DECLARATION

I, Peace Akudo Jiboku declare that:

1. The research presented in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated is my original work.

2. The thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

3. This thesis does not contain any other persons‟ data, pictures, writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from such persons.

4. This thesis does not contain any other persons‟ writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:

a. Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has referenced;

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5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copies and pasted from the internet, unless specifically acknowledged and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the Reference sections.

Peace Jiboku

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Student Name

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Date

Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike
Supervisor

.....

Signature

.....

Date

Dr. Khondlo Mtshali
Co-Supervisor

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Signature

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Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the Almighty God, Creator of heaven and earth. With Him, nothing shall be impossible. Except He builds a house, the labourers work in vain and except He keeps the city, those who are watchmen keep awake for nothing. In addition, the thesis is dedicated to my lovely children Emmanuel, Gideon and Grace for their endurance through the years I was away to undertake the PhD programme.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would not have been able to successfully complete this PhD programme without God‟s guidance and the immense support and contributions which I received from many individuals, groups, institutions and organisations. While I am not able to mention the names of everyone, I am sincerely grateful. God bless you all.

First, my heart-felt gratitude goes to my supervisors, Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike and Dr. Khondlo Mtshali for guiding me through the process of completing this study. Your mentorship is appreciated and your words of advice were invaluable as I carried on. I learnt a great deal from you. Professor Uzodike, I also thank you sincerely for facilitating my admission to the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

I am grateful to the South African government for bursaries that I received through the University of KwaZulu-Natal which assisted me on the programme. The Dean and all the staff members in the School of Social Sciences are appreciated. I thank Mrs. D. Small and Mrs. Nancy Mudau for their kind assistance at different periods. I acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Saras Reddy, Professor Labby Ramrathan and other members of the College of Humanities Cohort Supervision team for taking us through various workshops. I wish to appreciate the Vice Chancellor of the Olabisi Onabanjo University, Professor S. A. Adesanya for his intervention at crucial moments. Also, I thank the IDRC/the United Nations Mandated University for Peace Africa Programme for granting me a doctoral thesis award which assisted me during the course of the study. Professor Kenneth Omeje is appreciated. Thank you so much Dr. Samuel Ewusi and all my colleagues at the UPEACE programme.

My appreciation also goes to all the participants in this study: officials at the AUC; ECA; PAP, NEPAD and APRM Secretariats; the various civil society organisations, research institutions and media houses in Addis Ababa, South Africa and Nigeria for granting me access to their offices to hold interviews. I thank the Professors, scholars and academics, who spared some time off their busy schedules to grant interviews. I also appreciate the doctoral candidates who agreed to be part of this study.

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Chief Dr. S.O. Jiboku for his fatherly support when I needed to access particular interviewees. To Mr. O.O. Jiboku, you were a

father to us. Thanks for all your support. My appreciation also goes to Mr. and Mrs. Adesina Jiboku. I appreciate some individuals who have been part of my academic journey: Dr. Frank F. Nwosu, Medical Director of Rees Hospital; Mr. Jide Oladipupo of Jacolad Secretarial Centre; Dr. I. Pogoson, my M.Sc. thesis supervisor; my uncles, Chief Uzu Analaba and Mr. Emezi Analaba; my elder sister Mrs. Juliet Onubi who told me, "look Peace, you can cross that red sea", and her husband. I am grateful to my younger sister and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Uko for their outstanding support and for standing by me all the way through. I appreciate my younger sister and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Uzoeghelu; my elder brother and his wife, Dr. and Mrs. Timothy Abuba; Engineer Ikechukwu Abuba; and Chukwuka Abuba. God bless you all.

I cannot fail to show my deepest gratitude to Mrs. O.M. Odusanya, the Big Mummy of our children, for her wonderful and motherly care since the children were born and for taking care of them for the first two years I was away. To another Big Mummy, Alhaja Osibanjo; and Mr. and Mrs. Oloko, God bless you. Professor and Mrs. Tella are appreciated. To someone who was part of this dream from the very start, Aunty Titi Soremi, God bless you Ma. Mr. and Mrs Adeleye, thank you so much for standing by us.

To my spiritual fathers at the African Church Nigeria, Bishop Fatade, Bishop Odufuwa, Rev. Afolabi, Rev. Akinremi, Rev. Dairo, Rev. Banjo and others numerous to mention, thank you so much for your prayers. Pastor Sam Grove and his wife Sarah, and other members of Church on the Ridge, Scottsville are appreciated. I acknowledge the Umeh family; Mr. Sakiemi Idoniboye and his wife for caring; Mr. Ayo Whetho, Dr. Sadiki Maeresera, Mr. Mpumelelo Phungula, and Mr. Simeon Nwone for their assistance. My able flatmates in Phase Five – Dr. Pedzisai Munyoro, Mrs. Mass Tapfuma, Mrs. Edith Chikagwa, Vongai Murugani and Olufunke Fajimi are appreciated.

My love and appreciation goes to my dear parents, Mr. and Mrs. C.A. Abuba for bringing me uprightly. God has kept you strong to be able to look after our children till the present moment. God bless you. Finally, I acknowledge and appreciate my wonderful children, Emmanuel, Gideon and Grace for bearing all the inconveniences of relocation; for their patience and understanding with an „absentee" mother. To my loving husband, Mr. Joseph Jiboku, God bless you for years of support and encouragements. Your care, understanding, prayers and support in many ways, saw me through this journey.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAP	AU/NEPAD African Action Plan
AEC	African Economic Community
AfDB	African Development Bank Group
AfriMAP	Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project
AICD	Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
ALF	Africa Leadership Forum
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APR	African Peer Review
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APRM (MOU)	Memorandum on the APRM
APRM (O & P)	APRM Organisation and Processes Document
APRM (OSCI)	APRM Objectives, Stanards, Criteria and Indicators
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung‟s Transformation Index
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CET	Common External Tariff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRM	Country Review Mission
CSAR	Country Self Assessment Report
CSDF	Capacity Development Strategic Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSS	Country Support Mission
CSSDCA	Conference on Security Stability Development and Cooperation in
EAC	East African Community
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement/Free Trade Areas
G77	Group of 77 developing countries
G8	Group of 8 countries
G20	Group of 20 countries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHS	General Household Survey
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HNLSS	Harmonised Nigerian Living Standard Survey
IAIDA	Institutional Architecture for Infrastructure Development in Africa
ICA	Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDC/R&I	Industrial Development Corporation/Department of Research and Information
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPPF	NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility
MAP	Millennium Africa Recovery Plan
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIP	Minimum Integration Programme
MLTSF	Medium Long-Term Strategic Framework
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAI	New African Initiative

NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa"s Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
NPoA	National Programme of Action
NTB	Non-Tariff Barriers
NWG	National Working Group
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSF	Open Society Foundations
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PAP	Priority Action Plan
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PPPs	Public-Private Partnerships
PSDS	Private Sector Development Strategy
PSRPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RCM	Regional Coordination Mechanism
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RIAs	Regional Integration Arrangements
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SADC	South African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
STAP	NEPAD Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan
UDEAC	Central African Customs and Economic Union
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VOC	Victim of Crime
WAMI	West African Monetary Institute
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation

ABSTRACT

This study examines the complexities, realities and challenge of African economic integration in the quest for socio-economic development. The central concern of the study is that, while the African continent has experienced different stages in the development of regional economic integration and despite the fact that regionalism has continued to be recognised as crucial to Africa‟s development agenda, the continent has remained the least integrated of the world‟s major regions. Slow in realising self-sustaining socio-economic development and confronted with several political and socio-economic crises, it still harbours most of the least developed countries of the world, despite its enormous wealth in natural, material and human resources.

The thesis argues that regional integration is nevertheless a viable strategy to redress Africa‟s development challenges and marginalisation in world affairs especially in the light of on-going processes of globalisation, regionalisation and liberalisation which present several challenges for individual African political economies. The need for addressing the challenges of effective regionalism in Africa is no longer a disputable reality. This study therefore analyses on-going efforts of the African Union/New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) initiatives as the latest attempt of African leaders to foreground sub-regional and continental goals of economic cooperation and integration. Examining the discourse from the angle of governance deficits in African countries, the study specifically assesses the effectiveness of the APRM in interrogating issues of regionalism in Africa and in furthering the AU/NEPAD agenda.

During the course of the research, data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data includes: interviews held at the African Union Commission, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Pan African Parliament (PAP), NEPAD and APRM Secretariats, and a number of civil society organisations, research institutions and media houses, as well as official documents of these organisations. Interviews were also held with Professors who are experts in the field of study, a number of academics and well informed scholars and doctoral students whose studies relate to governance, security and development in Africa. Secondary sources include: scholarly literature, books and journals, institutional reports and documents, and various reliable internet sources. The thesis utilises qualitative research methodology and a descriptive and analytical approach. Using a thematic discourse and thematic content analysis, the study

draws from a combination of theories (economic theories – market integration and trade theories, functionalism/neo-functionalism and neo-realism) to enable a political-economic analysis of the field of study. Included in the overall methodology, is a sample of three APRM Country Review Reports for Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria. The reports are deployed to interrogate the following issues and questions: contending issues on governance and socio-economic development in African countries; how these issues impact on the continent‟s integration agenda; and how the APRM could possibly become an instrument to address these challenges in furtherance of the African Union/NEPAD objectives. A connection is established between governance; democracy; peace, stability and security; development at the national level in individual African countries and the realisation of national and regional integration goals.

The study finds that in many respects, the AU/NEPAD and APRM adequately respond to key issues of African economic integration. However, the contending issues of debate with regards to these initiatives also are examined. It is argued that these contentions have become pronounced because of the regional integration problematic in Africa and various political and socio-economic challenges bedeviling African countries. This is the area in which the study finds that the APRM, in its capacity as a governance initiative, occupies a key position in reversing the negative trend of African economic integration and advancing the objectives of the African Union/NEPAD. The study examines various primary and official publications indicating progress in Africa; statistical reports of successes achieved from the period of the establishment of the AU/NEPAD and APRM initiatives as against the periods of the late 1970s and 1980s. Notwithstanding the progress recorded, considering the central argument of this study on the need for regional initiatives to promote socio-economic development, the failures and challenges of the AU/NEPAD are identified, further portraying the usefulness of the APRM. Bringing together the various discourses, this study advances scholarly views on the need for a redefinition of the concept and goals of African economic integration not only to realise the socio-economic development and transformation of the African continent but also to enable African countries, individually and collectively to exploit the benefits of a period of more intense globalisation.

The study concludes that the APRM, as a programme of the AU, within its NEPAD framework, has the potential to improve governance and policy making processes in African countries, and to motivate reforms which are critical to African economic integration. The Mechanism should therefore be empowered to achieve its mandate of advancing constructive processes of change in Africa.

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CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

Introduction

1.1 Introduction and Background [1]

The quest for African economic integration has been demonstrated by policies and programmes constantly formulated by African leaders and the existence of different regional institutions in the continent which are promoting the goals of regional integration. Often times, at conferences, workshops, seminars, think-tank initiatives and programmes organised to brainstorm on Africa‟s socio-economic development challenge, regional economic integration issues feature prominently on the agenda. The literature on this subject matter is also growing as scholars continue to raise diverse discourses and debates on the strategies for implementing the continent‟s agenda. Various resolutions and policy recommendations are reached at different forums of African Heads of States, leaders, policy makers and representatives of civil society urging the accelerated implementation of regional integration agreements and promotion of deeper integration in the continent. Decades of effort demonstrate that African leaders, policy makers, and their peoples have not and do not lack meaningful ideas and visions for promoting the continent‟s development. There is, perhaps, the conviction that Africa‟s socio-economic development and transformation possibly would best be achieved within the framework of cooperative and integrative arrangements at both the sub-regional and regional levels. However, despite pan-African objectives and efforts, the present state of affairs in the African continent remains highly unsatisfactory with severe levels of political, economic and social instability as well as the attendant levels of poverty and underdevelopment.

Although blessed with enormous natural, material and human resources, Africa has remained underdeveloped, harbouring most of the least developed countries of the world. The continent has been plagued by several challenges such as: inadequate food supplies, poor health

[1] Some sections in Chapters One, Two and Three formed parts of a presentation made at the College of Humanities Postgraduate Conference, Durban Campus, South Africa, 3-4 October, 2012. Theme: Surveying the Humanities Research Landscape: What‟s Under the Postgraduate Lens?" The paper was subsequently published in the Postgraduate Conference Proceedings 2012, 455-470. Also, some of the sections formed parts of a presentation made at the first Research Methodology Workshop organised for doctoral awardees of the University for Peace Africa Programme, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3-14 June 2013. The paper was submitted in 2013 for publication and has been published in the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, June, 2014. 1-13.

facilities, cultural and religious crises, intra-state and inter-state conflicts, economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation and resource depletion, and continued marginalisation in world affairs.

In sub-Saharan Africa, it is estimated that "41 per cent of the people live on less than $1 a day" (Knoll and Hadden, 2012:1; Alexander, BBC News Magazine, 2012). According to the Millennium Development Goals Report 2014, sub-Saharan Africa is one of the continents in which a "majority of the people [are] living on less than $1.25 a day" (see, United Nations, 2014:9). A World Bank Report (2007:XVII) forecast that by 2030, Africa will contain a greater percentage of the world‟s poorest people. The likelihood that poverty will continue in sub-Saharan Africa is also indicated in a Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Document (2015). Majority of Africa‟s population reside in rural communities where they find it difficult to enjoy the benefits of national social service policies and some are not even aware of these services (Phogole, 2010: 1; Ngambi, 2011:7). Life expectancy at birth remains low (Inequality Watch, 2012; WHO, 2014) while unemployment has remained a common problem in many African countries (see, Roopanarine, 2013; Makoni, 2014). Moreover, Africa houses a large percentage of the world‟s refugees (Foluso, 2002; Mwangi, 2008:45; Guterres et al, 2012:673-674), and accounts for majority of the people who live with HIV/AIDS (Foluso, 2002; UNAIDS, 2011:7). Also, a significant number of Africans still die from malaria, cholera and other related ailments which could possibly be prevented or cured (Foluso, 2002). Sub-Saharan Africa contains a significant percentage of the world‟s malnourished people as food insecurity remains a problem in the continent (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2014:12). The effects of poverty and rampant diseases are further exacerbated by environmental challenges such as drought, "desertification, deforestation, and poor agricultural practices" (Nana-Sinkam, 1995:15; see also, ECA, 2007:3-14).

In light of the human security challenges listed above, it is not surprising that Africa is a weak player in the international economic system; the continent‟s resources continue to be exploited by non-regional actors. The marginalisation of Africa was particularly obvious in the late 1970s and 1980s when many countries witnessed severe economic downturns. The reality is that the continent‟s record in terms of major indices such as "security, foreign investment, trade, the information revolution and skilled labour force", has been disappointing (Rugumamu, 2001).

The persistent and costly conflicts in many parts of the African continent, over the years, present another issue of serious concern. In 2014, for instance, 15 African countries were either "involved in war or [were] experiencing post-war conflict and tension" (African Sun News, 5 November 2014). The net effect has been that national and collaborative initiatives, investments and long-term planning have been retarded or non-existent.

Sub-Saharan African states display the same attributes and challenges. They were colonial creations (except Ethiopia which was not colonised) and have been experiencing difficulties in achieving sustainable development despite the fact that they have been independent over four decades (see, Adedeji, 1989:161). Many of African countries are not only small in size, with small markets and economies; there are also 54 countries in the continent which is a large number (Matthews, 2003:XII; OSAA, 2010:13). These are constraining factors which come to bear when African countries decide to cooperate and pool their efforts together or integrate their economies to achieve economic and political goals. Moreover, the difficulties experienced in individual countries make regional economic integration in Africa, a complicated phenomenon. Most African countries are confronted with political and socio-economic challenges and they still depend on external assistance to execute developmental projects (Ndegwa, 1993; Murithi, 2008:2-3).

The reality, therefore (given the above context), is that the anticipated post-independence economic transformation and political development that would bring about life-defining and qualitative improvements in the lives of the masses of people across the region has remained an unrealised dream in most African countries.

Colonialism has long been blamed for the inability of African leaders and their people to achieve development and integration objectives, even though more recently, African leaders began to emphasise the implications of bad governance, corruption and other negative political impediments on the continent‟s development and integration process. Scholarly opinions differ on why colonial rule persisted in Africa. While there are some scholars who argue that colonialism brought about civilisation and economic prosperity in African societies (see, Nkomazana, 1998; Habibi, 1999:125-126; Southall, 2009:1-3), others maintain that political and economic factors accounted for the partition of Africa (Rodney, 1972; Ake, 1981; Amin, 2002:20-21; Goucher et al, 2004:3-4). These contending arguments feature consistently in literature. While it cannot be doubted that the long period of colonial rule had

its effect on Africa, it would also be important not to lose sight that African leaders have failed to effectively manage their states in the post-independence period. These issues are further discussed in other chapters.

Africa‟s physical, transport and communication infrastructures, as well as its banking and other institutions were established with the aim of facilitating the economic objectives of the colonial powers (Rodney, 1972:31-35 and 227-228; Ake, 1981:36). Even the states that were created during the colonial period were products of the arbitrary boundaries drawn by the colonisers to facilitate colonial administrative and political interests. Most African states were established without prior consideration of the cultural and linguistic make-ups of Africa‟s diverse pre-colonial societies. Thus, African states were not created based on the wishes and interests of the colonised people.

Among other scholars, Rodney (1972), Lawal and Olugbade (1989) and Ake (1981:35-38) describe the form of economic exploitation which the colonised states experienced during the colonial period. This was facilitated through trade and investment. For instance, the colonial powers derived high rates of profit from their investment in their colonies due mainly to an abundance of raw materials, the fact that Africans provided a cheap labour supply, and the reality that Africans could not compete with them (Lawal and Olugbade, 1989). The colonisers were also able to transport the cheap raw materials from African countries to their home countries, turn these raw materials into finished goods, export them back to the colonies without any tariff, and sell them for huge profits (Lawal and Olugbade, 1989; see also, Olutayo and Omobowale, 2007:103-104). This unequal form of exchange not only retarded the growth of local manufacturing industries, it ensured an overall lack of economic development of the colonies. Furthermore, unequal exchange enabled economic growth and development of the metropolitan through the profits they made from their colonies and repatriated home (Lawal and Olugbade, 1989; Ake, 1981:37-38). These challenges were among the factors which influenced nationalist movements and agitations for independence which eventually, was achieved by most sub-Saharan African countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa obtained what many scholars and writers have referred to as “flag independence” (Rembe, 1980:14; Mbingu, 1991:9; Noyoo, 2000:55; Olutayo and Omobowale, 2007:103). The economic structures at independence were weak, dependent,

poorly diversified and established in such a way that African countries continued to supply raw materials to satisfy the demands of external economies (Ake, 1981:36). As Adedeji (1989:20) opines, the dependent nature of African economies has consequences on Africa‟s cost structure; the continent‟s capacity to produce or benefit from making the most use of its natural resources; develop its own indigenous technology; and enjoy the "comparative advantage of surplus labour relative to capital". Added to these challenges was the fact that newly independent African countries were to participate in an international system where the rules governing international economic intercourse had been created without their participation. Thus, African countries were faced with the challenge of developing the continent and achieving economic prosperity in a Cold War era international system divided between the Western and Eastern blocs. This challenge, coupled with the need for a pan-African approach towards decolonisation of the continent and the quest for self-government and national liberation, set the stage for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

In establishing the OAU, African leaders identified the need for collective effort among African countries and displayed their willingness to cooperate and integrate. The organisation was formed to provide a common platform for African countries to cooperate in order to collectively address their development challenges and to present common positions in the international community. The Cold War phenomenon in the 1960s also saw African countries resolve to be non-aligned actors in the international system to avoid getting involved in the "East-West ideological conflict and military confrontation" of the Cold War era (OAU Report, 1990a:1).[2] As such, the OAU meant to promote collective self reliance and collective security of African countries.

After the founding of the OAU, African governments‟ development initiatives were therefore, based on the ideals of regional cooperation and integration. Many other regional economic organisations and economic unions were formed to promote cooperation among African countries. The continent‟s leaders adopted different forms of industrialisation towards achieving self-sustaining development but most of the regional initiatives were less

[2] Nzau (2010:146-152) described the three forms of development planning established in the immediate post colonial period. They are: "the western model of development planning which allowed for political economy to be shaped by market forces, with limited state interference; the socialist style of developing planning in which the state controlled the economy; and the third was a model that appeared like a merger of the capitalist and socialist model".

successful. Qobo (2007:2) notes however that, it is important to identify that at the time independence was achieved, Africa did not have the human and physical capital necessary for industrialisation. Hence, many African leaders looked up to their ex-colonial masters who often influenced their development thinking and ideas. The effect of such relationship was neo-colonialism – "new form of colonialism".[3] Scholars describe neo-colonialism as the third and current chapter of Africa"s integration into the global capitalist system (Amin, 2002:20-22; Gassama, 2008:340; Olutayo and Omobowale, 2007:103). One of the main characteristics of neo-colonialism is "the emergence of multilateral institutions responsible for setting the pace, direction, conditionalities and cross-conditionalities of development cooperation and international relations" (Tesha, 2002:16).

The internal problems in most of the newly independent African states, presented another challenge to development. In the immediate period that followed independence, African countries began to experience political challenges triggered by ethnic and tribal competition for political power, public offices and desire to control the allocation of national resources (Onwubiko 1973:377; Osaghae, 1994:34-35). Together, the weak political institutions created by the colonial rulers, constitutional challenges and political instability of the newly created African states, led to various military coups and other conflicts experienced in African countries a few years after independence (Ndulu et al, 1998; Boafo-Arthur (2003:236-237). The inter-state conflicts and boundary disputes witnessed in Africa were partly triggered by the arbitrary boundaries created at the Berlin Conference in 1885 (Porter, 2011). Intra-state and inter-state crises, many of which had been engendered by colonial powers, caused several divisions within and among African countries and negatively affected the economic development effort of individual countries.

In order to stem the tide of economic weakness and growing decline, as well as the associated political challenges, African countries joined other developing countries under the Group of 77 to demand a new international economic order at the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. As the United Nations, in its Declaration, and the Programme of Action for the establishment of a NIEO underscored, developing countries needed to cooperate not only to become self-reliant but also to enhance their position in the global economic arena. The UN

[3] "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus, its political policy is directed from outside" (Nkrumah, 1965:IX).

therefore strengthened its position for developing countries to make individual and collective efforts to improve on trade, financial and technical cooperation (UN-A/RES/3201 and 3202 (S-VA) 1974).[4] This programme encouraged the formation of several regional groupings in Africa such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa; Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). Another outcome of the progamme was the drive to strengthen collaborations between African countries. However, the demand for a NIEO did not receive the necessary attention from the major world powers partly because the Cold War had intensified during this period (Tesha, 2002:17).

The period of the 1980s is usually referred to as the "lost decade" for Africa because this was a period of economic hardship for African countries (Mlambo and Oshikoya, 1999:29; Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson, 2006:12; Sundaram, 2011). The Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not provide a complete solution to Africa‟s challenges. Even the OAU‟s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and other regional initiatives, and externally conceived programmes of the United Nations to support Africa‟s development were confronted with various challenges. The political and economic problems which impaired the effective implementation of development initiatives, did not only come from within Africa, the international community were also not fully committed to implementing the programmes of the UN for Africa. Thus, during the period between 1980 and the beginning of the 1990s, it was clear from all political and socio-economic development indicators that Africa was lagging behind.

The latter period of the 20th century saw the end of colonialism, the poor achievements of the SAPs, and the ineffectiveness of the Lagos Plan of Action. The end of the Cold War in the late 1990s indicated the process of more intense globalisation (Berger, 2001:1079-1085). In some other parts of the developed world, such as Europe and America, globalisation motivated countries towards regional economic integration (Sunmonu, 2004:69). Also, the growth and development achieved by ASEAN countries as well as China were issues of international attention. These developments led to new thinking by African leaders and policy makers on the need for more strategic programmes aimed at tackling the issue of Africa‟s

[4] For details on the New International Economic Order, see, Ojo, 1981. See also, Diwan and Livingston, 1979.

underdevelopment (Tesha, 2002:19-20). Efforts were made towards formulating new strategies for development and providing new mechanisms for effectively addressing the political and socio-economic challenges in Africa. The new wave for development by African leaders culminated in the establishment of the African Union (as a replacement for the OAU) in 2002, the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) Plan of Action as a programme of the African Union in 2002 and the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under the auspices of the NEPAD initiative in 2003.

The African Union, NEPAD and APRM initiatives symbolised the resolution by African leaders to foreground sub-regional and continental goals of economic cooperation and integration. It showed their conviction about the imperative of a working integration project to address the internal and external constraints to Africa‟s development efforts in a fast globalising world. African leaders entered the twenty-first century with a renewed drive and determination to take their destiny in their own hands, and to tackle the numerous problems confronting the continent. This enthusiasm could have been drawn from the fact that enough experience was acquired and maturity gained from the many years of the OAU and sub-regional integration projects. There would also have been much knowledge gathered on the several factors which accounted for the lack of satisfactory achievements of previous continent-wide development programmes (NEPAD Document 2001a, paragraph 42).

The AU/NEPAD Programme is premised on “African ownership and management” (AU/UN, 2008:10). The NEPAD document articulates the vision for Africa. It clearly outlines the problems confronting the African continent and a Plan of Action to address these problems so as to achieve the objectives (NEPAD, 2001b:2). The APRM is a “mutually agreed instrument acceded to by the member states of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism” (APRM MoU 2003, paragraph 7). The Mechanism was established to monitor participating countries‟ progress towards adopting and implementing NEPAD‟s priorities and programmes (APRM OSCI 2003, paragraph 1.3).

This thesis examines the process of African economic integration as envisioned by the African Union and NEPAD initiatives. The study focuses specifically on the APRM which, the study argues, is the most creative and exceptional programme of NEPAD. With the APRM initiative, NEPAD has identified democracy and good governance as pre-conditions for economic development and hopes to be a blueprint that will enable the African Union to

achieve its major objectives. While many studies on regional economic integration in Africa focus extensively on economic analyses of progress made by the regional economic communities, others have looked at discourses relating to the African Union, NEPAD and APRM as individual programmes. Still other studies examine these initiatives as functioning together towards advancing Africa"s integration and development efforts. NEPAD is the AU"s development programme while the APRM deals with governance. However, even though these linkages are established in literature, only few studies are comprehensive in explaining how these initiatives combine to advance Africa"s quest for economic integration.

Most studies limit their approach to describing NEPAD and APRM. Their descriptive approach often is accompanied by criticism of the shortcomings and weaknesses of these initiatives. The APRM is studied mostly as a regional governance initiative put in place to improve the political conditions in African countries and the APR processes in different member countries are analysed to examine their strengths and weaknesses. There is a dearth of empirical studies exploring how the AU/NEPAD and APRM initiatives connect with each other; how their visions are linked and correlate; and the potential benefits for African regional economic integration, governance and development in an era of intense globalisation. Moreover, scholars have not really been interested in specifically examining the instrumental use of the APRM in interrogating issues of regionalism in Africa and its potential contribution in formulating solutions to the slow pace of integration in Africa.

This study differs from a more standard format (described above) by approaching African economic integration discourse from the angle of governance deficits in African countries. It examines the institutional framework of the APRM; how its policies and programmes respond to various discourses on African economic integration and advance the AU/NEPAD integration and development agenda.

1.2 Statement of research problem

The levels of political, social and economic challenges currently facing the African continent are indicators that national and international attempts made to address the continent"s issues have been less than successful. The problems have worsened to the extent that it is becoming increasingly difficult for African states to function effectively as independent entities (Rugumamu, 2001). Basically, Africa is plagued by several crises of underdevelopment. The continent lacks developmental capital, is threatened by drought, severely challenged by high

rates of illiteracy and food shortage (Nwolise 2001:8-9; Uzodike 2009:3; Aidoo 2010:8), and a large segment of its population lives in abject poverty. Africans are "threatened by some of the world"s most severe cases of environmental damage, dread disease, economic pillage and impoverishment and psychosocial criminality" (Uzodike 2009:3). Only a few countries have escaped the negative consequences of internal armed conflicts (Bujra 2002:12).

The central argument of this study, therefore, is that the socio-economic transformation and development of Africa are the *sine qua non* of effective sub-regional and regional economic cooperation and integration of African countries. Indeed, such integration is necessary to reposition the continent to take active part in the globalising world economy. A redefinition of the concept and goals of regional integration is necessary if African countries are to maximise effectively their potential within the capitalist world economy. The study argues that the quest for African economic integration is a noble one considering the continent"s colonial legacy of fragmented and disparate political-economic history. Regional integration should be seen as a survival strategy for African countries in the twenty-first century. It is a strategy with potential to address Africa"s development problematic.

The above arguments fall in line with the assertion made by Asante (1986:206) that "no amount of foreign aid or, assistance from the United Nations and its specialised agencies can substitute for Africa"s regional determination and effort to develop". Also embedded in this position is the notion that, although international cooperation and aid is relevant and necessary for Africa"s development, they would remain meaningless without corresponding national, sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration (Adedeji, 1989:327-330; Asante, 1986:206).

1.3 Research hypotheses

As the 17th century English poet, John Donne, famously declaimed: "No man is an island entire of itself […]". The same principle can be applied to nations. In other words, interactions are inevitable among individuals, groups, organisations, nations and regions. Furthermore, given that countries of the world are not equally naturally endowed, they need to depend on each other and interrelate in an effort to meet most of their needs and objectives. These principles of interaction and mutual dependence underpin (among other principles) international relations and serve as the basis for understanding the rationale for regional

cooperation and integration in various parts of the developed and developing world. Following this premise, therefore, the following assumptions are made in this study that:

i. The present international economic system presents several challenges showing that no country, whether developed or developing, will be able to progress on its own. To this end, regional cooperation and integration are viable strategies for growth and economic development.

2. The socio-economic and political challenges confronting the African continent present African countries with no alternative than to deepen effective cooperation and integration at the national, regional and continental levels. Such cooperation and integration will enable African countries to individually and collectively maximise their potential in the global economy.

3. The APRM, if allowed to function effectively, could become an instrument for addressing socio-economic and political problems in African countries which retard African economic integration efforts.

1.4 Research aim and objectives

The aim of this study is to examine the challenges and complexities of African economic integration as envisioned by the African Union/NEPAD, APRM framework. Specific objectives of the study are as follows:

i. To assess the position of African political economies within the present international system and determine how they are shaped by the on-going processes of globalisation, regionalisation and liberalisation

ii. To identify the weaknesses and challenges of previous programmes aimed at promoting African economic integration and the strategies put in place by the African Union/NEPAD (through APRM initiatives) to address such issues.

iii. To identify salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration and examine the relevance of such issues for policy towards achieving the AU/NEPAD (APRM) integration objectives.

iv. To examine the effectiveness of the APRM in the African economic integration process and analyse its policies with respect to salient issues in African economic intergration discourse.

1.5 Research questions

The key question addressed in the study is: How does the African Union/NEPAD and APRM strategy represent a response to the challenges and complexities of the African economic integration project?

The study also addresses the following questions:

i. What is the position of African political economies within the present international system and how are they shaped by the on-going processes of globalisation, regionalisation and liberalisation?

ii. What were the weaknesses and challenges of previous programmes aimed at promoting African economic integration and what strategies have been and are being put in place to address such issues in the African Union/NEPAD, APRM project?

iii. What are the salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration and how relevant are such issues for policy towards achieving the AU/NEPAD, (APRM) integration objectives?

iv. To what extent is the African Peer Review Mechanism an effective strategy in the African economic integration process? Are the policies of the APRM informed by the salient issues in African economic integration discourse?

1.6 Justification of the study

Arguably, regional integration is not only necessary, but also a *sine qua non* for Africa‟s development. However, African economic integration projects have been less than successful. As such, there is a need for more studies aimed at addressing the salient issues that have impeded regional integration schemes and/or addressing the challenges in order to proffer meaningful solutions. This study fills an existing lacuna in the search for a solution to the slow pace of regional economic integration in Africa in as much as it examines the

problematic of African economic integration from the angle of governance deficits in Africa. Arguing that the failure of regional integration in Africa is as a result of governance deficiencies in African countries, the study assesses the instrumental use of the African Peer Review Mechanism in resolving governance and socio-economic challenges in African countries for the goals of integration to be realised. The concern of the study is to assess the effectiveness of the APRM in furthering the African Union/NEPAD agenda.

This study is significant as it addresses the attitudes, knowledge, opinions and decisions of an African political, managerial and educational elite. Its focus is on the political institution and structures of governance in Africa as key determinants of the processes of policy making and implementation of the economic integration agenda. The negative attitudes of African leaders in the public realm have had consequences for Africa‟s economic development which cannot be over-emphasised. Hence, there is a near consensus that the laudable objectives of the African Union/NEPAD and APRM may not be achievable due to challenges and political constraints posed by African leaders. Moreover, the study not only examines African economic integration from a political economy perspective but also provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the purpose of informing future policy decisions.

This study will assist in increasing awareness about AU/NEPAD programmes, and could lead to policies aimed at empowering civil society to participate effectively at all levels in African economic integration processes. In essence, the study reveals how academia, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, professional bodies, industrial and business organisations in individual African countries can harness their potential towards national, sub-regional and regional economic development. In general, the study‟s prospective outcome is to make a useful contribution to knowledge and research on African economic integration, governance and development.

1.7 Research methodology and design

This section of the chapter presents the methods employed by the researcher in collecting, collating, processing and analysing data in completing this study. Studies on African politics, integration and development are often descriptive and analytical, relying on history to provide background information about the continent, especially with regard to its initiation and integration into the global capitalist economy. By contrast, this research examines Africa‟s economic integration as envisioned by the African Union/NEPAD. It entails a

critical analysis of salient issues in the discourse of African economic integration. It investigates the policies and programmes of the African Union/NEPAD and assesses the workings and operations of the APRM which occupies a vital position in the integration process. The study is inclined to the qualitative research methodology; its overall approach is descriptive and analytical. Some of the main attributes of a qualitative research methodology are that "research is conducted in the natural setting of social actors; the focus of study is on process rather than outcome; the actors‟ („insider‟) perspective is emphasised; and the main concern is to understand social action in terms of its specific context rather than attempting to generalise to some theoretical population" (Babbie et al, 2001:270; see also, Polkinghorne, 2005:137-144).

According to Mason (2002:1), "qualitative research methodologies celebrate richness, depth, nuance, context, multi-dimensionality and complexity. Instead of editing these elements out in the research, qualitative research approach factors them indirectly into its analysis and explanation". The focus in qualitative research, according to Babbie et al (2001:272), is on "thick description – a lengthy description that captures the sense of actions as they occur". Qualitative research, "places events in the contexts that are understandable to the actors themselves" (Babbie et al, 2001:272). In line with these expert views, qualitative research methodology is appropriate for this study because its application provided the researcher with adequate opportunity to conduct a meaningful historical and descriptive analysis of the various discourses on the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM. It is also best suited for analysing the policies and programmes of the APRM and assessing the APR process.

1.7.1 The study participants – Sample size and Sampling method

A sample of 50 participants was selected using purposive sampling - a sampling method often used in qualitatative studies (Polkinghorne, 2005:140-141; Teddlie and Fen Yu, 2007:77). Purposive sampling may be used when "selecting units (individuals, groups of individuals, institutions) based on specific purposes associated with answering a research study‟s question" (Teddlie and Fen Yu, 2007:77). The emphasis in selecting this sampling method is not the number of participants to be involved in the study but the criteria used to select them (see, Teddlie and Fen Yu, 2007). Purposive sampling, also referred to as judgemental sampling is used when respondents are known to have the requisite information needed by the researcher. The sample consisted of 40 men and 10 women. Participants are from

different African countries including – South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria, Cameroun, Ghana, and Democratic Republic of Congo.

Participants in this study were selected and grouped into two broad categories. Category one was used to label the regional policy making organisations and institutions. This includes: (1) The African Union Commission which is the Secretariat of the African Union, the mother organisation involved in formulation of policies in different areas to promote the goals of integration. The AUC has its Headquarters in Addis Ababa and among its functions is to ensure the effective implementation of the objectives of the AU (2) Economic Commission for Africa – this Commission was created by the United Nations in Africa to promote: economic and social development, regional cooperation and integration and international cooperation for Africa‟s development (3) Pan African Parliament, also known as the African Parliament, is the legislative organ of the African Union, inaugurated in 2004. It provides oversight for AU‟s policies; promotes the implementation of AU objectives, identifies challenges in policy implementation and proffers recommendations on how these could be addressed, among others functions (4) NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency is the technical arm of the African Union. It coordinates and assists the implementation of regional and continental programmes and projects and promotes partnership aimed at assisting their implementation (5) APRM Secretariat - assists in providing technical and administrative support for the APRM implementation processes and also liases with national APRM structures.

Category two was meant for civil society as supposed beneficiaries of regional policies and programmes. Included in this broad group are: (1) civil society organisations – the CSOs directly or indirectly interact with the AU/NEPAD, APRM Secretariats. They undertake studies in monitoring the implementation processes of these regional frameworks. The CSOs organise programmes, seminars and workshops educating and sensitising the public about the objectives of regional integration and development frameworks and how the civil society can participate in and exploit the opportunities provided for them to engage with government (2) research institutions – interact with the AU/NEPAD, APRM Secretariats and act as think-tanks to facilitate the objectives of the regional frameworks. They organise national and international conferences, seminars and workshops which bring together stakeholders from different fields to engage with issues of African affairs and strategies of implementing regional programmes. The outcomes of such programmes are disseminated widely across

different regions. The research institutions also conduct studies for the AUC/NEPAD and APRM. (3) The media as a component of civil society covers events at the AU/NEPAD and APRM Secretariats and facilitates the dissemination of information about such events. The media sensitises the public and provides a medium where the civil society can participate in governance processes at all levels. The media works hand in hand with the civil society to sensitise the people about the objectives of the AU/NEPAD and APRM and how they can participate in regional integration processes (4) Respondents from the academia and professors are experts in the field of African and international politics and international political economy. They are experienced scholars and have contributed extensively on various issues on regional integration, governance, security and development in Africa. They have also granted several interviews on these issues. The respondents in this group have facilitated various national and international conferences, workshops and seminars and have promoted scholarship in their areas of expertise across various parts of the world (5) doctoral candidates who were selected for this study are knowledgeable on issues relating to the subject of investigation. Their doctoral projects are not only concerned with issues on governance, development and security in Africa, the candidates have also made scholarly presentations in different national and international conferences.

The purpose of this categorisation was to be able to analyse the policy making processes of regional institutions and assess the outcomes of regional policies reflecting the views of participants from the two broad groups. This grouping of participants was aimed at assisting the researcher in undertaking a substantive, value-free and reliable data analysis, and in generating detailed findings on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM.

1.7.1.1 Regional policy making organisations

Participants in this category are officials who work in the policy making institutions such as, the African Union Headquarters, Economic Commission for Africa, the Pan African Parliament, NEPAD and APRM Secretariats (see Appendix 1[A]). These officials are from relevant departments and units dealing with issues connected with regional integration. They are experienced senior officials, included in the bureaucratic set up of the organisations; are directly or indirectly engaged in the policy making processes and take part in the implementation and evaluation of the regional integration policies and programmes. As such, they have relevant and handy information which the researcher required in carrying out the study. They could also speak authoritatively on behalf of their organisations. For example,

one of the participants named in this category is a member of the Ethiopian House of Assembly. The researcher also interviewed a former Chairperson of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons. The sample size is 18 for this category of participants.

1.7.1.2 Civil society as beneficiary of regional policies and programmes

This category of participants included organisations and individuals representing the views of the civil society as supposed beneficiaries of the policies and programmes of the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM. They are representatives of CSOs, research institutions, the media sector, academia, public commentators and doctoral students. The CSOs, research institutions and media houses from which information was gathered are strategically located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where the African Union Headquarters and the ECA are based; South Africa where NEPAD and APRM Secretariats are located; and Nigeria (see Appendix 1[B]). The South African and Nigerian governments have been influential in promoting pan-African ideals and it is instructive to see how civil society operated in these countries. Representatives from the organisations and institutions representing the civil society category also relate and interact with officials of various departments in the regional policy making organisations and collaborate with them in different areas. This made it easier to obtain information on the governance and development conditions in these countries and how the policies and programmes of the policy making institutions are impacting on the civil society.

The participants who are part of the academic community are experienced professors and seasoned writers and other academics who are experts in the field of study. On the other hand, post-graduate students who participated in the study were doctoral students whose research interests and studies are related to governance, development and security issues. These doctoral candidates are also from different countries in Africa and are knowledgeable about governance, development and regional integration problems in their various countries and sub-regions. The sample size is 32 for this set of participants and consisted.

1.7.2 Data collection method

In order to maximise the benefits of using the qualitative research methodology, the interview process (which is one of the methods of data collection) was adopted in this study and enabled the researcher to "gain a rich and inclusive account of the participants" experience" (Polkinghorne, 2005:145). Key-Informant Interviews were conducted between December

2012 and March 2014. The interviews were semi-structured to give room for exhaustive responses and „inside" opinions while also allowing for flexibility (if the need arises) in making changes or adding new interview questions. In order to gauge the views of participants from the two broad categories, two sets of questions covering the different segments of participants from the broad categories were prepared based on the research problem, research objectives and research questions (see Appendices 2 and 3).

1.7.2.1 Key-Informant Interview

Key-Informant Interview was selected because of the subject matter and the elite focus of the research. Key informants were selected through purposive sampling. In this study, the researcher identified officials to be interviewed in the regional policy making institutions and the CSOs, research institutions and media houses including senior academics, parliamentarian and doctoral candidates. The views of relevant personnel were elicited on the processes, mechanisms, strategies, policies and programmes of the regional policy making institutions in advancing the goals and ideals of African economic integration. The average length of interviews was one hour and the language used was English because it was understood and spoken by all respondents as well as the interviewer. English language is frequently used in interviews because it is understood by many. Even though some participants were versed in other languages such as French, they preferred to speak English language. Interview responses were both comprehensively documented and recorded electronically.

The face-to-face interviews afforded the researcher a great opportunity to gather substantive data from respondents. It provided room for the researcher to be fully involved in the process and for participants to freely give their views on the different issues raised and questions asked. While most of the interviews were conducted on a one on one basis, in one case it was a telephone interview and in a few cases, the respondent preferred to respond to interview questions in writing due to busy schedules and in order to provide detailed information.

1.7.3 Data collection

Both primary and secondary sources of data collection were explored.

1.7.3.1 *Secondary sources*

A significant portion of the data, statistical facts, figures and records needed for analysis were obtained from: official documents and publications of the African Union, NEPAD and

APRM Secretariats; publications of the South African Institute of International Affairs; African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank and UNDP Reports; and UNECA Reports on Africa. Also explored were relevant texts, journal articles, conference, workshop and seminar reports, institutional lectures, newspaper reports, and recorded interviews in print, of personnel of the AU, NEPAD and APRM. The researcher also made use of secondary data obtainable from relevant e-libraries and other reliable internet sources.

1.7.3.2 *Primary sources*

Primary data used in this study were obtained from the interviews conducted during the field studies undertaken at the Headquarters of the African Union, ECA, PAP, NEPAD and APRM in Addis-Ababa Ethiopia and South Africa. Field studies extended to CSOs, research institutions and media houses in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, South Africa and Nigeria respectively. Primary data also included those obtained from interviews with Professors, the academia and doctoral students.

1.8 Data analysis

The study undertook a thematic discourse analysis in order to explore salient economic and political issues on African economic integration. Discourse analysis is a "methodology for analysing social phenomenon that is qualitative, interpretive and constructionist" (Hardy, Harley and Philips, 2004:19). The interest in undertaking discourse analysis is exploring social reality and, in doing so, focusing on the relation between text and context (Hardy, Harley and Philips, 2004:19-21). It enabled the researcher to connect this study with previous discourses on African economic integration.

Also, data collected from various sources was subjected to expansive and extensive reviews with the use of content analysis as a veritable tool of data analysis adopted in many studies based on the qualitative research methodology. Content analysis, according to Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1278), is "a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns". Qualitative content analysis "is mainly inductive, grounding the examination of topics and themes as well as inferences drawn from them in the data" (Zhang and Wildemuth, 1966:1). In undertaking a thematic discourse and content analysis, the data obtained from the various sources were categorised and coded and analyses were based on the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the data. The researcher also undertook a document analysis which

entailed a cross-country analysis of a sample of three Country Review Reports from the APRM Assessment.

The combination of the discourse analysis, content analysis and document analysis allowed ample opportunity for a comprehensive data analysis guided by the research problem, research questions, research objectives and hypotheses. The different chapters in this thesis are linked in addressing particular questions/objectives. Chapter three provides the framework for research questions one and two which are subsequently addressed in detail in other chapters – five, six and seven. Research question three is addressed in chapter five, while research question four is addressed in chapter seven.

1.9 Ethical issues

The aim of this study was to examine the challenges and complexities of Africa economic integration. Examining the discourse from the angle of governance deficiencies, the study sought to assess the instrumental use of the APRM in addressing such issues to facilitate the African Union/NEPAD integration and development agenda. To this end, data was gathered from the the organisations and institutions directly concerned with the subject matter and members of the civil society.

In order to gain access and permission to study organisations, a letter introducing the researcher and the objectives of the research was prepared and sent to most of the study organisations and other participants (a copy is attached, see, Appendix 4). The participants were willing to grant intetviews to the extent that the researcher will respect ethical issues such as the principles of anonymity and confidentiality; and to indicate their interest in taking part in the process, 90 per cent of the participants each signed a consent form (see, Appendix 2, page 414). Participants agreed to the recording of interviews and detailing of responses in field notes. In few cases, participants completed the interview schedule.

Considering the afore-mentioned issues, the names, sexes, and departments of participants are not indicated in the study. However, each respondent is given a tag related to the name of his/her organisation, institution or university and ascribed a number for easy identification of his/her responses. For instance, Respondent AUC [1] for a participant from the African Union Commission, Respondent AUC [2] for another participant from African Union Commission, Respondent NEPAD [1] from NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency,

Respondent AISA [1] from African Institute of South Africa, Respondent Media [1] from particular media house, RP1 for a particular Professor, Doctoral Candidate [1] for a particular doctoral candidate and so on (see Appendix 1(A) and 1(B) for the list of study organisations).

1.10 Limitations

Muhammad et al (2011:2085) list a set of demands posed in undertaking research adopting qualitative methodology. According to these scholars, "a good qualitative research demands time and resources to collect extensive data and requires the researcher to labour over field issues in trying to gain access, rapport and an insider perspective. It also engages the researcher in a complex, time consuming process of data analysis, and the ambitious task of sorting through large amounts of data and reducing them to a few themes or categories within its rigorous design". The researcher was able to address issues related to financial resources with the UPEACE/IDRC doctoral thesis award granted in 2012. With this award, the field work activities were undertaken in Addis Ababa, South Africa and Nigeria. In addition, the researcher was able to obtain access to some organisations through personal contacts.

One challenge faced in completing this study was in analysing contending issues on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM, despite the fact that the focus of the research was on the APRM. This challenge was as a result of what the researcher calls the "three-in-one" vision of the AU, NEPAD, and APRM as illustrated in this study. It was not always possible to assess the APRM without relating such assessments to the African Union and NEPAD initiatives. However, the researcher was able to overcome this challenge by systematically organising and coding data gathered from the different regional policy making organisations and other civil society organisations.

The limitations did not compare to the strengths and advantages of employing a qualitative research methodology in this study. In order to make the outcomes of the study substantive, reliable and verifiable, primary data obtained from the study organisations were not taken at face value. The researcher endeavoured to assess the values, strengths and weaknesses of data; situate facts and arguments in their various contexts and identify the consistencies and inconsistencies in statements made to cross-check for biases with other information sources.

1.11 Delimitation of the study

The study explores the realities and challenge of African economic integration. It examines the African Union in its capacity as Africa‟s pan-regional organisation which is promoting the goals of integration in Africa and the framework under which the objectives of the NEPAD are being promoted and achieved. However, the focus of the study is the APRM, Africa‟s key tool for motivating the implementation of good governance in member countries.

In exploring the various issues in the discourse on African economic integration, the study examines: regional economic integration as a strategy for development, political and economic issues influencing the quest for African economic integration and the evolution of regional economic integration in Africa with the OAU up to the establishment of the African Union/NEPAD and APRM frameworks, and on-going programmes of the AU/NEPAD at promoting African economic integration. Salient governance and development challenges at the national level in African countries which constitute obstacles to the achievement of regional economic integration objectives are thereafter examined. The study therefore examines the effectiveness of the APRM in addressing such challenges in furtherance of the African Union/NEPAD agenda. The study notes that collectively, the AU, NEPAD and APRM objectives seem to be targeted at addressing the internal political and economic crises in African countries to enhance national, sub-regional and continental integration.

The African Union took off in 2002; the NEPAD and APRM are products of AU‟s Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance adopted in 2002. With the celebration of the APRM‟s tenth anniversary in 2013, the study examines the progress which has been made with the implementation of the AU/NEPAD, APRM framework.

1.12 Structure of the thesis

The study has eight distinct chapters. Each chapter addresses particular research question(s). The present chapter introduces the study and provides a background to understanding the African economic integration and development problematic. The chapter articulates the research problem, objectives, questions and research hypotheses. It also includes the justification for the study and presents the research methodology which clarifies how data was obtained and analysed.

In chapter two, regional economic cooperation and integration are conceptualised. The chapter also examines some relevant regional integration theories which are considered potentially useful but are not selected for this study because they are considered inadequate to analyse the research concerns and questions. The chapter thereafter examines the various theories which provide a framework for analysis in this study, explaining how these theories will be combined systematically to provide a coherent analytical framework. It also features issues of theoretical debates, contestations and challenges as regards the discourse of African economic integration.

Chapter three comprises a literature review. This chapter conducts a thematic examination of scholarly discourses on regional economic integration in Africa in line with the theoretical findings presented in chapter two. Issues discussed include: Africa‟s development challenge in the post-independence period; the nature and workings of the international economic system; regionalism: a global perspective; the trend of African economic integration efforts; Africa‟s regional economic integration and development initiatives from the time of independence; the weaknesses and challenges of these initiatives; subsequent establishment of the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM; issues on regional integration in Africa and the issues of debates and contestations on the AU/NEPAD, and APRM initiatives.

Chapter four examines discourses on globalisation and its elements of liberalisation and regionalisation, exploring the challenges for Africa. Key discourses in this chapter are analysed within the theoretical framework guiding the study and the theoretical reviews articulated in chapter three. The chapter examines the challenges faced by African countries in the light of the demands posed by globalisation and emphasises the imperative of a working regional integration arrangement for Africa.

Chapter five examines salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration. The aim is to identify the causes of regional economic integration failures in Africa bearing in mind the theoretical expositions made in chapter two and scholarly discourses and debates in chapter three. The chapter focuses on the weak states in Africa and their political and socio-economic challenges. The chapter emphasises that the governance and development problems in African countries have remained as obstacles to the achievements of regional economic integration objectives. It thereafter examines the African Union, NEPAD and APRM

initiatives which are African leaders‟ latest initiatives promoting regional economic integration efforts on the continent. The AU/NEPAD continent-wide programmes which are being implemented are listed. However, the programmes on infrastructure development are examined. This is as a result of the importance of infrastructure development to the regional integration agenda and how it affects the success of other programmes to the point that it is possible to generalise the findings to other sectors. The chapter examines some of the challenges to implementing the AU/NEPAD programmes and further examines introduces the APRM as the instrument established to facilitate the AU/NEPAD Action Plan.

The APRM is therefore the focus of Chapter Six. Its institutional framework, continental and national structures, policies and programmes are explored. Specifically, the chapter examines the APRM‟s principles, purpose, thematic areas and how the APR process takes place in member states. A major section is devoted to analyses of three samples of the APRM Country Review Reports for Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria. The chapter examines how the programmes of the APRM connect with the research problem, objectives and questions raised in this study. The APRM is explored as a regional governance mechanism seeking to assist member countries to improve the governance situations in their countries and also their policy making processes. The chapter demonstrates that although the APRM is a regional initiative, the bulk of its programme is being undertaken at the national level. This is the critical linkage of the Mechanism to the study‟s central line of argument.

Chapter Seven is devoted to assessing available data on African economic integration. The chapter examines thematically, the various issues as they emerged from the previous chapters up to chapter six on the quest for African economic integration with the African Union, NEPAD and APRM initiatives. It grounds the discussion on theoretical and empirical data. The key concern of the chapter is to assess the effectiveness of the APRM in advancing the AU/NEPAD‟s integration and development agenda.

The chapter also examines the progress being made in promoting African economic integration and development with the African Union/NEPAD and APRM. It reflects some of the successes and achievements of the AU/NEPAD. The principal aim is to assess what has improved both in individual African countries and the continent as a whole reflecting on previous discourses in the various chapters. Additionally, the chapter identifies persistent problems; what still needs to be done; on-going programmes of the AU/NEPAD and what

lies ahead in the future. These assessments provide the bases for examining the challenges of the APRM as the Mechanism is not only central in determining Africa‟s future development but also in advancing the quest for African economic integration.

Chapter eight summarises the study and provides a synopsis of findings from previous chapters. It articulates how the various chapters are linked together in addressing the research problem and questions and in achieving the research objectives. Thereafter, the chapter concludes the study based on the critical findings on the AU, NEPAD and the APRM; provides several recommendations to enhance the APRM as a process of change in Africa and presents an outline of issues for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Africa has a large number of cooperative arrangements and institutions promoting the goals of integration. Yet, the continent has remained the least integrated of the world‟s major regions with several divisions and conflicts within and between African countries. The African continent has remained slow in its development trajectory and habours most of the least developed countries of the world. A large percentage of the African populace is mired in poverty while the sub-continent continues to be marginalised in global affairs. The obvious reality is that Africa is yet to benefit fully from the gains of integration and that the economic transformation of the African continent as a whole -- one of the main objectives often declared in establishing regional economic integration schemes -- is yet to be realised. There is in Africa, a seemingly wide gap between the theoretical aspirations towards regional integration and the empirical evidence and practical reality of actual integration. Regional integration in Africa raises several issues of contradictions and debates in the world of theory.

This thesis examines the policies and programmes of the African Union/NEPAD (through the APRM initiative) in response to key governance and development issues in the discourse on African economic integration. It examines the influence of political institutions in strengthening and/or promoting national, sub-regional and regional economic integration. One aspect of the argument is that African leaders and policy makers easily sign regional agreements and treaties, formulate desirable objectives in establishing regional economic institutions, but in reality are often not politically committed to the principles of regionalism and effective implementation of regional resolutions. Regional integration in Africa thus appears to be problematic and influenced by political variables.

In order to examine economic and political discourses on African economic integration, a combination of theories: Economic theories – trade, market integration and open regionalism; functionalism/neo-functionalism and neo-realism theories are employed. Combined in a

systematic format, these theories provide useful tools for examining: the factors influencing regional economic integration in Africa; challenges of integration processes in Africa; issues of debates and contentions on the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives, among others. Thus, the theories provided a framework of addressing the research problems, research objectives and hypotheses.

The chapter defines regionalism, regional cooperation and integration ad examines regional integration as a development strategy. An analysis of integration theories relevant to the study of African economic integration is made with a view to identifying why they were not selected for the present study. Thereafter, the selected theories for this study are examined and contextualised in the study. This section of the chapter illustrates the fact that, although integration theories are used to explain the evolution, development and successes of regional economic integration processes in Europe and other developed countries, regional integration arrangements in Africa are established on certain theoretical foundations. It is important to note, however, that the issue of "context" needs to be considered in analysing the problematic of African economic integration. Thereafter, the theoretical challenges and debates on the process of African economic integration as envisioned by the African Union/NEPAD (APRM) initiatives are examined. The conclusion to the chapter is thereafter presented.

2.2 Conceptualising Regional Cooperation and Integration (Definitional Issues)

Regional cooperation and integration are two distinct concepts often used together. The two concepts refer to the idea of bringing different units together for different types of economic and political interactions. However, identifying key items that distinguish these concepts enhances an understanding of the dynamism of regionalism[5] in different parts of the developed and developing world.

Regional cooperation explains a situation where nation-states decide to pool their efforts towards achieving specific objectives. It may not necessarily involve committing themselves to integrating their independent economies. These states are interested in actualising objectives which may not be possible if they were acting unilaterally (Lamberte, 2004:4). On

[5] Regionalism is a concept which refers often to formal cooperation and integration arrangements of a group of countries within a common geographical space aimed at facilitating or enhancing a sense of common identity and purpose through the creation of institutions that give shape to, and drive collective action (Lamberte, 2004:4).

the other hand, regional integration connotes a form of interdependence among nation states (Adetula, 2004:3; Lamberte, 2004:4). In establishing regional integration arrangements, sovereign states within a geographical space enter into a formal agreement to work together in order to actualise political and socio-economic benefits (Adetula, 2004:3-4). More importantly, regional integration requires independent nation states to cede their national sovereignty, make political commitments and sacrifices, and forego certain benefits in the interest of the larger body (Adetula, 2008:7; Claar and Andreas, 2010:114-117).

To Ravenhill (1990:14), cooperative or collaborative ventures do not require an enduring commitment from participating governments. They can be established to achieve a particular project or a number of projects; cooperative agreements could be between two countries or the arrangement could be such that many countries are involved. Cooperative arrangements are flexible and, to this extent, participating governments are not pressured to cede their national sovereignty. Radelet (1997:24, 1999:14-15) adds that cooperation arrangements "have lower profile; usually have smaller secretariats and bureaucratic hierarchies, and, therefore, are less demanding on scarce administrative and financial resources than more formal trade agreements". According to this scholar, cooperation can assist in facilitating increased intra-regional, inter-regional or inter-continental trade through effective communication. Cooperation links participating countries together, thereby accelerating the pace of regional economic integration (Radelet, 1997:24; 1999:14-15). Economic integration, according to Mattli (1999:41), involves two or more sovereign states willingly deciding to shift the authority to make decisions over economic concerns from the national level to the supra-national level. As Lamberte (2004:4) informs the reader, "most initiatives are „policy induced integration", the net result of regional cooperation" (Lamberte, 2004:4).

In differentiating between regional cooperation and integration, Adetula (2008:7) explains that, while cooperation may be used to classify a relatively informal type of collaborative ventures between two or more countries aimed at achieving particular goals, regional integration involves a formal agreement. Regional integration requires some level of political willingness, sacrifice and commitment on the part of integrating states to redesign strategies to maximise their potential in the capitalist world economy (Adetula, 2008:7). Following these definitions, therefore, regional cooperation may be understood as a stage in the process of regional integration where states relinquish some aspects of their national sovereignty (Haas, 1958:16; Adetula, 2004:3; Claar and Andreas, 2010:114-117; Khadiagala, 2011:2).

Haas (1958:16) notes that, as regional integration deepens, formerly independent nation-states are motivated to "transfer their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new larger centre whose institution and processes demand some jurisdiction over those of the national states". Corroborating this assertion, Etzioni (1965:4) views integration as a condition in which political entities are merged. A community of states is created with a decision making institution which regulates the affairs of that community. Member countries would begin to see themselves as having a particular regional identity having become members of this community (Etzioni, 1965:4).

Given the above definitions, integration connotes a process as well an outcome (Adetula, 2004:3-4; Adeniran, 1983:112). Integration involves a process of connecting an existing system with a future one (Adeniran, 1983:112). It could also be seen as a situation in which political integration has been achieved (Etzioni, 1965). However it is defined, integration is considered an outcome of the decision taken willingly by sovereign nation-states (Adeniran, 1983:112).

Over the years, regionalism has attracted several debates and contestations among scholars. Perspectives on the concept and practice of regionalism have changed over time. This is also true of the theoretical explanations (Olivier 2010:20-22). There are debates not only over issues of what constitutes a „region" or who the members of a region represent, but also on the motives and interests which drives regionalism in different parts of the world. In Africa, for instance, there are also questions on „what" should be integrated and „how" integration should proceed. Thus, it has become the common approach to differentiate between „old" and „new" regionalism, and various types of regionalisations (see, Hettne and Soderbaum, 1998:3-4; 2000:3; Gilpin, 2001:341-344; Soderbaum, 2007:319-320; Olivier, 2010:18-20).

Old regionalism is linked to regional integration attempts between the 1950s and 1960s which were inward oriented; explicit about the objectives to be achieved; clear about the programmes and had restricted membership (Hettne and Soderbaum, 1998:4, 2000:3; Olivier, 2010:18-19; Gilpin, 341-344). New regionalism, on the other hand, is inclusive, outward-looking and is associated with regional integration arrangements from the 1990s (Hettne and Soderbaum, 1998:4, 2000:3; Gibb, 2009:708; Olivier, 2010:18-19). New regionalism establishes the reality of growing interdependence of nation states in the international political system (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000:3; Gibb, 2009:708). It makes it difficult to

establish a general definition or theoretical explanation of regionalism (Gilpin, 2001:341). To this extent, there is a growing recognition of the need to develop a new regional approach towards a multi-dimensional, broadly focused perspective on regionalism (Olivier, 2010:21). In the last decade, regional cooperation and integration arrangements have been established in various parts of the world to an extent which has ensured that almost all countries in the developed and developing worlds are members of particular regional institutions (Delvin and Estevadeordal, 2002:2; see Sako, 2006). Moreover, countries in the developing world have also shown interest in cooperation. Cooperative arrangements also exist between developed and developing countries. There has been increasing interest in cooperating to accomplish regional cooperation projects in various sectors; promoting research activities; and creating regional bodies that regulate diverse aspects of economic policy making (Lamberte, 2004:4). Thus, Delvin and Estevadeordal (2002:2) assert that, regional integration agreements have increasingly been established as a strategy to respond to the challenges and demands of a fast globalising world marked with technological transformations.

Considering these assertions, therefore, it can be concluded that regional integration in the contemporary interdependent world has become more all-encompassing and multifaceted than in the previous decades (Langenhove, 2004:12-13). Adetula (2004:5) notes, however, that regional integration within the framework of countries in the less developed world is particularly complex and different from what is obtainable in the developed world because of the socio-economic and political dynamics which impact on the process. For instance, there are different questions that could be asked concerning the objectives of regionalism and the forms of regional integration in Africa. Regional integration arrangements in the African continent are established on certain philosophical premises which developed generally from the practice of countries in the Western industrialised societies and each of the different types of integration scheme has its distinct regularities, processes and method of operation (Adetula, 2004:5).

2.2.1 Regional economic integration as a development strategy

The changing perspective on regionalism has drawn attention to the need to identify the factors which motivate governments to desire integration considering the fact that nation-states are interested in preserving their national sovereignty (Ndegwa, 1993:19; see also Mwasha, 2008). There is no gainsaying that sovereign states take part in regional integration arrangements in expectation of obtaining certain political, social or economic benefits (Iyoha,

2005:4; Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:215). For instance, as the literature establishes, the commonly integrated sector is the economy. This linking factor between countries underlies the significance of the economy in any society. However, political variables are also being emphasised considering the political dynamics that influence the attainment of economic objectives (Jones, 1997:400-402).

More importantly, regional integration has been considered a viable development strategy in the less developed countries, particularly of Africa. African countries desire to increase their level of incomes, promote industrialisation, address political and socio-economic challenges, reduce poverty and provide for basic social needs and welfare of the growing population. These issues are all embodied in the need to promote development. Development, according to Pearson (1970:5), "takes place when the people participate in the determination of their environment and are allowed to choose and use their resources to the maximum capacity". Development connotes positive trends such as improvement, progress, and transformation at the level of individuals and society (see Pearson, 1970:5; Rodney 1972:9; House, 1993; Bellu, 2011:2-3). Particularly for developing countries of Africa, the quest for development is demonstrated by the formulation of various policies to promote development.

Development is a "multidimensional concept" (see, Rodney, 1972:9; Bellu, 2011:2) and has been defined by scholars from various perspectives. Although it occurs in the political, social, economic, cultural and other sectors and segments of society, scholars often refer to economic development because of its concern with "improvements in material living standards and therefore to improvement in income, consumption, employment, savings and investments. It also relates to how resources, goods and services are distributed between different people and the processes that influence this distribution".[6] Economic development is "traditionally regarded as the first form of development" (Bellu, 2011:3). It is a common belief that economic development will lead to social or human development which entails improvement in the quality of life, security, health, education, of individuals in society.[7] Economic development is seen to have been achieved "when all segments of the society benefit from the fruits of economic growth through economic efficiency and equity" (Kooros and Badeaux, 2007:120).

[6] www.cefims.ac.uk/cedepapp/116_wen_unit/index.htm. (Accessed: 20 January 2015).
[7] www.cefims.ac.uk/cedepapp/116_wen_unit/index.htm. (Accessed: 20 January 2015).

The drive for regional economic integration is therefore expressed when nation states accept the reality of their limitations as individual entities and the benefits which they tend to achieve by establishing cooperative and integrative arrangements (Mwasha, 2008:73). Regional integration, according to Mwasha (2008:73) begins, usually, from "simple cooperation on and coordination of mutually agreed aspects amongst a given number of countries to full integration or merger of the economies in question" (Mwasha, 2008:73). Regional integration follows a gradually evolving process. Five stages are involved in this process. These are: a "Free Trade Area (FTA); a Customs Union (CU); a Common Market (CM); an Economic Union (EUN); and a complete economic integration" (Balassa, 1961:174). The different stages, explained in Balassa"s *Theory of Economic Integration*, show the commitments required of integrating states as the process progresses.

The first stage involves the creation of a free trade area (FTAs). Here, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) are removed for member states while each of the participating states maintains its own tariff for countries outside the arrangement. The second stage entails the establishment of a Customs Union. Under this arrangement, a FTA establishes common tariffs and quotas (if any) for trading with countries outside the Union. In the third stage, the process advances with the creation of a Common Market. In this arrangement, "restrictions to trade and restrictions on factor movements" are done away with. The fourth stage involves the creation of an economic union. This arrangement is a step higher than what is expected in the Common Market. In addition, an economic union entails some level of harmonisation policies of participating countries in order to eliminate the discrimination resulting from differences in these policies. Total or Complete Economic Integration presupposes the merging of monetary policies and necessitates the creation of a supra-national body whose decisions are binding for the participating states (Balassa, 1961:174-175).[8]

Economic integration is particularly wished for by smaller states which do not yet have the capacities to compete with stronger economies. However, even the developed countries have realised the importance of integration in order to compete fully in the international system (Jones, 1997:400; see Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:214). Participating in economic integration arrangements can enable countries to enhance their productivity level through

[8] The final level of economic integration is reached when a supranational authority is in place. This requires some submission of national sovereignty by member states to the supranational body. The best example always cited to explain this stage of integration, is the European Union (Agubuzu, 2004:192).

efficiently using their natural, material and human resources. Countries would, in turn, be better placed to achieve economic growth and ensure the welfare of their population (Agubuzu, 2004:192). Countries taking part in a free trade area or customs union will enjoy the benefits of economies of scale, and, in addition, the benefits derived from cooperation in different sectors can be properly channelled in a wider market (Oshikoya, 2010). Regional economic integration, according to Mwasha (2008:74-75) can provide an enabling environment for public and private sector planning and investment.

Through participating in regional integration arrangements, collective security can be promoted while countries can enhance their bargaining power by presenting common positions in the international system (Oshikoya, 2010). Regional integration, particularly in the developing regions such as in Africa, has been considered as a strategy to address the problems of underdevelopment. The idea is that problems associated with poor infrastructures, unemployment, poverty, capacity development, as well as security and health concerns, such as HIV/AIDS, necessitate regional solutions. As Ikome (2004:40) points out, this is unlike the situation where countries in the developed world may be interested in regionalism to promote the "flow of certain goods and services or simply to secure a monopoly in the production and marketing of certain products to achieve more rapid economic growth".

Nevertheless, as much as the benefits associated with regional integration can be outlined, success in regional integration among countries does not occur in a vacuum. It is also necessary to consider the costs-analysis of integration (Oshikoya, 2010; Mwasha, 2008:74; Adedeji, 1989:351). Regional integration poses several challenges and demands a lot of commitments on the part of the government and citizens of member states for it to be successful. As Adedeji (1989:351) observes, participating countries would need to demonstrate their willingness to sacrifice for the common good in spite of "inevitable odds, strains and stresses". Regional integration requires that participating countries show their readiness to relinquish present benefits for greater future gains. And for cooperation to be sustained, it should be a joint endeavour which is beneficial to all members (Adedeji, 1989:352). Issues of contention in regional integration discourses (especially in the case of Africa) include those of national sovereignty, national interests versus regional interests, lack of political will and national political commitments to the integration agenda.

2.3 Theories of regional integration

A review of literature shows that issues on African integration and development cannot be analysed meaningfully using one particular theoretical framework. This is as a result of the complexities associated with regionalism in Africa and the changing perspectives of the concept as scholars attempt to grapple with the realities and challenges of globalisation, regionalisation and liberalisation. Africa has experimented with different types of regional economic integration arrangements and formulated different policies underpinned by pan-African ideas of cooperation and integration.

While several studies provide useful analysis of economic issues as primary determining factors for the success of regional integration arrangements in Africa, many others focus essentially on the relevance of politics. As such, scholars have been preoccupied with political and economic issues on regionalism in Africa because African governments and their people desire integration and unity as a long-cherished pan-African ideal and not necessarily as a means to an end (Okhonmina, 2009:89-93). Scholars therefore take into account the ideological dynamics and political-economic challenges associated with regionalism in Africa as points of reference in their theoretical analyses.

Adetula (2004:4) asserts, for instance, that when Africans were pushing to achieve independence, they desired to cooperate to reduce their dependence on foreign powers and to address their development challenges. Since independence was achieved, the quest for regional integration in Africa has been influenced by political, economic and social intentions and the need for stronger bargaining power in the international community (Adetula, 2004:5; see also, Nyirabikali, 2005:10-14). Currently, all African countries belong to one of the various RIAs around the continent. In fact, some African countries belong to more than one regional organisations and this has raised the issue of overlapping memberships as one of the problems of the regional integration process in Africa. The problem that arises in this situation is that of selecting an appropriate theoretical framework that captures the complexities of regional integration in Africa.

The main theories of integration such as: realism, neo-realism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, institututionalism, federalism, market and trade integration, and development integration each possesses its strengths and weaknesses in explaining particular aspects of the regional integration processes. As Olivier (2010:22)

notes, the issue is to identify how these theoretical approaches used either separately or combined, could be merged into a valuable analytical framework to examine the distinctiveness of African economic integration. In this section of the chapter, a number of integration theories which were considered useful but not selected for use in this study are examined. The strengths and weaknesses of these theories are identified in relation to the foci and objectives of the study.

2.3.1 Realism was considered but found inappropriate for this study because of its power-politics approach to the understanding of relations among countries. The general conception of the realists is that states (and not non-state actors) are the main actors in the international system. States are sovereign and each state has its national interest which it seeks to achieve in the international system. As such, international politics is defined as a battle for power among self-interested states seeking to achieve their differing and competing national interests in the international system (Morgenthau, 1954; 1978:4-15).[9] States are moved to action by the pursuit of their national interests and not by moral principles. To the realists, therefore, conflicts are unavoidable in international politics and it is the responsibility of each individual state to ensure its security. Realism emphasises that states should acquire and sustain power in order to ensure their security and survival. Accordingly, realists define National interest in terms of power; they assert that such power needs to be constantly maintained (Morgenthau, 1954; Donnelly, 2000:6-18).

Realists are therefore sceptical about the functionality of international organisations, institutions and treaties in light of the fact that such organisations do not possess the coercive power to control how sovereign states behave or to compel states to abide by regional principles and implement regional agreements. Realists do not believe that states which are at different levels of development would cooperate to achieve collective objectives. As Simmons and Martin, 2001:195 assert, realism was popular following the Second World. "The United Nations, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund all were the subject of highly critical review". These policies were considered to further the interests of the developed countries of the West as against countries of the developing world.

[9] Hans Morgenthau"s work (revised). Available at: http://www.mthoIyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm. (Accessed: 5 November, 2014).

With reference to the issue of African economic integration, some aspects of realism are useful in explaining the reality that the issue of sovereignty and the national interests versus regional interest phenomenon are major factors responsible for the slow pace of regional integration in Africa. African leaders are afraid of loosing their sovereignty to supranational institutions. They are not convinced of what the outcome would be if such regional arrangements fails to achieve its objectives as was, for instance, the case of the initial East African Community which was founded in 1967 and which collapsed in 1977 (Murithi, 2008:20). Beyond this, the RECs in Africa, African Union and its different institutions, and regional frameworks such as the NEPAD and APRM have been weak in enforcing regional initiatives. There are no serious punitive measures for countries that fail to abide by regional principles. As such, regional policies and left to the good will of countries. However, this theory fails to account for the level of inter-state relations occurring among African countries particularly at the level of the sub-regions, and the cooperative relations facilitated and enhanced at the AU. The theory was therefore not selected for the present study.

2.3.2 Intergovernmentalism as a theory of integration advances the idea that states play key roles in institutional institutions. It is the governments‟ decisions that will determine how effectively supranational institutions function. Integration is driven by participating governments and often based on national political and economic discourses (Diiego Castaneda, 2006:8; Kleinschmidt, 2013). Intergovernmentalists agree that international organisations are vehicles to guide regional integration processes (Gilpin, 2001:354), but they do not accept the proposition of neo-functionalists that international organisations and supranational institutions are influential and play crucial roles in the international system (see, Puchala, 1999:318-319; Gehring, 1996:225). Rather, intergovernmentalism puts forward the point that governments control and determine the pace of regional integration and the issues involved (Moravcist, 1993; Diiego Castaneda, 2006:8; Niemann, and Gutenberg, 2013:7). This theory proposes that other interests groups in society who are able to influence government‟s policy making processes on issues such as social and regional policies would not be able to pressure governments towards integration (Kleinschmidt, 2013:6).

The theory of intergovernmentalism could be employed to explain how governments attempt to further their interests in regional institutions such as the RECs in Africa - ECOWAS, EAC, SADC and continental instutions such as the African Union. However the theory would not adequately state how these institutions not only perform key roles in the various regions but

also influence the policy directives of member states (see, Puchala, 1999:318-319). Intergovernmentalism could also be used to explain that Africa‟s regional integration processes have been elite/leadership driven. For instance, the theory could be used to illustrate that countries voluntarily accede to the APRM thereby enhancing an intergovernmental process. However, intergovernmentalism was not selected for use in this study because it would not adequately explain the activities and contributions of other non-state actors in the process of regional integration. Since the 1990s, the contributions of civil society in addressing governance and socio-development challenges in many parts of Africa have been emphasised and the call has constantly been made for more space to be provided for effective civil society participation at all levels – national, regional and continental. This is one of the key discourses on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM initiatives.

In addition, intergovernmentalism will not account for the national governance and socio-economic factors at the national level which contribute to policy failures towards realising the goals of regional integration. For instance, Anadi (2005:142) asserts that, intergovernmentalism cannot account for the political instability in African countries which leads to discontinuity in policy making and also negatively impact on the ability of the governments to sustain bargaining process towards achieving regional integration objectives.

2.3.3 Institutionalism is another useful theory that was considered but was also not selected. Unlike realists‟ state-centric proposition, studies have been done which have found that institutions play key roles in promoting international cooperation (Simmons and Martins, 2001:199). As Annette (2010:4) notes, “institutionalisation is a sequence of events involving the development of formal and informal institutions to secure the policy preferences and strategic choices of members of regional bodies”. Participant countries in regional integration create institutions to provide rules that guide the process. Institutions not only assist member states in addressing their political and socio-economic challenges, they also foster cooperation and integration among states by “improving domestic capacity for implementing agreements” (Simmons and Martins, 2001:199; Gilpin, 2001:353). Institutionalism is used to connote the fact that there are structures in place, rules and procedures which guide different actors in making decisions on different issues (Kramer, 1982:185; Stokke, 1996:1-5; Diiego Castaneda, 2006:6; Lobo, 2008:12).

Institutionalism could be useful in explaining the functions which are performed by regional and international institutions. This makes it a useful theory which could be used to explain Africa‟s integration processes where institutions play key roles in furthering the continent‟s integration agenda. However, as Gilpin (2001:353) observes, institutionalism "has not led to a specific theory of economic and political integration". In addition, there is evidence to show that regional and international institutions have failed to achieve their objectives where the policies promoted through these bodies have failed to have the intended effects (Simmons and Martins (2001:200). Nevertheless, Simmons and Martins (2001:200-205) note that despite the shortcomings of institutionalism, a set of scholars from different fields are showing greater interest in exploring the contributions of regional and international cooperation and organisation in addressing global issues. Simmons and Martins (2001:200) note that:

> For the rationalists, this has meant looking to domestic institutional conditions that make it rationale to delegate authority to international institutions. For others, working from a more sociological point of view, this has meant drawing in a wide array of transnational actors that have been empowered by democratisation or international institutionalisation itself (Simmons and Martins, 2001:200-205).

Within the African context, working within the perspective of institutionalism, the continent has in place, a large number of regional integration arrangements and institutions promoting the goals of integration. At the sub-regional level, there are regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, among others. Each of the RECs has established institutions to promote cooperation and integration. At the continental level, the African Union has several organs and institutions, for instance, the PSC, ECOSOC, PAP and NEPAD and APRM which are the AU‟s initiatives promoting promoting good governance, sustainable development and regional integration. In addition, the programmes of NEPAD/APRM have established principles and guidelines for member countries. These go to show that Africa is lacking in policy and institutional frameworks to promote regional integration and development. However, institutionalism as a theory of integration, is not able to satisfactorily explain: the lack of institutionalisation in Africa; the factors accounting for the poor records of regionalism in Africa, for instance, the limited results achieved by Africa‟s RECs; weaknesses on the part of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM to enforce regional rules and guidelines for member countries; among others. Institutionalism theory does not explain

the fact that regional institutions make laws that are in most cases disregarded by states (Anadi, 2005:153).

Murithi (2008:20) and Mistry (2000) among other scholars, note that unlike other regions such as Europe, North America, Asia, which have made progress in furthering their integration processes, Africa continues to lag behind in meeting targets and deadlines which are set by regional institutions. Thus, the assertion made by Mistry (2000) concerning regional integration in Africa is worth underscoring. This scholar noted that treaties and protocols are important but not the determinants of the success of regional integration (Mistry, 2001). Some regional cooperation arrangements have progressed successfully without established institutions such as those which promote trade objectives as in Asia. In the case of Africa, institutions are in place but they are not able to enforce established rules and compel member countries to abide by regional principles and agreement. Policy implementation is left to the goodwill of member countries who may decide to disregard regional protocols. These issues have made some scholars to argue that African governments establish regional policy and institutional frameworks, but effective implementation of policies remains a challenge at the national level in African member countries (see, Adetula, 2004; Adogamhe, 2008, Murithi, 2008).

Institutionalisation remains a challenge in Africa. African institutions are weak and most lack capacities to functions. Thus, many writers have noted that there is a need to strengthen regional and continental institutions to achieve integration objectives. To this effect, some scholars have cautioned that Africa should follow the gradual processes towards achieving continental integration as proposed by the African Union (see, Ayangafag, 2008; Murithi, 2008; see also, Adogamhe, 2008). The issue of concern is that the structures and institutions necessary to facilitate integration are not yet in place at the national level in African countries (Onimode, 1993; Manboah, 2000). Thus, the researcher preferred to employ functionalism/neofunctionalism theories to further these arguments.

2.3.4 Federalism proposes a top-down strategy to integration unlike neo-functionalism‟s bottom up approach (see, Adogamhe, 2008:5). The theory assumes that the best way to achieve the ultimate goal of regional economic integration is to bring formerly sovereign nation states together under a new centre, a new union which would have a supranational

authority responsible for decision making and to which these states would submit (Dozenrode, 2010:19-21; Bergamann and Niemann, 2013:3). This entails that participating governments will cede part of their sovereignty to the newly established supranational institution and share political power with this newly established body (Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:214; Kambudzi, 2008:23; Dozenrode, 2010:19-21). While federalism is a useful integration theory which clearly explains the ultimate result of regional economic integration processes, it is not interested in the process of integration and how nations slowly transfer national sovereignty to a new centre (Dozenrode, 2010:19-21). This theory of integration has been accused of quickening the process of integration unlike functionalism/neo-functionalism which proposes a gradual/incremental process. For his part, Gilpin (2001:349) argues that, "federalism has never proved to be a successful route to political integration and its successes have been achieved only under unusual circumstances - military conquest or dynastic union -- and neither of these methods will necessarily lead to creation of an integrated economy".

The federalist theory provides a useful tool in explaining that African integration project right from the period of independence from the OAU to the African Union have been formulated with the objective of promoting continental unity. The African Union which replaced the OAU aims to ultimately lead to the establishment of a United States of Africa (USA) (AU, 2004). However, while African leaders consent to the need for African Unity considering the continent‟s political-economic history, development predicaments and the challenges posed by a fast globalising world, they continue to debate over the better integration strategy to achieve this objective -- neo-functionalist‟s gradual incrementalist approach or the federalist approach. The issue of strategy arose during the period of the establishment of the OAU and is still contentious with the African Union. This debate over the best strategy to achieve continental unity has also intensified since the proposal for establishing a Union Government was promoted by the African Union in 2005 (Murithi, 2008).

Scholars who promote the federalist approach note that a Union Government will be a right step towards achieving continentl unity and will show that African governments and people are sincere and committed to realising the objective. The argument goes that that sub-regional integration has been slow in furthering the African Union‟s objectives. African RECs have achieved limited results and have not been able to address the continent‟s numerous problems. As such, an African Union Government will speed up the process of continental

integration, address Africa‟s political and socio-economic challenges and give the continent a stronger voice in the international community. The argument is that African governments should be willing to submit to supranational institutions (see, Murithi, 2008; Adogamhe, 2008).

On the other side, those who promote the neo-functionalist idea suggest following a gradual process to continental integration with sub-regional integration promoted by the RECs. Such scholars and writers argue that this strategy will be beneficial for Africa due to the reasons that Africa has not yet put in place the required structures and institutions for continental integration to be achieved. For this set of scholars, the RECs should be strengthened as building blocks to continental unity. Through the various RECs, African leaders and people will internalise the norms and values developed to guide African integration processes (see, Adetula, 2004; Okhonmina, 2009). For instance, Lecoutre (2008:50) noted that the EU started with economic integration using steel and coal and has progressed to achieve deeper integration. This scholar argues that the "Arab countries had not succeeded in setting up an economic market despite their common language" (Lacoutre, 2008:50). There is also the argument that the institutions of the AU should be strengthened rather than furthering the idea of creating a Union Government for Africa (see, Murithi, 2008). One of the criticisms against those who favour this idea is that they are sensitive about the issue of sovereignty which continues to hinder African economic integration. However, it is instructive to note that several issues of debates and contestations have been examined reflecting the two approaches to continental integration (see, Olivier, 2010; Adogamhe, 2008; Okhonmina, 2009).

For the researcher however, the reality is that Africa has few successes. Intra-African trade remains low as does Africa‟s trade with countries outside the continent. In fact, several hurdles still prevent the free movement of persons, goods and services in some African sub-regions. Other impediments such as infrastructure development and the effective coordination and harmonisation of development policies and programmes of the African governments remain crucial challenges (see, Mistry, 2000). More importantly, national integration has yet to be achieved in most African countries. The afore-mentioned challenges show that regional integration in Africa is still confronted with a lot of challenges which need to be addressed for the AU‟s vision and mission to be realised (Murithi, 2008:2-6; see Mistry, 2001).

Considering the afore-mentioned issues and the focus of this study in examining the APRM, the federalist theory was not selected. Dosenrode (2010:6-22) and other scholars argue that the federalist theory may not be suitable for a developing region like Africa. This study adopts economic theories, functionalist/neo-functionalist and neo-realism in line with its focus to assess the instrumental use of the APRM in furthering the objectives of the AU/NEPAD.

2.4 Theoretical framework for this study

This section of the chapter examines the theories selected for use in this study – Economic theories – Market Integration, Trade and Open Regionalism. The aim is to explain „how" and „why" these theories are combined to provide a political-economic analysis of African economic integration in line with the research focus, problem, questions and objectives.

2.4.1 Economic theories - Market Integration: Trade and Open regionalism

The main reasons advanced why countries participate in regional economic integration arrangements are the economic benefits which member countries of such schemes enjoy. Market integration - trade and open regionalism - are economic theories having their bases in the neo-classical economic perspective which advances the gains of free trade, the advantages of economies of scale and making the best use of the opportunities created by economic liberalisation to establish and enlarge business ventures (Gibb, 2009:708). Market integration "consists of the linear progression of the various degrees of integration" (Lee, 2002:3) among countries beginning with the creation of a free trade area to a customs union, common market, and finally, economic union. For economists, the ultimate goal for advancing regional cooperation and integration is the merging of the countries concerned. This means removing all constraints to allow free passage of goods, capital and persons in order to promote the gains and benefits of economic integration (Balassa, 1961, 1965; Mattli, 1999:19; Sako, 2006:1-8). On the other side, open regionalism is another "variant" of the market integration theory which encourages economic liberalisation. It is broad-based and more open-ended form of regionalisation (Gibb, 2009:708).

The long established explanation for regional economic integration is derived from the Standard Trade Theory which explains the benefits derivable from international trade. According to this theory, free trade among two or more countries will produce economic gains (Gilpin, 2001:346-347; Geda and Kibret, 2002:4). Viner"s (1950) *The Customs Union*

Issue is an influential resource in this area. Viner argues that the primary ingredients of economic integration are trade creation and trade diversion. Participating countries will benefit from trade as long as the arrangement results in a net trade creation.[10] Trade creation occurs when "common external trade policy and internal free trade lead to a shift in production from the high- to low-cost Partner State in the community. Trade diversion on the other hand, arises when imports from the rest of the world are replaced by more expensive imports from the partner country" (Mwasha, 2008:74). Trade diversion, Freund and Ornelas (2010:2) observe, can make a trade agreement detrimental for participating countries and countries outside the bloc "where imports shift away from the most efficient supplier to the country receiving preferential treatment". Geda and Kibret (2002:4) illustrates that regional agreements do not guarantee an improvement in the welfare of member countries; they could however do so, so long as "trade diversion is minimal and/or trade-creation tilts the balance". For Kritzinger-van Niekerk (2005:2), "the risk of trade diversion could be mitigated if countries implement very low tariffs (open regionalism arrangements)".

Following these theoretical explanations, one point emphasised is that economic benefits are not static. They do not accrue automatically but are founded upon certain principles. Regional economic integration can either lead to trade creation or trade diversion (Kritzinger-van Kirkerk, 2005:2; Ogbeide, 2010:485; Freund and Ornelas, 2010:3-5). Participating countries are able to benefit if they trade in different commodities so that they are able to achieve interdependence within the region and also maintain common positions as a regional bloc vis-à-vis their external partners (Ogbonna et al, 2013:106). Also, countries are assumed in this theory to have achieved comparable levels of development for integration to progress (Gibb, 2009:713). This theory could be employed to explain the successful integration in Europe which began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.

Economic theories, such as market integration, trade and open regionalism, are useful theories that explain the dynamics and complexities of regionalism. These theories are able to account for various benefits of different forms of regionalisation among countries and also

[10] As Kritzinger-van Niekerk (2005:2) explains: "If goods are sufficiently strong substitutes, regional trade agreements cause the demand for third party goods to decrease, which will drive down prices. In addition, more acute competition in the trade zone may induce outside firms to cut prices to maintain exports to the region. This will create a positive terms of trade effect for member countries. However, the move to free trade between partners who maintain significant tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world may well result in trade diversion and welfare loss".

the factors that influence the formation of regional groupings across different parts of the world. Essentially, the main argument advanced by economic theories is that the economy is the fundamental variable that influences the processes of integration. As such, it is the basis on which successful regional economic cooperation and integration among countries could be assessed. This raises a question about the extent to which market integration and trade theories, with emphasis on economic variables are useful and appropriate in analysing regional economic integration issues in developing countries, especially of Africa. This question is fundamental considering not only the historical antecedents of the African continent, the „smallness" and „underdeveloped" nature of African countries and their economies, but also the lop-sided nature of international trade and issues of protectionism in international trade (Gibb, 2009:713). Most African countries are poor and also at different levels of economic development. As such, these theories are unable to account for the nature of the state and society in Africa, and the continent"s political economy (Gibb, 2009:713).

African economic integration processes have been underlined by the market integration model (McCarthy, 2010:1-3; Hartzenberg, 2011:1) yet, this approach does not adequately address the reality and needs of the continent (McCarthy, 2010:1-3). Whereas African policy makers emphasise the establishments of monetary union and common markets, they are unwilling to cede their sovereignty to a supranational body which, in essence, is one of the basic requirements of integration (Mwasha, 2008:77). McCarthy (2010:1-2) asserts that the design of regional economic integration arrangements in Africa is problematic. These RIAs have poor records of performance and often do not meet their programme of action to deepen integration. Poor implementation of regional integration policies and programmes are major challenges (Gibb, 2009:709; McCarthy, 2010:1-2). Intra-regional trade has remained low as a result of the fact that African countries are still developing and lack the necessary technology. Moreover, industrialisation is still a challenge and these countries have continued to supply raw materials (Ogbeide, 2010:486; Ogbonna et al, 2013:106-107). However, notwithstanding the unfavourable terms and conditions of international trade, African countries engage more in trading with their developed countries.

There is a general concern that the market integration paradigm does not address the realities of Africa"s political economy (Johnson 1991; Geda and Kibret 2002:2-4; 2010:1-2; Gibb 2009:706-709; Ogbonna et al, 2013:106-108). As Geda and Kibret (2002:4) point out, the classical theories of trade do not provide a complete explanation concerning regional

economic integration policies in Africa. The position of scholars such as McCarthy (2010:3); Ogbonna et al (2013) Lee (2002:19-22) is that African government should re-examine the appropriateness of the market approach to conditions in Africa. Regional integration policies should align with the realities and needs of the continent. For instance, policies could be enhanced in other service sectors such as infrastructure, development, education, health, human capital development, among others. While it is notable that trade is considered to be central to successful integration, the necessary structures and institutions need to be put in place to achieve regional integration objectives in Africa (McCarthy, 2010:1-2; Ogbonna et al, 2013:106).

The market integration theory provides useful explanations concerning the research problem of this study. The theory highlights some of the challenges of African economic integration, for instance, the strains in regional integration agreements established within the African continent and the trade agreements signed individually or collectively with countries or regional blocs outside Africa (Cattaneo, 2008:1). The reality is that, Africa has yet to achieve socio-economic development, one of the objectives usually associated with the formation of regional economic groups. The sub-continent, in particular, has remained marginalised in the international system despite its many years of trade relations with other countries of the world. Many of the challenges constraining Africa‟s economic integration agenda are yet to be resolved. These are pointers that the classical theory does not align with the situation in Africa (Ogbeide, 2010: 485; ECA, 2010:11). Whereas some levels of intra-regional trade and economic activities do take place in African RIAs, the process of regional integration has been very sluggish. Economic integration is necessary but success depends on how far African countries are able to achieve sustainable growth and development; it also depends on how Africa is able to exploit its natural resources. Thus, Ogbeide (2010:486) is correct in suggesting that, “market integration theories and strategies, just like market principles, liberalisation and regionalisation seem to favour the developed world” (Ogbeide, 2010:485-486).

Economic theories - market integration, trade and open regionalism - are useful in the course of examining the regional economic policies adopted in Africa since independence such as the OAU‟s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the NEPAD initiative, both of which emphasise inward-focused and outward-oriented regionalisms respectively (Ikome, 2005:344-345). These theories would also assist an analysis of issues relating to Africa‟s

economic policies vis-à-vis the challenges of the existing international economic system. As Olivier (2010:19-20) notes:

> Economic analysis of African regionalisation is singled out because it is currently highly fashionable and proliferating at a pace, mainly because of the saliency of the NEPAD, various Group of Eight Industrialised Nations (G8) resolutions on development aid to Africa, the prominence of the G20, the structuring of post-Cotonou trade and economic relations with the European Union (EU) (Economic Partnership Agreements – EPAs), the current World Trade Organisation (WTO) – led Doha initiatives towards global trade reform in which Africa has a big stake, as well as post-conflict reconstruction in war-torn areas (Olivier, 2010:19-20).

On the other hand, it is important to note that the regional economic integration process is complicated. Several activities are involved at various levels – national and regional. The reality is that economic integration will not prosper in a vacuum, but with political commitments and reforms (Rourke, 1995:569). The weakness of the market integration theory is that it gives primacy to economic variables in its explanations on African regional economic integration and does not emphasise the influence of institutional and political forces in ensuring progress (Mattli, 1999:11). Market integration theory assumes that states are able to create the necessary regulatory environment that advances the objectives of integration (Gibb, 2009:713). These weaknesses notwithstanding, many studies have been conducted using economic models to examine the progress made by RECs.[11]

In order to bring together economic and political discourses on African economic integration and to show the inter-relationships and connections between economic and political integration therefore, this study relies heavily on the theories on functionalism/neo-functionalism and neo-realism. The functionalist/neo-functionalist approach incorporate some form of political-economy clarifications on regionalism. The definition of regionalism, from the perspective of functionalism/neo-functionalism reflects a "clear distinction between integrative and non-integrative regional policies, and a theoretical distinction between conventional foreign policy transaction which are effectively integrationist" (Olivier, 2010:20). For its part, the neo-realist theory complements and enriches the functionalist/neo-functionalist analyses and is useful for explaining salient political issues which centre on the

[11] See for example, Cattaneo, 2008; Geda and Kibret, 2002.

nature and workings of the post-independence state in Africa. This theory enhances explanations about the bases of the economic and political policies of the African Union/ NEPAD, and APRM.

2.4.2 Functionalism

Functionalism is a theory which grew largely from the outbreak of World War II which raised concerns that the state had become moribund as an institution for social organisation (Diiego Castaneda, 2006:3; Ogbonna et al, 2013:105). Functionalism‟s approach was against power-politics and state-centredness in international relations. The argument of functionalism is that power-politics and state-centredness lead to conflicts and wars in the international system as states battle to achieve their varied and competing national interests while also defending and protecting their sovereignty. Functionalism is therefore a theory that seeks conditions that promote peace and prevent disharmony among states.

David Mitrany‟s (1943) *A Working Peace System – An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation* is an influential work in the tradition of functionalism. The main premise of classical functionalism is that nationalist tendencies and regard for sovereignty threaten peace and security in the international system (Ayinde, 2011:185). Its perspective is that political divisions trigger conflicts among states (Mattli, 1999:22). Functionalism affirms that, war is a universal problem that affects people and, as such, the need for world peace is shared by everyone (see Gilpin, 2001:350). This need then provides a general basis for international understanding and cooperation in functional spheres of activities which do not encroach on individual state sovereignty (Mitrany, 1943:33-39; Gilpin, 2001:350). Functionalism believes that through a system of functional cooperation, people are brought together and a sort of community feeling is generated and sustained (Ayinde, 2011:185; see Mitrany, 1943:33-39; Gilpin, 2001:350).

Functionalism significantly explains the role of international organisations (non-state actors and transnational institutions) – rather than national governments – in addressing common problems and providing for human welfare and basic requirements such as transportation, health and welfare necessities, trade and production (Mitrany, 1943:6 and 38; Mattli, 1999:22; Rosamond, 2000:33-34; Gilpin, 2001:350; Ayinde, 2011:185). These responsibilities, the functionalist thesis argues, are better handled by technical experts in

different structures of international organisations (Mitrany, 1946, 1966; Ayinde, 2011:185). Relating this to the APRM, the Mechanism provides opportunities for African experts – the academia, research institutions to be involved in its review processes. It views that policy making processes should be broad-based to promote people-centred policies.

The functionalist thesis provides a straight-forward explanation on the basis of international cooperation and the evolutionary nature of the development of international organisations. Functionalism enlightens researchers about the reasons why sovereign states, of their own volition, work together and how this cooperation progresses. Hence, functionalism emphasises that, international institutions are not complete in themselves and that they are not without weaknesses, but rather they should be seen as vehicles through which human needs could be met. As such, these organisations have to amend their activities in accordance with the needs of the day (Mitrany, 1943).

As an integration theory, functionalism sees international cooperation to be the first stage in the integration process. Its argument is predicated on a gradualist/incremental approach to integration that is embedded in the common conviction or need by people to pool their efforts in order to achieve a common objective (Mitrany, 1943; Rosamond, 2000:33-34). As the first step on the road to regional integration, functionalism is seen as providing a non-political approach which simply entails intergovernmental cooperation (Lodge, 1994). The logic of the theory is that, cooperation and interdependence among states grow as these states integrate in restricted non-political areas -- technical and/or economic (Diiego Castaneda, 2006:3). The benefits which functional agencies deliver would draw the loyalty of the populations and motivate participation in the area of integration (Diiego Castaneda, 2006:3). The theory therefore views integration as resulting from a drive towards international cooperation (Rosamond, 2000:33). Since functionalism does not necessitate that states cede their sovereignty, it views integration as a process whose success is cumulative: progress in one sector is carried over into another (Mitrany, 1966). The functionalist proposition is that integration could be consummated through the establishment of a “transnational complex of economic and social organisation” (Ogbeide, 2006:484).

Functionalism has been employed to explain how the European Union developed from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It is also a useful theory to analyse the processes of Africa‟s regional economic cooperation and integration which started with the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. In some ways,

functionalism could explain the circumstances which prevailed before the establishment of the OAU, that is, the felt need for African countries to cooperate. It could describe the functioning of the different organs and institutions of the organisation; the roles and functions performed by the OAU during the time it existed; the achievements and failures of the organisation; and the rationale for the process of transformation from the OAU to the African Union. These issues are relevant in this study to explain contending issues on African economic integration discourse.

Wapmuk (2009:652) notes, for instance, that the establishment of OAU was based on the functionalist ideal, and as a result its Charter respected the sovereignty of newly independent African states. It is possible that some of the founders of the OAU were attracted by this school of thought since it does not interrogate the sovereignty of states. To this extent, Wapmuk (2009:652) asserts that "although the African states were not as committed as they should be to the OAU, they could not disregard the organisation either". Through the forums provided by the OAU, African countries were able to present a common front in the international community.

The theory of functionalism, however, poses challenges to African economic integration as several scholars question the relevance of this approach to Africa when considering the political imperatives which come into play in achieving integration objectives (Ayinde, 2011:185). The reality is that African leaders meddle in affairs which are not contentious and which could possibly be resolved by technocrats. Hence, politicians become inappropriately involved in bringing about solutions to technical issues (Ogbeide, 2010:484). This is unlike the situation which obtains in other regions.

Another area of contention relates to the gains and benefits of international (functional) cooperation. Functionalism argues that it is less likely that countries would go to war when they are involved in doing things together. Although this assertion renders functionalism a valuable theory of integration, it does not represent the case in Africa as RIAs in Africa experience different inter-state conflicts. One of the shortcomings associated with functionalism is its apolitical approach to issues. As Ayinde (2011:185) emphasised, the areas of cooperation explored by functionalism are not "value free" and require aspects of policy making (Ayinde, 2011:185). Functionalism theory cannot afford to be insensitive to political issues (Ayinde, 2011:185). The view of Chen (2011:2) underscores "the fact that

functionalism overstated a one-way impact of economy on politics [and therefore] it cannot give people a convincing explanation of integration".

Ogbonna et al (2013:105) note the weakness of African countries which mainly produce raw materials and import manufactured goods. As such, the technical cooperation proposed by functionalists, "represents a small component of the transactions that take place between African countries" (Ogbonna, et al 2013:105; see also Ayinde, 2011:186). Africa is yet to strengthen its policy and institutional frameworks in order to achieve the goals of regional integration. As Manboah (2000:58) puts it: the "functions which need to be linked together in a network of organisation for the functionalist principle to work are non-existent and there is not yet a consensus among states or a convergence of the various regional blocs in Sub-Saharan Africa". These are major challenges to regional integration projects in Africa and the issue of concern to this study is how the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives respond to such problems. Africa is rich in natural, mineral and human resources which need to be exploited to achieve much needed development in the region. These challenges constitute issues of debate in the discourse on African economic integration.

2.4.3 Neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalism developed from functionalism. Proponents of the neo-functionalist theory identify with the functionalists propositions on the common pursuit of welfare needs through interstate cooperation but consider the process as basically political (Laffan, 1992:9). Neo-functionalists, just like the functionalists, agree that the authority of national government is gradually eroded as people transfer loyalties to supranational bodies (Laffan, 1992:9; see Gehring, 1996:229). Haas (quoted in Dosenrode, 2008:9) in his book - *The Uniting of Europe – Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, published in 1958, argued that unlike what functionalism proposes, the process of integration is not restricted to the intensification of policy collaboration in a specific functional area, economic or technical. Neo-functionalism is based on a political approach and re-launches functionalist theory in the perspective of regional institutions. It does not however, denounce its global dimension (Dosenrode, 2008:9).

To the neo-functionalists, "interests, rather than common ideals or identity, are the driving force behind the integration process, but actors may learn and develop common ideals and

identities" (Schmitter and Haas, 2005:258; see also Haas, 1958-12-13).[12] The neo-functionalist model therefore points out that issues of sovereignty and frequent conflicts among states are bound to occur in the process of integration. Long-term cooperation is bound to fail when there are conflicts of national interests in the process of integration, for instance, the conflicts between political powers such as parties and interest groups, and conflicts as a result of the attitudes of political elites. In such situations, there is need for supranational institutions that can propel the process of deeper integration (Rosamond, 2000:51-52; Gilpin, 2001:351-352).[13] Neo-functionalism, in this regard, involves the political elements in the process of integrating previously autonomous entities (Ayinde, 2011:186).

Following from the above, neo-functionalism attempts to be practical in explaining the process of regional integration. Its view is that regional integration is an inevitable process which could be initiated by political leaders of states who are interested in participating (Diiego Castaneda, 2006:4; Niemann and Schmitter, 2009:4). In this way, neo-functionalism notes that states are important participants in the integration process but emphasises that the states are constituted by different interest groups and political parties (Haas, 1968:115; Gilpin, 2001:351 Niemann and Schmitter, 2009:4). In the view of neo-functionalists, the diverse interest groups in society would benefit from the integration process (Haas, 1958:XIII-XIV; Gilpin, 2001:351; Diiego Castaneda, 2006:4) as there are supranational institutions which would facilitate economic and technical interactions across states (Haas, 1958:XIII-XIV; Rosamond, 2000:51; Anadi, 2005:139). These explanations depict the role and influence of supranational institutions as vital in the process of integration, and argue that such institutions should be conscious of their functions in order to provide the right direction (Haas, 1958; Rosamond, 2000:51-52).

Essential in the neo-functionalist thesis is the idea of „spill-over" (Haas, 1958:383; Gehring, 1996:229; Rosamond, 2000:51-52; Gilpin, 2001:350-352; Cini, 2003:81; Schmitter, 2004:47; Desonrode, 2008:10). Integration possesses a spill-over effect. It is a process that begins with integration in a restricted area and as the process continues, it becomes inevitable and will "spillover" into other areas (Haas 1958:12-13; Rosamond, 2000:51-52; Gilpin, 2001:350-

[12] The position put forth by neo-functionalism is that, although socio-economic and technical factors provide the basis for regional integration, and not necessarily political factors, the reality is that, collaborative activities in the areas not regarded as political, will slowly but surely permeate the political sphere (Anadi, 2005:140).

[13] The argument of neo-functionalism is that the process of creating an international society would prove to be difficult without putting in place some form of control and handing over decision making to a supranational institution (see, Caporaso, 1998:1-16).

351; Niemann and Schmitter, 2009:6-8). In essence, integration would gradually extend from economic to political areas and the outcome would be a merger of states and their different constituencies (Haas, 1958:16; 1968:114-115; Etzioni, 1965:4; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991:5; Rosamond, 2000:53). Elaborating on Haas‟ perspective on neo-functionalism, Schmitter (2004:47) notes that:

> Regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organisations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic and social integration will „spill-over‟ into political integration.

Another type of spill-over associated with the neo-functionalism theory is referred to as "cultivated spill-over" (Rosamond, 2000:61). Niemann and Schmitter (2009:9) note that, the idea of cultivated spill-over was used by theorists later on to further explain the integrative role played by supranational institutions in fostering integration ideals and ensuring the progress of the process. Thus, as an integration theory, one of the key elements underlined by the neo-functionalism thesis is „supra-nationality‟ as the "only method available to the state to secure maximum welfare, underpinning the idea that there are inseparable linkages between the social, economic and political domains in integration" (Biswaro, 2012:31).

Neo-functionalism has a very significant attribute of theory which is that it informs about the end state of regional integration. Although envisaging a supra-national state as the end product of integration, neo-functionalists are more concerned and interested in the "processes" of integration (Gilpin, 2001:353; Niemann and Schmitter, 2009:3). Neo-functionalists do not propose that upon the initiation of the regional integration process, deeper integration would result. Integration, following the neo-functionalist idea, is not an event; rather it is a process that increasingly gains its own momentum (Haas 1958:16; Rosamond, 2000:51; Ayangafac, 2008:166; Niemann and Schmitter, 2009:3).

Both functionalism and neo-functionalism are able to explain how regional integration begins; how it progresses and the end result of the process (Caporaso, 1998:1). The functionalism and neo-functionalism theories derived from the regional integration process in Europe which began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Hence, the

theories explain how economic variables propel political integration (Chen, 2011:1). Regional integration in this regard is seen as a process, embodying different stages with different expectations from member countries (Caporaso, 1998:1). Functionalism/Neo-functionalism theories help to explain the „how" and „why" of integration.[14] Also, the strengths of the functionalist/neo-functionalist approach lies in their accounts of the process of the evolution of international organisations and their explanations of the mechanisms of such organisations with focus on their institutions, secretariats and policies (Schmitter, 2002). International organisations, supranational institutions and sub-national actors, in the views of the functionalist/neo-functionalist writers play significant roles in addressing common problems, maintaining international peace and security, furthering regional integration processes and shaping the foreign policies of nation-states (Gehring, 1996:226; Gilpin, 2001:352).

Nevertheless, both functionalism and neo-functionalism have been criticised from different angles. For example, neofunctionalism claims that the role and authority of member states decrease as integration proceeds; however, this claim is contradicted by Africa"s experiences. From both European and Africa, experiences, the increased role of the state in national and regional affairs poses a significant challenge to neo-functionalist explanations. Particularly in the African context, neo-functionalism fails to account either for the nature and workings of the post-independence state in Africa or its influence on the process of economic integration. Neo-functionalism does not explain the lack of effective institutions in African countries, like those of interest groups and political parties, which are supposed to propel the integration process. It does not explain the reality that while regional integration is being embraced in Africa, the status-quo (state sovereignty) is maintained.

In addition, the idea that economic integration would lead to political integration was particularly challenged by intergovernmentalist scholars.[15] Neo-functionalism, some scholars argue, does not give explanations as to why countries which voluntarily decide to sign regional agreements and establish regional economic institutions (as it is particularly the case in Africa for example with ECOWAS, SADC, and AU) often become reluctant to implement

[14] According to Haas (1971:6), neo-functionalism sought to explain "how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves".

[15] Intergovernmentalism does not accept the spill-over effect suggested in the neo-functionalism theory. It also does not agree with the thought that supranational organisations are laced with the same form of authority as national governments (see, Diiego, 2006:8).

such agreements. In other words, neo-functionalism should advance reasons for failures of regional institutions to make it a complete theory (Schmitter, 2002). As Niemann and Schmitter (2009:10) argue, neo-functionalism "does not and cannot provide a general theory of regional integration in all settings especially not of their origins". Neo-functionalism takes for granted that participating countries in regional economic integration arrangements are economically developed and democratic. It does not account for the complexities and challenges of different regions. The theory of neo-functionalism is contradicted by the autocratic and under-developed nature and structure of the political economy of African countries.

Just as it was in Europe, the establishment of regional integration arrangements in Africa, both at the regional and continental levels are based on the functionalism/neo-functionalism idea. However, while African governments have been motivated by the success of regional integration in Europe, the continent has yet to fully exploit the benefits of integration. Much attention has been focused on establishing regional economic institutions but not on the structures that need to be created and/or consolidated for the progress of economic integration. As a tool of analysis in this study, however, the functionalist/neo-functionalist theses are able to explain the evolution of regional cooperation in Africa with the OAU in 1963 and the series of events leading to its transformation to the African Union. It provides insights on the functional organs of the African Union; the NEPAD and the APRM as regional initiatives.

Functionalism and neofunctionalism are appropriate theories inasmuch as the study is concerned with both Africa‟s national political institutions and Africa‟s regional policy making institutions. These two theories provide a framework within which the research questions, objectives and hypotheses of this study are examined. In order to mitigate the weaknesses of the functionalism/neo-functionalism theories and to be able to examine the national political, social and economic issues which constrain regional integration efforts in Africa, neo-realism is selected as a complementary theory to enrich the study.

2.4.4 Neo-realism

Neo-realism reflects the ideas of classical realism which views states as the main participants in the international system (Collard-Wexler, 2006:399; Koukoudakis, 2012:93). Neo-realists agree with the position of the realists that national interests are basically the determinants of

foreign policy objectives which states pursue competitively in the international system. Offensive realism conceptualises national interest in relation to power, while defensive neo-realism equates national interest to the security of states (Collard-Wexler, 2006:399; see Gilpin, 2001:356). Neo-realism also sees the international system as „anarchic" (Gehring, 1996:235). The argument is not that the system is characterised by persistent crises or disorder, but basically that it is without any form of world government (Collard-Wexler, 2006:399).[16]

The position of neo-realists with respect to discourses on regional cooperation and integration is that, states endeavour to participate in cooperative arrangements as long as such efforts satisfy their best interests. However, the enthusiasm to cooperate diminishes when the arrangement conflicts with the interests of the state (Gibb, 2009:715). State interest, is "often uncritically and simplistically assumed by the traditional theories of regionalism to be national self-interest" (Gibb, 2009:715). While this may be the case, the reality is that in some cases, "national interests" may be reflective of the interests of a few individuals in the state and not those of the civil society.

Neo-realism could explain the situation whereby sovereign nation states, confronted by an external crisis, may choose to cooperate in order to guarantee their security and as a survival strategy (Collard-Wexler, 2006:402; see also Gehring, 1996:231-232). In this regard, the benefits which such states enjoy through institutionalising cooperation in the international system depend on the condition and issues that are involved (Gehring, 1996:232; Collard-Wexler, 2006:402; Gilpin, 2001:356). Neo-realism also provides insights on the limits of such cooperation (Gehring, 1996:232; Gilpin, 2001:356). For instance, states are not prepared to negotiate national security for economic benefits in a regional arrangement (Gilpin, 2001:356). However, the reality, as Collard-Wexler (2006:402) points out, is that cooperation on socio-economic issues cannot be deepened without infringing on major concerns that obviously pertain to state survival. The case of the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over oil-rich Bakassi illustrates how difficult it is to promote cooperation among sovereign states. Cooperation is established for calculated reasons (Soderbaum, 2002:17). States estimate the "relative gains and distributive issues" (Gilpin, 2001:356). Regional cooperation

[16] According to Waltz (1959), the state of anarchy differentiates international system from the domestic system which possesses governments at different levels. These governments have the legitimate authority to make rules and regulations and enforce sanctions. Lack of a world government conditions the acts and behaviours of nation states in the international system. This is the main reason for war.

is not specifically initiated to create a world order (Soderbaum, 2002:17). Nevertheless, neo-realists do not under-estimate inter-state cooperation, but they are of the view that, cooperation may not be easily established and may be difficult to maintain (Gehring, 1996:236; see also Gilpin, 2001:356).

Sesay and Omotosho (2011:14) buttress the perspectives of neo-realism on the extent to which state interests are determinants of institutionalised cooperation in the international system. These scholars note that:

> The establishment of international organsations, irrespective of their geographical locations, membership size and distribution: whether they are bilateral or multilateral, regional, continental or global; and whether they are concerned with political, economic, military, or socio-cultural cooperation or not, is informed first and foremost by broad complementarities of member states‟ national interests (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011:14).

International institutions, in the view of the neo-realists, have limited functions in promoting cooperation (Collard-Wexler, 2006:399; Koukoudakis, 2012:93; Sesay and Omotosho, 2011:15). These institutions, according to Sesay and Omotosho (2011:15) are established to advance member states‟ national interests even though this is not particularly articulated as such in the states‟ foreign policies. Regional institutions are regarded as the products of state policies (Koukoudakis, 2012:93). They provide forums for cooperation or conflict between member-states and do not possess the needed authority to independently influence the behaviours and actions of member-states (Collard-Wexler, 2006:403). Considering these instances, therefore, the national power of each state in a regional integration institution becomes of interest to neo-realist scholars since participating states are not at equal levels of political and socio-economic development. It is the assumption of neo-realists that one or more countries which have achieved a level of political and economic development should be prepared to propel the integration process for success to be achieved (Gilpin, 2001:356; Collard-Wexler, 2006:4001-401). This does not however transform the „anarchical‟ arrangement of the international system. As Gilpin (2001:357) argues, regionalisation is not an “alternative to a state-centred international system”.

The neo-realist theory has been criticised for being largely state-centred and static about governance systems without taking into consideration the fact that institutions have in place

established feedback methods (Geghring, 2006:283). Also, the growing influence, roles and relevance of regional and international institutions in contemporary international politics, particularly in the case of the European integration process, put the position of neo-realism to test (Koukoudakis, 2012:93). It cannot however be disputed that the state still occupies a central place in determining the progress or failure of regional institutions (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011:15). This is a statement of fact taking cognisance of the slow pace of integration in Africa and the level of conflicts within the continent‟s RECs. African regional economic integration arrangements have a poor record because of what Sesay and Omotosho (2011:16) refer to as the "primacy of politics: and the "cult of personality" in the continent (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011:16).[17]

The neo-realist theory is relevant in this study in analysing the political and socio-economic development challenges in African countries which pose obstacles to the continent‟s regional economic integration processes. The theory also provides knowledge of capacity building in Africa in relevant areas to move the continent into deeper integration. For instance, the views have been expressed that some African countries should provide the leadership needed to advance the integration process. The neo-realist explanations are important in this study because the weakness of many African states significantly inhibits the pace of integration in Africa (Chabal, 2005:18-33; Qobo, 2007:3; Gibb, 2009:715). Beyond this, however, the governing elites of African states may either not want regional integration projects to be successful or are often able to use their local political control or dominance to determine the progress of the continent‟s integration agenda (Gibb, 2009:715).[18] This assertion not only calls attention to the undemocratic nature of regional integration processes in Africa but also highlights the often questionable commitment of African leaders to implementing regional policies at the country/national level (particularly when such policies are considered by them not to be in the „national‟ interest). One of the objectives of this study is to examine the APRM‟s policy responses to these issues at the domestic level in order to facilitate the achievement of sub-regional and regional goals.

[17] This view is shared by Gibb, that African governments often display outwardly, the zeal to achieve regional economic integration objectives just like other regions are making progress. However, they are unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices and commitments to ensure the success of RTAs in the continent. Many challenges relating to regionalism in Africa are associated with the nature and workings of post-independence states in Africa and their institutions of governance (Gibb, 2009:717-718).
[18] For details, see Soderbaum, 2008:14.

2.5 Theoretical „gaps" and problematic of regional integration in Africa – From the OAU to the AU

Having critically examined a selection of integration theories in the previous section, there is no doubt that regional economic integration in Africa presents a number of theoretical contradictions and challenges. It stands to reason, therefore, that the study"s key question is: to what extent do the African Union/NEPAD and APRM represent an adequate and effective response to the realities, complexities and challenges of African economic integration? This section of the chapter exposes the theoretical gaps and problematic of the regional integration process in Africa considering the poor record of regional integration institutions in the continent. The section explores seeming contradictions which form the basis of the theoretical debates on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM.

Regional integration initiatives existed even before African countries acquired independence from the late 1950s. The South African Customs Union (SACU) was established in 1910 and the East African Community (EAC) in 1919 (Geda and Kibret, 2002:1). However, modern discourses on regional cooperation and integration in Africa are centred on how the OAU got established and its process of transformation to the African Union. The NEPAD and APRM initiatives are also examined as regional programmes of the African Union to address governance and development issues in advancing the goals of African economic integration. It is possible to situate the development of regionalism in Africa within the functionalist/neo-functionalist explanations of the felt need for cooperation and the perceived role of regional institutions. Whereas Europe desired to establish a pan-regional structure to avert the occurrence of future wars (Olivier, 2010:25), African countries, as newly independent, economically underdeveloped countries emerging from long periods of colonial rule, found it necessary to cooperate and form technical linkages in the immediate post-independence period (Qobo 2007:2; Adogamhe 2008:2; Olivier 2010:25; Shaw 2009:45). The formation of the OAU and other regional institutions was considered to be imperative in order to further political and socio-economic objectives in the continent.

There were, however, some „missing" elements in Africa"s regional integration process with regards to theoretical postulations. Given that African countries were newly independent, they were yet to achieve economic independence. Moreover, as political entities, states were

yet to achieve a workable form of national integration. This meant that the basic structures and institutions to enable the integration process were not yet in place compared with the case of Europe (which provides a model for regionalism in Africa). The European countries were economically developed and had already achieved a level of intra-regional trade before the commencement of the integration process (Radelet, 1997:5). African states however sought political independence before focusing on economic development. Contrary to the expectation of the functionalist/neo-functionalist scholars that regional integration should follow a bottom-up process supported by the individuals and groups in society, regional integration followed a different process. It started with the establishment of the OAU which was a political initiative (of African leaders and policy makers). Later on, regional economic institutions focusing on economic sub-regional integration were established (Olivier, 2010:38). However, instead of identifying priority needs and challenges in the continent and formulating deliberate policies to address them, African leaders imitated the European process and saw this as a model for Africa.

At the time of establishing the OAU, African leaders consented to the proposal of African unity; however, they differed on how to achieve this objective. Two major groups of African leaders had different ideas. The first group referred to as the „Pan-Africanists" was of the view that Africa should consider immediate and total political integration where there will be a single government with common continental institutions, such as those emphasised in federalist theories. The other group called the „Gradualists/Functionalists", preferred a more gradual approach to African integration, perhaps in consideration of the fact that African countries were newly independent states (Martin, 1992; ECA, 2011c:29-30). These divisions did not stop the eventual establishment of the OAU.

A seeming contradiction can be found in the OAU"s Charter, signed by the African Heads of State and Government, which reflected the desire for African unity. However, its principles did not address the question of national sovereignty of member states. On the one hand, African states were sovereign political entities; on the other hand, the states lacked basic elements of statehood and were ill-prepared to achieve the continental vision of African unity (Shaw, 2009:45). These were theoretical gaps in Africa"s economic integration agenda and the issues negatively affected the process of cooperation and integration. Moreover, the OAU was established during the period of the Cold War, and as this war intensified, individual African countries became relevant in the rivalry of the Superpowers (Shaw, 2009:45). African countries

were therefore divided on several issues. As such, the OAU had to confront several external and internal political and socio-economic challenges in its efforts at promoting African unity and development. It was successful, however in speeding up the decolonisation of the continent (Akokpari, 2003:2-3).

Other theoretical contradictions in the integration plan were the principle of the OAU Charter (Article II (1) which upheld the territorial integrity of African states and the declaration on non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. These principles (which reflected key arguments articulated in neo-realism about state sovereignty) constrained the efforts of the OAU in achieving its objectives (Olivier, 2010:26). Not only did African leaders exploit the principles to misgovern the states, poor governance led to lack of popular interests and support for the continent‟s integration agenda (Adejumobi, 2009:407). Ideally, these were key elements outlined by functionalist/neo-functionalists writers for the success of RIAs. It was not surprising therefore, that bad leadership and poor governance led to successive military coups in some African countries; intra-state and inter-state conflicts, poverty and development challenges.

The OAU lacked the capacity to deal with these issues (Akokpari, 2003:2). These challenges, together with the unfavourable terms and conditions associated with international trade and economic interactions; ill-advised economic policies implemented by African leaders; lack of financial resources, skilled manpower and infrastructure; weak institutions; political instability and insecurity resulting from intra- and inter-state conflicts and the economic disparities and levels of development of African states, affected the realisation of regional economic integration objectives in the continent (Schalk et al, 2005:501). Basically, a majority of African leaders were not committed to implementing regional agreements at the national level. Their lack of commitment comprised a severe setback to the progress of RIAs.

Notwithstanding that there were several challenges in African countries which were impacting negatively on the regional integration process as identified above, the conviction, perhaps, that such challenges would be effectively addressed through effective cooperation and integration motivated the formulation of the OAU‟s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. Ten years later on in 1991, the Abuja Treaty was signed by African leaders within the framework of the OAU, indicating the objective of creating an African Economic Community (AEC) (ECA, 1995:1). The treaty set out to consolidate Africa‟s economic integration efforts

through strengthening the continent‟s RECs and promoting collective self-reliance and self-sustainable socio-economic development (IRCD, 2003).

A decade later, in 2001, NEPAD was established. This programme would receive the support of the OAU and the African Union. Moreover, African leaders had initiated the process of the transformation of the OAU to the African Union from the 1990s and this was finalised with the signing of the African Union Charter in 2002. The AU and NEPAD initiatives aimed at advancing the African economic integration agenda. Consequently, in 2002 the Heads of State and Government of the African Union adopted a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance in recognition of the need for African governments to emplace good governance and socio-economic development in order to speed up the integration process (APRM, 2008a:104-117). These objectives were further demonstrated when the African Union decided to adopt NEPAD as the framework for strengthening regional integration institutions envisioned in the Abuja Treaty (Kimaryo, 2013:37). It was the expectation that the integration of the African Union and NEPAD initiatives would lead not only to Africa‟s socio-economic transformation and integration, but also to more beneficial interactions with the West and multilateral institutions (Kimaryo, 2013:37). To facilitate these objectives, in 2003 the African Union established the APRM as a governance monitoring tool under the framework of the NEPAD initiative. The focus of this study is to assess the usefulness of the APRM in addressing socio-economic and political challenges in African countries in furtherance of the AU/NEPAD objectives.

2.6 Theoretical debates on African Economic Integration Process

The analysis in the previous section shows that African leaders and policy makers have not lagged behind in formulating regional economic integration initiatives intended to address Africa‟s political, social and economic challenges. Even the seeming lack of adequate success has not affected the continued search for regional economic integration. However, the obvious reality is that the integration process in Africa suffers several setbacks because the governments have formulated regional integration initiatives without addressing key governance and development challenges at the national level. This led to the failure of the OAU to achieve African unity. It is also a matter of concern and an issue of debate in regional economic integration discourses in Africa.

The formation of the African Union in 2002 gave new impetus to the African economic integration agenda. The AU has been described as an improvement on the OAU. The AU aims to implement better policies and programmes towards promoting sub-regional and regional economic integration and development in Africa. The organisation emphasises popular participation of Africans in the continent‟s integration and development processes (Adeyemi and Ayodele 2007:216). These are some of the main discourses associated with the functionalist/neo-functionalist theories. As neo-functionalists predict, the vision of the African Union is to unify the continent and grant Africans a common identity (Adejumobi, 2009:405). The final goal of the African Union is "full political and economic integration leading to the United States of Africa" (African Union 2005: Assembly/AU/Dec.90(V), S3).[19] The APRM and NEPAD are pan-regional programmes working together to ensure the realisation of the AU objectives. Since the AU‟s development programmes are futuristic in nature, with the RECs as "building blocks" to continental integration (Wapmuk, 2009:659), Africa‟s economic integration agenda aligns with the functionalist/neo-functionalist gradualist and bottom-up blueprint.

Notwithstanding that there are various integration frameworks in place, the contending governance issues and development challenges at the national level in African countries constitute a paradox in the continent‟s integration agenda. The intra and inter-state crises and conflicts in the continent; state sovereignty versus supra-nationalism phenomenon; challenge of nation-building and national integration; and several other socio-economic and political challenges at the national level pose a challenge to the theory on functionalism/neo-functionalism. These challenges at the national level also make neo-realism a relevant theory in African economic integration discourse. A salient question to ask, therefore, is: considering the challenges at the national level, how will the objectives of the African Union/NEPAD be realised? What challenges do these issues pose for the APRM? In essence, are the policies of the APRM informed by these challenges? These are some of the problematics addressed in this study.

Currently, there are on-going debates and contestations among scholars, media commentators writers, civil society representatives, policy makers and implementers centred on when, how,

[19] The idea of a United States of Africa proposes either a limited or total transfer of political power and authority from the governments of African countries to other supranational institutions (Kambudzi, 2008:14).

and the pace at which the objectives of the African Union will be achieved. Adogamhe (2008:4) underscores that:

> Once again, the renewed debate on African integration is whether the objective of building the United States of Africa should support the processes of socio-economic and political transformation of African states and societies either through a process of immediate creation of a central government (federalism) or through „gradual-incrementalism" or functional evolution of African state-system (Adogamhe, 2008:4)

In other words, how to actualise the vision of African integration is still a contentious issue between the "federalists, realists, functionalism and several other integration theorists" (Wapmuk, 2009:647). For several years, critics have questioned the commitment, determination and willingness of African leaders and policy makers towards making the vision a reality. While some scholars argue that such important issues need be debated and deliberated extensively, the amount of time and resources committed to such debates and the fact that there still exist divergent opinions and lack of consensus on issues, are matters of concern and doubts as to the realisation of the vision of the African Union. To this extent, therefore, how do we reconcile the neo-functionalist ideals of supra-nationalism with contending issues of sovereignty and nationalism enunciated in neo-realism? How will the gap between supra-nationalism and state sovereignty be bridged in Africa?

It is worth underscoring that the differing views on issues featuring on the debate agenda have arisen because of the „unique" factors inherent in African regionalism and the poor records of regional integration arrangements in Africa. However, the fact of general acceptability of regionalism as strategy for Africa"s economic development has remained a constant variable in the African Union/NEPAD and APRM discourse.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter examined regional economic integration in Africa from a political economic perspective within the purview of the market integration theory, functionalism/neo-functionalism and neo-realism theories. In relation to these theories, the argument is that regional economic integration faces a plethora of economic and political problems which pose challenges to the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives. While the theoretical gaps and challenges were identified, they do not connote however, that the AU-led initiatives

are not linked to Africa‟s integration and socio-economic development efforts (Ndayi, 2011:89-90). It was demonstrated by the analysis in this chapter that Africa‟s desire for regional economic integration and to achieve the goals of integration has not been matched by the required sacrifice and commitment to propel such efforts. Issues of power politics, state sovereignty and parochial interests of African governments are critical issues in the discourse. Consequently, these issues have constantly provided the bases for frequent debates and deliberations on the African Union-led integration process.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

Chapter one introduced the study and presented a historical context of Africa‟s colonial experience; the arguments for and against colonialism; an outline of the efforts made by African leaders to address the development challenge in post-independence period; and the political and socio-development challenges. In Chapter two, regional cooperation and integration was defined and regional integration was examined as a development strategy; competing theoretical perspectives were examined and the theories guiding this study were analysed. Thereafter, the chapter examined the theoretical gaps, problematic, challenges, contradictions and debates on African economic integration.

This study examines the problematic of African economic integration. The argument is that the failure of African economic integration is largely as a result of governance deficiencies in African states. The continent continues to grapple with the problem of underdevelopment. While the concern of this study is to examine on-going programmes of the African Union/NEPAD in response to the issue of integration and development in Africa, the focus is to assess the APRM which was established by the African Union within its NEPAD programme to address key governance issues in Africa. The study examines the potential of the APRM in proffering solutions to the slow pace of integration in Africa.

This chapter builds on the previous chapters and presents a review of scholarly literature on diverse discourses on African economic integration in light of the study‟s research problem, questions and objectives. The chapter begins by examining Africa‟s development challenge in the post-independence period and the nature and workings of the present international economic system, identifying that these are core issues propelling the quest for African economic integration. Thereafter, it explores regionalism from a global perspective and then

progresses to examine the trend of African economic integration efforts. A historical analysis of regional integration in Africa is presented, identifying the different stages in the evolution of African economic integration. The chapter further unpacks and analyses contending scholarly positions in relation to regional economic integration in Africa, the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives. This is followed with a conclusion to the chapter.

3.2 Africa‟s development challenge in the post-independence period

For many scholars, when examining Africa‟s development challenges, the point of depature is the discourse on colonialism in particular relation to: dynamics and problematics of inter-African relations; Africa‟s extra-continental relations; and the realities and challenges of Africa‟s quest for economic integration (see, Rodney, 1972; Amin 1972:503-524; 2002:20-27; Diwan and Livingston, 1979:25-30; Adedeji, 1989, 2002:1-10; Obasanjo and Mosha (eds), 1993; Amuwo, 2002:66-71; Onimode, 1988:1-22; Baah, 2003:1-8; Collier, 2006:7; Fonchingong, 2006:4-19; Boaduo, 2008:95-102; Southall, 2009:1-31; Olutayo and Omobowale, 2007:98-105; Alemazung, 2010:64-80; Poku and Mdee, 2011:6-28; Uwa, et al (2014:273-275). More so, some scholars trace the issue of Africa‟s development problematic to the period of slave trade (see, Rodney, 1972; Amin 1972:503-524; Mazrui, 1980; Adedeji 1989, 2002:2; Ndegwa 1993:18-19; Amuwo 2002:66-71; Naidoo, 2003:2-4; Asogwa, 2011:1-2; Boaduo 2008:95-102; Ngambi, 2011:7). Issues often analysed in this respect are: the legacies and effects of colonialism; neo-colonialism; the workings of the existing international economic system; globalisation, regionalisation and liberalisation and the challenges for African political economies; and Africa‟s development strategies.

The intention of scholars, however, is not to put the „entire‟ blame of Africa‟s slow pace of integration and development on colonialism as there are several internal political and socio-economic factors which constrain Africa‟s development in the post independence period. The challenge is that, African leaders and policy makers have implemented policies that are not aligned with the developmental needs and realities of the African continent. Despite external constraints to Africa‟s development efforts, in most African states the activities of African leaders affect the realisation of key development objectives. Thus, the argument is that the development crisis of the African continent should also be blamed on its leadership (see, Aredo and Adal, 2009:133-150; Venter, 2009:39; Salawu, 2010:345-348; Alemazung, 2011:30-40; Poku and Mdee, 2011:1-2).

The case of the East Asian new industrialised countries (NICs) is often cited to buttress this argument. These countries were also formerly colonised countries but have made significant economic progress and have developed their economies (see Bienefeld, 1988:4-5; Malhotra et al, 2003; Wei, 2007). Other scholars indicate that although the Asian countries‟ economic development was achieved due to the fact that they had intense economic interactions and were open to international trade relations; their governments were actively involved in developing their economies through dynamic policies. The economic successes of some of the NICs challenged the role of the government and the market in development (Page, 1994:219-220; see also, Radelet, Sachs and John-Wha Lee, 1997; Malhotra et al, 2003; Stiglitz, 2006; Ngara, 2011:61-68; Sundaram et al, 2011; Egbulem et al, 2012; Milward, 2013).

Ngara (2011:62) opines, therefore, that there is a need to comprehend fully the explanations for Africa‟s underdevelopment in order to develop effective development strategies for addressing its challenges. As, such, the general consensus of scholars, is that colonialism marked a „tuming point‟ in the history of Africa‟s development. It altered the structures, cultures and values of pre-colonial African societies or made them look inferior to those of the colonialists (Diwan and Livingston, 1979:25-28; Collier, 2006:7). Colonialism, some scholars argue, was an extremely exploitative adventure (Diwan and Livingston, 1979:25-28; Onimode, 2000:73; Collier, 2006:7). Several decades after colonialism was formally dismantled, its effects still remain persistent (Onimode, 2001:73; Collier, 2006:7). The general view is that Africa‟s leaderships need to formulate appropriate development strategies to move the continent forward, address developmental challenges and provide for the welfare of the continent‟s growing population. Added to these challenges, however, is the dire need for the political will and commitment on the part of African leaders and policy makers to effectively implement the strategies developed.

One of the consequences of Africa‟s contact with European colonial powers was its incorporation into the capitalist world economy. As discussed in the previous chapters, the colonial design enabled African economies to satisfy the interests of the colonisers and African markets were incorporated into the global division of labour (Akokpari, 2001:195; Poku and Mdee, 2011:13).[20] Currently, Africa has the most dependent and extroverted

[20] See details in chapter one of the study, 3-5.

economy world-wide; its markets are also the most dependent on the markets of the developed countries (Martin, 1992; Southall, 2009:11). As Akokpari, (2001:196) notes, such undue dependence has weakened the capacity of African states to cope with the demands of the international political economy (Akokpari 2001:195-196). However, Olaoluwa (2012:136) notes the contradictions within the international economic system, a condition in which even the world‟s developed and industrialised countries – USA, Britain, France and Germany are also trapped by the forces of the global capitalist economy. As this scholar emphasises, the structure of dependence is such that, the economic prosperity of the metropolitan countries was tied to "their exploitation of the markets in the colonies" (Olaoluwa, 2012:136).

These arguments on colonial experience and the dependent nature of African political economies form the basis for the explanations of modernisation and dependency theories on the economic development challenges of third world countries. The modernisation theory of the 1950s and 1960s is embedded in capitalism. Its perspective integrates the complete set of the changes which a traditional society experiences on its way to modernity (Matunhu, 2011:65; see also Fialho, 2011:9). Modernisation theorists prescribe different stages of development for third world countries and their calculation of the level of countries‟ development is based on these stages. This theory thus explains that Africa‟s developmental challenges, as a third world region, should be seen in the light of its "transition to modernity" (Fialho, 2011:9). Although the Modernisation perspective tried to prove a point that development follows a particular process, it was considered to be Eurocentric as it failed to recognise the socio-economic, cultural and environmental challenges that impact on development processes in third world countries (Matunhu, 2011:66).

Dependency theorists, on the other hand, argue that the reason for the poverty and underdevelopment of the countries in the periphery (third world countries) is not because they are not fully integrated into the world capitalist system but the manner in which they are integrated (Amin, 2002:19-20; Ferraro, 2008:58-60; Aluko and Arowolo, 2010:122-123; Matunhu, 2011:68-70; Egbulem et al, 2012:276). Dependency theorists are divided in their explanations on the dependent nature and underdevelopment of the third world. The Liberal dependency theorists view underdevelopment as a result of internal socio-economic challenges, structural and institutional weaknesses in the third world countries themselves (Sanchez, 2002; Aluko and Arowolo, 2010:122-123; Ferraro, 2008:58). For these scholars,

third world countries should make efforts to address these challenges and rescue themselves from the condition of underdevelopment; they could do this by seeking external assistance (Sanchez, 2002; Aluko and Arowolo, 2010:122-123).

On the other side, Marxist dependency theorists insist that third world countries were integrated into the world capitalist economic system in a disadvantageous way that ensured their continuous dependence on developed countries, and furthered their poverty and underdevelopment (Rodney, 1972; Amin, 2002:19-20; Aluko and Arowolo, 2010:122-123; Matunhu, 2011:68-70). For these scholars, therefore, it would be difficult for the countries in the periphery to develop as the Liberals suggest.

The dependency theorists challenged the prevalence of modernisation approach in the mid 20th century stating that the incorporation of the third world countries into the world capitalist system promoted unequal relationships between the developed and developing countries and fostered dependent development, underdevelopment and poverty in third world countries (Griffiths, 2005:169; Ferraro, 2008:61-62). As pointed out earlier in the chapter, however, the seeming growth of East Asian economies in recent years challenged this position (see, Bienefeld, 1988:7; Akokpari, 2001:193-194; Milward, 2013:7).

Arguing from a political-economy perspective, Ogunbanjo (2001:79) succinctly explains that, Africa‟s weak position in the international economic system, and its political, technological and industrial limitations, are a result of the continent‟s "forced" integration into the capitalist world system, "although there are internal factors that are contributory to this condition". Sundaram et al (2011:1) note that, although Africa‟s economic growth was appreciably the same as those of other developing regions in the decade following independence, the continent has not been performing satisfactorily. Baah (2003:1) refers to the period of the 1960s as the "Golden Decade" for Africa. It was, in his words, "a period of political freedom, self-realisation, economic growth and increased standard of living" (Baah, 2003:1).

The late 1970s and 1980s were, however, difficult periods as many African countries witnessed declining economic conditions (Baah, 2003:1; Sundaram et al, 2011:1). The view of Sundaram et al (2011:1) is that, Africa‟s position in the international economic system accounted for this state of affairs in the continent. Africa could not mobilise enough resources and lacked adequate capital as a result of its uneven trade relations. Unequal power relations

in the international system which prevailed in the post-colonial period were visible in the aspect of "inter-government bargaining -- on the rules of international trade, and bargaining between African governments and international firms on the return on investment" (Collier, 2006:7).

Notwithstanding the dependent nature of its post-colonial economies, Africa‟s development initiatives in the post-independence period included those that were formulated and implemented by African countries themselves and others that were externally conceived and implemented through the IMF and the World Bank (Baah, 2003:1). These externally conceived initiatives were founded on the free market ideology (Baah, 2003:1) and they failed to address Africa‟s development challenge (see Ikeme, 2000; Akokpari, 2001:193-194; Baylis and Smith, 2001:232; Adejumobi, 2003:3-4; Iyoha, 2005:2-3; Milner, 2005:833-834; Naidoo, 2003; Sundaram et al, 2011:2-6; Egbulem et al, 2012:272-275; Olaoluwa, 2012; Mah and Freitas, 2012:3-4). By the late 1990s, many African countries were among the least developed countries of the world (Sunmonu, 2004:67). As Mah and Freitas (2012:3) observe, the dependent nature of African economies led to further marginalisation of the sub-continent in world affairs. More importantly, Africa lost hold of "deciding on its own domestic policies as structural adjustment and aid conditionality during the 1980s, essentially took over the political economy of most African countries" (Mah and Freitas, 2012:3).

3.3 Features and Workings of the International Economic System

The uneven power distribution in the international system between countries of the North and those in the South is a widely espoused discourse. International political and economic relations between these two categories of countries continue to be asymmetrical; inequitable; conducted on an unequal basis; always advantageous and favouring the developed and industrialised countries who establish the institutions regulating international economic relations and make the rules governing the international political economic system. The position of the less developed countries of the third world is thus described as „dependent‟ (see Ikeme, 2000; Akokpari, 2001:193-194; Adejumobi, 2003:2-11; Malhotra, 2003:5-30; Iyoha, 2005:1-2; Milner, 2005:836-837; Shah Anup, 2006; Alemazung, 2010:62-64; Sundaram et al, 2011:16-20; Mah and Freitas, 2012:3; Milward 2013:20-21). Adejumobi (2003:6) states pointedly that "Africa‟s marginal role in the international capitalist system is influenced by and reinforced in the ideology of neo-liberalism".

Neo-liberalism promotes international trade, advances free enterprises, free trade and unhindered flow of resources (Olofin, 1989:17; Naidoo, 2003:4).[21] Trade liberalisation is the common policy approach for promoting greater trade flows (Malhotra et al, 2003:28). Accordingly, liberal international trade theory stresses the principles of comparative advantage as the basis of free trade (Adejumobi, 2003:6; Malhotra et al, 2003:21). As pointed out in chapter two, liberal international trade theory is useful for analysing regional integration even though this theoretical approach does not capture the realities and challenges of African countries in benefiting from international trade.

The gains that are formally associated with trade openness are undercut by the lopsided economic relations that exist in the international system (Olaoluwa, 2012:135) so much that, several studies have been carried out to examine the negative effects of free trade. There is also evidence which shows, to a large extent, that the postulations of the liberal international trade theory do not apply in all cases (see Olofin, 1981:17-18; Malhotra et al, 2003:28-30; Naidoo, 2003:4; Iyoha, 2005:1-2; Shah Anup, 2006; Glynn-Broderick et al, 2007:24-29; Milward 2013:2-7). In effect, this shows that free trade in its present form between developed and developing countries is itself lopsided and furthers the inequality that exists in the international system (Naidoo, 2003:4; Shah Anup, 2006). Since prices of world commodity and manufactured goods are largely influenced by the developed industrialised countries, free trade should be considered not to be „free" in the real sense of the word (see Olofin 1981:17-18; Naidoo, 2003:4; Malhotra et al, 2003:7-12; Iyoha, 2005:1-2; Shah Anup, 2006). As Naidoo (2003:4) notes, the "global free trade system is a myth and trade is a product of systems of power and wealth; while the developed countries demand greater openness from already wide open African economies, they maintain various measures to protect their own interests" (see also, Adejumobi, 2003:9; Milward, 2013:3-8). Thus, according to Milward (2013:8), it is obvious that in reality, the form of increased protectionism established in free trade results in economic benefits which are at the cost of the least underdeveloped of the

[21] According to Chang and Grabel (2004:15), "the term neo-liberalism refers to the contemporary adoption of the free market doctrines associated with the classical liberal economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Neo-liberalism elevates the role of markets over governments in economic governance and in mediating flows of goods, and capital, through the elimination of price supports and ceilings and the emphasis on free-trade. Neo-liberalism enhances the role and scope of the private sector and private property through privatisation and deregulation. And it promotes a particular notion of „sound economic policy" through balanced budgets, labour market flexibility and low inflation".

trading partners. The form of exchange that therefore takes place is lopsided (Milward, 2013:8).

The rules put in place to regulate international trade were established as part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system.[22] GATT was founded on three principles:

"(i) Non-discrimination, multilateralism and the application of the Most-Favoured Nation Principle (MFN) to all signatories;

(ii) Expansion of trade through the reduction of trade tariffs; and

(iii) Unconditional reciprocity among all signatories" (Adejumobi, 2003:8).

The Uruguay Round of negotiations on GATT which sought to expand the scope of the areas of international economic relations started in 1986 (Malhotra et al, 2003:50). Prior to this time, there had been seven rounds of negotiations namely: "Geneva (1947), Annecy (1948), Torquay (1950), Geneva (1956), Dhillon (1960-61), Kennedy (1964-67) and Tokyo (1973-79)" (Malhotra et al, 2003:50). It is instructive to note, however, that the first five rounds of negotiations were held during the period when many developing countries had not achieved independence (Malhotra et al, 2003:50). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development[23] (UNCTAD) which was established in 1964 to improve the GATT system took into consideration matters relating to developing countries and the inclusion of a clause on trade and development (Malhotra et al, 2003:50). Shadlen (2009:2) identifies that, the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was finalised when the "Final Act" was signed in 1994. This was a remarkable occurrence in the international political economy as it saw the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and brought in new binding agreements in new spheres of economic activities that were not covered in the previous arrangement (Shadlen, 2009:2). The WTO has been undertaking the Doha Round of trade negotiations which seeks to address the challenges of developing countries (Milner, 2005:836).

[22] The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947, after the 2nd World War, "as a part of the architecture of the post-war economic landscape. It was replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) in 1994 where an agreement to create the WTO was reached" (Iyoha, 2005:7).

[23] Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in his report states that UNCTAD was created in 1964 to address "imbalances and asymmetries" in the international economy – mainly in the trading system, that were impairing the efforts of developing countries to achieve strong and stable growth and development plan (UNCTAD, 2012. "Trade and Development Report 1981-2011". VII).

Notwithstanding that there are these established rules governing international interactions, the general view revealed in literature is that, the provisions of GATT/WTO have not provided a trading system that presents countries with equal opportunities to exploit the benefits of liberal international trade (see Malhotra et al, 2003:2-3 and 57-60; Adejumobi, 2003:8-12; Naidoo, 2003:4; Iyoha, 2005:7-11; Milner, 2005:837-838; Shadlen, 2009:2-3; Akinkugbe, 2010/11:119-120; Olaoluwa, 2012:136-137). The processes of negotiations further the interests of the developed industrialised countries. To this extent, the demand for better terms of trade and restructuring of the present international economic system formed part of the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[24] Sundaram et al (2011:1) argue, for instance, that in sub-Saharan Africa, "foreign direct investment has been largely confined to resource – especially mineral – extraction, even as continuing capital flight has reduced financial resources available for productive investments". The obvious reality is that early trade liberalisation has not led to Africa‟s economic development (see Adejumobi, 2003:8-12; Malhotra et al, 2003; Iyoha, 2005:1-2 and 7-11; Sundaram et al, 2011:1-2; Milward, 2013:2-8 and 14-21). As Sundaram et al (2011:1) noted, "the productive capacities in many sectors are not sufficiently competitive to take advantage of any improvements in market access".

Illustrating further the phenomena which characterise uneven international economic relations, Olofin (1981:17) highlights the activities of present-day large corporations which have multinationals across the developing regions of the South. According to this scholar, these companies are structurally positioned in such a way that they are able to direct economic activities, which includes the extraction or production of primary commodities and also the marketing of their manufactured products. Adejumobi (2003:3) notes, therefore, that "the unprecedented activities of multinational corporations with the phenomenon of mergers, acquisitions and interlocking relationships have effected a gradual transformation of the global economy".

Considering the aforementioned issues therefore, Malhotra et al (2003:1-4), as well as other scholars – Iyoha (2005:2-4; 7-11), Bilas and Franc (2010), Milward (2013:2-8) among others,

[24] Considering the features of the existing international economic system and its measures of exploitation, "the demand for changes in the rules governing international relationships became the focal point of UNCTAD in their various meetings. This led to the formation of a Group of 77 Countries with their concern for a new and just economic world economic order" (Okege, 1991:211). However, developing countries, especially of Africa, realised the need to re-define a new international economic order at three levels – national, sub-regional and continental, without which Africa will not benefit from a new international economic order at a global level.

would contest the claim that trade liberalisation promotes economic growth and socio-economic development in line with the postulations of traditional trade theories. Such contestations raise several questions in regard to empirical evidence of different countries‟ experiences with trade openness (Malhotra et al, 2003:21-32). The review of literature reveals that trade liberalisation is important for promoting economic growth when implemented „appropriately‟ and with the right policy in place (Malhotra et al, 2003:21-32; Bilas and Franc, 2010:107; Milward, 2013:30-31). This however does not rule out the controversies and contradictions identifiable in literature concerning how trade and trade policy stimulates growth and how it relates to socio-economic development (Malhotra et al, 2003:21-32 and 66-70; also see, Iyoha, 2005:3-19; Sundaram et al, 2011:16-28). The assertion of Malhotra et al (2003:41) is however, worth underscoring that, "trade should be seen as a means to development rather than an end".

Taking these discourses together, one of the realities confronting African countries is that of establishing effective economic cooperation and integration arrangements at regional levels. This would enable African countries to enjoy the benefits derivable from collaborative efforts; establishing large markets; reaping the gains of economies of scale; strengthening of collective bargaining positions; and also favourably competing and maximising the benefits of the international political economy. The issue of concern however, is that while other regions are successfully negotiating and exploiting the benefits of regional integration, this has remained a challenge in Africa. The contradiction in the case of Africa is that, despite the different policies and regional institutions established to promote regional cooperation and integration in Africa, the continent still lags behind in terms of socio-economic development. African countries are faced with several political and socio-economic challenges. Moreover, these challenges have become more complicated with on-going processes of globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation.

Another issue of contradiction relating to this discourse is that, despite Africa‟s several years of engagements in international trade and extra-continental economic relationships, the continent has continued to be marginalised in the international arena. Nevertheless, the general view expressed in literature is that, sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration offers the best strategy for African countries to benefit from the international economic system and reverse its marginalisation in international affairs (see, Adejumobi, 2003:18-19; Naidoo 2003; Bilas and Franc, 2010:107).

3.4 Regionalism: A global perspective

The proliferation of regional organisations from the late 1980s as a focused strategy for promoting economic growth, progress and development was fuelled by the end of the Cold War, ushering in a period of more intense globalisation. The success stories of integration projects in Europe and, later, North America were also motivating factors towards the drive for regional integration. This development demonstrates that despite the challenges and demands association with regionalism, its benefits far outweighs the costs. In essence, regionalism has become widely embraced as a survival strategy for nations in an increasingly competitive global economic system. Regional integration arrangements across regions vary in size and scope reflecting the political economic histories of countries across the globe. In Europe, it is underpinned by a strong institutional framework as is the case in Africa. This is different from the case of North America which has established a Free Trade Area (Mckay and Armengol, 2004:5). However, S.J. Perale‟s (2012) *The hemisphere's free trade agreements and how to untangle them* shows that indeed countries have been interested in free trade.

Research studies which have examined regionalism from a global perspective have not failed to examine the changing motives of RIAs in different parts of the developed and developing world, and difficulties faced by RIAs so much so that none of the regions have attained the final stage of integration. For instance, studies have been done to examine the impact of regional integration organisations on intra-regional trade and these have found that RIAs facilitate trade and other economic activities (Bilas and Franc, 2011:107; Malhotra et al, 2003). However, Adetula (2008) found that this is not the case in Africa where institutional and infrastructure deficits, among other factors constrain intra-regional trade.

In terms of progress and success achieved, Europe has moved farther in achieving deeper integration with the establishment of the European Union in 1992. The EU started with economic integration using steel and coal for example, as a basis for forging stronger links. It thus presents the best model of integration based on the functionalist/neo-functionalist theories (see, Biswaro, 2011). In a meeting of trade union experts, held under the OECD Labour/Management Programme, Haggard (1991:II) noted that the theme was recurring that

"regionalisation in Europe was in part a response to the disruptive effects of globalisation". Haggard adds that "there has been increased participation of the private sector in strengthening regional cooperation both as a strategy of enhancing its competitive position within an increasingly globalising process and to "offset the shift in the centre of global economic activity toward the Pacific region" (Haggard, 1991:II). The EU, according to Bilal (2007:3) has been involved in regional integration processes of developing countries, both for the purpose of trade and and other trade related matters. This is indicated in the EU"s current negotiations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regional organisations in the context of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) (Bilal, 2007:3).

Phelps and Alden (1999:37) note that regional integration in North America is driven largely by more limited largely economic considerations. It began in 1989 with a Free trade Agreement between the US and Canada wuhich was extended to include Mexico in 1994 through the formation of NAFTA. Studies have also indicated that progress has been achieved in North America with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which has facilitated the establishment of new trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world (Villarreal and Ferguson, 2015).

In addition, there are studies that have recorded the success achieved in Latin America which embraces open regionalism with the Latin America countries participating actively in free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential market access thereby setting the basis for successful regional integration (Valvis, 2008:13; Perales, 2012; Biswaro, 2011). Valvis (2008:13) note that while regionalism is not knew in Latin America, since the 1990s, trade has prospered and received a boost particularly intra-regional trade. Trade continues to occupy a central place in Latin America"s policy agenda. It does not imply however, that free trade does not have its negative effects (Perales, 2012). Notwithstanding, Biswaro (2011:39) opines that "after the currency and banking crisis of 1997-98, by 2000, the region was well on its way to recovery again". Perales (2012) assert that in Latin America:

> The signing of newer agreements includes clauses not included in earlier trade negotiations, covering areas such as competition policy, services and intellectual property. As a result, FTAs are supporting new spheres of policy making processes, the development of new mechanisms that have in turn assisted the modernisation process in many states.

Another regional grouping is Mercosur. Established in 1991, Mercusor aimed to create a common market among the following countries - Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. In 1995, "a FTA for the Americas was proposed to extend free trade in principle to all the countries in North, Central and South America by 2005" (Phelps and Alden, 1999:37). According to Valvis (2008:2), with the establishment of Mercosur, "it seemed that the regionalisation process in Latin America made a positive and radical shift". A publication titled: *Paths to Regional Power: The Case of Mercosur* published in 2002 showed the progress made with Mercosur during the 1990s up until 1997-98. Nofal (2002:208-209), note that "Mercosur was largely responsible for the growth in trade and investment in the region. Intra regional trade grew 340% from US$4.2 billion in 1990 to US$18.5 billion in 2000. This was a remarkable feat that was accomplished while simultaneously increasing rade with the rest of the world". However, it is documented, the number of political and economic challenges which have confronted Mercosur to the extent that there have been scepticisms and critisms from various quarters that it will be unable to achieve its objectives of establishing a regional common market dynamism (Espach, 2002:1-14; Nopal, 2002:208-222; see also, Valvis, 2008:2 and 18-22). These problems include: leadership deficiencies; lack of effective supranational institutions such as the EU; divergent interests and policy preferences of member countries among others (Nopal 2002:125; Valvis, 2008: 18 and 22). To this extent, Ivan Ramalho, Mercosur‟s High Representative, speaking to Merco Press, a South Atlantic news agency, identified the different sectors where success have been achieved despite the group‟s difficulties (see, Merco Press, 30 August, 2014).

Studies also show the progress made in Asia. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the most prominent regional integration arrangement in Asia which has made significant progress attracting scholarly attention (Biswaro, 2011; Soderbaum, 2013). ASEAN has achieved economic prosperity through "trade integration based on the exploitation of intra-regional comparative advantage" (Mckay and Armengol, 2004:5). The ASEAN established in 1967 has progressed slowly, successully forging a regional Free Trade Area, aiming to achieve a fully integrated ASEAN Economic Community by 2020 (Biswaro, 2011:19). Export-led growth is emphasised in Asia as in some parts of the world and this has been successful (Nkurayija, 2011). Unlike Europe‟s institutional framework, regional integration in East Asia is considered to be marked-led although the region is progressing towards enhancing inter-governmental cooperation (see, ADB, 2013).

Statistics reveal the progress made with ASEAN. According to ASEANstats (2013:2), "ASEAN trade with the rest of the world increased from US$428.1 billion in 2004 to US$914.8 billion in 2011, accounting for 75% of total ASEAN trade". The economic progress led to improved standard of living for the people with a reduction in the poverty level (ASEANstats, 2013:4). Soderbaum (2013:7) notes that the progress achieved in ASEAN arouses a debate "about the impact of the informal and non-legalistic approach of Asian regional organisations". As Biswaro (2011:39) identifies, despite the region"s diversities – in language, culture, resource endowments and political systems, East Asia has achieved success in promoting regional integration objectives. Intra-regional trade has increased while it continues to be relevant in relating with countries in other regions.

The case of Africa presents a different picture as an assessment of progress in the continent reveals that limited results have been achieved at level of the sub-regions (see, Mistry, 2000; Adogamhe, 2008; Okhonmina, 2009; Olivia, 2010). While regional integration continues to appeal to African governments and their peoples, as evidenced with the large number of existing RIAs and institutions established to promote the goals of integration, Africa has remained the least integrated and developed of the world"s major regions. Intra-regional remains low as is the case with the level of Africa"s trade with the rest of the world (ECA, 2010). The next sections of this chapter present diverse discourses on African economic integration.

3.5 The trend of African economic integration efforts

It is instructive to note that the importance of "regionalism" was recognised in pre-independence Africa as a number of regional integrative arrangements existed during that period. Not surprisingly, with independence generally achieved in the 1960s, African countries began to cooperate in order to address the effects of divisiveness under colonial rule by working to find solutions to common challenges and presenting a common front in the international system through the formation of the OAU and other sub-regional groupings.[25]

[25] "Regionalism during the colonial era, was encouraged by the colonial governments not out of any idealism but principally because of the need to exploit the potential of the economies of scale. Thus, the French colonial administration did establish two federations – Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF). Eight colonies – Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea, Dahomey (now Benin), Niger, Cote d"Ivoire and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) constituted the federation of French West Africa. The French Equatorial Federation was made up of what became the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon and Cameroon. But in 1956, the French authority launched the process of balkanisation so that, at the time of independence in 1960, the two federations had been disbanded. In their place, 14 small independent (and economically unviable) states, including Togo emerged. By so doing, France

To this extent, regional integration in Africa usually has underlying political motives apart from the economic (development) goals which RIAs seek to achieve (Matthews, 2003:17; Ikome, 2004:40-41; Landsberg 2012a:4-5).

African RIAs have been influenced by pan-African ideas of promoting unity, solidarity and collective self-reliance among African states (Landsberg, 2012a:4-5). African countries are not equally naturally endowed and financially developed; thus, one of the benefits of regional integration is the shared benefits which would accrue from natural and mineral resources if countries which possess them agree to share with those that do not have sufficient resources (Mangachi, 2008:150-151). It is argued that, by integrating its economies and harnessing its capacities and resources, Africa will be able to address its development challenges, achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and enhance the standard of living of the people. African countries will eliminate the various obstacles to "movements of goods, services, capital and labour; ensure policy coordination and harmonisation; infrastructural development as well as the promotion of peace and security within and between regions" (ECA, 2010:XIX).

Ayangafac (2008:161-163) also establishes that regional integration is imperative for Africa to exercise effective ownership, control and management over its vast natural and material resources and set minimum standards on how resources are exploited to the continent‟s advantage. According to the AU/NEPAD (2009b:5 and 11),

> It is estimated that Africa has more than 7% of the world‟s oil reserve; 8% of the world‟s gas resources; there is enormous exploitable hydropower capacity in African countries, estimated to be 13% of world total. Solar energy is also widespread in Africa. About 15 African coastal countries have excellent wind energy potential. Africa has 59 international trans-boundary river basins, 15 principal lakes, 38 trans-boundary aquifer systems, and 24 main watersheds that cross the manmade political boundaries of two or more countries. These resources cover about 64% of the continent‟s land area and contain 93% of its total surface water resources. These water basins are also home to 77% of the African population.

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imposed a severe burden on these newly independent minuscule states. Fragmented and balkanised, they sought refuge in regionalism through economic cooperation, even though this was a poor substitute for federalism, particularly as the phenomenon of irrendentism and separatism soon began to rear its ugly face, hence, the large number of economic integration entities established in West and Central Africa and subsequently in other regions of Africa" (Onimode et al, 2004:234-235).

Thus, the development, maintenance and management of these resources and others owned by several countries necessitate regional and continental partnerships, efforts and policies (AU/NEPAD, 2009b:11). These are also important for Africa‟s global economic relations. There is a need to coordinate and harmonise national policies and reach common agreements on Africa‟s natural resources (Ayangafac, 2008:161-163). According to the UNDP (2011:3), "if regional integration provides an impetus to better manage cross-border natural resources, this would support the notion of sustainability inherent in the human development paradigm".

Regional cooperation and integration provides for Africa, a viable strategy for investment in infrastructure development and maintenance for instance, roads, transport, energy, ICT; coordination and harmonisation of socio-economic policies in the areas of agriculture, education and health; addressing human development and human capital formation challenges; among others. African leaders can exploit the strategy of regional cooperation and integration towards "nurturing scientific research, design and development" (Kambudzi, 2008:15). The continent‟s manpower resources - health professionals, engineers, managers, and others could be mobilised; they could network, share knowledge and best practices and this could advance the process of socio-economic development (Kambudzi, 2008:15-16). Regional integration in no small measure enhances the informal relations which persist among Africans and propels "South-to-South" migration. The potential for regional economic integration to promote intra-regional trade, increase Africa‟s productive capacity in goods and services and trigger industrial development in Africa cannot be over-emphasised (UNDP, 2011:3).

Regional economic integration is also advocated to bring about "improvement in governance and public administration" in the continent (AU/NEPAD, 2009b:77). The reality is that some African countries which are relatively economically developed continue to underperform as a result of bad leadership, corruption and the prevalence of weak economic policies. It is arguable that functional regional institutions and policies which promote shared governance standards and democratic values could assist in redressing such issues and curbing the excesses of national political leaderships. Indeed, African governments are conscious that internal conflicts in an African country, triggered by political or socio-economic problems could spill over to its neighbours. Moreover, governments of African countries which are recording economic growth rates possibly understand that such development would not be sustainable with poor African countries as neighbours. These compelling imperatives have

sustained the quest for African economic integration. Regional cooperation and integration in Africa has therefore been sought at both the sub-regional, regional (continental) levels to a considerable extent:

> At independence, the evolutionary process of regional cooperation and integration in Africa virtually became a movement to the extent that within fifteen years after independence, over 20 intergovernmental multi-sectoral economic cooperation organisations had been established and over 120 single sectoral multi-national and bilateral organisations, meant to promote technical and economic cooperation, had been set up. Indeed, the 1960s could be regarded as Africa"s integration decade (Adedeji, 2002:3).

Despite the benefits associated with regional cooperation and integration, however, scholars often note the complexities and challenges of African economic integration. For instance, Ndongko (1993:179-180) asserts that the different sub-regional groupings, multilateral arrangements and institutions which were established to foster links between African countries had varying memberships and different objectives and goals which they were seeking to achieve.[26] To this extent, many such organisations did not have clear visions and in most cases, their memberships over-lapped. Many of the regional integration arrangements which were set up in the 1960s performed poorly (Adedeji, 2002:3). Kimunguyi (2006:3) points out that, African governments did not consider seriously the issue of integration during the 1960s which coincidentally was the period when the Cold War was at its peak. African countries were gaining from the assistance provided by the rivalry between Eastern and Western blocs for spheres of influence in the third world. As the Cold War ended and these powers withdrew from Africa, African governments began to give more attention to regional integration issues in the continent (Kimunguyi, 2006:3).

Therefore, in order to account for the political-economic dynamics of African regionalism, this study adopts a general view of regional integration. In particular, regional integration is examined from the view points of the functionalist/neo-functionalist perspectives to enable a political-economic analysis on African economic integration with on-going efforts of the African Union/NEPAD, and APRM. In line with the central argument of this study, regional integration requires a common approach, supported by the necessary institutions to address economic, political or social issues.

[26] Agubuzu (2004:195) notes for instance that, in the West African sub-region, there exist more than 40 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), which aims to promote regional cooperation and integration.

Africa‟s integration efforts have been influenced by a desire for political and economic emancipation, peace and security and sustainable development (Landsberg, 2012:4; see also Mwasha, 2008:77). For regional integration, in this sense, independent nation states must see themselves as having a particular regional identity and belonging to a political community (see, Etzioni, 1965; Landsberg, 2012a:4). Regional integration initiatives in Africa are thus beset with many political and socio-economic challenges and require political will, commitments and sacrifices from both the government and the people in order to achieve the goals. In other words, this suggests that while regional integration is necessary for Africa, key issues of governance and development need to be addressed for integration to succeed.

3.6 Examining Africa‟s quest for economic integration: A historical analysis[27]

African leaders and their people have long embraced regional economic cooperation and integration as a strategy for promoting socio-economic development in the continent. Over four decades after independence, it is possible to identify and examine Africa‟s integration experiments at different periods in its history in five different stages.[28] This shows that, Africa has not lacked normative frameworks on regional integration. In short, the continent‟s development initiatives since independence have had underlying pan-African political objectives.[29] This section of the chapter examines the different regional arrangements and

[27] The author acknowledges that similar analysis of the different stages of regional integration experiments in Africa was done by Francis Ikome in his PhD Thesis titled: "From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) – The political economy of African regional initiatives", submitted in 2004.

[28] This study borrows from Olivier‟s five episodes of African integration namely: the period dominated by the quest for „African Unity‟, „African Fraternity‟ or „Pan-Africanism‟; from continental geo-political approach to the sub-regionalism; continental cooperation with the Lagos Plan of Action; the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the launching of the African Union. Moreover, Adebayo Adedeji‟s paper titled, "The history and prospects for regional integration in Africa", presented at the Third Meeting of the African Development Forum Addis Ababa, 5 March 2002 was also handy and useful.

[29] Some of these initiatives are: "Africa‟s Declaration on Economic Cooperation and Development (1973); The Monrovia Strategy (1979); the Lagos Plan of Action (1980); The Final Act of Lagos (1981); The African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights (Nairobi 1981) and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights; Africa‟s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1985); Africa‟s Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa‟s Economic and Social Crises (1986); The United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD, 1986); the Charter on Popular Participation adopted in 1990; the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF, 1991); the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993); the Cairo Agenda for Action (1995); the Abuja Treaty, (1991); African Common Position on Africa‟s External Debt Crisis (1997); The Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999) and the Lome Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes (2000); The 2000 solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation; The Constitutive Act of the African Union (July 2000) and the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), October, 2001" (Ikome, 2004:42-43). See also, Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:215.

policies with a view to identifying the theoretical bases upon which these efforts were premised; and to examine key issues which impaired the achievement of policy objectives and which accounted for the shifts in the different stages. This then sets the stage for an analysis of the diverse discourses on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM. The section begins with a discourse on Pan-Africanism as a philosophy and ideology which underpins Africa‟s economic integration efforts. It thereafter presents an overview of Africa‟s development initiatives and policy declarations that are worth mentioning in the continent‟s efforts at promoting integration.

3.6.1 Pan-Africanism – The logic of African economic integration:

Africa‟s quest for economic cooperation and integration was born out of, and made attractive by Pan-Africanism; the struggle for independence; and the vision of a United States of Africa (see, Ikome, 2004:50-51; Adedeji, 2004:234-235; Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:213-214; Asogwa, 2011:8-9; Adogamhe, 2008:2, Kambudzi, 2008:19; Murithi, 2008:3-4; Okhonmina, 2009:86-87; Adejumobi, 2009:404-406; Uzodike, 2010/11:88-89). As has been previously highlighted, African countries came to terms with their political, social and economic limitations as most of them became independent and realised the necessity to cooperate to actualise both national and regional objectives. The concept of pan-Africanism has been defined differently by scholars. It has however, been accepted as the guiding philosophy in African history towards the struggle for a united continent in response to the effects of colonialism and of promoting Africa‟s development. It represented a gradual/functional approach of integration towards African unity in line with the ideals of functionalism/neo-functionalism. The interest in cooperation shown by newly independent African countries was triggered by a common challenge posed to them individually and as a collective of states.

It was emphasised in previous chapters that Africa‟s development challenges are often associated with the slave trade and subsequent colonialism. Pan-Africanism initially was espoused by Africans in the diaspora who had been exploited and oppressed during the era of slavery (Adogamhe, 2008:8). The desire for freedom from slavery and subsequently, for independence from colonialism triggered a number of pan-African conferences in United States and Europe between 1900 and 1945 which were attended by African intellectuals and activists from the Americas, Africa and Europe (Adogamhe, 2008:8). The fifth Pan-African Conference which took place in Manchester, England in 1945 has been regarded by scholars and writers as “memorable” because pan-African ideals were embraced by most educated

Africans and became a tool of African nationalism as articulated in the resolutions and declarations endorsed at that congress (OAU, 1977:1; also see Geiss, 1974; Adedeji, 2002:10). This conference produced a vision of a "Pan-African regional economic space to be administered by a Pan-African political arrangement" (Agubuzu, 2004:193).
The major efforts made towards fostering continental unity were:

> "The Ghana-Guinea Union (23rd November 1958) which was joined by Mali on 29th April, 1961;
> - The All-African People‟s Conference, Accra, 1958;
> - The Casablanca Group (7th January, 1961);
> - The Pan-African Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA);
> - The Monrovia Group (8-12 May, 1961);
> - The Brazzaville Group (19th December, 1961)" (OAU, 1977:1; see also, Agubuzu, 2004:193).

These various groups brought together Africans from the different countries with the objective of establishing pan-African ideals of cooperation among them. The regional efforts motivated the decision taken by African Heads of State and Governments to establish the OAU (see Adogamhe, 2008:9-11; Adejumobi, 2009:408; Uzodike 2010/11:89-90). The establishment of the OAU marked the first in five identifiable phases in Africa‟s efforts at regional integration - the stage of "putting supra-national pan-Africanism as the rallying point and the vision for political independence and economic decolonisation" (Adedeji, 2002:2); and, according to Olivier (2010:27), the "first episode of African regional integration". However, African leaders did not consent to the idea of an immediate establishment of a common continental government in the form of a United States of Africa in the early post-independence period and this is currently an issue of debate with the African Union (Murithi, 2008:186-188; Uzodike, 2010/11:90; Olivier, 2010:27). Hence, it has become one of the problematics of African economic integration. In the case of the OAU, it was obvious that African countries saw the organisation as important for them to actualise pan-African objectives (Uzodike, 2010/11:90). However, during the period of its existence, the OAU

functioned as "an institutional experiment based on an African states system with functional approach to regional cooperation and integration" (Adogamhe, 2008:11).[30]

The OAU Charter was regarded as a "largely negative agreement – not to move too much to the left nor too far to the right" (Cervenka, 1977:9). The organisation created an artificial unity which in no way affected the sovereignty of each independent state (Shaw, 2009:45). Sovereignty, this study argues, from the time of the OAU onwards has remained a major issue in the discourse on African economic integration. This is the rationale for employing neo-realism to illustrate the problematic nature of the African state in the quest for African economic integration.

The OAU Charter, Article II stated the purposes of the organisation. The organisation aimed at addressing a number of political issues, for instance, promoting unity and eradicating colonialism.[31] However, Article II (b) identified its role in promoting the welfare of the African people (Maloka, 2002:7). Some policies aimed at promoting Africa‟s development were formulated within the OAU. For instance, a resolution tagged "Areas of Cooperation in Economic Problems" was adopted at the first conference of the African Heads of State held in May 22-25, 1963 to put measures in place in order to promote economic cooperation. At this conference, a committee was created to look into possible ways of establishing a common tariff structure to protect Africa‟s new industries; setting up a Commodities Stabilisation Fund; harmonisation of the continent‟s development programmes (Ake, 1996:21-22; Teriba, 1991:129) among other objectives. The Conference also provided a forum for deliberations on issues relating to beneficial international trade relations for African countries (Teriba, 1991:129). The OAU created an avenue for regional support of national programmes such as the national import substitution industrialisation (ISI) for

[30] Chapter Two of this study presents a theoretical analysis of African economic integration discourse from the OAU to the African Union. The theory of functionalism/neo-functionalism is adopted in this study to explain the gradualist/incremental nature of African economic integration. The chapter also explains the challenges and weaknesses of such approach.

[31] For instance, Sunmonu (2004:64) states that "after independence of most African countries in the early 1960s, and the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963, the struggle for the complete decolonisation of Africa was fought ferociously, in tandem with the fight against apartheid in South Africa. The last colonial battle and victory were fought and won against Portuguese colonialism in Africa, with the independence of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau in 1975. Then, there was independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, and another 14 years before the end of apartheid in South Africa in April 1994, with the election of the first democratic, non-racial government led by President Nelson Mandela".

instance, and various national export strategies that were pursued in the years following independence in the continent (Ikome, 2004:47-48).[32]

The ISI strategy was unsuccessful however, not only because the necessary structures and institutions to make it work were non-existent, but also because of external constraints such as, fluctuating commodity prices and other trade restrictions. Structural challenges of the national markets of African states, small sizes of many states, lack of adequate financial resources; poor infrastructural facilities; poor economies, lack of technology, dependency on foreign capital, lack of physical and human resources; unskilled personnel; inexperience on the part of government and non-commitment to regional policies, led to the failure of the strategy (Mendes, et al, 2014:133-136). Although it was integrated into national development plans, the ISI was financed by loans from the developed countries which had conditionalities attached. These conditions were not favourable to the continent‟s industrialisation programme (Osaghae, 1993:103; Mendes et al, 2014:133-136). The ISI therefore existed only for a short period.

For his part, Baah (2003:2) pointed out that during the 1960s, the state was very much involved in economic activities and was providing social services to the people in the years immediately following independence. Government was spearheading the implementation of the ISI. However, the Cold War had its impact on African countries. The West feared that socialist oriented policies undermined their free market ideology and endeavoured to get many African states on their side, through the assistance of the World Bank and IMF, which took part in developing infrastructure in African countries in the 1960s (Baah, 2003:2-3). As such, it is the view of this scholar that the negative effects of the Cold War on Africa during that period undermined state participation in economic activities (Baah, 2003:2-3). Nzau (2010:146) also notes that, "although many factors favoured the state dominance as well as state-driven industrialisation process, yet, a bad political culture, weak political and social institutions, poor leadership and bad governance seem to have contributed to its failure from within".

[32] Import substitution industrialisation is based on the idea that, "domestic investment and technological capabilities can be spurred by providing domestic producers with (temporary) protection against imports" (Malhotra et al. 2003:37).

Bringing the assertions of these scholars together, the concern was that pan-African ideals were relegated to the background after the achievement of independence (see, Adogamhe, 2008:26). Taking into account the position of neo-realism that national interests of states impact on the integration process, it could be posited that governance challenges led to divisions among member-states of the OAU. These divisions weakened the pan-African agenda. This premise highlights the influence of states and the effects of the actions of government in strengthening or undermining regional goals. Another major issue was that citizen participation, which is a crucial element of the pan-Africanist agenda, was de-emphasised (Adejumobi, 2009:407)

These issues exposed the weaknesses of individual African countries and the regional diversities and challenges within the OAU. African leaders realised that, even though they had achieved political independence, they continued to be economically dependent. The external and internal challenges experienced in implementing the ISI strategy showed the dire need for more cooperation among African countries. Taken in conjunction with political dynamics triggered by the Cold War tensions, a motivation arose to reconsider the state-led ISI development strategy. There was also a need to focus more on developmental issues as an increasing number of African countries had become independent. In addition to the aforementioned factors, there was an interest in harnessing Africa‟s natural, material and human resources towards promoting political, social and economic benefits. The outcome was a focus on sub-regional integration and development.

3.6.2 The move from continental to sub-regional cooperation and integration

The period of the 1970s marked the second stage of African regional integration identifying the move from continental integration to sub-regional integration (Olivier, 2010:28). Sub-regional integration can be located within the functionalism/neo-functionalist gradualist explanation of cooperation among states in functional areas. Sub-regionalism also aligns with the neo-functionalist idea that interest drives integration and that political variables come into play in the process of integration. African leaders felt that establishing regional institutions at the sub-regional level would enhance the efforts of countries in the region to harness their resources for the purpose of development.

Nonetheless, the functionalist/neo-functionalist theory falls short of accounting for the African situation because it takes for granted the geography, political and economic dynamics

in the different regions in Africa. These theories are limited in explaining different political and economic rationales for the different policies formulated and implemented by the various sub-regional groupings, and how these policies promoted or undermined Africa‟s economic continental integration agenda. Functionalism and neo-functionalism do not account for competing national interests among participating countries in sub-regional groupings. For instance, rather than African leaders emphasising the need for collective efforts in addressing the structural impediments of the continent in order to achieve the continent‟s integration objectives, the approach adopted was "market-driven intra-state or extra-state territorial cooperation" (Olivier, 2010:28). Hence, regionalism during the period was mostly outward-oriented: focused on achieving political, social and economic goals (Adetula, 2004:2). This stage was marked by the "search for larger and sustainable sub-regional integration among independent African countries resulting in a breakthrough in sub-regional cooperation arrangements in the 1970s and 1980s" (Adedeji, 2002:2). It was during this period that regionalism was strengthened in less developed countries. Under the G77, developing countries put forth their demand for a New International Economic Order at the United Nations General Assembly.

By establishing sub-regional groupings, African leaders hoped to strengthen their bargaining power vis-à-vis the international community and benefit from international trade relations. The UN General Assembly in its Plan for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) had supported the idea that developing countries should establish cooperation in functional areas (Ojo, 1981). This Plan culminated in the establishment of sub-regional institutions in North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa, building upon institutions that had existed in the colonial era (Olivier, 2010:28).

African leaders made efforts to address the continent‟s development challenge. This was the focus of "Africa‟s Strategy for Development in the 1970s", a declaration adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference of Ministers in Tunisia, February, 1971 (Ake, 1996, 21-22; see also ECA, 1972:2). There was also the "Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence" adopted by the OAU in 1973 (Teriba, 1991:129-130; Maloka, 2002:7). In addition, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted a "Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa" at Kinshasa, in December 1976 (Teriba, 1991:130; Ake, 1996:21-22). The OAU Heads of State meeting in Libreville in July 1977 also approved this document

(Teriba, 1991:130; Ake, 1996:21-22). These programmes motivated the adoption, in July 1979, of the "Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (Teriba, 1991:131; Ake, 1996: 21-22).

Nevertheless, despite the efforts made by the African leaders, the success achieved by regional economic organisations during this period was below expectation.[33] While the decision to establish sub-regional groupings is economic, market integration does not address the weakness of political leaders, poor governance and the policy choices leaders make or do not make. For instance, there could have been policies to address national constraints such as infrastructure deficits, lack of adequate skilled manpower, lack of industrialisation and other developmental problematics which impair the realisation of sub-regional and continental integration objectives. These challenges were however persistent. The establishment of regional institutions did not lead to socio-economic development in the continent. Rather, leadership failures and weak economic policies resulted in corruption, poverty and poor economic conditions. These factors triggered political conflicts in some countries in the sub-region.

Basically, sub-regional integration did not lead to an increase in intra-regional or intra-African trade as countries continued to trade with their former colonial masters. African countries did not benefit very much from international engagements because of the internal political-economic challenges in African countries and the disadvantageous terms of international trade. The unilateral trade liberalisation policy embarked upon by the African countries which sought financial assistance from the IMF and World Bank negatively impacted on the process of integration. Many African countries were therefore in debt; their economies were dependent and they were marginalised in the international system. These challenges led to a change of ideas on the strategies for promoting Africa‟s development.

[33] Adedeji (2002:2) notes for instance, that "the emergence of major sub-region wide organisations did not in any way lead to the rationalisation of the multitude of intergovernmental organisations that were in existence, nor for that matter stop the formation of new ones. Thus, some 130 intergovernmental, multi-sectoral economic organisations existed side by side with them. This meant that a large number of countries held multiple membership – some belonging to as many as 20 to 25 of such organiations. Such multiplicity inevitably reduced the effectiveness of all the institutions, including the major sub-region-wide organistions".

3.6.3 The Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos

The introduction of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) in 1980 marked the third stage of African economic integration (Olivier, 2010:28-29). The formulation of the LPA was a demonstration that African governments were willing to address the continent‟s economic challenges (Kaunda, 1989:XVII-XX; see, Ikome, 2004). The LPA emphasised that external factors accounted for Africa‟s underdevelopment, citing the exploitation experienced during the period of colonial rule. It also noted that Africa‟s weak and extroverted economies were as a result of the exploitative tendencies of colonialism and neo-colonialism (Adogamhe, 2008:12). To this extent, the LPA was influenced by the explanations of dependency theory.

Against the continued influence of external forces on Africa‟s development initiatives (which accentuates rather than improves the situation in the continent), the LPA called for regional economic integration to promote collective self-reliance and self-sustaining development (Tipoteh, 1993:143; Ikome, 2004). It promoted the idea that Africa‟s wealth in resources should be harnessed to promote self-sustainable growth and development. The LPA identified a gradual/incremental process of integration towards the establishment of a single pan-African entity following the functionalist/neo-functionalist perspective (Dinka and Kennes, 2007:11). Its position was that development strategies should be more inward-oriented (Olivier, 2010:29). The Plan not only emphasised the role of the state in promoting development in the African context, but also provided a platform on which African leaders took a stand on the need to restructure the existing international economic order (Matlosa, 2010/11:5). The LPA, according to Maloka (2002:8), “took the Monrovia Declaration forward in that, it set out a developmental agenda for the continent for the 1980s, and towards the year 2000”.

The main objectives promoted by the LPA and FAL were: “food self-sufficiency; the satisfaction of the basic needs of the African peoples; creation of employment opportunities; internal mass production of essential consumer goods; establishment of the African Economic Community by the year 2000” (Sunmonu, 2004:64). Olivier (2010:29) notes particularly that, the LPA was a significant initiative marking Africa‟s efforts at promoting cooperation and integration as it re-launched the pan-African agenda, advancing continental cooperation as the strategy to accelerate the process of Africa‟s development. The Final Act of Lagos, in its Plan of Action, “developed an integration agenda, which laid the basis for the

Abuja Treaty of 1991" (Maloka, 2002:8). Considering these objectives, the LPA was regarded as a "structural blueprint for integration" (Onimode, 1993:154). Despite the laudable goals and objectives enshrined in the LPA, the Plan remained largely unimplemented. This showed clearly the insincerity of African leaders in establishing regional integration objectives and the passive role of the citizens concerning national and regional issues.

A number of critical external and internal factors accounted for the failure of the LPA. Africa lacked the required skilled manpower and financial resources to finance the development process. African countries" poor and extroverted economies were further affected by other international factors such as the unfavourable terms of trade, fall in commodity prices, increased protectionism, among others (Osaghae, 1993:101-113). Environmental challenges such as drought and desertification also affected the development process. Additionally, some African countries were experiencing internal conflicts. As noted earlier, these conflicts were and are triggered by poor governance and socio-economic challenges in various countries. Moreover, Teriba (1991:133) as well as other scholars – Onimode (1993:154); Tipoteh (1993:148); Osaghae (1993:101); Ikome (2004) and others, point to the lack of political will and commitment on the part of African leaders to implement regional policies enunciated in the LPA although some efforts were recorded in particular sectors.

Teriba (1991:133) notes that, even though member-states of the OAU supported the principles of the LPA, these were not always translated into their national plans and objectives. This is one of the major areas of contradiction in discourses on regionalism in Africa and which this study explains within a framework of neo-realist theory. Hiding under the guise of national sovereignty, most African leaders fail to implement regional agreements. Some governments, in this case, were rather implementing the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF to ameliorate economic hardships (Agubuzu, 2004:191). The SAPs promoted neo-liberal policies that were not sustainable in African conditions. Futhermore, as Tipoteh (1993:148) points out, another challenge to the sustainability of SAPs is the non-mobilisation of the African people for participation in implementation of development initiatives. Most of the challenges accounting for the failure of the LPA, as Onimode (1993:154) notes, reflect the failure of the "voluntarist" basis of regionalism in Africa and its functional/gradualist nature.

Having considered the weaknesses of the LPA, African leaders at their meeting in July 1985, adopted Africa‟s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) (Teriba, 1991:134; Maloka, 2002:8; Tesha, 2002:16-18). The approach of APPER was to focus on priority development sectors drawn from the LPA and to address the issue of Africa‟s debt burden (Teriba, 1991:134). APPER was an attempt to examine and revive the LPA and also to commit the OAU to rally international support through the United Nations to address Africa‟s condition (Maloka, 2002:8). The OAU Assembly also adopted a Resolution on the African Economic Situation calling for a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly to be held concerning Africa (Teriba, 1991:135). Prior to the UNGA Special Session, a document entitled, "Africa‟s Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa‟s Economic and Social Crises" was adopted in March 30-31, 1986 (OAU, 1986). This Submission motivated the adoption by the United Nations, at its Special Session in 1986, of the "Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990" (UN-PAAERD) (Maloka, 2002:9).

While the programmes of the United Nations were being implemented, African leaders, for their part, responded to the World Bank Berg Report released in 1991 promoting the SAPs, with the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) 1989 (Agubuzu, 2004:191). AAF-SAP contributed to efforts towards Africa‟s development by emphasising the significance of ensuring that, African countries‟ "short and medium term plans were consistent with long term measures for promoting growth with development" (Tipoteh, 1993:143). With the AAF-SAP, member-states of the OAU were encouraged to completely reject the SAPs promoted by the World Bank (Tesha, 2002:18). The question however was: did all the African leaders support this idea?

Despite the critical objectives which the APPER and the AAF-SAP sought to achieve, these policy frameworks did not generate the expected outcomes (Tesha, 2002:19). Tipoteh (1993:143) argues that the initiatives were weak because they failed to account for internal political and socio-economic challenges in individual African states. In essence, the implementation of regional initiatives such as the APPER and AAF-SAP, just like the LPA, could not have been possible in light of the political and socio-economic challenges prevalent in African countries. On the part of the United Nations, the implementation of the UN-PAAERD (1986-1990) also suffered great setbacks because of lack of commitment on the

part of the donor community to commit the required resources, among other challenges. Hence, the programme did not achieve its objectives (Maloka, 2002:10; Tesha, 2002:19). The UN came up with another programme known as the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) 1991. Through this programme, the UN was not entirely unsuccessful in rallying the support of the international community to assist in addressing Africa‟s challenges. Considering these conditions, therefore, the assertion of Onimode et al (2004:236) is worth mentioning:

> All of these programmes were opposed, undermined and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods institutions, and Africans were thus impeded from exercising their basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future... Given African leaders‟ excessive external dependence, their excruciating debt burden, their narrow political base, the pervasiveness of donor democracy...the implementation of these plans has suffered from benign neglect. Lacking the resources and the will to soldier on self-reliantly, they abandoned their own strategies, including the two - UN-PAAERD and UN-NADAF – that were crafted jointly with the international community under the aegis of the United Nations GeneralAssembly.

There was, however, a realisation by African leaders that the continent was experiencing development crises and was at a crossroads considering the external and internal challenges which confronted its development efforts. This realisation could, perhaps, have been as a result of the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of regional groupings in other parts of the world for economic purposes. African leaders knew that the developed countries were beginning to focus more on their own development agendas. The leaders decided to implement more effective strategies, taking into consideration the weaknesses of previous initiatives. Some lessons that could be drawn from the previous initiatives were that: regional cooperation and integration was crucial to Africa, however, the process was being undermined by political and socio-economic issues in African countries; there was need to reposition Africa‟s extroverted economies; Africa would need to exploit its human and material resources; and that continued total reliance on external efforts was not profitable to the African condition. These factors, among others, motivated the continued search for cooperation and integration arrangements in order to achieve development objectives.

3.6.4 The Abuja Treaty of 1991

The Abuja Treaty of 1991, establishing the African Economic Community marked the fourth stage of efforts towards African integration (Olivier, 2010:31). The Treaty entails a

gradual/incremental approach based on the market integration theory towards the eventual establishment of an African Economic Community. According to Maloka (2002:10), "the Treaty was an important step aimed at positioning the continent in the face of post-Cold war challenges".[34] It took the LPA and FAL integration initiative further with the intention of establishing an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2025 (Maloka, 2002:10). The signing of the Treaty confirmed the resolution of African leaders in Articles II (1)(b) and (2)(b) of the OAU Charter on regional integration, and resolutions CM/Res.123 (IX) and CM/Res. 125 (IX), adopted in Kinshasa in September 1967, stating their idea of creating an African market (Agubuzu, 2004:194).[35] Notwithstanding the laudable objectives, the internal governance challenges which have been identified previously, question African governments" political will and commitment to implementing regional protocols which they have signed.

Oliver (2010:31) opines that, with the signing of the Treaty, African leaders again de-emphasised the inward-looking approach formulated in the 1980s which were aimed at combating the continent"s dependence on the developed countries and which fashioned a developmental strategy based on collective self-reliance. The Treaty proposed an outward-oriented approach to regional integration which would benefit Africa. The principles of the Treaty include, "solidarity and collective self-reliance, recognition and protection of human and people"s rights, and accountability and popular participation in development" (Maloka, 2002:11).

Oliver (2010:31) notes that, it was critical for the Treaty to identify that popular participation was key to achieving development objectives and that African RECs are considered to be the building blocks of the AEC.[36] However, Mutume (2002:20) opines that the different phases outlined in the Abuja Treaty have been implemented only in some regions, in parts; it has been overtaken by the liberalisation programmes promoted through the SAPs of the World Bank and IMF. This assertion suggests that sovereignty is a key issue which needs to be dealt with regards to African economic integration objectives. Sunmonu (2004:70), for instance, observes that, the Abuja Treaty which was adopted in 1991 was only ratified by two thirds of

[34] The end of the Cold War in the 1990s which indicated the process of more intense globalisation motivated different countries to merge their economies in order to have larger markets and be more competitive. Africa needed to strengthen its strategies towards regional cooperation and integration.
[35] See the Abuja Treaty, establishing the African Economic Community.
[36] The AEC is supposedly to be founded on the corner-stones of five RECs, from the five sub-regions of Africa (see Sunmonu, 2004:70).

the OAU member countries on 12 May 1994. It is instructive to note however that some of the RECs such as ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, COMESA, are at present making progress in realising their objectives; others, such as AMU are lagging behind (see, ECA, 2010; ECA, 2011e).

Since the Treaty establishing the AEC built upon the LPA and FAL, African leaders felt that certain changes needed to take place in the OAU for its effective implementation. The continent needed a more structurally efficient and effective organisation than the OAU to implement the continent‟s integration agenda. The non-interference principle and respect for the sovereign status of member states provided by Article III of the OAU Charter constrained not only the efforts of the organisation to enforce its protocols, but also the intervention of the organisation when the need arose (Murithi, 2008:3; Olivier, 2010:27). Apart from the fact that member states of the OAU had limited loyalty to the organisation, it had no power to sanction against non-commitment to regional principles. Poor leadership and governance led to violation of human rights, political instability and several conflicts which characterised post-independence African states. These factors influenced the decision to establish the African Union. Practical steps concerning this transformation began in 1999 with a declaration made by the OAU Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libya to create the African Union. The outcome of subsequent meetings to see through the process of transformation was the "adoption of the African Union‟s Constitutive Act in 2000 at the OAU Summit in Lome, Togo, and the coming into force of the Act in 2001" (AfriMAP, 2009:4).

In 2001 (10 years after the adoption of the Treaty establishing the AEC was adopted), the New Partnership for Africa‟s development (NEPAD) was established. NEPAD was formulated as the movement for change in Africa progressed from the 1990s. NEPAD is an initiative of the OAU as the period of its formulation coincided with the process of the transformation of the OAU. The concern about Africa‟s growing debt crisis, poverty, underdevelopment and growing marginalisation in the international community led to rethinking Africa‟s development and international interactions (Hammons, 2011:747-750; Njehu, 2012:11; Rukato, 2012:92; NEPAD, 2011a:IV-V). Some African leaders who at the time, were Presidents of frontline African states, and who were engaged in Africa‟s continental and inter-continental processes, were key initiators of the NEPAD initiative

(Rukato, 2012:92).[37] NEPAD was adopted by Africa‟s Heads of State and Government in 2001.

NEPAD represents another effort by African leaders, building upon previous initiatives, to provide a regional direction for development. For instance, while the LPA proposed an inward-oriented regionalism, the NEPAD initiative emphasises trade liberalisation, open regionalism and integration into the global economy. It is thought that this approach was consistent with the demands and challenges of the new millennium. NEPAD seeks to assist African countries in responding to the demands of a new era of more intense globalisation. The NEPAD Document (2001a, paragraphs 59-60) proclaims the initiative as a long-term development blueprint for Africa which "differs in its approach and strategy from all previous plans and initiatives". NEPAD seeks to redress Africa‟s economic marginalisation and to build capacity for African countries to develop (NEPAD/ECA/OSAA, 2012:VIII).

The NEPAD founding document articulates the socio-economic challenges facing the continent and the need for African leaders to emplace political conditions such as democracy, good governance, peace and security as preconditions for achieving socio-economic development (NEPAD/ECA/OSAA, 2012:X; Motsamai and Zondi, 2010:3; Rukato, 2012:92). Through NEPAD, it is expected that African states would develop these values and monitor their implementation within the framework of the African Union in order to create an environment conducive to international investment and for long term economic growth, prosperity and development (NEPAD, 2011a:IV). The NEPAD initiative "seeks a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest through the instrumentality of political democracy and economic development on the continent" (Amuwo, 2002:65).

Considering the political imperatives which NEPAD brought to Africa‟s development agenda, the initiative is seen as a political-economic initiative which seeks to redefine the role of the state and its institutions in achieving self-sustaining socio-economic development (Amuwo, 2002:65). Although NEPAD emphasises trade liberalisation, and increased

[37] Indeed what eventually came to be known as NEPAD was a fusion of two plans – The Omega Plan of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. A combination of these two programmes saw the formulation of a new plan known as the New African Initiative (NAI). The NAI was later re-named the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) in October 2001, after a review of the policy initiative by the Heads of State Implementation Committee (see AU/UN, 2008; NEPAD, 2011:IV-V; Njehu, 2012:7).

partnership with other countries of the world, it also promotes the strategy of regional economic integration in Africa. This is in recognition of the internal challenges of African states and the different levels of development of countries in Africa‟s sub-regions. Part of NEPAD‟s agenda is to address the impediments to regionalism in Africa such as poor infrastructure and lack of skilled human resources, among others. Concerning the adoption of the NEPAD initiative, Olivier (2010:32) notes that African leaders formulate new programmes even before the previous one has been implemented and evaluated. The assertion of Olivier raises several questions concerning how democratic the processes of conception, formulation and implementation of policies are and the sincerity of African leaders. This is a reality especially when one considers the grand initiatives of the LPA, FAL, the AEC and other programmes that were formulated before NEPAD. These issues constitute part of the on-going debates concerning the NEPAD initiative. NEPAD has attracted different opinions from scholars, writers, observers and civil society representatives.

3.6.5 The establishment of the African Union

The African Union was formally launched in 2002 with the key objective of speeding up the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. Its establishment marked the fifth stage of African integration (Adedeji 2002:5; Olivier, 2010:33). The AU has been regarded as a significant achievement in the historical struggle for African economic integration, unity and development.[38] The AU aligns with the functionalist/neo-functionalist perspective of integration with emphasis on a bottom-up process of integration leading to the establishment of a United States of Africa (African Union, 2005: Assembly/AU/Dec.90(V),S3).

The AU promotes functionalist and neo-functionalist ideals on the role of people, groups and institutions in the process of integration. The Union is expected to make up for the weaknesses of the OAU. It is intended to represent a Union of the people; to promote democratic governance, and popular participation of the African people in the continent‟s integration and development process; to forge closer integration among its members and to promote the continent‟s socio-economic development (see Adejumobi, 2009:408; Geldenhuys, 2012:58). The AU reflects a stronger organisation which is more likely than its predecessor to provide the framework for the continent‟s integration and development initiatives, such as the implementation of AEC and NEPAD. Ultimately, the AU will bring

[38] For details on the establishment of the African Union, see *African Insight*, Vol. 42, No. 3, December, 2012.

about changes in Africa‟s political economy in recognition of the demands and challenges of the global world economy.[39] To achieve its laudable objectives, the RECs are expected to play strategic roles as "building blocks" of the African Economic Community (Uzodike, 2010/11:87; see also, Sunmonu, 2004:70).

In 2002, the Heads of State and Government adopted a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, expressing their commitment to addressing key political and development issues in the continent (AU Declaration, AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1). This declaration saw the establishment of different codes and standards in promoting "good governance, democracy, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development" (AU Declaration, AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1). This declaration established the African Peer Review Mechanism as a programme of the African Union within its NEPAD initiative. The APRM would ensure that African countries comply with the various codes and standards towards the effective implementation of the AU/NEPAD agenda. It would interrogate the governance challenges which have affected the African continent and encourage countries to promote good governance and implement reforms. In 2003, the decision to integrate the NEPAD into AU structures and processes was taken.

In addition to the different organs and institutions set up by the AU as stipulated in its Constitutive Act, African leaders established the Pan African Parliament to "increase its public accountability and access to the Africa masses" (Mbeki, 2012:19). In the same vein, the concern with issues of justice and human rights led to the establishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights. And to promote peace and security in the region, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004. The PSC is regarded as one of the key organs of the African Union tasked with the responsibility of coordinating the continent‟s activities in the area of conflict resolution and peace-building (see, Murithi, 2012a:89-90). Thus, the Protocol establishing the PSC created a Peace and Security Management Architecture (APSA) for the continent comprising of the Panel of the Wise, a Continental

[39] These goals are clearly stated in the African Union‟s vision of "an Africa integrated, prosperous and peaceful; an Africa driven by its own citizens, a dynamic force in the global arena" (African Union, 2004:37).

Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee, and the Peace Fund.[40]

In various discourses relating to the African Union, scholars often emphasise the features which not only differentiate it from the OAU but also signify the Union‟s capacity to tackle the various crises in the continent (see, Dersso, 2012:25-26; Landsberg, 2012a:6-7; Geldenhuys, 2012:59-62). There are scholars, writers and observers who argue that the African Union is no more than "a new wine in an old bottle" indicating that the African Union, although is a good idea, is not performing any better than the OAU because the political and socio-economic challenges which constrained the performance of the OAU are still prevalent in Africa (see, Adejo, 2001; Sesay, 2008). Such scholars emphasise the weaknesses of the AU, which they argue, are visible in the ineffectiveness of its key organs and institutions to enforce decisions, and few achievements recorded by the Union since its establishment in 2002.

The major challenges confronting the AU include the emphasis by African countries on national sovereignty and the national interest versus regional interest contradictions. The process which led to the establishment of the African Union was filled with debates as to how integration would proceed towards the establishment of the African Union. The 1999 OAU Declaration in Sirte, Libya to form the African Union therefore presented a compromise between those who considered that the continent should speed up the process of establishing a United States of Africa and those who preferred a gradual approach (Djinnit, 2002:20). By establishing the African Union, African leaders demonstrated their desire to deepen integration. However, the AU still upholds some aspects of national sovereignty (Djinnit, 2002:20).

From the analysis in this section, it could be considered that African leaders perhaps demonstrated more realism in addressing both the external challenges and more importantly, the internal challenges affecting the continent‟s integration agenda with the establishment of the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM initiative. While the AU is better-equipped than the OAU to promote Africa‟s integration agenda, the NEPAD initiative focuses on development issues – addressing the constraints to economic development both in individual

[40] For details on the functions and programmes of these new institutions, see Khadiagala, 2010; Dersso, 2012:11-44; Mbeki, 2012:13-24).

African countries and in the continent as a whole. NEPAD emphasises the political imperatives of development which singles it out from other development initiatives. It emphasises that African governments should promote good governance and democracy and be better organised, politically and economically, in order to explore beneficial global partnerships. The establishment of the APRM initiative to address the governance deficits in African countries in promoting the AU/NEPAD initiatives signifies African governments' realisation that the issue of governance poses a serious challenge to regionalism in Africa.

Theoretically speaking and based on a political-economic perspective, the AU/NEPAD and APRM initiatives demonstrate the linkages between governance; democracy; peace, security, and stability; and development in the quest for African economic integration (Landsberg, 2012b:104-110). On the other hand, the on-going programmes of the African Union/NEPAD initiative at promoting economic integration, unity and development of the continent have continued to elicit debates and contestations among Africans. These debates have intensified because of the poor record of regionalism in Africa. The assertion of Adedeji (2002:6) is worth underscoring here:

> On the positive side, the five phases in the evolution of regional economic integration in Africa highlight two realities (i) the genuine belief that regional integration in Africa is an imperative and (ii) in spite of many pitfalls, the untiring efforts and persistence in forging different cooperation arrangements. In other words, both the idea and ideals of regionalism have continued to be popular. Nevertheless, the consensus seems to have developed, even among the avowed integrationists themselves that African regional integration arrangements have not succeeded in achieving their stated goals and objectives.

3.7 Regional integration in Africa: An overview of the issues, problems and challenges

While scholars agree that regional integration is a logical response by Africans to the difficulties faced by a continent with small markets and landlocked countries (OSAA, 2010: 16; Hartzenberg, 2011:1-8), there is also a consensus that the considerable amounts of time, efforts and resources that have been expended on regional integration projects in Sub-Saharan Africa have not yielded positive results. The regional economic integration process in Africa faces a litany of problems and challenges which need to be effectively handled in the quest for sustainable development in Africa (Radelet, 1997:1; Mistry, 2000:553-554; Olowu,

2003:212-229; Adetula, 2004:2-4; Geda and Kibret, 2002:2; Gibb, 2009: 701-721; Lee, 2002:2; Okhonmina, 2009:90; Olivier, 2010:1-18; Hartzenberg, 2011:1-8).

Adetula (2004:4) argues that the concept of economic integration has been poorly defined simply to mean liberalisation or the non-existence of economic discrimination among economic entities and this can be confusing particularly for countries of the less developed world. Given a limited conception of regional integration as the gradual removal of trade and tariff restrictions between states, Adetula notes that, "many self-styled common markets, federations, unions and communities have emerged without promoting regional integration among members or even showing the potentials to do so" (2004:4). Considering these tendencies therefore, it is the view of scholars and writers on integration that, integration can be considered as "either a process or as a state of affairs reached by that process" (Adetula, 2004:4; see also, Balassa, 1961:174: Haas, 1958:16; Khadiaghala, 2011:2; Okhonmina, 2009:85).

In expectation of deriving the benefits of regional integration, African countries have established a number of organisations: "Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (1964), which has been replaced by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC); East African Community (EAC) (1967-77), which is now known as the East African Cooperation; West African Economic Community (1972); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1975); Preferential Trade Area (PTA) (1981), which is now known as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (1995); Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (1980), which is now called the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (1992); and Union of Maghreb Arab States (UMA) (1988)" (Okhonmina, 2009:90).

As Adetula (2004:2) opines, Africa has "experimented with about 200 intergovernmental organisations between 1960 and 1990". Although most of them declare their roles in promoting regional cooperation, the reality has been that they have performed less than satisfactorily (Adetula, 2004:2). Regional integration arrangements established in Africa have not led to increased intra-African trade nor have they improved Africa‟s inter-continental trade relations (Radelet, 1997:1, 1999:2). Lee (2002:9) notes that, while regionalism, particularly market integration, has been viewed as a strategy to address the challenges

experienced by small African economies, the previous attempts at implementing market integration (which were inward-oriented and which were based on import substitution industrialisation (ISI)) were fraught with several problems. As such, the main objective of market integration which is to enhance intra-African trade was largely not realised.

Intra-regional trade is inhibited by: the economic make-up of African countries which hampers the distribution of diversified products; weak institutional policies, weak infrastructural connections and linkages, weak monetary and capital markets (OSAA, 2010:16); huge economic differences between member states; the uneven distribution of gains consequently allowing more developed member states to be the major recipients of integration benefits; and lack of political will and commitment to regionalism (Lee, 2002:2-9). For Radelet (1997:22 and 25), formal integration agreements do not present the most suitable starting arrangements to realise the benefits of regional integration. Radelet (1997:25) insists that, it is doubtful that a trade-focused RIA will achieve positive results where the economy is not well developed, there is political instability, weak infrastructure and communication networks, there are administrative restrictions to trade and most importantly, if the trade agreement is not more outward-oriented.

Hartzenberg (2011:1) states that, the linear market integration model which stipulates a "step-wise integration of goods, labour and capital and (eventually) monetary and fiscal integration", place more emphasis on border procedures (such as the import tariff) while paying less attention to supply-side challenges. The view expressed in the ECA"s Africa Report (2010:1-6), however, is that the fact that the various RTAs in Africa have not led to improvements in the volume of intra-regional trade raises questions about how appropriate the linear model is for addressing the obstacles to intra-regional trade. The report also records that intra-regional trade is as inadequate as intra-African trade which has also remained poor when measured with its inter-continental trade (ECA, 2010:1-6; Hartzenberg, 2011:10).

In explaining some of the challenges experienced by developing countries in their regional integration efforts, Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990:2) emphasise that governments of these countries tend to copy the European example but have taken fore-granted some of the basic conditions that were satisfied in Europe before the process of integration began. These include: "a high level of intra-regional trade before integration was started; similarities in income and industrialisation levels allowing for intra-industry specialisation, political

congeniality in foreign affairs; and capability and willingness to provide compensation payments" (Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1990:2). Most of the basic elements for successful functional integration are therefore not yet in place in African integration projects (Onimode, 1993:154). These assertions suggest that it is highly problematic for Africa to follow the European blueprint (see, Gibb, 2009:701-702). The challenge, therefore, is that the policy prescriptions of African governments on regional integration often do not reflect the specific realities and needs of the continent.

For Geda and Kibret (2002:2), critical issues in the discourse on regional economic integration in Africa could be classified into two inter-related broad categories. These are: "issues of implementation and the limitation of insights from both the theoretical and empirical literature regarding the specific approaches that are appropriate for the continent; and implementation issues which cover both the economic, political and institutional constraints that surface at the implementation stage of economic integration treaties" (Geda and Kibret, 2002:2). These problems pose challenges for appropriate policies at the national, sub-regional and regional levels towards enhancing capacities for African economic integration.

3.8 Contending views on the the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives

One of the reasons for formulating contextually appropriate policies on economic integration in Africa is the need to strengthen national, sub-regional and regional efforts towards achieving the goals of integration. This is especially so given that the envisaged success of the AU/NEPAD (APRM) initiatives is anchored on the utilisation of regional and sub-regional approach to development (Khadiagala, 2011:5-6). Africa is challenged to accelerate its integration process as other countries both in the developed and developing world are successfully negotiating and exploiting the benefits of regionalism. Moreover, African countries are the "recipients of preferential access to the markets of many industrialised countries and these relations question the feasibility of full-fledged sub-regional and continental regional schemes" (Ndayi, 2011:88-90).

The African Union/NEPAD programme of action "highlights the importance of economic linkages within Africa and the need of external trade and aids for economic development" in order to address the many challenges of Africa (Adogamhe, 2008:24). It also emphasises the

need to have an integrated investment in different sectors to enhance the achievement of its objectives (Adogamhe, 2008:24). NEPAD associates Africa‟s development challenges with political issues such as lack of democracy, bad governance, mal-administration and corruption (Chene and Hodess, 2009:3). The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a programme of the African Union within its NEPAD framework for reviewing progress made in the achievement of jointly agreed targets, and compliance with mutually agreed standards by African member countries towards achieving the goals of economic integration (NEPAD Document 2001a, paragraph 201).

The peer review process aims to assess the quality of governance at all levels of government, parliament and the judiciary, and the private sector with the overarching goal of moving African countries more firmly towards policy effectiveness. In this way, they will be better able to move rapidly towards desired goals such as poverty eradication and the achievement of the other objectives of the NEPAD programme (Kouassi, 2007:18). APRM appears to demonstrate the commitment of African countries to address governance and socio-economic development issues and take charge of their own futures (Kouassi, 2007:18-19). The idea of an APRM is anchored not only on overcoming the challenges within the region of ensuring visionary leadership, good governance, embedding of democratic principles and national economic development, but also on the linkage to issues of national, sub-regional and regional integration and development (Kouassi 2007:18-19; Chene and Hodess, 2009:3).

The African Union/NEPAD initiatives, according to Ndayi (2011:88-93), question the findings of dependency theory by promoting the free market approach to economic development. Instead, NEPAD acknowledges the benefits derivable from engaging in the international trade system. NEPAD‟s stance represents a model shift from the old developmental regionalism which emphasised self-reliance through “delinking” from the international market to an emphasis on collective self-reliance and “strategic” linking in the international economic system (Ndayi, 2011:88-93). In consequence, several issues have been raised on NEPAD‟s economic policies, its reliance on foreign capital for its implementation and also the issue of funding (Amuwo, 2002:65-82; Onimode et al, 2004:244-254; Bond, 2010:1-7; Ebegbulem et al, 2012:271-273). NEPAD is considered by some scholars to favour Western ideas and as such cannot engender African development (Bond, 2002, 2005; Amuwo, 2002:65-82; Naidoo, 2003:3-5; Ebegbulem, et al, 2011:271-275).

The APRM as well, has been perceived as an instrument created to make African governments "look good" and portray that they are democratic in order to enhance their chances of attracting more foreign aid. It is not genuinely about promoting „good governance", empowering civil society, promoting people-centred development or of adhering to the principles of democratic governance (see, Bond, 2010:1-7). Although scholars and writers agree on the imperative of regional integration, especially with the current emphasis on regionalism in the global community, and on the lofty objectives of the African Union and its NEPAD and APRM initiatives, they also express concern about the capacities of these initiatives to achieve set objectives.

Adogamhe (2008:21) asserts that, most African states are weak; most are yet to establish democracy and have not developed effective state-society relations. Together, these challenges "create crisis of legitimacy for most existing state institutions". He poses a question, "[A]re the African people themselves sufficiently sensitised and mobilised to support the African Union?" Regional integration processes in Africa, as noted in other chapters of this thesis, are undemocratic in nature, reflecting the interests and preferences of African elites. More so, African governments are not committed to implementing regional programmes.

According to Adejumobi (2009:403), "people are the means and the end of development and should be in the foreground of Africa's regional economic and political integration projects". On the available evidence, this has not been the case. One of the major factors that contribute to the failures of many regional integration schemes in Africa is the failure to mobilise and enable citizen participation and ownership of the projects. For instance, Adejumobi (2009:408) notes that, "the basic principles of the OAU did not contain any reference to popular participation". In fact, the discourse on the African Union is "often restricted to political leaders, civil society leaders (especially international NGOs), and a few other elitist categories. Farmers, peasants, artisans, scholars and students, women's organisations, and social movements are often completely disconnected from the discourse" (Adejumobi, 2009:418). As such, some scholars and writers view the African Union as furthering (in many ways) the vision of the OAU at a higher level. The AU is regarded as representing African leaders' continuing „quest' for regional integration in their own interests (Adogamhe, 2008:17; see also, Okhonmina, 2009:86-95).

Okhonmina (2009:93) supports the argument above and asserts that African governments lack the political will to submit national political and economic interests to supranational bodies - another major reason for the failures of previous regional integrative schemes. This attitude may also influence their readiness to support sub-regional and regional programmes of the African Union and NEPAD (see, Mistry, 2000:558; Geda and Kibret, 2002:3).

There is no gainsaying the fact that a common thread runs through the views of scholars on the need to re-examine the workings of the post-colonial African state and to strengthen its structures and institutions in individual countries as part of the push towards effective implementation of the policies and programmes of the African Union/NEPAD. For instance, issues of sovereignty have to be effectively dealt with (Mistry, 2000:558; Geda and Kibret, 2002:2-3; Olowu, 2003:212; Kambudzi, 2008:15; Okhonmina, 2009:92-95; Olivier, 2010:27-30). There is also the discourse on civil society involvement and effective participation in sub-regional and regional integration processes (Adogamhe, 2008:21; Murithi, 2008: 6-7; Adejumobi, 2009:418-419). Indeed, some scholars are now focusing not only on the disordered nature of politics on the African continent but also its lack of institutionalisation (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Chabal, 2005:18-33). An outcome of the lack of effective institutionalisation is that African people are inclined not only to disengage from the state but also to evade the grasp of power rather than confront or change it (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Chabal, 2005:18-33). In some ways, the continent is witnessing a gradual disengagement by both the state and civil society from national facets of regional development projects (Adejumobi, 2009:403). As such, the AU/NEPAD (APRM) objectives may be in jeopardy of not being achievable.

The foregoing literature review reveals that there are diverse discourses and issues of debates and contestations on African economic integration, the African Union/NEPAD and the APRM initiatives. While regional economic integration is inevitable for Africa‟s self-sustaining socio-economic development, the process in Africa is constrained by political and socio-economic challenges. African governments have failed to implement policies which take into consideration the realities and challenges of the African continent and also the interests of the African populace. Therefore, critical issues that are emphasised, centre on the need for a retrospective consideration of the role of the state and civil society in the African integration process. The concern is that key governance and socio-economic challenges at the

national level which are obstacles to the pursuit of regional integration in Africa need to be addressed. This reflects the central arguments of this study and provides one of the reasons for the focus of this study on the APRM as an initiative of the African Union/NEPAD.

Considering this reality therefore, human capital formation, human capital development and human security issues are critical in the discourse on African economic integration. Africa‟s civil society needs to be empowered towards effective involvement in Africa‟s governance and development processes. For meaningful regional economic and political integration to take place in Africa, "people must be made the focus of the debates and the institutions as well as the processes and policy agenda of the evolving regional integration architecture" (Adejumobi, 2009:403). There is also the need for a collective will of African countries to transcend identified challenges and implement sub-regional and regional programmes at the national level. This is especially the case with respect to assessing the impact of African Union/NEPAD policies, programmes and strategies in addressing the problematic of African economic integration, and contributing to building effective and developmental states that will transform the African continent. These are the issues which constitute the core of this study‟s investigation.

Many studies on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM focus on examining their objectives, policies and programmes as individual initiatives or as joint programmes. Various studies on the AU examine its existing and new policies and programmes as Africa‟s continental institution promoting the goals of integration.[41] Progress in implementation of the AU/NEPAD initiative is analysed.[42] With regard to NEPAD, Motsamai and Zondi, in their Policy Brief, *The social dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa's Development: An analysis*, note that the economic aspect of the initiative has often been emphasised, whereas its role in promoting socio-economic development has been neglected.[43] Moreover, NEPAD has been criticised as a programme motivated by the countries of the West.

Few empirical studies exist which examine the NEPAD and APRM and their roles within the African Union and this is a significant omission considering that governance and development are critical issues for Africa. Particularly, most studies on regional integration in

[41] See, for instance, Landsberg, 2012a:1-11; Adejo, 2011; Sesay, 2011; Dersso, 2012:11-44.
[42] See, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012 (Special issue on the African Union).
[43] See, Motsamai and Zondi, 2010.

Africa examine the problematic issues in the process of implementation of regional objectives. These, thus extend to the AU/NEPAD initiatives. However, this thesis is concerned with the need to proffer constructive solutions to dilemmas of regionalism in Africa. Thus, the study addresses gaps in the literature with the intention of informing policies on the AU/NEPAD and APRM. It examines the problematic of African economic integration from the dimension of governance deficiencies in African countries. It is an empirical study assessing the effectiveness of the APRM in furthering the African Union/NEPAD integration and development agenda.

3.9 Conclusion

Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration is justifiable considering the continent‟s political history and the myriad problems confronting individual African countries. Particularly, such integration is necessary to reposition the continent to take an active part in the globalising world economy. However, African economic integration efforts have continued to suffer several setbacks because African leaders and policy makers have formulated regional integration schemes without addressing key governance and development challenges at the national level in African countries. To a great extent, this shows not only the inseparability of the politics and economics of integration, but also the fact that sub-regional and regional (continental) integration cannot be achieved without addressing key issues of national integration. The concern of this study is to examine on-going efforts of the African Union/NEPAD and APRM in response to the African economic integration problematic. Considering that the emplacement of good governance is critical to the achievement of regional integration objectives in Africa, the study focuses on the APRM.

The next chapter is devoted to an analysis of globalisation and its liberalisation and regionalisation elements. The aim of such analysis is to further establish the dire need for regional economic integration in an era of more intense globalisation.

CHAPTER FOUR

GLOBALISATION, LIBERALISATION AND REGIONALISATION: CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

Globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation became more intense following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and have become contemporary issues of debates and contestations among scholars concerning the global political economic system. As many writers argue, globalisation characterises another era in world history. It depicts a new age with several advancements, challenges and demands that characterise the twenty-first century. While liberalisation and regionalisation are not new phenomena, they are significantly increasing the pace of inter-relationships among nation states. This chapter builds upon the various discourses in previous chapters to examine the issue of globalisation and its elements of liberalisation and regionalisation, how they connect with Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration, the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives. In particular, the chapter addresses one of the research questions namely: what is the position of African political economies within the present international system and how are they shaped by the on-going processes of globalisation, regionalisation and liberalisation? It draws from extant literature and primary data garnered during the field study.

While acknowledging the challenges posed by globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation, this chapter argues that, in order to meet its development needs, Africa will need to continue to embrace the strategy of cooperation and integration. Furthermore, the chapter points to the significant role of leadership, governance and the state in ensuring progress in facilitating Africa‟s integration project and then presents a conclusion to the chapter.

4.2 Globalisation: Defining the concept

Globalisation has become a renowned concept in international relations, yet, it does not have a universally acceptable definition. The concept has been defined by scholars from various disciplines and from different perspectives. Globalisation has not only been perceived

differently by scholars, writers, governments and policy makers in different parts of the developed and developing world; over the years, globalisation also has aroused divergent discourses among scholars. The adjectives – "globality" (Scholte, 1996:44), "globalism" (McGrew, 2014:23), "global village and global market place" (Adejumobi, 2003:3), "shrinking world" (McGrew, 2014:19), "flat world" (Friedman, 2005), "a borderless world" (Manboah, 2000:47; Jilberto and Mommen, 2002:1) -- are used to express the growing "interdependence" and "interconnectedness" among peoples and nations of the world. Globalisation is a concept used to describe the fundamental transformation and changes taking place in the way international relations and interactions frequently take place with varying degrees of speed and difficulties among peoples and nations across national boundaries and in different areas of human activity – political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and military. The causes and implications of global trends and transformations for both developed and developing economies are also captured in globalisation discourses.

Frunza et al (2009:6) assert that:

> From a generic perspective, globalisation expresses the process of expansion of social, economic and political activities across the borders (national, then regional) in such a way that events that occur or decisions that are made in a certain area of the world come to have an impact and influence the lives of people in the other corner of the world".

Globlisation is used to refer to the process of developing contacts and networks among peoples, communities, governments, businesses and institutions across national frontiers (Otobo, 2004:108). Held and McGrew (2007:3) further explain that, globalisation connotes "the intensification, or growing magnitude, of interconnectedness in almost every sphere of social existence".

The process of expanding interactions among peoples and nations is made possible and easy by advances in transport and information and communication technologies, "political and military power, knowledge and skills, as well as interfacing of cultural and value systems and practices" (Nsibambi, 2001:1). Globalisation "is a process integrating not just the economy but culture, technology and governance" (UNDP, 1991:1). It expresses the reality of transfers of policies across national frontiers. Knowledge is transmitted and ideas promoted across

borders (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006:3). This is clear in the promotion of free market economics, liberal democracy, values on governance, and policies on gender and environmental sustainability, among others (Uwa, 2014:270). Globalisation expresses the fact that, "national societies and economies are increasingly interconnected and integrated; regional and global developments heavily impact on any nation"s development" (CUTS and FES, 2007:9).

The idea has been promoted that, the world has become a "global" village in which no state, whether developed or developing, exists in isolation. As a small village, there is a strong linkage between all the countries and also all regions of the world, to the extent that what goes on in individual states cannot be hidden from others. As one respondent aptly puts it "no one state can stand on the side".[44] Issues which are considered to be domestic and exclusive to states are now influenced or shaped by international institutions and events.[45] To this extent, it is becoming difficult for governments, independently or collectively to handle certain issues (OECD, 1996:3). While this has raised concerns that globalisation is increasingly eroding state sovereignty, for some, it may lead to improved governance resulting from free flow of ideas and information among both the government and the governed (OECD, 1996:3).

Whereas globalisation is a multi-faceted concept with political, cultural, environmental and other aspects, the economic dimensions and variables of globalisation are not only emphasised by scholars but have become the focus of scholarly debates (Adebambo, 2002:62; Adejumobi, 2003:2; Otobo 2004:108; Bilas and Franc, 2010:105; Nicolaides and Van der Bank, 2013:56). This, Mubangizi (2010:7) notes, is because globalisation is often wrongly considered in economic terms. Notwithstanding, economic issues are critical to any society, region or continent. Nicolaides and Van der Bank (2013:56) assert, for instance, that globalisation promotes economic integration through the greater openings provided for enhanced passage of goods and services across nations, "investment and labour and increased immigration, exchange of information and ideas". True economic globalisation, according to Kacowicz (1998), "involves a qualitative shift toward a global economic system that is no

[44] Interview with AUC „A", a senior official at the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date of interview: 19 June 2013.

[45] Countries of the world recognise the existence of "international courts, international human rights organisations, international military conventions, international laws, rules and regulations; and there are powerful international lobby and pressure groups in various fields" (Nsibambi, 2001:3).

longer based upon autonomous national economies but relocates production, distribution and consumption of goods in a consolidated global market place".

The advancement in information and communications technology (ICTs) enhances the establishment of linkages thereby promoting increased financial and economic integration (see, Obadan, 2008:15-19). According to the OECD (1996:4), globalisation is "both a cause and a consequence of the information revolution". A positive outcome is that the spread of factors of development such as technological advancements can be taken advantage of by individuals, groups, institutions and countries in different parts of the world, much more rapidly and much more quickly.[46] There are also new challenges which confront individuals, groups and nation-states which are fall-outs of globalisation. The tendency toward integration in the global economy is depicted in that the significance attached to "rising world trade and capital flows as an increasingly large share of world GDP is generated in activities linked directly or indirectly to international trade" (Uwa, 2014:270).

Nevertheless, while the definitions of globalisation over the years, in some respects indicate positive developments and progress, other definitions speak of exploitation, instability and underdevelopment (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006:3). Such discourses are reflected in the various theoretical explanations of globalisation which include those of the liberal, realist, Marxist and post-colonialschools of thought.[47] In short, globalisation has spawned a great deal of scholarly debate and disagreement. Omotola (2010a:25) notes that, the definition of globalisation is "value loaded". The developed countries of the North perceive globalisation as "a driving force for the transformation of global economy whose implication for development would be positive particularly for the third world" (Omotola, 2010a:25). This argument does not take into consideration the several challenges which globalisation has created and intensified for the state in the South. For Olaoluwa (2012:132), globalisation "is not a neutral term or social phenomenon". Global processes have been exploited by the Western industrialised powers for ideological purposes and to maintain their effective cultural and economic control (Olaoluwa, 2012:132). As Kacowicz (1998) observes, globalisation reveals the "triumph of US values, through the combined agenda of neo-liberalism in economics and political democracy".

[46] Interview with NIIA 1, a top level official at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria. Date of interview: 31 January 2014.

[47] For details on theoretical explanations of globalisation, see, Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014:2-13.

Nsibambi (2001:2) asserts that, while it is important to identify the opportunities provided by globalisation which could be exploited for developmental purposes, it should be noted also that there are negative outcomes, particularly for developing countries of Africa. Globalisation is referred to by many as a new process occurring in the global economy, however, other scholars note that the world has previously witnessed different phases of globalisation. According to Nicolaides and Van der Bank (2013:54), globalisation has been considered as the continuation of an old process which began "five decades ago with the advent of European colonialism". The present era of globalisation began during the 1980s; another was witnessed during the 1950s and 1960s while the previous phase took place during the years before the World War II (Oman, 1996:5; see also, Nicolaides and Van der Bank, 2013:54-55). One argument in this respect is that "globalisation is only a generic form of capitalism, and does not represent anything new" (Adejumobi, 2003:4). Adejumobi puts it aptly that, "globalisation is only a phase in the trajectory of capitalist development" (2003:4). However, Oman (1996:7-18), Adejumobi (2003:4; 12-19), Akokpari (2001:191-194), Ascani et al (2012:3-19), Frunza et al (2009:5-13) and other scholars identify that globalisation as presently experienced differs significantly from earlier periods. As such, governments must take into consideration the specificities of this period in the formulation of policy.

Globalisation in this present period is marked with greater emphasis on progressively integrating countries into the world economy; accelerating pace of technological development; by trade liberalisation and by growing significance accorded to global institutions and global rules (Mrak, 2000:1). There are qualitative changes in "global political, legal and economic relations" (Nicolaides and Van der Bank, 2013:54). Reflecting on the position of states on the one hand, and on the other hand, the roles performed by the World Bank, IMF and WTO, and the activities of multinational corporations, globalisation today could be viewed as a new process with novel developments, demands, and new sets of challenges (Nicolaides and Van der Bank, 2013:54).

The discourses outlined in this chapter reveal that globalisation is a controversial concept which sometimes arouses widely differering views among scholars. These debates are germane and critical to this study. Therefore, taking together the definitions and views of different scholars, and in order to present a political-economic analysis of globalisation, based on the argument in this study, the economic aspect of globalisation will be emphasised.

Analysis will not however be restricted to the economic aspect as there are other political issues which are relevant to the study. Hence, the study is guided by a reasonably straightforward definition such as that of Oman (1996:5) which summarises the elements of globalisation, viz:

> Globalisation is the growth, or more precisely the accelerated growth, of economic activity across national and regional political boundaries. It finds expression in the increased movement of tangible and intangible goods and services, including ownership rights via trade and investment, and often of people via migration. It can be and is facilitated by a lowering of government impediments to that movement, and/or by technological progress notably in transportation and communications. The actions of individual economic actors, firms, banks, people, drive it, usually in the pursuit of profit, often spurred by the pressures of competition. Globalisation is thus a centrifugal process, a process of economic outreach and a microeconomic phenomenon.

4.3 The dynamics of globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation

Globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation are significant forces influencing and shaping the nature and patterns of interactions and inter-relationships of states in the international arena. Although these phenomena are defined differently, they have areas of convergence and divergence and there are aspects in which these concepts overlap. Some scholars however debate the extent to which globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation are complementary concepts. This is especially the case when analysing the processes of globalisation and the benefits and challenges specific to developing African economies. Moreover, regional integration arrangements are established for particular political and socio-economic motives which may not be promoted by globalisation. Thus, the view of Kacowitz (1998) is that globalisation and regionalisation should not be examined independently from each other or from a "perspective of either convergence or divergence".

Globalisation and liberalisation, as the previous section highlighted, are related concepts. The concern of this section is to examine how these concepts coalesce and in which areas they differ. The examination is undertaken in light of the overall objectives of this chapter, namely: to examine the challenges posed by globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation for African political economies; to analyse their policy implications and how these concepts intersect with Africa"s quest for regional economic integration.

Globalisation is viewed as a process linked with the neo-liberal economic and political ideology which achieved dominance as the Cold War came to an end in the 1990s (Kacowicz, 1998; Akokpari, 2001:190-191; Adebambo, 2002:62; Adejumobi, 2003:3). Akokpari (2001:190) notes that, before the Cold War came to an end, globalisation and its neo-liberal doctrines were already pronounced. However, neo-liberalism could not be forced on Third World Countries as a result of the bi-polar nature of the international system prevailing at that period. One aspect of neo-liberalism is economic liberalisation. Globalisation, in the view of Haggard (1991:II), refers to the progressive liberalisation of the global trading arrangement. Globalisation opens up many opportunities for nations and people all over the world to benefit, through liberal policies, from expanded trade, improved transport, new communication technologies, and foreign investments, among others, in order to promote development (UNDP, 1999:1). Advocates of the neo-liberal ideology view economic liberalisation as necessary to promote political democracy (Kacowicz, 1998).

Jilberto and Mommen (2002:2) state that, globalisation "is driven by a widespread push towards the liberalisation of trade and capital markets". While globalisation advances "trade liberalisation, free capital mobility, privatisation, commercialisation and the empowerment of transnational corporations (TNCs)" (Ikeme, 2001), liberalisation advances a free market economy and advocates little or no state controls in the finance, trade and production sectors (Nicolaides and Van der Bank, 2013:55; Jilberto and Mommen, 2002:2; Otobo, 2004:111; Bilas and Franc, 2010:106). As Bilas and Franc (2010:106) assert, "the concept of globalisation and opening to the world assumes that every country is connected to other countries; deepening of those relations and building mutual cooperation". Since the 1980s, therefore, there has been record increase in volumes of international trade and capital mobility across countries which have significantly impacted on the regulatory role of nation states concerning such flows (Ascani et al, 2012:3).

Globalisation, Mrak (2000:1) notes, "has exposed national economies to much more intense competition than ever before". This is such that the process of "deeper" integration of all economies which globalisation promotes requires nations to sustain a "liberal trade and investment regime" (Jilberto and Mommen 2002:2). However, while the liberal trade approach benefits the developed industrialised nations, it poses various challenges to developing countries particularly in Africa (Akokpari, 2001:189-195). Thus, the proliferation of regional economic organisations in different parts of the developed and developing world

from the 1980s has been linked to efforts by governments and policy makers to enhance opportunities for countries to exploit the opportunities and cope with the challenges of globalisation. One respondent underscored the point that, "globalisation has narrowed the geographical and social divide among peoples and nations of the world consequently, compelling regional integration and development; otherwise, a continent that lags behind could be submerged and become more underdeveloped.[48] Considering the above assertions, the view has also been articulated that, globalisation promotes regionalisation and that regionalisation is a response to globalisation (see, Kacowicz, 1998; Mwasha, 2008:71; Frunza et al, 2009:12; Frunzeti, 2011:6-8).

Regionalisation has been defined from different perspectives to reflect the changing motives of regionalisms in contemporary global economy.[49] One perspective of regionalisation is that put forward by Lamberte (2004:4) as, "market integration spurred by unilateral reforms in individual economies within a particular region in the area of trade of investment". On the other hand, Frunzeti (2011:5-6), asserts that, "regionalisation refers mainly to increased connections and interdependencies that develop between countries within a specific region such as North America, Europe," Africa, and others. Regionalisation, Frunzeti (2011:5-6) notes, "as a dynamic process, may be best explained as a continuous formation process of regions as geopolitical units, as an organised political cooperation within a group of states or as regional communities such as pluralistic security communities". For Oman (1996:5-6), regionalisation "can be a *de jure* phenomenon driven by political forces that are motivated by security, economic or other concerns, or it can be a *de facto* outcome driven by the same microeconomic forces that drive globalisation".

Globalisation aligns with Modernisation Theory and promotes the market integration paradigm which emphasises trade and open regionalism. Open regionalism advances trade liberalisation which entails that regional integration arrangements are outward oriented, tailored towards meeting the demands of the global economy. Based on the propositions of the market integration theory (which have been discussed in detail in chapter two of this study), regional organisations would be able to exploit the opportunities offered by globalisation with the appropriate structures and policies in place. These include: the

[48] Interview with AUC B, a senior official at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date: 5 August 2013.
[49] See definitions on regionalism as presented in chapter two, section 2.2.

economic benefits that accrue through fostering inter-regional and inter-continental cooperation, creating bigger markets, building partnerships and establishing collaborative ventures across the developed and developing world. It is the comparative advantage which African countries derive from the supply of raw materials that perhaps provides one of the rationales for engaging in international trade (Adejumobi, 2003:12).

Regional institutions provide avenues through which countries could be effectively organised to attract investments, join efforts to address internal challenges to effective intra-regional and inter-regional trade relations, and collectively bargain in international economic relations (Mwasha, 2008:78; Frunza et al, 2009:7; Frunzeti 2011:8). Policies could be harmonised at the regional levels with reference to enabling global rules as they affect inter-regional economic relations (Frunza et al, 2009:7; Frunzeti, 2011:8). Haggard (1991:II) argues that, since economic globalisation hastens the steps toward the creation of regional economic institutions, and to the extent that regionalisation emphasises economic liberalisation, the concepts are compatible. Regionalisation becomes complementary to or a component of globalisation. This perhaps explains the motive for open regionalism from the period of the 1980s. One respondent argues that:

> From a positive perspective, globalisation, in as much as it talks about the era of a global village, it still recognises the importance of global blocs, because for instance, Africa‟s regional integration has been essentially an attempt to mimic European integration experience, so, globalisation to a great extent, does not discourage regional integration, if anything, regional integration blocs could be seen as building blocks to the global village agenda, if one can speak in those terms.[50]

The view of Alden and Phelps (1999:270) is that regionalisation performs a "mediating role" in promoting globalisation. For Lao Kam Chio (2008:70), "regionalisation can be seen as a stopover in the globalisation process or it may be considered an integral part of globalisation". The explanation would be that regional integration enhances business efficiency and promotes competitiveness of national economies in the global market. This is one way to enhance multilateral cooperation at the global level (Kacowicz, 1998). Regionalisation can motivate the reforms which are necessary requisites in a global economy. For its part, liberalisation is considered a "force" in the regionalisation process that assists

[50] Interview with ECA 1, a senior official at the Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date: 18 June 2013.

countries in committing resources to areas where they will profit more (Jilberto and Mommen, 2002:8-9).

In some cases, globalisation and regionalisation are considered not to be mutually reinforcing concepts. As Lao Kam Chio (2008:69) opines, regionalisation has been considered by some critics as "anti-globalisation" since the emphasis on geographical differences and historical ties does not align with the future goals of globalisation. Also, Regional Integration Arrangements could be instruments to respond to or challenge global rules in favour of regional interest (see, Kacowicz, 1998). RIAs which are inward oriented and protectionist are a challenge to liberalisation (Alden and Phelps, 1999:270). As such, RIAs may "divert trade and investment" (Jilberto and Mommen, 2002:8-9).

For its part, globalisation opposes regionalisation when regional cooperation agreements entered into by some states of the developed and developing world become detrimental to regional economic integration efforts in the developing regions. Although globalisation may encourage the establishment of joint efforts of states, it also triggers "individualistic tendencies" among developed member states in a RIA. For instance, such states may decide to put national interests before the regional collective interests in promoting trade liberalisation (Akokpari, 2001:201). This point relates especially to RIAs in Africa. Respondent ECA [1] notes:

> There are some forms of engagements that pose serious challenges to regional integration. For instance, if one considers the way Africa has engaged with regional blocs, the most classic case in point which is the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that were recently concluded by the European Union with some regional blocs on the continent; the EPAs – mapping of the continent does not match the regional communities that are on the ground in Africa, so there is this tension at some point.[51]

Looking at globalisation from this angle, scholars recall third world countries' experience of colonialism; neo-colonialism; the nature and workings of the international economic system; and the consequences of trade liberalisation policies for these countries.[52] Globalisation, for Omotola (2010b:107), is "nothing more than a re-colonisation process of third world countries". As one respondent explains:

[51] Interview with ECA 1 at the Economic Commission for Africa. Date: 18 June 2013.
[52] These issues form part of the discourses in chapter three. See, sections 3.2 and 3.3.

> Globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation are aspects of the advanced state of capitalism in the 21st century. The latter (regionalism) facilitates the operation of capital on a regional scale. The very ideology of capitalism and its rules of engagement are designed to maximise global profits of owners of capital and not advance the welfare of the majority of poor workers and producers, most of whom are located in developing countries. This creates a huge challenge for most African economies, as they are unable to reform the rules of engagement in a manner that can benefit African critical economies.[53]

Whether globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation are opposing or complementary concepts is a subject of scholarly debate. However, there is also the argument that their processes should be seen as "parallel and overlapping" (Kacowicz, 1998; Lao Kam Chio, 2008:70; Frunza et al, 2009:12; Frunzeti, 2011:7). The explanation is that we cannot speak about a global community without considering that the world is made up of regions. One of the major differences that could be raised between these concepts is that for globalisation, liberalisation occurs at a global scale while it occurs on a smaller scale in the case of regionalisation (Frunza et al, 2009:12). The concern is that the world is witnessing more intense globalisation to the extent that events that occur in one part of the world have implications for other parts. This concern could be extended to an assertion that while globalisation has offered opportunities which nations could exploit for the purpose of development, it has also engendered various difficulties which require regional, and in most cases global solutions. Many scholars and commentators argue in favour of globalisation, in support of the advantages which it affords for nation-states (see, Mubangizi, 2009:6; Evbuomwan, 2007:40). Their conclusion would then be that since globalisation has increased global competitiveness and transformed the world economy, it is the most compelling means for development (Mubangizi, 2010:8). On the other hand, the disadvantages of globalisation are also mentioned such as: environmental degradation, the spread of various forms of diseases; international crime; human smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism, among others (OECD, 1996:5; Nsibambi, 2001:2).

Notably, there are scholars and writers who would point to the severe political and socio-economic instability caused by globalisation particularly in developing African countries (see, Akokpari, 2001:188-189; Amuwo, 2002:67-68; Adejumobi, 2003:5-6; Glynn-Broderick et al, 2007:12-13; Olutayo and Omobowale, 2007:105-106; Asogwa, 2011:5-7; Mubangizi,

[53] Interview schedule completed by RP1of the University of Nairobi, Kenya. Date: 12 December 2012.

2010:5). Respondent NIIA [1] notes however that, "by and large, globalisation, especially economic globalisation, is something the underdeveloped world can take advantage of once they have the right structures and policies in place to take advantage of economic growth in various parts of the world and domesticate them".[54] The process of globalisation incorporates economic decision making which encompasses issues such as consumption, investment and savings across the globe (Nkurayija, 2011:12-13). It is a process of creating a common "marketplace" accessible to all individuals and nations of the world (Nkurayija, 2011:12-13; Oke and Ajayi, 2012:346).

While considering the merits of the different scholarly positions, this study argues that globalisation is a phenomenon with dual impacts. It offers a combination of opportunities and difficulties for the political, social and economic development of countries, particularly in the developing world such as Africa. It is therefore important that countries position themselves to exploit the opportunities and benefits and manage the challenges of globalisation. This would require the formulation of strategic policy and institutional frameworks. On the other hand, liberalisation and regionalisation is seen in this study to have both positive and negative consequences for Africa‟s development. The issue of concern is that, many years after independence, Africa still lags behind in terms of socio-economic development. African countries, individually or through their regional groupings are involved in intra-regional, intra-African and inter-continental trade and other economic relations. Yet, the continent has remained underdeveloped and marginalised in the international system.

Nevertheless, the African Union/NEPAD initiatives represent African leaders‟ latest efforts towards achieving the goals of integration and promoting socio-economic development in Africa in the twenty-first century. Through their APRM initiative, the African Union/NEPAD expect to address the political, social and economic challenges at the national level in African countries and promote improved strong economic policies in order to reposition the countries to individually and collectively exploit the benefits of the global economy.

The divergent discourses on globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation are necessary for this study which advances Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration as envisioned by the African Union/NEPAD, APRM initiatives. This is particularly so because the

[54] Interview with NIIA 1 at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria. Date: 31 January 2014.

AU/NEPAD and APRM were formulated in response to the forces of globalisation. These initiatives embody essential elements such as good governance, peace, security, and stability as preconditions for successful integration and development in Africa. This is the rationale for employing a combination of theories: Market integration: trade and open regionalism, functionalism/neo-functionalism and neo-realism to guide this study. While the AU/NEPAD advances market integration, trade and open regionalism, they also focus on putting in place effective national and regional governance mechanisms and policies to foster national, sub-regional, regional integration and socio-economic development. The governance aspect of the integration and development agenda is handled by the APRM. Functionalist/neo-functionalist theory supports the role of individuals, interest groups and institutions in promoting the integration process and this aligns with the dynamics of globalisation.

Neo-realist theory, which is also utilised by this research, identifies that the state remains a rational actor in Africa‟s integration and development processes. The combination of these theories enables a thorough analysis of the problematics of African economic integration vis-à-vis the demands and challenges posed by globalisation and the role of individuals, groups and institutions in addressing these challenges.

4.4 Globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation: Challenges for Africa

Data obtained from interviews conducted and a review of extant literature reveal that, globalisation and the economic liberalisation it promotes have implications for the political and socio-economic development of developing countries, especially for those in the poorer group. Consequently, the current trend of regionalisation, to the extent that it relies extensively on the process of economic liberalisation, also generates the same issues as the processes of globalisation (Haggard, 1991:6).

The view commonly expressed is that, although globalisation has its numerous benefits, these benefits are enjoyed by the developed industrialised countries which already have developed and competitive economies (see Manboah, 2000:60-66; Akokpari 2001:191; Amuwo, 2002:69; Adejumobi, 2003:5 and 12; Asogwa, 2011:6; Mubangizi, 2010-8-9). These countries dictate the rules and pace of global economic relations. Developing countries of the third world, which are lagging behind in terms of economic development and information technology tend to experience more challenges than developed countries in coping with the

demands of globalisation (see, Ikeme, 2001; Adejumobi, 2003:5-6; Evbuomwan, 2007:41-42; Asogwa, 2011:5-7; Mubangizi, 2010:9; Olaoluwa, 2012:137-138). However, while acknowledging these setbacks, it nonetheless is instructive to note that the processes of globalisation also provide opportunities which all nations could explore. For instance, some developing economies have exploited the globalisation process to their advantage exemplifying what some dependency theorists have termed "dependent development". Countries such as South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India and Mauritius have made progress by identifying and targeting their roles within the global system. While it is argued that globalisation does not favour all countries, the fact that some developing countries are benefiting from the process poses several challenges for African political economies.

Scholarly discourses on globalisation have focused on the opportunities which it has created for states to promote economic growth and development on the one hand, and the disadvantages and negative consequences on the third world countries on the other. Globalisation affects all aspects of the socio-economic development of third world countries to the extent that, according to Asogwa (2011:3), "the third world, especially African countries perception of globalisation is that of a dangerous process that increases inequality within and among states; a process which increases poverty and sustains disempowerment of the weak".

Olaoluwa (2012:131) substantiates these points clearly by arguing that, the challenges of globalisation and its trends of liberalisation and regionalisation are revealed when an analysis is made of the world capitalist system, the workings of multinational corporations; the processes of the IMF, World Bank and the functioning of the WTO. He is supported by Mubangizi (2010:8-10) who writes about the SAPs of the IMF and World Bank and development in Africa. In the context of the neo-liberal market economy, globalisation stresses such economic policies as: "de-subsidisation, liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, reduction or cancellation of state regulations on the market" among others (Egbulem et al, 2012:273). As Malhotra et al, (2003:66) opine, those who support globalisation emphasise the policy and institutional reforms which countries must institute to increase international trade and attract foreign investments. Malhotra et al, argue that the supporters of globalisation confuse means with ends. Trade is a "tool for achieving societal goals: prosperity, stability, freedom and better quality of life and should not therefore be seen

as an end in itself" (Malhotra et al (2003:66). Corroborating these assertions, Mubangizi (2010:9-10) argues that the objectives of globalisation completely differ from development goals.

The neo-liberal approach does not take into due consideration the shortcomings and negative consequences of market forces for socio-economic development. Globalisation, despite its associated benefits, does not account for the characteristics and workings of the existing international economic order which benefit the developed industrialised countries to the detriment of the developing countries. In addition, globalisation does not reckon with internal political and socio-economic challenges which confront African countries – challenges complicated by globalisation. Again, African countries are faced with the challenge of improving their systems of governance, putting in place effective institutions and structures and implementing strong policies to benefit from the globalisation process. The success story of the Asian Tigers and China which have established economic interactions with the rest of the world and are developing rapidly may be useful examples for African countries to emulate.

The concern of this study is that despite nearly two decades of Africa‟s openness to trade and constant economic relations with other countries outside the continent, it has remained slow in its development trajectory. Notwithstanding that some development policies are based on the neo-liberal principles promoted by the international financial institutions - World Bank and the IMF -- the continent is still lagging far behind in almost all indices of development. Africa‟s situation could be attributable in some instances to certain critical governance-related problems such as poor policy implementation, corruption, incessant conflicts, and lack of consistency which mark particular governments and leadership transitions. To this extent, the growth rates experienced in some African countries have not been consistent as such countries fall back to stagnant growth or development after specific shocks internal to themselves. However, there appears to be compelling grounds for claims that exogenous factors critically contribute to Africa‟s persistent underdevelopment and that openness retards the development of the region given its largely uncompetitive and dysfunctional political economies.

Basically, African states are highly "fragmented states", with weak and "extroverted economies" (Varela, 1980:37; see also, Matthews, 2003:XII; Mwasha, 2008:77; Satgar,

2009:41; OSAA, 2010:31; Olaoluwa, 2012:135). The concern has been expressed in previous chapters that majority of the African population live in poverty (MDG Report, see UN, 2014:9). According to the World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics, 2014, "the principal cause of poverty and hunger is the ordinary operation of economic and political systems in the world. Essentially, control over resources and income is based on military, political and economic power that typically ends up in the hands of a minority who live well, while those at the bottom barely survive, if they do"[55]

Most African countries still lag behind in terms of human resource development as their educational infrastructure bases are yet to be developed (Boah-Boateng, 2013:32-35). For instance, according to a UNESCO Report 2009-2014,

> 38% of African adults (some 153 millions) are illiterate; two thirds of these are women. Africa is the only continent where more than half of parents are not able to help their children with homework due to illiteracy...Only 1% of national education budget of most African governments is earmarked to address the issue of illiteracy.[56]

As in some other parts of the world, diseases in various parts of Africa which are preventable "through proper and adequate education and proper hygiene" impose huge burdens on African economies (Shah Anup, 2009). In the case of Africa, however, such diseases become especially pronounced as a result of the poor capacity to address health related issues. As a result, diseases that occur or begin elsewhere in non-African countries often impose major impacts on African communities. The latter is due to the fact that Africa has dependent scientific and medical culture that lacks the capacity to address health issues without reference to the West. Most universities in African countries are poorly funded and are rudderless with regard to the need to focus on addressing important local issues.

According to the information provided by the Global Health – Division of Parasitic Diseases and Malaria -- "91% of deaths from malaria in 2010 were in the African region...Direct cost of treating the malaria epidemic was estimated at least to be US$12 billion per year. The cost

[55] See, 2014 World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics, World Hunger Education Service. Available, www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world hunger facts 2002.htm. (Accessed: 9 February 2015).
[56] UNESCO Report (2009-2014). Available: www.unesco.org/new/en/dakar/education/illiteracy. (Accessed: 9 February 2015).

in lost economic growth is many times more than that".[57] HIV/AIDS is a major health problem in Africa (UNAIDS, 2011:7). The estimated number of adults and children living with HIV in the world, 2013, is highest for Africa (see figure 4.1, p.125). Poor living conditions and the lack of access to basic social amenities and services such as clean water and adequate sanitation have resulted in decreased health systems (Anup, 2009).

Figure 4.1: Number of Adults and children estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS 2013.



Source: UNAIDS. Available at: www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_ asset/01_Epi_ slides_ 2014July.pdf. (Accessed: 12 February 2015).

In addition to these challenges, a concerning issue in Africa is the lack of adequate human capital and modern technology to promote economic growth and development (Greve, 1980:26-28; Oshikoya and Hussain, 1998:9; Ogbu, 2004:1-5). According to Ogbu (2004:1), lack of adequate investment in science and technology has left Africans as consumers of technology. Ogbu notes that, "only 1% of patents registered in the United States Patent and Trademarks Office originate from Sub-Saharan Africa and that Sub-Saharan Africa has 113 researchers per million population compared to China‟s 554, India‟s 151, and NICs‟ 595" (2004:1-2). Yet, African leaders have formulated several development plans emphasising their commitment to the development of science and technology in the continent without effective implementation (Ogbu, 2004:2). There is constantly, the issue of brain drain as many professionals in Africa (particularly in the medical sector) migrate to other developed

[57] See Centres for Diseases Control and Prevention, CDC 24/7: Saving lives, Protecting People. U.S.A, 26 March 2014. (Accessed: 9 February 2015).

countries for lack of enabling environment to realise their potential (Shah Anup, 2009). This, too, negatively affects the continent‟s development.

The intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Africa (whatever their causes) and associated political instability and insecurity they breed, are concerning factors (Aremu, 2010:549-560; Karel, 2012:49-56). Conflicts impact negatively on national, sub-regional and regional integration and development (see, Evbuomwan, 2007:43; Aremu, 2010:554-556). Conflicts also limit the opportunities available for African countries to attract foreign investments. Considering the level of challenges confronting the African continent, therefore, the view of many is that globalisation poses several challenges for African political economies. Manboah (2000:60) states pointedly that, "the ideals of globalisation just like all other socio-economic projects of the West, neither understands nor addresses the African reality".

On the other side of the discourse, Greve (1980:24-27) as well as Boaduo (2008) draw attention to the fact that Africa has remained in the export of primary commodities rather than manufactured goods which is a major impediment not only to industrial development but also to development of self-reliant and self-sustaining economic systems that are less susceptible to fluctuations in the world market. Another aspect of this challenge is that the vulnerability of Africa‟s economies to changes in the global market is made worse by "the fact that a large number of them are based on a single major commodity" (Greve, 1980:24-27). Hence, with these challenges, the continent is not poised to compete in the world market neither would it benefit immensely from globalisation.

One of the criticisms of globalisation therefore, is that of transforming the world into a global market for goods and services produced and distributed by the dominant multinational corporations of countries of the West which are concerned with profit maximisation and promoting the capitalist agenda (Mubangizi, 2010:9). Liberalisation, one respondent notes, is more contentious. Liberalisation, especially de-regulation of custom restrictions on imported manufactured products and food items destroys Africa‟s infant industries and agricultural sectors. Globalisation and liberalisation have exposed Africa to global competition.[58] Another respondent notes however, that some writers argue that, the rationalisation of efficiencies in markets lead to better choices and more disposable income for consumers, which ultimately -

[58] Interview with RP2, of the United States International University, Nairobi, Kenya. Date of interview: 20 June 2013.

especially in the shortrun -- is beneficial to the economy as a whole as it gets rid of inefficient industries/producers and enhances the competitiveness of viable industries.[59] On the other hand, the previous respondent (RP2) observes that, privatisation and de-regulation of the mining sectors aggravate expatriate domination of Africa‟s economies and its correlated problems of tax avoidance and capital flight.[60]

The general opinion expressed by the International Forum on Globalisation (IFG, 2002) is that, "globalisation and liberalisation have led to de-industrialisation, increased unemployment and growing poverty, and reinforced Africa‟s role in the global economy as suppliers of cheap raw materials and labour". Thus, a respondent notes that "globalisation and liberalisation have also deepened Africa‟s external indebtedness. Following the continent‟s inability to industrialise and rather importing many of the things it could produce locally, Africa has consequently become heavily indebted with its various implications for integration and development".[61] African economies are also susceptible to external shocks such as the financial crises in America and Europe.[62] In the same vein, regionalisation which is also promoting economic liberalisation has not led to Africa‟s development. Hence, as Ayangafac (2008:167) notes, "Africa is locked in the vicious cycle of globalisation causing underdevelopment which, in turn, serves to entrench globalisation. Liberalism has exposed Africa‟s natural resources to huge capital, which does not usually have the continent‟s social welfare at heart". Adedeji (2002:8) highlights that:

> One of the tragic consequences of the perennial economic and political crises of the 1980s -- Africa‟s lost decade -- is that the dawn of the new era of globalisation which began in the 1980s met the African economy and polity virtually on their back. They were caught by the forces of globalisation, of information technology, new and more advanced communications technology, marketisation, internationalisation of the financial markets and the hegemony of transnational corporations as players in production and factor movements – in a complete state of helplessness and hopelessness.

Emphasising the negative consequences of the neo-liberal perspective, one respondent emphasises unreservedly:

[59] Interview with EISA 1, a senior official of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Date of interview: 9 October 2013.
[60] Interview with RP2. Date: 20 June 2013.
[61] Interview with RP3 of the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Date: 19 March 2014.
[62] Interview schedule completed by Doctoral Candidate 1, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Date: 18 September 2013.

> I don‟t see any neo-liberal agenda today. It has already defeated itself. It has failed in America; it has failed in Europe. Government is now involved in the development process. Just see the way all the governments are subsidising banks. How much is agriculture being subsidised in Europe? How much is government contributing to education? Go and see how many people have no money but who are being attended to in hospitals in Britain and we cannot talk about Belgium that was able to function for more than a year without any government in place but the system of welfare is functioning very well because they couldn‟t care less. Those are signs and indices that it is quite clear that the neo-liberal system, the pure neo-liberal system has collapsed. You cannot leave everything to the free market, once the market must be regulated.[63]

With reference specifically to the African situation, the respondent states that the neo-liberal agenda advocated by the Western industrialised countries for Africa is meant to further impoverish the continent and keep the continent in a perpetually subservient condition. He articulates the point that:

> The same developed industrialised countries are the same people that „killed‟ the Lagos Plan of Action. They killed the LPA because LPA didn‟t recognise the role of the Europeans and Americans in running the economy of Africa. They set the Berg Commission. Africans can make plans, but because they have no money, they have to go back to Europe and America, clapping hands, begging again. So, the issue of corruption has been sustained because of the so-called international market…Look, who are the people buying all the oil in Africa? Oil bunkering is being done by who?[64]

The view of respondent EISA [1] aligns with the perspective in this study. According to this respondent, globalisation is unavoidable, and therefore needs to be managed at the policy and strategic levels by the state, whilst liberalisation should be the ultimate objective of any African economy. But, the process of liberalisation in an economy should be phased in over an appropriate period of time, as the economy absorbs the consequences of liberalised economies.[65]

It is instructive to note, however, that one of the consequences of globalisation and liberalisation is their considerable effect on the regulatory functions performed by the state

[63] Interview with JDPC 1, a top level official at the Justice, Development and Peace Commission, Lagos, Nigeria. Date of interview: 4 February 2013.
[64] Interview with JDPC 1. Date: 4 February 2013.
[65] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.

(Ascani et al, 2012:3). By contrast with the post-World War II era, globalisation is systematically diminishing the functions of the state and its various institutions (Ascani et al, 2012:3). The lack of strong regulation of the economy by the state affects not only the political and socio-economic development of African countries but also the capacity and independence of their governments to provide for the needs of their populations (Mubangizi, 2010:5-6; Olaoluwa, 2012:137). As respondent RP3 points out:

> The typical African state is weakened under globalisation and easily falls prey to rebels. In a great number of countries, the state is scarcely in control. It is increasingly unable to perform some of the basic functions of a state – delivering social services, providing security and employment; and defending its core values. The state has also become too dependent on extra-African actors, losing its already tenuous sovereignty in the process and losing the ability to make critical decisions on development.[66]

These weaknesses of most states in Africa, including lack of effective leadership and poor governance, are major causes of several socio-economic and political problems in the continent. The view of another respondent (RP2), corroborates these assertions:

> The developed countries take advantage of globalisation and the poor economic and development conditions on the continent to poach African highly skilled labour. On the other hand, Africans working in the Diaspora contribute to human development and economic growth in their home countries through remittances and financial transfers. Remittances from the Diaspora have their own downside because they have been linked to funding Islamist terrorism and ethno-political insurgencies in various African states.[67]

The reality is that Africa is seriously challenged and marginalised in a globalised world not only because of the external factors constraining its developmental efforts, but also because it lacks the institutional and structural mechanisms necessary to cope with the demands of globalisation (Akokpari, 2001:188 and 204; Adejumobi, 2003:2 and 11-12; Evbuomwan, 2007:41-43; Asogwa, 2011:6). While this study argues in line with several scholarly contributions on the negative implications of globalisation for Africa‟s development, it also aims to establish that most of the complex situations in which Africa finds itself could be addressed through effective and visionary leadership, good governance, and the formation of

[66] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March 2014.
[67] Interview with RP2. Date: 20 June 2013.

articulate and appropriate economic policies. Analysing the discourse from a political-economic perspective, the focus of this study is to examine the contributions of the African Union/NEPAD, through their APRM initiatives in addressing key issues on governance and socio-development in Africa. To this extent, the study is also interested in examining the opportunities created and the advantages of globalisation which could be exploited in furtherance of the AU/NEPAD and APRM agenda.

One of the concerns of this study, for instance, is that Africa‟s enormous human, natural and material resources have not been effectively planned, exploited, and managed not only to achieve needed development but also to enable the continent to play a more active role within the international political economy. Moreover, Africa‟s development initiatives are yet to align with the needs and challenges of the continent as well as the interests of its growing population. Development initiatives are yet to impact on a majority of African citizens who are supposed to drive development processes in Africa. African governments are yet to address seriously issues of human development, human capital formation and human capital development which are crucial in the continent‟s development agenda. Thus, the question remains: how can African countries hope to prosper and survive in an increasingly globalising world, characterised by advancement in technology and knowledge and information driven?

The fact that globalisation is a phenomenon that cannot be stopped and has brought with it new actors, and new trends, and challenges for nation states, brings to the fore the urgent need to address the African development problematic in order for the continent to reverse its marginalised position and play active roles in the international system. One respondent underscored the point that, "for Africa to compete effectively in the global community, the continent must have the capacity, leadership transformation skills, and ability to unlock the skills of its human capital and be able also to continually assess what is being done".[68] However, another respondent noted pessimistically:

> The challenge is a lack of preparedness on Africa‟s part. We are not prepared because we still have a legacy of believing that our salvation lies outside our continent....How can you place yourself comfortably in a globalised world when you are not independent? We have to consolidate our own way of doing

[68] Interview with NEPAD 1, a senior official at the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency, Midrand, South Africa. Date of interview: 2 July, 2013.

> things first before seeking assistance. Most of the time, our governments are over-dependent on foreign forces. As long as this trend continues, we would remain like slaves in the international system.[69]

Emphasising the positive benefits of globalisation for Africa, the respondent noted:

> Globalisation presents a good opportunity for us to sell what we have and what we have is massive. We have enormous resources that many regions of the world cannot compare with us. If you look at our countries and their wealth in resources, for instance, if you take the Democratic Republic of Congo; you take Guinea, you take Cameroon, you take Nigeria, you take South Africa, you take Angola, you can take any of these countries, even Sudan or Ethiopia. All these countries have great potential. Some have started developing those potential, and it is encouraging. The new emerging countries like those who have managed to have high growth rates like Ethiopia, like Rwanda, like Ghana are good examples to emulate. But why can we not develop our potential? That is where I come to governance. There is nothing like governance without vision and vision is provided by leadership. If you have clear leadership and you have clear vision, you will get somewhere. We saw this from the example of the Asian Tigers...[70]

4.5 Globalisation: The imperative of African economic integration

While globalisation discourses emphasise the role of the market, individuals, interest groups, and institutions in promoting economic growth and exploiting the benefits of its processes, the above analysis has shown that, with the political and socio-economic challenges confronting Africa, the state should be involved and play an active role in the development process. Development, as Stiglitz (2006:26) asserts, is the product of an all-inclusive process involving every aspect of society - the market, government, non-governmental institutions, and the private sector. The NICs of Asia typically exemplified how the different groups in society jointly achieve development goals. The East Asian NICs adopted the „developmental state" model which had worked well for Japan (Milward, 2013:7).

Central to this model is "the policy of infant industry and agricultural protectionism, allowing growth to arise initially from domestic demand; only when industries were established and able to compete on the world market were subsidies and protective tariffs reduced"(Milward,

[69] Interview with AUC C, a senior management official at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date of interview: 17 June 2013.
[70] Interview with AUC C. Date: 17 June, 2013.

2013:7).[71] However, considering the prevailing conditions in Africa, African states (as they are presently constituted) would not benefit immensely from globalisation. Primarily, this is not only because of their globally non-competitive structural and institutional weaknesses, but also due to the productive inefficiencies within their manufacturing and services industries.

Coming to terms with the reality of the need for collaborative efforts for African countries to individually and collectively achieve political and socio-economic goals, regional cooperation and integration has been identified as a survival and development strategy in the period of more intense globalisation. Thus, the establishment of Africa"s RECs, the African Union/NEPAD and APRM to promote regionalism in Africa aligns with the functional/neo-functional perspective of the need for joint approach to solving common challenges and achieving common goals; and also the role of institutions in furthering this objective. Different scholarly opinions emphasise these positions.

Evbuomwan (2007:40) notes that working within effective regional and sub-regional economic arrangements is one attractive response to the dominant forces of globalisation. As one respondent argued:

> Regional integration is imperative for Africa in this world of globalisation.We need to look at our comparative advantage; we need to look at leveraging the resources that we have; and we need to look at trading amongst ourselves in order, if for nothing else, to boost our economies at the continental level. As a result, it is not by choice, it needs to be done and it"s something that has to be done if we"re looking at eliminating poverty, if we"re looking at job creation, employment creation and employing the youths which makes up over 75% of the African continent.[72]

According to Akinkugbe (2010/11:131-132), Africa needs not only to emplace a new vision for the development of the continent but also transform this vision into realistic plans. African countries need to strengthen collaborative ties within the continent and other developing regions of the world because of the small sizes of most of their markets and the

[71]As Stiglitz (2006:30-31) puts it succinctly: "Globalisation – in the form of export-led growth – helped pull the East Asian countries out of poverty. Globalisation made this possible, providing access to international markets as well as access to technology that enabled vast increases in productivity. But these countries managed globalisation: it was their ability to take advantage of globalisation, without being taken advantage of by globalisation that accounts for much of their success".

[72] Interview with OSISA 1, a senior official of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. South Africa. Date of Interview: 14 October, 2013.

"low level of domestic savings and other financial resources available for investment and to sustain the establishment of the large industries required in today"s globalising world" (Akinkugbe, 2010/11:131-132; see also, Agubuzu, 2004:205).

Regional integration will strengthen Africa"s position and the continent"s capacity to participate effectively in the global economy. Accordingly, one respondent emphasises that:

> The world has become global where different inputs go into production processes; as such, if Africa is going to benefit, it has to be connected to the global value chain one way or another. Thus, while Africa is pressing ahead with its own integration agenda, it should not also lose sight of the fact that the continent is part of the global economic mainstream and therefore government has to be mindful of the need to create a value chain that benefits Africa. The continent should not remain a raw materials producer permanently. Africa has to be in a position to add value to some of the materials that it produces that can fit into global production processes that is happening in the world at the moment.[73]

The imperative of strengthening sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration in Africa is compelling considering not only the unequal trade relations between Africa and the developed countries but also the discriminatory policies promoted by the WTO. Although African countries are members of the WTO, they should reinforce efforts to strengthen their internal markets and also endeavour to present common bargaining positions in their trade relations with the EU, Japan, USA and other countries.

Corroborating the views of other scholars, Sunmonu (2002:18) stated that, liberalisation which frustrates the new industries in Africa and which does not advance intra-African trade nor expand the percentage of Africa"s inter-continental trade is not good for the African continent. According to Sunmonu, "African governments would therefore need to adopt a „œcommon-sense" approach reflecting on the one hand, the demands of a fast globalising world and the imperative of effective sub-regional and regional integration" (Sunmonu, 2002:18).[74] Respondent RP2 underscored that:

[73] Interview with ECA 2, a senior official at the Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date of Interview: 19 June, 2013.

[74] Scholars are concerned about the increased external demand for the continent"s resources and the consequences of this for intra-African trade, and Africa"s sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration efforts to develop. Melber and Southall, in the book titled: *A New Scramble for Africa* (2009:XIX – XXVI) note that "the increased demand for Africa"s resources has been driven above all, by the sudden appearance of China as an economic actor in the international scene, whose dramatic burst of industrialisation has fuelled the global upswing of the last few years. Africa was regarded during the immediate post-Cold War as an undisputed sphere

> As much as possible, the African regional institutions should have their own home grown agenda when forging partnerships with international agencies and institutions. What African regional institutions mostly need from the outside world is support in diverse areas of capacity building and partnership funding of resource intensive projects such as multi-national peacekeeping. But by all means, Africans should not abdicate the driving seat to their partners from the developed countries in the event of any international partnerships.[75]

Another respondent added the point that, it is very important that Africa should present common positions on all major development concerns, not necessarily only about trade.[76] In the words of Respondent RP2:

> Regionalism in Africa will be promoted through the following: (1) visa-free immigration and travel policies; (2) free movement of consumer goods and services; (3) construction of trans-regional highways; (4) establishment of a regional commercial/investment banks e.g. Ecobank; (5) adoption of a regional security policy, especially with regard to conflict prevention, and conflict intervention and peacekeeping; (6) energy cooperation such as the West African gas pipeline; (7) security cooperation such as in counter terrorism and combating of high-sea piracy; (8) cooperation towards boundary demarcation and joint policing of land and maritime boundaries; and (9) cooperation in citizen protection, human rights and justice through the establishment of regional judicial and human rights institutions and appellant courts.[77]

The view of Respondent EISA [1] reflects the central argument of this study that:

> The one goal for regionalisation is to reduce the levels of social inequality and hardship of citizens through accelerated and broad-based growth in the economic activity of African economies. Unless regional integration at any level achieves this objective, then it should not be considered as a useful exercise. Integration comes at significant costs – bureaucratic, institutional, among others and unless it delivers a tangibly better result after integration is achieved than was the case prior to or without integration, there is no value in this integration.[78]

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of Western influence, yet, this geo-political map is now being challenged by China and other emerging industrial actors from the South such as India and Brazil".

[75] Interview with RP2. Date: 20 June 2013.

[76] Interview with AUC D, a senior official at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date of interview: 18 June 2013.

[77] Interview with RP2. Date: 20 June 2013.

[78] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.

Reflecting on the benefits and challenges of regional integration, one of the major issues of concern in this study is that Africa is lagging behind in achieving regional integration objectives. As has been emphasised in the previous chapters, Africa has the largest number of regional integration arrangements, yet the continent has remained the least developed and the least integrated region in the world. This raises several questions on Africa‟s approach and strategies towards economic integration and the realities and challenges of such strategies. The questions are relevant considering the dire need to achieve integration objectives. One respondent identifies that:

> While it is true that a strong African continent would be a threat to other continents of the world and that it is only in the best interest of African countries to integrate, African leaders have not risen above the „issues‟ that attempt to cause divisions in Africa; suppress their egos and sovereignty, and ensure that Africans come together and integrate for the progress of the continent. All the raw materials needed to develop the continent are available, and one of the benefits of integration is that experts can always be sought from different countries in Africa when they are needed.[79]

In line with the concern of this study, Respondent RP3 asserts that: "the continent is faced with the leadership and governance challenge; corruption, and lack of functioning regulatory institutions which are essential in developing human resources, promoting industrialisation, skills development and education, among others. The African state is therefore not adequately placed to spearhead the regional economic integration project and take critical decisions on regional integration."[80]

The above analysis shows clearly a growing recognition of the need to address the impediments to effective regionalism in Africa. It is also evident that issues on governance and development need attention in African countries. As is emphasised in empirical literature, and as various studies have found, RIAs in Africa have been less than successful when confronted with political, social and economic challenges in African states. A combination of the characteristics which African states present, comprehensively explains Africa‟s position within the context of the international political economy vis-à-vis its developmental

[79] Interview with Media 2, a top level official at the Television Continental, Lagos. Date of interview 22 January, 2014.
[80] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March 2014.

challenges. This is the hallmark of discourses and debates on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM. Adedeji"s (2002:8) assertion highlights this concern:

> Africa"s persistent economic crisis, severe at it has been is but a consequence of its political crisis…Inevitably, internal marginalisation has been grinding away at the foundations of the African society as a result of these deficits – development, democracy and security – whose cumulative consequence is the high incidence of poverty. Africa therefore faces the enormous task of coping with large-scale pervasive internal marginalisation, which in turn partly accounts for its global marginalisation. In other words, all the forces that have contributed to the lack of effective and dynamic economic cooperation and integration are also responsible for the inability of the continent to be an active player in the globalisation process.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter engaged with discourses on globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation as forces shaping the increasing interactions and interrelations among individuals, groups, institutions and states at the national, regional and global levels and the motives for such interrelationships. Globalisation has led to growing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world"s nations and peoples and the expansion in the movement of goods, services and capital across borders. The analyses of the chapter show that whereas globalisation offers several opportunities, its associated benefits do not accrue automatically for all countries. Particularly, the benefits of globalisation are yet to be exploited in Africa. Rather, globalisation has posed new sets of problems for African states. The continent has thus been marginalised in global relations.

The analysis in this chapter reveal that the opportunities and challenges propelled by globalisation necessitate the formulation and reformulation of policies, addressing national and regional challenges, and redesigning strategies at all levels towards achieving sustainable socio-economic development and addressing the issue of poverty in Africa. To this extent, regional cooperation and integration in Africa presents a viable strategy for African countries not only to address individually and collectively, the political and socio-economic challenges facing the African continent, but also for Africa to take an active part in a fast globalising world economy.

The realities and challenges of the on-going processes of globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation are such that African countries, on an individual basis, cannot favourably

compete and develop. As such, for the continent to effectively exploit its enormous natural, material and human resources to its advantage, it is imperative to address the issue of governance and development at the national level in African states without which sub-regional and regional integration will continue to remain elusive in Africa. These discourses are further examined in the next chapter which introduces the programme of action undertaken by the African Union/NEPAD and APRM to initiate and implement improvements in Africa‟s integration and development agenda.

CHAPTER FIVE[81]

SALIENT ISSUES IN THE DISCOURSE ON AFRICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter established that African economic integration increasingly has become imperative in an era of more intense globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation. The chapter also demonstrated that political and socio-economic challenges in African countries are, however, constraining factors to regional economic cooperation and integration efforts.

This chapter examines salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration and development from the angle of governance deficits in African countries. It examines the on-going policies and programmes implemented by the African Union/NEPAD (APRM) initiatives as African leaders‟ latest institutional framework addressing key integration and development challenges. The chapter draws from a series of interviews conducted during the course of the research, in conjunction with the available literature and a collection of official publications obtained from the African Union, NEPAD and APRM Secretariats, the ECA, and other governmental and non-governmental institutions. A combination of research tools, namely, fieldwork and desktop, enables the chapter to identify and examine the programmes and policies of the African Union and NEPAD (APRM) initiatives. The specific aim is to identify how these programmes respond to the salient issues of African economic integration and to interrogate the challenges faced in implementing these initiatives. The chapter situates analysis within the functionalist/neo-functionalist and neo-realism theories and addresses the question: what are the salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration and how relevant are such issues for policy formulation and implementation towards achieving the objectives of the AU/NEPAD (APRM) integration project?

[81] Some sections in Chapters Five, Six and Seven formed parts of a paper prepared for the CODESRIA 14th General Assembly and Scientific Conference. Date: 8-12 June 2015, at Dakar Senegal. Theme: Creating African Futures in an era of global transformations: Challenges and Prospects. The paper titled “Regional economic integration and the governance challenge in Africa: Missing links in the African Peer Review Mechanism Process” has been published in the Conference Proceedings.

Previous studies have examined various aspects of discourses on regionalism in Africa from the period of the OAU to the formation of the African Union and the establishment of the NEPAD and APRM initiatives. These studies demonstrate the acceptance by African leaders, policy makers and a majority of scholars that regional cooperation and integration is indispensable for Africa‟s development. Several factors, both internal and external, are often analysed as obstacles to the realisation of regional integration objectives both at the sub-regional and regional levels. Progress made by regional integration institutions, including the African Union (since it was established) are monitored through institutional studies and scholarly contributions.

Scholars have not failed to proffer solutions for the future of African economic integration. However, insufficient interest has been shown in empirically examining the APRM as a governance instrument which could be effectively enhanced to address overarching governance and development challenges that impact negatively on Africa‟s regional integration process. In short, the NEPAD‟s APRM has been and is not often studied within the framework of Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration. This is the focus of this study. Its argument is that the failure of regional integration in Africa is largely due to the governance deficits in the continent. Its assertion, therefore, is that the APRM, if allowed to function effectively, could possibly address these challenges towards facilitating the realisation of the AU/NEPAD‟s integration and development objectives.

While this chapter examines the nature and workings of post-independence African states, identifying and examining the governance and development dilemmas in Africa, it progresses to examine key policy frameworks of the AU/NEPAD with a focus on the programme on infrastructural development. A section of the chapter examines the complexities, challenges and paradoxes of the AU/NEPAD initiatives and connects the discussion to the APRM. This is followed with a conclusion to the chapter.

5.2 African states in the quest for economic integration: Identifying the salient issues

Scholars, writers and observers have argued consistently that critical issues on governance and development in Africa which have remained unresolved continue to pose obstacles to Africa‟s quest for economic integration (see, Mistry, 2000:556-558; Geda and Kibret, 2002:2-15; Adetula, 2004: Qobo, 2007:2-14; Gibb, 2009:701-721; Okhonmina, 2009:86-93;

Akokpari, 2010/11:74-76). Although the continent has witnessed different stages in the evolution of regional economic integration and notwithstanding that regionalism has continued to occupy a central position in Africa‟s development agenda, there is a missing link between, on one hand, the efforts of African states and sub-regional and regional organisations, and on the other hand, their success in realising the key objectives of regionalism.

This can be attributed, in particular, to two sets of factors: salient issues such as lack of good governance, democracy, poor leadership and domestic mismanagement; and continuing emphasis on absolute sovereignty and the attendant issues around national interests versus regional interests.[82] Together, these factors not only impede effective regionalism in Africa but also account for its problematic nature on the continent. As Respondent EISA [1] affirms, "governance challenges are immensely influential on all aspects of the experiences of Africa generally, and more specifically, they affect the speed, depth and extent of regional integration as barriers and obstacles that need to be overcome or managed in order to achieve better integration".[83]

Nevertheless, as has been emphasised in previous chapters, regional integration is imperative for Africa‟s development. Respondent RP2 underscores the point that "Africa‟s economic integration projects are worthwhile; they are practical and relevant imperatives of our time. Africa needs a good measure of political cooperation and economic integration to be competitive in the present international economic dispensation dominated by large regional trading blocs, foreign transnational corporations, as well as western-dominated international regimes and institutions".[84] Regional integration, as another respondent adds, seeks to correct the present imbalance in the international arena and promote regional/continental development. However, there seems to be lack of sufficient political will by African leaders. Unless and until this is brought on board, Africa‟s integration might tarry and be prolonged.[85]

[82] Two respondents referred to most of the governance issues in Africa as „deep-rooted‟ and „deep seated‟ challenges. One of these participants - doctoral candidate (2) of the University of Cape Town, South Africa, completed the interview schedule on 13 June 2013. The other participant who also completed the interview schedule is a member of the Ethiopian Parliament. He was also involved in the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP). Date: 12 October 2013.

[83] Interview with EISA 1, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, South Africa. Date: 9 October 2013.

[84] Interview with RP2, United States International University of Nairobi, Kenya. Date: 20 June 2013.

[85] Interview with AUC B. African Union Headquarters. Date: 5 August 2013.

Respondent EISA [1] states that although there are pockets of cooperation and good news, for instance, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the increasingly integrated East African Community (EAC) are the best examples of this, these efforts are sub-regional and in both examples, building on historical ties rather than newly forged linkages courtesy of the OAU/AU and NEPAD.[86] Corroborating this assertion, RP2 adds that, Africa‟s integration projects seem more feasible, practical and functional at the regional and sub-regional levels.[87] For instance, "Qaddafi‟s dream of a United States of Africa remains a distant pipe dream at present, and given the recent proliferation of intra and inter-state conflicts, and the escalating threat of terrorism inside the continent, the future prospects of economic integration appear dismal at present".[88] Basic ingredients necessary for Africa to accelerate its integration processes appear to be lacking and have not yet been put in place (see, Onimode, 1993; Manboah, 2000).

This researcher does not claim that classical integration theories – functionalism and neo-functionalism - which provide (in tandem with neo-realism) the theoretical lens for this study, are without flaws. However, it is argued that the theories instructively emphasise the basic principles of inter-state cooperation, explaining the „what‟ „how‟ and „why‟ of nations‟ willing decisions to cooperate in the first place (Haas, 1971:6). These theories propose a gradual, stage by stage, bottom-up approach to integration; as one respondent noted: "putting in place the „enablers‟ of integration".[89] This suggests that the desire to integrate develops as the instruments, structures and mechanisms of cooperation and interactions are put in place to facilitate the removal of all obstacles and barriers to "free movement of persons, goods and services" in order to achieve regional integration objectives (Balassa, 1961; Mattli, 1999:19, Sako, 2006:1-8).

One of the arguments proposed in functionalism for instance is that, nation-states will be less likely to go to war if they engage more in international and social cooperation (Mitrany, 1943:8-9; 33-39). That said, the key concept in neo-functionalism - „supra-nationalism‟ entails that, sovereign nation-states, in the process of integration, are willing to share their sovereignty and to submit politically to the collective governance architecture of supra-national institutions. This presupposes that participating countries in regional integration arrangements develop a

[86] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.
[87] Interview with RP2. Date: 20 June 2013.
[88] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.
[89] This comment was made during an interview held by the author with AUC E, a senior official at the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date of interview: 17 June 2013.

level of confidence in the capacity of international institutions to protect their interests and guide the process for beneficial cooperation among member-states.

The idea proposed by neo-functionalism is that there are supposed to be standardised norms which need to be developed to guide the conduct and behaviour of integrating member states. Hence, Respondent AUC [E] notes that, "when speaking about integration, we are concerned with common policies and convergence policies. This is one of the key elements of integration in Europe".[90] The European Union is usually considered to present the best model of integration which is a bottom-up, progressive approach to integration. The EU developed in stages, from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The EU's integration process is characterised by strong supra-national institutions and member states are willing to cede national sovereignty and to abide by the norms, principles and governance standards of the institutions so established.[91]

Biong Kuol Deng (2010:2) cites the case of Asia in his discourse on sovereignty. Most of the Asian states have reshaped the absolute emphasis on state sovereignty. Through empowering their citizens, collective self/indigenous effort and committed leadership, some of the Asian states compete effectively in the global economic arena (Biong Kuol Deng, 2010:2; see also, Page, 1994:219-223). However, in an African context, Uzodike (2010/11:88) notes that "Africa's experience with regional integration reflects ambivalence and contentions as to the process and form of, and path to, continental unity". Although African countries have been motivated by the success of integration efforts in Europe and the Americas, the issue of state sovereignty posed a form of disagreements in the formation of the OAU and is still a contentious issue in the operations of the African Union (Uzodike, 2010/11:88). The integration process in Africa is therefore hampered by the unwillingness of African leaders to share sovereignty with regional organisations. In consequence, regional integration arrangements in Africa lack strong and effective supranational institutions (Matthews, 2003:76).

[90] Interview with AUC E. Date: 17 June 2013.
[91] Britain currently is challenging the extent to which EU immigration policies serve British national interests; furthermore, the recently re-elected Conservative government has a popular mandate to defy the EU.

Moreover, in the quest for regional integration, many African states qualify as weak states (Mistry, 2000:553-555; Qobo, 2007:3). In terms of geographical strength, most African states are too small in size and population and are not economically sustainable (Mistry, 2000:553-555; Olivier, 2010:24; Qobo, 2007:3).[92] More so, African states rely on primary products which do not have ready markets within the region; for instance, Respondent RP3 poses a question: "in East Africa, the major crop of Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda is coffee. The question is: who will buy whose coffee? Their inability to industrialise and the generally extroverted nature of their economies present as challenges of regional integration.[93] Equally concerning, is that African states are at different levels of development and these states are heterogeneous entities with differing "languages, cultures, societal norms and natural resources endowment" (Adogamhe, 2008:18). Important factors, such as these, should be seriously factored into the continent"s sub-regional and regional integration agenda; a particular issue of concern has to do with how African leaders are committed and able to manage these diversities (Adogamhe, 2008:18).

Regrettably, however, post-independence African leaders have been ineffective in managing the affairs of their states. National integration has proven to be a challenge in many African countries in the face of endemic poverty, inequitable distribution of national resources, poor governance, political corruption, ethnic fractionalisation, ethnocentrism, and nepotism -- with consequent political-economic implications for national, sub-regional and regional development. Lack of shared political, economic and social interests, norms and values undermine national development and the spill-over effects are felt at the sub-regional, regional and continental levels. As Adedeji (2002:9) asserts, regional integration objectives may not be achievable without shared visions and values among the African populace (Adedeji, 2002:9). It would remain a difficult undertaking where "there is no shared social economy in which the welfare of the people and the community is paramount and the transformation process is socially unjust, not politically participatory and culturally vibrant". (Adedeji, 2002:9).

Although African governments and their peoples have shown much interest in establishing regional integration institutions, they have expected too many benefits to accrue from

[92] Qobo (2007:4) notes that it will be difficult to measure the performance of regional economic schemes against a common standard. It is equally important to consider that the number of participating countries in the different regional integration arrangements varies.
[93] Interview with RP3, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Date interview: 19 March 2014.

integration, without due considerations of the costs, commitments and sacrifices involved in the process. The theories on regionalism point out clearly that, sovereign states agree to cooperate with each other towards regional integration because they expect to derive certain political, economic or social benefits from the process; nevertheless, it requires some level of commitments (Adetula, 2004:2-5; Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:213). For neo-realist scholars, however, regional cooperation and integration, depends on the issues involved (Collard-Wexler, 2006:399-406) and may be affected when such issues conflict with national interests of participating states (Gibb, 2009:715). This raises the question of national interest versus regional interest in the discourse on regionalism, especially in Africa (Gibb, 2009:715). As Adetula (2004:10) observes, many sub-regional integration schemes are still directing their focus exclusively to national development, which causes conflicts among participating member countries particularly when it comes to distributing benefits. Added to this is the fact that RECs in Africa fail to fashion their objectives in line with the vision of continental integration, which explains: the problem of overlapping memberships of regional organisations; ineffective coordination; duplication of regional programmes; and competition (Agubuzu, 2004:202).

The RECs represent the cornerstone on which continental integration could be established in Africa, but there are many impediments at this level. While some RECs have achieved minimal successes, others are still lagging behind considerably. As Respondent RP3 observes grimly:

> These structural challenges militating against effective regionalism remain firmly in place, mistrust has continued to characterise intra-state relations in Africa. Regional economies are either dominated by non-African actors or by dominant economies on the continent, while conflicts continue to divert attention from regional integration and regional development. Generally, regional integration in Africa has not gone further than what it was in1960 when the idea was firstmooted. This raises pessimism about the viability of African economic integration in an era of globalisation, when the European Union (EU), for instance, prefers to deal with Africa under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) via a balkanised Africa.[94]

One of the major challenges to regionalism in Africa, one respondent observes, is that African governments and their peoples are yet to identify with common interests, norms and

[94] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March, 2014.

values and it would be best to begin to foster integration at the domestic level.[95] This study aligns with scholarly views cautioning on the need for African governments to adopt a gradual approach to economic integration taking cognisance of the realities and challenges at the national level (Mistry, 2000:560-566; Adedeji, 2002:9-10; Qobo, 2007:1; Akokpari, 2008, 2010/11:80-81). A top level official at the Africa Institute of South Africa notes:

> When the OAU was to be formed, there were two groups of thought. The first group, represented by Kwame Nkrumah, was of the opinion that integration must start at the continental level. The other groups wanted integration to begin at the regional level. Although that debate is still on, African leaders missed an important front which is the national, because... I don‟t see how African leaders can contribute towards regional integration and continental integration if they don‟t contribute towards national integration. There are some countries in Africa where national integration needs to be seriously promoted because you have problems of tribalism and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. In addition, the state has failed to provide for the needs of the people. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a case in point. How do you expect the DRC to contribute towards regional integration when it is in a mess? Although I understand what Nkrumah meant about continental integration, but the point is that... if you look at the European Union, the level of integration which they have achieved is as a result of their achievement at the national front...So, I am injecting the national front in this debate. Look at it for instance, South Africa has enormous resources, but when you consider the level of corruption and poverty.... The starting point is the national level because certain political issues need to be settled first".[96]

Perhaps because of their mutual suspicions and desire for immediate accrual of national benefits, African governments are not fully committed to the issue of regional integration. Although they have signed regional agreements and established regional institutions, the structures and institutions necessary to propel integration are either non-existent or weak at the national level. Lack of political will and commitment to implementing regional policies and integrating such policies into national programmes; and unwillingness to share their sovereignty are problems associated with African economic integration. Moreover, Africa‟s integration processes are inclined towards a top-down approach and have remained elitist in nature. African citizens, as supposed beneficiaries of regional policies and programmes are not actively involved in the

[95] Interview schedule completed by Senior Academic (1) from Ghana Institute of Journalism, Ghana. Date: 11 June 2013

[96] Interview with AISA 1, a top level official at the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. Date of interview: 3 July 2013. In the same interview with the respondent who is a member of the Ethiopian parliament, he also pointed out the case of collapse of states in Africa, referring to South Sudan and North Sudan, Somalia and Mali.

conception, formulation, implementation, and monitoring of regional policies both at the national and regional levels.[97]

As most scholars observe, regionalism in Africa has been driven largely by the political leadership without adequate support from the private sector and civil society such that policies that are emplaced reflect the preferences of African governments and elites and, in most cases fail to address the priorities and choices of the majority of African people (see, Adogamhe, 2008:21; Adejumobi, 403 and 418; Bilas and Franc, 2010:104). Notwithstanding, this study highlights that the role of political leadership in fostering the ideals of integration is imperative if such leadership is committed to promoting democracy, transparency and accountability. It also advances the need for Africa‟s civil society to be effectively organised and positioned to positively exploit the benefits of an open approach. For instance, it could be asserted that Africa‟s civil society often botch opportunities to select the best candidates for political offices during elections.

Beyond these weaknesses, however, African leaders are yet to develop innovative ideas with regards to finding alternatives to the persistent over-reliance on external developmental assistance and aid while Africa‟s rich natural resource endowments at national, regional and continental levels could be harnessed and converted for developmental purposes (see Murithi, 2008:2). Rather, the continent continues with the supply of natural resources to the industrialised countries of the West who also set their prices. Nevertheless, while external aid and development assistance are necessary, these have not translated to Africa‟s development nor have they led to poverty reduction or improved living conditions for the masses of the people. Hence, this study shares the concern of Respondent RP3 who notes that, "over-dependence on external forces undermines the continent‟s ownership of integration and development initiatives. This is especially the case of West Africa which continues to look to Paris for security, and general instruction. This was partly the cause of tension between Ivory Coast and Nigeria in ECOWAS and which for a long time paralysed the regional body".[98] African governments fail to take collective action but instead, speak with dissenting voices in

[97]As one respondent, AUC A notes, "the ideal situation should be, for instance, that majority of the African people know what the objectives of the African Union are; the visions; who is doing what in the African Union Commission, and so on. This is not the case in Africa. People outside do not know what exactly goes on in the African Union not to talk about owning the African Union process. This is a major challenge because everybody is supposed to be part of the process" (Interview with AUC „A". at the African Union Headquarters. Date: 19 June 2013).

[98] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March 2014.

issues of global affairs, hence, the continent has remained weak in its extra-continental relations (Akokpari, 2001:200-201; Adejumobi, 2003:14-19; Qobo, 2007:3-5; Bilas and Franc, 2010:106-107; Sundaram et al, 2011:4-6). As Manboah (2000:49) observes, for most of Africa‟s history of development, the leaders have had to decide whether to opt for continued integration into the global economic system or otherwise; to promote an outward oriented growth strategy or implement some form of self-reliant approach to development. The African continent has not only continued to struggle in its bid to overcome daunting challenges but also has been marginalised in the international arena (Murithi, 2008:2).

Clearly, there are a number of political and socio-economic challenges in most African countries (such as poverty, economic underdevelopment, political instability and insecurity) which have continued to affect the realisation of regional integration objectives. These challenges have been linked to the characteristics and workings of African states and their institutions of governance (Kefale and Aredo, 2009:89; Salawu, 2010:348; Motsamai and Zondi, 2010:2-3; Ngambi, 2011:6-19; Poku and Mdee, 2011:1-3). In most cases, lack of effective political leadership, poor governance, corruption, socially divisive politics, weak economic policies, and lack of concern for the needs and welfare of citizens have given rise to intra-state and inter-state conflicts which negatively impact on sub-regional and regional integration. These issues have made the search for peace, stability, security and development elusive in Africa.

5.3 African states in question: The governance and development dilemmas

At both theoretical and empirical levels, Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration generates several contradictions. While the desire for regional integration is frequently expressed, the political and socio-economic obstacles to integration remain in place. It is the contention of this study that many of the challenges to the African economic integration agenda are man-made; and that they are located at the national levels in individual African states. The issue of governance has become critical in African economic integration processes. Moreover, the evolution, existence and continuing functioning of the state in Africa are subjects of critical theoretical debates and contestations among scholars with reference to contemporary discourses on international relations and organisations.

Neo-functionalism and neo-realism theories, when combined, provide a useful and adequate framework for understanding the complexities and challenges of regional integration in Africa

emphasising the role and influence of the state and regional institutions in the process of integration. While neo-functionalism advances the position that regional integration is the outcome of the decision of political elites, individuals, interest groups and institutions operating within a democratic political system, neo-realism identifies the state as the main actor in the integration process and, as such, accords much importance to the role of government in determining the success or otherwise of integration.[99] Bringing together the various discourses, the chapter will emphasise the role of the APRM which is a programme of the AU/NEPAD and explain how the APRM initiative forms the focus of this study.

Scholars and writers have not failed to employ different terms to describe the state in Africa: colonial state (Englebert, 2000:1822; Mandani, 2002:506); soft and ineffective (Osaghae, 2003:2; illegitimate (Akokpari, 2008:90); facade states (Mehler, 2005:12); weak (Jackson, 2002:38); underdeveloped (Sorenson, 1997:260); imported (Kawabata, 2006:2); failed (Akokpari, 2008:90) and others. These negative words are often used with respect to discourses relating to the origin, nature, character and more importantly, the workings of the African state and its political and socio-economic challenges. The post-colonial African state, in its nature and workings, exhibits the characteristics of a colonial state (see, Ekeh, 1975:93-106; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:1-4; Englebert, 2000:1821-1834; Osaghae, 2003:2-3; Akokpari, 2008:90; Aiyede, 2010:55-56; Poku and Mdee, 2011:22-23).[100]

The argument exists that for a state to be effective and functional, it deserves to evolve from within the society, where it derives its existence and legitimacy (Osaghae, 1998; 2003-6-12). This is the idea expressed in the Social Contract Theory of the state as well as in liberal democratic theories. Social contract connotes a form of „reciprocal" relationship between the state and society (see Steward, 2002:342-345; Biong Koul Deng, 2010:1-7). The society sees itself as part of the state and this creates in citizens a sense of ownership, belonging and commitment towards participating in the affairs of the state and contributing to its transformation and development (Osaghae, 1998; 2003:6-12). This is not the case with many African states. African states were mostly colonial creations foisted on the African people by

[99] Adequate details on these theories and how they influence this study are analysed in chapter two on theoretical framework.

[100] The colonial state advanced the interests of the colonial masters; to expand the sphere of political and economic control of the colonisers; to exploit and dominate the people and to exploit the resources of the colonised people. It was therefore, not a peoples" state; it was hostile and not concerned with furthering the interests and wishes of the indigenous people. As such, the colonial state did not have shared values with society.

the colonialists and, as such, did not evolve from within society (Ekeh, 1975:106-111; Englebert, 2000:1821-1832; Osaghae, 2003:6-12; Macleans, 2008:166-178).

The boundaries of the state were drawn artificially without due recognition of geographical elements such as size, population, and natural resources endowments; social demographics such as ethnic affinities, culture, or economic conditions of different societies (Olivier, 2010:24). African states were hurriedly instituted by the colonialists to facilitate their political administration. To this end, the colonial boundaries that were created not only divided groups that were formerly homogenous entities but also brought together, within the same geographical space, different groups, which in many cases, did not share common interests (Akokpari, 2008:90; Aiyede, 2010:55-56). These boundaries were inherited by African leaders at independence and, regrettably, they were accepted by these leaders when the OAU was formed in 1963 (Akokpari, 2008:90; see also Shaw, 2009:45; Aiyede, 2010:55-56; Biong Koul Deng, 2010:1-7; Olivier 2010:24; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:1).[101] As noted by one respondent interviewed by this researcher, "the OAU tried to bring unity to weak, underdeveloped and „illegitimate" states and not to unite „Africans"".[102]

Englebert (2000:1823) asserts that, "Africa is the region with the highest proportion of countries where the process of state creation was exogenous to their societies and where the leadership, or ruling class, inherited the state rather than shaping it as an instrument of its existing or developing hegemony". African states, as colonial creations, did not command the loyalty of the people as their own state. There was a "divide" between the state and society. The state was alien to the people who had already built confidence in their ethnic formations which existed in the pre-colonial African setting.[103] Post-independence African states were thus considered to be illegitimate states (Englebert, 2000:1823; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:1-4; Osaghae 2003:6-12; Aiyede, 2010/11:55-56; Biong Koul Deng, 2010:1-7). These states "suffered from a dichotomisation between power and statehood" (Englebert 2000:1821-1823).

[101] The idea of Shaw (2009:45) and other scholars is that African leaders could have considered it worthwhile to engage and take the lead in restructuring the states in post-independence period, especially with the establishment of the OAU. This would have resulted in a reduction in the number of such fragmented states and also enhanced the capacity of the states to meet the needs of the African people.
[102] Respondent is a member of the Ethiopian Parliament. Date: 12 October 2013.
[103] The phrase, „Two Publics", formulated and made popular by Peter Ekeh was written to show how African civil society reflected the characteristics of the post-independence African state. (For details, see Ekeh, 1975)

As a result of their weak internal legitimacy, the continued existence of post-independence African states was based mainly on the formal recognition bestowed on them by international law as sovereign entities (Osaghae, 1998; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:3-4).[104] African elites in the post-colonial period, have since found it a hurdle to restructure the African state to drive the development process and satisfy the functions associated with modern states (Ikejiaku, 2009; Aiyede, 2010/11:55-56; Akokpari, 2010/11:69; Poku and Mdee, 2011:1-3; Colliers and Schunemann, 2013:1).[105] It is therefore argued that the political and socio-economic challenges experienced in Africa not only reflect the nature of the state in the continent, but also that, "the character, material and historical circumstances and the nature of politics affect how these problems occur and are addressed in terms of policy statements and actions" (Aiyede, 2010/11:55).

Consequently, the post-colonial African state appears to have failed in effectively addressing the social, economic and political needs of the people (Mehler, 2005:8-13; Englebert, 2000:1832-1834; Akokpari, 2008:90-103; Aiyede, 2010/11:55-56). Akokpari (2008:90-103) examines the state‟s failure in terms of its inability and incapacity to handle carefully the challenges and difficulties associated with diverse groups co-existing together. The issue of concern is that the post-colonial African state has not maintained its position as an impartial agency in the allocation of national resources to the various groups which constitute the state and which compete for such resources (Akokpari, 2008:90-103; see also Onyeoziri, 2002). Rather, as Aiyede (2010/11:55) asserts, "in most African countries, regional cleavages have coincided with group or sectional inequalities providing fertile ground for political entrepreneurs, who turn regional differences and inequalities to political capital". Thus, the autonomy of the African state has been questioned.[106]

[104] Although African states, at independence, were clothed with the garment of state sovereignty and have continued to emphasise state sovereignty in carrying out its functions, the obvious reality is that this has not been translated to national sovereignty; in other words, to put it succinctly, what Biong Kuol Deng refers to as „people‟s sovereignty‟ (for details, see Biong Kuol Deng, 2010:1-7).

[105] For instance, the state is expected to provide for the welfare and well-being of the society; provide security functions at the collective level and present itself as an impartial agency in regulating the activities of its citizens. Failure to perform most of these functions have led to human security challenges and conflicts in most African states. Cilliers and Schunemann (2013:1) note for instance, the number of "conflicts, civil wars and mass killings" experienced in a number of African states few years after independence was achieved.

[106] Onyeoziri (2002) illustrates further that the autonomy of the African state has not only been compromised, African elites have promoted sectional interests against national interest, making the state not to be neutral and impartial in performing its responsibilities.

Attempts made by successive African governments to deal with issues of ethnic diversities and regional cleavages and to promote national consciousness, democracy and good governance have been less than successful as most African states have continuously been affected by political crises, instability and insecurity (Akokpari, 2010:71-75; see Englebert, 2000:1823-1824).[107] These challenges are fuelled by the lack of effective leadership, poor governance, weak state-civil society relations and dissatisfaction with government policies. In most cases, however, the political settings of most African states have been characterised by violent competition for national resources including the quest to control political power. Hence, politics has become a „do-or-die" affair (Englebert, 2000:1823; Onyeoziri, 2002 Chabal, 2005; Aiyede, 2010/11:55; Akokpari, 2010/11:71-75). The violent contestation for political power led to an outbreak of military coups experienced in some African countries – Benin, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Togo and Upper Volta – a few years after they were granted independence (Englebert, 2000:1824; see also, Nwolise, 2000:8-13; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:1-3). Internal conflicts continue to be characteristic of a number of post-independence African state.

As Akokpari (2008:90-103) highlights, the intense competition for political power arises out of the reality that the post-independence African state is the major allocator of state resources.[108] The state is the major employer of labour. As Poku and Mdee (2011:122) note, "the state is the major source of finance and major partner in most economic enterprises. The existence of well armed and numerous police, paramilitary forces and the army itself add to that appearance of strength". Yet, the African state fails to meet the needs of its citizens. Therefore, viewing the occupation of political offices as an avenue to control state resources could be mirrored in the light of the underdeveloped nature of the African state and poverty which pervades the society (Aiyede, 2010/11:55-56; Poku and Mdee, 2011:122). Accordingly, most African governments, once they occupy public offices, do not wish to hand-over power (Sikod, 2008:202). Indeed, some governments "pervert" democracy, rig elections and engage in politically corrupt activities (Venter, 2009:39). Consequently, as

[107] African leaders often claim to promote democracy but, in reality, this is not the case. With a few exceptions, most leaders in Africa do not abide by democratic principles (Venter, 2009:39; Akokpari, 2010/11:71). This is a major factor which contributes to the challenge of nation building.

[108] This view is shared by many scholars (Ikejiaku, 2009; Uzodike, 2010/11; Alemazung, 2011; Aiyede, 2010/11:55; Colliers and Schnemann, 2013:1). Cilliers and Schunemann (2013:1) note in addition that "as violent competition for state resources raged on, many groups or regions tried to break away from the arbitrary post-colonial state, including Congo"s Katanga, Nigeria"s Biafra, the Ewe and Asante of Ghana, the Agni of Cote d" Ivoire, the Somalia of Ethiopia, and the Barotse of Zambia".

Ikejiaku (2009:19) argues, "political corruption has been identified as one of the major causes of poverty",[109] and the failure of development in third world countries, particularly in Africa. Corruption, especially in the realm of politics, has become a common feature, visible in the African state.

In his analysis, Ikejiaku (2009:19) examines the negative effects of political corruption on efforts at establishing a democratic society and promoting good governance. Political corruption is endemic and severe and perpetuates Africa"s crises of leadership and governance (Alemazung, 2011:33). Corruption permeates all aspects of Africa"s societies. Corruption is therefore the bane of Africa"s development (Ikejiaku, 2009:15-16; Okhonmina, 2009:92-93; Uzodike, 2009:4-5; Alemazung, 2011:33; Cillers and Schunemann, 2013:5). The assertions of Uzodike (2009:4-5) particularly captures the scenario in Africa:

> Basically, no other region of the world has been as poorly led and governed by so many leaders for so long. In a continent where many among the super-rich are often directly in politics or (if in business) prime beneficiaries of the distributional arrangements that derive from political linkages, accountability and the rule of law are usually empty phrases that do not apply to the political and business elites. Governance structures and access to political power are widely seen not as opportunities to serve one"s country or community company or colleagues, church or congregants but as conduits for pilfering state assets and amassing wealth (for oneself, friends and associates) with the sort of impunity that renders hollow any pretensions about the relevance of accountability and the rule of law. In some African countries, the feeding frenzy is so unmitigated by any visible or credible legal or moral strictures that perpetrators of this financial violence typically go unhampered and unpunished – even when identified.

Elaborating the negative consequences of bad leadership and corruption on the achievement of regional integration objectives and development, Uzodike (2009:4-5) further asserts:

[109] Poverty, it is generally agreed, is a persistent challenge in Africa (see Evbuomwan, 2007:41; Omotola, 2010:57, Motsamai and Zondi, 2010:1-2; Phogolo, 2010:1). For Evbuomwan (2007:41), "poverty is highly visible in most African countries. Overcrowded settlements in major urban areas without basic social services and remote and isolated rural areas are major concentrations of the poor. Compared with other developing regions, Africa suffers from more severe and persistent poverty. Approximately 45 per cent of Africans are income-poor -- measured according to a poverty line of $1 a day -- and 42 per cent suffer from the incidence of human poverty, defined by life expectancy, educational attainment and living conditions". Life expectancy in Africa has remained low. Motsamai and Zondi (2010:2) note that, "despite positive economic growth trends in many African countries, poverty persists in Africa. This means economic recovery in some cases has not produced the required social outcomes. Whilst these outcomes have been uneven across and within African countries, the escalation of poverty, jobless economic growth, vulnerability to fluctuating commodity prices, inequality, and decline in social development indicators are common problems that most countries share".

> Resources that could go toward national and regional development projects – road and communication infrastructures, health and other social services, and industrial schemes – are stolen and often deposited in Western banks where they help to reduce the cost of money and contribute towards the widening gap between Africa and the West. In its essence, corruption serves to undermine visionary leadership and responsible governance arrangements by destroying or weakening the capacity of nation-states and societies to deal effectively and holistically with the challenges and opportunities that face them.

Regional integration, scholars conclude, provides a means to resolve most of these issues. This view supports the position of functionalism/neo-functionalism on the advantages of joint efforts in solving contending societal challenges. The general response of participants in this study was also unanimously affirmative on the question: Is regional integration necessary for Africa?[110] The benefits associated with regional integration cannot be over-emphasised. However, despite those massive potential benefits, Respondent EISA [1] opines that, "although regional integration is imperative for Africa, it is not at any cost. The costs and benefits of how efficiently regional economic integration can be achieved have to be weighed and the value or lack thereof needs to be continuously appraised…."[111] This cautionary attitude is instructive and may underscore the tepid regional integration approach by many African governments, which has stalled or weakened integration projects on the continent.

From the neo-realist perspective on states and regional integration, the analyses reveal that regionalism would not progress in Africa with the persistence of identified governmental and socio-development challenges. To reiterate the position of this study, sub-regional, regional and continental integration and development will continue to remain elusive in Africa without corresponding national integration. National integration connotes political and economic restructuring in post-independence African state; re-aligning the state and the society in order to achieve regional integration objectives. These factors, among others, necessitated the transformation of the OAU to the African Union and subsequently, the adoption by the African Union of the NEPAD and its APRM initiative. As noted by Respondent RP1, the AU and NEPAD are expected to provide the economic, political and socio-cultural framework and mobilisation platform for galvanising states towards overcoming challenges and the attainment of continental integration. To that extent, the discourse of African economic

[110] The respondents included officials of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM; UNECA; CSOs, media houses, the academia and doctoral students. Approximately 50 participants responded to this question.
[111] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.

integration is closely intertwined and logically linked to the objectives of the AU and the NEPAD.[112]

Through their APRM initiative, the AU/NEPAD aim to address salient governance and development issues that will usher in African economic integration. The concerns of this study are, whether African leaders are ready to address governance challenges that may betray important weaknesses; and whether the APRM would be strengthened to transform the governance architecture in Africa. Considering salient governance challenges in the continent, many are sceptical that the African Union-led integration project may succeed where others failed and that integration may bring economic transformation and development to Africa.

5.4 Africa‟s quest for good governance, socio-economic development and economic integration

Africa‟s governance and development problems became more evident from the late 1980s; and, with the end of formal colonial rule in the continent in the 1990s, there arose a seeming "blame discourse" in the international arena and across Africa that the continent has continued to confront several political and socio-economic challenges as a result of its leadership failure to promote good governance.[113] In the African context, good governance discourse became prominent not only because the Structural Adjustment Programmes and other development initiatives such as the OAU‟s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action were unsuccessful, but also because of internal conflicts which erupted in different African countries resulting from dissatisfaction with governments‟ activities in the public realm. Africa‟s development challenges were linked to "personalisation of power, prevalence of unaccountable and authoritarian governments, violation of human rights, rampant corruption, absence of the rule of law, state intervention in the economy and lack of decentralisation" (World Bank, 1989:7).

[112] Interview schedule completed by RP1. Date: 12 December, 2012.

[113] Good governance, "refers to the set of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions among the government, civil society and private sector. It is a way a society makes and implements decisions – achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their legal rights and obligations" (UNDP/German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. 2000. The UNDP Role in Decentralisation and Local Governance: A Joint UNDP-Government of Germany Evaluation. New York: UNDP. 27).

Indeed, good governance created a framework for the economic growth and prosperity achieved by the Asian Tigers. The good governance discourse was also fuelled by the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, a period which ushered in the process of more intense globalisation with increasing emphasis on democratic governance and democratisation of development processes (Geldenhuys, 2012:59). The international donor community made good governance a necessary condition for granting aid to developing countries. The idea was that developing countries would continue to record poor economic growth and socio-economic development without „good governance" conditions (Singh 2003:2). Thus, pressure mounted on developing countries to make progress towards democratic governance in order to attract international recognition and assistance.

To this extent, the increasing recognition that there is a synergy between governance and development and the belief that bad governance is an underlining factor in Africa"s underdevelopment, ignited the series of measures taken by African leaders to re-design the continent"s development strategies from the 1990s. Not only were opinions expressed concerning inadequacies and seeming ineffectiveness on the part of the OAU especially in handling issues of violent conflicts, poor governance, maladministration, corruption, human rights abuses, poverty and underdevelopment (Murithi, 2012a:89; Geldenhuys, 2012:58-59); there also emerged, a realisation that Africa"s political independence would be unsustainable without consequent economic development.

At various meetings of the African Heads of States and Government of the OAU, Africa"s developmental challenges featured prominently on the agenda. Issues of concern were not only the increasingly changing dimension of conflicts, instability and insecurity in the continent, and civil wars in some African states, but also the reality of failure of states to confront development challenges and provide for the well-being and needs of the people (Dersso, 2012:17). The OAU"s Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) mechanism was not achieving successful results in resolving conflict situations in the states (Murithi, 2012a:89), and the international community, in particular, paid less attention to issues of conflict resolution in Africa (Dersso, 2012:19-20; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:11).

Considering the human and economic cost of these conflicts and their implications for African integration processes, there was a strong belief in the need for more focus on the

economic development of the continent and to collectively resolving the issues which trigger internal conflicts in African states. In an OAU Declaration in 1990, African leaders demonstrated their resolve to respond to the political and socio-economic challenges confronting the continent through their commitments to the pan-African political ideal of "African solutions to African problems".[114] In the 1990 OAU Declaration, the continent‟s leaders noted:

> We reaffirm our commitment to revive the ideals of Pan-Africanism and commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples to maintain and strengthen our unity and solidarity and to pool our resources and wisdom in order to face the challenges of the decade of the 1990s and beyond, change the bleak socio-economic prospects of our continent and guarantee a better life for all peoples and future generations yet unborn. These objectives are well within our capabilities. We, therefore, pledge to apply ourselves fully to the achievement of these objectives (OAU, 1990b, paragraph 12).

Accordingly, different programmes were formulated between 1990 and 2000 underpinned by the ideals of pan-Africanism and reflecting the pledges by African leaders to commit themselves to achieving continental objectives, and addressing the issue of state sovereignty in order to make progress (Geldenhuys, 2012:59). These initiatives include the: "African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation endorsed in 1990; Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action on human rights 1999; Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security; Lome Declaration indicating an OAU stance on Unconstitutional Changes of Government adopted in 2000" and others (OAU Declaration AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1).[115]

As democracy began to be take root in the continent and new leaders were elected in a number of African countries, African leaders began the process of transforming the OAU. Efforts in this direction began in 1999 and culminated in the establishment of the African

[114] The concept of „African Solutions to African problems" has become popular in expressing optimism that the continent has the natural, material and human resources which could be mobilised for development. As such the concept has become prominent in recognising the various efforts made in the continent towards an African renaissance, African renewal and Africa‟s economic recovery and transformation (For details, see Dersso, 2012.

[115] For details on the programmes adopted from the 1980s, see Republic of South Africa, International Relations and Cooperation Department, "African Union in a nutshell", Pretoria, 2003, www.au.nepad/au-nutshell.htm.

Union in 2002. The period of transformation from the OAU to the African Union also coincided with the formulation of the NEPAD initiative by some African leaders. In 2003, African leaders took the decision to adopt the NEPAD as the comprehensive economic programme of the continent and thereafter established the APRM as the governance instrument of NEPAD to facilitate the achievement of objectives. The establishment of the African Union/NEPAD and APRM demonstrated the zeal of African leaders to establish a political-economic governance and security architecture in the African continent. As Respondent AUC [B] indicates, the African Union, NEPAD and APRM initiatives seek to redress the problems of poor governance, corruption and institutional failure, thereby providing the necessary conditions for sustainable growth and development.[116]

5.5 The African Union/NEPAD: Key policy frameworks and implementation strategies

In the first decade following the African Union‟s adoption of the NEPAD programme, African leaders, working in partnership with the United Nations and other international partners within and outside Africa, the RECs and other stake holders, rolled out their Action Plan (AU/UN, 2008:I). Known as Africa Action Plan (AAP), the AU/NEPAD document listed thematically, the policies, programmes and projects to be implemented. These policy frameworks were formulated based on identified regional integration and development challenges and needs in the continent as well as those of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (NEPAD/ECA/OSAA, 2012:VIII-X). Within each of the priority areas identified, there are policy frameworks embodying the programmes and projects to be accomplished, with the estimated costs stated and the roles or responsibilities expected of each of the continent‟s development partners are outlined (AU/NEPAD, 2008; see also, NEPAD, 2011a:5).

On-going AU/NEPAD programmes and projects are being implemented at national and sub-regional levels where various policy frameworks have been formulated (NEPAD/ECA/OSAA, 2012:XI-XII). They include: “the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP), Africa‟s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA), Environment Action Plan (EAP), Sub-regional Environmental Action Plan (SREAPs), NEPAD Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP), NEPAD Spatial

[116] Interview with AUC „B‟ at the African Union Headquarters. Date: 5 August 2013.

Development Programme (SPD), Programme for infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF), African Union Gender Policy Framework, Framework for Engendering NEPAD and regional economic communities (RECs), AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, Policy Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), AU-NEPAD Health Strategy", among others (NEPAD, 2011a:4-5; see also, AU/UN, 2008:I).

The AU/NEPAD Africa Action Plan 2010-2015 was first conceived in 2005/2006 but had to be revised to accommodate new and pressing needs identified in particular areas (NEPAD, 2011a:5). It got the approval of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) in June 2009, in Sirte, Libya having been confirmed at the level of the RECs (NEPAD, 2011a:5). Also, in order to expedite the implementation of major infrastructural projects in the Plan "through accelerated financial closure of the AAP (Priority Action Plan)" the NEPAD Agency in December 2010, issued an abridged edition of the AAP, Infrastructure PAP 2010-2012 (NEPAD, 2011b:6; see also, NEPAD, 2011a:29). A progress review of the Plan between 2005 and 2008 showed that:

> Progress with the implementation had been negligible, and only a small number of infrastructure projects had reached implementation since 2008. A prioritisation analysis was conducted aimed at delivery bankable „quick win" projects and programmes with strong regional impacts. Of the 25 priority programmes and projects listed in the abridged version of the AU/NEPAD AAP 2010-2012, 8 were at Stage 2 – Feasibility/Needs Assessment; 15 were at Stage 3 – Programme/Project Structuring and Promotion; 2 were at Stage 4 – Implementation and Operations (NEPAD, 2011b:7-8).

The abridged version was meant to merge major programmes in the sector such as the 2002 Short Term Action Plan (STAP) with the AAP and also outline priority programme to be incorporated into comprehensive projects such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development (PIDA) for which studies began in 2009. It comprised chapters focusing on two of the particular sectors - infrastructure and gender development and also a chapter presenting related information for the main crosscutting sectors (NEPAD, 2011b:6). The abridged version of the AAP sought to underscore the critical need for addressing the issue of financing and engaging the stake-holders and partners within and outside the continent in mobilising resources for implementing the AU/NEPAD Plan of Action.

Considering that various studies have been undertaken at different periods examining the significance of continental frameworks of the AU/NEPAD and monitoring the progress on implementation, the present study will limit analysis in this section to programmes on infrastructural development. This is due to the need to work within the scope of the study. Infrastructure development is selected based on how important and linked it is to the realisation of Africa‟s integration and development agenda. The spill-over effects of infrastructure development on other sectors of the economy and in accelerating the implementation of other programmes, for instance, on agriculture, cannot be over-emphasised. Hence, it would be possible to reflect the findings on infrastructure development to the implementation of other programmes of the AU/NEPAD. (See figure 5.1, p. 159).

Figure 5.1: Infrastructure development could spill over to progress in other sectors



Source: Author‟s Compilation

5.5.1 AU/NEPAD initiatives on infrastructure development

Within the African Union/NEPAD initiatives, African governments have established various policy frameworks, programmes and projects focused on addressing the different infrastructure needs and challenges at all levels in the continent. Basically, the sectors emphasised within the NEPAD framework are: energy, water, transport and information and

communications technology (ICT). These sectors are central to achieving the AU/NEPAD‟s objectives of accelerating regional and continental integration and development, enhancing intra-regional, inter-regional and inter-continental trade, harnessing and developing Africa‟s natural, material and human resources, eradicating poverty, improving the standard of living of Africans and promoting Africa‟s competitiveness in the world economic system (See, NEPAD, 2002:2; McPhie, 2003:2; Ngwainmbi, 2005:305; RCM, 2007:10; Biau et al, 2008:3; AU/NEPAD, 2011:33-34; Nyirenda-Jere, 2010:2-3; Hammons, 2011:747; ECA/AU, 2012:2; Ijeoma, 2012: 37; Bassole, 2014:1).

The infrastructure gap has been continuously emphasised as one of the principal obstacles to intra-African trade and other economic activities in the continent. It is a fundamental cause of the slow pace of socio-economic development in Africa. The dearth of infrastructure constitutes a set-back and limits Africa‟s capacity to attract investments and effectively exploit the benefits of a more intensively globalising world (Hammons, 2011:749). It is calculated, for instance, that poor infrastructure in Africa cuts down business productivity by at least "40 per cent and per capita output growth by 2 per cent" (Bassole, 2014:4; see also, AICD, 2009). A study published by the World Bank (2010) found that: Africa lags behind other developing countries in terms of infrastructure coverage; Africa‟s difficult geography is a prominent issue in the continent‟s infrastructure development efforts; the different countries have peculiar infrastructure challenges; the power sector presents the major infrastructure challenge; Africa needs an estimated US$93 billion a year to address its infrastructure needs, among others.[117] NEPAD has identified that, "there can be no meaningful development without trade and there can be no trade without adequate and reliable infrastructure"[118] Infrastructure development is therefore, one of the priority project in the AU/NEPAD African Action Plan.

The spill-over effects of infrastructure development on other sectors is documented in scholarly materials. It could lead to generating more investments in other sectors (McPhie, 2003:1; Ngwainmbi, 2005:298; Hammons, 2011:749; Ijeoma, 2012:36; Bassole, 2014:4). Ngwainmbi (2005:298) identifies the benefits of ICT for good governance and democratisation. This could then enhance the process of the APRM if well exploited. ICTs

[117] See, Foster and Briceno-Garmendia, 2010.
[118] See, www.nepad.org/regionlintegrationandinfrastructure. (Accessed: 12 February 2015).

could empower individuals to take part effectively in governance and development processes. Infrastructural development, which meet the needs of the people, ICTs, have the potential to promote peace, stability and security in the African continent as many of the issues that trigger internal conflicts would be addressed. The capacity of African states to perform their functions would be enhanced. This would create the necessary environment and conditions for regional cooperation and integration and the conduct of international business. African countries would be able to attract more investments making the continent an investment hub.

Considering therefore, that the dearth of infrastructure is a concern to all, progress in the achievement of NEPAD‟s infrastructural development programme for the continent is crucial as similar efforts in most African countries have been less than successful. The challenge is that, on the one hand, infrastructure development is a huge project, and a regional approach is ideal for Africa; on the other hand, regional cooperation efforts in the continent are confronted with many challenges. Also important is the fact that external assistance is needed towards addressing the infrastructure development challenges in the continent and needs to be adequately mobilised and utilised appropriately. NEPAD is expected to intervene in order to facilitate the speeding up of the implementation of programmes that were already in place; foster partnerships for development assistance; identify key challenges and advocate the establishments of new policies in order to enhance efficiency in addressing the infrastructure deficit.

The NEPAD initiative is meant to bring about a new drive, to motivate the political will and commitment of governments to address identified problems in the infrastructure sector. It expects to provide a regional approach aimed at coordinating and harmonising the efforts of African governments in handling infrastructural development (NEPAD, 2002:2). On the other hand, NEPAD‟s APRM, through the process of country self-assessments, monitors to ensure that governments of member countries comply with regional codes and standards concerning the AU/NEPAD infrastructure development programmes as well as the programmes on agriculture, environment, and others. On-going regional projects relate to: “The connectivity and modernisation of corridor, ports, railways and air transport; improvement of road networks and these include the completion of the “missing links” of the Trans-African Highway (TAH) with different road construction, rehabilitation and extension” (ECA, 2013:13). The latter part of this section examines NEPAD‟s successes, failures and challenges in achieving these goals.

NEPAD‟s infrastructure development programmes are two fold: the Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) which embodies Africa‟s priority measures and projects, and the Medium to Long-Term Strategic Framework (MLTSF). In 2002, NEPAD‟s STAP began the process of regional infrastructure development (AfDB/NEPAD, 2010:13). Through this initiative, the continent‟s infrastructure challenges were identified and STAP focused on four areas namely: "facilitating the establishment of policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks to create a suitable environment for investment and efficient operations, capacity building initiatives to empower the implementing institutions to perform their mandates, investment in physical projects, and studies to prepare future projects" (NEPAD, 2002:7; AfDB/NEPAD, 2010:15).

In order to ensure the effective implementation of STAP, the role of NEPAD was: "mobilising political will and actions to implement policy and institutional reforms, including harmonising regulatory systems and ratifying agreements, facilitating the mobilisation of resources for regional projects, and facilitating knowledge sharing, networking and dissemination of best practice among countries, RECs and technical agencies (NEPAD, 2002:7). The STAP was linked with the Medium to Long-Term Strategic Framework (MLTSF) which was concerned with medium and long term planning for strategies towards achieving the goals of STAP. The MLTSF was also concerned with attending to issues related to governance and regulation, capacity building, among others (NEPAD, 2002:10).

The STAP initiative hoped to bring about positive improvements in all the infrastructural sectors handled under the NEPAD initiative: improving the transport sector; ensuring the most beneficial usage of Africa‟s energy resources thereby enhancing the standard of living for Africans; promoting effective public-private partnership, regional development corridors and power pools, closing the infrastructural deficit in ICT, improving sustainable access to clean water and sanitation (AU/NEPAD, 2011-33-34). The formulation of the STAP was in the early years of NEPAD before the Africa Action Plan; as such, it "merged all the existing priority regional and continental programmes and projects of the RECs" (NEPAD, 2011a:28). STAP took on close to 120 regional projects for implementation in the different infrastructure sub-sectors.[119] This initiative promoted collaborations between the private sector, infrastructure agencies and the RECs (NEPAD, 2011a:27-28). African governments were

[119] A comprehensive list of identified projects in the different sectors are documented in NEPAD, 2002:2-10. See also, AfDB/NEPAD, 2010:14-21.

able to establish and strengthen partnerships with important institutional financial agencies, the World Bank and the African Development Bank which funded some of the NEPAD"s projects and the European Union Commission.

The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa was established at the G8 Gleneagles Meeting in 2005 with "the mission to help improve the lives and economic well being of millions of people across the African continent through support to scaling up investment in infrastructure development from both public and private sources" (ICA, 13 May 2009). The African Development Bank also received assistance from the Canadian government to create a NEPAD infrastructure Projects Preparation fund (NEPAD-IPPF). This fund helped in project preparation and in carrying out feasibility studies (NEPAD, 2011a:26). From the time of its formulation in 2002 to 2008, the STAP projects "attracted investment amounting to US$5.6 billion" through the IPPF with the support of the AfDB and other partners (NEPAD, 2011a:28; see also, RCM-Africa, 2007:10).

An UNCTAD Report (2012:3) has it that, "available data indicate that Africa"s economic growth performance in the decade that NEPAD was introduced (2000-2009) was significantly better than the decade before its introduction (1990-1999)". The RCM-Africa (2007:10) reports also that emphasis is placed on road transportation and attention is being paid to Trans-African Highway System. An ECA (2013:16) Report notes however, that road sector has been confronted with several challenges of: "extension and maintenance due to, among other causes, the overloading of the vehicles, the lack and poor management of funds allocated to road network". Also, the various "missing links" in the Trans-African Highways System are yet to be addressed (ECA, 2013:16). There were sub-regional projects in the ICT sub-sector and, in addition, "NEPAD now has 22 water projects underway in seven river basins" (RCM-Africa, 2007:10). A third review on progress of the implementation of STAP carried out in 2009 revealed that:

> Implementation progress has been below expectations. In all, 103 STAP projects were reviewed. Of these, 16 projects reached completion. Approximately 70% of the STAP projects have progressed in some form or another. Among the STAP projects, 89% of study projects progressed, followed by 80% of investment projects, 65% of facilitation projects and 36% of capacity building projects. A similar ranking was also observed among the STAP completed projects - 33% of studies were completed, followed by 20% of investment projects; 6% of facilitation projects and 0% of capacity building

> projects. Progress has been particularly slow in the case of capacity building and facilitation projects due to various reasons such as financing constraints, inadequate mechanisms of project monitoring, unclear definitions of projects, etc. The progress has been good in the case of study projects and moderate in the case of investment projects. In the case of studies, the ownership/control rests with the RECs; hence their progress is better than that of any other project type. In the case of investment projects, externalities dominate the progress of projects, namely financing, political and capacity constraints... Majority of the RECs did not have up-to-date information on many of the STAP projects. This was mostly observed for capacity building and facilitation projects (AfDB/NEPAD, 2010:2).

Other projects were on-going before the STAP and MLTSF were later developed into the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) in 2010.[120] The establishment PIDA initiative was a watershed in the agenda of African leaders to develop this sector. Approved in 2012, the PIDA initiative is broad-based and builds on the other programmes in this sector (ECA/AU, 2012:2; Bassole, 2014:1). In formulating PIDA, African leaders took into consideration the shortcomings of the past initiatives, the weaknesses and the elements to be improved upon such as, the need for Africans to own the initiative, the issue of funding, the need for improved strategies of implementation and others (ECA/AU, 2012:1). In the PIDA initiative, African governments outline the short-term, medium and long-term goals which they are set to achieve by 2020, 2030, and 2040 respectively, "with expert projections that African countries will grow by an average of six percent a year until 2040" (The NEPAD, Guide, 2012a:32).

PIDA"s Priority Action Plan (PAP) is to implement 51 regional and continental infrastructure projects. These projects are classified in the different sectors as follows: "15 projects in the energy sector, 24 in transport, 9 trans-boundary water projects and 3 for ICT" (ECA/AU, 2012:5). These projects were later "broken down into 433 projects and sub-projects. 83 of these were subsequently selected to form part of the PIDA PAP for 2020. Out of 433 projects, 16 projects considered as „quick-wins" for financing implementation were shortlisted" (NEPAD, 2014a:29-30). (See Table 5.1, p. 165). The ECA/AU (2012:5) outlined that, the "overall cost of delivering the Priority Action Plan from 2012 through 2020 is expected to be nearly $68 billion or about $7.5 billion annually for the next nine years".

[120] For more details on the success recorded in the implementation of the STAP projects, see NEPAD"s Annual Report, 2003/2004, 22-28.; see also, AfDB/NEPAD, 2010; NEPAD, 2011a:27-28.

Table 5.1: Sixteen high development impact regional infrastructure projects

No.	Project Name	Infrastructure Sector	Footprint Country/RECs	Implementation Status*
1.	Ruzizi III Hydropower Power	Energy – Generation	SADC, EAC	Feasibility study completed 2008-11. PPP contact expected to be signed in August 2014. Financial closure August 2016. Project is expected to begin in 2017 and construction completed in 2020. This project enjoys national, regional and international support/financing.
2.	Dar es Salaam Port Expansion	Transport – Ports	Tanzania, SADC, EAC	Project enjoys national, regional and international support. Port Master Plan completed in early 2000‟s. Feasibility for the modernisation of berths 1-7 completed. Expression of Interest (EOL) released in 2013 for PPP and transaction advisory. Request for proposal was postponed in late 2014. World Maritime News as well as The Citizen Tanzania, 15 April 2015 have it that “Dar es Salaam has secured USD596 million for upgrade. The World Bank will give a USD400 million loan for financing the upgrade project in line with Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project (DMGP). The UK‟s Department for International Development will give USD136million in a prospective grant while the remaining 60million will be provided from the International Development and Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA)”.
3.	Serenje-Nakonde Road	Transport – Road Infrastructure	Zambia, SADC	Economic analysis was done in 2012/ 2013. The final design reports and bidding docs were expected to be available in November 2013. The designs were undertaken in three sections: Serenje-Mpika, Mpika-Chinsali and Chinsali-Nakonde. An AfDB Report dated March 2015, revealed that “the government of Zambia through the Roads Development Agency is seeking funding from the African Development Bank to finance the rehabilitation of the T2 road from Chinsali to Nakonde road section”. The AfDB has taken interest in the project and an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) has been undertaken. Project is expected to be completed by the end of 2017.

				The project enjoys national, regional and international support.
4.	Nigeria-Algeria Gas Pipeline	Energy – Gas	ECOWAS, UMA	Feasibility studies concluded and accepted by sponsors in September 2006. Intergovernmental agreement between governments executed and ratified. Implementing authorities are NNPC (Nigeria), SONATRACH (Algeria) and SONIDEP (Niger), Nigeria‟s Infrastructure Concession and regulatory Commission (ICRC), as well as the ECOWAS. Initially, the NNPC and SONATRACH would hold a total of 90 per cent of shares while Niger would hold 10 per cent. EXPOGROUP Report (19 December 2014) reveals that the states involved are committed to the project. In the NNPC News and Update, April 23 2015, NNPC Group Managing Director announced that the project had been integrated into the Nigerian Gas Master plan and is expected to deliver first gas around 2015. The Chief Executive Officer of SONATRACH also declared that Algeria was ready to add value to the project for the benefit of all parties involved and offered the use of the existing gas pipeline network and storage facilities of SONATRACH for the project. NNPC is progressing with the Trans-Nigerian segment of the pipeline to kick start and fast-track the initiative. Expected project completion 2015 for a duration of 4 years.
5.	Modernisation of Dakar-Bamako Rail Line	Transport – Rail	ECOWAS	Engineering consultants completed the pre-feasibility study for the Dakar-Djibouti rail project in 2011-2012. Grant application to be submitted by the two governments through ECOWAS and UEMOA.
6.	Sambangalou Hydropower Project	Energy – Generation	ECOWAS	Project enjoys national, regional and international support. All documents, policies, studies and legal framework have been completed and will be updated by new transaction advisor once the financing has been mobilised. Expected date of project completion 2018.
7.	Abidjan-Lagos Coastal Corridor	Transport – Road Infrastructure	ECOWAS	Enjoys national, regional and international support. The terms of reference for the feasibility and

				detailed engineering studies and Treaty prepared and validated. Some sections of the corridor are already being implemented as national projects and the countries concerned are rolling out one-stop border posts as part of on-going trade and transport facilitation project.
8.	Lusaka-Lilongwa ICT Terrestrial Fibre Optic	ICT	SADC, COMESA	Project expected to commence in 2015. Expected construction duration is 0.75 years. Issues of operations and management funding resolved; technical studies partially completed. Governance, management and structure: Needs identified. Part of Malawi Fibre Optic Network Plan.
9.	Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya Transmission Line (ZTK)	Energy – Transmission	SADC, EAC, COMESA, IGAD	On-going rehabilitation and uprating of old power stations and the new power projects currently under implementation or planned for development in the next five years or so.
10.	North Africa Transmission Corridor – Project	Energy – Transmission	UMA, COMESA	Some sections for this line already exist within a limited commercial framework.
11.	Abidjan Ouagadougou Road – Rail Project	Transport – Rail	ECOWAS	Some sections of the programme are already being implemented under national projects. Corridor management committee recently established. Financing has been obtained from various donors, and a PPP is intended for the project.
12.	Douala-Bangui-Ndjamena Corridor/Road – Rail	Transport – Road Infrastructure	ECCAS	Some sections of the programme are already being implemented under national projects. Corridor management committee recently established. Financing has been obtained from various donors, and a PPP is intended for the project.
13.	Kampala-Jinga Road Project	Transport – Road Infrastructure	Uganda, EAC, IGAD	Contract: build. Expected construction duration 4 years. Design studies for upgrading the road are on-going with planned completion in December 2013 and will either recommend upgrade of the existing road or the provision of a new 3-4 lane dual carriageway with access control. Issue of operations and maintenance, funding: Resolved. Technical studies: Partially completed.
14.	Juba-Torit-Kapoeta-Nadapal-Eldoret	Transport – Road Infrastructure	EAC, IGAD	Contract type: Build, maintain operate; Detail design complete. The first phase of this project is being

	Road			funded by World Bank. Because of the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan, the project is yet to be approved by the bank. The second phase (in Kenya) is expected to be prepared next fiscal year subject to IDA resource availability.
15.	Batoka Gorge Hydropower Project	Energy – Generation	SADC, COMESA	Potential contract type: Build, operate, transfer or PPP structure where both government and private are involved from the start - SPV. Planned commencement year 2015. MOU was signed between Zambia and Zimbabwe in 2012 and the project should be fully completed in a 5-6 year period. Tender is out for new feasibility studies including social and environmental impact assessment.
16.	Congo-DRC Road/Rail Bridge and Kinshasa to lllebo Rail	Transport – Roads/Rail	ECCAS, SADC	The Joint Technical Monitoring for the bridge section of the project has been appointed. Feasibility study and detailed design are being prepared under the supervision of ECCAS. The railway section of the project will be the responsibility of the DRC Government, which has already formed a Railway Technical Committee to oversee the pre-feasibility study.

Source: NEPAD (2014a:31).

*Data used for the compilation of the implementation status of the projects was obtained from: NEPAD, 2014b. Dakar Financing Summit for Africa‟s Infrastructure, Regional Infrastructure Transformation Brochure. Additional information provided from other sources have been indicated in the table.

As the table above reveals, the 16 priority projects which the Report on the AU/NEPAD Dakar Financing Summit for Africa‟s Infrastructure, held between 14-15 June 2014, records as "strategic and regionally balance projects" are at different development stages (NEPAD, 2014b). According to this Report:

> The 16 are further grouped into two main categories: "First 8", high impact projects deemed relatively advanced in terms of readiness and a "second eight (8)" which is relatively at early stage of project development cycle. Within each category of projects, there is diversity in the state of readiness. Four of the projects are at an advanced stage of funding, while the remaining ones are at various stages of project implementation" (NEPAD, 2014b).

With the PIDA initiative, the African Union Commission and the NEPAD Agency would work with development partners, the ADB and other stakeholders to implement the

programmes and projects mapped out in this sector (NEPAD Annual Report, 2012b:19). The Institutional Architecture for Infrastructure Development in Africa was also endorsed by African Heads of State and Government in 2012 as a body through which the AUC and NCPA will develop attention to monitoring and advocacy of the PIDA implementation process at the continental level (NEPAD Annual Report, 2012b:18-19).

The RECs will be concerned with monitoring the progress on implementation of projects in the different sectors. The RECs are tasked with not only ensuring that "soft" policy measures are harmonised and implemented in individual countries, they will also ensure that continental institutions concerned with updating Heads of States on overall progress are kept abreast of happenings at the state and regional levels (NEPAD Annual Report, 2012b:19).[121] On the other hand, information provided on the websites of relevant institutions handling infrastructure development issues for the civil society to access and be carried along on the developments in the continent need to be regularly updated. More forums should be organised with CSOs representatives to keep the flow of information on progress up to expectation.

As part of efforts to facilitate the achievements of objectives in this sector, the 16th Assembly of the AU-NEPAD approved the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI) which was launched in 2010 (see, The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:34-45). The PICI initiative identifies and supports eight projects (in the African Union‟s five regions) in the infrastructure sector from the AU/NEPAD AAP (The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:34). Three projects out of the selected 16 outlined above, are among the selected PICI projects (NEPAD, 2014b). (See Table 5.2, p. 170).

[121] Soft policy measures, according to Bassole (2014:2), refer to "the removal of intangible barriers to free movement of goods, capital, services and labour and the establishment of institutional frameworks to enhance integration of national markets".

Table 5.2: Eight projects advancing regional integration

Project	Champion	Beneficiary countries and Regional Economic Communities
Missing Links of the Trans-Sahara Highway	Algeria	Algeria, Niger and Nigeria Tunisia, Mali and Chad ECOWAS, Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
Optic Fibre Project – Along the Nigeria-Algeria Gas Pipeline Project Alignment	Algeria	Algeria, Niger and Nigeria ECOWAS, AMU
Dakar-Ndjamena-Djibouti Road and Rail Project	Senegal	Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti ECOWAS, ECCAS COMESA and IGAD
North- South Corridor Road and Rail Project	South Africa	South Africa, Botswana Mozambique, Zambia Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi SADC, COMESA and EAC
Kinshasa-Brazzaville Bridge Road and Rail Project	Republic of Congo	Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Eastern, Central and Southern Africa ECCAS, SADC and COMESA
Nigeria-Algeria Gas Pipeline	Nigeria	Nigeria, Niger and Algeria ECOWAS, AMU
ICT Broadband Fibre Optic Links Connecting Neighbouring States Project and Umojanet Cross-Border Terrestrial Network	Rwanda	All African countries All RECs
Water Management, River and Rail Transport Projects	Egypt	Countries to be selected

Source: NEPAD, 2011a. NEPAD – A Continental Thrust: Advancing Africa's development. South Africa: NPCA. 32-33.

The various efforts of African governments through different regional and continental initiatives aimed at addressing the infrastructure deficits have been acknowledged by many scholars and international organisations (Zhou, 2003:3; RCM, 2007:10; Biau, 2008:5; UNCTAD, 2012:3; ICA, 2013:4; Bassole, 2014:9). A senior official at the ECA confirmed the identified projects and measures being put in place to harmonise transport policy and to

develop the physical transport infrastructure at the continental level. This official noted: "we are working on the trans-African highways. In Africa, we have nine trans-African highways that we call the backbones of the regional integration process. They go from Algiers, right down to Cape Town. In some areas, you have what we call „missing links" on the highways and we are trying to see how countries and RECs can assist in building these missing links..."[122]

The ECA official explained further that:

> In order to tackle the problems constraining people from moving freely across the continent, we are looking at two aspects: the physical – roads and railway linkages, and then the soft parts which are the cross-border issues. So now, what we are trying to do is to harmonise the technical designs for these roads; to have technical norms, and to have norms for environmental issues, for social issues, for safety issues, and so on. So, look at it that if all these links are completed, Africans would be able to move across the continent. Let"s also look at the corridors. In each REC, they have a set of corridors which they are trying to promote so that they can have transport routes to the landlocked countries to facilitate access to these countries; to have harmonised norms on corridors. A decision was also taken in 2000 to liberalise air transport market and we are pushing for its implementation.[123]

Several initiatives have been established with the objective of infrastructure development in the continent and there are infrastructure development projects on-going at the national level in African countries and at the level of the RECs (Hagerman, 2012:12-26).[124] Summits and Forums continue to be organised to mobilise governments, development partners, business persons, and other stakeholders to support infrastructure development and address challenges in this sector. According to AU/NEPAD Dakar Financing Summit (NEPAD, 2014b), "many high capacity international backbone network projects have been built to connect Africa to the rest of the world on an open access basis, thus allowing a gradual reduction in bandwidth cost and long distance tariffs". In 2012, the NEPAD Energy Programme with assistance from partners, promoted "Africa"s voice in the United Nation"s Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4ALL) and promoting investment in sustainable bio energy" (NEPAD, Annual Report 2012b:21). The NEPAD e-Africa programme, which aims to make Africa globally competitive achieved progress with "the launch of the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE)

[122] Interview with ECA 3, a senior official at the Economic Commission for Africa. Date: 19 June 2013.
[123] Interview with ECA 3. Date: 19 June 2013.
[124] For instance, infrastructure development projects in Southern Africa and at the national level in Cote d"Ivoire and other African countries.

submarine cable and mobilising African countries‟ support for the dotAfrica project” (NEPAD Annual Report 2012b:22). Through the NEPAD e-schools initiative, many schools are being linked and ICT skills are being taught to the youths (NEPAD, 2011a:38-40).

Private sector participation has also improved compared with what obtained in the 1990s (NEPAD Guide, 2012a:39). The UNCTAD Report (2012:3) indicates that, NEPAD has put in place policies to develop infrastructure in Africa which is important for agricultural development in the African region. It is agreed that progress in the implementation of the PIDA projects in the different sectors would unlock Africa‟s potential for economic growth, prosperity and sustainable socio-economic development (RCM-Africa, 2007:10; Biau et al, 2008:5; Ijeoma, 2012:46).

Results are trickling in but at a rate considerably below the rate African leaders promised when they established NEPAD. The slow pace of regional project implementation and the number of projects completed are not encouraging and show that governments are yet to demonstrate the requisite political will and commitment to realising agreed regional objectives. NEPAD‟s STAP did not achieve the expected goals but raised the policy challenges, technical issues and other governance deficits in this sector. As such, scepticisms about the feasibility of meeting the goals enunciated in the PIDA initiative at a reasonable target time are justified. The concern of this study is therefore how difficult it would be to realise regional economic integration objectives with the level of seriousness and commitment to follow through the successful completion of various regional infrastructure projects.

Beyond the issue of funding, several studies reveal that national and regional priorities do not align and this is a major cause of delays and failures in implementing and completing projects on infrastructure development. For instance, PIDA‟s review shows that, “segments of the Trans-African Highways that correspond to the priorities of the country involved have been built, but segments that do not fit country priorities have stagnated” (The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:33). In some cases, projects have been poorly implemented and some abandoned as a result of corruption and misappropriation of fund. These are some of the key issues illustrating the political and economic challenges in implementing regional infrastructure projects which have to be dealt with for the AU/NEPAD‟s PIDA and PICI initiatives and others to be successful.

There is evidence to suggest that the international community has been favourably committed to supporting regional infrastructure development in Africa (Ngwainmbi, 2005:305; RCM-Africa, 2007-20-22; Biau et al, 2008:5; Ijeoma, 2012:39; ICA, 2013:11-24). This could perhaps, be as a result of the emphasis on promoting good governance by the NEPAD and its APRM initiative. Biau et al (2008:4-5) note, for instance, that "from 2005 to 2006, Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA)"s members" commitments for transport projects in Africa, rose from US$2.6 to nearly US$3.2 billion. The share of annual commitments to regional infrastructure projects by multilateral and bilateral agencies has changed from less than US$100 million in 2000 to nearly US$1 billion in 2006". The ICA"s Annual Report 2012 and 2013 records progress both at the national levels and in partners" commitments in addressing the infrastructure challenge in Africa.

Notwithstanding the global attention attracted by African initiatives, several issues of concern shared by scholars and observers with regard to donor funds are critical in this study. For instance, donor funds do not come without conditions attached (Zhou, 2003:3; Ngwainmbi, 2005:305), may be inadequate, unsustainable and not directed to specific needs and challenges in the continent (see, Zhou, 2003:3; AU/NEPAD, 2011:42-47; ECA/AU, 2012:6; Egbulem et al, 2012:275). As Respondent AUC [A] notes: "when you say that partners can fund this project, the problem is that the partners will fund the programme which in their views, is very important or will benefit them. They cannot fund a project which is not in their interest. This is the problem. For instance, the CAADP project is very important for the continent, but it may not be critical for the partners; who then will fund this"?[125] Bassole (2014:9) also observes that: "since the G8 Summit held in Gleneagles in 2005, external public funding jumped from US$37 billion in 2007 to US$56 billion in 2010. These resources have nonetheless remained well below the requirements". The issues raised here further the argument in this study that Africans should see external assistance as secondary to primary efforts to look inwards and promote self reliance and collective efforts towards development. Another concern is the need for African governments to be strategic as the East Asians were and make plans meaningful enough to maximise what is obtained from external partnerships for the benefit of the continent and its people. The moral responsibility to care for one another is first and foremost ours as Africans.

[125] Interview with AUC A at the African Union Headquarters. Date : 19 June, 2013.

It is regrettable, however, that there are key issues relating to lack of accountability on the part of African leaders with regard to corruption and the diversion of donor funds (Ngwainmbi, 2005:305; Chen, 2012:12; Ijeoma, 2012:46; Bassole, 2014:9). The limited participation of Africa‟s civil society and the private sector in the conception, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies are all key governance issues in Africa, and as such, generate lack of confidence and support for national, regional and continental initiatives such as PIDA. It therefore is the concern of this study that the APRM, as a governance monitoring instrument would address governance issues in order to facilitate the implementation of the AU/NEPAD programmes.

Different studies have been undertaken by institutions, scholars and observers generally to monitor progress in the implementation of NEPAD initiatives. While the goals articulated in NEPAD appear to be focused on addressing Africa‟s political and socio-economic problems, many are concerned not only about the sincerity of African leaders, but more about how regional initiatives affect the lives of the poor who constitute the majority of the population and particularly those in the rural areas. The question to ask is: do NEPAD initiatives align with the realities and needs of the African continent and its people? For instance, is it a matter of concern that in some cases where the infrastructure is available, it may be beyond the reach or affordability of the poor masses? In a study on NEPAD‟s energy initiative, Zhou (2003:1), identifies disconnects in NEPAD‟s objectives of eradicating poverty, promoting economic growth and socio-economic development, and promoting the role of women in all sectors. For example, highlighting that multinational corporations in Africa carry on operations without adequate consideration for the problems faced by the masses of the poor in the host communities, Zhou (2003:2) notes that:

> Energy supply paradigms have tended to be built on the same model of monopolistic structures that tend to supply energy to the industrial complex neglecting the needs of the poor. The potential that is in small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) to catalyse industrialisation and create the much needed employment has not been exploited. Similarly, the potential in moving from few actors and large energy supply side structures to new systems with magnitude of small scattered installations that are manufactured, distributed, marketed and operated by a small myriad of individuals and small firms remain a lip service.

Zhou (2003:2-3) emphasises that Africa‟s enormous potential has remained underutilised in the energy sector. This is also true of other sectors such as agriculture (see, Bwalya,

2012:23). Africa continues to fail in making the most advantageous use of its enormous natural and material resources and investing in human capital formation and development partly because of dearth of infrastructure and lack of appropriate and articulate policies. African countries have differing infrastructure needs and challenges: thus, progress in different sectors is variable since countries are not at the same levels of development (McPhie, 2003:7; The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:32). For instance, with reference to NEPAD‟s ICT policy initiative, McPhie (2003:2) notes that the process of reform has been initiated in almost all Africa countries but the level of progress is not the same across the continent. Many African countries, particularly those with more developed economies, have "embarked on programmes of telecommunications, liberalisation and deregulation to a greater or lesser degree" (McPhie, 2003:2). These challenging issues portray disconnects in the formulation of the NEPAD initiative as such challenges could have been factored in from the start and mechanisms put in place to cope with such issues. Hence, NEPAD has to live up to the task of coordinating national policies in order to achieve the PIDA objectives. The APRM also has the responsibility of monitoring to ensure that policies of member countries conform to regional agreements, policies and programmes.

Notwithstanding the levels of progress in project implementation, the general view is that NEPAD‟s development objectives are yet to be achieved (McPhie, 2005:47; Bassole, 2014:9). Infrastructure challenges are still major constraints to the continent‟s integration and development agenda. Persistent socio-economic challenges – poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and environmental degradation, among others - are evidence pointing to weaknesses both in the design and implementation of the NEPAD initiatives. These challenges which have persisted in many African countries draw attention to the question raised in this study about the goals which are outlined in regional initiatives and those which are being sought and pursued in reality.

Another concern is whose interests are promoted in initiatives such as NEPAD: those of the elites or non-elite members in the countries. In essence, regional integration initiatives fail to align with the realities in the continent and the needs of the people and this puts to test the sincerity of African leaders. Why have African leaders not put in sufficient effort into human capital formation and development; harnessing African skills at home and abroad; developing the educational systems in their countries; reversing the issue of brain drain and creating jobs for the unemployed? It is doubtful if, in reality, Africa leaders are confident that Africa can

achieve independent development without reverting to the West for funding and support. These issues are crucial and raise questions on how the PIDA initiative will be implemented. While it is noted that in establishing the NEPAD initiative, African leaders appear to demonstrate the desire and political will to promote regional integration, it is a concern that regional policies are most often not integrated into national laws and policy frameworks (ECA/AU, 2013:3). Even in cases where they have been signed as treaties, they are not enforced (ECA/AU, 2013:3). Moreover, beyond the issue of inadequate funding, regional initiatives are constrained by "weak policy alignment and harmonisation" (ECA/AU, 2013:3; see also, RCM-Africa, 2007:33-34; NEPAD Guide, 2012a:32). A major test for NEPAD would be to reverse these negative trends.

In order to achieve the objectives outlined in various regional initiatives, there is need for "harmonisation of economic and investment policies, monitoring regional decisions, drafting regulations" (Ijeoma, 2012:37; see also, McPhie, 2003:9; RCM-Africa, 2007:30-34; Bassole, 2014:9). It is increasingly clear that African leaders would have to speak with one voice and agree in addressing infrastructure challenges that hinder the continent‟s integration and development processes. If this is achieved, it would not be difficult to foster a more inclusive process involving all stakeholders in the development process at all levels. These assertions point to the fact that governance issues at the national level in African countries need to be tackled in order to achieve regional objectives. The APRM has the mandate to address governance deficiencies in furthering the AU/NEPAD objectives.

Implementing the PIDA project would require a lot of funding and mobilising funds at the domestic level becomes imperative. Zhou (2003:3), Ijeoma (2012:46) and other scholars note that Africa needs to look inwards, build its own capacity to fund its development process. Depending on donor funding in order to implement development programmes and projects is not the best option for Africa (see, RCM-Africa, 2007:37-38). For Bassole (2014:9), African governments need to emplace good political and economic governance to be able to manage the huge funds needed for infrastructure development and overcome the challenges in furthering a regional approach. Above all is the need for governments to demonstrate a strong political will in planning how to achieve the objectives.

A cross-cutting issue on infrastructure development in Africa is the need for effective private sector involvement (Biau et al, 2008:4; Chen, 2012:12; ICA, 2013:3; Bassole, 2014:9).

However, while African governments and policy makers recognise that public-private partnerships will enhance their efforts (McPhie 2003:1; RCM, 2007:18-19; Subramoney, 2012a:11; Chen, 2012:13), PPP in Africa has yet to be fully exploited (Bassole, 2014:9). As Biau et al (2008:4) point out, this is particularly notable in the road sector partly as a result of "perceived risk". Hence, in order to motivate private sector participation, governments have to play key roles in "planning, safety, security, competition and regulation" (Biau et al, 2008:4).

Success in achieving the objectives of the PIDA initiative, as well as other regional programmes is therefore anchored on the political will of African leaders to commit resources to project implementation. However, as Respondent ECA [3] notes pessimistically:

> The challenges are first, the commitment...because when it comes to signing documents, governments are always willing to do that, but once they get back to their various countries, the implementation becomes a problem; so, that"s why we are lagging behind in the completion of many projects. Yes, otherwise, if people were implementing the decisions, by now, I think, the continent would have been linked from North to South and East to West. So, there is the challenge of commitment. The second problem I can say is that of resources; financial resources, because these are huge investments and to get funds is not easy. And PPP is not working on road infrastructure. It is only in South Africa that you can see it working, but in the other African countries, you cannot see much of that. May be you can see it in the ports... especially when it comes to the containers [126]

When asked the question: why do you think private-public partnership is weak in Africa? [T]he respondent stated that:

> The problem is that of capacity to deal with public-private partnership.You know, the processes are very complicated; so people, sometimes are not aware of all the documentations, the rules, the regulations pertaining to PPP. They are not aware of these. And also, there is this governance issue, and then also, the technical capacity is not there for those people who are supposed to work, to deal with these issues.[127]

Interestingly, however, this challenge could be mitigated if strategies are put in place by government at the national level to recruit the majority of skilled Africans in the diaspora.

[126] Interview with ECA 3, at the Economic Commission for Africa. Date of interview: 19 June 2013.
[127] Interview with ECA 3. Date: 19 June 2013.

The view of Chen (2012:12) sums up the challenges in implementing regional and continental programmes which includes those listed in the AU/NEPAD, Africa Action Plan:

> Policy is highly susceptible to errant politics, which change the application of rules, increase the incidence of corruption and introduce the notion of political overtones in what should be otherwise regular processes. Businesses require certain levels of political stability and consistency in order to maintain viable operations and investment in Africa. Previously agreed upon programmes, projects and contacts should remain intact even though the government of the day has changed.

5.6 The African Union/NEPAD initiative: Complexities, challenges and paradoxes

From the analysis above, it can be asserted that African leaders have made considerable efforts in putting in place policy frameworks in priority areas to address the continent‟s development needs even though there are several flaws which have been identified. Although several challenges have been identified with regards implementation, progress is also being recorded. It is also worth reiterating that Africa‟s development partners have identified with the AU/NEPAD efforts to develop the continent and are assisting at different levels in implementing Africa‟s priority programmes even though it has been noted that their priorities are often so different from those of their African partners. Thus, with policy frameworks addressing governance and development issues and aimed at reducing poverty, it would not be out of place to say that the AU/NEPAD Plan of Action provides a holistic, broad-based and comprehensive approach to addressing the integration and development challenges in Africa.[128]

Looking at the issue of governance and Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration and development, Respondent RP3 identifies that the African Union has been able to induce principles of good governance by compelling countries to abide by certain democratic norms; has incorporated the Article 4(h) in contrast to the discredited non-intervention posture of the OAU; and has established bodies like the PSC, APRM, amongst others.[129] Even so, the AU‟s intervention has been poor or non-existent in badly governed countries such as South Sudan,

[128] The opinion shared by Respondent ECA 1 is that: "NEPAD remains one of the most important development agendas or frameworks that have been crafted in recent times on the continent. One of its underlining principles is that of continental integration, regional integration; it goes back, revives the Abuja Treaty and all of that, so, NEPAD is quite an essential pillar in integration. And if you look at its various components, whether you talk of economic governance, political governance or other pre-conditions for development, there is always a regional dimension to everything it does". Date of interview: 18 June 2013.

[129] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March 2014.

DRC, Mali, Libya, Somalia and Nigeria. The AU, Rukato (2012:94) informs, has also intervened in resolving conflicts in African countries such as, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC.[130] On a general note, with the African Union/NEPAD initiatives, the development landscape has widened in Africa with new opportunities being created, expanded partnerships fostered and new relationships established through which Africa is coming to terms with new ideas and approaches to development (AU/NEPAD, 2011:6).

Notwithstanding the progress which is being made with implementing on-going programmes, divergent views are expressed on the possibility of achieving the African Union/NEPAD initiatives. This is due to weak governance, leadership failures in African states, poor implementation of previous pan-African initiative, among other factors. Most of these views are in line with the arguments emphasised in the theory of neo-realism which is used in this study to examine political issues associated with the workings of the African state, and the influence of the state on sub-regional and regional integration processes. Such governance issues form the thrust of this study with focus on the APRM.

African governments and policy makers are criticised for conceiving and formulating policies without putting concrete measures and strategies in place for implementation at the national level. This is a major challenge highlighted in the analysis of the implementation of on-going AU/NEPAD programmes and projects. Africa‟s economic integration efforts are therefore considered to be based more on theoretical than practical realities. This disjuncture between theory and practice is illuminated by Mistry (2000:561) who contends that, in the African context, success of integration is not determined by the number of conventions, policies, protocols and agreements formulated and signed by integrating states even though these may be necessary. The view of OSISA [1] buttresses Mistry‟s point:

> A lot has been done in theorising, but in practicalising very little has actually been registered. It goes without saying that long before the issues of integration was actually talked about by the Heads of AU member-states and Governments, the issue of integration has been ... you know, something that has been in existence some-time if you look at history, by Africans themselves, at the people-to-people level. We‟ve been very tenacious in

[130] Notwithstanding these successes, Professor P3 referred to the AU as “a toothless bull, a leviathan with the feet of clay, unable to resolve conflicts. The Ivory Coast, Malian and current conflict in the DRC required the assistance of external actors to restore peace. Corruption and bad governance continue unabated”. Date: 19 March 2013.

> moving across borders; we‟ve been very tenacious in ensuring that the informal sector and informal trade actually thrives across borders. So with or without pronouncements made by Heads of States and Governments of the African Union, the issue of integration has been at the centre of what it means to be an African.[131]

The arguments of these scholars reflect the concern of this study that African economic integration is largely driven by ruling elites. Regional agreements are outcomes of top-down decisions by African governments without due consultation with and input from the African people. This is a major challenge to regionalism in Africa. Respondent AUC [C] states that:

> Regional integration will resonate with the people and not the leadership. The people need to see, on the ground, tangible benefits of integration and how the process affects their lives, for instance, in the aspect of physical integration -- linking people and countries by road, rail or air infrastructure. As people get linked and do business together, they build trust among themselves and this further deepens integration. To this extent, it is ideal to achieve physical integration first before political integration".[132]

The point needs to be stressed that regional integration evolves from the people; as RP4 puts it succinctly: regional integration should be owned and supported by Africans and focused on developing the continent, eradicating poverty and improving the living standard of the people. On the other hand, economic regional integration implemented from above, which promotes the selfish interests of the elites to the detriment of societal good is bad for Africa.[133] Given this study‟s emphasis that, in the African context, the socio-economic development and transformation of the continent is the *sine qua non* of regional integration, it is concerned with examining APRM processes. The study does so with the aim of addressing governance issues that confront the process of regional integration in Africa and furthering the integration and development objectives of the AU/NEPAD.

The concerns of scholars, writers and observers are echoed by one respondent who noted that, "the African Union/NEPAD and APRM are good initiatives but are mainly driven by African governments who have the political will to determine their successes or failures".[134] Another

[131] Interview held with OSISA 1. Date: 4 October 2013.
[132] Interview with AUC „C". Date: 17 June 2013
[133] Interview with RP4 of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Date of interview: 14 August, 2013.
[134] Interview schedule completed by Doctoral Candidate 3. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. Date: 14 June, 2013. This view is also shared by Doctoral Candidate 4. Rhodes University, Johannesburg, South Africa who noted: "although there are visible signs of integration in some RECs,

argument is that it is possible for the African Union/NEPAD, APRM integration framework to address key governance and development issues if only the policies are internalised and enforced.[135] Some scholars and observers comment that most African development initiatives set over-ambitious objectives and as such do not meet stipulated targets. The AU/NEPAD Action Plan does not escape this criticism as African governments aim to address issues of security, governance, integration and development in tandem with with several other projects outlined for implementation (see, Akokpari, 2010/11:79; Bullen, 2011; UNCTAD, 2012:6).

Whilst the AU/NEPAD objectives are laudable, issues of funding at all levels constitute a major challenge. The idea is thus expressed that the African Union/NEPAD need to focus on implementing minimal programmes directed to and focused on specific and urgent needs in the continent (see, Zhou, 2003:3; Akokpari, 2010/11:79; Ngwainmbi, 2005:307; UNCTAD, 2012:6). To emphasise this point, most of the African Union/NEPAD projects are yet to be implemented which shows that more still needs to be done and that there are many challenges which need to be overcome. These views on the African Union/NEPAD reflect the salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration.

There is no doubt that with the necessary mechanisms put in place, the African Union/NEPAD initiatives will create conditions for a stronger African continent in the era of globalisation‟s realities and challenges. Regrettably, however, the internal political-economic dynamics in Africa have made it difficult for leaders to comply with regional agreements and to be committed to implementing continent wide policies and programmes at the national level. In short, it has proven difficult to establish pan-African ideals, values and norms because of the absolute emphasis on state sovereignty.[136] What challenges do these issues pose for the APRM?

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integration objectives are far from being realised especially because of the state centric nature of African states, the issue of state sovereignty and weak political culture and institutions. Moreover, lack of compliance to regional agreements and lack of measures to enforce rules is another challenge. Political actors have their personal interests to protect and their calculations determine the costs and benefits of participation. As such, the AU/NEPAD, APRM initiatives are still evolving, but... hmmm... they may achieve very little" (Interview schedule completed by Doctoral Candidate 4. Date: 12 June, 2013.

[135] Interview with Senior Academic 1 from Ghana Institute of Journalism. Date: 11 June 2013.

[136] In my interview with OSSREA 1, a top level official at the Organisation for Social Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), the respondent noted that: "regional integration and sovereignty are two different issues in Africa". Date of Interview: 21 June 2013.

Another challenge has to do with the concern for instance, that the roles, functions and of the NEPAD Agency vis-à-vis the RECs, national governments, and the African Union Commission are seemingly complex and remain unclear. Although the process of integrating NEPAD into the African Union structures and processes was completed in 2010, there are still duplications of functions and programmes of the African Union Commission and the NEPAD Agency, and challenges of harmonisation and coordination of efforts (see, RCM-Africa, 2007:28-29). On the one hand, there is the view that NEPAD"s operations may be affected by the processes of the African Union (Rukato, 2012:99), and on the other hand, there is the concern that NEPAD lacks in sufficient resources to carry on independently (Onimode et al, 2004:246-247; Rukato, 2012:99). As Akokpari (2003:2) opines, the African Union and NEPAD are faced with "institutional and operational challenges".

Apart from these challenges, the NEPAD programme is criticised as an embodiment of several contradictions. Scholars, writers and a variety of civil society associations state in unequivocal terms that the process of NEPAD"s formulation was elitist and excluded the participation of the African people (see Onimode et al, 2004:244-245; Bond, 2005:29-30). As much as civil society was not part of this process. NEPAD is considered inadequate and ill-equipped to present a people-centred approach to development. Importantly, NEPAD is considered not to possess the capacity to interrogate the lack of effective leadership; democracy and good governance; and the challenge of self-sustaining development in the continent. Since NEPAD"s conception was not embedded in society (Macleans, 2008:166-178), it provides a top-down approach to governance and development (Akokpari, 2010/11:79). Onimode et al (2004:239) state pointedly that, "NEPAD is more elitist than any of the landmark strategies" previously formulated for Africa"s development.[137] Several questions posed about the NEPAD initiative raise concerns not only about its integration into the African Union"s processes, but over the possibility of achieving the AU/NEPAD objectives.

Another criticism levelled against NEPAD is that whereas it seeks to promote regional cooperation and integration, it places emphasis on the free market, neo-liberal approach as it is prepared to deal with them within the context of a global environment dominated by the West. NEPAD promotes the establishment of "reciprocal" partnerships with countries of the

[137] Previous development initiatives are examined in chapter three of this study.

developed world, especially the G8 industrialised countries (see Amuwo, 2002:65-71; Ebegbulem, et al, 2012:272-273). While it is arguable that it is imperative for Africa to engage in global interactions and partnerships, this does not de-emphasise the central position of the African state in the place of development (Adar et al, 2010/11:XVI). It would then be realistic to question the capacity of the NEPAD initiative to promote the interests of the people and the continent as a whole.

Taking a retrospective look at Africa‟s engagements and interactions with the developed world, the continent has not been able to add value to its natural resources and strategically position itself to exploit its immense resources to further its development (see, Amuwo, 2002:65-71). Criticisms of NEPAD are further fuelled by NEPAD‟s heavy reliance on external funding for the implementation of its programmes and projects. In consequence, much effort is expended in mobilising external partners to commit resources to the African continent (Onimode et al, 2004:246-247; Akokpari, 2010/11:79; Ebegbulem et al, 2012:273). In light of this unequal partnership, African leaders lack ownership of the NEPAD initiative as they are accountable to external donors and partners. This is why the „good governance‟ agenda of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund has been contested by scholars, especially in Africa (Amuwo, 2002:71-72; Chabal, 2002:447-462; Ebegbulem et al, 2012:275-277; KJAER, 2014). Moreover, the G8-industrialised countries have not given adequate attention and commitment to implementing their Action Plan for Africa[138] as demonstrated by "low levels of foreign direct investment in Africa to date" (Macleans, 2008:173).

African leaders need to be conscious that the continent cannot develop based on foreign aid. Furthermore, governments are advised to question the seriousness and commitment of the developed countries to Africa‟s development given that issues such as adverse terms of trade, commodity pricing and debt problems confronting the continent, have yet to be resolved (Onimode et al, 2004:247-248). This is apart from the limited response and concern shown by the countries of the developed world and the G8 to African crises and conflicts in recent times (Macleans, 2008:173). Indeed, it would be ideal for the continent to work towards feeding and producing for itself, and insisting on fair trade for its resources.

[138] At the G8 industrialised countries meeting in Kananaskis in 2002, world leaders endorsed an Africa Action Plan. According to the Plan, "African governments that meet certain criteria will be able to benefit from US$64 billion annually in global assistance for investment and trade into the continent" (Venter, 2009:33)

Although NEPAD sets out its plan towards Africa‟s development, its vision and principles may have been misconceived as NEPAD is considered by some to be a "conduit for accessing donor money" Rukato (2012:97). Considering the fact that donor funds do not come without conditionalities, this perhaps explains why it is believed in some quarters that the NEPAD initiative benefits more from Western support than from the African Union (see Onimode et al, 2004:251).[139] It could also explain why Africa‟s integration efforts "continue to be stifled, as many partners prefer to fund individual country projects, rather than those that are sub-regional in nature, and which would bring more benefits to the regions and continent" (Rukato, 2012:99). There is perhaps the consciousness that the African Union, if it functions effectively will speed up the process of integration, unity, peace, human development and self-sustainable development in the continent (Onimode et al, 2004:251).

A key challenge appears to be for the African Union to take the lead in driving the integration and development agenda, taking the NEPAD as its blue-print economic programme for action, with the RECs driving the integration process. This is one way of effectively taking ownership of NEPAD and reshaping it to serve the developmental goals of the African continent and its people. One of the key issues in this regard is expressed by Respondent RP5 who notes that, "Africa should get itself off the „begging attitude‟ and start creating an environment where it can fund its own programmes. Or else, the question needs to be asked: how could a continent richly endowed in resources, continue to rely greatly on external actors to fund its development programmes?[140]

While this study acknowledges the different views of scholars on the NEPAD, it also notes that there are scholars such as Motsamai and Zondi (2010:1-8) who argue that the economic aspect of NEPAD has been emphasised while the social policy intervention aspects have been de-emphasised. On the other hand, as Ottosen (2010:6-9) observes, NEPAD should be evaluated not as a stand-alone programme but with respect to Africa‟s quest for good governance, regional economic integration and development. The debate and contentions

[139] RP3 notes that: "NEPAD remains a huge suspect. It was crafted along neo-liberal lines, something reminiscent with the obnoxious and ubiquitous structural adjustment programme". Date of interview: 19 March 2014.

[140] Interview with RP5, University for Peace, Costa Rica. Date of interview: 20 June 2013.

concerning the African Union/NEPAD and the APRM arise as a result of the poor record of regionalism in Africa and the governance question. The APRM as a programme of NEPAD is tasked with ensuring that good governance and socio-economic development which will benefit the African population prevails in the continent. As Ottosen (2010:9) comments, "good governance will not be questioned today. This was not the case 30 years ago when the Monrovia commitments were made and the LPA adopted".

Indeed, most observers, regardless of their views about NEPAD, accept that the key to Africa‟s economic recovery and development rests with Africans. Aiyede (2010/11:63) as well as other scholars, argue that Africa has the resources to finance its own development projects but that "concrete measures will have to be taken in the area of combating corruption, reducing the cost of politics and ensuring political accountability" in order to mobilise more internal funds required for development. This would not be achievable without the active participation and support of the African people. In short, the issue of governance has become critical for African economic integration and development. Success in achieving the objectives of African Union/NEPAD Plan of Action depends on the political willingness and commitment of African leaders to promote good governance, democracy, effective state-society relations and well-focused and articulate social and economic policies at the national level. These overarching issues pose serious and on-going challenges for the APRM.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has established that Africa‟s integration efforts since independence have been bedevilled with setbacks resulting from salient governance and development challenges which have remained unresolved. With the establishment of the African Union and the NEPAD initiative, African leaders demonstrated their commitment to redress recurring problematic through effectively implementing regionalism on the continent. The AU/NEPAD programmes and projects were targeted at addressing Africa‟s development needs at all levels, promoting regional and continental integration and ensuring Africa‟s effective participation in the global economic system. However, considering the fact that the challenges which constrained the performance of previous regional integration schemes are still persistent, the AU/NEPAD initiatives have been subjected to various criticisms.

Despite the criticisms levied at the AU/NEPAD initiatives, however, there appears to be a consensus that they provide the institutional and programmatic framework for achieving the

much needed development in Africa and to repositioning the continent to take its rightful place in an increasingly globalising world economy. The questions that need to be asked therefore are: to what extent are African governments sincere and committed to realising the objectives of the AU/NEPAD? How does the APRM present a strategic framework to interrogate the governance questions on regionalism in Africa and promote the AU/NEPAD integration agenda?

The issues raised above constitute the focus of discussions in the next chapter which examines the institutional framework of the APRM. The APRM is Africa‟s key governance monitoring instrument established by the African Union as part of its NEPAD‟s initiative to promote good governance and socio-economic development in the continent. The chapter aims to examine the programmes and processes of the APRM and how the APR process responds to salient issues of African economic cooperation.

CHAPTER SIX
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND APPROACH OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter established that success in realising the vision of the African Union and its NEPAD initiatives hinges on the political will and sincerity of African governments to commit human, material and financial resources towards programme implementation. The previous chapter argues that African governments would have to be innovative in dealing with the continent"s development partners (within Africa and outside) and in making the most beneficial use of domestic and donor resources. They would need to demonstrate their commitment to establishing good governance; to accountable and responsible leadership; to democratic values and to formulating appropriate socio-economic policies at all levels. These ideas motivated the establishment of the APRM.

This chapter examines the institutional framework and approach of the APRM. It explores the APR processes and the functionality of the Mechanism towards interrogating key issues on governance and socio-economic development in Africa. The chapter draws on extant literature, APRM official documents/archival materials, and interviews conducted during the study. In this chapter, analyses of a sample of APRM Country Review Reports for three countries namely, Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria are also undertaken. This exercise differs from previous exercises given that it examines the four thematic areas of the APRM and relates its findings to the issue of African economic integration. The aim is to examine the practical aspects of the APRM in exposing the governance and socio-economic development challenges in African countries which, as identified in this study, impact on sub-regional, regional and continental integration. Beyond this also, is to identify how the APRM could become useful as a tool not only in intervening and resolving governance challenges, but also in responding to the salient issues on African economic integration.

Unlike other studies on regional integration in Africa, this is an empirically researched and theoretically based study that examines the linkages in discourses on African economic integration, globalisation, the African Union, NEPAD and APRM. The study"s argument is centred on the governance deficits in African countries. In fact, it is different from other

studies as it argues that, while Africa would benefit immensely from regional integration, this will not be realisable without a regional governance monitoring initiative such as the APRM. The chapter conclusion is presented in the last section.

6.2 The African Peer Review Mechanism: Africa‟s governance monitoring instrument

The APRM is a product of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the inaugural Summit of the African Union on 8 July, 2002 in Durban, South Africa (AHG/235 (XXXVIII, Annex 1). This Declaration was also approved at the 6th Summit of the then NEPAD‟s Heads of state and Government Implementation Committee, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 9 March, 2003 (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU/Annex 1). In this Declaration, African governments recognised the dire need of the continent for good governance and socio-economic development and articulated the various standards and norms of the African Union with regards to governance in African countries to actualise NEPAD‟s development objectives. The decision was approved to establish the APRM as the instrumental framework through which the African governance and development reform agenda contained in the AU Declaration will be enhanced and facilitated.[141]

The APRM seeks to assess the governance challenges which have affected Africa‟s development several years after independence and monitor African governments‟ commitments in the AU‟s Declaration to promote good governance. It seeks to put in place the conditions that will improve the quality of governance and policy making process in the African continent and assist African countries to build effective governance structures that will manage the continent‟s resources for the purpose of development. Hence, the APRM is thought to be a home grown African programme established to bring about governance reforms in the quest for socio-economic development and transformation in Africa. The following APRM documents outline its key objectives, principles, and processes:

[141] For details, see African Union, 2002, Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1.

Box 1

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the APRM (NEPAD/HSGIC/03- 2003/APRM/MOU) - countries which decide to accede to the APRM sign this document.

APRM base document (AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex II) – establishes the APRM as part of the NEPAD initiative. It outlines the principles, purpose and mandate of the APRM.

APRM Organisation and Processes (NEPAD/HSGIC/03.2003/APRM/Guideline/ O&P);

Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the APRM (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/ APRM/ Guideline/OSCI), sets out the APRM codes and standards which will guide the country assessments and reviews. Paragraph 1.9 of the document states that these codes and standards have been put in place by the African Union not without consideration for internationally recognised standards and practices in other areas aimed at achieving the objectives of governance and socio-economic development.

Outline of the Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Assessments and the Country Review Visit (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/Outline) **(AU/NEPAD, 2003a:1).**

According to Verwey (2006:8), peer review, which is associated with peer learning, "assumes that a non-coercive gradual convergence of policy and practice in participating countries is preferable to attempts to impose „desirable" policies on countries". In conceiving the APRM, African leaders attempted to bring in the traditional concept of „peers" into the continent"s governance process (Hansungule, 2007:4). Peer review, according to Hansungule (2007:4), "in its original sense is an African invention that was critical towards ensuring a stable governance system in traditional African society before colonialism". One respondent tried to demonstrate the idea:

> It is like you ask someone to help you look at your back there"s no shying away. We do that in the family setting now. You say, for instance, to your brother or sister, please help me release my zip. That happens where there is love, and the person will do that without offence and you are not hiding. If your brother says hey! hey! hey! remove this, remove this, eleyi o da (meaning this is bad), you will go and remove it. The principle for the family setting - co-responsibility and mutual caring worked in the traditional setting. Will this work for the APRM, because between the principle and the practice, there is an entire world.[142]

[142] Interview with a JDPC 1, the top level official at the Justice, Development and Peace Commission. Date: 4 February 2013.

Other scholars observe that the APRM borrowed from the practice of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of conducting country assessments on particular sectors, such as economic governance practices (Akokpari, 2003:12; Hope, 2005:289; Masterson, 2006; Herbert and Gruzd, 2008:7-8). However, the APRM assessment is peculiar and exceptional in the goals which it seeks to achieve (Gruzd, 2014:12). The establishment of the APRM marks a significant attempt in the history of African leaders" efforts at establishing pan-African governance architecture which could respond to salient issues on African economic integration and development. As part of its strategy as a regional governance mechanism, the APRM identifies that political leaders can learn from one another through sharing of experiences and good practices and this would assist in improving governance. This has become crucial particularly considering Africa"s political history and development experiences, current challenges and the demands of a period of more intense globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation.

Developed in Africa, by Africans and for Africans, the APRM came at a point when African leaders declared their commitment towards Africa"s economic recovery and renaissance at the turn of the 21st century. In creating the APRM as part of the NEPAD initiative, African leaders were conscious of the reality that: "there cannot be peace and security in the continent without socio-economic development, and that there cannot be socio-economic development without peace and security… One cannot separate the „political" from the „economic"…the two must go hand in hand"[143]. The APRM recognises the imperative of addressing the governance challenges which trigger conflicts in Africa and advances that the African people would have to be involved in the process to facilitate this objective.

The mandate of the APRM is to encourage participating states in ensuring that their "policies and practices conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards; and achieve mutually agreed objectives in socio-economic development contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance" (MOU on the APRM, Paragraph 6). For its member states, the APRM aims to stimulate effective leadership and governance reforms through a participatory self-assessment process and "develop policies and practices that would lead to the attainment of the NEPAD objectives of political stability high economic growth, sustainable development and

[143] Interview with AUC C, at the African Union Commission. Date: 17 June, 2013.

accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration" (APRM, Base Document, paragraph 3). This envisaged that the principles of popular participation; openness; transparency and inclusiveness of governance processes would improve the decision making processes of government, empower national institutions and develop trust and confidence between the government and the citizenry to collectively address their socio-economic challenges and meet societal needs (ECA, 2008a:XIV).

The strength of the APRM -- although initiated by governments -- is that it deals directly with the people, the concerns of the people. People"s views about governance in their countries are reflected in the APRM report.[144] The APRM recognises the role and contributions of civil society in governance and development processes.[145] It promotes the idea of citizen" participation which became a prominent discourse particularly from the 1990s (see Ghaus-Pasha, 2004:2; Ranchod, 2007:2, Ogom, 2010:28; Verwey, 2006:20-21; Masterson, 2006; ECA, 2008a:15-17). To this extent, many have called for the active involvement of institutions such as the national parliament (Beetham, 2006:VII; ECA, 2008a:26; ECA, 2008b:9-13; Shifa, 2011:11) and media sector (Beetham, 2006:6; Turianskyi and Grey-Johnson, 2014:5-7) in individual member countries to promote civil society participation in the APR processes.

Broad-based participation and consultation between government and civil society is essential as the issues covered within the APRM reflect the overall political and socio-economic conditions of member states and reveal the weaknesses and shortcomings of the political leadership in order to proffer realistic solutions (ECA, 2011c:61). The tendency for „sensitive" issues to be covered by those who hold public offices cannot be over-emphasised. Paragraph 22 of the Memorandum of Understanding on the APRM encourages the "participation of all stakeholders in the development of National Programme of Action

[144] Interview with APRM 1, a Former Chairperson of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons. Date of interview: 1 February, 2013.

[145] The concept of civil society does not attract a universal definition. However, this study adopts the definition of the London School of Economics that, "civil society is used to refer to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women"s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups" (London School of Economics, 2006. A Definition of Civil Society. Available: http//www.Ise.ac.uk/collections/CCS /introduction.htm#generated-subheading2.

(NPoA) including trade unions, women, youth, civil society, private sector, rural communities and professional associations". Respondent EISA [1] explains:

> The APRM opens up a conversation across all levels of society, from the President down to the line Ministries, civil servants, the corporate sector and the non-state sector. In many countries prior to APRM, these different groupings rarely interacted in any formal manner around governance issues and institutions in their country. The APRM has stimulated more systematic engagement by non-state sectors in the daily business of government than was previously either permitted or possible.[146]

The APRM provides an innovative approach for governments and the citizens to work together as partners in building an open, corrupt-free, democratic, progressive and peaceful society which would be attractive to foreign investors and development partners (ECA, 2008a:XIII). To this extent, the APRM has been considered to serve as a "dual contract between African governments and their citizens on the one hand, and between Africa and its development partners on the other" (ECA, 2008a:XIII).

Considering the premise upon which the APRM is established and the objectives which it seeks to achieve, the governance mechanism has been described by scholars, officials of Africa‟s institutions and the continent‟s development partners, as: "the most ambitious piece of information to have come out of Africa since decolonisation" (Hansungule, 2007:3); "a unique example of South-South peer review" (Tungwarara, 2010:7); the "most innovative facets" (David and Ben Idrissa, 2013:59); "most innovative and important element" (ECA, Diversity, 2011d:V); and "unique aspect" of NEPAD (NEPAD/ECA/OSAA 2012:15). It is considered a "prime and credible model for good governance" (AU/NEPAD, 2011:8); "a novel way for showcasing Africa‟s thinking on governance" (APRM Annual Report, 2009:19) and a "jewel in NEPAD‟s crown" (APRM Report 2009:VII). Gruzd (2009a:1) asserts that the APRM is "a key building block in Africa‟s governance architecture". For the ECA (2010/11:28) the APRM is the "very first continental government effort to use a wide participatory approach to solicit popular views of the people about how they wish to be governed, thus, it is innovative and challenging".

The APRM, according Hansungule (2007:4), is the "technical arm of NEPAD set to give direction and predisposition to the African Union and therefore to the often quoted African

[146] Interview with EISA 1 of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. Date: 9 October, 2013.

Renaissance". Gruzd (2014:7) emphasised that the APRM promotes the six cornerstones of the 2009 Capacity Development Strategic Framework for Africa. These are: "leadership transformation; citizen transformation; knowledge and evidence-based transformation; utilising African potential, skills and resources; developing the capacity of capacity developers; and integrated planning and implementation for results" (AU/NEPAD, 2012:13).

The APRM is open to voluntary accession which indicates that member-states of the African Union are under no obligation to participate and that a participating country can decide to withdraw its membership by giving a notice to this effect, to the APRM Secretariat (APRM, MOU, paragraph 32). Its periodic assessments and reviews of the overall governance structures and processes of participating countries (Uzodike, 2010/11:94; APRM, OSCI, 2003 paragraph 1.9), are based on four issue areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development (NEPAD, 2011:20).[147] (See Figure 6.1, p. 194).

[147]An APRM Questionnaire is used during the country self-assessment process to obtain information on government actions in the APRM focus areas; and to gauge the activities of government against set "criteria and indicators in order to determine whether standards have been met" (APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraph 1.10).

Figure 6.1: APRM Focus Areas in Member Countries



Source: Author's Compilation

The APRM reviews are of four types. The first is the country or base review which is supposed to take place eighteen months after a country becomes a member; periodic review which is held every two to four years; reviews which may be requested by member states outside the compulsory reviews; and that which could be instituted on the insistence of the APR Forum to come to the aid of a country where the Forum have received signals of imminent political or economic crisis (APRM Base Document, paragraph 14). To this end,

participating countries, on their accession to the APRM, commit themselves not only to submit to periodic peer reviews and commit necessary resources towards the success of such reviews; but also undertake to be guided by agreed principles, goals and standards as articulated in the official documents of the APRM (AU/NEPAD, 2003a).

The APRM process is considered to be valuable as member countries are expected to draw up a National Programme of Action (NPoA) to provide realistic policy measures and time-frame to address identified problems emanating from the reviews (ECA, 2008a:XIII). Presently, 35 countries out of the 54 African Union member states are participating countries while 17 member states have been peer reviewed and some countries have started implementing their NPoAs (Gruzd, 2014:6). The participating member countries of the APRM are listed in Appendix 4.

6.2.1 Structures of the African Peer Review Mechanism

A set of institutions have been established to direct and coordinate APRM affairs and also perform different functions as outlined in its official documents. The continental institutions consist of the:

(1) Committee of Heads of State and Government of Participating Countries also known as the APR Forum;
(2) Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel);
(3) APRM Continental Secretariat;
(4) Group of Independent Experts;

The APRM partner institutions include the:

(1) United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA);
(1) African Development Bank (AfDB); and
(2) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Together, these continental and partner institutions are responsible for the overall implementation of the APRM (see figure 6.2, p. 196).[148]

Figure 6.2 - APRM Continental Structures



[148] Data used in explaining the APRM continental and national structures were obtained from: APRM Annual Report, 2009; APRM O&P, 2003; APRM Base Document 2003; ECA, 2008a; Tungwarara et al, 2010:3; Herbert and Gruzd, 2008:8.



Source: Author's Compilation

In addition, participating countries are mandated to put in place structures as part of the requirements of the process for the purpose of coordinating APRM activities and facilitating interactions with the Continental Secretariat. The national structures are:

1. APRM Focal Point
2. National Governing Councils
3. APRM National Secretariats
4. Technical Research Institutions (TRIs) (see figure 6.3, p. 197).

Figure 6.3: APRM National Institutions





Source: Author's Compilation

6.2.2 APRM stages and processes

There are five stages marking the APR base review process as outlined in the APRM founding document. Each state embodies a set of complementary tasks performed by the APRM continental structures and national structures established by member countries to implement the APR process (see Table 6.1, p. 199).

Table 6.1: Five Stages in the APR Process

Stages in the APR Process	Continental Institutions	National Institutions
Stage 1 – Preparations are made for Country Self-Assessment	Continental Secretariat provides necessary documents to the country billed to undertake self-assessment Undertakes background research on the country Prepares an "Issues Paper" reflecting on issues in the CSAR and preliminary NPOA.	The member country wishing to undertake Self-Assessment sensitises the public about the APRM. Interacts with the APRM Continental Secretariat Appoints national APRM institutions Develops research strategies Hosts Country Support Mission (CSM). Prepares a Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) and a preliminary National Programme of Action (NPOA).
Stage 2 – Follow-up from stage 1	Visit of Country Review Mission (CRM) to member state	Facilitates the process of broad-based consultations of the CRM
Stage 3	Preparation of APR Report	Finalises NPoA
Stage 4	Submission of the final Report by the APR Panel to the APR Forum for peer review	The Head of State or Government partakes in the process of peer review and clarifies issues, if there are any.
Stage 5 – Completion of the process	Official presentation of the Report at regional and sub-regional institutions, AU Summit, the PAP, the African Commission on Human and People"s Rights, the PSC, and ECOSOC six months after the Report has been considered by the APR Forum. The Report becomes an official document	Ensures the implementation of the NPoA.

Source: Author"s Compilation; See, AU/NEPAD, 2003a, paragraph 21; Herbert and Gruzd, 2008:16; ECA, 2008a:3.

The timeline for the completion of these processes vary between countries depending on country specifics. However, it is estimated that the period for completion of this exercise should be between six and nine months (AU/NEPAD, 2003a, paragraph 28). The process of self-assessment and country review to be undertaken every two to four years involves the five stages as in the base review (APRM Base Document, paragraph 14). This is to follow up on

member states towards consolidating efforts in achieving the objectives of the APRM (APRM, O & P 2003, paragraph 7.19). Meanwhile, APRM member countries are expected to submit annual reports on the progress they have made in implementing their NPoAs (Gruzd, 2014:14).

A very important point to highlight concerning the APRM is the fact that the African Union and its principal bodies, the PAP, ECOSOC, PSC, are part of the review process (Uzodike, 2010/11:94). As the APRM Guideline, paragraph 12 indicates, the success of the APRM hinges on national ownership and leadership by the participating countries in ensuring consistency with existing national efforts and other development initiatives. It also depends on the efforts made by the member country to address capacity constraints at the national level and to mobilise international support for the implementation of its NPoA (AU/NEPAD 2003a, paragraph 12).

In conducting the base review, the APRM takes into consideration the factor of each country‟s different levels of development at the time of accession, as such, a member country is expected to come up with a timetable -- a programme of action -- on how it will effect progress towards achieving agreed standards and goals taking cognisance of its peculiar circumstances (APRM Base Document, paragraph 17). The APRM, as an African initiative, relies principally on member-countries‟ contributions for its funding (APRM, O & P 2003, paragraph 8.1). In addition, it is assisted by its strategic partners whose roles and responsibilities in the APR processes are defined (APRM, O & P 2003, paragraphs 6.1-6.10). The APRM does not depend on external funding. However, any form of external assistance "is welcomed if they are managed in a way that clearly respects African ownership of the APRM and all its processes" (APRM, O & P 2003, paragraph 8.3).

6.3 Significance of the APRM focus areas

This section of the chapter examines the four focus areas of the APRM in order to highlight their significance for promoting good governance, peace, security and stability; and development which are necessary conditions for realising the goals of national, sub-regional and regional integration. The section reflects different factors inhibiting successful integration identified in previous chapters and highlights how the APRM could provide a strategy to address such issues.

6.3.1 Democracy and political governance

The APRM demonstrates that the leadership crisis and policy failures in Africa; corruption; poor state and society relations; weak institutions; poor public service delivery; poor socio-economic conditions; and associated challenges of nation-building; intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Africa are outcomes of lack of democracy and good political governance. The concerning factor is the effect which governance challenges continue to have on the continent‟s regional integration and development agenda. The analysis of both secondary and primary data in chapter five, drawing insights from the functionalism, neo-functionalism and neo-realism theories revealed that the failure of regional cooperation and integration in Africa is principally as a result of governance deficiencies – the nature and workings of post-African independence states. As a result, this study emphasises that regional integration as envisaged by the African Union and NEPAD will be in jeopardy if the ideals promoted by the APRM are not sufficiently institutionalised. As such, the APRM institutions should be empowered to perform their functions.

The concept of governance is still evolving and as a result socio-economic development remains a challenge in Africa. By accepting to undergo APRM reviews and assessments therefore, countries expect to benefit from improved governance and policy making processes (Hope, 2005:283; Zimmermann, 2009:80) and the positive spill-over effects will be felt at the sub-regional and regional levels. Therefore, the debates on what democracy and good governance concepts entail notwithstanding, there is a general understanding that Africa will only develop under a system that promotes democracy and good governance. These concepts then have to be properly defined.

The APRM promotes both the African Union‟s regional and international declarations on democracy and governance and outlines the various objectives, standards and indicators to assess to what extent a member country has complied with its objectives.[149] The elements of democracy require more than simply the conduct of periodic elections (Leon 2010:4). The focus is on ensuring that African political leaderships promote transparency and accountability in the public sphere. They should operate within a constitutional democratic process. The constitution should provide for democratic principles such as: the rule of law, the separation of powers; promote popular participation and protect human rights, and ensure

[149] For details on the standards, declarations and indicators, see the APRM, OSCI 2003:2.2 – 2.3.3.

effective and efficient public service (APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraph 2.2). These conditions would create the enabling conditions in Africa for realising national, sub-regional and regional goals. For instance, the APRM aligns with the view of this study that the success of the African Union/NEPAD‟s policies and programmes, in the areas of agriculture, infrastructure, health, environment, capacity development and poverty reduction, hinges on the willingness of the African governments to address governance deficits and provide effective leadership. This argument also applies to speeding up the process of African regional economic integration and the continent‟s effective participation in the global economic arena. Promoting good governance and democracy will lead to strong and articulate policies which would trigger the much needed transformation in Africa.

6.3.2 Economic governance and management

The various chapters of this study emphasise that Africa has enormous natural, material and human resources that are needed for its transformation and development. Regrettably however, the continent presents a paradox. African countries, individually and collectively, have not been able to exploit their resources to develop. The slow pace of regional integration and underdevelopment in Africa could be attributed to lack of effective and visionary leadership, poor governance, weak socio-economic policies and corruption, among others. This raises again the fact that the APRM is a key initiative, which if capacitated, could address these governance deficiencies and positively transform the situation in Africa.

Regional integration and development objectives as promoted by the African Union/NEPAD will be facilitated if African governments are politically willing and committed to abiding by regional protocols and implementing regional codes and standards promoting good economic governance and management. The civil society should be able to hold government accountable to implementing policies. Whereas government leads the process of ensuring good economic governance and management, an enabling environment needs to be created for effective civil society and private sector participation in policy processes, governance and development processes. These are the ideals promoted by the APRM.

The APRM focuses on enabling African countries to put in place adequate legal, policy and institutional frameworks that will lead to good economic governance and proper and useful management of financial resources. The new frameworks (and other existing ones which need to be up-graded) should conform to regional and international codes and standards. The

approach is not only to regulate economic undertakings in different sectors but also to ensure the organisation and management of public spending and mobilisation of domestic resources, and to combat corruption and money laundering. Economic governance and management aims to encourage countries to promote people-centred policies in order to address socio-economic challenges; invest in human capital formation and development, reduce poverty, create employment, and finance public projects as these will go a long way in preventing or reducing internal conflicts and promoting sustainable development (APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraph 3.1; ECA, 2008a:13; NEPAD, 2011a:20).

The concern of the APRM is that most African countries have in place weak revenue generation strategies and accounting systems; lack necessary infrastructures and technology to conform to international standards. Oversight institutions, such as the media, civil society parliament and the judiciary in many African countries are constrained in the area of capacity to perform their functions. These are some of the factors which lead to corruption and money laundering, lack of effective public-private partnerships, poor budget performance; poor domestic savings; debt crisis; misappropriation of public funds; inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the public service, poor performance in the different economic sectors, and poor delivery of social services. Thus, part of the effect is that most governments fail to meet the needs of its population; mobilise resources for promoting trade and investments and diversifying their economies and achieve the objective of industrialisation. Most countries are yet to exploit their natural and material resources, invest in their human capital, establish effective institutions and improve infrastructures, which are necessary for achieving national, sub-regional and regional integration and development goals (see, APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraphs 3.2-3.5; AU/APRM, 2009:139-149).

Economic governance and financial management is also concerned with ensuring that national economic goals, policies and programmes are in line with sub-regional and regional policies and promote such interests. This would make for effective coordination and "harmonisation of monetary, trade and investment policies amongst the participating states" (APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraph 3.1).

6.3.3 Corporate governance

Corporate governance aims to promote the establishment and adoption of principles, values and practices, codes and standards to guide individuals and corporations in the country to

undertake business operations and other economic activities in line with national development objectives and within defined norms (APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraph 4.1). Putting in place good corporate governance codes and standards and monitoring their implementation and enforcement, is one way to ensure that African countries present common positions and establish common laws and regulations with regards to how business is conducted in Africa. These should be supportive of regional and international codes and standards.

The concern of the APRM is that many African countries lack effective and up-to-date laws, policies and institutional frameworks to regulate the business environment, monitor the production and distribution of goods and services by public and private enterprises; address labour and environmental issues, and ensure effective implementation of corporate social responsibilities. Even in cases where corporate governance laws are in place, the lack of effective monitoring results in non-adherence to these laws. These inadequacies have resulted in commercial disputes, poor standard and quality of goods and services, non-compliance with the principles of corporate social responsibilities, labour and industrial disputes, environmental degradation and depletion, among others (APRM, OSCI 2003, paragraphs 4.1-4.4; see also AU/APRM, 2009:228:236).

The focus of the APRM on corporate governance reflects the thinking of African governments on the imperative of creating the enabling environment in African countries to build partnerships, attract investments regionally and globally and repositioning the continent to exploit the gains of the global economy. The African continent would also be better prepared to manage the adverse effects of globalisation and liberalisation. Corporate governance objectives align with Africa‟s regional and continental integration agenda as countries would be better placed to contribute to regional efforts when there is socio-economic development, peace and stability, progress and equity at the national level in individual countries.

6.3.4 Socio-economic development

A growing number of studies establish a linkage between democracy, good governance, peace, stability and seccurity, and socio-economic development (see Hope, 2005:284; Gruzd, 2007:55; Aredo and Adal, 2009:133-150; Zimmermann et al, 2009:71; Landsberg, 2012b:105; Hamam and Quedraogo, 2012:59; Ndangiza, 2013:11). Hamam and Quedraogo

(2012:59) cite the example of the "agitation in Africa triggered by the Arab Spring demonstrating yet again, the importance of good political and economic governance for the continent"s development".

The underlying argument is that socio-economic challenges such as inequality, unemployment, poor health conditions, HIV/AIDS, poverty, which are potential causes of political crisis, civil strife and conflicts, can be effectively reduced if government promote good governance, principles and values of democracy and people-centred policies. As such, bad governance is at the root of socio-economic and political challenges in Africa. This, unfortunately, constitutes a major challenge to the realisation of regional integration objectives. Hence, this study asserts that the APRM, as a regional monitoring mechanism has the potential to reverse the slow pace of integration by encouraging African governments to address governance deficits, one of which is weak civil society and private sector participation in national, sub-regional and regional affairs. The study argues that APRM should be fully empowered to address and overcome the above problematics.

As a citizen-driven initiative, the APRM recognises that, „people" are the agents of change and the drivers of development processes. Their socio-economic needs should therefore attract the priority attention of government policies (see, Lamouse-Smith, 1993:73; Adejumobi, 2009:403). Socio-economic development, in its broadest sense, entails the "attainment of equitable conditions in society where individuals have guaranteed respectable outcomes in income, health, food, personal security and participation in policy making processes in a democratic process" (CUTS, 2007:1). There is thus, a need for capacity building measures towards empowering individuals to be actively involved in the affairs of government.

Good governance cannot be achieved without a "viable, strong and informed civil society" (UNDP, 1997:11; see also Ghaus-Pasha, 2004:3; Verwey, 2006:20-21; Masterson 2006; UNDP Civicus, 2011:17). As Ogom (2010/11:38) opines, "civil society represents the lubricants of state-society relations, the engine without which development and effective governance and democratic consolidation would stall". Evidence supports the fact that in countries where civil society is allowed to operate freely, they have experienced peace, stability and economic progress (ECA, 2010/11:7-9). These are the ideas summed up under the APRM"s focus area on socio-economic development.

6.4 Analyses of APRM Country Review Reports of three member-countries[150]

This section of the chapter gives a practical nuance to the implementation of the APRM in member states based on the discourses in previous sections on the purpose of the APRM; its organisational structure and the significance of its focus areas. The section presents analyses of the APRM Country Review Reports (CRRs) of Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria in that order. These countries were selected to represent the Eastern, Southern and Western parts of Africa and were among the first few to accede to the APRM upon its inception in 2003. Their governments perhaps identify the need for political and socio-economic reforms on the basis of their respective countries" historical experiences.

Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria are also in the process of implementing their NPoAs, having undergone the APRM country review process. Beyond the fact that South Africa and Nigeria have been influential in promoting pan-African ideals, they are regarded as regional powers possessing enormous natural, material and financial resources. These countries have what it takes to lead the process of successful integration in Africa. It would therefore be useful to ascertain the political and socio-economic conditions in these countries and how, practically, they are implementing regional codes and standards promoted by the APRM. On the other hand, Rwanda is a small country and it would be worthwhile to establish the nature of its governance and socio-economic development challenges.

Previous studies, such as *The African Peer Review Mechanism: A Compilation of Studies of the Process in Nine African Countries*, conducted by the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa in 2010, have analysed the APRM Reports of Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria with a view to examining how the APR process was implemented in these countries; the strengths and weaknesses of the APRM; and have provided recommendations for a way forward. The analysis in this study is done with the aim of examining, empirically, how the APRM could function as a governance programme of the African Union, within its NEPAD initiative, to resolve governance challenges in African countries in order for Africa to realise the goals of regional economic integration. In essence, to examine how, by promoting and monitoring the

[150] The analyses provided in the following sections are based on both the data available and findings presented in the Country Review Reports (CRRs) of the selected African countries and those obtained from other scholarly and institutional sources. Therefore, all the sub-headings; themes, sub-themes are the same as those provided in the CRRs with slight modifications. In some cases, the researcher was able to paraphrase the contents of the Report to reflect its authors" statements and findings. However in other instances, the exact contents were reported in order to ensure a correct representation of the findings in the Report.

implementation of the agreed regional codes and standards, the APRM could facilitate the realisation of the integration and development goals of the AU/NEPAD. The argument of the study is that regional integration would be promoted by Africans; as such, the people are supposed to experience how regional initiatives empowers them and affect their lives, wellbeing and living conditions.

This study is interested in reviewing the entirety of the Reports, and also examining further, the impact of different governance challenges such as poor health conditions, HIV AIDS, poverty, unemployment, and crime, in realising national and regional objectives. The review covers governments" responses to these challenges; if the challenges are persisting and why; APR Panel recommendations; documentation of best practices; peer review process; and how, with these, the APRM, if empowered to function, could possibly proffer solutions to the slow pace of regional integration in Africa. In carrying out this exercise, some questions were important:

Box 2

1. How do the Country Review Reports enhance understanding of the APR process?
2. What were the key findings of the CSAR and CRM on the APRM objectives in each thematic area? Were the key findings of the CSAR and CRM complementary, reinforcing or contradictory?
3. Were the recommendations of the APR Panel suggestive as solutions to the governance challenges identified in the Reports?
4. How do the identified national challenges impact on Africa"s regional economic integration agenda?
5. In what ways could the APRM assist in the realisation of regional economic integration Objectives?

The CRR findings in each thematic area are summarised while attempts are made to examine other scholarly and institutional studies relating to progress made in the countries. The approach here is to illustrate from the CRR, that democracy, good governance, good policies, peace, stability and security and development are central elements which would lead to national, regional and continental integration. This is reflective of the argument of this study that African countries are confronted with various political and socio-economic problems

which impair Africa‟s regional integration processes and that national integration in African countries is significant for the success of regional and continental integration. On the other side is to show the significance of continental initiatives such as the African Union‟s APRM in promoting democracy, good governance and development in African countries (see figure 6.4, p. 208).

Figure 6.4: Approach for APRM Country Review Reports analyses



Source: Author‟s Compilation

6.4.1 APRM Country Review Report 2 - Republic of Rwanda (July 2006)

6.4.1.1 Introduction/Background.

The Rwanda CRR (AU/APRM, 2006:24-26) provides a background showing that ethnic rivalries in Rwanda had begun even before the country‟s independence in 1962. Ethnic tensions between the Hutus and the Tutsis, stimulated by the struggle for political power and control, culminated in a civil war in 1990. The political instability, with associated poor

socio-economic conditions in the country resulted to increased tensions for change of government culminating in a genocide which led to the death of many and destruction of lives and property. Ethnic-based politics led to increased hatred and intolerance on the part of the Rwandese. This was the situation in the country when the Government of National Unity came on board in 1996 (AU/APRM, 2006:26). The effects of prolonged conflict on the economy were devastating. The people lost confidence in the state: many were internally displaced while others became refugees in other countries. The Government of National Unity, established in 1996, was confronted with the huge challenge of rebuilding the state and restructuring the economy.

Scholars attribute different causes to the Rwandan crisis: ethnic factionalisation, poverty, poor governance and bad politics. Gruzd (2007:61) adds that, "the Rwandan government has frequently been accused of fomenting regional instability under the pretext of dealing with its security concerns in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Here too, land is a key source of conflict". This means Rwanda has conflicts with its neighbours (as indicated Appendix 1, Objective 1, pages 37-38). Whatever the cause/s of conflict in Rwanda, prolonged conflict culminating in genocide presents an extreme example of the unpleasant situations in post independence African countries which require political and socio-economic reforms such as those advocated through the APRM.

Conflict, whether intra-state or inter-state, has negative implications for the realisation of the goals of national, sub-regional and regional integration and development. First, is the loss of lives and property and the effects that political instability has on the economy of a state in conflict. Second, there is a shift in focus of the government to conflict resolution and peace building where resources which could be used for developmental purposes are diverted for these purposes. Third, corruption, unemployment and poverty are resultant effects of conflicts (see Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:5). Fourth, regional integration benefits derivable from intra-regional trade, movement of persons, goods and services are lost. The reality, as Figure 6.4 above tries to show, is that a state in conflict cannot promote integration objectives. Fifth is the rise in the number of refugees and displaced persons and the attendant challenges such as spread of diseases and HIV/AIDS.

Rwanda acceded to the APRM on 9 March 2003 and the Country"s APR Focal Point was appointed in January 2004. The country hosted the APRM Secretariat in February 2004. The

first stakeholders‟ workshop took place on 26 March 2004 where the government set up a Technical Review Team. A follow-up stakeholders‟ workshop was held in May 2004 to strengthen preparations. Hence, the thematic groups were reconstituted into Technical Review Teams (AU/APRM, 2006:26-27).

The CSM visited Rwanda between 21 and 24 June 2004 and its deliberations with the government and the country‟s APRM institutions led to a review of the set of background documents; a re-examination of the NGC, the APR Technical Review Team and the programme for self-assessment. The CSM finalised its activities on 24 June 2004, with the government setting up a NGC made up of 50 members inclusive of the public, private and civil service sectors and chaired by the Minister of Finance. The draft report was produced and validated at a National Conference held for this purpose on 17 December 2004. The Report was reviewed by two independent research institutions and was submitted to the APR Secretariat in March, 2005. The Country Review Mission (CRM) was in Rwanda from 18-30 April 2005 (AU/APRM, 2006:27-31).

Although the Rwandan APRM structures and the continental structures were seen to have performed expected functions, some scholars and observers who studied the APR process noted the attempt of government to dominate the APR process (see LDGL, 2007:10; Turianskyi, 2009:4). This could perhaps be an attempt to cover up many governance „questions‟ which the process would unveil. The intervention of the CSM led to a change in the constitution of the NGC in most countries which also showed that the visit of the CSM impact positively on the APR process.

The LDGL (2007:10) also noted that civil society participation came later than expected and was inadequate; civil society representatives were ill-prepared for the Country Self-Assessment, such that a bulk of the information provided reflected the views of the government and revealed the already established existing programmes of government (LDGL, 2007:10). On the other side, however, it is notable that CSOs in Rwanda are still emerging (UNDP Civicus, 2011:10), and with the APRM processes, they could become stronger overtime. While the identified weaknesses tend to suggest that the APR process was more of a government affair, Rwanda was commended for making a good decision to sign up for membership of the APRM (see, Oculi, 2007; Hansungule, 2007:41). It is important to state, however, that while political leadership is necessary to facilitate the APR process and

ensure its success, the process will not be credible without the effective participation of various segments of civil society. CSOs need to be proactive and organised and seize every opportunity they have to work with the APRM. The exercise needs be taken seriously as a national exercise.

6.4.1.2 Democracy and Good Political Governance: Overview of Rwanda‟s Country Review Report

The Rwanda‟s CRR (Objectives 1-9, pages 33-57) indicates that the government has put in place different policies, laws and institutions to promote democracy and peaceful co-existence considering the political history and conflicts in the country. A new constitution was adopted and elections were held in 2003. Several administrative reforms have been embarked upon and new institutions created towards achieving the objectives of decentralisation. However, despite the efforts aimed at promoting unity and avoiding a reoccurrence of conflicts, political and socio-economic challenges still persist as potential conflict causes which cannot be ignored.

According to the CSAR, Rwanda has endorsed all the AU‟s declarations and protocols promoting codes and standards on democracy and good political governance; however, the country has not been forthcoming in domesticating these protocols. The CRM also confirmed this weakness and noted other capacity constraints in the area of implementation (AU/APRM, 2006:35-36). This does not speak well for the peace and security of the country and its people considering the country‟s political history. The view in this study is that Rwanda is a small country which could benefit from sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration. However, as can be seen from the Report, the governance and socio-development challenges in Rwanda and its conflictual relations with neighbouring countries are limiting factors to realising integration objectives. Again, another issue which is a major reason for the failures of integration and development initiatives in Africa is non-implementation of regional agreements such as that which could speed up progress in Rwanda.

Democracy and political governance in Rwanda arouse several questions when benchmarked against the exact objectives, explicit regional codes and standards promoted by the APRM. For instance, the CRR reveals that individuals are reluctant to express their views on public matters; the constitution tends to discourage forums for dissenting ideas and opinions about politics, but adopts a consensus rather than a competitive approach in making political

choices (see, AU/APRM 2006:33-42). Although this strategy is preferred in the light of Rwanda‟s political history and experience, it suggests that democracy is still evolving in the country. Scholars and observers‟ reports confirm the "fragile" nature of Rwanda‟s democracy (Chene and Mann, 2011:10; BTI, 2012:3). According to BTI (2012:3):

> The current government pursues authoritarian capitalism firmly believing that the reforms are imperative and require strong leadership. The regime continues to suppress any real opposition but skilfully hides its authoritarian character behind a set of seemingly democratic institutions. However, elections, multiple parties and special commissions of inquiry serve as instruments of the ruling elite rather than promoting true political pluralism.

The Rwandan government is not favourably disposed to accepting criticism from opposition parties and groups, and this factor impacts on the rights of its citizens (BTI, 2012:4-5). These are areas in which the APRM demonstrates its usefulness in exposing governance challenges in countries, promoting codes and standards that should be maintained and monitoring the implementation of policies. Where citizens are empowered and civil society and media participation is effective, where oversight institutions are functional, civil society can hold government accountable to implementing national and regional policies and this could bring about changes particularly when government, as well as the people are aware that the country assessment and reviews of the APRM are continuous. Moreover, peer reviews, peer-sharing and peer pressure which the APRM promote could be effective in advancing reforms. This would be the case if the APRM is bold in pointing out governance weaknesses and advancing creative and realistic solutions (see, Oculi, 2007). Governments, it is notable, do not cherish being called undemocratic.

Notwithstanding the political questions in Rwanda, evidence points to the fact that Rwanda has made progress after the period of the genocide and this has attracted attention from different quarters (see, BTI Report, 2013:2-5; The Guardian, 3 April 2014). The country was not as developed when it became independent (BTI Report, 2013:3). Malunda (2012:10-11), examining the country‟s economic situation notes the hardship experienced since the 1980s. There were "famines in 1987, 1989-1990, 1991 and 1993. Economic growth combined with high rates of population growth resulted in declining per capital GDP throughout the 1980s and 1990s". While highlighting that the increase in population did not stop with the genocide, Malunda (2012:6) states that presently, Rwanda is considered as "one of the best performing countries in Africa and an example of success in post conflict reconstruction". The country is

included as one of the fastest growing and top moving countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on the UNDP"s Human Development Index Report 2012 (UNDP, 2012:18; Africa"s Pulse, 2013:3). (See figure 6.5, p.213).

Figure 6.5: Some of the fastest growing Sub-Saharan countries in 2012



Source: Africa's Pulse (2013:3)

Rwanda records a best practice for instance, in promoting women participation in governance processes (see Objective 7, page 51-54). It was rated "7th (out of 136 countries) in the rankings of the World Economic Forum"s 2014 Global Gender Gap Report" (IMF, 2014:14). An AfDB Report on Rwanda (AfDB-Rwanda, 2014:7) highlights that "the number of parliamentary seats held by women increased from 56 per cent in 2008 to 64 per cent in 2013". The Rwandan government emphasises the significance of gender equality in policy formulation and budgetary allocation to different sectors (IMF, 2014:14). The issue of gender is articulated in the "2003 constitution, the 1999 Civil Code and the 2013 law governing land tenure" (IMF, 2014:14). The efforts of the Rwandan government in combating corruption and creating a convenient environment for business are also recorded: Rwanda is cited as "one of the most improved countries in the annual Doing Business Index" (Malunda 2012:6-7).

6.4.1.3 Economic Governance and Management: Overview of Rwanda‟s Country Review Report

The CRR (Objectives 1-5, pages 58-78) description of the economic situation in post-genocide Rwanda shows clearly the effects of conflicts on economic development at the national level. The government has had to address many pressing issues, especially with regard to repositioning the economy and solving human security challenges as a result of years of conflicts. Significant progress has however been made by putting in place mechanisms, legislation, policy and institutional frameworks to regulate the economy, provide for the needs of the growing population and ensure poverty alleviation. The establishment of a new constitution in 2003 was a watershed in the country‟s political history and it was hoped that far reaching changes would result from implementing the constitution to improve the economic situation. However, addressing socio-economic development remains a challenge despite on-going reforms.

Rwanda‟s economy grew “at an annual average rate of 8 to 10 during the second half of the decade 2000s resulting in a 1.3 to 1.7 percentage point annual reduction in the national poverty headcount” (Africa‟s Pulse, 2013:14). The IMF Report (2014:5) underscored that “poverty declined from about 60 per cent in 2000 to below 45 per cent in 2010/2011”, see figure 6.6, p. 214.

Figure 6.6: Poverty has been on a downward trend



Source: IMF Country Report 14/343 – Rwanda (2014:9).

The global economic crisis slightly affected Rwanda‟s GDP in 2008. However, as Malunda (2012:5) notes, “Rwanda‟s GDP per capital has increased from less than 200US$ in 1994 to 540US$ in 2010”. Rwanda is one of the African countries which have made notable progress

through investing in its agriculture sector and this has contributed to poverty reduction. Africa‟s Pulse (2013:22) shows that “almost half (45%) of the reduction in poverty in Rwanda between 2001 and 2011 has been accounted for by developments in agricultural production”. Agriculture provides 70% of employment in Rwanda (AfDB Report on Rwanda, 2014:5-6). It provides for the country‟s export (see Figure 6.7, p. 215). Rwanda has also benefited from growth in other sectors such as industries and services, particularly tourism (AfDB Report on Rwanda, 2014:5-6; Africa‟s Pulse, 2013:6).

Figure 6.7: Contribution of agriculture to poverty reduction



Source: Africa‟s Pulse (2013:22).

According to the CRR, financing development programmes is still a challenge and the country still depends on foreign assistance “for about 50 per cent of its annual budget” (Malunda, 2012:5). Government is however, considered to make good use of foreign aid to promote socio-economic development and this perhaps account for records of improvements in different sectors (IMF, 2014:5). Inflation rates have been controlled and “remain in single digits due to the implementation of robust macroeconomic policies and the easing of global food and fuel prices” (AfDB-Rwanda, 2014:6; see also, IMF, 2014:14). While export has improved and Rwanda is starting to make progress towards export diversification, there has

also been an increase in imports and this has negatively affected the balance of trade (Malunda 2012:5).

Despite the efforts to mobilise resources and generate domestic savings, (one of the objectives of the APRM under this focus area), corruption is still recorded as an issue in the public domain albeit at a low rate (AU/APRM, 2006:74). As the Report (see pages 71-75) and subsequent APR Panel recommendations (in page 76) indicated, the Rwandan authorities are yet to exploit the role of the civil society, media, and parliament in providing oversight functions and enhancing public accountability, combating corruption and educating the public about the workings of government.

There are difficulties in the area of providing employment and human capital formation, development and education (Malunda, 2012:41-42). Despite the efforts and on-going reforms, however, several challenges in reducing inequality, promoting inclusive growth, developing infrastructure, poverty reduction, still persist (Malunda, 2012:45-47). The analysis of Rwanda shows the linkage between conflict, governance, development, national and regional integration (as shown in figure 6.4, p. 208 above). More efforts are needed to sustain economic growth, promote adequate private sector participation, improve non-agricultural sectors such as manufacturing, providing employment and developing skills (Malunda 2012:5-7 and 47; BTI, 2013:3; IMF, 2014:7-14). The argument in this study is that the challenges explicitly exposed by the APRM reflect the concern for regional solutions to be found.

The CSAR indicates that although Rwanda has subscribed in principle to internationally recognised principles and standards relating to economic governance and management, many of the international conventions have not been ratified (pages 61-66). Rwanda promotes regional integration efforts; however, as the APRM document stipulates, national policies should be consistent and supportive of regional goals and interests (see, pages 76-78). For instance, some non-trade tariff barriers are still in force in Rwanda (Malunda, 2012:58). National integration is still a problem because of the nature of democracy and political governance in the country. The CRM however noted the progress which is being made in observing regional standards and codes and the improvement recorded in the country‟s economy. The reality is that Rwanda could consolidate its progress and record more successes by addressing the political constraints identified in the CRR.

6.4.1.4 Corporate governance: Overview of Rwanda‟s Country Review Report

Rwanda is a small country, densely populated with a growing economy (see, BTI Report, 2013:13). As earlier highlighted, given the country‟s political history and experience of genocide, political and economic reforms are being implemented to address the aftermaths of protracted conflict. For instance, the CRR indicates that, supported by funding from the World Bank, the Rwandan government has embarked on establishing basic infrastructures through its Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project (AU/APRM, 2006:79-81). Even so, Rwanda is lacking in adequate legal, policy frameworks for promoting good corporate governance and mechanisms for monitoring compliance with existing laws regulating business undertakings. Additionally, many of the existing laws and policies are reported to be outdated and are being updated. Other laws are being drafted (see pages 79-88).

The identified weaknesses exist despite the fact that the country has ratified key international standards and codes in corporate governance and endorsed most standards and codes outlined in the APRM Questionnaire. The level of implementation and compliance with the various standards and codes which have been ratified also varies. The level of awareness about various standards and codes remains low (pages 80-81). This perhaps accounts for weak civil society participation. All these governance weaknesses and persisting challenges under this thematic area are made explicit through the APR process for Rwanda to make sustained efforts to create enabling environments whereby it could benefit more from local, regional and foreign investments.

Considering the importance of good corporate governance in achieving Rwanda‟s political and socio-economic development objectives, the APR Panel encouraged the Rwandan government to establish an Inter-Ministerial Task Force to look into the above mentioned issues. It was also stressed that the public and private sectors should continue efforts at creating awareness on the need to promote good corporate governance (AU/APRM, 2006:81). In analysing the CRR (see, pages 79-109), the need for effective involvement of the media and key segments of the civil society in monitoring adherence to corporate governance codes and standards was underscored (page 100). In its annual Progress Report on the implementation of Rwanda‟s APRM Programme of Action 2007, government appeared to have taken into consideration most of the recommendations of the APR Panel on

improving corporate governance. For instance, the Report (2007:7) highlighted that "the business community is small and corporate governance is fairly new. Efforts have been made on streamlining laws for enhancing business environment". Several laws have been enacted. Efforts have been intensified to combat corruption, among others. According to the AfDB, Report on Rwanda (2014:7):

> Rwanda remains the third most competitive country in Sub-Saharan Africa and was ranked 66 out of 148 in the 2013 Global Competitive Index. The country"s Doing Business ranking also improved to 32 out of 189 in 2013 with improvements being recorded in eight of the 10 dimensions that measure the state of business climate.

6.4.1.5 Socio-Economic Development: Overview of Rwanda"s Country Review Report

The CRR (see, Objectives 1-6 pages 110-135) indicates that Rwanda has made great progress in achieving the objectives of the APRM outlined in this thematic area, some of which are also consistent with the MDGs. The government has improved in service delivery to the poor, improving living standards, assisting the poor to access financial services among others (see also, IMF Report – Rwanda, 2014:5-9). Rwanda"s progress in different sectors varies.

The government of Rwanda has made giant strides in the promotion of gender equality and education (AU/APRM, 2006:131-135). According to the BTI Report (2013:2), "the most important step forward has been the substantial increase in secondary and tertiary education and the almost 100% primary school attendance". Government has shown its commitment to education, training, and skills development as "expenditures for education and training have been continually increased and now amount to 4.5% of GDP" (BTI, 2013:19). Policies have been formulated to improve water supply, sanitation, and provide health care delivery. For instance, government has put in place a national health insurance policy which enables the people access affordable health services (AfDB-Rwanda, 2014:6). It has also promoted agriculture sector-led development which has benefited the growing population, and as such poverty has been reduced (AU/APRM, 2006, 119-121).

Considering the efforts made in improving health-care delivery, "the number of people living with HIV/AIDS decreased from 400,000 in 2001 to 170,000 in 2012" (CIA Factbook, 2014) and maternal and child health have relatively improved. Table 6.2 (p.219), presents the

figures for the period 2000 to 2005. According to Africa‟s Pulse (2013:11), in 1990, “the maternal mortality ratio was 850 deaths per 100,000 live births. In 2010 the value of this indicator was 500 deaths per 100,000 live births. The under-five mortality rate has declined substantially as well, from 178 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 109 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011”. To this extent, Rwanda is considered one of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa making progress on the UNDP‟s Human Development Index, 2012 (see table 6.3, p.220).

Table 6.2 - Child Mortality (per 1,000 live births) and Maternal Mortality (per 100,000 births)

	Infant mortality		Under-5 mortality		Maternal mortality	
	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005
Rural	123.5	108	216.2	192	*	*
Urban	77.9	69	141.3	122	*	*
Total	107	86	196	152	1071	750

Source: Rwanda‟s APRM Programme of Action PoA: Annual implementation of progress report – 2007. 36. (Available online: Atkt Rwanda Aprm poa Implementation 2007 En). *Data indicates not available.

According to the CRR (page 110), Rwanda lacks adequate resources and the capacity to address the socio-economic challenges of its growing population, particularly the majority who are poor and live in the rural areas. Foreign Direct Investment in the country is low (Malunda, 2012:6). The distribution of the population is also a challenging factor. Rwanda has made commendable progress in formulating socio-economic policies, however, the reality is that poverty and socio-economic challenges such as unemployment still persist (see, pages 114-117).

Table 6.3: Sub-Saharan countries are top movers on the HDI index 2000-2011

GLOBAL RANK	HDI	GLOBAL RANK	NONINCOME HDI
2	Rwanda	2	Rwanda
3	Sierra Leone	3	Niger
4	Ethiopia	4	Burundi
5	Mozambique	5	Mali
6	Mali	7	Tanzania
7	Burundi	8	Ethiopia
8	Niger	9	Sierra Leone
9	Tanzania	10	Mozambique
10	Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	11	Angola
12	Angola	12	Liberia

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2012. Africa Human Development Report 2012: Towards a food secure future. 18.

Rwanda is not richly endowed with natural resources and is challenged by severe climatic conditions. The country relies on foreign assistance and is making efforts towards achieving self-reliance and self-sustaining development. Given its disadvantages, the Rwandan case demonstrates the dire need for sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration in Africa to address national challenges in post-conflict countries. As the CRR highlighted, several years of bad governance and the 1994 genocide have left long standing political and socio-economic effects in Rwanda (AU/APRM, 2006:110-117). The country‟s Vision 2020, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP), and Sector Strategies have all been mapped out for promoting socio-economic development (see, Objective 2 pages 119-122).

The Rwanda CRR identifies that the country has ratified various regional and international protocols and conventions related to socio-economic development. Many of its existing laws are being reviewed while new ones have been formulated in light of the Rwanda‟s 2003 constitution; to conform to international standards and codes and also to accommodate new challenges and needs. According to the Report, the processes of making these laws have been participatory of all stakeholders (AU/APRM, 2006:111-113). The CRM noted however, that in Rwanda, complying with laws formulated to promote socio-economic development, for instance on health and sanitation, is a problem because of several socio-economic factors

which include: lack of adequate information on the part of the people; low literacy level; ineffective information dissemination system or awareness creation mechanisms among others (AU/APRM, 2006:111-113). The recommendations of the CRM included that, government should make more efforts to improve capacity of the rural population and enhance efforts at promoting socio-economic development, especially in the area of healthcare.

6.4.1.6 Overarching governance issues in Rwanda

The overarching governance issues which were identified in the CRR (pages 136-141) are briefly discussed in this section with the aim of examining their impact on national and regional integration and development or how they could be addressed through regional policies. With this, the APR process provides opportunities for countries to learn from peer reviews and the CRR documents country experiences, standards and best practices which in future, countries can reference and learn from to enhance governance.

1. **Land and population**

Land and population issues are considered to require the urgent attention of government. While they could be addressed nationally, the AU/NEPAD initiatives recognise that such issues deserve regional attention. As such, in relation to gender issues, the APRM promotes and monitors the implementation of the AU/NEPAD‟s regional codes on gender equality, women‟s rights, girl child education, access to land and other infrastructure. This is in recognition of the contribution of women to development processes at all levels and also to redress the numerous cultural biases and violence against women in many African countries.

Rwanda‟s CRR revealed that land issue accounts for a large number of conflicts as the majority of the population, about 80% are confronted with inadequacy of land and work (BTI, 2013:13). The impact of conflicts has already been identified. The population is growing and they need to have sources of incomes to feed their families; they require shelter; they need to establish small business ventures. Almost 91% of the population depends on farming as a means of livelihood (AU/APRM, 2006:136). These issues point to the need to speed up land reforms in Rwanda. The government of Rwanda was encouraged to formulate a comprehensive and clear policy on land and population.

2. Political pluralism and competition of ideas

The issue of concern relates to the "complexity of Rwanda"s move towards multi-party and political pluralism" (AU/APRM, 2006:137). The political system does not provide room for individuals and groups to express dissenting and competitive views about the government and public policies and this is a limiting factor to democracy and good governance. It is also a potential cause for civil strife and conflicts as individuals and groups are not free to exercise their civic rights (see, BTI, 2012:3-5). A political system "characterised by consensus rather than voluntary participation by political parties" (AU/APRM, 2006:137), will be constrained in its governance and socio-development processes. The negative consequences for sub-regional and regional integration cannot be over-emphasised. Part of the goals of the challenge of the APRM is to motivate political reforms in countries such as Rwanda (see Gruzd, 2007:64; Turianskyi, 2009:17-18).

3. The Gacaca judicial system

Although recognised as one of the effective ways of dispute resolution and bringing peace and reconciliation after the effects of the 1994, genocide, there are concerns about the capacity of the Gacaca judicial system not only to attract the interest of the Rwandese but also about whether the Gacaca system conforms to international human rights norms and standards (see Gruzd, 2007:64). A modern judicial system is recommended that will incorporate the ideals of the Gacaca judicial system (AU/APRM, 2006:137-138). This is part of providing the enabling environment for the conduct of business in Rwanda. The Gacaca judicial system in Rwanda was commended by the CRM and countries could learn from the APR Panel recommendations to integrate such system into a modern system in preventing and resolving conflicts.

4. Capacity constraints

The Rwandan CRR identifies the challenge of strengthening the institutions of government – legislature, judiciary civil society, and others to perform critical functions (AU/APRM, 2006:138; see also, Turianskyi, 2009:7). In terms of establishing institutions and mechanisms, Rwanda has made immense progress. However, the challenge has been lack of adequate capacity for these institutions to perform effectively. It is important to strengthen the Human and Institutional Capacity Development Agency (HIDA) (AU/APRM, 2006:138).

The Report aligns with the perspective in this study that human capital development, skills development, training at the local and national levels need to be taken seriously by government. These are many benefits which could be realised through cooperation at the sub-regional and regional levels. They could also be achieved through ensuring that corporations perform their corporate social responsibilities to their host communities. The CRR encouraged the civil society, the private sector and development partners to assist governments‟ efforts in resolving socio-economic challenges.

5. Aid effectiveness

The fact that Rwanda relies on external assistance was clearly indicated in the Report. The issue of concern has to do with making judicious use of aid. The government needs to do periodic assessments on aid received and in which sectors aid is utilised; how effectively the aid is utilised and how much the donor institution benefits (AU/APRM, 2006:139). The APR Panel identified that, beyond putting in place effective mechanisms for checks and balances, the government needs sound, deliberate and appropriate economic policies to enhance self reliance growth and sustaining development (see, page 119). These are critical elements in achieving national and regional development goals.

6. Managing diversity

The APRM identifies that diversity management in most African countries is central to fostering national integration and promoting peace and stability at the national level (see, ECA, 2011d:3-7). This is a pre-condition for the achievement of sub-regional and continental integration objectives. The Rwandan government has put in place measures and institutional frameworks for managing diversity and ensuring peaceful coexistence among the ethnic groups in the country. Its effort towards achieving national stability, unity and reconciliation has been noted in the report. However, the government needs to do more in managing the different ethnic groups so that there will not be cases of domination by a particular group. Good governance, opening the political space for participation in decision making processes, equity in distribution of national resources, dialogue with various groups, are values promoted through the APRM that would promote peaceful coexistence in Rwanda (AU/APRM, 2006:139; see ECA, 2011d:23-24).

6.4.1.7 Concluding remarks on Rwanda‟s Country Review Report

The next sessions of the CRR (pages 142-184) presents: the government of Rwanda‟s comments on the APR Panel Report; comments from the APRM Panel after submission of Report to APR Forum; and Rwanda‟s Programme of Action broadly presented. These processes show that the five stages of the APR processes were completed.

According to the CRR, the responses made by Rwanda to the overarching issues were positive; they were well acknowledged and the government stated its pledge to address these issues in the NPoA. However, at the 4th APRM Meeting in Abuja, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, clarified some aspects of the Panel‟s Report that he felt were misinterpreted probably for lack of in-depth interaction by the CRM with the people. Concerning the explanations of the President of Rwanda on these issues, scholars have observed that the APRM may find it difficult to promote reforms in countries such as Rwanda, raising again the issue of state sovereignty as a critical challenge in the APRM discourse. Turianskyi (2009:17-18) for instance, observes that, “the participating Heads of State were not eager to criticise their Rwandan counterpart because of its long history and legacy of genocide”. While these comments are notable, it is also important to state that one of the important aspects of the APRM is that it presents Heads of States with the opportunity to discuss, dialogue, and criticise one another; learn and share experiences and put pressure on colleagues to promote reforms. In a way, this is an attempt to interfere in the affairs of member countries. Moreover, the clarifications made by the president do not alter the CRR but are attached to it.

6.4.2 APRM Country Review Report 5: Republic of South Africa (September 2007)

6.4.2.1 Implementation of the APRM Process in South Africa

The South Africa‟s CRR (pages 39-50) provide details on the implementation of the APRM process. South Africa signed up to participate in the APRM in March 2003. The government appointed the Minister for Public Service and Administration as the National APRM Focal Point; created an interdepartmental committee and put in place a temporary secretariat in the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). Various Workshops were held to sensitise the people about the APRM and their envisaged role in the process. The country held a National Consultative Conference on the APRM between the 28 and 29 September, 2005 of almost 350 people – inclusive of state and non-state representatives. In addition, the

President established a 15-member NGC and the Focal Point was also put in charge as the chairperson. Each member of the NGC excluding the chairperson had an "alternate" to make the national body more inclusive. Provincial Focal Points were also selected and a Provincial Governing Council (PGC) was created in each province.

The CSM visited South Africa between 9 -11 November 2005 and the MOU on the review was signed on 17 November 2005. Deliberations with the CSM led to: expansion of the membership of the NGC from 15 to 29 members as alternate members became full members; decision on parliament‟s involvement in the process; technical research institutions to be involved; and sensitisation of the public. Preparations for the Country Self-Assessment included: the creation of a research group of seven members by the NGC; four research institutions selected to compile the CSAR; and the appointment of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Auditor-General to assist the process. After the compilation of the thematic technical report, seminars were held on the 4-7 April 2006 to review it. Together with the inputs received, on the draft report, the CSAR and draft NPOA was compiled. On 4-5 May 2006, the country held the second national consultative workshop for the presentation of the draft CSAR. Such workshops were also organised at the provincial level.

The Report (pages 43-44) records some concerns raised by stakeholders on the process of country self-assessment review. Some members of civil society held the view that there were attempts by the NGC to influence the process by its "reluctance" to bring in the technical institutions when the exercise began; moreover, the CSAR got concluded after its validation by the APR Secretariat. In addition, it was argued that the Auditor-General and Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), which were employed for the purpose of quality control, were not "thorough" in their efforts. Nonetheless, the NGC confirmed stakeholder participation and the inclusiveness of the process; stating that validation workshops had been held, and that amendment to the Report was based on stakeholders‟ responses. South Africa submitted its CSAR and draft NPOA in June 2006 and hosted the CRM from 9 - 25 July 2006. The CRM formally began its consultations and deliberations with different stakeholders on 12 July 2006 (AU/APRM, 2007:45-50).

In different studies assessing the APRM process in South Africa, a number of concerns were raised particularly regarding government‟s leading role in the process (see, Mbelle 2010:322;

Hutchings, Dimba and Tilley, 2008:1-3). Mbelle (2010:322) noted for instance that the government had "undertaken its own ten year review of developments since the country‟s first elections in 1994 and seemed to regard the self assessment as a similar undertaking that was in effect a report card for the African National Congress (ANC) Administration". Not only were the national APRM structures constituted mainly by public officials, the government "dictated which CSOs were to participate; setting the norms of civil society engagement throughout and substantively editing the final CSAR after the final consultative conference had discussed the summary reports prepared by the four research institutes" (Mbelle, 2010:322; see also Seaton, 2008; Hutchings, Dimba and Tilley, 2008:1-3; 8-9). Other studies also identified challenges in the engagements between the government and CSO representatives (Jordaan, E. 2007; Hutchings, Dimba and Tilley, 2008:1-3; Boyle, 2008:1-2). Moreover, the visits of the CSM and CRM were considered to be "very short" and "tended to concentrate on urban centres and consultations with towns people, ignoring the country‟s huge rural population" (Mbelle, 2010:323; see also Seaton, 2008).

The issues raised by these scholars are germane in showing some of the weaknesses of the APR which should be addressed to improve future reviews. While the South African government and its people recognise the importance of the APRM, the government is perhaps not honest about being assessed and scores low in meeting the benchmarks which have been set. Again, it is partly because of such fears that some other African countries have not acceded to the APRM and they are criticised for hiding bad and unacceptable practices. It would however be worthwhile if the APRM could motivate countries to improve performance bearing in mind that bad governance would be exposed during the assessment and review processes. The interest of this study is that civil society, organised in various groups, could be motivated to effectively utilise the opportunities provided by the APRM to improve governance in their countries.

6.4.2.2 Background notes on South Africa

The APRM CRR provides background explanations on the political history of participating countries in order for a comprehensive assessment of the country‟s challenges, development efforts and persistent problems. In the case of South Africa (see pages 51-67) which experienced several years of colonial and apartheid rule, the adoption of a new constitution in 1996, marked a new beginning for South Africa to garner the gains of the freedom and

democracy. The constitution, in promoting democratic governance, established three spheres of government and upheld the principle of separation of powers. South Africa‟s first democratic elections which held on 27 April 1994 increased the impetus for reform in the country based on good governance, democracy and popular participation. The country has since moved on and has achieved progress in a number of areas.

Nevertheless, despite the, legal policy and institutional frameworks put in place to achieve a peaceful, stable and progressive society, the aftermaths of the apartheid era have remained. The country is bedevilled with governance socio-economic challenges: racial divisions and racism is a challenge; poverty, unemployment, high rate of crimes among others. Government has however been making efforts to address these challenges (AU/APRM, 2007:51-67; see ECA, 2011d:9).

A brief history of South Africa – its colonial experience; apartheid rule and democratic transition were examined in the Report (pages 51-67). According to the CRR, South Africa has made remarkable strides in promoting democratic governance, addressing challenges and meeting the needs of its growing and diverse population. Its post-apartheid economy has grown. The country has put in place mechanisms to address persistent issues of discontentment and managing diversity. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 1996 is significant in South Africa‟s transition to democracy.

South Africa is respected by countries of the developed and developing world for its influence and contributions in international development. The country is a force to reckon with in Africa‟s quest for regional integration and development. South Africa has played a significant role in promoting pan-African ideals and in the establishment of pan African development initiatives and institutions.

6.4.2.3 Democracy and Political Governance: Overview of South Africa‟s Country Review Report

Considering its colonial and apartheid history, promoting democracy and good governance is critical to sustainable peace, stability and socio-economic development in South Africa. In achieving the objectives of the APRM in this focus area, the CRR identifies that South Africa has made giant strides in terms of legal, policy and institutional frameworks to promote the values of democracy and particularly in providing for the rights of the diverse communities,

combating corruption and ensuring efficiency and effectiveness of the public service, addressing gender issues, among others. The South African Constitution is "celebrated" as that document that binds together the diverse communities in the country as the government and people chart their way forward in establishing democracy and good political governance (AU/APRM, 2007:69). It established three spheres of government which although are autonomous, are "interdependent and interrelated" (AU/APRM, 2007:71). Substantive efforts of the government towards achieving the APRM objectives under this thematic area are detailed in this section of the CRR, pages 73-119.

The IDC, Report (2013:1) indicates economic progress in South Africa since the beginning of democracy. The country "recorded an average rate of economic growth of 3.3% per annum in real terms over the period 1994-2012, a remarkable improvement on the 1.4% average annual growth registered during the period 1980-1993". However, an analysis of the CRR revealed that despite the stable political condition in South Africa and various government policies since 1994 to improve the socio-economic situation in the country, it is proving to be difficult to address persistent socio-economic challenges. These challenges although national, have negative implications for sub-regional and regional integration objectives as South Africa is regarded as a force in promoting the ideals of pan-Africanism. They constitute pull-back factors to the country"s economic growth and progress.

Key challenges in South Africa include: poverty and racial inequality in accessing social services and public wealth, unemployment; weak capacities and human capital base particularly at the local level making for rural-urban dichotomy; corruption; high rate of crime and violence, HIV AIDS, among others (see Objectives 1-9 pages 74-119; see also, Mbelle, 2010:324). For instance, "almost 25% of the population (and 65% of young people) are without work" in South Africa (AfDB/OECD/UNDP Report on South Africa, 2014b:122). Statistics South Africa (2014:III) records that "an estimated 730,000 households in South Africa experienced house breaking/burglary in 2011 and a further 200,000 households were victims of home robbery, making these crimes the most prevalent household crimes". Figure 6.8 (p.229) below further reveals the rate of some forms of crime in the country). The question to ask is: How can the people enjoy their various rights with the prevalent high rate of crime and violence?

One of the effects of such challenges as inequality, poverty and unemployment is the xenophobia observed by the CRM: accordingly, the Mission made recommendations to reverse this trend (see Objective 1, page 77 and 80). Other studies have also noted the phenomenon of xenophobia (see, Musuva, 2014:377-402) which shows the APRM"s potential in identifying governance challenges. Xenophobia (which persists unabated, especially considering the 2015 incidents in Durban and other parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces) hinders the actualisation of the benefits of regional integration.

Figure 6.8: Home robbery incidents by province, 2010-2012 (Number in thousands)



	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	RSA
VOCS 2010	25	35	3	19	56	27	107	38	26	336
VOCS 2011	22	23	2	7	41	10	52	20	23	200
SAPS 2010/2011	1	2	0	1	4	1	7	1	1	17
SAPS 2011/2012	1	2	0	1	4	1	6	1	1	17

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2014. Crime Statistics Series Volume 1, 14.

The CRR revealed also that there are challenges in the intergovernmental relations process as stakeholders view local government (which is central to promoting the interests of the people) as subordinate (AU/APRM, 2007:71). Turianskyi (2009:5) observes that, there are challenges in implementing the principle of separation of power, even though this was not mentioned as an overarching issue. The South African government was encouraged to strengthen the local units to perform their key roles in the country"s democracy (AU/APRM, 2007:71). The need for South Africa to encourage multiparty systems and avoid the issue of "floor-crossing", in order to consolidate and deepen its democracy was greatly emphasised by the CRM (AU/APRM, 2007:71). The government has since taken action concerning the issue of "floor-crossing" (see, Gruzd, 2014:17).

With regard to standards and codes of democracy and political governance, the CSAR lists the various protocols which have either been signed or ratified by the South African government and others yet to be ratified. One area of concern noted by the CRM is inadequacy in domesticating and implementing some of these conventions and as this study identifies, weak implementation of regional resolutions and agreements is one major challenge hindering the realisation of regional objectives. As the CRM found during its consultations with stakeholders, South Africans‟ awareness about the existence of these protocols and conventions is low. The lack of capacity for parliament to perform its oversight functions and monitor the domestication and implementation of regional and international codes and standards were also addressed. The panel recommended effective collaboration by both government and non-state stakeholders in educating South Africans on the existing protocols which the country has signed (pages, 2007:71-73).

The CRR revealed that, generally, South Africa still has more to do in promoting democratic values and principles and implementing the standards and codes of good governance outlined in the APRM‟s thematic areas. The country is still far from achieving the objectives listed under this thematic area.

6.4.2.4 Economic Governance and Management: Overview of South Africa‟s Country Review Report

Since 1994, the government of South Africa has been making efforts to reposition the country on the path of economic growth and management, to address the socio-economic challenges confronting the country and meet the needs of its growing population. There was the need for several economic restructuring considering the country‟s experience under the apartheid regime. The CRR lists the various factors which negatively affected the country‟s economy during the apartheid regime and the several challenges which were legacies of the past. Black Africans were marginalised in undertaking economic activities; it was difficult for them to access and enjoy social services while many were dispossessed of their economic resources and others left in poverty. Moreover, the unfavourable environment did not encourage investors while the country was economically sanctioned for many years. The new government was therefore faced with the challenge of reversing these negative trends (AU/APRM, 2007:121-156).

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) initiated in 1994 was the first development programme of government aimed at turning the tide of the economy, promoting economic growth; and delivery of basic services. In response to new and emergent challenges, in 1996, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy was introduced. The GEAR strategy also contributed to developing the economy; however, the challenges it faced resulted in the formulation of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2005. AsgiSA was expected to address the challenges to fast economic growth and development which will positively impact on the people‟s wellbeing in society (AU/APRM, 2007:122-127). Evidence reveals that South Africa has recorded moderate economic growth in the period since 1994. Figures 6.9 (p. 231) and 6.10 (p. 232) show the country‟s GDP growth rate at various periods and the external factors which affected the country‟s economy.

Figure 6.9: Gross Domestic Product – South Africa



Source: Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Department of Research and Information 2013. “South African economy: An overview of key trends since 1994”. 1

Figure 6.10: GDP growth. Figure shows the external factors which affected South Africa



Source: Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Department of Research and Information 2013. "South African economy: An overview of key trends since 1994". 1

According to the CRR, South Africa has moved forward significantly in addressing its internal challenges. The government‟s development agenda has sought to address the issue of poverty and reduce inequality (see figure 6.11, p.233). Development policies, mechanisms and strategies have been put in place to reflect government‟s drive to promote economic growth and socio-economic development. Efforts have been made by government to promote decentralisation, efficient public service delivery, combat corruption and money laundering. Improvements are recorded in budget administration and ensuring proper public finance management. The country has a developed economy and does not lack in terms of infrastructures. Over the years, South Africa is one of the African countries "that have qualified to be listed in the exclusive league table of developing countries that are striving to move up the economic ladder" (AU/APRM, 2007:127). In fact, Mbelle (2007:351) notes that South African governments just like other African governments, do not lack when it comes to formulating policies, but their willingness and commitment to programme implementation is

a huge challenge. Lack of commitment to implement constitutional provisions is a basic deficiency notable among African leaders (Turianskyi, 2009:17-18).

Figure 6.11: Percentage of individuals going hungry between 2002 and 2012



Source: Statistics South Africa, 2012, In-depth analysis of the General Household Data, General Household Data Series Volume IV – Food security and agriculture 2002-2011

Despite the progress made in addressing its national challenges, the CRR identifies several persisting challenges in achieving the objectives in this thematic area: constraints of the parliament in performing its oversight functions; poor management of public resources are noted at the sub-national levels of government; poverty, unemployment and shortage of skilled personnel; crime; violence; corruption; are among the socio-economic challenges in South Africa (see, pages 134-143). There appears to be disconnects in programme formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (see, Pillay, 2000). Such issues reflect a part of the concern of this study based on the imperative of broad-based participation in governance and development processes. The APRM proves to be an intervening factor in ensuring that national economic growth promotes inclusive development.

Notwithstanding its challenges, South Africa, as one of the larger economies in Africa, attracts investment flows to its rapidly growing consumer sector (Africa Pulse, 2013:20). The IDC (2013:29) however highlight a major concern about:

> A large and widening deficit on the current account of the balance of payments as the country remains particularly reliant on foreign as the country remains particularly reliant on inflows of foreign capital to fund the substantial shortfall between investment and savings. The openness of the economy and the highly concentrated nature of the national export basket make it extremely vulnerable to global economic developments.

According to the findings of the CSAR and CRM (see Objective 5, pages 152-155), South Africa promotes regional economic integration. The country is however advised to ensure that its national economic policies support the pan-African agenda because one of the major factors militating against the achievement of regional objectives is inconsistencies in national, sub-regional and regional policies and programmes. South Africa is seen to be more open to engaging with developed partners than with underdeveloped partners. In consequence, one can raise issues about how much more South Africa could do to promote regional concerns given its capacity to assist other African countries in the sub-region in promoting the ideals and objectives of regional cooperation and integration. In light of the above issues, there is, to some extent, a tendency to regard South Africa‟s hegemonic power in the sub-region as more of a problem than, a blessing. One of the concerns of this study is that while countries promote open regionalism, considering the level of political and socio-economic challenges in Africa, African leaders need to redefine the goals of integration with regard to African development and transformation. Regional integration in Africa needs to be advanced to the point where countries such as South Africa are able to make necessary sacrifices to promote pan-African interests.

The CSAR lists the regional and international standards and codes which South Africa has endorsed in this focus area but does not provide details on compliance with these standards. It does, however, state that the country has submitted reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) to the IMF and World Bank in each area approved by these institutions as “being important to their work” (AU/APRM, 2007:128-129). The CRM found that all the relevant codes and standards outlined in the APRM Questionnaire had been ratified (page 128).

6.4.2.5 Corporate Governance: Overview of South Africa‟s Country Review Report

The South Africa‟s CSAR indicates the different factors which makes South Africa a force to be reckoned with and an active role player both in international and regional affairs. In terms of contribution to Africa‟s gross domestic product (GDP); industrial output, mineral production, export earnings, physical infrastructure, and technology, South Africa stands out. The country‟s manufacturing sector is growing. It also has great potentials in tourism and the service industry. The private and state-owned corporations are involved in production both for export and domestic consumption (AU/APRM, 2007:157). The government considers corporate governance to be crucial in promoting socio-economic development, especially considering the political-economic transformation that has been taking place in the country since 1994. The concern in this study is for the country to be strategic enough to exploit its potential and connections to address long identified challenges.

The government has reformulated existing laws and enacted new legislation; established rules and regulations to ensure that its private and state-owned enterprises, in their economic activities, conform to regional and international codes and standards endorsed by the country. There are various laws regulating the financial sector, trade and investment promotion, and export promotion. Corporate governance laws embody those relating to employer-labour relations; environment; human rights; shareholder rights; consumer rights; among others (see assessment of Objectives 1-5, pages 167-223).

The CSAR mentions the progress made in implementing regional codes and standards on corporate governance. In terms of legal, policy and institutional frameworks promoting good corporate governance, the country cannot be considered to be lacking. The problem is in the area of implementation and monitoring compliance. However, the views of stakeholders are different on the adequacy of country‟s labour laws. For instance, the Report notes that South Africa faces the challenge of “balancing economic growth with adequate safeguards for workers given the historical background of the country” (AU/APRM, 2007:159). The “Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) strategies, as well as related codes, sectoral charters and various microfinance schemes” are part of reforms of the government to enable historically disadvantaged groups actively to participate in the economy (AU/APRM, 2007:159).

Despite these efforts however, South Africa has continued to "operate two economies – one advances and sophisticated with first class infrastructure and competitive industries and the other informal and characterised by high levels of poverty and unemployment" (AU/APRM, 2007:159). This is apart from the prevalence of the HIV and AIDS pandemic and other socio-economic challenges which have been highlighted. Corruption, lack of proper oversight by the parliament and other related issues such as poor accountability were identified in the Report. The APRM encourages the formulation of policy where there is none and effective implementation and monitoring of existing policies. It identifies the areas requiring attention by government in national development (see AU/APRM, 2007, 199-204).

The APRM raises one of the concerns of this study for national and regional efforts to address human development challenges and promote human capital formation and development. In this regard, South Africa still has to be more forthcoming in implementing policies and strengthening institutional monitoring mechanisms. The challenges it faces, such as lack of skilled manpower, portray that the open economy which the country operates is yet to benefit majority of the population and this necessitates revisiting South Africa‟s national development and foreign policy objectives. Moreover, the socio-economic challenges are concerning to investors within the country, in Africa and outside Africa.

6.4.2.6 Socio-Economic Development: Overview of South Africa‟s Country Review Report

Despite its wealth in resources and infrastructures which ensure that South Africa is one of the fast growing economies in Africa, the country‟s socio-economic challenges cannot be over-emphasised. The concern in this section is to examine what progress has been made in improving socio-economic indicators. South Africa, as noted in the previous focus areas, has two economies – developed and underdeveloped. Its challenges, although national, have implications for the realisation of sub-regional and regional objectives. For instance, health challenges and HIV/AIDS pose concerns in the area of cross-border movements (see Assessment of Objectives 1-6, pages 225-271).

South-Africa‟s socio-economic development is examined in the context of the country‟s experiences during the apartheid era and the legacies of this period. Apartheid South Africa faced economic sanctions for two decades and this affected the growth of its economy; the black people were marginalised in the economy; had little access to social services; disposed

of their resources and oppressed. The need to provide for these previously disadvantaged groups therefore presents a challenge to government. Since 1994, however, the government has made efforts to put in place legal, policy and institutional frameworks to address daunting challenges facing the country. The RDP and GEAR initiatives were part of these programmes. However, while the South Africa"s CRR noted that, the government encourages broad-based participation in governance and development processes and there are programmes aimed at assisting individuals, the GEAR programme was criticised as an initiative formulated without broad based consultation and therefore failed to address the needs of the masses of the people (AU/APRM, 2007:226).

Concerning the various objectives identified under the APRM thematic area on socio-economic development, South Africa has progressed minimally in a number of areas. These were highlighted in the CRR (pages 235-271). Poverty levels decreased (as indicated in figure 6.11 above). This is also noted in the MDG Country Report/South Africa (2013:28). This report also highlights the social packages including grants given to indigent households and provision of basic services (see pages 22-23). In the area of creating jobs, there are improvements although the problem still persists with the unemployment rate at 25% (see Table 6.4, p. 238 below).

Table 6.4: Key labour market indication

	Apr-Jun 2013	Jan-Mar 2014	Apr-Jun 2014	Qtr-to-qtr change	Year-on-year change	Qtr-to-qtr change	Year-on-year change
	Thousand					Per cent	
Population aged 15–64 yrs	**34 712**	**35 177**	**35 332**	**155**	**620**	**0,4**	**1,8**
Labour force	**19 663**	**20 122**	**20 248**	**126**	**585**	**0,6**	**3,0**
Employed	**14 692**	**15 055**	**15 094**	**39**	**403**	**0,3**	**2,7**
Formal sector (non-agricultural)	10 374	10 780	10 755	-24	381	-0,2	3,7
Informal sector (non-agricultural)	2 360	2 336	2 379	43	19	1,8	0,8
Agriculture	742	709	670	-39	-73	-5,5	-9,8
Private households	1 215	1 231	1 290	60	75	4,9	6,2
Unemployed	**4 972**	**5 067**	**5 154**	**87**	**182**	**1,7**	**3,7**
Not economically active	**15 049**	**15 055**	**15 084**	**29**	**35**	**0,2**	**0,2**
Discouraged job-seekers	2 425	2 355	2 419	64	-6	2,7	-0,2
Other (not economically active)	12 624	12 700	12 665	-35	41	-0,3	0,3
Rates (%)							
Unemployment rate	25,3	25,2	25,5	0,3	0,2		
Employment/population ratio (absorption rate)	42,3	42,8	42,7	-0,1	0,4		
Labour force participation rate	56,6	57,2	57,3	0,1	0,7		

Due to rounding, numbers do not necessarily add up to totals.

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2014. Statistical Release P0211, Quarterly Labour Force Survey Quarter 2, 2014. V.

In the education sector, enrolment and completion rates have increased. Progress is noticeable in effort at skills development even though the skills gap is still a cause for concern as it is a major factor causing unemployment (AfDB/OECD/UNDP Report on South Africa, 2014b:131). Table 6.5 (p. 238 below) is compiled to show the employment and skill levels.

Table 6.5: Breakdown of employment and skills level

Breakdown of skill level by occupation/Number of workers by skill level				
Date	Skilled	Semi Skilled	Low Skilled	Total
	Managers Professionals Technicians	Clerks, sales and services, skilled craft, machine operators	Elementary domestic worker	
1994	1,8m	4.2m	2.9m	8.9m
2014	3.8m	7m	4.3m	15m
Breakdown of the South African Workforce by skill level				
1994	21%	47%	32%	
2014	25%	46%	29%	
Breakdown of the Black African Workforce by skill level				

1994	15%	42%	43%	
2014	18%	48%	34%	
Breakdown of the White Workforce by skill level				
1994	42%	55%	3%	
2014	61%	36%	3%	

Source: Author"sCompilation; See Research reports and papers, Statistics South Africa (2014). "Employment, unemployment, skills and economic growth: An exploration of household survey evidence on skills development and unemployment between 1994 and 2014.

The government has also emphasised gender issues in the formulation of policies and programmes. This has established South Africa as one of the African countries which have achieved success in promoting gender equality. The table 6.6 (p.239 below) reflects this success.

Table 6.6: Facts and figures – South Africa, Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Indicator	1994 baseline (or nearest year)	2010 Status (or nearest year)	Current status (2013 or nearest year)	2015 Target	Target achievability	Indicator type
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2013						
GPI primary	0.97:1 (1996)	0.98:1[8] (2009)	0.96:1 (2011)	1:1	**Likely**	MDG
GPI secondary	1.13:1 (1996)	1.01:1[9] (2009)	1.07:1 (2011)	1:1	**Achieved**	MDG
GPI tertiary	0.86:1 (1996)	1.32:1[10] (2009)	1.38:1 (2011)	1:1	**Achieved**	MDG
Ratio of literate females to literate males 15-24 years	1.1:1 (1996)	1:1 (2009)	1.0:1 (2011)	1:1	**Achieved**	MDG
Female share of non-agricultural wage employment	43 (1996)	45 (2010)	45 (2012)	50	**Unlikely**	MDG
Ratio of female unemployed to male unemployed 15-64 years	1.1:1 (2001)	No data	1.0:1 (2011)	1:1	**Achieved**	Domesticated
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	25 (1996)	44 (2009)	44 (2009)	50	**Likely**	MDG

Source: Millennium Development Goals/Statistics South AfricaReport (2013:53).

However, the MDG Report (2013:52) noted that: "the overall scores mask differences such as those related to population groups and location. There are some issues, notably gender-based violence which are not well captured in any of the indices. Indicators and related information for discussing the goal are gender and race disaggregated data on education, employment and political life". In the area of health, statistical figures show the challenge in managing the spread of HIV/AIDS (see table 6.7, p. 240 below).

Table 6.7: South Africa - HIV prevalence estimates and the number of people living with HIV, 2002-2014

Year	Prevalence				Incidence	HIV population
	Women 15-49	Adult 15-49	Youth 15-24	Total population	Adult 15-49	(millions)
2002	16,7	15,8	14,1	9,0	1,64	4,09
2003	16,9	15,9	13,2	9,1	1,64	4,20
2004	17,0	15,9	12,5	9,2	1,69	4,29
2005	17,1	15,9	11,9	9,3	1,73	4,38
2006	17,3	15,9	11,5	9,4	1,69	4,48
2007	17,5	16,0	11,1	9,5	1,59	4,61
2008	17,7	16,2	10,8	9,7	1,47	4,75
2009	17,9	16,3	10,4	9,8	1,36	4,88
2010	18,0	16,5	10,1	9,9	1,29	5,02
2011	18,2	16,6	9,7	10,0	1,25	5,14
2012	18,3	16,6	9,3	10,1	1,16	5,26
2013	18,4	16,7	9,0	10,1	1,14	5,38
2014	18,5	16,8	8,7	10,2	1,11	5,51

Source: Statistics South Africa 2014. Statistical Release P0302 -Mid-year population estimates (2014:7).

The challenge for the South African government is to develop a socio-economic development paradigm that can address the legacies of apartheid; reposition the economy for sustainable growth and meet the socio-economic needs of its diverse population. The need for policy coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation become imperative. The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) is the current initiative of government to address the socio-economic challenges and accelerate reforms based on democratic governance principles (see, pages 225-245).

The CSAR lists the different protocols and conventions signed by South Africa but it does not provide adequate information on the domestication of these standards and codes. The CRM findings confirmed the adoption and ratification all the standards and codes outlined in the APRM Questionnaire. However, the Mission established the non-ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which, according to the Mission, is important for "South Africa‟s rights-based development agenda" (AU/APRM, 2007:229). The ICESCR was recently signed on 18 January 2015 (see, ESCR-NET, 2015). During its consultations with stakeholders, the CRM observed that many South Africans were uninformed about the existence of many of the conventions and the challenges of poor implementation and interpretation of such conventions in some cases (AU/APRM, 2007:233-234). The Panel therefore recommended that the government of South Africa should take measures to redress the negative trends (see APR Panel Recommendations, page 234).

6.4.2.7 Cross-cutting issues in South Africa

This section presents the cross-cutting issues which were identified in South Africa‟s CRR (pages 273-288). They were mentioned across all four thematic areas. These governance issues require the urgent attention of the government and people of South Africa because they are not only national but also regional concerns.

1. Unemployment

The Country Review Report, in the various thematic areas, highlighted that unemployment is a challenge that has persisted in South Africa despite the efforts of government in terms of policy and institutional frameworks to provide jobs for to meet the needs of the diverse population. The several causes of unemployment were outlined in the Report. At the household level, unemployment brings: "severe financial hardship and deepening poverty; an unbearable level of indebtedness, homelessness and housing stress; the atrophying of work skills and ill-health; family tensions and breakdown; boredom; alienation; shame and stigma; increased social isolation; crime; and erosion of self-confidence and self-esteem" (AU/APRM, 2007:274; see, Schwabe, 2003:5-6). Unemployment has negative consequences for the political and socio-economic development of the country. Unemployment leads to crime, violence, and other social vices which threaten both national and regional peace and stability. South Africa could hasten to align its policies with continental capacity development programmes in order to reduce unemployment.

2. Capacity constraints and poor service delivery

According to the Report, capacity constraints relate to the issue of severe skills shortage experienced across all sectors of the economy and at all levels of the government, but particularly at the provincial and local government levels. The acute shortage of skills impacts negatively on the delivery of goods and services especially at the local government levels. Unemployment persists, but the number of skills available is inadequate to meet demands (AU/APRM, 2007:275). Acute skills shortages in South Africa as in other African countries constitute draw-backs to achieving national and regional goals and exploiting the benefits of the global economy. This reflects the focus of the African Union/NEPAD and APRM that countries implement programmes aimed at capacity development.

3. Poverty and Inequality

Despite all the legal and policy frameworks in place by government since 1994 towards poverty eradication and reducing the high level of inequality, these challenges are still persistent and evident in both the urban and rural areas. Poverty and inequality breeds several other negative consequences such as: high rates of crime, health challenges and HIV and AIDS; unemployment, corruption, and other social ills which continue to affect the political and socio-economic development in the country (AU/APRM, 2007:276; see also, Schwabe, 2003:3-6). Considering South Africa"s enormous wealth in resources, more needs to be done in addressing human capital development and human development challenges and empowering the people to access social services (see, Schwabe, 2003:3-5). This is one of the concerns of the APRM, namely, that African countries prioritise the implementation of policies that address socio-economic challenges in line with NEPAD"s objectives.

4. Land reform

South Africa needs to accelerate its land reform programmes in its quest for socio-economic development. Land is a critical factor in addressing unemployment in the country, ensuring the redistribution of wealth and income, empowering the people and reducing poverty. Access to land is a major issue in furthering the goals of NEPAD"s CAADP initiative (Zimmermann et al, 2009:40). As was stated in the Report, land reform is complex and needs to be handled carefully because of the tensions that could be engendered (AU/APRM, 2007:276).

5. Violence against women

Despite the fact that South Africa‟s constitution entrenches a wide range of human rights and addresses racial and gender equality issues, nation-wide violence against women continues to increase. Although this is a national issue, it has attracted the attention of the African Union/NEPAD because of the role women play in promoting food security, reducing poverty, good governance and socio-economic development. This is also a source of fear to women from other African countries who may wish to come to South Africa. And this reduces the benefits that could accrue from positive migration. The high incidences of rape and other forms of abuse of women call for serious concern as a result of the health implications and HIV AIDS. These incidences pose negative trends not only for South Africa‟s socio-economic development but also for Africa‟s regional economic integration agenda. As has been examined in the Report, a system-wide response is needed to urgently address this governance challenge (see Objective 7, pages 112-114).

6. Violence against children

Violence against children in South Africa is a source of serious concern. According to the Report, there are available evidence showing that "majority of black South African children suffer numerous socio-economic challenges that negatively impact their growth and development" (AU/APRM, 2007:279). Beyond the insufficient access to social services, deprivation and violence, children, particularly girls, are exposed to various forms of abuse. This further increases HIV and AIDS and other diseases infections. According to the Report, even though there is scanty information on the situation, "the scale of the problem of orphans and vulnerable children in the country is reaching crisis proportions" (AU/APRM, 2007:279). Issues concerning children and youths need to attract serious attention of all stakeholders at all levels. Not only are the youths Africa‟s future leaders, poor socio-economic conditions and youth unemployment generate conflicts with national and regional implications.

7. HIV and AIDS Pandemic

South Africa is one of the countries with the highest number of people infected with HIV in the world. The number is still increasing despite all efforts by government and civil society organisations to address this phenomenon (AU/APRM, 2007:281-283). The HIV and AIDS pandemic impact negatively not only on South Africa‟s socio-economic development but also on its regional and international relations. HIV and AIDS pose serious threats to regional integration objectives such as inter-border movements across Africa and intra and inter-

African trade. Tackling the HIV and AIDS pandemic should continue to attract serious attention (see, Schwabe, 2003:4-5).

8. Corruption

Although the Report indicated that corruption is at a lower level, "there is a growing concern about the increasing levels of corruption and its debilitating effects on service delivery and poverty especially in the provinces and municipalities" (AU/APRM, 2007:283). The Report also pointed out the several areas which government needs to seriously consider in its fight against corruption (see, Objective 4, pages 150-152). In terms of legislation and institutional frameworks and anticorruption mechanisms, the country is not lacking, but as the Report indicated, South Africa "lacks one supreme, independent corruption-fighting body, relying instead on improved coordination between several anticorruption institutions" (AU/APRM, 2007:284). The government needs to look into the issue of establishing a national body in its fight against corruption because it not only breeds dissatisfaction with state institutions but also has negative implications for development, peace and security at national and regional levels.

9. Crime

The increasing rate of crime in South Africa is cause for serious concern. The Report notes that, "the distinctive feature of crime in South Africa is not its volume, but its level of violence" (AU/APRM, 2007:285; see, Hansungule, 2007:28). The effects of crime on South African society cannot be over-emphasised. Several factors leading to increase in crime, such as unemployment and inequality, are provided in the Report (see, Objectives 1 & 8, pages 74-119). It was noted that the crime rate in the country cannot be dissociated from its political history. The issue of high crime rates in the country needs to attract more serious attention of the government as it has negative implications for national and regional development. It could affect cross-border movements and reduce the benefits which could accrue to positive migration (see Objectives 1 and 8, pages 74-119). Stakeholders have even questioned the effectiveness of the South African Police Services (AU/APRM, 2007:285). It is the recommendation of the APR Panel that an integrated and holistic approach is needed to tackle this challenge. There is need to address human capital formation and human development challenges alongside those of the criminal justice system.

10. Racism and Xenophobia

The Report draws attention to the issue of racism and xenophobia especially considering the country‟s political history. Years after the apartheid experience, there is still the belief that one race is inherently superior to another. On the other hand, the Report stated that "despite the solidarity and comradeship between black South Africans and the rest of the people of sub-Saharan Africa during the decades of struggle against apartheid and for liberation, foreigners, mostly of African descent, are being subjected to brutality and detention" (AU/APRM, 2007:286). Tackling increasing outbreaks of xenophobia against non-South African Africans and the negative consequences for South Africa‟s relationship with other African countries, is imperative if pursuing the quest for African economic integration (see Objective 1, pages 74-119; see Hansungule, 2007:28).

11. Managing diversity

The South African society consists of people of diverse ethnic groups and race and as the Report indicated, this diversity presents "both challenges and opportunities for South Africa‟s socio-economic development process" (AU/APRM, 2007:287). Diversity, if not properly managed, remains a potential source of conflicts with negative consequences for peace, political stability and socio-economic development at the national and regional levels (see, ECA, 2011d:9, 22-24). This is the concern of the APRM that African countries promote democracy and good political governance in the interest of their diverse populations. The CRR notes that South Africa has made progress in managing diversity by guaranteeing the political rights of the diverse population. However, government still needs to accelerate socio-economic reforms to ensure equal access to social services and economic empowerment of disadvantaged sectors of the population (see Objective 1, pages 74-81).

6.4.2.8 Concluding remarks on South Africa‟s Country Review Report

The next session of the South Africa‟s Country Review Report (pages 291-380) is the Appendices which outline the country‟s Programme of Action; comments from the government of South Africa on the Report; Report on the peer review of South Africa by the APR Forum and conclusion. These processes show that the five stages of the APR processes were completed.

The South African government welcomed the report and commended the APR Mission for a positive Report. However, the government, in discussions with members of the APR Panel,

raised a number of methodological and conceptual issues bordering on how data and reports were presented in the report. Some of the issues which the President clarified were raised at the floor of the APR Forum, for instance, the issue of xenophobia and racism (AU/APRM, 2007:360). This is in the spirit of the APRM – engaging with the government of the member state to express observations on the Report and also allowing the other governments to share ideas and best practices.

Notwithstanding, some scholars have established that the issue of xenophobia was not taken seriously by the South African government and its "relevance was dramatically demonstrated by the violence that erupted in South Africa against nationals of other African countries in April 2008" (Mbelle, 2010:324; see also Gruzd, 2014). This points particularly, to the usefulness of the APRM in identifying governance challenges, providing recommendations to resolve such problems. It also shows that if governments of member countries implement the ideals of the APRM, one of Africa‟s greatest challenge, which is governance, would be resolved.

6.4.3 APRM Country Review Report No. 8 - The Federal Republic of Nigeria (June 2009)

6.4.3.1 Implementation of the APRM Process in Nigeria

Nigeria‟s CRR (pages 31-39) details the APRM implementation process in Nigeria. Nigeria signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the APRM on the 9th March 2003 at the Sixth Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. To begin the implementation of the APRM in the country, the government appointed the Secretary to the Government of the Federation as the National Focal Point (NFP). A National Steering Committee made up of 22 members was created to assist in the process of implementation. In addition, the government established a National Working Group made up of 31 members constitutive of both state and non-state actors. 10 research institutes selected from the six geo-political zones in the country were also employed (APRM CRR, 2009:32). The country hosted the APR Panel‟s Country Support Mission (CSM) between 21 and 24 March 2005. The CSM‟s deliberations with the country‟s leadership led to an agreement to increase the number of civil society representatives in the NWG and the decision that the chairperson should not be a government appointee.

The Nigerian implementation process was delayed for some time and only resumed in 2006. Adele-Jinadu (2008:1) assessing the APRM process in Nigeria, notes that,

> The implementation of the APRM in practice has been slow. After a long preparation period in 2004 and 2005, research for the completion of the country self assessment only got underway in 2006. The process then seemed to falter once again as the incumbent administration appeared to wish to amend the constitution to allow for a third term in office during the lead up to elections in 2007.

Electoral management issues characterise most African countries. Probably the Nigerian government did not want the weaknesses of the electoral system to be exposed during the country assessment process. In one respect, this shows that the APRM has the potential to motivate countries to reform since governments do not wish to be labelled "undemocratic". On the other hand, it shows that the APR process could be manipulated by government and the objectives may not be achieved. It also shows the extent of sincerity of the Nigerian government as well as other governments of the APRM member countries in achieving the objectives. This is a pointer to the fact that the success of the APRM is dependent on political leadership in member countries.

A follow up mission was arranged in October 2006 (AU/APRM, 2009:32). The government employed five lead research organisations (LROs) to manage the country survey process. The approach of the LROs was to first domesticate the APRM master questionnaire to the Nigerian context. Four research instruments were thereafter used, namely: desktop research, the mass household survey (MHS), the elite/decision maker interview (EDMI) and focus-group discussions. This was to ensure that the research instruments are appropriate to obtain comprehensive information on the Nigerian situation. This also, is an innovative aspect of the APR process in that it addresses peculiar situations of member countries. Although, there were various challenges encountered in the process, the exercise was completed and the CSAR and preliminary NPoA prepared.

The 2007 elections in Nigeria saw the emergence of Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar"Adua as the country"s new president and his administration made some changes to the national APRM structure. A new Secretary General of the Federation was appointed and took over from the former official. The NWG was also expanded to 240 members comprising stakeholders

across different spheres of society. Once the process was completed, the country conducted a nation-wide validation of the CSAR and draft NPoA. This exercise was enhanced with the printing of 40 million copies of the "simplified version of the executive summary of the CSAR in Nigeria‟s main languages" (AU/APRM, 2009:34). This practice was recorded as an innovation from which countries can learn. This shows the usefulness of the APRM in promoting good practices. The Report was also reviewed by independent expert organisations. The 36 states of the federation were covered by the expanded working groups and different validation sessions were held with different state and non-state stakeholders.

A two-phase nationwide validation of the CSAR and draft NPOA was held from 19 to 30 November 2007 in 14 centres covering the 36 states of the federation; and from 3 to 11 December 2007 in Abuja. It marked the preparation process of the final NPOA taking together inputs received during the exercise. The CSAR and NPOA were approved by the NWG and the Federal Executive Council (FEC) on 28 December 2007 and 9 January 2008 respectively. The country submitted its final CSAR and draft NPoA in January 2008, enabling the fielding of the CRM between 3 February and 2 March 2008.

6.4.3.2 Background/Introduction

Nigeria has natural, material and human resources that it could exploit to become a great nation. Its vast natural resources, growing population, ethnic diversities and rich cultural heritage, if well exploited, with visionary leadership would make the country a force to be reckoned with. However, the country presents a paradox. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has been confronted with various political and socio-economic challenges: ethnocentrism and religious conflicts; ethnic fractionalisation; political instability, as the country has experimented between military and civilian governance at different periods in its history. Poor leadership led to mal-administration, corruption and violation of human rights. The country‟s economy has remained unstable and not only have most Nigerians remained poor in the midst of abundant resources, but also the gap between the rich and poor has widened.

Nigeria‟s political history is that of long years of military rule and several attempts at democratic transitions. The long years of military rule which started immediately the country became independent left indelible effects both on the country‟s leadership and its people and affected the country‟s socio-economic development. The quest for democracy was realised in

1999. Despite its many challenges, however, the country has remained as a single political entity, and its government has embraced the federal system of government to meet the competing needs of society (AU/APRM, 2009:41). The weaknesses of Nigeria‟s federal system, notwithstanding, it has withstood the passage of time. Moreover, while successive Nigerian governments have made efforts to emplace policies which address the country‟s political and socio-economic challenges, Nigeria‟s civil society and the media have energetically promoted the call for democracy, good governance and constitutional reforms. Nigeria successfully orchestrated a civilian transition in 1999. Subsequently, the country has remained under a democratic government; however, the political and socio-economic challenges have remained.

Beyond the country‟s need for good political leadership and governance, one of the key problematics which have proved difficult for the country‟s leadership and policy makers to address is nation building – promoting peaceful co-existence and unity which is a precondition for development (see, ECA 2011d:1-2, 22-24). This is one of the concerns of the APRM, namely, that countries promote political and economic ideals that will promote not only national, but also sub-regional and regional integration.

The Report gives a brief historical background of how the Nigerian state got established; how the country was separated into four distinct units by 1940 – bringing historically diverse ethnic groups to form a federal state of Nigeria without their consent. The remaining part of the Report runs through the nature of regional politics that existed and the ethnicisation of political parties during and after independence in 1960 (AU/APRM, 2009:43-44). Hence, the independent Nigerian state was a weak state. Its institutions – the civil service, the judiciary and the police were alien structures and were not established to meet the challenges of a new and emergent state. The federal structure was also imposed while the leadership was new. Control of the state became competitive as state power determined the control of national resources. While all the major political parties competing for the control of state power were formed along ethnic lines, the minority groups clamoured for the creation of more states. The Report notes that, “in an attempt to meet the demands and concerns of the minority tribes, more political and administrative units were created” (AU/APRM, 2009:44). The number of states in Nigeria became 36 in 1996 (AU/APRM, 2009:44-45).

A detailed account of military rule in Nigeria, the actors involved in the coups and the effects of such coups are provided in the Report. Essentially, the successive coups reflected the weakness of the newly emergent Nigerian state and the nature of its political leadership. The military justified their taking over political power on the ground of inability of the civilian administration to govern the state and maintain law and order, but most ended up worse than civilian governments. Democracy returned to Nigeria when former military head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo won the presidential election. He was, however, to lead a country faced with many problems (AU/APRM, 2009:45-47).

6.4.3.3 Democracy and Political Governance: Overview of Nigeria‟s Country Review Report

The findings of the CSAR and CRM revealed that Nigeria faces several problems in achieving the objectives of the APRM listed under this theme (see Assessment of Objectives 1-9, pages 64-138). These problems, however, need to be understood within the context of the political history and development of the Nigerian state. They include: political challenges which have to do with managing elections, promoting national integration; establishing democratic values; curbing corruption and money laundering; ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the public service sector. Nigeria‟s constitution "reflects a skewed balance of power in favour of the executive at national and state levels" (AU/APRM, 2009:66) which makes applying the principle of separation of power, checks and balances problematic. There is also "the tension between people holding national citizenship and those with indigeneship status" (AU/APRM, 2009:67). This is among the factors accounting for many communal and intra-state conflicts witnessed in Nigeria.

Nigeria is also confronted with the Niger Delta crisis; inequality – the widening gap between the rich and the poor; the issue of providing for the needs of its growing population and addressing socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, poverty; dearth of infrastructures and basic social facilities among others. This is despite the country‟s wealth in natural resources. For instance, Nigeria‟s economic growth rate was "8.0 per cent from 1999 and from 2004 to 2009 was 7.0% respectively" (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011:2). Its steady growth rates have not translated into improved socio-economic conditions for the people. The poverty rate in Nigeria which currently is about 61 per cent, compared to previous rates, shows that poverty reduction has remained a challenge. Table 6.8 (p.251) and figure 6.12 (p. 252) below reflect data obtained from a General Household Survey (GHS) and

those of the Harmonised Nigerian Living Standard Survey (HNLSS). The reality is that government‟s policies and targets reflected in the Nigeria‟s APRM NPoA, are as yet not yielding as much success.

Table 6.8: Poverty rates per capital from GHS Panel Data (% of population)

	Poverty headcount		Diff	Poverty gap		Poverty severity		Poverty headcount
	GHS 2010-2011	GHS 2012-2013		GHS 2010-2011	GHS 2012-2013	GHS 2010-2011	GHS 2012-2013	HNLSS 2009-10*
National	35.2	33.1	-2.1	9.2	9.6	3.7	3.9	62.6
Rural	46.3	44.9	-1.4	12.9	13.1	5.2	5.3	69.1
Urban	15.8	12.6	-3.2	2.8	3.6	1.0	1.3	51.2
North Central	33.4	31.1	-2.3	8.9	8.9	4.0	3.5	65.8
North East	47.1	50.2	3.1	15.9	13.0	6.9	5.2	75.4
North West	46.9	45.9	-1.0	12.4	12.4	4.6	4.8	74.2
South East	31.7	28.8	-2.9	8.1	10.3	3.2	4.7	54.9
South South	27.7	24.4	-3.3	6.7	7.7	2.7	3.2	53.3
South West	21.2	16.0	-5.2	3.6	5.4	1.3	2.0	47.9

Source GHS 2010/11-2012/13: post planting and post harvesting visits
**Data are not directly comparable to GHS results. They are presented just for illustrative purposes.*

Source: Adapted from: World Bank, IBRD-IDA 2014. Nigeria Economic Report No. 2. July 2014. 17.

Figure 6.12: Number of poor - Nigeria



Adapted from: World Bank, IBRD-IDA 2014. Nigeria Economic Report No. 2. July 2014. 18.

Table 6.8 and Figure 6.12 above reveal regional disparities and higher levels of poverty in the north than in the south. Nigeria lags behind in promoting gender equality. Also, the country ranked 136th most corrupt out of 175 countries that were assessed in the 2014 Global Corruption Index. Nigeria was "classified the 3rd most corrupt country in West Africa after Guinea and Guinea Bissau" (see Transparency International Corruption Index, 2014:9; Ejike 2014). Nigeria‟s socio-economic challenges are issues to consider in realising regional integration objectives due to the fact that Nigeria is one of the regional powers promoting pan-African ideals (see also, ECA, 2011d:7-9, 22-24). This is one of the concerns of the APRM that countries implement regional policies which would lead to improved social-economic conditions for the masses as this has corresponding effects on the continent‟s integration and development agenda.

Several features which appear to define democracy and political governance in Nigeria were outlined in the CRR (AU/APRM, 2009:65-68). First, since the 1990s, successive governments have tried to nationalise the political party process leading to three largest political parties in the country. Second, the forum for civil society participation in governmental affairs has increased, acknowledging the efforts of the civil society in opposing military rule in the country. Third, the judiciary is exercising its independence in performing oversight functions and the National Assembly is carrying on in its roles. The performances of these institutions have however been seen to be weak (CIA, Fact-Book on Nigeria, 2014). Fourth, Nigeria has benefited from very powerful institutions of traditional leadership and some religious leaders (even though there are controversies over the role of traditional rulers in political affairs). Fifth, there are legislation and institutional frameworks in place to promote national integration, representation and power sharing (AU/APRM, 2009:65-68). The Report (page 68) notes that the Nigerian government is making efforts to address the several political and socio-economic challenges bedevilling the country. There are calls for a review of the 1999 constitution; for government to reform the electoral system; to strengthen institutions combating corruption, among others.

According to the CSAR, Nigeria has signed many regional and international agreements, conventions and codes, addressing issues on democracy and political governance and some of these conventions have been ratified. However, the Report indicates a lack of proper records, amidst other challenges of ratification, domestication and effective implementation; lack of awareness on the part of the citizens about treaties which the country has signed and where to access them; and other challenges which make implementation and monitoring difficult (AU/APRM, 2009:77-79). The APR Panel therefore recommended that, Nigeria should adopt adequate measures to address the identified challenges (see, Sections on APR Panel Recommendations).

6.4.3.4 Economic Governance and Management: Overview of Nigeria"s Country Review Report

The Report presents the case of Nigeria which is "currently the largest oil producer in Africa and the seventh largest in the world". (AU/APRM, 2009:139). The country is endowed with vast natural and material resources, and expanding trade and consumer sectors which could be exploited to promote development in other sectors (Leke et al, 2014:5). However, this has remained at the level of an unrealised potential as Nigeria continues to fail in converting its

wealth in oil and natural resources to achieve socio-economic development and poverty eradication (AU/APRM, 2009:139). While the numerous benefits and shortcomings of overdependence on oil revenue are noted in the Report (AU/APRM, 2009:139-140), the concern is that decades of military rule, lack of visionary leadership, poor economic governance and public financial management, corruption, lack of political accountability, and internal conflicts, have impacted negatively on Nigeria‟s socio-economic development.

According to Africa‟s Pulse (2013:4), FDI in the services sector has been increasing and Nigeria, as one of the fast growing economies in Africa, has been attracting investment flows, yet the country has continued to be confronted with endemic socio-economic challenges (as highlighted above). UNDP 2014 Report (showing indices in Nigeria) records that "Nigeria‟s HDI value for 2013 is 0.504 which is in the low human development category – positioning the country at 152 out of 187 countries and territories. Between 2005 and 2013, Nigeria‟s HDI value increased from 0.466 to 0.504, with an increase of 8.1 per cent or an average annual increase of about 0.98 per cent". Thus, Nigeria presents a contradictory picture. It is foremost among African countries endowed with rich resources, which nonetheless make minimal progress (see figure 6.13, p.255). As Africa Pulse (2013:20) put it simply, "the rich oil countries of Africa have a poor track record in prioritising expenditures, implementing projects and getting value for money".

Figure 6.13: Sectoral contribution to total growth for selected countries
****The contribution of agriculture to growth is larger in resource poor countries****



Source: Africa's Pulse (2013:14)

With the return to democratic rule in May 1999, the stage was set to reposition the Nigerian economy by implementing economic reforms and sound economic policies. Whilst President Olusegun Obasanjo‟s regime introduced the NEEDS initiative to promote reforms, his successor, President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua, introduced the Seven-Point agenda for Nigeria‟s development. The government has also made efforts to restructure state enterprises; it has introduced and implemented several reforms in different sectors of the economy; it has put in place legislative, policy and institutional frameworks to rebuild the economy and ensure sound financial management. Measures to combat corruption and money laundering also have been put in place (AU/APRM, 2009:142-149). Despite the existence of these frameworks and the progress which has been achieved, a serious challenge remains in the management of oil resources by the three tiers of government. In consequence, the economic conditions of the people have yet to be improved.

As the CRR highlighted, the government created the Excess Crude Account managed by the Central Bank of Nigeria to ensure that resources are properly managed and to promote development and finance public projects. However, there was scant information in the CSAR and the CRM findings on how revenue accruing from the oil expenditure is managed

(AU/APRM, 2009:142). This is one of the concerns of the APRM in promoting codes and standards on economic governance and financial management.

The CSAR notes that Nigeria has signed, ratified and implemented the relevant standards and codes to promote economic governance management. There is, however, limited information on the dates of accession and ratification of these codes and standards and how they are being domesticated. The CRM findings confirm the findings of the CSAR on poor record keeping and also note that "the roles of the federal and state governments with regards to standards and codes are not clearly defined and coordinated" (AU/APRM, 2009:148). Although there are some codes and standards which do not need to be ratified, the CRM observed lapses in monitoring and reporting on the extent of implementation. Importantly, stakeholders also do not have enough information about the existing codes and standards which the country has ratified (AU/APRM, 2009:148).

The CRM revealed the efforts made in improving Nigeria‟s budgetary activities and processes; debt management, good practices for transparency in monetary and financial policies; bank supervision and restructuring of the banking system; fighting corruption and money laundering; and promoting regional integration (see Assessment of Objectives 1-5, pages 151-206). The Federal Republic of Nigeria‟s Report (2011:2), highlights that:

> Nigeria‟s growth figures are based largely on non-oil sector growth. As the domestic prices have gradually settled, inflation rate from 1999 to 2003 was 11.9% and from 2004 to 2009 was 11.6%. This inflation rate seems low, comparing with the rate of 20% in 1980. There has been a stable increase in foreign reserves from the amount of 16.96 billion dollars in 2004 to 53 billion US dollars in 2008. With the deregulation of foreign exchange market, the value of the Naira has stabilised but has been kept at a significantly depreciated level.

Leke, et al. (2014:8), note also that "the environment for growth has improved due to greater macroeconomic stability and reforms have translated into stronger growth". While these successes are recorded, it is instructive to note that Nigeria still lags behind in addressing infrastructure deficits both in the rural and urban centres of the country, reducing poverty and unemployment among majority of its population. The gap between the rich and poor has widened while corruption continues to eat deep into the nation‟s fabrics. Sustainable socio-economic development is still a far cry in Nigeria despite the wealth of the country in natural

resources. Part of the recommendations of the APR Panel on regional integration (see, Objective 5 pages 198-206), is that the Nigerian government should take the issue of infrastructure development seriously.

6.4.3.5 Corporate Governance: Overview of Nigeria‟s Country Review Report

Nigeria‟s CRR identifies the various efforts of government since 1999 in establishing laws, policies and institutions regulating how business and other economic activities in the public and private sectors are carried on (see AU/APRM, 2009:208; 217-256). It, however, reports that these laws need to be updated to reflect new concerns and conform to international standards. According to the Report, “corporate governance issues have, nevertheless, not yet become of regular concern in Nigeria. The subject is still new and the relevant codes have been promulgated fairly recently” (AU/APRM, 2009:209-211). This finding is critical considering, for instance, the number of businesses operating in Nigeria and the need for human capital formation and skills development in the country. The Report confirms the low level of awareness by stakeholders and corporations of the corporate governance codes in the country. Generally, people are yet to be sensitised about corporate governance related concerns and, as such, many continue to think of corporations as associated with big oil companies and not the small and medium enterprises. Beyond this identified gap, there is not enough understanding on what corporate social responsibility (CSR) means (AU/APRM, 2009:209-211).

Nevertheless, while the above facts were established, the CSAR and CRM findings reveal that implementation of existing laws and establishing good business ethics have been difficult. The various institutions responsible for monitoring implementation are constrained in the area of capacity. The main reason provided for these problematics is corruption (see Assessment of Objectives 1-5, pages 217-256). Corruption pervades both the public and private sectors. This has prevented the country from enjoying the full benefits of CSRs and ensuring that corporations carry on their business in line with national interests. An example is the Niger Delta crisis which has been triggered by the indiscriminate manner in which multinational corporations exploit the resources of host communities without adequate concern for the health and welfare of the people.

Also, Nigeria has not yet exploited the contribution of the private sector in its development process. The dearth of infrastructure, crime and insecurity, poor tax administration systems and a flawed banking sector, are all internal factors affecting the conduct of business in Nigeria (see, Objective 1, pages 220-228). The APRM, in exposing these national challenges, is concerned that Nigeria has failed to meet the needs of majority of its population. The country was consistently one of the top two most popular destinations of foreign investments in Africa having returned to democratic rule in 1999 (and on-going). Amodou Sy and Copley (2014) highlight that "investors contributed to 21.3 billion in FDI in 2013 and 2.5 billion in January and February of 2014 alone". The large population and the market created for investors are attractive feature. That said, corruption and misappropriation of funds by the political leadership has continuously hindered Nigeria‟s socio-economic development. The funds which are improperly diverted by the state could properly be invested into priority areas such as education and skills development, improving infrastructures, among other legitimate areas.

The CSAR indicates the standards and codes which Nigeria has adopted at the national level and the international codes that have been ratified and domesticated. The CRM notes that significant efforts are needed to improve corporate governance in Nigeria. The findings of the CRM, looking at several aspects relating to standard practices in the banking industry, insurance, among others, revealed that the government has a lot to do in promoting corporate governance in Nigeria. The APR Panel therefore recommended that Nigeria should take necessary steps to address the identified challenges and create public awareness on the existing codes in the country. Institutions that provide oversight functions should be strengthened (see, APR Panel Recommendations, pages 216, 227-228 and 237-238).

6.4.3.6 Socio-economic Development: Overview of Nigeria‟s Review Report

The CRR reiterates the fact that Nigeria presents several contradictions (AU/APRM, 2009:257). The country‟s wealth in natural and material resources has not been exploited to benefit its growing population, to achieve socio-economic development and eradicate poverty. Figure 6.14 (p. 259) below shows the level of poverty in rural and urban areas and the prevailing socio-economic conditions in these areas.

Figure 6.14: Rural versus urban gap - equal population but socio-demographic inequalities



Source: GSMA Intelligence, 2014 Country Overview – Nigeria. June 2014. 7.

In Nigeria, unemployment is a common feature among the youth and women and this is a major factor that leads to crime and other negative social vices (see figure 6.15, p.260). Poor health and education systems are revealed in the Report as Nigeria lags behind in developing its human resources (AU/APRM, 2009:274-318). Nigeria is lacking in infrastructure and this is particularly a problem in the power sector (see, Foster, 2014). These national negatives are major impediments to the realisation of regional integration objectives.

The education sector is not properly funded as revealed in the budgetary allocation to the sector, hence the challenges in Nigeria‟s educational sector are multi-faceted. Leke et al (2014:8) highlight that "basic literacy among 15–24 years old -- a crucial indicator for potential economic success -- is just 66%, compared with 99% in South Africa". Provision of basic necessities such as housing, water utilities and sanitation that would enhance the standard of living of its citizenry is inadequate. With these infrastructure deficits, the enabling environment is lacking for individuals to realise their full potential (see, Leke et al. 2014:8-9). As such, as many as an "estimated 17 million Nigerians live overseas and contribute remittances equivalent of 5 percent of Nigeria‟s GDP" (Leke et al. 2014:32). Nigerians have migrated to other countries in search of greener pastures.

Figure 6.15: Unemployment in Nigeria



Source: Trade Economics, 2015. Available at: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ nigeria/unemployment-rate. (Accessed: 10 April 2015).

The Nigerian government‟s excessive dependence on oil revenue has led to a neglect of other sectors such as solid minerals, agriculture and allied industries (see pages 257-272). The CRR confirms that, whilst the government has put in place various developmental strategies, policies and programmes, Nigeria‟s "level of economic development over the past four decades has been disappointing" (AU/APRM, 2009:257).

The NEEDS initiative of the federal government aimed to address many of these challenges. Notwithstanding the different concerns raised by stakeholders during interactions with the CRM about the level of participation of relevant segments of the population in the formulation process of NEEDS and its relevance to the common person, it was noted that the "NEEDS document is impressive in content and has received worldwide acclaim" (AU/APRM, 2009:258). The NEEDS initiative took a comprehensive, holistic and integrated approach to the issue of socio-economic development in Nigeria. The NEEDS initiative is now being upgraded to NEEDS II (AU/APRM, 2009:258-259). The Report states clearly that Nigeria is not lacking in terms of policies, plans and programmes to promote socio-economic development, but the problem has been in the area of implementation. For instance, while development programmes are formulated, government fail to demonstrate the necessary political will to commit resources towards implementation (pages 258-259).

To this extent, the reasons provided for the poor state of affairs in Nigeria include: poor leadership, corruption and poor management of public resources; ineffective policies; lack of adequate involvement of the civil society in governance and development processes; among others (AU/APRM, 2009:258-259). Whilst the CRR findings reveal the progress made in addressing some of Nigeria"s socio-economic challenges, it identifies that the country has yet to achieve broad-based participation in its governance and development processes (AU/APRM, 2009:259-260).

The CSAR indicates that it is not an easy task to establish the standards and codes which Nigeria has signed and the level of their implementation. This is due to incomplete records by the Ministry of Justice and is suggestive of the "problems associated with keeping official records in Nigeria" (AU/APRM, 2009:260). However, the Report shows that Nigeria has implemented various standards and codes related to socio-economic development. The government has also demonstrated its commitment to implementing continental initiatives such as the NEPAD/APRM although there are concerns about low level of public awareness about such existing codes. The CRM also confirms that, "on the whole, there was no evidence that Nigeria had complied with several of the standards and codes" (AU/APRM, 2009:262). The challenges persist. Moreover, the process of domestication of protocols is complex. The APR Panel therefore recommended that the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should put measures in place to rectify the identified shortcomings (see pages 317-318).

6.4.3.7 Overarching issues in Nigeria"s Country Review Report

This section highlights cross-cutting governance issues in the Report (pages 320-348) which should attract priority attention of government because of their cyclical effects on the Nigeria"s political and socio-economic development. They are to reflect in Nigeria"s NPoA.

1. Managing diversity and promoting nation building within the framework of the Federation

Nigeria has been described as a state of many nations considering its many ethnic groups with differing backgrounds, different cultural norms and values; and the large percentage of people with religious diversities (see ECA, 2011d:1 and 7-9). The country is also highly populated. The challenge of managing diversity and promoting nation building stares government in the face. Efforts to peacefully manage social and religious diversity need to be enhanced. Current legislative and institutional reforms need to be fast-tracked while new

policies are designed to address the political and socio-economic challenges confronting the country. In addition, the Nigerian government should promote good governance, democracy, and responsible, accountable, transparent and honest leadership. The Report points out the different areas in which government focus and actions need to be enhanced (AU/APRM, 2009:323:327).

2. Dependence on oil or gas and lack of economic diversification

The need for economic diversification came out strongly in the Report. The issue of concern here is that the heavy dependence on oil revenue for socio-economic development has led to de-emphasis on other non-oil sectors such as agriculture. It has also fuelled the contending discourses on revenue allocation, inter-governmental relations among the different levels of government; lack of motivation to develop other sources for revenue mobilisation; corruption; food insecurity; inadequate efforts at employment generation and conflicts in the Niger Delta (AU/APRM, 2009:328-330). On the other hand, it is notable that Nigeria has not been able to exploit its enormous oil wealth either nationally or within the sub-region or region to address its energy crisis.

3. The scourge of corruption

As the Report indicated (see above), corruption is one of the greatest impediments to Nigeria‟s political and socio-economic development. The negative effects of corruption, particularly political corruption and its associated problems are cause for serious concern. Despite the efforts of government in putting mechanisms, policies, laws and institutions to combat corruption, the objectives are yet to be achieved. Several factors limiting the success of anticorruption measures and institution have been enumerated. One such factors is the cadre of officials that are involved in corruption. There is need for capacity building, strengthening anticorruption institutions and oversight bodies – parliament, civil society and media, in the fight against corruption (AU/APRM, 2009:330:332; see, Ehinmore and Ehiabhi, 2013). Political corruption limits the opportunities to realise regional objectives.

4. Ineffective policy and programme implementation and poor service delivery

As indicated in the Report (see above), Nigeria has ratified several international and regional conventions and protocols in the different APRM thematic areas and has made progress in putting in place domestic laws, policy and institutional frameworks to achieve political and socio-economic development. However, the public sector has continued to be ineffective

while poor service delivery remains a problem. The issue of concern is in the area of implementation. Non-compliance to laws and regulations and lack of adequate enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are other weaknesses which need to be addressed. Nigeria will not make progress if the political leadership does not demonstrate the political will and commitments to implement standards and codes (AU/APRM 2009:332).

5. The informal sector

The informal sector is increasingly attracting attention as a source of socio-economic development in developing countries. This sector is vital in Nigeria‟s quest for socio-economic development and needs to be explored because of the large number of the population that are engaged and the different spheres of activities both in the urban and rural areas. Although there are divergent views expressed concerning the informal sector, Nigeria should consider the benefits it can derive from this sector in terms of employment generation and poverty reduction, and promoting popular participation in the country‟s development process. The government needs to consider seriously how to encourage the growth of the informal sector (AU/APRM, 2009:332:335).

6. Slow progress towards gender equality and limited advancement of women

Gender issues permeate both the public and private sectors of the economy in Nigeria; this deficiency is visible at all levels of government and experienced in every areas and sectors – political, social and economic (see, ECA, 2011d:25). Despite the existence of policy and institutional frameworks promoting gender issues and international and regional conventions signed by the government on the issue of gender, the level of participation of women remains low. This, according to the Report, is a violation of human rights and also marginalisation of a vital segment of the nation‟s population in its political and socio-economic development process (AU/APRM, 2009:336).

Cases of discriminations against women and abuse of women and girls have been enumerated in the Report (AU/APRM, 2009:336). The efforts of non-governmental organisations in promoting women‟s rights are also noted (APRM CRR, 2009:338). Government needs to pay close and serious attention to gender issues. Gender inequality is a major constraint in consolidating Nigeria‟s democratic process and needs to be addressed. Laws need to be implemented and enforcement and monitoring mechanisms put in place to ensure that stakeholders comply with policy issues on gender (AU/APRM, 2009:337-338).

7. Land policy reform

The land policy reform needs to be fast-tracked taking into consideration the several issues of contention and impediments listed in this Report. The Nigerian population place much value on land as an important economic asset and land ownership is a vital issue. Land issues are not only associated with efforts to promote socio-economic development and reduce poverty in Nigeria, they also constitute a potential source of conflict. The government needs to be innovative and careful in handling land matters while also taking into consideration the need for other economic policies that will enhance the effective use of land (AU/APRM, 2009:338-340; see also, ECA, 2011d:25).

8. The role of traditional rulers in governance

Although there are contending views on the constitutional role of traditional rulers in governance, the CRR advises that Nigeria‟s political leadership should re-examine the positive and important roles which traditional rulers have played in the nation‟s political history and their impact in the process of democratisation in the country. Despite the views outlined in the Report on the negative sides of traditional rulers, government needs to consider this as a serious national issue. It should consider that the nation‟s diverse population reside in different parts of the country and the priority which it places on decentralisation of governance structures and democratisation of the development process (AU/APRM, 2009:340-343; see also, ECA, 2011d:26).

9. The diaspora and remittances

According to the CRR, one of the areas which government needs to pay serious attention is the population of Nigerians in the diaspora and their remittances to the home country. While there are many Nigerians professionals abroad who are respected for their expertise in different spheres of economic and professional activities, there are reports about those who are engaged in criminal activities, thus bringing disrepute to the image of the federation (AU/APRM, 2009:344). One of the issues raised in the Report is that the size of remittances sent back home from Nigerians living abroad cannot be underestimated and if well managed, could assist the nation‟s efforts at promoting socio-economic development and reducing poverty (AU/APRM 2009:344). The different types of remittances are well documented in the Report. Another key point is that Nigerian professionals abroad conceive ideas and systems of practice and develop economic, social and political networks which could be well enhanced in strategising for economic growth and development in the country (AU/APRM,

2009:345). To this extent, the hindrances to effectively exploiting the positive benefits derivable from Nigerians in diaspora should not be overlooked by government.

10. Social indiscipline, disorder and value reorientation

The CRR raises the concern that whereas the Nigerian authorities and the public are conscious of the importance of culture in regulating individual behaviour and actions and emphasise religious teachings in the way they live and relate, social indiscipline and disorder remain major constraints in improving governance in Nigeria (AU/APRM, 2009:345). Social indiscipline, as revealed in the Report, manifests in different areas and these attitudes affect quality in the delivery of services by both public and private-sector institutions (AU/APRM, 2009:347). There are many laws, rules and regulations to promote governance yet, as the Report findings reveal, implementation is ineffective (AU/APRM, 2009:347). Lack of compliance and conformity with rules and regulations manifests both among those at the top and lower levels in both public and private-sector institutions. While there are many Nigerians who have kept to standards, professionalism and self-discipline, there is a call for Nigerians to return to a value system. This call, perhaps, is part of the concern that Nigeria should provide enabling environment which would be attractable to local, regional and foreign investors (AU/APRM, 2009:347-348).

6.4.3.8 Issues Unique to Nigeria

1. The Lagos metropolis

Nigeria‟s CRR brought to the fore, the need for the government to address the difficulties experienced in the Lagos metropolis, Nigeria‟s former capital until 1991 (see page 348-350). Although Lagos has its origin in the colonial era, it has remained the commercial capital of the country where most economic activities are undertaken. It is also the arena where most of Nigeria‟s industrial activities take place: home care, food, rubber/plastics, chemicals, textile and beverage among others.

Abiodun (1997:192-222) notes that a survey in 1984 by the Federal Office of Statistics revealed that “Lagos accounts for 62 per cent of gross industrial output and 61 per cent of the total national industrial value added. It houses approximately 70 per cent of all Nigeria‟s industries”. Lagos is home to a large population of Nigerians and also hosts populations of neighbouring African countries. As the Report notes, “Lagos is Nigeria‟s gateway to the

world. It is the Western terminus of Nigeria‟s road and rail networks. It also has an international airport and a seaport" (AU/APRM, 2009:349).

Despite its remarkable characteristics, however, the situation in Lagos can be best described as chaotic. In terms of effective sanitation, most of its cities are lacking. Environmental pollution is a serious problem. For infrastructure -- good roads, energy, transport, among others, the situation is no different. Basic facilities are insufficient to meet the needs of the large population in Lagos. Housing is also a problem. In fact, many unemployed youths have taken to crime, thereby presenting a serious security issue in Lagos. Although the government at all levels are conscious of these challenges and the need to develop Lagos into a megacity, they would need to demonstrate the political will and commit resources to actualise this objective. Moreover, the situation in Lagos would require the collaborative efforts of all stakeholders (AU/APRM, 2009:348-350). Addressing infrastructural impediments in Lagos, for instance, would not only promote trade and competitiveness but also create jobs for the growing population which would promote economic growth which Africa desires (ECA/AU, 2012:4).

2. The economics of the Nigerian film industry (Nollywood)

Nigeria has one of the most thriving film industries in the world known as Nollywood. The Report (pages 351-353) indicates that "Nollywood churns out an average of 2,000 movies annually; as many as 50 films are produced every week". Because of the large audience which it has attracted across the African continent, it has become one of the potent sources of reflecting not only perceived Nigerian cultures, societal values and political ideologies, but also those of Africa. Beyond the fact that Nollywood generates large revenues, it provides employment for Nigerians who work in different areas to sustain the industry (AU/APRM, 2009:351). Despite these positive characteristics, however, Nollywood is faced with challenges. The film industry is yet to meet international standards in the quality of its production. Another issue of concern relates to the content of several of the movies which are being produced and how they impact on the society. The Nigerian film industry and others such as Gallywood could be improved and used as a tool to propagate the ideals promoted by the APRM. Nollywood‟s intellectual property rights system could be strengthened and it could be considered as part of the emerging knowledge economy in Africa (AU/APRM, 2009:351).

6.4.3.9 Concluding remarks on Nigeria"s Country Review Report

The next sessions of the Country Review Report (pages 353-514) contain: the Appendices which present in detail, the country"s Programme of Action; comments from the Nigerian government on the entire report (that is, Nigeria"s response to the APRM Country Review Report); Report on the peer review process in Nigeria by the APR Forum and conclusion. These processes show that the five stages of the APR processes were completed.

The government was appreciative to the CRM for seeing through the successful implementation of the process. The government also reiterated Nigeria"s commitment to the APR process and objectives and to implementing the NPOA. The comments of the government dwelt on the findings and the recommendations of the APR Panel for the country.

While commending the CRM for a positive report, the government, in discussions with members of the APR Panel, were interested in providing more explanations and clarifying some of the points made in the Report by various stakeholder groups in the country. These responses were grouped according to each thematic area. The peer review of Nigeria was undertaken at the Ninth Summit of the APR Forum on 29 June 2008 and the first Extraordinary Session of the APR Forum held on 29 October 2008.

6.5 Summary of findings

A summary of findings reflecting on some of the challenges identified in the three APRM CRR analysed is presented as follows:[151]

1. The influence of the executive in the APR process:

While the APRM is supposed to be a citizen-driven initiative and is a national exercise to be conducted by the government, the analyses of the three CRRs confirmed the concern of many scholars that government, particularly the executive, attempted to take charge of the APR process (Adele-Jinadu, 2008:31-35; Mbelle, 2010:321-351; LDGL 2007:11-17). This is observed in establishing national APRM structures such as the National Focal Point and National Governing Council (NGC) and the weakness in making the process adequately participatory. For instance, it is notable that, appointing a government official to lead the

[151] These points have been underscored in many scholarly analyses of APRM Country Reports. For instance, see: Adele-Jinadu, 2008:31-35; Mbelle, 2009:321-351; LDGL, 2007:11-17.

national process gives a political effect to the APRM to the extent that it is a national endeavour. However, considering the functions performed by the Focal Point, the concern is that it may have a negative effect and lead to political manipulation of the entire process (Adele-Jinadu, 2008). The visit of the CSM and CRM at different stages in the APR process showed that the APRM is proactive in providing measures to ensure the integrity of the process.

It was equally observed that the executive arm of government tends to overrun the affairs of the parliament and the judiciary, thereby making the separation of powers problematic in the countries‟ democratic processes and in the implementation of the APRM process. There were lapses observed in the documentation of regional and international protocols and conventions signed by the selected countries. The parliament and judiciary were also weak in performing their oversight and other functions which would have enhanced the APR process. The roles of the civil society, both in the urban and rural areas and those of the independent media were scant. These weaknesses do not however suggest that the APRM is not a good initiative. This regional initiative addresses critical issues relevant to Africa‟s development and could be improved to perform its mandate effectively.

2. Challenges of policy domestication and implementation

The findings from the Report analyses emphasised the views of scholars such as Turianskyi (2009:17-18) that, although the government sign and ratify regional and international protocols, conventions, codes and standards, there are several challenges in the area of domesticating such codes and standards and implementing them. In some instances, the national legal, policy and institutional framework to support the implementation of such codes and standards are simply non-existent. In other cases, such codes and standards are not implemented nor complied with despite the existence of oversight bodies to ensure compliance. A related challenge is lack of adequate capacity for institutions to enforce compliance with codes and standards or adequate monitoring of the extent of compliance. Adequate measures are also not put in place to evaluate the extent to which policy objectives are being met. The inadequacies on the part of member countries could explain the reasons why several problems persist. If the ideals of the APRM are effectively implemented and adequate monitoring mechanisms are put in place to ensure adherence to codes and standards, the situation of governance in these countries would be improved.

3. Lack of adequate public participation in the policy process

Countries are yet to achieve adequate broad-based participation in governance and development processes considering the findings of the country review reports. This point has been underscored in many studies on the APR process in participating countries (see Adele-Jinadu, 2008:31-35; Mbelle, 2010:321-351; LDGL 2007:11-17; Hansungule, 2014:35-36). Adequate and active participation is not achieved because of lack of knowledge and preparation by civil society across different spheres of society. The level of participation of the civil society and independent media still needs to be seriously improved. It was notable that, it most cases, civil society are unaware of the protocols and conventions signed by government, and to that extent, do not know their rights and how to access them. Information dissemination about the activities and workings of government and about the existing policies in the country is low and this speaks much about the political willingness and commitments of the government to provide and protect the rights of its citizens. The concern of this study is that citizens be adequately empowered to participate in APR process in order to contribute effectively to governance and development at all levels.

4. Persistence of political and socio-economic challenges

The level of socio-economic challenges currently facing Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria are pointers that the different legal and policy frameworks, programmes and institutions put in place to promote socio-economic development and meet the needs of the population are yet to achieve satisfactory success. The high levels of poverty, crime, health challenges, security challenges, abuse of human rights, corruption, inequality, poor service delivery, environmental challenges, among others, reveal the need to re-examine, in some cases, the process of policy formulation and implementation, and in others, the effectiveness of implementation of the NPoAs.

Considering the findings in this chapter therefore, the success of the APRM, as a regional mechanism depends on the political willingness and commitment on the part of governments of member states to domesticate and implement codes and standards at the national level. Not only this, civil society needs to be empowered in order to be adequately prepared to participate in the APR process. With effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure codes and standards are implemented and the APRM principles are adhered to, the APRM has the potential of finding solutions to the challenges of national, sub-regional and regional integration and development.

6.6 Conclusion

The analyses in this chapter reflect scholarly discourse that in establishing the APRM, African leaders demonstrated the need to find solutions to the several governance and socio-economic challenges confronting the African continent. This point has been demonstrated by the political leadership of Rwanda, South Africa and Nigeria in undergoing the APRM base review. The APRM Country Review Report findings show that the Mechanism aims to identify the governance deficiencies in member countries and encourage governments to embark on political and economic reforms at addressing the identified problems. This would however be better achieved through popular participation of citizens in the process of designing sound and appropriate economic policies.

It does appear from the analyses that the policy framework of the APRM is informed by salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration. However, this chapter has revealed an obvious reality: that the APRM implementation is confronted with several difficulties. For instance, contending issues at the floor of the APRM Assembly is unacceptable. Issues of disagreements with the governments of countries that have undergone reviews need to be resolved to move the Mechanism forward (Jordaan, 2007:341). It is the argument in this study that, with adequate political will and commitment by political leadership of member countries and effective involvement of the civil society and private sector, the APRM could be improved and allowed to function, as Africa‟s innovative instrument to promote good governance and promote social and economic reforms. The APRM could become effective in addressing governance challenges and usher in African economic integration.

The next chapter is devoted to an assessment of available data on African economic integration reflecting on the various analyses in previous chapters. This is with a view to assessing what has been achieved so far with the AU/NEPAD initiatives especially with the APRM monitoring framework.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REFLECTION AND ASSESSMENT OF AVAILABLE DATA ON AFRICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is a follow-up to the previous one which examined the organisational structure and management of the APRM; the APR process; and a sample of three APRM Country Review Reports. The analyses of that chapter revealed that African countries are truly confronted with various governance and development challenges. Whereas such challenges are national in their characteristics, they have implications for regional and continental integration and development. Many of the challenges have remained persistent despite the meaningful efforts made to address them and as the chapter establishes, these challenges could be effectively addressed through regional efforts.

In this chapter, data collected from different primary and secondary sources are assessed and analysed reflecting key issues examined in chapters one to six. The study examines Africa‟s colonial history and its development problematic and sees the quest for African economic integration as justifiable and crucial. As part of its objectives, it presents historical analysis on regional integration in Africa; addresses issues of globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation; examines salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration; and includes an analysis of the African Union and NEPAD. Based on the diverse discourses, the study then examines the APRM initiative to find out how useful it could be in establishing principles, values, codes and standards in the thematic areas, which, if complied with by countries, will enable Africa to achieve the long desired goals of African economic integration. This chapter aims at identifying and examining what progress has been achieved so far with the AU/NEPAD and APRM initiatives. In particular, spotlight is on the APRM, assessing the effectiveness of the APRM and how it could assist the realisation of the AU/NEPAD objectives.

Various studies view the APRM as an important initiative of the African Union as part of its NEPAD initiative. They examine the role of the APRM in promoting good governance and improving policy making processes in countries; advancing broad-based participation; and encouraging governments to establish enabling conditions to attract investments and promote

socio-economic development. Thus, scholars tend to identify APRM‟s successes, weaknesses and potential. There are those who argue that, the APRM is confronted with several challenges and may not be relied on to address the political and socio-economic problems in Africa. Issues of debates and contestation are often identified and considered in order to proffer a way forward for the APRM. While this study engages with scholarly observations, perspectives and findings, it establishes that despite the weaknesses identified in the APR process, considering what the APRM seeks to address (that is, addressing the governance deficiencies in Africa), its focus areas and processes, it qualifies as an instrument which could become useful to address salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration.

The issue of governance is "sensitive". African leaders do not wish to be tagged undemocratic, or exposed when found to be involved in corrupt acts or mal-admonistration, as such, the concern of this study is that the civil society and the media will be effectively engaged in APRM processes to intervene in resolving key deficiencies. The role of the civil society in fostering democracy and promoting good governance cannot be over-emphasised and needs to be revived. In addition, the media has shown itself to be an agent of change in Africa‟s political scene since independence. It will therefore be beneficial to Africa, if civil society can rise and occupy its position as a change agent in Africa. Unlike the contributions of other scholars to knowledge and analysis of the AU, NEPAD and APRM, this study is empirical, guided by a combination of theories and based on empirical data collected at the AU Headquarters, Pan African Parliament; Economic Commission for Africa; NEPAD and APRM Secretariats; civil society organisations; research institutions; media houses; renowned academics experts and doctoral students familiar with the subject matter.

The various sections assess the: contribution of the APRM in building democratic developmental states; scholarly perspectives on the need to redefine the goals of regional integration in Africa; successes and achievements of the APRM; contending views on the APRM‟s effectiveness in promoting civil society participation at all levels; documented statistical facts and figures which are reflective of Africa‟s achievements in different sectors; progress in regional economic integration; concerns about issues of coordination and harmonisation relating to the African Union, NEPAD, APRM and the RECs; critical perspectives on the challenges and weaknesses of the APRM. The last section provides the conclusion to the chapter.

Analyses in this chapter are based on the study‟s research questions. In particular, the chapter draws attention to the following questions, namely: To what extent is the APRM an effective strategy in Africa‟s economic integration process? Are the policies of the APRM informed by the salient issues of African economic integration discourse?

7.2 The role of the APRM in building democratic developmental states

Taking a comprehensive look at the history of Africa‟s political economy, the establishment of the APRM could be said to be good for Africa. This study has established that the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM are representative of attempts by African leaders to collectively confront myriad political and socio-economic development challenges after previous initiatives which were formulated in the era previous to the 1990s. In designing these initiatives, African leaders took cognisance of the weaknesses of previous initiatives while considering the emerging trends and challenges of the global political economy. They sought to respond to internal and external demands to re-conceptualise governance and development in the light of the weaknesses and failures of post-independence African states. A restructuring agenda was formulated towards promoting Africa‟s economic recovery, integration and socio-economic development in the new millennium. This was to be led by the African Union/NEPAD initiatives. In order to assist the implementation of the African agenda, the establishment of the APRM and its existence, could be justifiable.

In their different contributions with regard to the problematic nature of regionalism in Africa, scholars have identified that the role of the African state is critical to ensuring the success or failure of sub-regional and regional integration (Adedeji, 1989, 2002:1-10; Qobo, 2007:2-3:Adetula, 2008:30-33; Adogamhe, 2008:21-24; Khadiagala, 2008:8; Gibb, 2009:715-718; Okhonmina 2009:93-94; ECA/AU, 2011:5). In a report, *Towards a Union Government for Africa – Challenges and Opportunities* edited by Dr. Timothy Murithi, participants‟ submissions point to the fact that, although there are several reasons why the call for a Union Government is significant for Africa, there is need to adopt a “gradual” approach with a view to addressing real political issues which have to do with the African state (Murithi, et al, 2008; see also, Adogamhe 2008:21-24; Uzodike, 2010/11:98). These scholarly views align with the perspective of this study that, the AU/NEPAD, through their APRM initiative, aim to give a new definition to governance and development in Africa. Analysis of the APRM thematic areas and objectives; and the regional codes and standards

which have been put in place, show that the Mechanism is attempting to reshape African states into what has, since the 1970s, been referred to as the "developmental state".

This concept of developmental state in academic discourses rekindles the long standing debate among scholars on the role of the state vis-à-vis the market in development. There have been arguments for a minimal state where the development process is market driven and government‟s role is limited to "preventing monopoly and externalities, providing public goods and enforcing the law" (Denny, 2006:1-2; see also, Abe, 2006:8). There is the contention for a regulatory state whose government regulates the economy, provides for the welfare of the people and may assist the growth of the private sector by providing an enabling environment for businesses to thrive (Denny, 2006:1-2; see also, Kashara, 2013:4). The developmental state on the other hand sees the government actually leading the process of development. Whereas the concept of developmental state was first coined by Johnson (1982) to explain the economic growth in Japan - which happened as a result of the effective involvement of the government in guiding the country‟s development process side by side with the private enterprises[152] - it became popular when scholars reviewed the rapid economic progress achieved by the Asian Tigers from the 1970s (Abe, 2006:8; Fritz and Menocal, 2006:3; Adejumobi and Gonzaque, 2010:149; ECA/AU, 2011:5-9; Kashara, 2013:4).

In the case of Africa, however, the debate on the role of the state is significant considering the different development patterns which African leaders have followed in the post-independence period (Maipose, 2009:8-9; Amuwo, 2010:3-5; Olaoluwa, 2012). Between the 1950s and 1960s the state was the main institution promoting development. However, the failure of government to promote good governance and effective economic policies, among other factors, led to a shift towards the neo-liberal model with effective roles for civil society and private sectors from the 1980s (Maipose, 2009:8-9). The failure of SAPs led to a rethink of development strategies and re-enacted the debate on the developmental state in Africa in the late 1990s (Amuwo, 2010; Meyns and Musamba, 2010:7-8; Olaoluwa, 2012:139-141).

[152] According to Professor Michael Chege, Japan had "emerged from the ruins of the 1945 bombing and the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima to become the world‟s second largest economy in less than fifty years" (see, ECA, 2011c:85) because the state took a centre stage in its development process.

While some scholars have called for a developmental state, many others have argued that what Africa needs is a democratic developmental state (DDS), noting that the developmental states of the Asian Tigers were not democratic (Amuwo, 2010:5; ECA/AU, 2011:7-9; Kashara, 2013:5). Democracy is a contested concept, particularly in Africa where it is often erroneously associated with the conduct of elections. Hence, scholars argue that Africa requires a state that promotes democratic values such as broad-based participation and which takes centre stage in socio-economic development, human capital formation and development (Onimode et al, 2004:244-246; Meyns and Musamba, 2007:9; Amuwo, 2002:76-77; 2010:5-6). This kind of state, it is argued, will command the support and loyalty of the citizens.

As Adar, Juma and Miti (2010/11:XVI) point out, "the concept of developmental state is premised on the idea that state intervention is determined by socio-economic and political context". The concept has been employed by a variety of scholars to re-examine the position of the states in Africa in light of the continent‟s integration and development challenges and also taking cognisance of global realities and complexities. When relating these perspectives to the current study, a central argument of the study is that the APRM aims to assist in building democratic developmental African states that are responsible, accountable and reliable through its country self-assessments and periodic reviews. It provides opportunities for civil society and other external bodies to participate in governance reviews. The researcher argues in favour of states that promote participatory and inclusive governance to pave the way for people-centred development; states with visionary leadership, committed to bottom-up policy-making and development processes. The APRM advances that African governments should see their people as agents of change, recognising that development will spring from the people. Hence, people should be allowed to realise their full potential in the state. The concern, in the case of Africa, is that most states are weak and not yet adequately positioned to exploit both regional and global opportunities.

From the analyses presented in the previous chapter, particularly on the APRM CRRs of three selected member countries, it appears that the APRM is attempting to contribute towards establishing a new political economic order in Africa as a precondition for the creation of a "new international political economic order" (see, ECA, 2011c:12). In short, the APRM seems to propose a new political economic order at three levels – national, regional and international. The APRM‟s thematic areas and objectives, if well implemented and adhered to by member countries could facilitate this objective. The idea of the APRM is that

member countries would be motivated to address identified governance deficiencies, conform to acceptable standards, establish strong policies and build strong institutions, among other values (Akokpari, 2003:13; see also, Sisulu, 2013:8-9). These elements are necessary to realise regional integration and development goals. However, this study has found that the APRM can only achieve its mandates if it is allowed to function effectively. In essence, the Mechanism needs to be re-designed and strengthened.

7.3 Redefining the goals of regional integration in Africa: APRM strategy in the AU/NEPAD Agenda

Although the African Union/NEPAD initiatives were established in response to Africa‟s integration and development challenges, one of the key issues that have been raised by scholars and observers is the need to redefine the goals of regional integration in Africa in line with contemporary global challenges. On one side is the argument that pan-Africanism does not question issues of leadership, governance, domestic politics, ethnicity and religious conflicts, ecological disparities, economic underdevelopment and poverty in African states which are critical to the continent‟s integration agenda (Adedeji, 2002:8-10; Qobo, 2007:2-5; Adetula, 2008:30-33; Adogamhe, 2008:18-28; Okhonmina, 2009:92-94; UNDP, 2011:17-19; Golit and Adamu, 2013:11-12). On the other side, studies reveal the limitations of the traditional approach of the trade and market integration in promoting growth and socio-economic development in the African continent (Lee 2002:1-5; Adetula, 2004:6-7; Gibb 2009:713; McCarthy, 2007; Hartzenberg, 2011:3-8; Golit and Adamu, 2013:11). Lee (2002:22) emphasises the need to redefine both the “theory and practice of regionalism in Africa”. The argument of the study is that with the APRM, there is an attempt at addressing the governance question which is critical to African economic integration. Among APRM‟s objectives is the issue of regional integration. Beyond this, the codes and standard on corporate governance is to enable Africa countries put in place standards concerning how business is conducted in Africa. Adhering to the codes and standards across the four thematic areas will enable a redefinition of the goals of regionalism in Africa.

The concern of different scholars is that, despite the existence of several RIAs in Africa and the continent‟s continuing trade and other economic relations with the developed countries of the world, Africa has yet to address the challenge of underdevelopment (Adetula, 2004:6; Golit and Adamu, 2013:11-12). Its intra-regional trade and inter-continental trade remain low (Radelet, 1997:1-2; OECD/United Nations, 2011:24). In light of the salient issues in the

discourse, the thinking is firstly, that governments have to be articulate about the goals of African regionalism and secondly, that while the need to promote Africa‟s regional economic integration and development agenda is not in doubt, contemporary global realities also need to be considered (Lee, 2002:2-5; Adetula, 2008:4; Golit and Adamu, 2013:23). At this juncture in the thesis, it is useful to re-state the key arguments:

> The socio-economic transformation and development of Africa are the *sine qua non* of effective sub-regional and regional economic cooperation and integration of African countries. Integration is indeed necessary to reposition the continent to take active part in the globalising world economy. There is, however, a need to redefine the concept and goals of regional integration if African countries are to maximise effectively, individually and collectively, their potentials within the capitalist world economy. Considering the political history of the African continent, regional integration provides a good strategy to resolve most of Africa‟s governance and socio-development challenges. Regional initiatives should, therefore, reflect this objective.

It is worth noting that these arguments are reflected in the views of all participants in this study, on the goals of regionalisation in Africa.[153] Quoting one of the respondents verbatim:

> The aim of regionalisation should be first and foremost, to improve the standard of living of the people and achieve socio-economic development in Africa. It is not just about putting resources together in order to generate wealth for the states, but making sure that the benefits are felt on the ground by the people. But then, the challenge is that we are [at] different levels of development, for example, look at Burundi and Rwanda. The question is: how are we going to mobilise resources and work together towards implementing the same programme when some states are lagging behind? We need also to make sure that the governance structures in African countries are focused about the goal of empowering the people. These objectives can only be achieved by promoting good governance.[154]

Indeed, political leadership and governance, at all levels – national, regional and continental, is critical for realising regional integration objectives in Africa. However, the question remains whether African governments and policy makers are actually ready and willing to address the governance problems which retard the regional integration process in Africa particularly

[153] About 50 interviews were conducted during the course of this study. The views of participants cutting across both policy making organisations and the civil society, revealed that the goals of regional economic integration appear to have been misconstrued in Africa. Little wonder that Africa has many institutions promoting regional integration, yet the continent is far from achieving the objectives and is still struggling to achieve socio-economic development.

[154] Interview with AUC „C‟. Date: 17 June 2013.

considering the elite/leadership driven nature of the process. This is where the APRM aligns with the objectives of this study. The respondent further notes:

> Our leaders should be determined to go beyond tribes and ethnic politics; de-emphasise the artificial divisions caused by colonialism and go for what bring us together; what unite people instead of what divide them. The reasons are these: if people are divided as a nation, how can there be integration at the regional level? How can there be regional development without national development? How would Africa survive in a globalised world when it is divided? Yes, Africa should partner with other regions; partnership is good, but the benefits come only when partnership is with mutual partners, equal partners. But our weakness in Africa is that we have not prepared ourselves to exploit our resources. We need to be united; shape our plans, our own priorities; and then, we can call partners in.[155]

Another scholar corroborated the above assertion by stating that: "regional integration should lead to poverty eradication throughout Africa. It should provide opportunities for Africa to use its wealth of resources to develop Africa and improve the living conditions of Africans. We should develop our states – Somalia, Ethiopia, Rwanda and others; provide education for our people and develop our human resources.[156] The RECs, the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives all represent functional regional institutions established to drive the integration agenda as advocated in functionalist/neo-functionalist theory. Their existence reveals an important fact which is that, in Africa, we do not lack integration frameworks and development initiatives. What tends to be lacking is implementation whether at the level of the RECs or continental integration envisioned by the African Union. Moreover, "the absence of a legal framework to enforce the implementation of regional policies and programmes further impairs the integration process. All is left to the goodwill of the member states".[157] These were cross-cutting issues identified in this study and they informed analyses of the APRM. The Mechanism interrogates key governance and development issues, most of which account for the slow pace of integration in Africa. However, the issue of concern to the author is how the Mechanism could be strengthened to achieve its objectives and whether African leaders would be willing to address key governance deficiencies that may betray important weaknesses. Considering the issues of policy failures in Africa, the question remains – will APRM be able to transform the governance architecture in Africa?

[155] Interview with AUC „C". Date: 17 June 2013.
[156] Interview with a Senior Academic (2) at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis-Ababa University, Ethiopia. Date: 21 June 2013.
[157] Interview with AUC „D". Date: 18 June, 2013.

Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned issues, it could be noted that based on its founding objectives, the APRM has been strategically positioned to support the implementation of the African Union/NEPAD objectives. APRM [1] underscores the point that: "indeed, for as long as we have divisions in Africa; as long as national integration remains a challenge; as long as Africa is in dire need of accountable and responsible leadership; we need the APRM…"[158] In fact, Bing Pappoe (2010:16), in his contribution on the APRM notes that there is no evidence in any country where both the government and the citizens were not favourably disposed to the APRM. The Mechanism shows the importance of regional initiatives. However, this study identifies the weaknesses in implementing other regional initiatives which may affect the APR process. Moreover, lack of effective citizen" participation in Africa"s integration process is a major challenge for the APRM. These issues portray that lack of political willingness and commitments required to make the APRM work has not been addressed. Moreover, the APRM would require adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to realise its key objectives.

The APRM, one respondent noted, "provides the context for which integration should occur".[159] Its reviews are crucial and strengthen the activities of the AU/NEPAD. As Respondent RP4 explains:

> The African Union provides the institutional framework within which NEPAD programmes are being implemented. While the AU concentrates in actually building institutions of peace and security, institutions of conflict prevention and conflict management, NEPAD spearheads the economic realm. And to actually deal with the economic realm, it is important for African states to address their structural weaknesses, and there comes the APRM. The APRM takes two focuses. One is that the business of one African country is the business of any other African country. That is why it is called peer review. African leaders could raise issues related to state development, state making, state sovereignty, and conflicts in other states. This was totally absent during the period of the OAU. And secondly, this review [will] help to identify the key structural and institutional weaknesses of states and thereby prescribe ways and means of addressing them. So, the APRM is a very very important framework.[160]

[158] Interview with a former Chairperson of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, APRM 1. Date: 1 February, 2013.
[159] Interview scheduled filled in by Doctoral Ctudent 1. Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Date: 18 September 2013.
[160] Interview with RP5 from the University for Peace, Costa Rica. Date: 20 June 2013.

Another respondent at the AUC buttressed the above assertion on how the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM work to facilitate the actualisation of the objectives of economic integration:

> The African Union as the overall body works at the policy level. The AU has put in place certain elements to guide the process of continental integration. These are shared values. They are supposed to be overarching. NEPAD uses those AU policies to attract investments on a large scale to Africa. And, in order to serve as the „referee", to make sure that countries are doing the right thing, you have the APRM which plays the role of a referee. The APRM sets standards and benchmarks for countries. So, the point is that, in actual fact, the APRM is separated from the AU because we don't want it to mix up. The APRM is going to play the role of that referee, to look at the standards, to look at whether the benchmarks are being met; so that when those benchmarks are met you will see that Africa has a best practice which it is prepared to absorb. The APRM sets the tone for the environment. Now, the challenge is whether the APRM is actually performing. Otherwise, the APRM is a very very good idea. For instance, they monitor our elections to see whether they are credible because that is one thing that will settle whether there is peace or not…[161]

In short, NEPAD and APRM, as programmes of the African Union, demonstrate the linkage between the political and economic imperatives of regional integration. Respondent AUC (E) further asserts that:

> NEPAD and APRM present a holistic programme emphasising both the economic and political aspects of integration. When I say political integration, I am not talking in terms of having one country. I mean, political integration to the extent that, the norms of the African Union become overarching shared values which all countries are committed to. To say, that wherever you go in the continent, you know that coups will not be allowed; human rights will be respected; corruption is held at minimal level and is an anathema; and you understand that countries will not be indifferent to what is happening in other countries. Those are the elements of integration that when all countries commit to them, they are enabling elements to aid integration. The APRM monitors compliance of the shared values in member countries.[162]

With these shared values, NEPAD promotes the harmonisation of regional policies for countries to benefit from economies of scale and enjoy free movement across Africa. Additionally, NEPAD emphasises the need for African countries to integrate in order to create larger markets which are attractive to investors; create necessary conditions, in terms of larger policy and economic space; and put in place standards to benefit from the global

[161] Interview with AUC „E". Date: 17 June, 2013.
[162] Interview with AUC „E". Date: 17 June 2013.

process (see, Schwabe, 2003:1-5; Hope, 2005:291-307; Busia, 2006:2-3; Verwey, 2006:9; Qobo, 2007).

The APRM, according to a top level official at the NEPAD Secretariat, "is a member of our Steering Committee. This Committee serves like an executive board that reports to the Heads of State. So, there are interactions and interface on a regular basis. NEPAD and the APRM energise the integration process, bringing the programmatic and governance fields together".[163] An APRM official notes that, in improving governance in member states, the APRM works with civil society. Civil societies in one country will interact with other countries – facilitating integration at the level of peers and at the civil society level.[164] The APRM is an attempt to establish a "pan-African governance system" (Uzodike, 2010/11:94) which is critical to Africa‟s regional integration agenda. The Mechanism is "involved in promoting Africa‟s commitment to sustaining systems of good governance as part of the African Governance Architecture so as to achieve an accelerated process of development on the continent".[165] To a significant extent, therefore, the APRM occupies a central position in the African Union/NEPAD framework.

While the responses of these officials are notable, it is also important to state that one of the major factors accounting for the limited success achieved in realising integration objectives is that African leaders have failed to implement regional agreements at the national levels in their various countries. As such, it could be questioned how the shared values and standards promoted by the APRM would be adhered to and implemented in order to facilitate Africa‟s integration.

7.4 Successes and achievements of the APRM

Since its establishment in 2003, and upon celebrating a decade of its existence in 2013, the APRM has attracted differing opinions. There are those who are of the opinion that the APRM concept is a good idea, but is confronted with a lot of challenges in its implementation. Others do not believe in the sincerity and commitment of African leaders in establishing the APRM. There are however, a set of scholars and writers who feel that the

[163] Interview with a top level official at the NEPAD Secretariat, (NEPAD 1), Midrand, South Africa. Date: 2 July 2013.
[164] The respondent is a senior official at the APRM Secretariat, (APRM 2), Midrand, South Africa. Date: 2 July 2013.
[165] Interview with a senior official at the APRM Secretariat, (APRM 3), Midrand, South Africa. Date: 2 July 2013.

Mechanism has enormous potential, but is still evolving. A key issue addressed in this study is that the APRM needs to demonstrate its usefulness in practice by establishing practical and realistic conditions and mechanisms in which African leaders who are bold enough to subject themselves to assessments, are persuaded to take positive action, even if persuasion might entail deploying a strategy of public criticism. The views of participants in this study were diverse. This section of the chapter brings together the different views concerning what the APRM stands for and the progress made in the achievement of objectives.

7.4.1 Recognition of the ideals of the APRM

According to the views of study participants, official published documents and publications of the RECs, the African Union, the ECA, NEPAD, along with scholarly literature, the APRM is Africa‟s governance monitoring tool (Cilliers, 2002:1; Hansungule, 2007:2; Mangu, 2007:363-366; Grimm and Katito, 2010:1-3; Bing-Pappoe, 2010:15; SAIIA, 2010-3-4; Uzodike, 2010:93-94; ECA, 2011d:V-VI; Landsberg, 2012b:104-115; Poku and Mdee, 2011:24; The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:59-63; Marcelin, 2014:33-36).

The APRM has since received both regional and international recognition. This was broadly reflected in the views of all the participants in this study. One participant argues that, the APRM is "the primary governance instrument that Africa has. It is indigenised; it is very African in its art and its code".[166] While identifying with this respondent‟s assertion, the author contends that African leaders should indeed be politically willing and committed to adhering to the ideals of the APRM. This study highlights the point that the NEPAD and APRM promote ideas of the Western industrialised countries (See, Bing-Pappoe, 2010:5; Bond, 2010:3; Egbulem et al, 2012:272-273). Moreover, funding these initiatives from domestic sources is a principal challenge for African countries (Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:50; Mangu, 2007:384; Bing-Pappoe, 2010:22). Notwithstanding, as another respondent contends, the APRM as a governance tool was established, "as African Heads of State realised that they have to take their destinies in their hands and that governance cannot be an externally driven process, every time coming from outside, with conditionalities..."[167] Its

[166] Interview with a OSISA 1, South Africa. Date: 4 October 2013.
[167] Interview with ECA 4. a senior official at the Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date: 18 June 2013.

establishment signals to the world that Africans are capable of solving their governance deficiencies and coming up with initiatives on development.[168]

As at 2015, 35 African governments have signed up to the APRM, on behalf of their people, and the number, it is hoped, will increase in the future.[169] Respondent ECA [4] argues that" "the mere fact that the government of these countries accept to undergo the APR country assessment processes is commendable. Otherwise, should they go back to their coups?[170] APRM [1] notes: "all those countries that have joined are represented by their Heads of State and that makes the APRM very very important".[171] While the views of these officials are notable, it is important also to underscrore the point that, the mere accession to the APR process is not a guarantee that a member country will abide by the codes and standards by the APRM. There are many member countries that are lagging behind in implementing their NPoAs. The persistent political and socio-economic challenges in member countries are the evidence. The APRM has however brought to light the fact that Africa now has codes and standards on political, economic, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. One respondent commented, "its aims and plan of action is good, although it remains to be seen how successful it will be".[172]

Professor Mohiddin, presenting a Concept Paper at a Workshop organised by the APRM Support Section, Governance and Public Administration Division of the Economic Commission for Africa, commends the APRM, stating that although "the APRM is a „work-in-progress", its achievements so far are very encouraging. As it continues to operate, expand its membership and thus gain more expertise and experience, explore hitherto inaccessible governance domains, expose new governance deficiencies, and identify emerging best practices, it is also likely to encounter new challenges and opportunities" (ECA, 2011c:16).[173] Collier (2006:17) also underlines the points that firstly, non-participation in the APRM is a sign that a particular government does not like to be criticised; and secondly, civil society can

[168] Interview with a top level official at the NEPAD Secretariat, NEPAD 2. Midrand, South Africa. Date: 4 July 2013.
[169] For the list of countries that have acceded to the APRM and their statuses, see Appendix 4.
[170] Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013.
[171] Interview with APRM 1. Date: 1 February 2013.
[172] Completed interview schedule by Doctoral Candidate 2, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Date: 13 June 2013. This view was shared by all other doctoral students who completed the interview schedule.
[173] In fact, participants at the Workshop, mainly those from the civil society, academics, scholars, and ECA officials, in their various presentations praised the APRM. What they did was to locate the establishment and existence of the APRM within the context of Africa"s the political history. Participants further looked at the potentials of the APRM while identifying deficiencies in different areas. For details, see ECA, 2011c:16-52.

use the findings of the APRM as a basis to request a change in government. The author‟s view however is that, more than a decade on the Mechanism should provide more practical mediums through which civil society will be assisted to exploit its potentials.

A significant majority of the participants from the different sectors recognise the ideals of the APRM and also express concerns about the challenges it would face due to the nature of issues which it seeks to address. A senior official at one of the CSOs noted:

> The APRM is a novel African driven initiative which is generating crucial data and information through its reviews and committing its members to the process of improving identified weaknesses in their respective governance. Like NEPAD, the APRM is 10 years old in 2013, but despite this milestone remains very much a work in progress although its membership has grown from 16 original members to the current 34 member states. The potential of the APRM in transforming the continent organically from the bottom-up is immense, but the mechanism is still young, despite a decade in existence, and this potential remains exactly that – potential.[174]

7.4.2. Promoting democracy and good political governance

Studies conducted by various CSOs and research institutions and different scholarly articles on governance and socio-development challenges in Africa indicate that democracy and the good governance agenda has become a prevalent issue in Africa, particularly with the establishment of the African Union and its NEPAD and APRM initiatives (Cillers, 2002:2-6; Akokpari, 2003:3; Busia, 2006:2; Hope, 2005:284-285; Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:49; Mangu, 2007:356-357; Venter, 2009; Grimm and Katito, 2010; Olivier, 2011; Marcelin, 2014:11). Despite issues of contestation regarding the concepts of democracy and good governance, there are studies showing a greater recognition in Africa that democracy is a preferable form of government (Schwabe, 2003: 1-5; Hope, 2005:284-285; Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:54; Mangu, 2007:360; Grimm and Katito, 2010:1; Olivier, 2011; Poku and Mdee, 2011:24). However, the author notes that democractic norms and values are yet to be entrenched in many African countries despite the existence of regional frameworks of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM. Otherwise, how do we explain that there are still many African leaders who still manipulate the electoral process in order to remain in power? Why for instance, is the „Third-Term Agenda‟ a contentious issue yet to be resolved by the African

[174] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.

Union? Do these issues not show lack of sincerity on the part of African governments? Do such issues not indicate that a continental organisation such as the AU is weak in enforcing rules?

Many scholars have asserted that the consciousness is being promoted that governance has a deeper meaning than government and that good governance embodies the various discourses of citizen participation (Masterson, 2006; OSSREA, 2009; Venter, 2009: 27-39; Bing-Pappoe, 2010:17; Poku and Mdee, 2011:24; Ndangiza, 2013:2). The role of the APRM in furthering these ideas is emphasised in scholarly literature, studies and reports (Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:49; Adele-Jinadu, 2008:35; Zimmermann et al, 2009:71-79; Poku and Mdee, 2011; Ndangiza, 2013:2-11; Sawyer, 2012:60-63). For instance, Poku and Mdee (2011:24) note that:

> There is a growing consensus on what the key elements of governance reforms in Africa should comprise. These include, creating or strengthening institutions that foster predictability, accountability and transparency in public affairs; promoting a free and fair electoral process; restoring the capabilities of state institutions, especially those in states emerging from conflicts; anti-corruption measures; and enhancing the capacity of public service delivery systems. Nothing better illustrates Africa‟s commitment to a new approach to governance than the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

This study aligns with the findings of different scholars that the APRM has done much in promoting democracy and good governance in member countries. Some of its member countries are undergoing the APR process and submitting their CRRs and NPoAs. There are some member countries which are already implementing their NPoAs and submitting their progress reports (Collier, 2006:17; Zimmermann et al, 2009:79; Poku and Mdee, 2011:24; Gruzd, 2014:17-18). The APRM assists in encouraging member countries to implement reforms. Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, and others, are implementing changes in their political-economic systems (Sawyer, 2012:62; Gruzd, 2014:17-18).

Some institutional reports record that progress is being achieved in Africa. For instance, “between 1998 and December 2008, 76 presidential and 59 parliamentary elections were held in sub-Saharan Africa while between 2009 and December 2012, 35 presidential and 22 parliamentary elections were held, with Sierra Leone, Senegal and Ghana being the most recent (December 2012)” (NEPAD Business Plan, 2013:8; see also, AfDB/OECD/UNDP,

2014a:11-12). While the intention is not necessarily to ascribe these changes to the APRM, such progress in particular member countries could encourage non-member countries. Moreover, the Mechanism, as a programme of the AU/NEPAD could assist in consolidating the improvements.

It increasingly is appreciated that improved governance is a pre-condition for poverty reduction as shown in North Africa (Schwabe, 2003:1-5; Hope, 2005:283-285; NEPAD Business Plan 2013:8; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:11-12). This is deepening the realisation of the link between peace, economic prosperity, freedom and socio-economic development (Hope, 2005:283-289; NEPAD Business Plan, 2013:8; Hammam and Quedraogo, 2012a:59). Also noted in this study are various perspectives that some African governments have established constitutions; they have put in place conflict preventive mechanisms; decision making processes are becoming more inclusive via the incorporation of civil society; there is more emphasis on combating corruption, promoting good economic policies, accountability, and improving public sector service delivery. Progress has been achieved in many African countries in promoting gender equality (Mangu, 2007:386; AU/NEPAD, 2011:14; NEPAD, 2011a:74-79; ECA, 2012a:10; The NEPAD Guide 2012a:65; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:1-2; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:11-12; Gruzd, 2014:17-18). The above record of progress notwithstanding, it is instructive to note that the issue of poor electoral management and electoral violence and conflict is still a common problem in most African countries. Lack of effective implementation and monitoring of policies inhibit the process of reforms in many countries. Promoting good governance is still a big problem coupled with corruption, lack of political accountability, and bad politics in most African countries (see, Turianskyi, 2009:3-18; Venter, 2009:39; Meredith, 2005:14; Salawu, 2010:348).

In addition to its findings on the achievements at the national level, however, the present study undertook to examine the APRM‟s objectives underlined in this thematic area with respect to promoting effective and accountable leadership, broad-based participation, peace, stability, security and sustainable socio-economic development. These elements are crucial for the realisation of key objectives of Africa‟s integration agenda. The study aligns with scholarly perspectives that political challenges will have to be dealt with for the AU/NEPAD agenda to succeed. Thus, the APRM is seen here as a strategy with potential to ensure democratic sustenance and to continuously promote good governance in Africa. However, this study also notes that the APRM could be hindered by the governance challenges which it

seeks to address as African leaders lack the required political will to allow the Mechanism to function.

7.4.3 Africa – Moving from "non-interference" to "non-indifference"

Geldenhuys (2012:53-65), Biong Koul Deng (2010:1-7), Mulikita (2005:4), Collier (2006:17), Herbert and Gruzd (2008:5-6), are among the scholars who have highlighted that, looking at the AU Declaration establishing the APRM and other such declarations promoting good governance; the APRM focus areas; provisions of its official documents; and the different stages of the APR process; the Mechanism, intervenes in the national affairs of member states. This study aligns with such arguments. It identifies that the APRM questions government‟s political and socio-economic policies, examines the performance of public officials, raises questions about national budgets, provides a forum for non-state stakeholders and external personalities to partake in country assessment processes.

As many as 70 per cent of those interviewed from different sections, share the idea that the African Union, NEPAD and APRM are typical in illustrating that Africa is gradually moving away from the principle of non-interference in the affairs of member states which was associated with the OAU, to that of non-indifference of the African Union.[175] One respondent notes: "okay, since the AU would not be indifferent to conflicts in African countries, this would help in ensuring regional peace and security. This is an improvement over the OAU. The Peace and Security Council is quite okay, even if it is not that vocal".[176] The respondents did not however fail to also point to the fact that membership to the APRM is voluntary unlike that of the African Union. Nonetheless, this study identifies that, non-indifference in the affairs of African member countries, responds to a key governance challenge in achieving regional integration objectives which has to do with the nature of sovereignty of African states. The AU/NEPAD initiative, through the APRM, is attempting to reshape and redefine the concept of sovereignty in Africa. As one respondent emphasises:

> Non-indifference simply means, as an African country, I cannot be indifferent to what is happening in other African countries, especially those around me. Take for instance, I am in Nigeria, I have Ghana and Benin Republic as my neighbours, I cannot be indifferent to what is happening in Benin Republic, in Cotonou or in Accra because if there are issues, conflicts or crisis; if things are

[175] Gleaned from the responses of various participants in this study.
[176] Interview with Senior Academic 3 at the Hawassa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date: 21 June 2013.

> not done right there, I would have refugee problems because they will flood my country. The challenge would be that, I already have issues in my own country that I am unable to manage. So, if I am not careful I will experience the same kind of crisis that is happening in my neighbouring countries or something worse because now I have to grapple with a lot of issues, my own issues and then others". So, that is what again, the APRM is doing; that"s where the issue of peer review is important.[177]

The respondent further mentions that the APRM is pushing the AU"s decision not to tolerate any government that comes to power through unconstitutional means.[178] The AU"s decision is encapsulated in Article 23 of the African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections. On the other hand, however, respondents also emphasise the weaknesses of the African Union in ensuring that its decision of non-indifference holds firm on crucial matters, for instance, in maintaining regional peace and security. Senior academic [2] states that the AU"s peace and security architecture is not yet as functional as that of the EU and that the AU has not been proactive in dealing with conflicts.[179] Another opinion is that, "the AU is concerned with attending to many issues – development, integration, and others. The Union should be more realistic and focus on regional peace and security only. In this respect, it could simply cooperate with the RECs and the UN to promote conflict intervention through preventive diplomacy, multinational peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building".[180] According to EISA [1], "the AU remains very much aspirational in its aims and objectives and continues to grapple with the continent"s challenges under considerable logistical, financial and political constraints".[181] As Collier (2006:17) notes, the "AU"s observers of elections have worked to more lenient standards than other observers. The AU has failed to reverse more recent coups in the Central African Republic and Mauritania. Similarly, the AU military intervention in Dafur, though a major step forward, has clearly not yet ended the killings" (see also Grimm and Katito, 2010:2). The AU needs to realistically redress these weaknesses in order to remain relevant.

Nonetheless, a general opinion expressed by participants is that efforts have been made in promoting peace and security as conditions for socio-economic development in the continent. Examples are the AU"s intervention in Burundi, Dafur, Sudan and Somalia (AU/NEPAD,

[177] Interview with a top level official at the NEPAD Secretariat, (NEPAD 3). Midrand, South Africa. Date of interview: 4 July 2013.
[178] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.
[179] Interview with Senior Academic (2), Institute for Peace and Security Studies. Date: 21 June 2013.
[180] Interview with RP2, United States International University, Nairobi, Kenya. Date: 20 June 2013.
[181] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.

2011:7). Although there were conflicts in Guinea Bissau and Mali in 2012, and persisting challenges in managing elections in some countries, relative stability has been maintained in the continent as the number of conflicts has reduced compared to the period of the 1990s (NEPAD Business Plan, 2013:8-9; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:20; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:11-12).

7.4.4 Identifying governance challenges and proffering solutions

Different studies on the APRM have lauded its strength in identifying governance challenges in member countries (in the different focus areas) and proffering solutions. Countries are then expected to report back to the APR Forum on how far they have gone in addressing identified challenges (see, Hope, 2005:283-307; Herbert and Gruzd 2008; Mangu, 2007; Zimmermann et al, 2009:80; Poku and Mdee, 2011:24; Marcelin, 2014:18). This study aligns with such findings. A significant majority of the interviewees across different sectors also reflected this success. For instance, ECA [4] notes that, "the APRM has been successful in bringing to public limelight, many "cross-cutting" issues on governance that affect African countries".[182] These challenges are documented in a number of studies and scholarly materials. Issues including corruption, youth unemployment, land use, among others, are now defined as overarching issues which should receive government"s priority attention (SAIIA, 2010:3-4; ECA, 2011d:V).[183] While aligning with the views of respondents, this study stresses the need for the APRM to conduct follow-up reviews to ascertain the authenticity of the report which member countries present about the implementation of their NPoAs.

The concern of this study is that the governance and socio-economic deficiencies have negative implications for sub-regional and regional integration and need to be addressed. The focus is to identify how the APRM could potentially mitigate these challenges. About 90% of the participants reflected this perspective. ECA [4] noted: "in every single country which was reviewed, those issues are always there. Since the APRM is a governance instrument, it has the base for a stable African continent".[184] This statement aligns with Hope"s (2005:296-298) contribution that the APRM provides many benefits to countries such as, "greater transparency and improved public accountability". Corroborating these assertions,

[182] Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013.
[183] These cross-cutting issues were analysed in the APRM Reports in chapter six. It was clear from the three APRM Reports analysed in chapter six that, the levels of countries" development and their wealth in resources, do not guarantee peace and stability. Several governance challenges were identified in these Reports.
[184] Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013.

Respondent NEPAD [2] adds: "it is not a report from the Bretton Woods institutions that identified these cross-cutting problems. So, it is an innovation from this particular continent. Yes, I think, for me, APRM is a great success.[185] APRM [2] states that: "the APRM Secretariat is a research organisation and a policy advisory institution. Most of the analyses and recommendations from the Panel of Eminent Persons are based on national and regional integration issues. The problem has been with implementation".[186]

The APRM tries to resolve one of the challenges of regional integration in Africa which is that, "countries are yet to build trust and confidence among their people at the domestic level. One way to do is to do more exchanges at the people level - the youth level; the gender level and at the level of experts".[187] The APRM, if allowed to function, could go a long way in also building exchanges at the level of the RECs. Respondent APRM [3] highlights the role of the APRM in achieving this objective:

> We interact with NGO coalitions in some countries that have them, for instance, the Mauritius Coalition of Civil Societies (MACOSS). For countries that do not have NGO coalitions, we go to the universities, nurses, doctors and so on. The civil society should take advantage of the APRM. APRM is not just a secretariat, it has constituent national parts. Many of the countries have national councils and civil societies are supposed to be part and parcel of the national councils. APRM even encourages countries to define civil society.[188]

Some respondents were however, of the view that the APR process is beset with a lot of difficulties and the researcher agrees with such views. In particular, there are respondents who noted that the national structures in most African countries are dominated by government functionaries without adequate citizen involvement. Their submissions reinforce the concerns of scholars on the weaknesses of the APR process (Heubaum, 2005:6; Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:50-53; Gruzd, 2007; Turianskyi, 2009:3-18; Zimmermann, et al, 2009). However, it is important to note that government functionaries are important to give the APRM a national recognition; however this should not be exploited to dominate the process and mar its integrity. On the other side is the fact that most CSOs in Africa still need

[185] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date: 4 July 2013.
[186] Interview with APRM 2 at the APRM Secretariat, Midrand, South Africa. Date: 2 July 2013.
[187] Interview with NEPAD 1. Date: 2 July 2013.
[188] Interview with APRM 3 at the APRM Secretariat, Midrand, South Africa. Date: 2 July 2013.

to be strengthened and properly organised to effectively engage with government and take advantage of the APRM review processes.

In the view of one of the interviewees, NEPAD and the APRM are "white-washing" strategies.[189] African leaders would come up with beautifully designed programmes, seeking to promote democracy and good governance, as a cover-up for their poor leadership, corruption and other negative acts.[190] Respondent RP4 notes: "it's about playing the game... Have you heard that phrase? The question is whether all of this good governance rhetoric is coming from above or below. And, if it is coming from above, the next question is: can you trust it? Is there anything of any integrity there at all..."?[191] The respondent, who is a member of the Ethiopian parliament, notes:

> APRM was not a transparent and genuine initiative. From my observation of its conduct in Ethiopia, it does nothing except strengthening the venture of our governments to legitimise their authoritarianism through flattering by their counterparts. It is far short of being bold in figuring out shortcomings with regard to democracy and rule of law in the countries where the reviews are carried out. Such initiatives should be undertaken by a body independent of the states which created it. APRM is far from achieving its purpose.[192]

Similarly, all the doctoral candidates (from different African countries), who participated in this study, when reflecting on the political and socio-economic challenges in their countries, identified that the contribution of the APRM to resolving governance and development issues, and contributing to regional integration is limited.[193] One of the doctoral candidates observes that: "the political challenges confronting Africa are many. These are deep-rooted issues. Where will the APRM start from? The APRM will be totally undermined since it is a voluntary mechanism".[194] The democratic deficits in Ethiopia (which were raised during the field studies) and such issues in other member countries study present impediments to the APRM. Respondent RP3 notes pessimistically: "the APRM's contribution towards regional integration is minimal... APRM is not a project that is rallying countries and because only between 30 and 40 of the 54 countries in Africa have signed up, its contribution to integration

[189] Interview with RP4, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Date: 14 August 2013.
[190] Interview with RP4. Date: 14 August 2013.
[191] Interview with RP4. Date: 14 August 2013.
[192] Interview questions completed by member of Ethiopian Parliament. Date: 12 October 2013.
[193] Doctoral students were from Uganda, South Africa, DRC, and Kenya.
[194] Interview questions completed by Doctoral Candidate 2, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Date: 13 June 2013.

is bound to be minimal".[195] The responses of officials and experts above are critical to this study and suggestive of the need for re-designing the APRM and developing more monitoring mechanisms if it is to achieve its mandate. The civil society and the media need to be effectively involved not only in performing oversight functions but also in advocating for effective policy implementation. The ideas expressed by respondents do not however suggest that the APRM is not a good idea. As RP3 also noted:

> The APRM is good in principle, but ineffective in practice. Membership to it remains voluntary. Countries can sign unto it or withdraw. Countries such as Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Sudan which make international headlines on human rights, have stayed out of the APRM and neither the AU nor the APRM has any compulsory mechanisms to compel states to behave in a particular way. In short, these institutions and structures are good, but then they lack effective implementation clout.[196]

Referring to the governance and development challenges in Africa, the respondent also notes that: "the AU and its institutions could potentially mitigate these challenges, but the AU, the APRM and NEPAD must in the first instances, prove to be credible instruments of integration".[197] This statement confirms the concern in this study that the APRM, if allowed to function with adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place, could become an instrument to resolve the governance dilemmas in Africa in achieving the goals of regional integration.

7.4.5 APRM: Functioning as a crisis and conflict prevention instrument

Studies conducted by different institutions and scholarly positions on the APRM record that the APR process in some countries alerted the government about imminent crisis: the challenge of diversity management as marked in election related crisis between ethnic groups in Kenya, and the issue of xenophobia in South Africa (ECA, 2011c:12-13; Sawyer, 2012:62; Gruzd, 2014:19). The incidences actually happened in these countries. There was the electoral violence in 2007-2008 in Kenya and xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008 (ECA, 2011c:12-13; Sawyer, 2012:63). As has been highlighted in chapter six, xenophobic attacks recently occurred in Durban and other parts of KwaZulu-Natal.

[195] Interview with RP3, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Date: 19 March 2014.
[196] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March 2014,
[197] Interview with RP3. Date: 19 March 2014.

As some scholars like Gruzd (cited in SAIIA, 2010:3) note, even though the warnings of the APRM are not seriously considered in some cases, the APRM findings often serve as a guide to policy actions in the case where a conflict erupts suddenly in a member state. This study supports the idea that the APRM could serve as an early warning instrument for future conflicts and crisis. In addition, the study advances the view that, the APRM could enable governments to be proactive in addressing issues which trigger intra- and inter-state conflicts; assist conflict prevention and reduction strategies of the RECs and the African Union; and ensure peace and security at national and regional levels (see, Gruzd, 2007:55; Ndangiza, 2013:2; Marcelin, 2014:11). As such, the argument here is that the APRM could address one of the impediments of regionalism in Africa. The views of a majority of respondents reflect this perceptive. For instance, a senior official of the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes states:

> The APRM is a good idea because what it does is that it reveals the extent of our development. It gives you a kind of guidance of the analysis of development –what have we covered; what do we need to cover. That is the strength of the APRM. And the APRM has made impact in that many countries have now acceded and you have very few countries that have not, so that then gives you really the impression of what it stands for. And many African governments are quite weary of being called out to say, we are not developing in certain areas, you know. Like for instance, one of the challenges that was revealed in the last APRM Review on South Africa was on xenophobia, and as a result of that, the South African government has been very sensitive to that and really has made efforts in ensuring that, say look, there are effective ways of addressing xenophobia and also saying that, let us have a re-look at this, because this is not xenophobia, it‟s a form of foreign attacks on foreign individuals which are criminally induced, you know. Let‟s look at these and address them properly and give them their proper names, yea. So, the APRM in that process is really really a good thing. Indeed, it is really a good thing”.[198]

7.4.6 Fostering “peer learning, experience sharing and best practices”[199]

Scholars and writers on the APRM have highlighted that, the peer review process provides a forum for African governments to learn from peers, share experiences and best practices (Cillier, 2002:4; Hope, 2005:283; Busia, 2006:4; Hansungule, 2007:7; Bing-Pappoe, 2010:27; Tungwarara, 2010:VII; Ndangiza, 2013:2; Sawyer, 2012:63; Gruzd, 2014:19). The lessons and experiences gained from the peer review processes are also important to other

[198] Interview with ACCORD 1, a senior official of the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes Durban, South Africa. Date of interview: 24 February 2014.
[199] These are popular words used in scholarly materials on the APRM.

African countries outside the APRM, Africa‟s RECs and other stakeholders (NEPAD, 2011a:22). According to Tungwarara (2010:VIII), it cannot be over-emphasised that peer learning, experience sharing and best practices shared by governments, and peer influence are necessary ingredients that will increase the pace of integration in Africa (Tungwarara, 2010:VIII; see also, Busia, 2006:4; Collier, 2006:17).

This study aligns with the views of these scholars. It notes, particularly, that with the required political will, the strategy of peer learning, experience sharing and sharing of best practices will aid African governments to address governance challenges that constrain the continent‟s integration agenda. Hence, Africans would begin to maximise the benefits of regional cooperation and integration. The strategies should therefore be extended to the level of the African citizens and their organisations at all levels. One respondent identifies that: "the APRM brings Heads of State of different African countries together to take stock of what good they are doing in their country, their weaknesses and shortcomings; the positive sides; and to share experiences.[200] A significant number of the participants aligned with this perspective. One respondent illustrates this clearly:

> The APRM has no direct role to play in integrating African states; however, it does provide a useful framework for understanding the issues which different states have in common. The APRM also provides a platform within which African states are able to dialogue on these common issues, explore and share unique and novel solutions to common challenges and reflect critically on the role of other states in supporting the governance processes of each member state.[201]

Emphasising this response, NEPAD [2] notes:

> Yes, the APRM has been successful, I think to be more precise, I mean I have sat in most of those meetings, I mean it‟s amazing. Actually, I mean that the Heads of State, the inputs they give to each other have been open, upfront and very honest, in manners that people out there would not know but for me who has been there. So, it has been a very useful exercise where Heads of State are able to talk to one another in an open, simple language. Most presidents who have been there, presenting their reports have really welcomed the inputs of their peers.[202]

[200] Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013.
[201] Interview with EISA 1. Date: 9 October 2013.
[202] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date: 4 July 2013.

While this study identifies with the assertion of this respondent, it has also noted the cases where some Heads of State did not accept some aspects of their CRR.[203] This weakness however, does not however undermine the usefulness of the APRM. Respondent NEPAD [2] also adds that:

> There is lack of information on the APRM where some people think it is some report from the Bretton Woods institution, but this is not the case and it misses the peer learning aspect of the APRM. You see, if it didn‟t identify the right things, you would then be questioning, you know, we would be saying look... And if it praised things that were not supposed to be praised then we can question. So far, on a substantive level, nobody has been able to point out that one.[204]

7.5 African Peer Review Mechanism – Promoting civil society participation at all levels[205]

It is well documented that the lack of effective civil society participation in the governance process is one of the major causes of failure of regional integration and development initiatives in post-independence African countries (see, Adedeji 2002-8-10; Qobo, 2007:2-5; Adogamhe, 2008:21; Okhonmina, 2009:94; Adejumobi, 2009; Bilas and Franc 2010:115; Motsamai and Zondi, 2010). It was noted, in previous chapters that Africa‟s integration processes were elitist and undemocratic and this affected progress. In fact, to buttress the significance of popular support for regional initiatives, one of the interviewees in this study argues, for instance that, despite the conflicts and tensions in the DRC, or Rwanda, or even if one looks at Uganda, people collaborate among themselves, harmoniously on the basis of trade. Trade relations among citizens of these countries are not characterised by conflicts. Integration would be facilitated by the people and not the government.[206] The respondent notes: "African governments obstruct regional integration".[207] This opinion supports the assertion of Akinkugbe (2010/11:132) that, informal cross-border trade which remains a vital part of rural African economic activity and invisible integration over the years enjoyed only near (if not total) neglect by African countries". This study supports scholarly arguments that civil society has a critical role to play with government in the continent‟s integration and development agenda.

[203] For details, see sections on "comments made on the CRR" in the analysed of country reports in chapter six.
[204] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date: 4 July 2013.
[205] The concept of civil society has been defined in the previous section 6.2.
[206] Interview with AISA 1, a top level official of the African Institute for South Africa. Date: 3 July 2013
[207] Interview with AISA 1. Date: 3 July 2013.

It is noteworthy that, the idea of citizen participation in governance and development processes in Africa became more pronounced from the 1990s with the internal and international pressures on governments to promote democracy and good governance ideals (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004; Masterson, 2006; Verwey 2006; OSSREA, 2009; CCP-AU, 2012). As such, several studies, particularly on the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM have identified with the enormous role played by CSOs; emphasising that the avenues have been created for improved citizen engagement at both national and regional levels (Masterson, 2006; Herbert and Gruzd, 2008; ECA, 2008a:15-17; CCP/AU, 2012). However, scholars identify that Africa‟s civil society is confronted with several difficulties; and in their various studies, they provide recommendations for enhanced participation (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004:6-9; Verwey, 2006:24-26; Herbert and Gruzd, 2008:361-383).

In line with various scholarly contributions and findings, this study advances that popular participation is a key element in achieving the African Union/NEPAD objectives. It supports the view that with the APRM, civil society participation has improved at all levels (see Gruzd, 2014:18-19). The APRM has empowered citizens to speak out about governance issues in their countries. Through the national structures established at the national level in APRM countries, the political space has increased for civil society participation. This section of the chapter assesses, empirically, progress made in enhancing citizen and civil society participation.

Data analysis is based on information collected from different sources. On the one side, officials of policy making institutions - the African Union, PAP, NEPAD, APRM and ECA were interviewed. On the other, civil society representatives were also interviewed. They were from CSOs -OSISA, EISA, ISS, ACCORD, OXFAM; and JDPC; all in South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria respectively. Respondents from research institutions were from OSSREA, AISA and NIIA. Participating from the media sector were, Daily Dispatch Newspaper and the Witness Newspaper in South Africa; Punch Newspaper, National Mirror Newspapers and Television Continental News in Nigeria; and the Reporter Newspaper in Addis Ababa. Respondents also included members of the academic community - experts who are knowledgeable on the subject matter.

The data from policy making institutions confirms the views of some scholars such as Landsberg (2012a:10) that, whereas the AU, NEPAD and APRM provisions emphasise

citizen and civil society participation, the forums for engagement are still weak and citizen participation is still a challenge. Even though more avenues have been created for participation, CSOs have not been properly organised. One respondent from NEPAD expressed this concern mentioning the lack of effective involvement of the ECOSOC in the APRM process. The respondent notes: "the quality of engagement and the levels of engagement are still concerns. I am looking for something a little bit higher than what we already have. It is like the organisations that are inside know themselves. It is the same organisations and the same people.[208]

Another respondent from the AUC adds:

> We have a platform for the private sector. It is called African Private Sector Forum. This is the forum we organise annually where we take on board the views and the concerns of the private sector and we consult them regularly on the major issues. The ECOSOC is a body of the AU handling the issue of civil society involvement. The Pan African Parliament is trying to bring people into the governance process, and the CIDO deals with civil society involvement and the diaspora. These forums exist but need to do more to achieve the objective of effective civil society participation.[209]

Participants in this study from CSOs expressed their views on how their organisations and institutions continue to contribute variously to national and regional integration discourses; development and governance, peace and security in Africa. These organisations also confirmed their engagements with the African Union Departments; NEPAD and APRM Secretariats, the ECA, and even the RECs at different levels. They are involved directly or indirectly in handling issues related to: civic education, training and sensitisation on national and regional issues; awareness creation; advancing research and publications, and African scholarship; organisation of conferences and workshops on African issues; conflict management and peace building issues; humanitarian concerns; election monitoring and management; advocacy for human rights and new policies; environmental protection and management.[210] The OSISA has undertaken analyses and reviews of a dozen of APRM Reports; monitoring the implementation of NPOAs.[211] The respondent from OSISA notes:

[208] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date 4 July 2013.
[209] Interview with AUC „D", Date: 18 June 2013.
[210] Data gleaned from interviews with CSO representatives.
[211] Interview with OSISA 1. Date: 4 October 2013.

> Beyond what the civil society was set up to do at the dawn of democracy since the 1980s and early 1990s, the terrain has changed; the issues largely remain the same, but the nuance now with very many complicated issues. Issues of natural resource governance in some situations, anti-corruption and also greater issues left to do with the nationalistic aspect sometimes which was generally what we had twenty years ago, now have more regional and continental focus. The civil society, we are faced with how to be able to strengthen our institutions, protecting the mandate of our institutions away from executive powers that have clearly now systematically decided collectively to weaken institutions which they have built up 15, 20 years ago. The role of civil society, obviously, has fundamentally changed. New factors have also come in – the diaspora; the role that they are playing is supposed to be heard; technology, and other things are there. So, there is a larger constituency that is out there, looking at very many different issues that are extremely complex in nature and extremely diverse.[212]

There is a general opinion that civil society participation is being promoted in the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM. Approximately 60 per cent of the participants note that, unlike in the past when people saw the role and position of civil society as hostile to that of government, currently, there are a lot of development initiatives between government and the civil society partly because, on many occasions, government may have the resources but rely on civil societies for skills and expertise. This finding is well documented in scholarly literature (Hope, 2005:285; Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:53; Bing-Pappoe, 2010:15-17; Landsberg, 2012b:109). Another reality is that CSOs are often at the forefront not only of criticisms about government performance but also on challenges or opposition to government legitimacy. Often, it is CSOs who are at the front of demands for change and transformation in society and the actual implementation of formal policies. Indeed, government officials are aware that CSOs are vulnerable and can be captured either by government officials or the opposition in service of parochial interests. In some instances, they are even used as pawns by external forces in the service of external interests.

The data also reveals that citizens‟ participation varied in different African countries and that there are still some African governments who are not open to civil society participation and still see thriving CSOs as threats. The opinions were diverse. South Africa has a vibrant civil society; this was particularly notable pre-1994.[213] In Nigeria, to a large extent, the civil society is active; this was especially so, during the military regime before democracy was

[212] Interview with OSISA 1. Date: 4 October 2013.
[213] Interview with a senior official at The Witness Newspaper, (Media 1). Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. Date: 16 August 2013.

installed in 1999.[214] Participants noted that CSOs relaxed somewhat when democracy was enthroned, and street protests and demonstrations disappeared. The civil society thought democracy had been achieved and that government would live up to their responsibilities. They however found this not to be the case. There now is a general opinion on the need for more active participation of civil society for democratic consolidation.[215]

In Ethiopia, however, the situation is somewhat dissimilar. Participants from Ethiopia noted government‟s attempts to place some restrictions on civil society participation and on the issues which can be handled by CSOs. Civil society in Ethiopia is therefore not as active. A respondent from one of the CSOs in Addis Ababa notes:

> In some ways, eem yes, there are government‟s restrictions on civil society activities. Of course, that‟s the reality. For example, in Ethiopia, there are clear limitations to how far you can talk about human rights. But these are not unique to us here. These limitations affect every research organisation, every university, every researcher, basically. If you come to Ethiopia, journalists, for example, are known to be jailed here. So, this is nothing new, and it is not unique to us. It is just the way the politics currently is.[216]

This assertion is corroborated by a senior academic from the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa: "for many reasons, in Ethiopia, there are no vibrant civil societies like there are in South Africa, or Kenya or Nigeria. Ethiopia is a bit behind".[217] Another senior academic emphasises that, "there is constitutional recognition of freedom of speech and freedom of the press that is well institutionalised in Ethiopia, but when it comes to practice, especially after September 9/11, this has been a challenge. The government usually accuses journalises of being biased in their analyses, simply advocating for views which can contradict the policies of the government".[218]

The general opinion expressed by CSO respondents is that, despite the progress made in civil society participation, African civil societies are faced with many challenges. The data obtained reveals the following: the views of civil society are often ignored by policy makers; in other words, there is a disconnect in how civil society effect change in policy; many CSO

[214] Interview with Media 2, a top level official at TVC Continental, Lagos, Nigeria. Date: 21 January 2014.
[215] General opinions shared by all the participants from CSOs and some media sector representatives.
[216] Interview with ISSA 1, a senior official at the Institute for Security Studies. Date: 19 June 2013.
[217] Interview with Senior Academic 2. Institute for Peace and Security Studies. Date: 21 June 2013.
[218] Interview with Senior Academic 3, at the Hawassa University, Addis Ababa. Date: 21 June 2013.

leaders have joined the political class and this lessens the capacity of civil society to critique governments‟ actions; civil societies are not as organised as they could possibly be; there are duplication and replication of functions and organisations; lack of coordination of efforts of civil society organisations; lack of civil society networking and coalitions; funding issues; lack of clarity on which groups constitute civil society organisations; civil society participation is still at informal and unofficial levels, of an elite nature and still based in the urban areas; most CSOs are international and thriving ones are those that are well networked; absence of grassroots CSOs and lack of capacity for existing ones; lack of information about regional initiatives; lack of interest in regional integration issues; among others.[219] It is clear that there are weaknesses both on the side of the government and CSOs.

A top level official at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs reports for instance that, they would organise conferences and invite CSO representatives, but it appears that CSO representatives are more interested in policy advocacy; human rights and others. Regional integration issues almost do not attract much concern.[220] Another respondent notes: “civil society is not as organised in Africa. Unfortunately, I think in some cases, the Western countries have invested in some CSOs to the point that some leaders of CSOs are interested in their material interests to get funding from donors. If you take the case of Zimbabwe, you have so many CSOs, but their primary concern is political, in a narrow sense; they are either in support of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front or the Movement for Democratic Change.[221] The case of governance deficits in Zimbabwe is well documented in scholarly literature (see, Karuuombe, 2003:60-61; Kebonang and Fombad, 2006; Thonje, 2013:37-41). For NEPAD [3], funding is a problem to CSOs and this is a factor that determines how independent these organisations are in formulating their programmes. That is why we had, and will continue to have it, although not as prominent as before, the rivalry between government and civil society.[222] These responses reveal the poor state of governance in most African countries and it is one of the main objectives of the APRM to transform the dialogue process between government and civil society.

[219] Gleaned from interviews with CSO representatives.
[220] Interview with NIIA 1, a top level official at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Date: 31 January 2014.
[221] Interview with AISA 1. Date: 3 July 2013.
[222] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.

Representatives from research institutions – OSSREA, AISA and NIIA who were interviewed are also critical in their views about the need for increased civil society engagements at the national level and regional levels as a measure of promoting African economic integration. These organisations are think-tanks to policy making institutions and have been contributing to regional integration and development in Africa through research; undertaking collaborative studies and developing African scholarship; and promoting collaboration among researchers, scholars and CSOs. Conferences, seminars and Workshops are organised for scholars and policy makers to brainstorm on burning African issues.[223] The OSSREA and AISA have interactions of different forms with the RECs, the AU, NEPAD and APRM. A senior official from OSSREA notes: "we have conducted research focusing on the problems of regional integration with the East African Community. We have also been involved with COMESA on regional integration issues. We have identified many of the challenges that are persisting. Currently, we are trying to enhance the knowledge of parliamentarians on regional integration".[224]

The Media sector representatives expressed different views on how the media has been involved in governance and development processes in Africa, and also in promoting regional integration issues with the AU, NEPAD, APRM and the RECs. The media has been playing the role of: educating and informing the public about issues in the public domain and also relating to integration and regional initiatives; assisting CSOs to mobilise public opinion on national and regional issues; explaining government plans and programmes to the people; empowering the people; setting agenda for the government; exposing the ills in government; keeping government on their feet and giving them sleepless nights; playing the role of a "watch-dog"; ensuring that government fulfil their promises to the people; praising government when they do well and also pointing out the inefficiencies in government; fighting corruption; assisting in curbing the excesses of government; protecting African people from being manipulated by political actors; giving a voice to the people; among others.[225]

The information obtained reveals the following: the media has long existed and have tried to remain independent to a very large extent; there has been a quantum leap in the number of

[223] Data gleaned from interviews with participants at the research institutions.
[224] Interview with OSSREA 1, a top level official at the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, (OSSREA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Date: 21 June 2013.
[225] Gleaned from data obtained at the media houses visited.

media, both the print and electronic free media since the 1980s; readership of newspapers is decreasing as people rely on online newspapers; media activities have increased with the internet and increased social media networks; there is a plurality of views in newspapers, internet and social media networks. Data also shows that the media sector in Africa is faced with several challenges: difficulty in obtaining official information; insufficient media networking; some governments attempt to clip rather than support the media; a somewhat healthy rivalry between the government and the media; government, often times, does not pay serious attention to the views of the media; restrictive laws in some countries; press censoring; poor expertise of some media employees; "corporatisation" of the media -- most newspapers are more concerned with publishing stories that would grant profits more than civic education.[226] Particularly, a senior academic from Zimbabwe, reflecting on the problems faced by the media in his country notes: "the influence of the media on governments‟ performance is subdued due to the nature of media control and ownership. Most of the media institutions in Africa are government controlled. Those that are not controlled by the government, that is, private media, are heavily censored to stifle their voices.[227]

On the aspect of African economic integration, the media representatives note that the AU/NEPAD and APRM were good initiatives and the media has often been called upon to cover their events and those of Africa‟s RECs. African governments, civil society and their organisations have also taken advantage of the media to contribute to discourses on African affairs.[228] An official from the TV Continental comments that: "the aim of the TVC is to report the true African story. Western media erroneously feed the world with lies about Africa, but we tell the world what Africa is. Our pay-off is „Through African Eyes‟ and we enjoin the world to see the other good and exquisite side of Africa".[229] Another respondent who is a senior official at National Mirror Newspapers notes concerning the APRM initiative that:

> The APRM, as an initiative of the African Union is a laudable project as it has the potential of encouraging the spirit of positive competition among member

[226] The information provided here was gleaned from data obtained at the media houses visited. However, the phrase „corporatisation of the media‟, was used by the respondent at The Witness Newspaper, (Media 1). Date: 16 August 2013.
[227] Interview schedule completed by a Senior Academic 4 of the Zimbabwe Open University. Date: 22 February 2014.
[228] Information gleaned from interviews with media representatives.
[229] Interview with Media 3, an official at the Television Continental, Lagos, Nigeria. Date: 22 January 2014.

> countries. The media‟s role in the APR process is through adequate exposure of all reports and activities of the APRM and by exposing, through commentaries, feature articles and opinion on the various initiatives and projects embarked upon by member countries. In doing this, both inadequacies and strengths of each member country would spur the spirit of competition in the continent.[230]

Despite the significant role of the media in the process of national, regional and continental integration and development, a general concern expressed is the weakness of the media in educating the citizens about regional initiatives such as the APRM. One respondent from Nigeria asserts that: "we do cover African stories; it‟s not as if we have correspondents in those countries. We are focused on Nigeria for now. But, of course, if we see very good African stories, we do report..."[231] Another respondent from South Africa underscores the same points:

> The media in South Africa has not done enough in educating the masses about regional integration issues. Under Thabo Mbeki‟s rule, we had very good initiatives underway like NEPAD and APRM, but it‟s a pity that the South African media is lagging in this regard. We have tried, but we need to upgrade our newspaper management and begin to educate South Africans that we are part of Africa. I mean, a worrying issue like that of xenophobia takes place and like, we have tried to highlight xenophobic issues, we do try, but I confess that is a major weakness in South African journalism that needs to be seriously addressed."[232]

Corroborating these responses, another participant from South Africa reports that:

> I noted that a few countries have been peer reviewed but it is unfortunate that for us as a media, the outcomes of such reviews are not reflected well. Information dissemination is central to the functioning of the APRM and as long as there are no clear channels on how people can obtain information through the media, this is a problem. My view is that, there is a huge gap in communication about the APRM, in the media. The Mechanism ends up as an issue understood only by those who are interested in studying about it.[233]

Despite the weaknesses which were identified in the analysis in this section, the view shared by 90 per cent of all the participants interviewed, shows that the APRM provides more

[230] Completed interview schedule by senior official from National Mirror Newspapers. Date: 25 February 2014.
[231] Interview with Media 4, a top level official, Punch Newspaper, Lagos, Nigeria. Date: 22 January 2014.
[232] Interview with Media 1. Date: 16 August 2013.
[233] Interview with Media 5, a senior official at the Daily Dispatch Newspapers, East London, South Africa. Date: 23 July 2013.

opportunities for promoting broad-based participation and this is important for Africa‟s socio-economic development. Although participation differs in countries that have undergone APRM reviews, some respondents indicate that civil society participation has been critical at different levels in the country self-assessments processes and during the APRM external reviews. There have, however, been several lapses identified. Respondent NEPAD [3] declares that:

> When the APRM was being conceived, the civil society played a major role in formulating or polishing the idea, if you like, what exactly should be the focus when we are talking about viewing governance in this continent using our own binoculars not from the Bretton woods institutions. So, there‟s a lot civil society has been contributing. When the African Governance Architecture was being put together, both the APRM and the NEPAD were involved. The civil society was, and is still seen as some kind of „watch dog‟ to see, apart from what it is that you can contribute to the process, how can you play the role of some kind of „audit‟ or „checks and balances‟. Yes, APRM is effective as a concept. Fortunately, I was one of those people that were there from the beginning when we were devising the concept. It is one thing you can put on the table. So, the APRM is doing well as a concept, if you now talk about its implementation, aaah, that‟s another issue, it‟s not performing as well. The culprit in that regard, interestingly, it‟s the issue of governance.[234]

The view of this respondent shows that the APRM has the potential to promote regional endeavours such as the integration agenda if the issue of governance is properly addressed. Respondent ECA [4] notes, for instance that in some countries, government wanted to make the APR process an executive affair, but the APRM said no.[235] This confirms the finding from the CRRs that the CRM had to intervene in countries before changes were made to the national structures. A very interesting point to underscore at this juncture is that a number of scholars, writers, resource persons and CSO officials have analysed the APR process in different countries, pointing out the clear weaknesses, lapses and challenges and promoting suggestions for a way forward considering the importance of the APRM initiative.[236] Quoting OSISA [1] verbatim: “this is a “way to basically push and make for sound solid pronouncements based on facts, through a systematic audit for great engagement of civil society so that the APRM always takes their views on board. One concern, however, is that there are very few civil society and think tank organisations that have got a direct mandate to

[234] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.
[235] Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013.
[236] See for instance, Hansungule, 2007; Mbelle, 2007; Adele-Jinadu, 2008; Bing-Pappoe, 2010; Tungwarara et al, 2010.

deal with the APRM; in other words, that have volunteered to follow-up the process".[237] The awareness is being created that the civil society needs to be effectively organised to exploit the opportunities created by the APRM for citizen" engagement. Respondent NEPAD [3] confirms this assertion:

> Civil society engagement has formed, and is still forming a central focus ...We have moved from the old notion of „we against them", that is, state actor versus non-state actors, government practitioners and stakeholders versus civil society, versus the academia, versus the non-formal business people. This is because there is this realisation that there must be a synergy between these two blocs. So, there is a lot of cooperation between state actors and non-state actors, and that"s what both NEPAD and APRM have actually brought into the development trajectory in the continent and that also is impacting on the process of integration.[238]

7.6 Statistical facts and figures indicating progress in different sectors.

The general view emerging from the other sections – 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 of this chapter is that, Africa has seen some improvements in governance generally compared with what obtained previously in the continent. The improvements have resulted to progress in different areas as revealed in various institutional publications and reports, research studies and scholarly literature (RCM-Africa, 2007:6-18; APRM, 2008a:14-18; OECD/United Nations, 2011:14; ECA, 2012a:10-26; Adetula, 2008:31-32; Cilliers and Schnnemann, 2013:1-2; ECA/AU, 2013:6; Badiane and Makombe, 2014:1; Christopher Jr. and Champanhet, 2014; ADB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:11-12). However, it needs to be identified that the levels of progress achieved vary between countries and regions in Africa. Importantly, a common view is that, despite the achievements which are being recorded, there are persisting political and socio-economic challenges. This section of the chapter presents statistics, facts and figures showing progress in different sectors and persisting challenges.

7.6.1 Economic growth and progress

Official publications of the African Union, NEPAD and the ECA, indicate that Africa registered positive economic growths during the past decade (AU/NEPAD, 2011:8-15; ECA, 2011e:8-9; NEPAD Business Plan, 2013:7-31; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:17-30). Statistical facts and figures presented by the IMF and World Bank, as well as other official

[237] Interview with OSISA 1. Date: 4 October 2013.
[238] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.

reports and scholarly materials reflect the improvements made in different sectors (Akinkugbe, 2010/11:127-129; Grimm and Katito, 2010:1; IMF, 2010:1-15; NEPAD/ECA/OSAA, 2012:13-18; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:1-2; McKinsey and Company, 2014:1-10; Onyukwu et al, 2014:127-151). According to the ECA"s RIO+20 United Nations Conference Report on Sustainable Development (ECA, 2012a:12), for instance, "no less than six African countries were among the world"s ten fastest growing economies over the decade 2001-2011 – Angola 11%, Nigeria 8.9%, Ethiopia 8.4%, Chad 7.9%, Mozambique 7.9%, and Rwanda 7.6%". It is also believed that the progress will continue in the future if improvements in governance generally are sustained.

NEPAD/ECA/OSAA"s (2012:13) publication records that "22 non-oil exporting African countries have been recording growth of more than 4% a year since 1998, including Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Uganda. These are all post-conflict economies". Other African countries are also showing positive progressive signs. Another AU/NEPAD official document records that, "since the early 2000s, the macroeconomic fundamentals including the average growth rate on the continent have been steadily rising at a fast rate of 3-5% compared to the negative rate of previous decades and by world standard" (AU/NEPAD, 2011:8; see also, RCM-Africa, 2007:7-8; Christopher Jr. and Champanhet, 2014). According to the Report, whereas the growth was affected by the "global financial and economic crisis, good progress is being made by African economies attributed to sound pro-market economic and corporate governance systems" (AU/NEPAD, 2011:8). Figure 7.1 (p.306 below) illustrates this achievement.

Figure 7.1: Africa's GDP growth rates (%)



Source: AU/NEPAD, 2011, Accountability Report on Africa-G8 commitments: 2001-2010. 8.

As the ADB/OECD/UNDP (2014a:17) indicates, "in 2013, Africa maintained an average growth rate of about 4%. This compared to 3% for the global economy and underscores again the continent‟s resilience to global and regional headwinds". This growth performance however varied between countries and regions in Africa (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:17). Present statistics reveal potential growth outlook for Africa (NEPAD Business Plan, 2013:9). According to Global Economic Outlook forecast for 2015, "GDP growth in Africa in 2015 is projected at 4.4%".[239] Zwane (2015) reports that, "the IMF revised its growth forecast for Sub-Saharan Africa down to 4.9% from 5.8% in 2015 and 5.2% from 6% in 2016".[240] Africa‟s "collective GDP in 2020 is projected to reach US$2.6 trillion" (NEPAD/ECA/OSAA, 2012:45). Global Economic Outlook 2015 note that there is a positive growth outlook for the continent as long as the institutions function as expected and governments promote good governance.[241]

An official of the NEPAD Secretariat highlights the positive trend: "for the past ten years, Africa has been consistently recording positive growth rates in the face of world crisis, economic and financial crisis. What does that say? It tells us that our help does not lie in the outside world"[242]. By putting in place, regional codes and standards promoting good corporate governance and good business ethics, Africa is making efforts to create a good business environment conducive for investments. As AU/NEPAD (2011:42-47) and NEPAD/ECA/OSAA (2012:44-45) record, there are increasing investment openings in the agriculture, infrastructure banking sectors, among others for Africa to achieve sustainable growth and development.[243] (See figure 7.2, p.308). The study notes, however, that the improved growth rates in Africa have not yet reflected in improved standard of living for the

[239] See Global Economic Outlook 2015 – Key Findings. "Global economy to see only a modest growth in 2015". November 2014. Available at: http://www.conferrence-board.org/data/globaloutlook.
[240] Zwane, T. "IMF revises growth rates for South Africa". Mail and Guardian, 21 January 2015.
[241] Global Economic Outlook 2015 – Key Findings. "Global economy to see only a modest growth in 2015".
[242] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.
[243] According to the NEPAD Business Plan (2013:7), "during the last years, Brazil has transferred its school grant programme and its programme for fighting illiteracy to some African countries. In 2011, the country was engaged with the continent through 53 bilateral health agreements with 22 African countries. China has complemented its investment flows and trade arrangements with finance and technical assistance for building hard infrastructure. In July 2012, China pledged to double concessional loans to USD 20 billion over the next three years. In May 2011, the government of India pledged to provide a USD 5 billion credit over the next three years in addition to the USD 2.9 billion extended by the Export-Import Bank of India through lines of credit. Over the two decades, Africa has become one of the main actors of South-South cooperation and trade. China‟s trade with Sub-Saharan Africa rose from USD1 billion to more than USD 140 billion during the period 1992-2011. In the same period, Indian companies diversified their investments in the continent ranging from agriculture to hospitality and telecommunications".

mass of the people, reduction in unemployment and poverty rates, among others. The inclusiveness of the growth could therefore be questioned.

Figure 7.2: Sector share of GDP growth



Source: Mckinsey and Company, 2014, "Lions on the move". 5.

Further evidence of significant improvement in Africa‟s economies is the fact that government is now realising that it has to take ownership of its development process by mobilising domestic funding for programmes and projects.The role of the private sector in national and regional development processes is increasingly being emphasised and groups, such as NEPAD Business Foundation have been promoting public-private sector partnerships (NEPAD, 2011a:13; Rukato, 2012:96; AU, 2013:53). According to AU/NEPAD, (2011:9), "internally generated revenue in Africa improved significantly from US&129 billion (1997-2002), to US&472 billion in 2008. Domestic revenue represented 84% of total sources of financing for Africa in 2009".

Respondent NEPAD [3] observes that:

> Today one interesting fact is that before now, we thought oh, infrastructure is an issue in Africa, we must deal with, let‟s get money from donors, from the North and all that. And because they have their own issues, melt down, and this and that, the European stuff, we all know, money wasn‟t coming.... But it will probably interest you to know that financing infrastructure development in the continent by more than 80 per cent so far in recent years has been done through domestic resources in Africa, for over 80 per cent. So, there is hope in this continent. Ten years ago, the Times Magazinereferred to Africa as a „lost continent‟. Ten years after that, the samemagazine changed the phrase toAfrica rising. Obama even referred to it as something like a continent full of hope, a rising continent.[244]

RP4 however found some problems with the Report, „Africa Rising‟. He points to the protests in North Africa and the seemingly militarised governance in some African countries, such as Zimbabwe.[245] The respondent was also concerned that Africa‟s wealth in natural resources have also not been developed to make the continent an active participant in the global community. Rather, the continent‟s resources continue to be exploited by non-regional actors. The situation is such that Africa is yet to actualise regional integration objectives, for instance, in promoting trade, and socio-economic development.[246] Moreover, the positive economic growth, notwithstanding, there are persisting governance and development challenges in a number of African countries, yet to be addressed. There are a number of unemployed women and youths out there in many countries; poverty and social inequality is still persistent. There is still food insecurity in some parts of the African continent (UNDP, 2012:7; Anyanwu, 2014:11; Marcelin, 2014:11-18; Onyukwu et al, 2014:127-151).[247]

Notwithstanding that many scholars and writers have identified with Africa‟s growth perspectives and the various contributions of the African Union/NEPAD in promoting Africa‟s development, several critical questions have been raised concerning the on-going projects promoted through the NEPAD initiatives. The key issues of debate are: do these programmes benefit the masses of the people? How sincere are African leaders in promoting people-centred development? These questions and others on NEPAD are significant considering the salient issues in the discourse on regionalism and development in Africa and

[244] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.
[245] Interview with RP4. Date: 14 August 2013.
[246] Interview with RP4. Date: 14 August 2013.
[247] These challenges were identified in the APRM Reports analysed in chapter six.

also the current challenges in most African countries.[248] These issues continue to raise concerns among many (see, Adogamhe, 2008:25-27; OCED/United Nations, 2011:23-24; ECA/AU, 2013:6; Anyanwu, 2014:11).[249]

One respondent from the ECA notes that, translating economic growth into poverty reduction has been a persistent problem and people have been calling out for a social compact to address some of the social issues.[250] The difficulties necessitate that a regional governance monitoring programme such as the APRM be empowered to ensure that governments implement policies that will address socio-economic concerns of their people and accelerate inclusive growth. The APRM monitors to make sure that member countries commit financial and other resources in speeding up the projects and programmes mapped out in the AU/NEPAD Plan of Action to improve the lives of Africans. Respondent NEPAD [3] notes optimistically:

> Yes, it‟s not yet good, yes; but it‟s not all about wars and famines, and mal-nutrition and all that, that we have in Africa. There are still some good stories that Africans can tell; we only need to apply our minds and focus on those good stories rather than the bad commentaries that we‟ve been getting so far. The beautiful thing about the APRM is that, it has four thematic areas and components. We have the political; and the economic and corporate governance which is private sector driven... So, the APRM covers all sectors and parts, of human endeavours and we need to encourage it in order to address all these issues.[251]

The analyses in sections 7.6 and 7.6.1 paint a picture which is somewhat suggestive of Africa‟s rebirth beginning from the 1990s. However, the reality is that key challenges confronting the AU/NEPAD and APRM initiatives show that the promises made by African leaders are far from being fulfilled. The argument of this thesis remains that the success of regional initiatives would be measured by the extent to which they lead to improved political, economic and social conditions, poverty reduction and improved standard of living for Africans.

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[248] See fuller discussions on the salient issues in chapter five, sections 5.2 and 5.3.

[249] A regional workshop organised by the National Labour and Economic Development Institute and the African Labour Researchers‟ Network held between 22 – 23 May2003 brought together seasoned writers, scholars, civil society representatives to brainstorm on the NEPAD initiative. Several questions were raised concerning this initiative bothering on the economic policies it promotes, funding, partnerships with the developed world, programmes on Africa‟s development among others. The NEPAD initiative continues to generate issues of debates and contestations.

[250] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2006.

[251] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.

7.6.2 Socio-economic development

There are indicators that progress is being made at the national level in implementing programmes aimed at socio-economic development in different sectors such as: the environment, health, education, trade, infrastructure – road, transport and ICT, agriculture, and science and technology (NEPAD, 2011a:25; NEPAD 2012a:18-25; see also Zimmermann et al, 2009; AU/NEPAD 2011:31-40; Ijeoma, 2012; Benin and Bingxin Yu 2012; AU, 2013-31-36; NEPAD Business Plan 2013:10-33; NEPAD Annual Report, 2012b:26-27; Bassole, 2014). For instance, in the area of agricultural development, the progress and challenges in CAADP‟s implementation, has been documented by scholars (Kimenyi et al, 2012:8-9; Njehu, 2012:13; Golooba-Mutebi, 2014:2-3). According to NEPAD Business Plan (2013:18), the commitment to implement environmental sustainability policies has led to progress in some areas which includes: "growth in the practice of sustainable and organic agriculture as Malawi and Uganda have shown; impressive growth in the development of renewable energies in countries such as Egypt and Kenya; and planned massive investment in solar energy in South Africa", among others. There are however, persisting socio-economic challenges.

The general finding from documentary sources, institutional records and reports and scholarly literature is that progress has been made over the years, in promoting socio-economic development, albeit at a slow pace and in particular sectors (see the Human Development Index presented in figure 7.3, p. 312). Particularly from the 1990s, there were renewed efforts to improve governance, and implement policies in priority areas in order to achieve the MDGs and realise developmental objectives. Targets and benchmarks were set to ensure investments and commitment of financial resources to areas such as agriculture development and others sectors which had hitherto been neglected. NEPAD‟s CAADP has various sub-sectors with the aim to improve the lives of the people, reduce poverty and ensure food security among others. There were also more efforts to monitor the implementation of policies and communicate findings.

Figure 7.3: Slow progress and lost years in Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: UNDP, 2012. Human Development Report 2012. 17

Zimmermann et al (2009:35) for instance, note that "rural poverty had started to decline in 10 or 13 countries analysed over the period 1990-2005". According to the UNDP (2012:7), the level of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa declined by "almost 5% points, to less than 48% between 2005 and 2008 – the largest drop in that region since international poverty rates began to be estimated" (see figure 7.4, p. 313). The Report indicates that: "for the first time, the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty also fell in the region, from 395 million in 2005 to 386 in 2008. This drop reversed the long term trend of increase since 1981" (UNDP 2012:7). Badiane and Makambe (2014:1) also observe that, between the period of 2003 and 2010, economic growth was particularly visible and this was the time "when the agricultural sector grew at an annual average rate of almost four per cent". Three countries – Ghana (since the 1990s), Ethiopia and Rwanda feature in literature and documentary sources as having recorded economic development and achieved poverty reduction with agriculture playing a key role (Ukaejiofor, 2014:10-11; see also, Kolavalli, et al, 2010:4-21; Bizimana et al, 2012; Africa Lead II, 2014:1-2; Bizoza et al, 2014:8-9; Pinto et al, 2014).

Figure 7.4: Poverty reduction lags in Sub Saharan Africa



Source: UNDP, 2012, Human Development Report, 19.

NEPAD/APRM priority programmes also support capacity development, emphasise improvement in education and the health sectors and promote gender equality in benefiting from the services in these sectors. The AU-NEPAD Health Strategy stipulates that African countries be committed to adequate health care by devoting at least 15% of their national budget to the health sector (AU/NEPAD, 2008). NEPAD also coordinates investment and external assistance to address health challenges. As records show, there has been improvement in education, "child and maternal mortality rates and equality" (ECA/AU, 2013:6; see also, UNDP, 2011:21; Christopher and Champanhet, 2014; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014a:10-11; Marcelin, 2014:11-18). According to NEPAD Business Plan (2013:11-12), "the aggregate net primary school enrolment for Africa rose from 64% in 2000 to 84% in 2009. This shows that more African countries took opportunity of improved support and investment in the education sector (NEPAD Business Plan 2013:12). The UNDP Report (2012:18) revealed that "between 2000 and 2010, expected years of schooling increased by almost five years in Burundi and Rwanda, with smaller improvements in many other countries".

NEPAD Business Plan (2013:17) indicates that, "the incidence of new HIV infections has dropped by more than 21% in sub-Sahara Africa, dropping from 2.6 million in 1997 to 1.9 million in 2011. The incidence has fallen in 21 African countries and the decline is noticed in countries recording the highest number of infected people". Despite the progress however, HIV/AIDS is still a major problem which affects many people; poverty is still a major challenge in Africa, there is hunger, mal-nutrition, high unemployment rates;[252] HIV and AIDS; poor infrastructure in African countries (Schwabe, 2003:6; Hope, 2005:285; Evbuomwan, 2007:41-43; RCM-Africa, 2007:8; ECA/AU, 2011:3; ECA, 2012a:14-15; Anyanwu, 2014:11; Christopher and Champanhet, 2014; FAO/IFAD/WFP, 2014:12-14). A large percentage of Africans still lack access to basic facilities such as water and improved sanitation utilities (UNCTAD 2013:51). Thus, Africa may not be able to achieve some of the MDGs by 2015 (RCM-Africa, 2007:8; ECA/AU, 2011:3; Christopher and Champanhet, 2014; Ewusi, 2014:VIII; FAO/IFAD/WFP, 2014). This study argues that, the socio-economic challenges constitute major set-backs to regional integration. They are factors in intra-state and interstate conflicts which continue to have negative effects on the continent‟s integration agenda. On the other hand, however, their persistence in countries reveals more the need for sub-regional and regional solutions to be found.

7.7 African economic integration: The progress so far

This section of the chapter assesses the progress of regional integration in Africa. It presents different opinions on the subject; statistical facts and figures showing the levels of progress made; on-going efforts of the African Union, NEPAD, APRM, and the RECs. It also reveals the problems which have remained.

7.7.1 Current emphasis on speeding up the process

The view of about 90 per cent of the participants -- officials of the African Union, NEPAD and ECA and other participants – are that, African governments are showing greater interests and are emphasising more on the need to advance regional economic integration to exploit global economic benefits. This is in line with various opinions that African countries, if well organised, could individually and collectively benefit immensely from enhanced partnerships

[252] In a study conducted by Anyanwu (2014:11), using ILO‟s definition of youth aged between 15 – 24 years, the scholar noted that, "in 2011, about 74.8 million youths were globally unemployed with nearly 20% of them in Africa".

particularly, from South-South cooperation (Evbuomwan, 2007:43; UNDP, 2011:60; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013:1-2; ECA/AU, 2013:6).

Since the 1990s, programmes and policies have been developed to hasten the process of integration both at the level of the RECs and the AU/NEPAD. One way to examine progress is by the efforts put into implementing the continent-wide programmes and projects of the AU/NEPAD. According to Respondent ECA [2], "peace and security is a big objective, priority for RECs. Progress has been made in bringing civil society into the integration process. The NEPAD programme has been broken down into different clusters - infrastructure, industry, agriculture, and funds are being mobilised for them".[253] Another official at the AUC adds that, "in the development area, like in infrastructure and agriculture, Africa has a clear vision. For instance, the architecture of PIDA has been defined and results would come from implementing the PIDA project in the future. In the aspect of agriculture, there is CAADP which is also a very very good framework. There are however, some challenges faced in implementing these projects".[254]

Emphasising that there are also programmes and projects being implemented by the RECs, Respondent AUC [D] indicates that, efforts are being made in monitoring the progress in implementing both continental and regional programmes and, in identifying the challenges.[255] NEPAD (2011a:47) records the series of efforts and commitments of the government to meet the target objectives made under CAADP since it was formulated in 2003. For instance, the official publication identifies that, "the share of agricultural spending between 2000 and 2005 increased significantly (75%)" (NEPAD, 2011a:47). The AU/NEPAD (2011:31) highlights that, "in some parts of Africa, agricultural growth averaged 5.3%, while in the Southern Africa region, it peaked at 7.1%". As at 2014, "45 African countries had endorsed the CAADP initiative; 40 have endorsed their country CAADP Compacts; 28 have concluded their investment plans and 20 have held forums to mobilise resources" (FAO, 2014:5). The NEPAD Agency "facilitated the deployment of over 55 experts to 18 countries to support CAADP implementation" (NEPAD Annual Report, 2014a:13).

[253] Interview with ECA 2. Date 19 June 2013.
[254] Interview with AUC „A". Date: 19 June 2013.
[255] Interview with AUC „D". Date: 18 June 2013.

For the RECs, ECOWAS and ECCAS have endorsed the CAADP Compacts and formulated investment plans; IGAD has also signed the Compact, while COMESA and SADC are in the process of finalising their Compacts (FAO, 2014:5). According to Benin and Bingxin Yu (2012:XII), "13 countries have surpassed the CAADP 10 per cent target in any single year: Burundi, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, only seven of them have surpassed the target in most years: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Senegal. In other countries, performance vis-a-vis the CAADP 10 per cent is mixed".

Efforts are on-going in some regions and at the continental level towards infrastructural development – rail, road and air; telecommunications and energy, in order to facilitate and energise the integration process (Zhou, 2003:3; Biau, 2007:5; Bassole, 2014:1; Ijeoma, 2012:40). There have been increased investments in developing infrastructure and broadening of private sector partnerships; some achievements have been recorded in developing the transport sector, ICT, energy, water and sanitation, among others (ECA, 2011e:9-13; NEPAD, 2011a:26-41; NEPAD Annual Report, 2012b:18-20; AU, 2013:33-50; NEPAD Business Plan, 2013a:22-25; The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:11-21). Respondent ECA [2] confirms that a lot has been done to improve the situation in Africa. He mentions the NEPAD Short-Term Infrastructure Plan that has really helped countries to improve upon their infrastructure density.[256] Beyond this, Respondent ECA [2] highlights that the AU is looking at ways and means of mobilising resources to make the PIDA a living reality. African countries are making efforts to improve their infrastructure situation with support from China. The Chinese are assisting in that front.[257]

In some countries, however, there are still impediments. Railway network is yet undeveloped. Infrastructure development is a huge investment which requires a lot of financial resources. Hence, Africa is still constrained in the area of funding capacity and would need to go extra miles to achieve this objective (AU/NEPAD, 2011:34). The Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI) and other efforts at the national and sub-regional levels are pointers that efforts are being geared up to address infrastructure development (AU/NEPAD, 2011:37; The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:34-35).

[256] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.
[257] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.

In order to emphasise the concern of African governments to address the challenges to speed up the continent‟s regional integration agenda, Respondent ECA [2] mentions the flagship publication of the ECA, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*". The ECA has been involved in assessing regional integration in Africa and assisting with information to policy organisations to provide a direction for action. The sixth series has now been produced.[258] The official notes: "the premier edition produced in 2004, looked at the comprehensive assessment of where Africa stood on regional integration. After the first edition, we went into thematic issues; so, the second edition looked at the issue of rationalisation of regional integration arrangements; that led to the decision of the Heads of State in 2006 to place an embargo on the creation of more economic groupings. And then, the third edition looked at the issue of monetary and financial integration. The fourth addressed intra-African trade. In this edition, we looked at the issues of infrastructure, trade facilitation, and production; all the determinants of trade were assessed. This edition led to the decision of the African Union to now create a Pan-African Free Trade by 2017. This was handled in the fifth edition".[259] On the other hand, the AUC, in collaboration with the ECA, the AfDB and the RECs have formulated Minimum Integration Programmes (MIPs) and are taking steps towards establishing the "African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank" ECA (2010:11).

7.7.2 The successes and challenges

Majority of the participants are agreed that despite the efforts made so far, Africa still has much to do in order to achieve regional integration objectives. All of them point to the low level of intra-African trade over the decades as one major indicator of lack of satisfactory success. Respondent ECA [2] notes, for instance: "if you look at our publications, the statistics, intra-African trade has consistently been below 15%, whilst in the EU intra-EU trade is around 70% and 40% in Asia.[260] This trend is revealed in literature, documents and studies undertaken by Africa‟s regional organisations, the IMF and other international institutions on progress in trade among countries. It is also emphasised by many scholars and analysts (ATF, 2011:3; ECA, 2011e:4; Akinkugbe, 2010/11:121-123; ECA, 2012a:19). Table 7.1 and figure 7.5 (p.318 below) show the low level of intra-African trade.

[258] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.
[259] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.
[260] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.

Table 7.1: Intra-African trade in total trade of Africa: Imports and exports, 2004-2012.

	($US million) / (en Million de Dollars des EU)					
	Total African trade / Total du Commerce Africain		Intra-African trade / Commerce Intra-Africain		Share of intra-African trade (%) / Part du Commerce Intra-Africain (%)	
Year / Année	Imports / Importations	Exports / Exportations	Imports Importations	Exports / Exportations	Imports Importations	Exports / Exportations
2004	202,967	223,489	27,556	23,540	13.6	10.5
2005	247,141	305,712	33,741	30,014	13.7	9.8
2006	280,540	365,693	38,132	38,835	13.6	10.6
2007	354,560	399,635	48,421	42,899	13.7	10.7
2008	445,844	529,201	58,700	58,734	13.2	11.1
2009	400,168	370,591	54,968	55,016	13.7	14.8
2010	461,483	483,545	64,693	64,061	14.0	13.2
2011	551,167	607,797	69,912	78,341	12.7	12.9
2012	582,868	640,689	74,526	83,281	12.8	13.0

Source: African Statistical Yearbook, 2014, published by the AfDB, AUC and ECA. 37.

Figure 7.5: Share of Intra-African trade in in total trade of Africa (%)



Figure 7.5: Part du commerce Intra-Africa dans le total (%)



Source: AfDB.AU/ECA, 2014. African Statistical Year Book, 2014. 37.

Table 7.1 and Figure 7.5 above show little or no progress in percentage terms. Emphasising this negative trend, Respondent ECA [1] highlights that: "most of the integration agenda on the continent is economic, but most RECs have been overtaken by the imperatives of conflict management, and therefore, the economic focus has remained a footnote in many instances. The various RECs trade less with each other than they trade with the outside world. And aggregate, if one can put the continent together and analyse that, the outcome would be the same".[261] The assertion of this official is illustrated in figure 7.6 (p. 319 below). The fact that African countries prefer to trade more with external partners was highlighted in chapter three of this study. This interest is attributable to both institutional and infrastructure deficiencies that constrain intra-regional trade and make it cheaper to do business with other non-African

[261] Interview with ECA 1. Date: 18 June 2013.

countries; the extroverted nature of African economies and the fact that African countries produce similar products, among others (see, UNDP, 2011:15-17).

Figure 7.6: Africa's trade flows with selected partners



Source: AfDB, OECD and UNDP. 2014a. African Economic Outlook, 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa"s Industrialisation, 10.

Despite the level and frequency of economic interactions that take place in the continent, Africa does not derive substantial benefits from trading with external partners (see, Adetula, 2008:6). One of the reasons for this is that the continent depends more on the export of primary commodities.[262] There is the concern that Africa"s "share in world trade has declined from around 6%, in the early 1980s to above 2%; less than 1%, if South Africa is excluded" (ECA, 2010:3). Respondent AUC [D] clarifies, however, that there are two ways to assess regional integration. First, is to look at progress made by the different RECs; their programmes and the objectives. At the continental level, it is to base analysis on success recorded in the process of meeting the objectives of establishing the African Economic Community and the African Union"s Constitutive Act.[263] Table 7.2 (p. 320 below) shows the different stages in this process.

[262] Interview with RP5. Date: 20 June 2013.
[263] Interview with AUC „D". Date: 18 June 2013.

Table 7.2: Status of implementation of the Abuja Treaty per REC

Stages of the Abuja Treaty	Stage one: 1994-1999	Stage two: 2000-2007		Stage three: 2008-2017		Stage four: 2018-2019	Stage five: 2020-2023	Stage six: 2024-2008 latest 2034
RECs	Strengthening existing RECs and creation of new RECs where they do not exist	Coordination and harmonisation of activities	Gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers	Free Trade Areas	Customs Union	Continental Customs Union	Establishment of an African Common Market	Monetary and Economic Union
UMA	Achieved	Achieved	In progress	Not yet	Not yet	This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved Customs Union and harmonised their respective Common External tariff (CET), with a view of creating one single continental CET	This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved continental customs unions as well as free movement of labour and capital	This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved African Common Market at which time there will be a common currency issued by the African Central Bank
IGAD	Achieved	Achieved	In progress	Not yet	Not yet			
SADC	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	In preparation			
CEN-SAD	Achieved	Achieved	Not yet	Not yet	Not yet			
ECOWAS	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Good progress			
COMESA	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved			
ECCAS	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	No date fixed			
EAC	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved			

Source: African Union, 2013, Status of Integration in Africa (SIA IV) 2013. Addis Ababa: AUC. 20. Updated with data from Africa Capacity Building Foundation, 2014. Africa Capacity Report 2014: Capacity imperatives for regional integration in Africa. 70.

In explaining the preliminary stage of the AEC process, Respondent ECA [2] stated that:

> The first phase is strengthening the RECs and one way to do this is to create FTAs by removing trade barriers and non-tariff barriers. At the moment, tariff is quite low; it is around 8% on the average. Of course, there are some countries still charging above 8%. The key challenge is non-tariff barriers – the roadblocks and other administrative challenges, which are still very pervasive. Some RECs are trying to reduce them, for instance, in COMESA there is the on-line reporting system to get feedbacks on these non-tariff barriers. There is also the key objective of achieving macroeconomic policy convergence criteria within the RECs. These are basically modelled based on the EU model – low inflation; single digit inflation, low budget deficit,

> improved economic growth. These are being achieved. I think there has been some progress made.[264]

The above information is as well captured in the ECA Publication, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV (2010)* (see also, RCM-Africa, 2007:6-10 and UNDP, 2011:15-20). It is on record that, some RECs have made efforts in terms of developing "formal frameworks intended to coordinate the convergence of national economic structures and macroeconomic policies. UEMOA, ECOWAS, COMESA, EAC, and CEMAC, already have created macroeconomic convergence programmes (ECA, 2010:23; see also, RCM-Africa, 2007:9-10). The ECA Report also noted that the macroeconomic convergence programmes "have different targets and objectives" (ECA, 2010:23). Another ECA Report (2011e:7-8) shows the inflation rates and growth performance GDP (average) for some RECs. See tables 7.3 and 7.4 (p.321-322 below). According to Mkwezalamba (2011:17), some RECs are making efforts to harmonise their "business and financial laws, for instance, COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC". A number of them are also simplifying their "customs procedures and documentation nomenclature" (Mkwezalamba, 2011:17). Efforts in this direction include, "installation of one stop border posts (OSBP) at key crossings" (Mkwezalamba, 2011:17; see also, AU, 2013:10).

Table 7.3: RECs macroeconomic convergence criteria
Inflation rates (Average)

RECs	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Average 2003-2009
UEMOA	1.3	0.5	2.6	2.4	2.4	7.4	0.96	2.51
CEMAC	1.3	0.6	2.9	9.2	0.3	13.3	4.69	4.61
ECOWAS	7.2	6.7	8.5	7.8	7.0	11.5	4.14	7.55
SADC	6.0	7.0	1.0	10.1	9.3	12.3	7.94	7.66
CEN-SAD	6.98	8.03	10.15	8.65	6.35	13.52	4.88	8.37
EAC	7.2	8.1	5.3	5.0	8.0	17.0	11.1	8.81
IGAD	9.19	10.56	10.73	6.89	7.46	16.53	8.67	10.00
COMESA	7.0	2.0	22.4	8.0	8.9	14.3	10.09	10.39
ECCAS	13.70	10.97	18.89	10.79	5.63	16.79	6.07	11.83
MRU	7.38	12.64	18.45	19.33	14.55	21.09	6.97	14.34

Source: ECA, 2011e, Progress Report on Regional Integration in Africa. Seventh Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration, Addis Ababa, 2-3 June. 7.

[264] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.

From table 7.3 above, it would be observed that the different RECs had recorded high inflation rates. Only UEMOA and CEMAC recorded low inflation rates within the period. According to the ECA (2011e:7-8), "one of the reasons contributing to the low rates in UEMOA and CEMAC is the fact that they are both monetary unions which mandate their Central Banks to control their monetary policy" (ECA, 2011e:8). The obvious reality is that the RECs are yet to achieve the required low inflation rates.

Table 7.4: Growth performance - GDP (Average)

RECs	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Average 2003-2009
EAC	4.9	5.7	6.6	8.0	6.8	7.3	4.79	6.30
ECCAS	3.90	10.53	6.84	5.39	7.03	6.15	1.49	5.90
IGAD	2.48	5.97	6.00	7.08	7.06	6.44	5.58	5.80
COMESA	2.4	4.4	4.5	6.0	6.1	6.0	4.03	4.78
SADC	2.9	4.6	4.5	7.1	6.9	5.3	2.12	4.77
CEMAC	5.0	8.3	4.2	2.7	5.6	4.2	0.67	4.38
CEN-SAD	2.14	5.00	4.40	4.97	4.37	4.82	3.67	4.20
ECOWAS	2.6	3.8	4.8	4.5	4.2	5.0	3.33	4.03
UEMOA	3.9	2.8	4.1	3.9	2.9	4.1	2.99	3.53
MRU	-6.65	4.27	5.29	5.77	5.92	6.85	2.77	3.46

Source: ECA, 2011e, Progress Report on Regional Integration in Africa. Seventh Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration, Addis Ababa, 2-3 June, 8.

The table shows that growth rates for the RECs fluctuated for the period, 2003-2009 (ECA, 2011e:8). This shows that a lot needs to be done to strengthen the RECs in order to speed up the process of establishing the AEC. Notwithstanding the weaknesses, it is registered that there is a renewed motivation to enhance intra-African trade among the RECs. Respondent AUC [D] notes that "generally, in terms of progress, at the continental level, comparing the Abuja Treaty, Africa is on track. Progress is on-going as some RECs, like the EAC have already moved to the customs union. There is a need to support other RECs to reach their objectives and also to foster the integration process."[265] Corroborating this assertion, Respondent ECA [2] adds that, "the EAC, COMESA and SADC have decided to trade the path of establishing this grand free area...If that is able to materialise, it will really pave the

[265] Interview with AUC „D". Date: 18 June 2013.

way for this continental FTA by 2017. The other RECs like ECOWAS have also done a lot to really consolidate their FTAs".[266]

A majority of the participants across different sectors agree that some progress in integration is being achieved at the level of the RECs and this was commendable, even though some RECs are lagging behind. The EAC and ECOWAS were mentioned particularly as having made significant progress. SADC is also moving forward (UNDP, 2011:15-17). According to Respondent NIIA [1], "the RECs have progressed at various rates, at various paces; that of West Africa, ECOWAS is making significant progress. Many studies have been done about ECOWAS which has formulated and implemented more policies than any other regional integration schemes in other parts of Africa, for instance, in the free movement of peoples across borders. It‟s a prelude, a precursor to ultimate economic union".[267] ECOWAS, according to Respondent AUC [D], has adopted what is now called a people-centred development where the Secretariat has an office for civil society and private sector representatives to participate in the initial development of programmes. The views of civil society are promoted by these representatives from the beginning, throughout the process, and this is a best practice that others can emulate.[268]

Some respondents did not fail, however, to mention the problem of corruption at check points in the case of ECOWAS. For instance, NEPAD [3] noted: "you move from point A to point B and if you are checked and you don‟t have the correct papers, you grease the palms of people. So, that‟s a governance issue and is really rubbishing our integration agenda. However, we are making hay slowly; we will get there someday".[269] As one of the Professors indicates, "the RECs are making progress. Through them, Africa can actually achieve integration. They present opportunities that Africa can benefit from in the long term in terms of globalisation".[270]

In order to strengthen efforts towards the realisation of the goal of a CFTA in 2017, "African governments at the 18th African Union Summit in January 2012, adopted a Comprehensive Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade (UNESC, 2013:6). There are other particular

[266] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.
[267] Interview with NIIA 1. Date: 31 January 2014.
[268] Interview with AUC „D". Date: 18 June 2013.
[269] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.
[270] Interview with RP5, University for Peace, Costa Rica. Date: 20 June 2013.

areas in which progress is being made in achieving regional integration objectives. One of these is in taking regional and continental positions on crucial issues that will affect Africa‟s integration and development; and as well, taking ownership of these processes. Some officials at the African Union and NEPAD made known the efforts made in emphasising the need for a regional position on the EU‟s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (see, AU, 2012). Respondent AUC [D] said that those agreements are actually working towards disintegrating Africa; they would negatively impact on the continent‟s integration agenda. That was why the African Union was playing a critical role in formulating a common position... The RECs are negotiating blocs and member states are also negotiating the EPAs, but at some point, they saw the need to harmonise their positions. The AUC was asked to take the role in coming up with a roadmap for the negotiation process which it did.[271] There have been some provisions at the level of the AU to say no, we are not ready to go into an EPA with our level of development, so the process has stalled a little bit.[272]

Some officials at the African Union Commission also mentioned that there are many studies going on in the African Union towards speeding up the process of integration and transformation. According to Respondent AUC [A],

> One of the studies is in the area of finance, how the AUC will finance itself and its programmes. There is a study on Alternative Sources of Funding. The former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, in the past AU Summit presented his Report on this issue and a decision was taken. Now the heads of states have agreed in principle that they need to forge ahead, that there is need for alternative sources of funding. There is also a study undertaken by the NEPAD Agency and ECA to finance NEPAD programmes mostly based on domestic resource mobilisation”.[273]

On the other hand, all the officials at the African Union and NEPAD assert that the continent now has a new initiative called “Agenda 2063” (see also, AU, 2014b). Agenda 2063 is a key programme of the African Union, targeted at making African economic integration a reality.[274] Respondent NEPAD [2] adds that, “Agenda 2063 is about asking ourselves: where are we going to be in 50 years time? Then, coming up with targets in the NEPAD areas, the priority areas of the continent; being clear about them and so on. It is about defining our strategies; it is about making sure that the policy frameworks and programmes that we have

[271] Interview with AUC D. Date: 18 June 2013.
[272] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.
[273] Interview with AUC A. Date: 19 June 2013.
[274] Interview with AUC A. Date: 19 June 2013.

are complementary...[275] The view of this respondent reflects some of the concerns in this study about governance of the integration process. One of the interviewees, however, underscored a very salient point which has been emphasised in this study, namely, Africa does not lack in terms of integration frameworks, but that:

> The problem Africa has in relation to African economic integration is that there‟s absolutely no leadership of the African continent. We need more leaders, not stronger men but more leaders that have got the good will to deliver on their promises of building stronger institutions that are more powerful than their own egos and their own agendas, and also to be more accountable, to have the courage more or less to follow through on all treaties at the continental level; certainly, 43 treaties and declarations and conventions by African Union Summits that we have going back for the past 50 years...We have accumulated so many things on paper... theory as to what should make this continent great, but we have failed to act upon them largely because of the lack of leadership".[276]

7.8 Coordinating and harmonising the regional economic integration process

On-going programmes and projects implemented at the RECs and continental levels; as well as the new ones underway in Africa, call for greater coordination and harmonisation on the part of the African Union. However, there are perceptions of conflicts and tensions in the interactions, working relations and goals of the African Union and NEPAD. This is an issue of concern to scholars (see, Adedeji 2004; Gruzd, 2009a:2-3; Landsberg, 2012c:51-53; Rukato, 2012:97; Karuuombe, 2013:57-64). There are also views that functions and activities overlap (Grimm and Katito, 2010:2; see also ECA, 2012b:13-14; Rukato, 2012:99). Some scholars and observers even note that the role of the APRM in the African Union structure and processes is not clear enough (see, Amuwo, 2002:74). APRM is constrained because its continental structures are not well integrated into the RECs and the African Union‟s structures (see, Asante, 2011c:74).

There are no clear guidelines of how the RECs implement the CRRs.[277] There is the challenge of harmonising regional and national policies and norms, among member countries (Grimm and Katito, 2010:2; The NEPAD Guide, 2012a:32). Thus, the APRM is constrained without necessary political, legislative or other forms of support from these organisations

[275] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date: 4 July 2013.
[276] Interview with OSISA 1. Date: 4 October 2013.
[277] Interview with APRM 2. Date: 2 July 2013.

(Landsberg, 2012b:114-115). This section examines the progress made to coordinate and harmonise the activities of the African Union, NEPAD, APRM and the RECs in order to achieve a common goal.

The views of participants from the various regional policy making institutions highlighted different but related responses. A majority of the officials are positive that there have been improvements in coordination processes especially since the NEPAD programme was integrated into the structures and processes of the African Union. They however note that there are still challenges to be addressed if Africa is to succeed in actualising its integration agenda. For instance, as ECA [1] states: "there are weaknesses in the APRM"s relations with the African Union".[278] According to a former Chairperson of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons [APRM 1], "the APRM receives a little support from the AU".[279] The concern in this study is that the APRM would receive the support of the African Union and NEPAD in order to function effectively. The official at the Pan African Parliament had this to say:

> The thing with organs is that the heart is working independently, but if you remove all the kidneys, the heart becomes useless. So, all these organisations, even the APRM, it has got some specific committees that, occasionally it confers with within the PAP, or briefs and says for the APRM, this is what we are doing and this is how we think PAP can assist us at the level of legislation or as a legislative body, or advise us on consultancy working within the AU.[280]

Coordination and harmonisation issues are important considering that the APRM is a programme of the African Union within its NEPAD initiative. A senior management official at the AUC however notes that, the concern of the AU and NEPAD should be that both initiatives should benefit the entire continent.[281] Emphasising how the AU and NEPAD came into existence, Respondent ECA [1] states that:

> There is need to put things into perspective. There shouldn"t be any mutual exclusivity in the AU and NEPAD agenda. To begin with, the NEPAD is an AU programme; they are not separate institutions at all. It"s a mis-representation to perceive them that way. The AU is the parent and NEPAD is the offspring, so you cannot detach the offspring from the parent. That needs

[278] Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013.
[279] Interview with APRM 1. Date: 1 February 2013.
[280] Interview with PAP, an official at the Pan African Parliament, Midrand, South Africa. Date: 4 July 2013.
[281] Interview with AUC F, a senior management official at the African Union Commission, Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia. Date: 17 June 2013.

> to be understood. However, like it is with every older set of institutions, there are always challenges of co-habitation. That is what has been the problem with the AU, NEPAD relationship.[282]

This assertion is corroborated by that of Respondent NEPAD [2] stating that: we should understand how the integration is coming on because the child came before the parent. NEPAD in 2001, AU took off in 2002. So, there needed to be some alignment and streamlining. This was the reason for the decision to integrate.[283] Respondent NEPAD [2] went further to elaborate key decisions taken towards the process of integration:

> They also mandated the chair of the Commission to work with the NEPAD Agency in this process of integration guided by the chair of the HSGOC. The chair of the Commission established what is called Coordinating Unit and this consisted of members between the AUC and NEPAD and we worked on around the issues of integration. This was at three levels – governance structures, programmes and then the administrative aspect. And that was concluded only in 2010....From the governance side, the chair of the AUC sits at the HSGOC and the chair of the AU sits too. So, there is congruence there. So, all those personalities are part and parcel of the HSGOC. Now, the HSGOC is a committee of the AU Assembly. From the programme side, we established what is called a coordination mechanism. The experts from both institutions will sit; interrogate our plans, our implementation strategies and how we are going to do them and all of that. And we do so at least once in a year, in a big structure. Then in each sector, people from the AUC, NEPAD, RECs, they meet, working on specific issues and their meetings are regular. They work on projects and they are very regular. So, that‟s how we then do the work...[284]

Respondent AUC [D] emphasises this process, but adds that there are some problems:

> Since the major decision was taken to integrate NEPAD into the AU structures and processes, a major achievement is that we can talk about is the creation of the NEPAD Coordination Unit here. This unit actually has a role to intermediate between what we are doing and what they are doing at NEPAD; to facilitate communication flows between us and them and also we are trying to harmonise and to synchronise whatever we do from their side but also from our side. So, things have started moving slowly. I think now, people are used to working together....Take example of our department; even my division here, we have joint initiatives, like RECs Support Capacity Programme, to support the RECs. This is one programme that is an initiative between the AUC and the NEPAD and actually we are taking the lead on this, with all the RECs, but then also with the support of the UNDP, and some other organisations. But in

[282] Interview with ECA 1. Date: 18 June 2013.
[283] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date: 4 July, 2013.
[284] Interview with NEPAD 2. Date: 4 July 2013.

> some areas, I think that we still face problems because people are not used to working with others. They say, okay, this is my programme, this is my initiative. The AU has its vision and strategic plan; so do the RECs. The frameworks are there and their objectives are linked to the general framework.[285]

Another respondent from the African Union Commission notes: "we are on the good way to achieving our integration objectives. The only problem is that all the African institutions should work closely together to reach the same vision. Each of the RECs has its own strategic plan and its own objectives and so on, and sometimes it is not certain that these objectives are in line with the AU strategic plan. This is the major challenge and that is why, the AU is working on an African Strategic Plan - African Agenda 2063".[286] As this respondent further explains, there are problems in harmonising projects, programmes and policy making. These were highlighted in the study on the process of integration and the recommendations of this study are being worked on. There are still some challenges especially in the technical process.[287] Quoting him verbatim: "in the area of agriculture, infrastructure, partnership is going on well. But as you know, harmonisation is a process, and we are trying to do our best to get everything working definitely".[288]

The opinion of a senior management official at the AUC appears to be conclusive:

> NEPAD was a brilliant idea, but I think somewhere in Africa, we are suffering from excessive jealousy of power. The African Union is focusing on the development policies and NEPAD is implementing them. Then the challenge remains, where is the boundary? In some cases, even now, you find NEPAD taking initiatives here and there, no direction. They cooperate, yes, but the cooperation is not fully achieved. And for me, that is the challenge we have to address, specifically, to make sure that the boundaries are set and we understand each and everyone"s role. Our leaders fail to put collective interests before individual interests. That is the dilemma we are facing in Africa.[289]

The views of different personalities from the regional policy making institutions articulate one important reality which is that: most of the difficulties experienced in the implementation of regional policies in Africa have much to do with individuals associated with the process and unless these are redressed, success will not be achieved. Practically speaking, it is in

[285] Interview with AUC „D". Date: 18 June 2013.
[286] Interview with AUC „A". Date: 19 June 2013.
[287] Interview with AUC „A". Date: 19 June 2013.
[288] Interview with AUC „A". Date: 19 June 2013.
[289] Interview with AUC „C". Date: 17 June 2013.

Africa‟s best interest to integrate but attempts to speed up the process of regional economic integration might continue to experience set-backs and be prolonged. The issue of governance at all levels is critical but the AU needs to give its full backing to initiatives which have been established or else the future of NEPAD and the APRM may be in jeopardy. More importantly, the complexities, realities and challenges of African economic integration require a lot of sacrifices, commitments and political willingness on the part of African leaders. The APRM offers a viable tool to address coordination and harmonisation issues but is confronted with several challenges.

7.9 Criticisms and challenges of the African Peer ReviewMechanism

From the analyses made in the previous sections, it is clear that the issue of governance is fundamental to Africa‟s quest for economic integration. It is therefore a key determinant of the successful implementation of the integration agenda and achieving the objectives. This is where the APRM is very important to Africans. Its successes, achievements and potentials have already been examined. However, the Mechanism has been criticised and has experienced many challenges. This section of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of these challenges, the missing-links and weaknesses of the APRM. The responses of participants were detailed on this issue, reflecting some of the challenges which were raised in previous chapters of this study.

Motive for establishing NEPAD and the APRM: Seen to be politically motivated, some people are of the view that African governments are moved by the desire to attract more donor funds. The argument thus exists that these programmes are not truly about promoting good governance and democracy (see, Amuwo, 2002:61-77; Dot Keet, 2003:32-45; Karuuombe, 2003:52-65; Bond, 2010:1-7). In particular, conceptualising good governance and democracy have attracted various debates and contestations.[290] This category of criticisms are expressed when many reflect on the nature and character of Africa‟s political leaderships; insincerity on the part of government; bad governance; corruption; and others. African governments are considered to be insincere in formulating initiatives. For instance, among the participants who were critical of the AU, NEPAD and APRM, one of the respondents asserted:

[290] The concerning issue is: how should the concept of good governance and democracy be defined considering the Africa‟s political-economic realities?

> NEPAD and APRM are a big joke essentially because they are offshoots and strategies of the highly dysfunctional African Union which, I argue, should leave issues of economic development and integration to the RECs. APRM is a caricature because the African governments are just using it to rub each other‟s backs to foster the illusion of good governance. NEPAD is cash-strapped, white-elephant and largely donor driven.[291]

Another participant adds: "I‟m not sure the change of name of the NEPAD programme will substantially change into a success story. NEPAD, despite its noble goal has not been able to fulfil many of its original objectives".[292] This respondent referred to NEPAD‟s goal as noble but was concerned about its implementation. The view is corroborated by that of another respondent who notes that: "sadly, NEPAD has been abused by the very people who were appointed to implement the project. As with BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) in South Africa, only select individuals benefited from NEPAD.[293] Raising the issue of the APRM‟s capacity to monitor democracy, one respondent underscored that: Rwanda was the first country to submit its APRM report but Kagame is a dictator. There is nothing anybody can do against Kagame. But Kagame is building Rwanda...[294]

> The APRM can only be the mirror of what African states are. When you have democracy functioning well, then the APRM will operate and function very well. But when you do not have that, hmmm....They are not going to walk out the government in place; it is the government in place that will facilitate the entire process. And so, if you have a government that is not transparent and accountable, what will the result be? Is the APRM a good thing? Will it work in Nigeria where, for instance, the National Assembly cannot challenge the executive?" We are not yet ready for peer review. You see, peer review wants everything, not only good governance, but also improvement in public service... But if you see the way it is done... ah, ah. The conditions are simply not in place.[295]

Still emphasising the challenge of governance and the effectiveness of the APRM, another respondent argues that Africa is in need of leaders with clear visions. There is no governance without vision and vision is provided by leadership.[296] In his words: "you put democracy where you ask people to come and vote, and then majority of the voters, 90% of the voters

[291] Interview with RP2. Date: 20 June, 2013.
[292] Interview questions completed by RP1 of the University of Nairobi, Kenya. Date: 12 December 2012.
[293] Interview questions completed by top level official, Foundation for the Development of Africa (FDA), South Africa. 12 December 2012.
[294] Interview with JDPC 1. Date: 4 February 2013.
[295] Interview with JDPC 1. Date: 4 February 2013.
[296] Interview with AUC „C". Date: 17 June 2013.

are not educated, they vote for a particular tribe instead of looking at the programme of the would-be government. Can we develop in that way? The challenge is both leadership and governance, because, you can have good leadership, but governance is at all levels. The structures are not yet in place, many people are illiterates".[297]

From the points raised above, the criticisms levied against the APRM are all results of governance challenges in African countries, a challenge which the APRM intends to confront. The views above do not detract from the fact that the concept of the APRM is good and its objectives laudable, the APRM promotes popular participation and if this is effective, most of the governance challenges raised by the respondent would be addressed, for instance through CSOs. If the political leaders could be sincere, politically willing, and committed to the APRM, this initiative would work for Africa. For as much, the APRM promotes clear codes and standards which democracy and good governance could be benchmarked in countries. If the APRM is allowed to function, it would benefit Africans as a citizen-driven initiative. The Mechanism will promote the values of true democracy and good governance in African countries.

Voluntary participation and withdrawal from the APRM: This is an issue of great concern and there is a growing emphasis on the need for all African Union member states to accede to the APRM. The views of all participants in this study are aligned on this view. Underscoring this point, Respondent RP4 states that, "the way the APRM is structured, it is such that it becomes a voluntary endeavour for countries that want to move forward. The question is: what about those countries that do not want to move forward? When they fall into conflict, what happens? Their people run into these countries that are moving forward and then we now have refugee problem".[298] While it could be suggested that the African Union should make accession to the APRM to be mandatory, the view of this scholar indicates that countries that wish to move forward accede to the APRM. It can be argued that progress in member states could motivate other non-members to accede.

Non-sanctions for non-compliant member states: The APRM is, perhaps, constrained when it comes to sanctioning non-compliant member states -- a pointer to the fact that state sovereignty remains a contentious issue in the APR process (Akokpari, 2003:14; see also,

[297] Interview with AUC „C". Date: 17 June 2013.
[298] Interview with RP5. Date: 20 June 2013.

Turianskyi, 2009:3-18). How effectively will it then achieve its objectives? Moreover, member states are not bound to accept the outcomes of the APR process. This weakness has been obvious in some of the countries which have undergone the review process. As Respondent ECA [2] highlights, "the Ethiopian Prime Minister was very reticent in publishing the Country‟s Review Report because he did not agree with some of the things there. He wasn‟t the only one; there were countries where there were tensions also".[299] Onimode, et al (2004:246), for their part, assert that peer review "is not feasible in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter, where there is a lot of sensitivity about sovereignty and the heads of state tend to herd together like trade union leaders". Many are concerned about how effectively the APRM could function and not about the goals of the Mechanism.

The African Union, Respondent RP5 argues, "is still a club of dictators. The AU is still made up of many leaders who have stayed in power for more than 20 years and who are still oppressing their people and leading their people to underdevelopment. What can the APRM do about this?[300] Another respondent adds: "peer review is not working because our leaders are all not honest. Most of them do not have the moral standing to criticise one another. So, what you find out is that although peer review is a good concept, the thing is not working.[301]

Monitoring and evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are ineffective and inadequate. Respondent RP4 identifies that "countries undergo the review process, compile and submit their reports and NPoAs, but there is a missing link, a problem in terms of follow-up to how far the government in question has taken action to implement the suggestions that came as a result of the review process. So, countries have joined the APRM just to look good because what eventually happens is that the reports come back to them and it ends there. Nothing trickles down. No serious change can be really evaluated".[302] One way to check this would be for the APRM to develop adequate monitoring measures to ensure adherence by countries to codes and standards and implementation of their NPoAs. Another issue of concern is that the number of reviews conducted has reduced in recent times. Respondent NEPAD [3] identifies this, saying: "peer review is doing well as a concept but there‟s still a lot to do, for instance, the momentum has slowed down in implementation. How many countries get reviewed in a year now? Before you could get three countries being reviewed in

[299] Interview with ECA 2. Date: 19 June 2013.
[300] Interview with RP5. Date: 20 June 2013.
[301] Interview with Media 4, Punch Newspaper, Nigeria. Date: 22 January 2014.
[302] Interview with RP5. Date: 20 June 2013.

just one year; now, you may have a country in one year or even one and a half year, or two years or something; but these things are being dealt with gradually"[303] The researcher identifies that this is a critical challenge which affects the implementation of regional agreements, weakens regional institutions and slows down the integration process. African governments show a lot of zeal in formulating policies and establishing regional institutions but at the level of implementation, the commitment and zeal diminishes. The APRM is confronted with this challenge and would require realistic measures on the part of governments at national and regional levels and citizens of member states to re-invigorate the process.

On the APRM questionnaire and review process: There have also been complaints that the APRM questionnaire did not emphasise issues such as, "agricultural policy, the informal sector, environmental protection and media freedom" (Hamam and Quedraogo, 2013:59). On the other side, the questionnaires over-emphasises issues of political governance. One respondent raised the issue that the civil society constituents are not given enough time to prepare for the APR process and as results have shown in some countries, they were ill-prepared.[304] Particularly, in the case of Nigeria, the respondent notes that: "they will select you as a member and they will send you documents to download three to four days before the meeting. How many documents do you have to download? Jesus Christ! You will simply understand that they don"t mean well. They don"t mean well at all".[305] This challenge speaks of the fact that non-state stakeholders should be informed on time in order to prepare adequately for a credible APR process.

Gap in policy implementation: A general criticism noted by all the participants in this study, cutting across the different sectors, is that African governments are very good when it comes to policy formulation but at the stage of implementation, willingness and commitment diminish. Furthermore, regional institutions do not have the power to sanction erring governments. Respondent AUC [C] observes pessimistically:

> African governments are full of rhetoric. There is no other continent that has the level of policy frameworks and programmes in every single sector. There is an anticorruption policy; there is the policy on human rights, elections and

[303] Interview with NEPAD 3. Date: 4 July 2013.
[304] Interview with JDPC 1. Date: 4 February 2013.
[305] Interview with JDPC 1. Date: 4 February 2013.

> democracy; there is a programme on conservation of natural resources and all others. The continent has about 43 treaties touching on each and every aspect of human endeavours and these are supposed to be binding. But, where are they on the ground?[306]

Clearly, the APRM experiences this "gap between rhetoric and reality" (Akokpari, 2003:13). Doctoral candidate [2] states that, "the APRM is a tool or a framework that is good on paper. In practice, it is faced with a lot of challenges – the issues are the same, the actors are the same.[307] Despite some of the criticisms and challenges of the APRM, other scholars and observers consider that the APRM is a good initiative; that its objectives may have been well conceived despite some weaknesses in the area of implementation. For instance, Respondent NIIA [1] notes:

> APRM is important. APRM is something we need to the extent that it establishes standards that we voluntarily can hold on to on a comparative basis; standards which are difficult to impose from outside but which once we agree to, we can do all in our power, all in our means to try to meet up to…However, as good as it is, the pity of it all, in my own opinion, is that the APRM is not well publicised. I don‟t know whether to say it is not well adhered to. But, it is as if ever since it came into being with NEPAD, it has, in some countries, not been taken too seriously and I think Nigeria is one of those countries...This says a lot about how seriously on a continental basis, we are taking this APRM initiative. I would have assumed that at least, major indices or major areas of emphasis of the APRM initiative should also be reflected, on an annual basis, either in countries‟ annual budget or key initiatives such as the Transformation Agenda of this administration and also key policy initiatives of past administrations. I would have expected APRM‟s key goals and objectives to be reflected in them; but, unfortunately, they are not, and you know, that begs the question what is it all about…[308]

The assessments and assertions of experts raise key questions about the commitment and sincerity of African governments in ensuring the success of the APRM, and the integration of its policy frameworks into national policy processes.

Capacity, operational and funding challenges: The APRM is also confronted with "capacity, operational and political challenges" (Landsberg, 2012b:114; see also, Heubaum, 2005:6; Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:50-53; Mangu, 2007:380-384). The issue of funding

[306] Interview with AUC C. Date: 17 June 2013.
[307] Interview questions completed by Doctoral Candidate 3. University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Date: 14 June 2013.
[308] Interview with NIIA 1. Date : 31 January, 2014.

the APRM is a principal challenge; some members-states are handicapped with resources to implement NPoAs (Kebonang and Fombad, 2006:50-53; Mangu, 2007:384; Bing-Pappoe, 2010:22; Landsberg, 2012b:114). It is equally concerning that most APRM member countries are not adhering to the specified time-lines for reporting on the progress made in implementing their NPoAs (Busia in SAIIA, 2010:5-6). These are areas in which civil society organisations are important agencies not only in holding governments accountable to keeping their promises and implementing policies which touch on the lives of citizens but also in monitoring objectives of regional programmes such as the APRM. However, Africa"s civil society and their groups are constrained by several challenges. These were identified in section 7.5 above. As Mulikita (2005:9) asserts, "to date, the principal criticisms directed at the APRM concept have been the lack of ownership by African citizens and the top-down approach, both at the continental level and within individual countries".

Perhaps, the questions to ask at this point are: how popular is the APRM among ordinary Africans? How educated and informed are the African people on the objectives of the APRM and how they can exploit the opportunities provided by the AU/NEPAD and APRM? One aspect of the issue is that:

> There is scanty knowledge of the APRM and there is scanty information of what the APRM is particularly doing. The media is involved in the APRM processes, but the APRM process remains highly „intellectualised", and to a large extent, has remained the reserve of students, researchers, and scholars. But the farmers, the peasants and the common man on the street do not know about the APRM. Moreover, the APRM processes are not clearly reflected in parliamentary activities of the different governments.[309]

There is no doubt that popular participation which is the core principle of the APRM initiative is limited by the lack of adequate information. This would need to be improved. Beyond that, is the problem identified in the previous section that, some African governments have deliberately put in place measures to curtail the participatory activities of civil society groups. These are the weaknesses that have made some people to question the participatory and inclusive processes associated with the APRM and the reality that the APRM Review Reports are reflective of the views of the people. The APRM as an African Union initiative, therefore, is affected by the leadership problems in the continent. As OSISA [1] argued:

[309] Interview with ACCORD 1. Date: 24 February, 2014.

> The major challenges of the APRM – one is commitment, and the other is the lack of political will to be honest to the process. This is reflected in the number of countries which have joined the APRM and the number of reviews that have been conducted. We have not seen that populate drive to action in the sense that the NPoAs have not been largely implemented; they"ve been largely ignored. The issue of the APRM has not been brought to the centre of our national development plans, and all of that. As a result, it"s a political issue which is ironic because of the percentage of population of the African continent who have actually acceded to the process, up to 850 million people. So, with the response, there is an opportunity for us to engage. But the truth is that at the political level, it becomes very difficult for ownership to really take place, especially at the people to people level.[310]

7.10 Conclusion

This chapter analysed and assessed available data on African economic integration utilising a thematic format and reflecting on emerging issues from the previous chapters. The AU was established when African leaders realised the need for a more effective organisation than the OAU to promote African economic integration. The AU has since adopted the NEPAD initiative as its development programme and established the APRM as part of NEPAD to be concerned with governance issues in the continent. Establishing the linkage between democracy, good governance; peace, stability and security; and development, the African Union/NEPAD and APRM respond to the complexities, realities and challenges of African economic integration in an era of more intense globalisation. Particularly, this chapter assessed the effectiveness of the APRM in addressing governance and socio-economic challenges in Africa in order to enhance the prospects of the realisation of African economic integration.

The APRM was seen to be attempting to promote the establishment of democratic developmental states in Africa. This was established considering, as this study identified, that the role of the African state was critical in determining the success or failure of the African economic integration project. Secondly, the APRM was examined in its role as furthering the regional and integration objectives of the African Union/NEPAD. The Mechanism promotes and monitors adherence by countries to agreed regional codes and standards in African countries towards achieving the goals of integration and development. Thirdly, the chapter analysed the successes and achievements of the APRM and thereafter the progress which have been made so far in different sectors at the national and regional levels. It also identified

[310] Interview with OSISA 1. Date: 4 october 2013.

that progress is being made in speeding up the process of regional integration and that there are on-going and new programmes underway in Africa. The chapter also dealt with issues concerning harmonisation and coordination of the policies and programmes of the AU/NEPAD and APRM and also the weaknesses, criticisms and challenges of the APRM.

The conclusion of this chapter is that, despite the several weaknesses, criticisms and challenges, with the AU-led initiatives, Africa has progressed significantly and efforts are being strengthened to reposition African countries towards achieving national, sub-regional and regional integration and development. African governments are more aware of the need for countries to put in place enabling conditions by promoting democracy, good governance, broad-based participation, strong policies and socio-economic development. And also eradicating poverty and providing for the needs of their growing populations. This would enable countries individually and collectively to exploit the gains of regional integration and as well position themselves to exploit global opportunities. However, this chapter establishes the finding that while Africa has made progress and achieved economic growth, the continent‟s growth has not yet impacted on majority of the people with the persistent socio-economic and governance challenges in many African countries.

Considering the central argument of this thesis, the goals of regional economic integration in Africa are far from being achieved. Critical challenges need to be addressed. Measures need to be taken not only to consolidate and strengthen the gains which have been achieved and address persisting challenges, but also towards effective implementation of new programmes in furthering the African economic integration agenda. It is in this regard that the APRM, despite its weaknesses and deficiencies is seen in this study, as central to Africa‟s quest to realising the goals of regional economic integration. The APRM is a good strategy in achieving the goals of the AU/NEPAD and, if encouraged to function effectively, will respond to the salient issues in the discourse. The Mechanism is aiming to address most of the governance and development problematics in Africa which are mostly “man-made”. However, so far, the APR process is confronted with a lot of challenges and would require political will and commitments on the part of African leaders and the effective involvement of the African people to make more progress. There is no doubt that the effectiveness of the APRM is constrained by governance deficiencies. The APRM needs to be improved.

Having identified the challenges confronted by the APRM in advancing the ideals of the AU/NEPAD integration agenda, the next chapter summarises the findings of this study in order to present its conclusion and proffer suggestions for the way forward.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

Africa‟s economic integration projects continue to record poor performances due to political impediments and socio-economic challenges in African countries. This study has engaged with examining the problematic of African economic integration. It has traced the efforts at achieving integration objectives from the period of independence, identified salient issues in the discourse and examined the instrumental use of the APRM in addressing the challenges. The study is an empirical contribution to the body of knowledge on African regionalism and on the APRM. It has assessed the effectiveness of the APRM as a governance monitoring initiative of the African Union, within its NEPAD framework, in contributing to resolving the problematic of African regional economic integration. The researcher identifies firstly, that there is a connection between governance, peace, security, stability and development in African states and secondly, that there is a connection between good goverance and the progress of integration at the sub-regional and regional levels. These key connections are being promoted through Africa‟s regional initiatives – the RECs, African Union, NEPAD and the APRM.

As conceptualised by the researcher, the African Union is like a parent who adopted a son/daughter in NEPAD, and has a grand-child in the APRM.[311] Hence, there is a relationship between the AU/NEPAD and APRM which is both logical and familial. Although the study interests itself in how these different but related frameworks collaborated to push the objective of African economic integration, its main focus is the role of the APRM. In pursuing this focus, the study has examined and assessed the APRM‟s effectiveness in advancing the AU/NEPAD‟s integration and development agenda. A combination of theories – market integration (trade and open regionalism), functionalism/neo-functionalism and realism – have provided the theoretical framework of the thesis. Data analysis was based on the core research question which requires interrogating how the AU/NEPAD, through the APRM initiative, responds to the complexities, realities and challenges of African economic integration.

[311] Akokpari, J. (2004:249) identified in his work, *The AU, NEPAD and the promotion of good governance in Africa* that "the AU is the womb that bore NEPAD"

This chapter sums up the issues analysed and findings derived in previous chapters (one through to seven indicating which chapter addressed particular research questions/objectives). The aim is to enable the researcher to articulate instructive and reliable conclusions, to provide useful suggestions for a way forward and for future research. The findings in the chapter reflect the study"s research problem and focus, the central argument, research questions and research objectives.

8.2 Summary of findings

8.2.1 The realities and challenges of African economic integration

It is widely accepted by governments, scholars, writers, and civil society representatives that African economic integration is a laudable project and holds great potential for the transformation of the continent, its development, and its capacity to generate and distribute prosperity for and to the people of Africa. However, it is acknowledged that the process of integration in Africa is complex, challenging and in some respects, fraught with contradictions. The data obtained from both secondary and primary sources explored in this study confirm that regional economic integration is a good and useful strategy which all nations, irrespective of their different rates of development, can explore in order to develop individually and collectively. As seen from within the framework of economic theories – market integration, trade and open regionalism, and functionalism/neo-functionalism - a number of benefits are derivable from regional economic integration. The economic benefits of trading among countries were also highlighted by a majority of the participant respondents who contributed to this study. The reality, however, is that even though the economic benefits of regionalism are often emphasised, more often, political imperatives are prerequisites for the economic benefits. For instance, Respondent RP1 notes that: "in Africa as elsewhere, RIAs are mainly the outcome of necessity felt by nation-states to integrate their economies in order to achieve rapid economic development, decrease conflict, and build mutual trusts between the integrated units".[312]

In the African context, regional economic integration became an important subject as more African countries began to achieve independence from the late 1950s. There was the seeming realisation that considering colonial rule and the effects of its divisive administration, newly created African states would find it difficult to make progress in an international system

[312] Interview schedule completed by RP1. University of Nairobi, Kenya. Date: 12 December 2012.

dominated by powerful, rich and industrialised countries of the West. African states would need to unite. As such, the quest for cooperation and forging technical links among African countries was influenced by pan-African desires for collective self-reliance, solidarity, development, peace and unity. This led to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and, subsequently, the formation of other sub-regional groupings and regional development initiatives. They include the: OAU‟s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action; 1991 Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC); New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) adopted by the African Union. All of them have been underpinned by the ideals of regional integration. However, despite the continuous advocacy for African regionalism, especially within the context of global trends of liberalisation and regionalisation, the story of regionalism in Africa is not one of satisfactory success. Chapter One articulated the research problem, central argument of the thesis, research questions and objectives, research methodology and design.

The study found that African economic integration efforts have been underpinned by political motives beyond the economic objectives which RIAs seek to achieve. This influenced the thinking of the researcher in defining regional cooperation and integration as a development strategy and adopting a combination of theories to provide a political-economic analysis of African economic integration. The different theories guiding this study -- market integration (trade and open regionalism), functionalism/neo-functionalism and neo-realism -- are examined in chapter two showing how they were useful for analytical purposes; how they completed each other and the various theoretical debates and contestations in the discourse. Firstly, market integration theory assisted in opening up the scholarly arguments for a redefinition of the goals of regionalism in Africa. This is an on-going discourse considering Africa‟s internal challenges and global realities. Secondly, functionalism and neo-functionalism challenge civil society and their different groups and regional institutions to play key roles for Africa to realise the goals of integration in a fast globalising world. Thirdly, neo-realism unpacked the debate over African states, and their roles as actors in achieving national, regional and global objectives. Put together, these theories enable a comprehensive analysis which demonstrates that, while regional institutions such as Africa‟s RECs and the AU are important, their success depends on internal dynamics at the level of the states. Consequently, the study argues that the APRM could foster the establishment of democratic developmental states in Africa.

A review of literature undertaken in Chapter Three further expounded the various discourses identified in the theoretical analysis on African economic integration. While other regions have made progress in their regional economic integration efforts, Africa has lagged behind. The chapter emphasises that African governments realised quite early in the post-independence era their need to cooperate. To this end, although Africa‟s integration agenda was influenced by political incentives, the economic objective was also pronounced. Chapter three provides the basis for understanding the issues discussed in chapter four which centres on globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation and the challenges they pose for African political economies.

The study found that Africa‟s RIAs, between the 1960s and 1980s did not achieve satisfactory success due to both external and internal factors. However, the argument in this study, while not neglecting external factors, centres more on the internal factors: lack of adequate political will and commitment to regional programmes; poor leadership and governance; emphasis on absolute state sovereignty; lack of democracy and popular participation; poor economic policies; among others, were key factors that constrained the performance of the OAU and other regional groupings. These challenges also impacted on economic development in the continent as many countries suffered economic hardships between the late 1970s and 1980s. Most countries therefore implemented the SAPs of the World Bank and IMF which led to deteriorating conditions for the masses. The point of emphasis in this study is that external influences and challenges could have been ameliorated with visionary leadership, backed by popular support and the formulation of articulate economic policies which would have taken into consideration the realities and needs of the African continent and its people.

In order to clearly demonstrate the effects of poor political and economic conditions on the continent, Chapter Three examines literature showing the different stages of Africa‟s experimentation with regional integration and implementation of regional programmes up to the transformation of the OAU from the end of the 20th century to the African Union at the beginning of the 21st century. It therefore sets the stage for addressing the second research question: What were the weaknesses and challenges of previous programmes and efforts at African economic integration and what strategies have been and are being put in place to address such issues in the African Union/NEPAD, (APRM) project? This research question was further examined empirically in other chapters – five, six and seven. Chapter Three

shows how the AU commenced operations and established a declaration adopting the NEPAD programme and creating the APRM as a governance programme to aid the implementation of NEPAD. Thereafter, it engaged with scholarly literature featuring differing perspectives on the problematic of African economic integration; the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM initiatives.

The study found that a debate continues to rage among scholars over which strategy should be adopted to actualise the vision of African economic integration as envisioned by the African Union. The concern here is that, while Africans settle for a gradual integration process (as advocated by functionalism/neo-functionalism) with Africa‟s RECs as the building blocks towards the creation of an African Economic Community, the issue of state sovereignty and domestic politics remain unaddressed. This is a fundamental omission in the integration agenda and is a point of emphasis in this study. It thus is scarcely surprising that many scholars and commentators are displaying a certain amount of scepticism about the goals and objectives of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM.

Notwithstanding the poor record of regionalism in Africa, the establishment of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM shows the ongoing conviction of African leaders that the continent is in dire need of working integration arrangements. This became imperative within the context of more intense globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation which, as described in chapter three, poses several challenges for individual African political economies. African economies are too weak to respond effectively to global economic demands and challenges. This is the focus of analysis in Chapter Four which analyses contending scholarly debates on globalisation, liberalisation and regionalisation, its effects on African states and the challenge for the African continent. While divergent scholarly opinions are examined in this chapter, the study argues that globalisation presents both opportunities and challenges to Africa. Regional economic integration is seen as a viable strategy for Africa to exploit the opportunities created and manage the effects of globalisation. However, the chapter stresses that African governments would need to promote good governance and undertake internal political and economic reforms in order to achieve national, sub-regional and continental integration and development objectives.

Chapter Four also discusses the fieldwork component of the thesis. It found that in all the interviews conducted at regional institutions - the African Union, NEPAD, APRM, ECA, and

in some CSOs - participants‟ views reflected the challenges posed by globalisation and the greater need for regional integration in Africa. Participants traced the efforts to actualise integration. From this discussion emerged a general agreement that yes, regional integration is necessary for Africa and the continent‟s leaders and their peoples have demonstrated their quest for it. The different policies, programmes, multilateral agreements and institutional frameworks existing in the continent are the evidence.[313] For instance, Respondent NEPAD [1] notes that, "the leaders have made efforts to emulate what is being done in other regions. African leaders are not lacking in terms of regional frameworks and initiatives for promoting integration.[314] Nonetheless, Africans have not yet adequately exploited the benefits of regional integration. In terms of political, social and economic development, Africa continues to lag behind. The study advances the debate that governance is a key factor in the regional economic process in Africa. This concern informs the aims of this study, namely, to assess, empirically, the potential of the APRM in interrogating the governance deficits in African countries and finding solutions to the slow pace of regionalism in the continent.

To facilitate the aims of the study, Chapter Five addresses the third research question: What are the salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration and how relevant are such issues for policy formulation and implementation towards achieving the objectives of the AU/NEPAD, (APRM) integration project? It is argued in this chapter that, although Africa‟s quest for regional economic integration is noble, there are several contradictions hindering the process of implementation. Indeed, as one respondent notes, "Africa has a complex institutional architecture".[315] Basically, one major paradox that this study highlights is that while there is growing interest in integration, governments continue to cling to national sovereignty. The sovereignty versus supranationalism phenomenon is a two-faced (opposite) element in all RTAs and RECs in Africa.

The analysis in Chapter Five portrays that Africa‟s economic integration agenda is particularly hampered by governance and development challenges which were and still are linked to the nature and workings of post-independence African states. These issues are critically analysed within the framework of the functionalist/neo-functionalist and neo-realist theories. While functionalism/neo-functionalism provides useful explanations that integrating

[313] This data was gleaned from the interviews conducted with officials at the African Union, NEPAD, APRM, PAP and ECA; and some CSO representatives.
[314] Interview with NEPAD 1. Date: 2 July 2013.
[315] Interview with AUC „D‟. Date: 18 June 2013.

countries are expected to submit to the directions of supranational institutions, such as those of the African Union and RECs, neo-realism explains the tendency of African governments to control or interfere in the integration process. The agenda of African leaders from the 1990s to promote „good governance" and socio-economic development within the framework of a functional economic integration process is therefore examined. This chapter reflects discussions on the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM initiatives which were examined previously in chapter three under the section of the evolution of African economic integration and the different stages marking the efforts of African leaders in promoting regional integration.

The findings revealed several issues of contentions and debates among scholars and most participants in this study, across different categories on the AU/NEPAD and APRM. Both the literature and the respondents revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the initiatives. The researcher also recorded many of the weaknesses of each initiative on the one hand, and other challenges in the area of coordination of functions and programmes on the other. Indeed, there are mixed reactions to the AU/NEPAD and the APRM. However, from the analyses made in the study, most of the scholars and officials who are pessimistic about the African Union and its initiatives are not averse to their laudable objectives. Rather, they are more concerned about problematics such as: the poor record of regionalism in Africa; lack of a clear definition of the goals of regionalism; insincerity on the part of African governments and their lack of political will and commitments to implement the objectives. These are identified as unresolved difficulties and disjunctures that often lead to policy failures in Africa.

There were a number of issues raised about NEPAD and the APRM, because the issue of governance has been a critical challenge for decades in Africa. As such, most respondents are of the view that African governments are „pretending" to be promoters of good governance before the countries of the West. They are therefore not to be trusted. In fact, one official in a CSO notes: "if you schedule an interview with any personality at NEPAD and you get someone to interview, come back to me and I will change my mind about NEPAD".[316]

[316] Interview schedule completed by a top level official of the Foundation for the Development of Africa. Date: 12 December 2012.

The study found that these arguments are fundamentally important. However, data obtained from field studies and other secondary sources, also reveal the other side of NEPAD. Together with the African Union, NEPAD promotes social policies aimed at addressing socio-economic development challenges in Africa (see, Motsamai and Zondi, 2010). Operating within the ambit of regional integration with the AU, NEPAD assists in coordinating national and regional efforts. And, with the APRM, NEPAD is promoting efforts to develop African states not only to get effectively involved in Africa‟s governance and development process but to reposition states to explore regional and global opportunities.

The AU/NEPAD Africa Action Plan and one of its key continent-wide programmes are also discussed in Chapter Five. The programmes on infrastructure, just as other programmes, although are continental, are being implemented at the RECs and national levels. Infrastructure development focuses on several sectors and was selected out of the AU/NEPAD‟s continent-wide programmes because of its significance to the integration agenda. Other programmes which would have spill-over effects in promoting the continent‟s integration agenda are also on-going. The analysis in this chapter however reveals that success in the implementation of the AU/NEPAD agenda is dependent on the political will and commitment of African leaders to promote good governance, broad-based participation, and responsible and accountable leadership, particularly in order to mobilise domestic savings, make the most advantageous use of donor resources, fight corruption, and enhance service delivery, among others. These governance aspects of the AU/NEPAD integration and development agenda were to be handled by the APRM.

The APRM was the focus of the study in Chapter Six. This chapter addresses the fourth fourth research question: To what extent is the African Peer Review Mechanism an effective strategy in Africa‟s economic integration process? Are the policies of the APRM informed by the salient issues on the African economic integration discourse? It engaged intensively with an analysis of the institutional framework and approach of the APRM. APRM is viewed as a strategic framework in Africa‟s economic integration process. In this chapter, three APRM Country Review Reports are discussed and reviewed in detail to give an in-depth portrayal of how the APRM functions and achieves its mandates in member countries. While some studies have analysed the APR process to identify the strengths and lapses in line with the guidelines of the Mechanism‟s founding documents and its objectives, the analysis of the entire Country Review Reports in Chapter Six is framed by this study‟s intention to assess

how the APRM responds to salient issues in the discourse on African economic integration. In essence, the chapter examines how the instrumental use of the APRM could address governance and development challenges in African countries to pave the way for African economic integration.

The study revealed that the thinking behind the formulation of the APRM and the idea of the APRM itself was innovative. The Mechanism defines exhaustively the principles and objectives of governance in the four thematic areas which is quite commendable. Compared with most other continents of the world, Africa has enormous natural, material and human resources and thus potentially is a powerhouse. What Africa needs to realise its considerable potential are leaders who would promote good governance and effective policies to transform its utilisation and deployment of resources. As Hansungule (2007:3) asserts: "governance deficit is „independent" Africa"s perennial headache".

With regard to the three Country Review Reports analysed, the findings, in many respects, align with those of other studies even though the purposes of such analyses may differ. Despite the weaknesses and lapses pointed out in the country review processes, the APRM identifies positive performances, different governance challenges and best practices in the countries examined. The Panel of Eminent Persons offers several recommendations which if implemented, would redress national and, by extension, regional challenges. In line with the central arguments of the study, it is noted that, although the governance challenges identified through the review process were national in characteristic, they have negative implications for the achievement of regional integration objectives. The APRM sets the pace, and puts in place benchmarks which member countries should meet. The Mechanism emphasises the need for common policies, convergence of policies and harmonisation of policies to achieve the AU/NEPAD"s objectives. This makes regional initiatives such as the APRM imperative for Africa"s progress.

8.2.2 Africa – Moving forward?

There are an assortment of statistical facts and figures to show that Africa has been making strides in different sectors since the 1990s as distinct from the period of the late1970s and 1980s. These are examined in Chapter Seven. This progress is being consolidated with the policies of the AU/NEPAD/APRM initiatives. Africa leapt forward with regard to promoting democracy and good political governance; economic governance and financial management;

corporate governance and socio-economic development. These achievements were recorded from the 1990s against what obtained between the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, Chapter Seven also examined the fourth research question.

The study revealed that in light of the regional codes and standards of the AU/NEPAD being promoted through the APRM, governments of member countries as well as other African countries are becoming conscious that they are expected to be accountable, both to their citizens and their development partners. Policy making processes are becoming more inclusive and participatory; new legislation and policies are being formulated; democratic values are becoming more appreciated. Governments are making efforts to improve public service delivery. Africa is becoming more stable and conducive for the conduct of business and for investment. The private sector is becoming involved in promoting socio-economic development. These were issues that were previously poorly handled. Statistical evidence shows that Africa recorded significant economic growth, and indicates that more progress is expected in the future.

On the other hand, this chapter identifies that even though significant economic growths continue to be recorded, to a large extent economic growth rates have not yet impacted on socio-economic development and transformation of the continent. In other words, the findings of the study show that economic growth has not yet positively affected the lives of majority of the people. Although progress has been made in addressing socio-economic challenges, poverty, high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, inequality, among others, are persistent. This is recorded as a key finding reflecting the central argument of this thesis. It appears that, in particular, socio-economic development issues are not receiving adequate political focus and that the policies and programmes are not aligning with the needs of the people.

Findings also reveal that, given improved political and socio-economic conditions at the national levels in most African states, Africa has made progress in achieving regional integration objectives. Although the RECs are progressing at different rates, they share an intention to put in place common standards and mechanisms to promote regional integration and to address common challenges. In short, Africa is set to establish a Continental Free Trade Area in 2017 as part of the process towards establishing the AEC. To this extent, regional economic integration issues are receiving greater attention than was the case in

previous decades, both at the regional and continental levels. There is now more emphasis on mobilising resources towards implementing the flagship projects of the AU/NEPAD. However, the study found that African countries are yet to make progress in the area of cooperation and harmonisation of policies in the service sector.

It is also revealed that despite the above achievements, intra-African trade is yet to be improved, as is Africa‟s trade with the outside world. There are still hindrances to free movement of Africans across Africa; industrialisation is yet to be achieved; many African countries still lack in physical infrastructures; many other socio-economic challenges remain. These are signifiers of non-achievement by political elites in regard to the goal of socio-economic development and transformation of the continent. Moreover, persisting governance deficiencies, for instance, lack of sincerity, commitment and strong political will on the part of Africa‟s leadership and the persistence of corruption, cast doubt on the sustainability in practice of the noble principles which inform regional economic integration programmes.

The study therefore underlines that with the cross-cutting issues and various political and socio-economic development challenges which have been identified, the issue of governance remains fundamental to Africa at all levels. Given the complex institutional design and the disparities in our economies, governance of the integration process is essential. Thus, the APRM has a significant role to play in Africa‟s emerging governance architecture (see Uzodike, 2010/11:93-95).[317] African governments will need to emplace good governance, responsible and accountable leadership in order to actualise the goals of regional economic integration. Moreover, good governance is a critically important aspect of strategies to implement Africa‟s Agenda 2063. Evidently, the APRM remains central in the discourse on African economic integration.

Nevertheless, as is revealed in Chapter Seven, there are mixed opinions concerning the APRM. The overall finding, however, is that scholars who criticise the AU, NEPAD and APRM initiatives as well as a majority of this study‟s respondents who are not optimistic,

[317] During one of the interviews with at the Economic Commission for Africa, one of the senior officials informed the author that the APRM in future proposes to move to another stage, to the regional level, where the Mechanism will monitor to address the problems of each region to enhance regional integration. The official noted: “we have not started yet because only 17 countries have been peer-reviewed. At the regional level, we want to do assessment; to assess the regions themselves to see what the weaknesses are, going through the RECs. But this stage is still not started” (Interview with ECA 4. Date: 18 June 2013).

points to the issue of governance and political leadership in Africa. Particularly for the APRM, major concerns are the missing links and challenges of the APRM and the weaknesses and lapses identified in the APR process. Essentially, the APRM‟s effectiveness is constrained by the governance challenges which it is intended to address. This, however, does not demonstrate that the concept of the APRM is not a good concept. Rather, it shows that several issues urgently need to be addressed for the APRM to achieve its objectives.

8.3 Conclusion: the future of African economic integration

With the African Union/NEPAD and APRM, there is currently a renewed drive for African economic integration based on the political and socio-economic challenges confronting the continent, challenges of global economic relations, and recognition of reasons for failures of previous initiatives. Despite their various shortcomings, the AU/NEPAD and APRM initiatives respond adequately to the complexities, realities and challenges of African economic integration. These initiatives align with the functionalist/neo-functionalist theoretical perspective on the role of institutions in driving the integration agenda. However, Africa continues to lag behind its target of achieving successful regional integration and development despite several regional integration schemes around the continent.

Within the neo-realism perspective, this study identifies the salient issues in the discourse on regionalism in Africa and examines the governance and socio-economic challenges constraining regional integration and development initiatives. Examining the objectives of the African Union and the NEPAD initiatives, the study focused on the institutional framework of the APRM, which was created specifically as an instrument for resolving identified governance challenges in furtherance of the AU/NEPAD integration agenda. The conclusion of this study is that, despite its weaknesses and challenges, the APRM represents a valuable strategy with great potential to offer effective solutions to the slow pace of integration and development in Africa.

Peer learning, experience sharing and peer influence are vital for the progress of African economic integration. These could be exploited at the level of the RECs, Heads of States, by the civil society, private sector, and even the media. They could focus on different issues and sectors such as, politics, health, education, skills development, creating employment, and agriculture, industry, infrastructure, among others. At various meetings of the AUC, NEPAD, ECA, AfDB, peer learning could be facilitated. The wise saying goes that, “two heads are

better than one". The study argues that APRM can enhance efforts to foster collaborations and cooperation amongst people and motivate countries to implement policies. The study notes that CSOs and the media could help document the best practices. At another level, one respondent notes that, "the APRM can enhance South-South cooperation. This does not mean that Africa should jettison the Americas or the UK, but interact more and learn and share lessons from Africa. The APRM is useful to enhance the capacity development and leadership transformation programmes of NEPAD".[318]

The Mechanism needs to be improved and allowed to function effectively as an instrument of change in Africa. The findings reveal that there are some critical disconnects in the focus of the APRM on addressing human development issues and human capital development and promoting socio-economic development. Potential causes of conflict such as poverty, unemployment, among others, which threaten human security in member states, need to be addressed. The APRM will not succeed unless appropriate and realistic measures are put in place to strengthen the Mechanism as a programme of the AU/NEPAD and to enhance the APR process.

8.4 Recommendations[319]

The following recommendations are advanced based on the divergent discourses, findings and conclusions reached in this study. This researcher's position is that the challenges of the APRM can be addressed in terms of both agency (of authoritative units and allies) and policy instruments. Following this section, suggestions are provided for further research studies on regional economic integration in Africa, the African Union, NEPAD and the APRM.

- Role of African governments: African governments need to show their political will, sincerity and commitment to an effective APRM by committing necessary financial and other resources towards implementing their APRM NPoAs and fulfilling other APRM obligations.[320]

[318] Interview with NEPAD 1. Date: 2 July 2013.

[319] These recommendations include those published by the researcher. See Jiboku, P.A. "Maximising the use of the media as a tool in popularising the African Peer Review Mechanism". UPEACE Africa Policy Series, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2014. 35-44.

[320] The APRM needs to be taken seriously by both the government and the citizens and seen as a national commitment. For instance, APRM policies and programmes and the NPoAs should be integrated into national programmes and budgeted for accordingly. The APRM National Institutions should be kept functioning in order to follow-up on the achievements of objectives. Governments need to abide by democratic principles of freedom of speech and rule of law and also provide information to enhance the functioning of the APRM.

- Role of the AU: The African Union, as the umbrella organisation, needs to do more across national boundaries. Working with other stakeholders, the AU should endeavour to: popularise the APRM; deepen common understanding of the rationale for its establishment; disseminate information effectively on what the APRM is actually doing, its achievements, and best practices on policies and governance. The APRM Review Reports should also be broadly accessible. The researcher believes that these efforts could be enhanced by the effective use of the print and electronic media. The AU could also sponsor more video clips, newspaper, television and radio commentaries, talk shows and jingles on the APRM (see, Jiboku, 2014:42).

- Role of the APRM: African people are growing weary of the non-implementation of national and regional policies by the continent‟s political leadership. Increasingly across Africa, citizens want to see practical results, and how regional initiatives such as the APRM affect their lives and well-being in society. As such, the APRM needs to enhance its monitoring strategies to ensure that member states comply with agreed resolutions and policies in implementing continent-wide programmes of the African Union/NEPAD as well as their NPoAs. APRM optimists are hopeful that: the initiative would conduct more reviews; the APR process would be inclusive, transparent and credible; and the reports generated would be reflective of the views of society and align with the needs, realities and challenges of the African continent. The APR process therefore needs to be revived, because at various levels, the APRM would have to prove its uniqueness in the area of policy implementation.

- The APRM should instil confidence and trust in the civil society, and support its quest to assume its position as agent of change in the continent. Therefore, the APRM needs to: focus more attention on human capital formation and development; address human security issues towards empowering the civil society and bridging the gap between the state and society in Africa. There is need for more education and sensitisation of the African people on the opportunities provided by the APRM. This would require the efforts of all stake-holders -- especially CSOs -- to be effective.

- Role of APRM Continental Secretariat: The APRM Continental Secretariat needs to be more innovative in its media strategies to publicise the APRM in the languages

understood by citizens. As a people-driven strategy, more conferences, seminars and workshops on the APRM promoted by the CSOs, the media and APRM‟s strategic partners, would enhance the APR process and reduce the negative perceptions and feelings about the APRM. In addition, NEPAD and APRM Secretariats could have more video clips, talk shows and jingles on the APRM. The views of the general public about the APRM could be effectively coordinated through the social media.

- Role of Civil Society Organisations: The contributions made by civil society organisations to Africa‟s governance and development processes cannot be over-emphasised and such efforts need to be consolidated. The effective mobilisation of Africa‟s human resources towards enhancing their participation in governance and for development purposes is vital for the region but presents a major challenge for civil society which is a valuable instrument for achieving the much needed development in Africa. CSOs need to be proactive and be properly organised in engaging with regional institutions such as the APRM. CSOs can form networks and coalitions across the continent to collaborate, share experiences and learn from peers on how to engage more effectively and enhance participation at national, sub-regional and regional levels. Indeed, African CSOs need to develop more interest in APRM issues and be willing to exploit the political spaces created for them to engage with government.

Policy Instruments

- The AU (APRM) can facilitate the participatory interest of CSOs in the APR process by creating or enhancing project funding opportunities for participating groups.

- African educational sectors should be more directly relevant to the needs of their publics and societies. There is the view that the incapacity to invest in research and development is the bane of the African continent. Also, in most cases, there is a gap between researchers and policy makers and this has a lot of implications on our planning and developing processes.[321] As such, there is a need to redefine the concept of civil society to include tertiary institutions (and all sectors and groups in society). For instance, as one respondent notes: “institutions of higher education need to be

[321] Interview with JDPC 1. Date: 4 February 2013.

integrated into the APRM processes; they are going to play major roles particularly in addressing the methods, challenges and opportunities related to the methodology on collecting information and assessing information on the APRM".[322]

- The APRM should include in its policy agenda, the positions reached at different Workshops advocating increased roles for national parliaments of member states in the APRM structures and processes.[323]

- The AU should strengthen the APR process by making accession to the APRM mandatory for all its member states.

- The presence of the African Union (as the parent organisation) and its various organs -- such as the Pan African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC) – should give more support to the APR process.

- Finally, more needs to be done with regard to coordinating and harmonising the programmes and policies of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM to achieve the overall objectives of a strong, united, peaceful and prosperous African continent.

8.5 Suggestions for future research

As this study has shown, regional economic integration is a viable strategy for Africa to achieve much needed sustainable project. There is therefore need for more studies to address persisting problems as Africans look forward to the year 2063. On-going debates and contestations on the African Union, NEPAD and APRM call for more scholarly attention and research. Issues concerning coordination and harmonisation of functions, policies and programmes of the RECs, African Union, NEPAD and APRM should also attract scholarly debates. For instance, there is the thinking that the APRM could be brought into the African

[322] Interview with ACCORD 1. Date: 24 February, 2014.
[323] For instance, the recommendations of the Bagamoyo Workshop organised by the UNECA in collaboration with the UNDP Office in Tanzania and the Pan African Parliament. Date: 12-14 November, 2008.

Union as was the case with NEPAD.[324] How this will work and the implications of this proposition should be of interest to scholars and students of politics.

More studies are needed on the APRM, to analyse more Country Review Reports as more countries accede to the APRM. Research could also be done to ascertain how the Mechanism has been improved as the years go by, especially as several recommendations have been provided to enhance performance. The civil society is challenged to undertake studies to monitor progress and performance of the APRM in addressing human capital development issues as a citizen-driven initiative promoting good governance and socio-economic development.

[324] Comment made by Professor Amos Sawyer in an interview (see, The NEPAD Guide, 2012a: 63).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX, 1(A) and 1(B)

LIST OF STUDY ORGANISATIONS

A. Regional Policy Making Organisations/Key Informants

S/N	Organisation	Location	Number of Participants	Identification Tag
1.	African Union Headquarters (AUC),	Addis Ababa Ethiopia	6	Respondent AUC [1] to AUC [6]
2.	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)	Addis Ababa Ethiopia	4	Respondent ECA [1] to ECA [4]
3.	Pan African Parliament (PAP)	Midrand, South Africa	1	Respondent PAP [1]
4.	NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA)	Midrand, South Africa	3	Respondent NEPAD [1] to NEPAD [3]
5.	Former Chairperson of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons	-	1	Respondent APRM [1]
6.	APRM Secretariat	Midrand, South Africa	2	Respondent APRM [2] and APRM [3]
7.	A member of the Ethiopian House of Assembly	-	1	-
		Number of Participants	18	

B. Civil Society Organisations/Other Institutions/Participants

S/N	Organisation	Location	Number of Participants	Identification Tag
Civil Society/Non-Governmental Organisations				
1.	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)	South Africa	1	Respondent EISA[1]
2.	Foundation for the Development of Africa (FDA)	South Africa	1	Respondent FDA [1]
3.	AfriMAP: Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy	South Africa	1	Respondent

	Project (Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa)			OSISA [1]
4.	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)	South Africa	1	Respondent ACCORD [1]
5.	Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	1	Respondent ISS[1]
6.	Oxfam International, Liason Office with the African Union	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	1	Respondent Oxfam [1]
7.	Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC)	Ogun State Nigeria	1	Respondent JDPC [1]
Research Institutions/Think-Tanks				
8.	Organisation for Social Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, (OSSREA)	Addis Ababa Ethiopia	1	Respondent OSSREA [1]
9.	African Institute for South Africa (AISA),	Pretoria South Africa	1	Respondent AISA [1]
10.	Nigerian Institute for International Affairs	Lagos Nigeria	1	Respondent NIIA [1]
Media Sector				
11	The Witness Newspaper	Pietermaritzburg, South Africa	1	Media [1]
12.	Television Continental	Lagos, Nigeria	2	Media[2] and Media [3]
13.	Punch Newspaper	Lagos, Nigeria	1	Media [4]
14.	Daily Dispatch Newspaper	East London, South Africa	1	Media [5]
15.	The Reporter Newspaper	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	1	Media [6]
16	National Mirror Newspaper	Lagos, Nigeria	1	-
Academia Professors				
17.	University of Nairobi	Nairobi, Kenya	1	RP1
18.	The United States International University of Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	1	RP2
19.	University of Cape Town	Cape Town, South Africa	1	RP3
20.	University of KwaZulu-Natal	Durban, South Africa	1	RP4

21.	University for Peace	Costa Rica	1	RP5
Other Academics				
22.	Senior Lecturer, Ghana Institute of Journalism	Ghana	1	Senior Academic [1]
23.	Senior Lecturer, Institute for Peace and Security Studies	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	1	Senior Academic [2]
24.	Senior Lecturer, Hawassa University	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	1	Senior Academic [3]
25.	Senior Lecturer, Zimbabwe Open University	Zimbabwe	1	Senior Academic [4]
26.	Lecturer – University of Kisangani	Democratic Republic of Congo	1	Senior Academic [5]
Post-Graduate Students				
27.	Doctoral candidate, Stellenbosch University	South Africa	1	Doctoral Candidate [1]
28.	Doctoral candidate, University of Cape Town	Cape Town South Africa	1	Doctoral Candidate [2]
29.	Doctoral candidate, University of KwaZulu-Natal	Pietermaritzburg South Africa	1	Doctoral Candidate [3]
30.	Doctoral candidate, Rhodes University	Johannesburg, South Africa.	1	Doctoral Candidate [4]
31.	Doctoral candidate, University of Dodoma	Tanzania	1	Doctoral Candidate [5]
		Number of Participants	32	

2. In your view, what challenges do issues of globalisation, liberalisation, and regionalisation pose for economic integration and development in Africa?

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3. What were the weaknesses and challenges of previous efforts and programmes at achieving the goals of African integration? Do the African Union/NEPAD and APRM initiatives address the challenges?

4. What, in your opinion, should be the goals of regionalisation in Africa? Please relate your answers to any sub-regional or regional groupings in Africa.

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5. Please comment freely on Africa‟s regional institutions and their relations/partnerships with other countries of the world (regionally organised).

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6. What are your thoughts concerning the viability of African economic integration?

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7. Is regional economic integration necessary for Africa?

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8. Please comment freely on the African Union/NEPAD and APRM -- African leaders‟ latest regional strategy towards promoting good governance, embedding of democratic principles, effective citizens‟ participation, poverty reduction and economic development in the African continent.

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9. What would you consider to be the „salient‟ issues in the discourse on regional economic integration in Africa? In essence, what are those factors that undermine the regional integration process in Africa? Do you feel that the AU/NEPAD, APRM integration framework can effectively address these issues?

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10. How would you assess the effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism towards achieving African economic integration? Do you think the APRM can address the challenges of regional integration in Africa?

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11. What do you consider would be the challenges of the APRM with regard to the issue of African economic integration?

12. Are there mechanisms established for effective collaboration and harmonisation of the policies of the AU, NEPAD and APRM ?

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11. Please comment freely on the challenge of regional integration for Africa‟s development. Give suggestions.

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE APRM

1. What are the challenges of the APRM? Why do you think some states are not participating in the process?

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2. How representative of the people is the APRM? How is the APRM educating the people?

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3. In what ways do you think the APR process contribute to resolving issues on regional integration with the AU/NEPAD initiatives?

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4. How does the APRM monitor the affairs of a member country after a country has submitted its report? Are there follow-up mechanisms in the APRM?

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5. How are the policies and programmes of the APRM implemented?

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6. What do you think of the APRM? What are its future prospects?

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Kind regards.

Peace Jiboku (Mrs)

CONSENT FORM

Name of Researcher: Peace Jiboku

Supervisor: Professor U.O. Uzodike

CONSENT

I ……. (Names of participant in full), hereby confirm that I have read the attached document and understand that the purpose of this exercise is purely academic. I therefore consent to be a participant in this study.

....
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT DATE

1. What is your assessment of Africa‟s economic integration project so far? (Please feel free to add more lines to your replies).

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2. What, in your opinion, should be the goals of regionalisation in Africa? Please relate your answers to any sub-regional or regional groupings in Africa.

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3. Is regional economic integration necessary for Africa?

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4. What is your understanding of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)?

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5. What is your perception about the role and objectives of the African Peer Review Mechanism in promoting good governance and Africa‟s developmental and integration process?

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6. What level of participation do you consider appropriate for civil society organisations in the APRM processes?

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7. How democratic are the institutions of governance in your country?

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8. What are your thoughts about state and civil society relations in your country? Do you think that the state is providing the enabling environment for civil society participation in governance processes?

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9. How would you assess the roles of civil society organisations in governmental processes in the African context?

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10. What are the challenges to effective civil society participation in public affairs? (Relate your answer to your organisation).

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11. What are the aims and objectives of this organisation?

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12. In what ways does this organisation influence government‟s policies and programmes?

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13. Are there governmental policies that influence the achievement of this organisation‟s goals and objectives?

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14. Are there processes provided for this organisation to make contributions to regional integration issues? Do you relate with the African Union, NEPAD and APRM Headquarters?

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15. How effectively can civil society organisations contribute to issues on African development and regional integration processes?

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE MEDIA SECTOR

1. In which area(s) would you expect the media to participate in promoting the objectives of the African Union, NEPAD and APRM?

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2. Does your organisation relate with the African Union/NEPAD and APRM? What re your roles in relating with these organisations?

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3. How have your organisation given a voice to the people on governance issues? Do you think the media is influencing government policies?

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4. What are your views about media networking? Can this influence issues on regional integration?

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5. What are the challenges of this organisation with regards to promoting good governance, democracy and regional integration issues?

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Thank you very much for participating in my study. Your views will acknowledged and represented accordingly.

Kind regards.

PEACE JIBOKU (MRS)

CONSENT FORM

Name of Researcher: Peace Jiboku

Supervisor: Professor U.O. Uzodike

CONSENT

I ……. (Names of participant in full), hereby confirm that I have read the attached document and understand that the purpose of this exercise is purely academic. I therefore consent to be a participant in this study.

....
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT DATE

Appendix 4

Letter of Introduction to study organisations/institutions

UNIVERSITY OF
KWAZULU-NATAL
INYUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI

School of Social Sciences
Private Bag X01
Scottsville 3209
Pietermaritzburg
South Africa
Tel: (033) 260-5007/6317
(031) 260-1254
Fax: (033) 260-6479
E-mail: uzodike@ukzn.ac.za

3 December 2012

To Whom It May Concern:

RE: Permission for Research Access to Mrs. Peace Jiboku, PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, RSA

I am writing on behalf of Mrs. Peace Jiboku – a PhD candidate in Political Science in the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa - to request that you please grant her access to your institution/unit, for the purpose of conducting her doctoral research study.

Her study, titled "The Quest for African Economic Integration: An Assessment of NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism," is part of the requirements towards the completion of her doctoral study. Mrs. Jiboku is currently at the data collection stage and would need access to your organization/unit to conduct interviews.

Taking the position that the levels of political, social and economic challenges currently facing the African continent are pointers to the fact that national and international attempts made to remedy the situation have yielded little dividends, the candidate argues that the socio-economic transformation and development of Africa are the prerequisites for the effective sub-regional and regional economic cooperation and integration of African countries, which is necessary to reposition the continent to take active part in the globalizing world economy. Underpinned here are the twin assumptions that no amounts of foreign aid or assistance from the United Nations and its specialized agencies can substitute for Africa's regional determination and effort to develop, and that although international cooperation and aid are relevant and necessary for Africa's development, they would remain meaningless without corresponding national, sub-regional and regional cooperation and integration.

I would be most grateful if you could provide Mrs. Jiboku with pertinent assistance. She needs access to your staff from different units of your organization. I can assure you that she is a disciplined, conscientious and deferential researcher and that this is purely a scholarly enquiry whose purpose is to discover facts and, hopefully, proffer solutions that could serve as the bases for addressing the challenge of slow regional integration and development in Africa.

I also wish to request you to kindly grant her access to your library and archival facilities.

Please do feel free to contact me should you have any queries about Mrs. Jiboku or her doctoral research endeavor.

Sincerely,



Ufo Okeke Uzodike (PhD)
Dean and Head
School of Social Sciences

School of Social Sciences
Postal Address: Private Bag X01, Scottsville, 3209, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
Telephone: +27 (0) 33 260 – 5007/5317 (031) 260-1254 (Durban)
Facsimile: +27 (0) 33 260 6479
Email: uzodike@ukzn.ac.za

APPENDIX 5

APRM Member Countries and their Current Statuses

Countries	Date of Accession to the APRM	Review Status	Country Review Report Publication Date	National Plan of Action Status
Algeria	March 2003	1st review completed	June 2007	Not Available
Angola	July 2004	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Benin	March 2004	1st review completed	January 2008	Not publicly available
Burkina Faso	March 2003	1st review completed	2008	1 progress report published
Cameroon	July 2004	Has not undergone the review yet	Not publicly available	Not available
Chad	January 2013	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Republic of the Congo	March 2003	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Djibouti	July 2007	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Egypt	March 2004	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Ethiopia	July 2004	1st review completed	January 2011	Not available
Equatorial Guinea	January 2014	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Gabon	April 2003	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Ghana	March 2003	1st review completed	June 2005	3 progress reports published
Kenya	March 2003	2nd review started	May 2006	1 progress report published
Lesotho	July 2004	1st review completed	June 2010	Not available
Liberia	January 2011	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Malawi	July 2004	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Mali	May 2003	1st review completed	May 2009	Not publicly available
Mauritania	January 2008	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Mauritius	March 2003	1st review completed	January 2010	Not available
Mozambique	March 2004	1st review completed	January 2009	Not available
Niger	July 2012	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Nigeria	March 2003	1st review completed	June 2009	Not publicly available
Republic of Cote d'Ivoire	January 2015	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Rwanda	March 2003	1st review completed	July 2006	1 progress report published
Sao Tome and	January 2007	1st review	Not publicly	Not available

Principe		completed	available	
Senegal	March 2004	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Sierra Leone	July 2004	1st review completed	January 2012	Not available
South Africa	March 2003	1st review completed	September 2007	2 progress reports published
Sudan	January 2006	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Tanzania	July 2004	1st review completed	January 2013	Not available
Togo	June 2008	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Tunisia	January 2013	Has not undergone the review yet	-	-
Uganda	March 2003	1st review completed	January 2009	1 progress report published
Zambia	January 2006	1st review completed	2014	Not publicly available

Source: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) APRM Toolkit. Available: aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za.