds a similar conclusion to the research findings. However, when theorising the finding of the Africanist conception of time, it must be pointed out that the theory alluded to the fact that does not take a linear direction but moves backward from Sasa back to Zamani (Mbiti, 1990; Diagne, 2017). In another light, selected history academics in South Africa discerned time in temporalities and cycles.

Explicit reference to the third finding of African self-consciousness the designated history academics in South Africa referred to as ethno-philosophy. At the center of ethno-philosophy lies the conviction that the teaching and learning of African history should develop a certain amount of consciousness since the centrality of learning is wisdom (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; Tabhu, 2018). More so, linking it to African history, this meant if you are teaching a particular topic and you consider yourself as one community. Besides intellectual sharing wisdom. This is asking what wisdom this means to all of us him included. By wisdom and going back to ancient Egypt there is a close connection between wisdom and consciousness. In other words, this is developing consciousness and wisdom at the same time. Each topic should develop wisdom within us, not just for the sake of knowing but for growth. This theory is consistent with the finding which concerns itself with critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality.

6.4.3 Decolonial theory

Concerning the second result on emphasis on African agency, the four trends of African philosophy were silent which necessitated the study to employ decolonial thought as a theoretical framework for this study. The decolonial theory is not only an enduring political and epistemological movement intended for the liberation of the (ex) colonised peoples from global coloniality but also as a way of thinking, knowing, and doing (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015b). It is about abandoning the Eurocentric colonial paradigm that continues to lessen African people into objects rather than as subjects of knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013c). The finding on emphasis on African agency is directly in line with the theory since the attempt is to demonstrate the African initiative or a liberating perspective. That is to say through this theory's intervention is that it strives to cast a positive light on African history. Emphasis on African agency is articulated through a decolonial theory Shaka is not the explanation for wars, conflicts of the 1820s but it was a 'nineteenth-century revolution in Bantu Africa' and emphasises the fact that African leaders such as Mzilikazi of the amaNdebele, Zwangendaba of the amaNgoni, Soshangane of amaShangane and others non-Nguni leaders such as Sebetwane of the Kololo, demonstrated African genius in state-making and nation-making thus being important makers of African history (Cobbing, 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 2019b; 2020a). More precisely, Africans were not the cause for the changes of the 1820s but a product. African societies were caught within the European net which transformed them over a long period in reaction to the attention of external plunder (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 2019b).

6.5 Reflections of the study

This section is a reflection on how the process of research went considering the nature of what I was trying to achieve concerning a decolonised philosophy of African history through the theoretical contributions of designated history academics in South Africa. This reflection will focus on the findings and methodology.

6.5.1. Findings

With respect to research findings, the struggle I met was in terms of some of the designated history academics in South Africa saying more while others said less. This was due, in large part, motivated by the fact that decolonisation discourses seem to be simple at a surface level while in reality, they demand profound and deeper intellectual reflections (Mbembe, 2015). Nevertheless, the research findings confirm that I was able to respond to the set of research questions. On the first research question which concerned itself with the coloniality of the philosophy of African history, the analysis led to the following conclusions: modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis and Africa as ahistorical. On the second research question concerning a decolonised philosophy of African history, the analysis led to the subsequent conclusions: Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and African self-consciousness. This means that I managed to achieve the objectives of the research.

6.5.2 Methodology

As has been the case throughout the study, the attempt was not only to comprehend the designated history academics' theorisation of a decolonised philosophy of African history but to contribute to decolonised research methodologies as well. As such, my paradigm was Afrocentric in the sense that while research conventions tend to focus on the interpretivist, critical and post-positivist paradigms I leaned more on the African-centred worldview of seeing and researching (Mkabela, 2005). That is to say, this study worked within the Afrocentric lenses which encourage world outlooks or researching that are contextually based on where we are (Zondi & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b; 2020c). This is consistent with what has been obtained in the literature concerning moving the center of this epistemic repositioning of the world which deepen and pursue taking African scholarship as a point of departure as means of seeing for ourselves, thinking from where we are, and as a means of writing the world from an African metropolis (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004; Wa Thiong'o, 2016;

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018c; 2020c). To a greater extent, my study was Afrocentric in the sense that from the outset it was embedded in African literature right up to the end with an attempt to make it speak differently concerning the philosophy of African history. The adoption of an Afrocentric paradigm was yet another milestone in this research since it was not only aligned with the theoretical framework which was housed in African philosophy but also extends to the idea that the paradigm incorporated a cultural and social engagement as opposed to scientific distance as the best approach to understand the philosophy of African history. This thesis revealed very well that there was a great alignment between Afrocentrism and decoloniality despite the former being mainly propounded in Latin America. This is best illustrated in the search of literature by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018b; 2018c; 2020a) that decolonial theory is a collective name that encompasses the struggles for epistemic freedom in the Global South which embodies Latin America in general and Africa in particular.

In consideration of the foregoing, the data generation methods which were semi-structured interviews through skype and emails, due to Covid-19 lockdown restrictions, still enabled the nature of the engagement with designated history academics in South Africa to Afrocentric whereby power dynamics of one being a history academic and one being a student was a limitation but the Afrocentric paradigm empowered our dialogue to be one community of equals or a community of co-search and community co-learning. This could have been a different case in conventional ways of researching since power dynamics detaches the knower or academic to the student that is fed knowledge without active engagement since the former is less knowledgeable (Mbembe, 2016). As such, the Afrocentric nature of this study qualified the generated data to be analysed through the theoretical framework and literature search which was from an African centred worldview. Such was the case for the presentation and discussion of research findings which were that the truth is not limited to individuals but is grounded in the experiences of the community.

While I made considerable efforts to conduct an Afrocentric study, the drawback was that the university processes and conventions have not really adopted decolonised research methodologies, which made it problematic for me to undertake a study that is purely Afrocentric. This is largely because the institutional processes and conventions of conducting research are largely taught through one perspective of interpretive, critical, and positivist paradigms. A similar conclusion was obtained in the literature search by Mbembe (2016) the existing forms of research in Westernised universities still disregard other epistemic traditions. With respect to methodology, the struggle I encountered was in terms of designated history

academics in South Africa saying more and others saying less. This raised the colossal question as to why designated history academics in South Africa did not respond as much as I would have wanted them concerning certain questions. The analysis revealed that the inconsistency may be due to the undermentioned: First is that it could be my data generation methods were problematic in the time-consuming sense since academics are always under pressure for productivity. Second, it could be that the topic of decolonisation is too sensitive. Third, it could be that the research was too complicated that some people have not really thought about and they sought to work with what they know in the system. Fourth, it could be that the discourse on decolonisation sounds very simple at a surface level but reveals to be very complicated when one tries to be engaging in it as it relates to the philosophy of African history.

6.6 Implications of the study

Based on the conclusion and findings of the study, I employed the concept of the implications of the study with caution. While preparing for this study, I realised that the questions confronting the philosophy of African history are profoundly intellectual. To gain a deeper understanding concerning the implications of the study, this section employed three sub-sections: implications for current research, implications for future research, and implications on myself.

6.6.1 Implications for current research

This study showed that it is highly impossible to deal with the philosophy of African history without clarity on history, the idea of history, and African history itself. The broad implication of the present research is the urgency of studying how African history is since there has been an insurgence and resurgence of decolonisation discourse in South African universities. This wave has not extended itself fully to the field of History Education and philosophy of African history. Further implications for current research are certainly the use of modernist vocabulary and concepts transhistorical into understanding pre-colonial African history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020a). That is to say, when I tried to map out unconventional decolonised conceptual categories beyond the ones in existence, I encountered major struggles since I had to subscribe to certain university conventions and on the other hand, produce decolonised conceptual categories. This problem arises from the complex reality of how as a professional historian produced particularly by the vocabulary and concepts I learned during my training as a historian within a modern Westernised university where modernist vocabulary and concepts are a language of intellectual and academic discourse (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018b).

6.6.2 Implications for future research

For the sake of future research, these are the things that a researcher working within this field of study must consider. First is that a thorough decolonised research methodology is still a subject of concern since the research methodology in existence while it accepts the Afrocentric paradigm, but it is not yet fully decolonised given university conventions. Second is the struggle for unconventional forms of research which is not part of the mainstream academic discourse of African history. The research discloses that while it is correct to critique conventional Western conceptual categories transposed to African history, African scholars have not quite formulated unconventional African conceptual categories for the philosophy of African history. It is a question of future research to investigate African philosophy as a theoretical framework. Research on the subject of African philosophy besides countless efforts done by African scholars has been mostly restricted to the limited comparison of African philosophy versus Western philosophy. What has not been questioned are the metaphysical foundations of Western philosophy by professional African philosophers which at the centre lies in the Cartesian metaphysics according to which is a distinction between body and soul. Further research should be done to investigate and ground a decolonised metaphysics of African philosophy. Further still, the ongoing contestation between universalist and traditionalist schools on African philosophy resembles the unresolved problem of metaphysics (Agwuele, 2009; Osha, 2010).

6.6.3 Implications for myself

The present implication on myself encapsulates several epistemic questions that haunted me as I was trying to produce a decolonised philosophy of African history through the theoretical reflections of the designated history academics in South Africa. The first implication was the need to read extensively the African archive with an attempt to broaden my understanding of the colossal study of the philosophy of African history. What this study has shown me is that I would not have made it in this field of research without a supervisor who is well trained in the decolonial project and Africanist conventions. Another major implication I had to grapple with was the thin line embodied by decolonised conceptual categories such as Africanising, Africanist, decolonising, African philosophy, and philosophy of African history to mention a few. The more I thought about the conceptual categories, the more I realised they are complex, and it was easy to fall into the other. The overall implication of this study is that it strengthened my growth in the field of research through exposure to research canons which includes abstract,

problem statement, research questions, literature review, research design and methodology, data analysis, and discussion of research findings. More than that, the study profoundly natured me to Africanist ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical aspects, the politics of knowledge production, philosophy of African history included.

6.7 Conclusion

The main conclusion is drawn on the basis of the research findings, therefore, this dissertation concludes that the coloniality of the philosophy of African history is discussed and theorised as: a modernist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African crisis and Africa as ahistorical. More so, a decolonised philosophy of African history is discerned and theorised into the Africanist conception of the philosophy of African history, emphasis on African agency, and African self-consciousness. These findings constitute serious implications towards a decolonised philosophy of African history through theoretical reflections of the designated history academics in South Africa since it is not limited to a critique of the coloniality but also reveals some of the tenets towards a decolonised philosophy of African history.

Taking the above complexities into account, I assert that a decolonised philosophy of African history requires a new metaphysical basis whose essence does not only derive from the continent of Africa but extends to the philosophy of African history as Africans tell it themselves, and as they self-define themselves across time (temporalities) and space.

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LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A Gatekeepers Approval from four South African Universities

University of Cape Town Gatekeeper's Approval

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

Dr. Joanne Hardman

University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, 7701
Physical address: Humanities Graduate School Building, University Ave South, Upper Campus
Tel: +27 (0) 21 650 3920 Fax: +27 (0) 21 650 3489
E-mail: Joanne.Hardman@uct.ac.za Internet: www.uct.ac.za/depts/educate

EDNREC20200704

21 July 2020

M. Tabhu
217059173
UKZN

RE: Ethical Clearance for Masters Research project

I am pleased to inform you that ethical clearance has been granted by the School of Education Ethics Review Committee of the Faculty of Humanities for your academic project Towards a decolonised philosophy of African history: Theoretical reflections of history academics in South Africa. We wish you all the best with your research.

Please note that you must follow the university regulations on conducting research during COVID 19 lockdown. No face to face research is currently allowed

Regards

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR JOANNE HARDMAN

ETHICS CHAIR

"Our Mission is to be an outstanding teaching and research university, educating for life and addressing the challenges facing our society."

University of South Africa Gatekeeper's Approval

UNISA | university of south africa

GATEKEEPER PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH INVOLVING UNISA EMPLOYEES, STUDENTS AND DATA
Ref No: 2020_GKP_006

To: Mr. Mlamuli Tabhu, UKZN student number: 217059173

From: Dr Retha Visagie, Manager: Research Integrity, Directorate: Research Support

Contact details: visagrg@unisa.ac.za; 012 429 2478

Date: 2020-07-27

This is to confirm that Dr Retha Visagie, acting on behalf of the Executive Director: Research and Innovation of Unisa, Prof Les Labuschagne, has granted Mr. Mlamuli Tabhu gatekeeper permission to undertake research involving Unisa employees and data, towards a research study for Master's degree, entitled:

Towards a decolonised philosophy of African history: Theoretical reflections of history academics in South Africa.

The gatekeeper permission provides Mr. Mlamuli Tabhu principial permission to conduct his research at Unisa. However, from a research ethics perspective, his application for ethics clearance will be reviewed on merit, after which the Unisa Research Permission Subcommittee of the Senate Research, Innovation, Postgraduate Degrees and Commercialisation Committee will consider granting him permission, based on the merits of an application in that regard, to include Unisa employees and students in a survey/interviews. The latter permission is not to be confused with gatekeeper permission and is dependent on criteria that are contained in the Unisa Policy for conducting research involving Unisa employees, students or data.

Regards,

Dr R. G. Visagie: **Manager: Research Integrity**
☎ 012 429 2478, ✎ visagrg@unisa.ac.za

University of Kwazulu-Natal Gatekeeper's Approval

UNIVERSITY OF ™
KWAZULU-NATAL
INYUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI

30 January 2020

Mr Mlamuli Tabhu (SN 217059173)
School of Education
College of Humanites
Edgewood Campus
UKZN
Email: tabhu94@gmail.com

Dear SMr Tabhu

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Gatekeeper's permission is hereby granted for you to conduct research at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) towards your postgraduate studies, provided Ethical clearance has been obtained. We note the title of your research project is:

"Towards a decolonized philosophy of African history: Theoretical reflections of history academics in South Africa."

It is noted that you will be constituting your sample by conducting interviews with academic staff members in the discipline of African History at UKZN.

Please ensure that the following appears on your notice/questionnaire:
• Ethical clearance number;
• Research title and details of the research, the researcher and the supervisor;
• Consent form is attached to the notice/questionnaire and to be signed by user before he/she fills in questionnaire;
• gatekeepers approval by the Registrar.

You are not authorized to contact staff and students using 'Microsoft Outlook' address book. Identity numbers and email addresses of individuals are not a matter of public record and are protected according to Section 14 of the South African Constitution, as well as the Protection of Public Information Act. For the release of such information over to yourself for research purposes, the University of KwaZulu-Natal will need express consent from the relevant data subjects. Data collected must be treated with due confidentiality and anonymity.

Yours sincerely

DR KE CLELAND
REGISTRAR (ACTING)

155

University of Zululand Gatekeeper's Approval

University of Zululand, Private Bag X 1001, KwaDlangezwa, 3886 W: www.unizulu.ac.za UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

T: +27 35 902 6374 F: +27 35 902 6355 E: Lundalin@unizulu.ac.za

Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research & Innovation

Mr. Mlamuli Tabhu
School of Education

College of Humanities

Edgewood Campus

University of KwaZulu-Natal

05 June 2020   Per email: tabhu94@gmail.com

Dear Mr. Tabhu

REQUEST TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND (UNIZULU): "TOWARDS A DECOLONISED PHILOSOPHY OF AFRICAN HISTORY: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS OF HISTORY ACADEMICS IN SOUTH AFRICA" Your letters to me, refers.

The University of Zululand's Research Ethics Committee (UZREC) hereby grant approval for you to conduct part of your research at UNIZULU, as per the methodologies stated in your research proposal and in terms of the data collection instruments that you have submitted. We note also that University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), has issued an ethical clearance certificate and having read the documentation, we accept the documentation.

You may use this letter as authorization when you approach the relevant persons. Please note that the permission is based on the documentation that you have submitted. Should you revise your research instruments, or use additional instruments, you must submit all the changes to the University of Zululand Research Ethics Committee (UZREC).

The UZREC wishes you well in conducting research.

Yours sincerely

Professor Mashupye R. Kgaphota
Acting Chairperson: University Research Ethics Committee
Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research & Innovation

Appendix B University of Kwazulu-Natal Ethical Approval

UNIVERSITY OF
KWAZULU-NATAL ™
INYUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI

04 September 2020

Mr Mlamuli Tabhu (217059173)
School Of Education
Edgewood Campus

Dear Mr Tabhu,

Protocol reference number: HSSREC/00001803/2020
Project title: Towards a decolonised philosophy of African history; Theoretical reflections of history academics in South Africa.
Degree: Masters

Approval Notification – Expedited Application

This letter serves to notify you that your application received on 11 August 2020 in connection with the above, was reviewed by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC) and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

This approval is valid until 04 September 2021.
To ensure uninterrupted approval of this study beyond the approval expiry date, a progress report must be submitted to the Research Office on the appropriate form 2 - 3 months before the expiry date. A close-out report to be submitted when study is finished.

All research conducted during the COVID-19 period must adhere to the national and UKZN guidelines.

HSSREC is registered with the South African National Research Ethics Council (REC-040414-040).

Yours sincerely,

Professor Dipane Hlalele (Chair)

/dd

_____
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
UKZN Research Ethics Office Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building
Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000
Tel: +27 31 260 8350 / 4557 / 3587
Website: http://research.ukzn.ac.za/Research-Ethics/

Founding Campuses: ■ Edgewood ■ Howard College ■ Medical School ■ Pietermaritzburg ■ Westville

INSPIRING GREATNESS

Appendix C Informed Consent

Towards a decolonised philosophy of African history; theoretical reflections of history academics in South Africa

DECLARATION

I………………………………………………………………… *(full names of participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent/do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

For any questions or concerns the study participant, kindly consult University of KwaZuluNatal Office Of Research Ethics by phone (031) 260 4557, fax (031) 260 4609, or regular email HssrecHumanities@ukzn.ac.za or Dr. Maposa; 031 260 3546, email, maposam2@ukzn.ac.za).

Signature of the Participant   DATE

……………………………………………………………………………………

Appendix D Recruitment Letter

Greeting: (History Academic).

My name is (Mlamuli Tabhu) (History Education department/University of KwaZulu, Natal, and School of Education, Edgewood Campus and whose contact details are as follows: 082 285 1037, email, tabhu94@gmail.com). Under supervision (Marshall Tamuka Maposa) (History Education department/University of KwaZulu, Natal, and School of Education, Edgewood Campus and whose contact details are as follows: 031 260 3546, email, maposam2@ukzn.ac.za)

You are being invited to consider participating in a study that involves research titled (Towards a decolonised philosophy of African history; Theoretical reflections of history academics in South Africa). The aim and purpose of this research is to (gather in-depth empirical data concerning a decolonised philosophy of African History. I.e. metaphysics, discourse, thinking, and worldviews behind how African history is taught or written). The study is expected to enroll (five history academics in South Africa). It will involve the following procedures (Semi-Structured Interviews through skype). The duration of your participation, if you choose to enroll and remain in the study, is expected to be (1 hour). The interview will be audio-recorded, and the principle of confidentiality will be observed throughout.

The study will not involve any risks and/or discomforts. We hope that the study will contribute to knowledge production in History Education. This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (approval number: 00001803/2020).

Your participation in this research is voluntary and that you may withdraw participation at any point, and that in the event of refusal/withdrawal of participation the participants will not incur penalty or loss of treatment or other benefits to which they are normally entitled. The generated data will be as confidential as possible in the sense that I will use pseudo names to keep it protected. Moreover, it will be kept in a memory stick in the supervisor's office. It will be deleted after 5 years.

If I have any questions or concerns about the study participant, kindly consult University of KwaZuluNatal Office Of Research Ethics by phone (031) 260 4557, fax (031) 260 4609, or regular email HssrecHumanities@ukzn.ac.za or Dr. Maposa; 031 260 3546, email, maposam2@ukzn.ac.za).

Appendix E Research Instrument

The basis of this Semi-Structured interview is to grasp in-depth empirical data concerning the philosophy of African History. I.e. metaphysics, discourse, thinking, and worldviews behind how African history is taught or written.

1. To start with, how would you explain the philosophy of African history?

2. Some scholars argue that African history deserves a unique philosophy on the basis that African history is unique conceptually, philosophically and culturally. What is your take with regards to this argument?

3. What is your take with regards to the philosophy of African history when you read the philosophy of history propelled by Hegel and later by Trevor-Roper that Africa is ahistorical?

4. What are we to make of a decolonised philosophy of African history concerning discourses such as patriarchy, empty land thesis and South African exceptionalism?

5. How African is the philosophy of African history in your respective institution?

6. What are your views on the appropriateness of the curriculum assessment policy statement [CAPS] as a policy with which to frame the philosophy of African history?

7. What would a decolonised philosophy of African history look like?

8. Can you comment about the possibilities of a decolonised philosophy of African history in Africa in general and in South Africa in particular?

Appendix F Editors Letter

Rainbow Global Contractors

108A Van Buuren Road, Bedfordview, Johannesburg, South Africa

Email: bmaregedze@gmail.com

Call/WhatsApp Brian

+27646712326

Visit Our Website: zimhumanities.com

Date: 15/03/2021…………

To Whom it may concern

This is to certify that I, Brian Maregedze, have edited the document titled, **Towards a Decolonised Philosophy of African History; Theoretical Reflections of History Academics in South Africa**, by Mlamuli Tabhu. I have made all the necessary recommendations and corrections. The document is therefore ready for submission and or presentation to the relevant authority.

Yours Faithfully,

B. Maregedze

Appendix G Turnitin Receipt

Towards a Decolonised Phi... -- /0

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