

***CAVEAT EMPTOR. IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS***  
**IN DECOLONISING AND POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA**

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## DECLARATION

I declare this thesis to be entirely my own work except where otherwise stated in the text.

A.R. Jones

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## ABSTRACT

The study is premised on a notion of ‘African crisis’. Since the notion of crisis is multi-dimensional, hence susceptible to variable interpretations and emphases, the study posits and argues two interconnected hypotheses, thus operating within a finite investigative and interpretive framework

It is hypothesised that a crisis of the state in Africa to a significant extent is a crisis in the spheres of political legitimacy and social cohesion. As both spheres fall within the operational ambit of ideology, the study examines the concept in some depth. In order to investigate the problematic of ideology in decolonising and postcolonial Africa, a distinction is made between ideology *per se* and phenomena and practices deemed ideological. During a process of exploring and analysing this distinction, cognisance is taken of the interface between ideology and social science paradigms. From this interface emerges the notion of an ‘ideological paradigm’.

Accordingly, it is hypothesised that two dominant paradigms in Cold War era Africa, namely, modernisation theory and scientific Marxism, are implicated in the crisis of the state. Included in this proposition is an argument that the application of exogenous developmental schematics in effect reproduced a colonial ethos inhospitable to endogenous innovation and initiative, not least in respect to the formulation and application of ideologies adequately congruent with – hence intelligible to – the lived worlds of Africans. Moreover, to the extent that the post Cold War era is characterised by the dominance of a neoliberal paradigm, this contention is of continuing relevance.

The better to distinguish between an ideological paradigm and an ideology, the study investigates two significant departures from paradigmatic convention in decolonising Guinea-Bissau and postcolonial Tanzania. Both Amilcar Cabral and Julius Nyerere articulated and applied ideologies on the whole grounded more in local contexts than in exogenous paradigms. While Cabral's thesis is discussed at some length during the course of a literature review, *Ujamaa* in Tanzania comprises the dissertation's main case study. Tanzania is conceptualised as embarking on a post-independence quest for an inclusive epistemology on which to base an ideology at once locus-specific and informed by general tenets of human-centred socialism. From this quest emerged a national ethic that - in a post Cold War era - continues to influence state-societal relations in Tanzania, and thus has proven to be of lasting value.

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## **SECTION ONE**

### **ELABORATION OF CONCEPTS, THEMES AND ARGUMENTS**

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING 'AFRICAN CRISIS'

The 'crisis of the state' in Africa is - and has been for the past couple of decades - a central preoccupation of much of the research and publication undertaken by Africanists, whether scholars or journalists, and whether resident inside or outside the continent. As indicated below by a brief review of recent and relatively recent literature, the concept of 'crisis' is multi-faceted, *ergo*, susceptible to interpretation on a number of levels and from a variety of angles.

This dissertation addresses as follows the notion of 'African crisis'. Firstly, the dissertation largely confines itself to the Cold War era given a focus on two exogenous and competing paradigms of development. It is hypothesised that to the extent that adherents of modernisation and Marxist paradigms respectively have formulated premises and drawn conclusions designed not so much to chart the mutable contours of local landscapes as to affirm the immutable reality tracks embedded in their paradigms, they have contributed to the crisis of the state in Africa.

Secondly, the dissertation hypothesises that the failure of ideology, more specifically in its capacity as generator and facilitator of political legitimacy and social cohesion, is a feature of state crisis. The study thus takes issue with the contention, for instance, that in Africa, political ideologies largely are irrelevant,<sup>1</sup> and that while Africa is prey to the demons of division, ideology has nothing to do with it.<sup>2</sup> Instead, it is suggested that if Africa is prey to the demons of division, it at least in part is due to the failure in key respects of applied

ideology, and further, that if ideology is unable to make an effective contribution to intra-state disputes, it either becomes or already is an aspect of state crisis.

The hypotheses adumbrated above are linked by an argument that the Euro-North America-centric ethos of the Cold War replicated colonialism's construction of a climate inhospitable to endogenous innovation and initiative, not least in respect to the formulation and elaboration of ideologies adequately congruent with – and hence intelligible to – the lived experience of a majority of state inhabitants. A relative lack of locus-specific ideologies thus has played a part in the tendencies of postcolonial states to mirror the coercive propensities of their colonial forebears. Moreover, this somewhat unpromising situation for the legitimacy of the postcolonial state has not necessarily been improved by post Cold War expansion of neoliberalism into all the regions at the periphery.

The better to distinguish between on the one hand, conformity by ruling elites with the purportedly scientific imperatives of either of two dominant paradigms, and on the other, a more paradigm-critical approach coupled with construction of ideologies adequately congruent with lived worlds, the dissertation highlights the experiences of (decolonising) Guinea-Bissau and (postcolonial) Tanzania. More space is allocated to the latter experience since Amílcar Cabral did not live long enough to convert his thesis of revolutionary struggle into a legitimating and thus non-coercively unifying ideology for the postcolonial state of Guinea-Bissau.

The introductory chapter has three primary objectives. Firstly, to contextualise within post-Cold War Africanist discourse a dissertation informed in key respects by Cold War era issues,

debates and problematics. More specifically, to examine a variety of commentaries and arguments published within the last decade which highlight the - at best - slightly precarious, and at worst, violently contested legitimacy of the postcolonial state,<sup>3</sup> and hence to indicate the longevity of problematics addressed by this study. During the course of an introductory review of pertinent literature, a second objective is pursued, namely, delineation of the interface between political ideologies and development paradigms. The third objective is to provide a preliminary outline of the dissertation's conceptual points of departure, that is, 'ideology', 'ideological', and 'paradigm'. During the process of defining key terms, an outline of the dissertation's structure and content also is provided.

### **Context of the research: an embattled sub-continent.**

#### *Legitimacy and security issues*

In the above respect, two of Richard Joseph's recently published analyses of 'African crisis' are illuminating, particularly in combination. In *Africa: States in Crisis*, Joseph contends that: "Africa will not make sustainable progress in building democratic systems and fostering economic development until the continent acquires coherent, legitimate and effective states."<sup>4</sup> Given that a bipolar Cold War era of competing economic and ideological power blocs has been replaced by neoliberalism's unipolar trajectory, and therefore that *realpolitik* in conjunction with regional and local pressures have induced one party and military regimes at a minimum to hold multi-party elections, Joseph's discussion unfolds against a post Cold War backdrop of state democratisation initiatives in Africa. In both papers, he pinpoints anomalies that infiltrate democratisation agendas. To cite one example: in Uganda, Museveni's 'Movement' has delayed the introduction of multi-party politics, thus bucking the trend. Yet this 'no party' (one party?<sup>5</sup>) regime "has made effective use of state institutions to

turn the tide of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to sustain one of the highest economic growth rates in Africa.”<sup>6</sup> Joseph both implicitly acknowledges and explicitly anticipates a looming contradiction by suggesting that as Uganda embarks on a process of reviving a multi-party dispensation, “ways must be found to protect the gains it has made in governance, state capacity and public service.”<sup>7</sup> This is his only reference to Uganda, but given the trend of his argument it can be inferred that the institutions and *modus operandi* of a comparatively capable and - in at least one important respect - progressive state will not necessarily or obviously be enhanced by the introduction of competitive multi-party politics.

In *Facing Africa's Predicament: Academe Needs to Play a Stronger Role*, Joseph draws attention to a second anomaly, that is, logically incompatible messages embedded in the foreign policy of the United States (U.S.) Having noted that “in the post-cold war world, counterterrorism has replaced anti-communism as the major preoccupation of American foreign policy”,<sup>8</sup> he narrows his focus to Washington’s mixed message to Africa, more specifically to oil producing and / or strategically located (in the context of the U.S. led war on terror) states. Such states are in a position to resist demands for political and economic reform, Washington’s avowed commitment to competitive party politics, human rights, the rule of law and so on notwithstanding. Autocratic, even brutally repressive leaders duly trade on U.S. preoccupations. For example: “Even Charles Taylor, one of Africa's most war-prone leaders, calls his elite regiment in Liberia the Anti-Terrorist Unit.”<sup>9</sup> In combination, Joseph’s papers thus highlight two areas of ambivalence in liberal democracy’s would-be totalising discourse. One is domestic: the potential for the introduction of a multi-party system to undermine state achievements and capabilities. The other is external: reform initiatives are

waived by a superpower in search of strategic alliances. Indeed, concludes Joseph, some of Washington's foreign policy programmes "bear an eerie resemblance to cold war politics."<sup>10</sup>

On balance, Joseph attributes endemic and ubiquitous insecurity in Africa not so much to the absence - or superficial and contested implementation - of liberal democracy as to the steady erosion of state legitimacy in the decades since independence. Investigating the causes of chronic instability, he touches on a number of problematics that are associated with "the unviable territorial configuration of African states",<sup>11</sup> and observes that borders in any case are being reconfigured, albeit in destructive ways (war, smuggling, trans-state criminal networks). Hence, a pertinent question is: how can borders constructively be reconfigured to enable "the emergence of cohesive and functional states?"<sup>12</sup> An associated problematic is that the emergence of viable states is inhibited by "the disconnection between African societies and existing formal state systems" - a disconnection, he opines, that a series of multi-party elections held in a variety of states over the past decade or so have done little or nothing to rectify. Citing Krasner's contention that "one of the critical purposes of the state is to represent symbolically the existence and unity of the political community which is also a social and moral community"<sup>13</sup> Joseph laments the weakness of the "ethical filaments" that connect states and societies in Africa. In the absence of these ethical filaments, "political power will only replicate the money-changing bazaars of Nigerian politics."<sup>14</sup> Further, ethnicity and religion will continue to attract the social attachments and loyalties that states crucially lack.

Given the above assortment of problematics, Joseph contends that neoliberal strategies of democratisation are insufficient to restore capability and legitimacy to post Cold War African

states. They should be accompanied by truly democratic developmental processes including the revival and enhancement of social welfare services from which 1980s structural adjustment programmes compelled states to withdraw. In short, he appears to favour a return to "the ideals of social democracy", the better to ensure that marginalised groups "acquire stakes in the new democratic systems."<sup>15</sup> While this suggestion of Joseph's is more implied than stated, a second recommendation is made fully explicit. He regrets that "with the end of the cold war, African studies - and area studies generally - were increasingly dismissed as outmoded" and avers that scholars have a major role to play in reviving and enhancing Africanist discourse. In this respect, he advocates "smart partnerships" between African scholars and their counterparts in the Northern hemisphere, the better to arrive at "a systematic understanding of how Africa's poor development performance can be reversed."<sup>16</sup>

#### *Chronic economic underdevelopment*

Joseph's contention that "the security needs of the African people exceed those of any other on earth"<sup>17</sup> is underscored by Colin Leys' claim - in *Confronting the African Tragedy* - that "in sub-Saharan Africa most people are facing a future in which not even bare survival is assured."<sup>18</sup> Having noted that economic gains - albeit deeply flawed (since most of the benefits were diverted elsewhere) - were made by the expansion of the forces of production during the colonial era, Leys points out that: "African nationalist leaders and their western supporters were confident that with independence their countries' economic growth rates would accelerate and the gap between Africa and the industrial world would be progressively closed."<sup>19</sup> Instead, two "development decades" later, high hopes stand revealed as "tragic delusions": poverty now is more widespread and more entrenched than was the case at independence, and "a chronic dependence on aid" has critically undermined the sovereignty of

African states.<sup>20</sup> To compound a poverty-stricken, aid-dependent picture, a high level of corruption is the pervasive product of "the scramble for whatever surplus is still extracted from the direct producers", and accordingly has deprived African states of legitimacy.<sup>21</sup> Infrastructures have collapsed, bribery and extortion are common currency, as is violent crime in the cities. Malnutrition is widespread, life expectancy generally is low. "In face of this" contends Leys, "'Africanists' have a lot of soul-searching to do. The original optimism about the post-independence future, questioned by very few, now looks like a serious failure of analysis, if not a lapse of objectivity." Leys then asks: "How should the African tragedy be explained?"<sup>22</sup>

Questioning the accuracy of Davidson's premise<sup>23</sup> that colonialism's systematic destruction of Africa's indigenous polities in tandem with the grid-like imposition of states "that took no account of the traditional political values of the people ... brought together within the colonial state boundaries", and thus that "the situation in Africa is primarily ... a crisis of institutions",<sup>24</sup> Leys avers that Davidson's archetypal precolonial polity, the Asante state, does not adequately lend itself to a comparison with Yugoslavia (a comparison that constructs key elements of Davidson's thesis). Not the least of the differences that compromise an argument based on purported similarities is that while precommunist Yugoslavia was chronically underdeveloped by contrast with states in Western Europe, nonetheless levels of industrialisation and productivity were high relative to those in precolonial Asante.

And this is the point: the ultimate cause of the weakness of the precolonial African states, vis-a-vis external capital and imperialism, was the extreme backwardness of their economies. It is not a question of the richness of their traditional cultures or of the dignity and meaning these cultures had afforded the African peoples. It is simply that they had no capacity to defend themselves against the forces - political and military as well as economic - developed by capitalism in the west.<sup>25</sup>

The weakness of precolonial economic development then was compounded and entrenched by colonialism's destruction of indigenous economies and "the social orders based on them, without putting in their place economies or social systems capable of defending themselves against 'world market forces' after independence."<sup>26</sup> Apart from attributing a long term aspect of the African tragedy to the failure of colonial regimes to transform - or to allow Africans to transform - the relations of production, Leys does not address in any detail issues of precolonial and colonial economic underdevelopment. However, his outline is mentioned and details are elaborated by Giovanni Arrighi in *The African Crisis*.<sup>27</sup> In this paper, Arrighi's stated objective is to situate African crisis in a world systemic context. His method includes a comparison between the precolonial and colonial inheritances of Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia respectively.

In assessing economic underdevelopment in precolonial Africa, Arrighi highlights firstly, a (pre-Atlantic slave trade) shortage of labour attendant on an abundance of land and other natural resources relative to scarcity of population; secondly, "the subsequent depopulation and disruption of productive activities, directly or indirectly associated with the capture and export of slaves."<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the slave trade not only materially exacerbated an extant population and production shortage, it further reduced production *per se* by channelling activities into "the protection-producing industry."<sup>29</sup> Colonialism's contribution to an economically unpromising situation was to take over protection-producing activities while simultaneously making entrepreneurialism in trade and production the preserve of non-Africans. By contrast, East Asia in both precolonial and colonial eras had an abundance of labour relative to natural resources. This determinant was supplemented firstly by commercial exchanges with Western Europe in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries and secondly, by

East Asia's incorporation - beginning in the latter part of the 18<sup>th</sup> century - in Europe's world system. This said, the original determinant proved crucial because "under the conditions of escalating competition among Third World regions in the 1980s, the availability of a large, flexible and low-cost labour supply"<sup>30</sup> became the primary indicator of state and regional ability to compete.<sup>31</sup>

Like Joseph, Arrighi factors the role of the United States into his investigation of African crisis; unlike Joseph, he emphasises the impact of unevenly distributed economic aid. For instance, U.S. aid to South Korea between 1946 and 1978 came to a total of nearly \$6 billion compared with a total of \$6.89 billion in aid to the entire African continent during the same period. "By the time the world economic crisis of the 1970s set in, the Cold War had thus further increased the chances that East Asia would succeed and Africa fail in the coming competitive struggles of the next two decades."<sup>32</sup> (i)

Apart from an endorsement of Mamdani's analysis of the skewed political projects of postcolonial states (namely, Africanising urban and administrative centres while failing adequately to de-tribalise the rural peripheries<sup>33</sup>), Arrighi pays minimal attention to specifically political factors. This omission is partially remedied by Fantu Cheru in *African Renaissance. Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalisation*<sup>34</sup> and remedied in full by Claude Ake in *Democracy And Development*.<sup>35</sup>

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(i) As a general rule, information and / or direct quotations are acknowledged by only one endnote if derived not only from the same text but also from the same page, and if cited within the same paragraph of this study.

*Exogenous paradigms, entrenched elites and other developmental problematics*

While according all due weight to the considerable contribution made by external actors and adverse economic factors to the problem of governance in Africa, particularly during the Cold War period, Cheru contends that “a significant portion of the blame lies with African governments themselves, who have managed successfully to suppress the avenues of democratic expression, participation and self-government of their citizens.”<sup>36</sup> Despite the triumph of democracy “as an idea” in much of Africa since 1989, the practice of democracy “is in profound trouble and has not moved beyond the holding of multi-party elections.”<sup>37</sup>

Like Joseph, Cheru highlights a disjuncture between state economic reform and the practice of democracy, but he approaches the anomaly from a different angle, viz, “an inherent contradiction” between democratic political reform and market-oriented economic reform. He contends that structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have “tended to encourage or reinforce authoritarian political forces that negate the ideals that the same donor community seeks to promote.”<sup>38</sup> As does Joseph, Cheru points out that since SAPs increase poverty, not least by decreasing state expenditure on vital social services, they alienate citizens from the state and further erode the in any case problematic legitimacy of the African state.

Additionally, Cheru notes that rapid economic growth in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore has not been achieved under democratic conditions. “Their economic success can be attributed to the fact that they represent ‘developmental states’ - states led by elites that ... pursue national economic growth as their central objective, to the exclusion of other priorities.”<sup>39</sup> By contrast, “the paradox of the new wave of democratisation in Africa is that its ‘success’ is built upon the failure of development.”<sup>40</sup>

Conversely, Claude Ake contends that “the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place.” In contradistinction to Arrighi’s line of argument, Ake posits that by-and-large “political conditions are the greatest impediment to development.”<sup>41</sup> He cites the unusually statist nature (far more so than colonial experiences in other parts of the world) of colonialism in Africa. Not only were colonial states absolute, they also were arbitrary. (An example is the colonial government’s decision not only to introduce previously unknown cocoa cultivation in the Gold Coast but also to make it the pivot of the economy). Utilising Gramscian terminology, Ake contends that colonial officials “showed hardly any interest in transforming domination into hegemony, beyond the notion that their domination was also a civilising mission.”<sup>42</sup> Given its focus on the crude accumulation of power and profit, colonialism’s propagation of ‘civilising’ values did not amount to the dissemination of legitimacy norms. In turn, the legitimacy vacuum that accompanied colonialism was reproduced by forces in opposition to it: in both cases, the *de facto* possession of power and the right to rule were conflated. “The result was an unprecedented drive for power; power was made the top priority in all circumstances and sought by all means.”<sup>43</sup>

Political independence by-and-large did not reconfigure the nature of the state which continued to rely heavily on “an apparatus of violence”, thus eliciting coercion-induced compliance from the population.<sup>44</sup> Whereas nationalist discourse pre-independence had been radical and egalitarian, post-independence nationalist elites narrowed their focus: firstly, to the containment of “frustrations arising from the failure to effect the societal transformation that many had hoped for and fought for”;<sup>45</sup> secondly, to competition among themselves for the appropriation and accumulation of state power. Competing elites extended divisive

tentacles into their national constituencies by appealing to ethnic, communal and religious loyalties. The unifying trajectory of pre-independence nationalism thus was fragmented by the alienating tendencies of post-independence politics. Elites "created not only strong divisions within their own ranks but strong antipathies and exclusivity in society."<sup>46</sup>

Given the weak material base of post-independence elites, a condition contingent on their economic marginalisation by discriminatory colonial practices and compounded by their lack of experience as entrepreneurs, they availed themselves of state resources in order to retain power. Elites in power felt no need to engage in entrepreneurial activities since their control of the state and its resources enabled effortless and risk-free appropriation of surplus; elites out of power "did not even have the option of channelling their ambitions into economic success, which was primarily a matter of state patronage." Within this setting of "lawless political competition amidst an ideological void" bequeathed by colonial to postcolonial states, development emerged "as an attractive idea for forging a sense of common cause and for bringing some coherence to the fragmented political system."<sup>47</sup> It was an idea, Ake contends, towards the realisation of which elites made token gestures "while trying to pass the responsibility to foreign patrons." Economic dependence engendered by colonialism thus was extended and perpetuated by the political leaders and bureaucratic managers of postcolonial states operating in tandem with foreign donors and developmental experts. "But as it turned out, what was adopted was not so much an ideology of development as a strategy of power that merely capitalised on the objective need for development."<sup>48</sup>

In Ake's explication of postcolonial state crisis, an ideology of development notionally filled the legitimacy vacuum (re) produced by the non-fulfilment of egalitarian and redistributive

promises embedded in the discourse of anti-colonial nationalism. Yet, given the extent to which African leaders relied on an exogenous development paradigm and its agents, they in effect transferred the onus for state legitimacy to non-African blueprints and expertise on the one hand, and on the other, to their people. In the former instance, Western agents of the paradigm marketed it as a science of development, and thus derived their legitimacy from their status as scientists.<sup>49</sup> In the latter instance, leaders argued that only a nation-wide ethic of hard work could enable 'catch-up' programmes.

The hard work was to be done literally in silence; the overriding necessity of development was coupled with the overriding necessity for obedience and conformity. African leaders insisted that development needs unity of purpose and the utmost discipline, that the common interest is not served by oppositional attitudes. It was easy to move from there to the criminalisation of political opposition and the establishing of single-party systems.<sup>50</sup>

The exogenous development paradigm targeted for critical attention by Ake is modernisation theory. Having acknowledged that modernisation theory by no means is a seamless monolith, indeed that it incorporates "a complex unity of diversities", <sup>51</sup> he interrogates the theory in its most common and characteristically teleological form. The paradigm's point of departure is an original - once universal - condition of backwardness. Operating on the premise that Western states represent the highest stage of evolution thus far, the paradigm's implicit assumption is that linear developmental progress is "a matter of becoming western." Furthermore, "when the theorists encountered cultural resistance, they proclaimed the need for the modernisation of attitudes."<sup>52</sup> In consequence, the theory ignored or reduced (to backward social and political formations) the historical and cultural specificities of Third World countries.

In the 1960s, modernisation theory conflated the wealth of nations and the welfare of people. A 1970s shift in focus from wealth to welfare was no more than superficial. Despite the appearance of a new critical awareness, development continued to be equated with economic growth. Even though in the 1980s, the equation flew in the face of deteriorating African economies, "the validity of the paradigm was asserted so aggressively that the prospect of using another paradigm could no longer be seriously entertained."<sup>53</sup> Moreover, since the paradigm was maintained by the specific interests of elite fractions of African and Western donor communities, both African leaders and foreign patrons "have made certain assumptions, used certain concepts, valued certain aspects of experience and not others, focussed on certain issues and ignored others [and] adopted a particular discursive practice and particular strategies for ordering experience."<sup>54</sup>

Ake's argument thus imputes the primacy of ideological (in the sense of representation of the particular interests of dominant groups as national / global interests) substrata that generate and configure a given development paradigm. He explains the seeming inability of African elites and foreign experts to concede the inadequacy of the paradigm by positing a correspondence between its ideological and its scientific character. In the former respect, "the ideology was shaped decisively by the essentially political interests of its proponents." In the latter respect, the paradigm was a "conveniently abstract" science of development<sup>55</sup> in that it enabled its adherents to overlook African specificities. He concludes his analysis of the failure of modernisation theory to formulate and implement sustainable development strategies by contending that scholars and agents of the paradigm have tended "to focus on ideologically derived answers to the problem of development that bear no relation to the

nature of the problem. Their concern is not so much to solve a problem on its own terms as to realise an image of the world."<sup>56</sup>

In the argument sketched above, Ake does not refer to the (formerly) widespread application in Africa of a Marxist development paradigm. This gap in argumentation briefly is addressed by Issa Shivji, and addressed in more detail by Ato Quayson. Shivji, having cited the Cold War confrontation that "turned the newly ... independent states into pawns, and the continent into a chessboard of proxy hot wars" and averred that "the consequences of those hot wars have been devastating for the continent",<sup>57</sup> alludes to the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, specifically to "radical political economy with its concepts of class and modes of production", contrasting it favourably with neoliberal discourse which lacks "theoretical vigour or political vision." This said, Shivji acknowledges that radical political economy was an elite and very often an elitist project.<sup>58</sup>

Addressing a Cold War-informed postcolonial context in Africa, Quayson notes that Marxism provided "a prime anti-hegemonic discourse with which to contest the West",<sup>59</sup> but, like Shivji, highlights the elitist trajectory of the Marxist development project. Having alluded to "the tragic obfuscations that Marxist rhetoric has produced in the postcolonial world",<sup>60</sup>

Quayson contends that

... within the dynamics of certain newly independent states that opted to turn to Marxism to mobilize the ordinary people for the business of building viable post-independence societies, the rhetoric hardly ever matched with the practice, partly because this derivative ideology had to take shape within contexts that were riddled with their exacerbated cultural contradictions. Thus, in practice, the mobilization of the masses actually entailed the concentration of power in the hands of a radical elite who turned out to be not very different from the Western bourgeoisie they so vehemently criticised.<sup>61</sup>

Thus, like Ake, Quayson highlights the disjuncture between African particularities and the totalising trajectory of an imported development paradigm but unlike Ake, his critique includes a Marxist development paradigm. He cites Rattansi's assessment both of a Marxist linear narrative of the transition from one mode of production to another, and the equally linear, functionalist approach of modernisation.<sup>62</sup> This said, it is worth noting that Quayson distinguishes between an overly determinist Marxist paradigm and the Marxian concept of the dialectic. Whereas the former treats as incommensurate any phenomenon that doesn't fit within the parameters of class analysis, the complexity of the dialectical model enables recognition that "the old and the new often persist side by side in language, in theoretical discourse and even in the disposition of the various social attitudes."<sup>63</sup> Illustrating the point, Quayson cites the cult of the leader in postcolonial Africa, and notes that a cult of personality was utilised by Marxist, non-Marxist and capitalist-oriented leaders alike: "Both Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi carefully cultivated a personality cult from different ideological positions, the first being ardently Marxist, and the other an unflinching capitalist. These could be multiplied across the entire gamut of African politics."<sup>64</sup> It takes, observes Quayson, a "complex model" adequately to explain this "peculiar process".<sup>65</sup>

Citing Raymond Williams' notion of a dialectic of residuality and emergence, Quayson juxtaposes a precolonial concept of 'culture hero' with a postcolonial leadership cult, and defines this combination of phenomena as "a dialectical mutation in which a variety of 'old' and 'new' ideas are sometimes reconstellated to produce new perspectives and realities."<sup>66</sup> The postcolonial cult of the leader is a product of accommodation between old and new (or residual and emergent) forms of legitimisation. It is a process in which a pivotal figure in

traditional narrative and “the imagining of the modern state itself”<sup>67</sup> are contiguous, and thus is a syncretic blend of traditional and modern modes of cultural authenticity. However, not least in light of Quayson’s recent statement about “the amazing phenomenon of failed states”<sup>68</sup> in Africa, it seems that traditional modes of cultural authenticity have played an ambivalent role in the state’s quest for legitimacy. He depicts the scenario as follows: the cultural heroism of the decolonising and early post-independence periods transmogrified into postcolonial dictatorship that deployed simple dichotomies as a way of forcing people to make the ‘right’ choices. Authoritarian binarisation of reality generated “nervous conditions”<sup>69</sup> among the populace; widespread anxiety in turn generated a new set of urban myths in which heroes are ordinary people who are able to trick their overlords. The rescripted narrative represents a decisive shift in the location of heroes. In the reconstituted mythology of cultural heroism, epic qualities no longer belong to political figures. They now belong to trickster figures: anyone can be a hero as long as s/he is astute enough to engage in a brand of subterfuge that undermines - while pretending to serve - the authority of elites.<sup>70</sup> In short, a state-sponsored mantra of ‘culture hero’ or ‘man of the people’ in the first instance was reinforced, and in the second instance, subverted by popular narrative. Where once the narrative was utilised to empower leaders, a shift in focus to ‘trickster’ heroes undermines ruling elites, and state legitimacy accordingly is eroded.

### **Collation and contextualisation of themes.**

Between them, Africanists cited above provide an incisive survey of a number of the sub-continent's chronic ailments, whether endogenous, exogenous or a lethal combination. While Leys and Arrighi focus on the role of economic determinants, in the process tracing sub-

Saharan Africa's economic underdevelopment back to precolonial times, Ake argues that postcolonial Africa's development deficit is an outcome of political factors, in particular, the struggle for power. "Political power was everything; it was not only the access to wealth but also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being."<sup>71</sup> Further, Ake, Joseph and Cheru all develop a theme of doubtful or non-existent state legitimacy, and question - Ake emphatically so<sup>72</sup> - the capacity of neoliberalism and multi-partyism to address the legitimacy vacuum that characterises states in crisis. Additionally, Joseph discerns a normative vacuum at the heart of the postcolonial state - a problematic that in part is a consequence of postcolonial reproduction of the rift between African societies and colonial states. In a post Cold War era, this rift is widened by the application of neoliberal economic reforms that increase the divide between haves and have nots; moreover, multiparty elections by no means adequately address the de-legitimizing paucity of substantive and participatory dimensions of democracy.

Shivji's paper indicates that current arguments about the nature and purpose of democracy are rooted in an earlier period. He cites Cold War era debates at the University of Dar es Salaam between proponents of the dependency / under-development paradigm on the one hand, and on the other, "mainstream American paradigms of political science centring around modernisation and nation-building."<sup>73</sup> Ake elaborates in some detail a connection between an imported paradigm of modernisation and an ideology of development adopted by postcolonial elites to fill - at least notionally - the legitimacy vacuum attendant on the decay of anti-colonial, radical nationalist ideology. He underlines the extent to which African leaders delegated the legitimating dimension of ideology to an abstract science of development.

Quayson extends - by including a Marxist development paradigm - the connection made by Ake between single party regimes, imported development paradigms and derivative ideologies. He distinguishes, however, between two brands of Marxism: an overly determinist ideological mode on the one hand, and on the other, a complex, dialectical and flexible mode.

*Cold War epistemological disputes.*

At this juncture in a review of salient literature and focal themes in the arena of 'African crisis', it is germane to flag two lines of enquiry that emerge *ex hypothesi* during the course of the dissertation. Firstly, while Ake's critical appraisal of modernisation theory incorporates its status as a science of development, Quayson refers to the elitist and authoritarian leanings of Marxism in Africa without touching on its claim to scientific stature. Yet it is precisely this claim that lent scientific authority to Marxist dismissal of the solutions posited by modernisation theory to problems of underdevelopment, and concomitant depiction of the paradigm and its proponents as agents of American imperialism. Likewise, given modernisation theory's declared commitment to a value-free science of comparative politics, Marxism was conceived as just another ideology to be judged solely - and clinically - in terms of performance criteria (at any rate, in principle.) Decolonising and postcolonial Africa's encounter with exogenous development paradigms thus was configured by the paradox of two competing, 'universal' sciences that - to borrow a phrase from Kuhn - talked through each other.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, each science defined the other as ideology.

A second line of enquiry is directed towards Marxism's division into linear (scientific) and lateral (dialectical) formats. These marked divergences between varieties of Marxism flag an epistemological disjuncture, summarised by Bernstein as "that pervasive tension at the heart

of any socialist or communist project between realism and utopianism, between the claims of Marxism as a science of social reality and a programme of human emancipation.”<sup>75</sup> In short, the issue (raised by Quayson) of incommensurability or - more moderately put - epistemological incompatibility, applies not only to rival development paradigms operating in Africa during a Cold War era, but also to contestations between scientific and humanist Marxism. Marxist scholars and activists - *mutatis mutandis* - were located in either of two disputatious camps: one armed with scientific certainty, operating in support of actually existing socialism in the Second World, and its expansion into the Third World; the other “born from the defeat of mass politics”<sup>76</sup> in the First World, providing socialist critiques of capitalism as well as moral support to anti-imperialist movements in the Third World.<sup>77</sup>

#### *Post Cold War neoliberal problematics.*

In light of ‘Western’<sup>78</sup> Marxism’s human centredness and deployment of analytic (dialectical) method in contradistinction to its *alter ego*’s reliance on its global authenticity as a science, it is scarcely surprising if the former emerged from the demise of scientific socialism in better shape than the latter. This said, Perry Anderson, in the course of a survey of the lifespan to date of *New Left Review* - a journal closely associated with Marxist Humanist trends<sup>79</sup> - soberly asserts that:

Four decades later, the environment in which NLR took shape has all but completely passed away. The Soviet bloc has disappeared. Socialism has ceased to be a widespread ideal. Marxism is no longer dominant in the culture of the left. Even Labourism has largely dissolved ... What is the principal aspect of the past decade? Put briefly, it can be defined as the virtually uncontested consolidation, and universal diffusion of, neo-liberalism.<sup>80</sup>

Anderson is emphatic that “neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided across the globe: the most successful ideology in world history”<sup>81</sup> - a far cry from the conjuncture of the 1960s when “a third of the planet had broken with capitalism.”<sup>82</sup>

Sawyerr, referring to the rise of neoliberalism with its pro-market / anti-state bias, notes that it coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union “and the discrediting of the alternative vision of society.”<sup>83</sup> Whereas Anderson perceives the (Clinton-Blair) ‘third way’ as “the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today”,<sup>84</sup> Sawyerr cites the notion of a ‘global village’ as the ideological myth behind which neoliberalism conceals its exploitative agenda, and observes that “it takes a considerable leap of the imagination to locate much of sub-Saharan Africa within this ‘global village’.”<sup>85</sup> He contends that Africa's current crop of ruling elites are locked into an ideology that places severe constraints on the ability of states to intervene - with people-friendly policies - in the purportedly neutral trajectory of market forces. Concluding that neoliberalism, and the institutions that promote it, inhibit the fulfilment by the state of its principle function, that is, the defence and enhancement of the well-being of its people, he argues that: “this ... is the fundamental reality that lies at the base of the continuous crises of the sub-Saharan African state.”<sup>86</sup>

Like Sawyerr, Abrahamsen highlights questionable attempts by international financial institutions, the World Bank in particular, “to absolve themselves from any responsibility for Africa's economic failure and to present their policy prescriptions as a set of technical truths.”<sup>87</sup> Arguing that development aid conditionalities are ‘neutral’ only from the perspective of those who already accept the underlying neoliberal assumptions, she points

out that "for those who do not, the advice to cut food subsidies and introduce fees at health clinics is far from 'technocratic.'"88

In sum: given the decline of Marxism as a development paradigm in tandem with its loss of credibility as a science of social reality, it seems that only one avenue of rationally planned and executed development is open to underdeveloped countries. Following on from this, it is arguable that the modernisation paradigm, once marketed in the Third World as an alternative to Marxism, subsequently has metamorphosed into the only truly scientific, *ipso facto*, globally applicable mode of formulating and implementing development initiatives. Cold War era modernisation theory thus has re-entered post Cold War social science discourse as "one of the most important (positive or negative) points of macro-comparative reasoning."<sup>89</sup> Knobl includes *en passant* in his argument an observation that: "Marxism, the great macro-theoretical rival in the 1960s and 1970s has lost much of its intellectual attraction."<sup>90</sup>

However, to link yesterday's modernisation theory with today's neoliberalism is to beg the question (given that the focal concept of 'political system' is embedded in modernisation theory, whereas neoliberalism initially eschewed explicitly political criteria) of why - as the 1980s shifted gear into the 1990s - did a science of Third World economic progress marry itself to a set of political conditions? What factors enabled neoliberalism's evolution from Western economic orthodoxy to globally dominant economic-political blueprint? This is a question of some significance since it is the latter - and later - development that underwrites juxtaposition of the term 'neoliberal' with the terms 'ideology' and 'hegemonic'. By not only attaching a set of political institutions and arrangements to an extant economic base, but also marketing a particular political format as indispensable to the successful functioning of the

doctrine, neoliberalism has endowed a political superstructure with scientific status by association (in the process generating anomalies, as noted by Joseph and Cheru, above).

In the event that science fails - that is, if regular elections plus multi-partyism in tandem with macroeconomic development policies do not produce either a sufficient degree of political legitimacy or the predicted economic growth rates, a common outcome is that international financial institutions and donor countries blame the 'usual suspects', namely, governments and state apparatuses in recipient countries, for perpetuating the existence of a disabling environment. It is worth noting, however, that Joseph Stiglitz, formerly the World Bank's Chief Economist, provides an exception to the conventional rule of fault allocation. Stiglitz argues that:

The application of mistaken economic theories would not be such a problem if the end of first colonialism and then communism had not given the IMF and the World Bank the opportunity to greatly expand their respective original mandates, to vastly extend their reach. Today these institutions have become dominant players in the world economy. Not only countries seeking their help but also seeking their 'seal of approval' so that they can better access international capital must follow their economic prescriptions ... The result for many people has been poverty and for many countries social and political chaos.<sup>91</sup>

Speaking at the World Social Forum (convened in Mumbai early in 2004), Stiglitz warned that economic instability and social insecurity will lead to a rise in violence in the world because it is impossible to separate economic from social and political issues, and contended that economic policy cannot be delegated to the technocrats of international financial institutions but instead should be at the centre of democratic debate in each country.<sup>92</sup>

### **Statement of position and preliminary definition of terms.**

It is not the intention of this dissertation to operate as an *apologia* for corrupt and coercive governance in Africa (or anywhere else, for that matter), or to provide any semblance of endorsement for 'sit-tight' heads of state and their prosperous cohorts, including those who resort to populist, axiomatically anti-Western rhetoric as a means of diverting attention from state-wide violation of human rights. This said, my introductory chapter follows Stiglitz in highlighting the collapse of the communist bloc as a crucially enabling factor in the transmogrification of neoliberalism, from its 1980s inception in Thatcher's Britain and Reagan's America as an alternative to Keynesian economics, to its current status as globally dominant ideology. An additional and related issue is that the Soviet bloc's implosion did severe damage not only to an ideology but also to the epistemology by which it was underpinned and from which it derived much of its force and conviction. In consequence, the commanding heights of social science epistemology now are occupied by an elite caste of intellectuals primarily based in the First World, and methodologies are configured accordingly.

Leaders of political and intellectual opinion in post Cold War Africa combine adaptation to and reaction against the global dominance of neoliberalism. While prominent politicians and statesmen revisit Pan-Africanist discourse in order to recast it in an 'African Renaissance' mould better suited to 21<sup>st</sup> century global *realpolitik* than its 20<sup>th</sup> century predecessor,<sup>93</sup> social scientists call for a new paradigm with which to conduct Africa-specific intellectual enquiry.<sup>94</sup> In short, the quest for a distinctive 'African identity' with which to counter Eurocentric meta-narrative has outlasted the Cold War.

This dissertation argues that nodal points of sub-Saharan Africa's endemic crop of debilitating ailments are derived - at least in part - from the Cold War, its ontological and epistemological binaries, ideologically driven dichotomies, and concomitant incommensurability of rival social science paradigms. While the era of decolonisation approximately can be dated from the end of the Second World War, at which juncture African nationalism definitively shifted into decolonising gear,<sup>95</sup> postcolonialism is conceptualised as an ongoing process<sup>96</sup> with its formal origin in the *annus mirabilis* of 1960. Although the time frame that informs the dissertation's title approximately coincides with the Cold War decades, it is worth emphasising that the trend of the dissertation is to regard postcolonialism not so much as a chronologically defined era but rather as a nuanced, unfolding continuum. As Abrahamsen puts it:

The post in postcolonialism is not ... to be regarded as a clearly dividing temporal *post*, but rather as an indication of continuity. Postcolonialism, in the words of Gyan Prakesh, 'Sidesteps the language of beginnings and ends.' It seeks to capture the continuities and complexities of any historical period, and attempts to transcend strict chronological and dichotomous thinking where history is clearly delineated and the social world neatly categorised into separate boxes.<sup>97</sup>

The argument outlined above incorporates a notion that zero-sum games played by Cold War warriors - whether of the pen or the sword - on both sides of a global schism generated a climate unfriendly to endogenous innovation and initiative, not least in the realm of context-specific ideology in its capacity as politically legitimating and socially cohesive schematic within the boundaries of a given state. Further, this problematic has not been redeemed by the post Cold War pre-eminence of neoliberalism as a universal paradigm of development.

One consequence, both of Cold War and post Cold War meta-narratives, is that the lifespan of African nationalism has been over-extended, and in the process has mutated into a primarily defensive ideological instrument. The ever-diminishing ability of this relic of a once vibrant decolonisation ideology to endow its elite protagonists with sufficient legitimacy is indicated by rising levels of state (or state-sponsored) violence during and - in some cases - well beyond the 1980s. "Exhausted nationalism"<sup>98</sup> by definition is socially disruptive and nationally divisive. Far from providing a solution to 'African crisis', it both contributes to and is an aspect of the crisis of the postcolonial state.<sup>99</sup>

The chapter now moves on to a preliminary investigation of 'ideology'. According to Plamenatz, 'ideology' refers not to a single concept but to "a family of concepts."<sup>100</sup> De Crespigny and Cronin cite "the load of meanings" carried by the term 'ideology'.<sup>101</sup> Larrain notes that 'ideology' is "a concept heavily charged with political connotations and widely used in everyday life with the most diverse significations."<sup>102</sup> He distinguishes between negative and positive interpretations of the concept.<sup>103</sup> In similar vein, De Crespigny and Cronin distinguish between two approaches to ideology: "Those who hold that ideologies obtain ... their effects entirely through distortion" and those who "deploy the term in a more neutral fashion."<sup>104</sup>

Having highlighted the difficulties inherent in arriving at a precise definition of the term, authors cited above conceptualise ideology as being or aspiring to be "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas ... characteristic of a group or community";<sup>105</sup> as "systems of practically oriented beliefs or attitudes associated with social groups";<sup>106</sup> or as "the expression of the world-view of a class."<sup>107</sup> A notable feature of these definitions is the collective / communal /

social application (or alternatively, aspiration) of ideology. (Plamenatz, however, avers that one person may be deemed to possess an ideology – but adds a caveat, namely, that “the person whose ideas are so styled is held to be important ... and what he does has grave consequences for others.”<sup>108</sup>) Bearing in mind the socially collective application - or aspiration - of ideology, I embark as follows on an open-ended definition of the concept, viz, a theory-based programme of action that aims to integrate itself *qua* schematic of beliefs and activities with a given social constituency.

Having arrived at a preliminary definition, it remains to be said that in Chapters Two and Three of the first section of the dissertation, origins and interpretations of ‘ideology’ are explored in some depth and detail and, moreover, that this is a complex task. As De Crespigny and Cronin observe, “the diverse senses of ‘ideology’ tell us much about the wanderings of our own recent history.”<sup>109</sup> In Chapter Two, particular attention is paid to the labyrinthine interface between ideology and science. Also, since ‘science’ imputes - following Kuhn<sup>110</sup> - the equivalent concept of ‘paradigm’, the latter is examined in conjunction with science and ideology. During the course of this examination, the scientific (or paradigmatic) roots of Marxist and modernisation theories are explored.

A further complication is that the distinction between ‘ideology’ *per se* and phenomena or practices negatively conceptualised as ‘ideological’ is not altogether easy to pin down. For instance, are all ideologies by definition ideological, or are some ideologies more ideological than others? It seems reasonable to surmise that if an ideology fits Hountondji’s depiction of an assortment of (one party and military) state ideologies in Africa as “deceptive alibis in which the powers that be quietly do the opposite of what they say and say the opposite of

what they do",<sup>111</sup> it is more, rather than less, ideological. Hountondji's observation suggests that ideologies in which ideological elements predominate are very largely the instruments of self-serving elites; it also imputes an admixture of conscious mendacity, and thus dovetails with Havel's depiction of Cold War era (in particular, Brezhnevite) ideology in Czechoslovakia:

Ideology, in creating a bridge of excuses between the system and the individual, spans the abyss between the aims of the system and the aims of life. It pretends that the requirements of the system derive from the requirements of life. It is a world of appearances trying to pass for reality.<sup>112</sup>

Discernable in Havel's and Hountondji's respective anti-ideological stances is an inference that ruling elites knowingly misrepresent the lived experience of a majority of people.

Mannheim, however, takes the point of view that situationally transcendent ideas rate as ideological if they do not succeed in realising their projected contents despite "the good faith"<sup>113</sup> in which their adherents and practitioners operate. Drawing on aspects of Mannheim's thesis, Chapter Three contains an analysis of Che Guevara's aptly titled *African Dream*.<sup>114</sup> Guevara's somewhat anguished narrative provides a compelling, if harrowing account of his encounter, as practitioner of a scientific and universal paradigm of Marxism-Leninism, with the lived world of the Congo, and the concomitant challenge to his (unmistakably sincere) commitment to the universal validity of his chosen science of revolution.

Guevara's aptitude for self and paradigm interrogation resonates - *mutatis mutandis* - in Apter's retrospective contention that "too much of what passed for developmental 'science' was confusing. Too much that passed for political development was ideological."<sup>115</sup> Apter,

however, does not explicate the precise meaning of 'ideological' when applied to a development paradigm. In order to arrive at a definition of an 'ideological' paradigm, and bearing in mind that both modernisation theory and scientific Marxism incorporate key elements of positivism, Chapter Two discusses Bhaskar's critique of empiricism<sup>116</sup> and Gramsci's disparaging review of Bukharin's attempt "to provide a schematic description and classification of historical and political facts, according to criteria built up on the model of natural science."<sup>117</sup>

In the first section of the dissertation, the concept 'paradigm' is unpacked according to Kuhn's use of the term. In brief: firstly, a paradigm *ipso facto* is scientific (this said, Kuhn's hesitations in regard applying the term to social – as opposed to natural – sciences duly are noted); secondly, it is "a preformed and relatively inflexible box",<sup>118</sup> requiring "commitment to the same rules and standards"<sup>119</sup> on the part of a given scientific community. Thirdly, it encapsulates a "strong network of commitments – conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological", and "provides rules that tell the practitioner ... what both the world and his science look like."<sup>120</sup> A paradigm, therefore, in relation to a specific community, is a world-view incorporating shared values (which are important determinants of group behaviour)<sup>121</sup> and thus, fifthly, has a normative function, viz, the allocation of legitimacy criteria.<sup>122</sup>

Finally in the first section, Chapter Four examines the paradigmatic roots of two models of nationalism, that is, 'revolutionary' and 'reformist', applied in Africa during the Cold War era, followed by an investigation of paradigmatic nationalism's converse within the nationalist genre, (African) cultural nationalism. Whereas a paradigmatic variant of nationalism - whether derived from a science of modernisation or of Marxism - defines itself

as scientific, cultural nationalism derives its momentum from a metaphysical essence that Africans are deemed to share, and to that extent is the antithesis of a scientific model.

The second section (Chapters Five to Nine) begins with a review of the genre of African Studies with particular reference to its genesis and development during the Cold War era. The section then moves on to an in-depth survey of selected literature defined largely but not exclusively as paradigmatic. Exceptions to the paradigmatic rule also are explored, not least the context-specific, revolutionary theory of Amilcar Cabral.

In the third section, Chapter Ten investigates *Ujamaa* in Tanzania. In so doing, the chapter illustrates the beneficial, long-term consequences for political legitimacy and social cohesion of an ideology at once humanist and locus-specific. At this juncture, the dissertation's theory and literature based analytic method is supplemented by information and ideas gleaned from interviews with individual Tanzanian respondents, conducted in Dar es Salaam in July 2003. Chapter Eleven concludes the dissertation, not least with reference to the concept of an 'ideological paradigm'.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **OF IRON CAGES AND PARADIGMS**

Chapters Two, Three and Four launch three lines of enquiry that configure the dissertation's thematic trajectory. The first line of enquiry takes in the genealogy of social science paradigms (or expert knowledge systems) imported to 20<sup>th</sup> century Africa from Europe and North America. During this process, the complex and disputed interface between science and ideology is explored. The second line of enquiry targets the interaction between a science of social reality (in this case, Marxism-Leninism) and the lived world, utilising – by way of a case study - Che Guevara's experiences in the Congo. The third line of enquiry traces the contours of nationalism in decolonising and postcolonial Africa. During the course of this investigation, several variations on a nationalist theme emerge, of which revolutionary nationalism and (behavioural) 'nation building' respectively are paradigmatic, hence of general developmental applicability. Conversely, cultural nationalism articulates and upholds the notion of an African cultural essence, and hence asserts African social and political specificity.

#### **Paradigms and ideology**

##### *Social science paradigms.*

Widespread use in the social sciences of the term 'paradigm' can be dated from Kuhn's seminal contribution to the philosophy of science. Initially, Kuhn expressed doubt about the applicability of the term 'paradigm' to social science research. "It remains an open question what parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all. History suggests that the

road to a firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous."<sup>123</sup> However, in a later work in which he revisited his thesis, Kuhn modified his initial position, and indicated that the term 'paradigm' is applicable to communities of scientists to the extent that shared examples of successful practice generate a sense of communal consensus that, in turn, enables "the unproblematic conduct of research."<sup>124</sup> Referring to *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn observed that ..

...monitoring conversations, particularly among the book's enthusiasts, I have sometimes found it hard to believe that all parties to the discussion had been engaged with the same volume. Part of the reason for its success is, I regretfully conclude, that it can be too nearly all things to all people.<sup>125</sup>

The text to which he refers (with a second edition in 1970) has sold over a million copies in 20 languages and rates as one of the most influential academic books of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>126</sup>

According to Oakley, Kuhn regarded the social sciences as being pre-paradigmatic,<sup>127</sup> but "this did not stop social scientists from enthusiastically taking up his idea of paradigms, while not being totally clear what they were .... Kuhn himself apparently used the term in 22 different ways."<sup>128</sup> This said, and taking her cue from Kuhn's explication of the 'sociological' meaning of paradigm, Oakley contends that "paradigms are not only produced from the *doing* of scientific work, they also play a key role in *providing* covert reference points; paradigms bind people together in a shared commitment to their disciplines."<sup>129</sup> (ii) From this concise definition, three features of a paradigm can be inferred and expanded. Firstly, a paradigm is self-sustaining. It extends and confirms itself as an explanatory model through the affirmative work of its practitioners. Secondly, in a limited sense it is coextensive with a school of thought or body of theory although the latter terms do not

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(ii) Unless otherwise stated, all emphases in quotations are in the original.

necessarily include key characteristics of paradigms, for instance, the notion that a paradigm *ipso facto* is scientific. Thirdly, 'covert' suggests that a dig conducted between the lines of paradigmatic texts will uncover assumptions, not necessarily stated as such but nonetheless identifiable.

Patton's definition of a paradigm covers more ground than Oakley's.

A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply embedded in the socialisation of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological considerations. But it is this aspect of paradigms that constitutes both their strengths and their weakness - their strength is that it makes action possible, their weakness is that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm.<sup>130</sup>

Extrapolating from Patton's account, a social science paradigm firstly, is peripatetic since it takes a globe-trotting route rather than restricting itself to one slice of territory; secondly, is socially and culturally informed by the specific locus of its originators; thirdly, is exclusive since it excludes world views incompatible with paradigmatic epistemology, along with cognitive systems that are located outside paradigmatic boundaries and - *ipso facto* - are unscientific. The exclusivity of a paradigm in turn depends on fourthly, the 'unquestioned assumptions' from which its practitioners draw their strength (action) and weakness (presumably, action which lacks a paradigm-critical component.) Arguably, these unquestioned paradigmatic assumptions can be likened to Berger's 'respectable motif'.

Citing the second *Middletown* study, Berger notes a "series of 'of course statements' - that is, statements that represent a consensus so strong that the answer to any question concerning them will habitually be prefaced with the words 'of course!'"<sup>131</sup> It so happens that the

*Middletown* studies were conducted within a setting of middle class American mores, but I see no reason not to apply the same principle, *mutatis mutandis*, to the bedrock of paradigmatic assumptions, indeed to any statement or inference that - shored up by consensus - presents itself in the light of a self evident truth. Such assumptions form the respectable motif of any given paradigm, and to offer a serious challenge to bedrock elements is to bring oneself - as Berger would put it - to the threshold of unrespectability.<sup>132</sup>

Bearing in mind the locus-specific origins of paradigms, it seems reasonable to infer that bedrock assumptions in origin are space and time contingent: the socio-cultural texture of the space of origin informs the assumptions, as does the historical era from which a paradigm emerges. Again, given a finite space and time of origin with all the cognitive and predictive limitations attendant on finity, a paradigm can either declare itself relevant only in the context of, say, the 19<sup>th</sup> century aftermath of the industrial revolution in Western Europe, or alternatively, post World War Two North America, or it can find a way to transcend its bounded context, and thus declare itself possessed of global applicability as well as - at least, to the extent to which it projects itself into the future - possessed of more-or-less timeless relevance. Finally, a paradigm's ability to achieve this formidably large objective depends - at least in the first instance - not merely on an epistemology but - perhaps more to the point - a simplified epistemology.<sup>133</sup> In the second instance, the success of a paradigm presumably depends on its ability to attract a solid and reasonably reputable body of theorists as well as a not inconsiderable number of practitioners.

In past ages of the social world, only religious knowledge systems possessed attributes suitable for universal trajectories and global constituencies. Since religion *qua* widely

accepted epistemology over time largely has been replaced by science, it seems appropriate that the most successful - that is, widely travelled and practised - paradigms are grounded in a scientific epistemological base. Beyond this seemingly respectable scientific terrain, however, lies the thorny and tangled question of the extent to which it is possible or even desirable for the social sciences to model themselves on or to claim equivalent epistemological status with the natural sciences. This seminal question notwithstanding, during (approximately) the Cold War era, two social science paradigms in particular are emblematic of the allure of explanatory and predictive certainty in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, namely, modernisation theory and Marxism, more specifically, the scientific variant.

#### *Social science and reflexivity.*

Arguably, the reflexivity of theory is emblematic of pitfalls inherent in social – or ‘soft’ – science’s attempt to emulate the ‘hard’ sciences. This section of the chapter begins by distinguishing between two ways of interpreting the concept of reflexivity, and then moves on to delineate similarities and differences between Marxist and modernisation paradigms in the light of their respective claims to equivalence with natural science. During the course of the delineation, a tendency on the part of social scientists is noted, namely that in the event of anomaly, fault is allocated not to a given paradigm but instead to the object/s of research.

Rosenburg’s unpacking of the concept of reflexivity reveals one general meaning but two textures - ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ - within that meaning. In the thin (or unintentional) sense, theory is reflexive inasmuch as (and if) it shapes thought and action in the lived world of social experience and practice.<sup>134</sup> For instance, if publication in a widely read national newspaper

in South Africa of a scholar's theory about racism, including explanations and predictions derived from an array of quantitative data, subsequently affects attitudes and outcomes in the society which is the subject of the research, the theory qualifies as reflexive. In other words, once a theory becomes known to the human beings constituting the raw material on which social science research focuses its expert attention, real outcomes duly are affected, either in a way that affirms the theory's predictive power or distorts / frustrates it. In the 'thick' or purposive sense, a reflexive theory is a normative theory, the aim of which is to affect human action. In sum: the 'reflexivity' of theory denotes an interactive component – intentional or otherwise – between scientific research and the social world to which it applies itself.

The exemplar in Europe of reflexive theory in its 'thick' sense is critical theory (the Frankfurt school and humanist Marxism in general) which adopted Marx's critique of ideology *qua* alienation-inducing false consciousness as a humanist motif. According to Rosenberg's understanding of what critical theorists "mean by their demand for 'reflexive' theory", they mean theory that is not merely descriptive (describes the way the world is) but also prescriptive (describes the way the world ought to be), and that therefore "prescribes the direction in which action should be taken."<sup>135</sup> In the world as perceived by Marxist humanists, there both is and ought to be a normative force which drives action, namely, the drive to emancipate oneself and other human beings from false (or ideological) beliefs. What Rosenberg seems to be suggesting is that any theory, the avowed intention of which is to emancipate people from false belief, *ipso facto* is reflexive.

Since documented endeavours to emancipate others from false belief go back at least as far as Socrates, 'thick' reflexivity is a new term for a time-honoured endeavour. 'Thin' reflexivity,

on the other hand, has relatively modern roots in the science of the European Enlightenment and has introduced a novel (relatively speaking) problematic insofar as the certainty of a belief grounded in a scientific epistemology, and arrived at by way of an objectively formulated and applied set of methods makes it difficult, even well-nigh impossible for adherents and practitioners to entertain serious doubts about the universal validity of their paradigm. Instructive in this regard is Delanty's summary of the position of scientific - as distinct from humanist - Marxism.

Marxist epistemology always assumed that science as a cognitive system was in possession of truth and that this truth corresponded in some way to the revolutionary and constructivist potential in the consciousness of the proletariat. Ideology was thus a 'false consciousness' while science was true consciousness.<sup>136</sup>

Scientific Marxism assumes that knowledge of reality coincides with the most historically advanced form of human consciousness to date, that of the proletariat. Given that science and the highest form of consciousness are indistinguishable from one another, all other modes of cognition and practice axiomatically are excluded - relegated to the dustbin of ideology. *Ipse dixit*. 'It is so because science says it is so.' Since modernisation theory also incorporates the above maxim, I now turn to the scientific genealogy of the modernisation paradigm.

Modernisation theory's epistemological position and methodological approach owe much to the behaviouralist trend in positivist social science, in turn informed by psychology's science of behaviourism. For instance, Susser, in the course of a critique of behaviourism, and having noted "the behaviourists' insistence on the desirability of a 'value-free' science,"<sup>137</sup> quotes Easton: "Values can ultimately be reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual's total life experience."<sup>138</sup> Since in a behavioural lexicon, values (of a certain sort) and ideologies are coextensive, neither can be understood as having real or substantive

existence. To the behaviourist, as Susser explains, an applied ideology is relevant solely for its effects. Estimating the utility or otherwise of a given ideology by extension, then, is restricted to evidence provided by behaviour affected by attitudes which in turn are informed by ideological commitments. Furthermore, an ideology, much like any other ideation system, is of interest to applied social science in a behavioural mode only to the extent that it affects the behaviour of a large enough number of people to rate as behaviourally significant, not least because it then is quantifiable and as such lends itself to precise measurement and rational adjustment. Even then, it is not significant in itself. "Ideas can be stated in terms of groups: the groups never in terms of the idea."<sup>139</sup>

Whereas scientific Marxism attributes to proletarian consciousness the status of scientific truth, thus ultimately allowing human cognition at a certain level - the level of species-being - freedom to be and to realise itself,<sup>140</sup> behaviouralism allows no such possibilities or potentialities. Briefly put, behaviourist psychology rejects as meaningless - random or arbitrary - all forms of cognitively or viscerally induced behaviour which cannot be traced back to an identifiable (physical) cause. Cognitive attributes such as attitudes, personality traits, beliefs and so on, along with visceral attributes such as emotions, therefore are fully derivative and as such, have no substantive niche in behaviourist epistemology. Rosenberg summarises as follows the behaviourist approach:

Taking their lead from Skinner, psychological behaviourists hold that the aim of their science is not to understand the mind, but to systematise observable behaviour. Systemising behaviour means providing general statements that enable us to correlate observable experimental conditions with the behaviour they trigger.<sup>141</sup>

Behaviouralists deviate from the behaviourist path inasmuch as they attribute meaning to cognitive constructs such as attitudes when they can be linked to empirical referents.<sup>142</sup> Their ultimate objective, however, does not differ markedly from that of behaviourism. "Their aim is generalisation with predictive power."<sup>143</sup> As argued by Hall, Durkheim's theory has played a part in constructing this telescoped method of uncovering objective reality. More specifically, Hall attributes it to ...

... the selective manner in which Durkheim's work has been appropriated (expropriated might be more accurate) into mainstream American empirical social science. Durkheim is regarded as the 'father' of positive social science *because* he rejected all the Germanic nonsense about ideas, Mind, Spirit. He consigned 'ideas' to a little black box not because they were unimportant but because they could not be analysed. Instead, he determined to treat what could be analysed - patterned social interaction governed by norms and channelled by institutional structures. The observable aspects of these had to be treated as if they exhibited the hardness and consistency of objects in the natural world. Hence the famous admonition - to 'treat social facts as things'.<sup>144</sup>

But, continues Hall, during a process of selective appropriation what has been passed over is Durkheim's belief that social phenomena exist *sui generis*, and that the "'facts' which Durkheim wanted to treat as 'things' were social actions *informed by ideas* ..." Hall concludes that despite appearances, "Durkheim belonged to the neo-Kantian tradition. 'Noumenal' reality had to be studied through its forms of appearance - through 'phenomenal' reality."<sup>145</sup>

As outlined by Hall, the difference between Durkheim and his American expropriators is fine but nonetheless significant. To admit the reality *sui generis* of ideas, and of social phenomena informed by ideas, is not the same as excluding from the terrain of the real all ideas and social phenomena not susceptible to precise determination and quantification in terms of their effect on behaviour. From Hall's critique perhaps can be extrapolated a notion that the most significant point of difference between behaviouralists and Durkheim is located

in the slide rule with which a behaviouralist measures reality. Any effect observably determined by an ascertainable cause is susceptible to empirical investigation, and therefore qualifies as 'real.' Whereas Durkheim despaired of the capacity of hermeneutics to provide adequate knowledge of the intention concealed in the mind of the individual actor, instead turning to collective representations of social action<sup>146</sup> with which to inform his interpretation, behaviouralists retain as legitimate research material those cognitive attributes that morph into quantifiable forms of collective behaviour. In the process, however, they exclude "unmeasurable elements" from the study of particular groups, thereby disembarassing behavioural epistemology of elements not amenable to precise measurement, and relegating them to "the shadowy domain of quasi-phenomena."<sup>147</sup>

Referring to a frequently made connection between behavioural methodology and an ideology of conservatism, Susser contends that "behaviouralism's much criticised 'obsession' with stability and its insensitivity to change can be more fully appreciated if we recognise it as a concomitant of the scientific method and not merely another case of 'establishment politics.'"<sup>148</sup> This said, behavioural science hinges on a particular perception of natural science, namely, that "nowhere does nature present us with discontinuity or revolt against its laws."<sup>149</sup> It is worth noting that this perception of a uniform, universal, hence generalisable by virtue of its causal laws, natural reality also applies to Marxism's perception of the natural order, and therefore of its own status within the practices and predictions of science. For example, in the preface to the first German edition of *Capital*, Marx compared his methods to those of the physicist.<sup>150</sup> He would have liked to dedicate *Das Capital* to Darwin (who

declined the honour<sup>151</sup>) presumably to celebrate the affinity of their respective scientific discoveries - or, at any rate, so Engels contended during a eulogy at Marx's graveside.<sup>152</sup>

Behaviouralism thus shares with scientific Marxism, firstly, a correspondence theory of truth in which there is a correspondence between scientific truth and natural necessity; secondly, a belief that science, whether natural or social, is the study of an objectively existing reality. These features, however, beg the question of a differentiation, described by Bhaskar as the central paradox of science, between scientific *knowledge of things* and *the things themselves*, that is, the intransitive objects of knowledge. Whereas knowledge (of things) is a social product, the objects of scientific investigation ...

... are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these 'objects of knowledge depends upon human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel and heavy bodies fall to earth in exactly the same way ...'<sup>153</sup>

If one argues that the objects (human societies) of social scientific knowledge are not intransitive in the sense deployed by Bhaskar,<sup>154</sup> then the concomitant reflexivity of social science undermines the claim that a given social science paradigm is the equivalent of natural science. Pieterse, for instance, argues that "in the social sciences positivism is largely a past station" not least since "social sciences are of an extraordinary complexity because they involve political processes that are reflexive in nature, in the sense that social actors will act upon any theory, which is thus modified in action."<sup>155</sup>

An emblematic instance of the claim interrogated by Bhaskar and Pieterse can be found in a behaviouralist assertion that "science has no recourse to utopia. The physical laws that the scientist encounters are fixed. No talent or will can change them. There is no sense in saying

of a particular phenomenon, *qua* scientist, that it is good or bad, or in calling for the reform of one of Newton's laws."<sup>156</sup> In short, behavioural science assumes that its method, which it rates as equivalent to the method of the physicist, is constant and invariant. In the light of this behaviouralist belief, it is arguable that for Marxism's perfection of ends (world socialist revolution eventuating in global socialist society and the realisation of species being), behaviouralism substitutes perfection of means. Hence, modernisation theory offers, not the vision of social perfectibility offered by scientific Marxism, but instead a perfect method of engineering modern societies - or at any rate, the best available method. In support of this constricted route to modernity, behaviouralism asserts that "to dream of another set of givens, to criticise reality from the perspective of a vision of the potentially possible, is to fall prey to what Eulau called 'the normative fallacy.'"<sup>157</sup> In the world inhabited by behaviourists, social reality itself sets fixed limits to the possibilities of social change given that, firstly, the realm of the knowable by definition is restricted, and secondly, it is surface knowledge: we know only that which we physically can observe, quantify, calculate and so on. In short, modernisation theory offers a conservative model of change.

Whereas 'early' Marx declared upfront the purposively reflexive nature of his theory, viz: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it"<sup>158</sup>, for behaviourists, reflexivity is a non-issue in light of the neutral and dispassionate distance a behavioural scientist sets between him or herself and his/her objects of study.<sup>159</sup> By the same token, the value-neutral texture of the behavioural paradigm ensures that judgements between ideologies are made on functional grounds only. However, against this purportedly neutral stance, it could be argued that in selecting the most appropriate

methods with which to implement modernising agendas in undeveloped societies, behaviouralists make choices - for instance, between private and state ownership, between free market and planned economies - which by inference indicate ideological preference.

Furthermore, as Pieterse emphasises: "Stages theories of political modernisation could accommodate any form of authoritarianism as a 'necessary stage' ... provided they were not communist. Hence the crucial distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian political systems."<sup>160</sup> Pieterse's statement that "modernisation is essentially social engineering from above and an operation of political containment rather than democratisation"<sup>161</sup> is echoed by Susser's contention that at the end of the day, behavioural science does double duty as an ideology of conservatism.<sup>162</sup> By focussing exclusively on what 'is' - as perceived by behaviouralism - behaviouralists attempt to construct a reality that conforms to their perception of it. In other words, if reality sets limits to social aspirations, so, too, do behaviouralists aspire to set limits to social reality. Furthermore, given their posture of scientific objectivity, behaviouralist denial (in effect) of the reflexivity of their theory suggests that they either consciously pretend to be value neutral or are self-deceptive.<sup>163</sup>

Expanding the point, Elshtein maintains that behaviouralists start from rock bottom with brute-data identifiable behaviour, thus enabling simple questions that in principle can be answered. In the process, they exclude questions they consider unscientific, such as questions about social justice. By privileging certain questions and excluding others, they set the agenda within which research can (read 'should') be conducted.<sup>164</sup> She concludes that "because the practitioners of an ostensibly value-free social science deny that their work is infused with

values, they cannot recognise and thus cannot articulate, the implications of their conclusions for human wants, needs and purposes within political and social life."<sup>165</sup>

In sum, neither modernisation theory nor its behavioural parent acknowledge the reflexivity of theory. Additionally, unlike Marxists whose scientific certainties foundered somewhat on the undeniable evidence of Soviet bloc morbidity, behaviouralists (even if some now are postbehavioural), given their privileged niche as members of the only remaining global superpower's intellectual elite, are in a position to ignore the implications attendant on the reflexivity of their paradigm, or at any rate, to avoid acknowledging it in any way which reflects badly on themselves. There perhaps is an all too common assumption that - since scientific method is never at fault - if an experiment fails to achieve the predicted results then the objects of scientific method by definition are faulty. Cooper's anecdote provides a small but telling illustration of this mentality.

In 1990, I met one of the revered founding fathers of American comparative politics, who, on hearing of my area of specialisation, commented, 'nothing interesting is happening in African politics.' Whereas at one time, modernisation theory had led political scientists and sociologists to look toward Africa - and not leave its study to anthropologists - Africa's failure to behave in accordance with the theory seems to have led many of these disciplines to abandon the continent.<sup>166</sup>

From the anecdote cited above can be garnered a supposition that if a social science paradigm is unable to account for anomaly, its practitioners react by relegating the object/s of research to the 'excluded middle'. Further, this exclusionary - that is, of alternate realities - approach on the part of exogenous paradigms arguably has been mirrored by the adoption of developmental ideologies intended to sanction not only construction and maintenance of one-party states but also concentration of power in relatively few expert hands, thereby ironing out

difference and contradiction. The above suppositions, and the connection between them, are explained and elaborated in the next section of the chapter.

### **Ideology and the excluded middle.**

Asked to deliver a paper about 'Disenchantment' as pervasive theme in highly industrialised societies, Gellner, suspecting that he is "expected to be *agin* it," decides to engage the theme via a less conventional route. First, he articulates the standard 'Disenchantment' position regarding ...

... the Faustian purchase of cognitive, technological and administrative power, by the surrender of our previous meaningful, humanly suffused, humanly responsive, if often also menacing and capricious world. *That* is abandoned for a more predictable, more amenable but coldly indifferent and uncanny world. The Iron Cage is not merely one of bureaucratic organisation it is also a conceptual one. It places constraints not merely on our conduct but also on our vision.<sup>167</sup>

He then suggests an alternative conceptualisation to the orthodox juxtaposition of the 'Iron Cage' thesis with a proposition that social tension and civil unrest inevitably are attendant on the dominion of specialised knowledge which is at the heart of modernity. He instead proposes "the Rubber Cage thesis, which is meant to apply to a later or fully developed stage of industrialisation."<sup>168</sup>

It is noteworthy that Gellner does not dispute the applicability of the Iron Cage thesis "to the *emergence* of industrial society."<sup>169</sup> In juxtaposing an iron with a rubber cage, his intention is to contrast serious and arduous knowledge with a cognitive mode that is accessible enough to accommodate the public domain in highly developed countries. The illustration he provides is drawn from the realm of politics,<sup>170</sup> specifically, the role of constitutional monarchy in an established democracy characterised by the separation of powers. Constitutional monarchy

serves a useful function precisely because it is symbolic and therefore is not tainted by the failure of government policies. A monarch attracts the loyalty of the national public, yet at the same time his or her political role is taken no more than half seriously. This, argues Gellner, is a useful way to ensure that real power is not sacred.<sup>171</sup> However: "The question is whether the argument can be transferred to the sphere of belief or ideology, as opposed to the sphere of politics."<sup>172</sup> In other words, in the sphere of belief / faith / ideology (Gellner uses the three terms interchangeably), should there be a separation of powers between iron and rubber cages, or should the iron cage extend its domain to encompass the lived world?

As Gellner illustrates, there are two categories of response to the above question. According to one response, the "potency of modern knowledge, *and* its rapid growth and consequent instability, make it unsuitable and unsafe as the foundation of one's moral, social, human vision. It is subject to dramatic transformations. The great discovery of today becomes the fallacy of tomorrow."<sup>173</sup> According to this argument, iron and rubber cages should occupy separate and distinct spaces, thus leaving the lived world to be experienced in a "personal, warm, human, intelligible" way.<sup>174</sup> The converse argument, however, asks the question: "how useful is half-serious belief?"<sup>175</sup> and thus queries the usefulness (to modernity) of the lived world if it is insufficiently informed by scientific cognition and serious belief.

Instructive in the context of this dissertation's lines of enquiry is Gellner's depiction of 'the God of the excluded middle.'

It is plausible to suspect that we owe the remarkable knowledge which is the foundation of modern society to a certain intolerant seriousness. The religions of Abrahamic tradition proposed a jealous God. A jealous and exclusive God, when rearticulated in terms of Greek thought, became the God of the excluded middle. His intolerance of divine rivals became also the intolerance of simultaneously held

contradictory beliefs. Without the impulse to systematise and eliminate incoherence, could it ever have happened? Is this not the crucial clue to the miracle of Cognitive Growth?<sup>176</sup>

Extrapolating from Gellner's discussion: the argument against keeping iron and rubber cages separate and distinct is an argument against the bifurcation of thought into two streams: scientific (serious) and everyday (half serious). At first glance, the argument seems egalitarian since a division between the two seems elitist ('real thinkers' in one space and 'messy thinkers' in another), whereas to conflate the two seems democratic and inclusive. This said, given 'the intolerance of simultaneously held contradictory beliefs' which characterises the iron cage, is it not, perhaps, an argument in favour of inflicting jealous, exclusive and intolerant denizens of the iron cage on the luckless inhabitants of the lived world in order to transform their cognitively untidy existence into a reasonable facsimile of iron cage order? Additionally, given Gellner's acerbic depiction of the simplifications, hence distortions (of complex and difficult knowledge systems) that are a *sine qua non* of applying expert knowledge to the lived world,<sup>177</sup> it looks like a process of mutual distortion. On the one hand, 'ordinary people' are instructed by experts in scientific theory and its application in practice; on the other, experts - in order to enter a public domain - are obliged to turn their silk purses into sows' ears.

Wrapping up his thesis, Gellner revisits the argument in favour of keeping the two modes of cognition separate.

It might be said that the God of the Excluded Middle was merely required as the First Cause of the genuine Cognitive Growth on which we now all depend. Once that movement has developed, it can be carried on by its own momentum, and no longer depends on the psychic set of men in their daily life.<sup>178</sup>

The above proposition intimates that in a highly industrialised country, the iron cage is powered by its own generator which functions irrespective of lived world mentalities. Nonetheless, Gellner declines explicitly to commit himself to either argument. ("Which of these two attitudes is correct? Quite obviously, we do not know."<sup>179</sup>) At this juncture, however, it is instructive to revisit his distinction between countries in which industry is highly developed and countries in which industry is emergent. It is a distinction that overall he approaches *en passant*, but his point becomes clearer if one considers the link he makes between cognitive (scientific) growth and stage of economic development. The populations of countries only now embarking on this dual path, by inference must learn to co-exist with the god of the excluded middle. What other choice do they have?

The above point of conjecture is highlighted by statements and estimations made in the 1960s by two of newly independent Africa's high profile heads of state. Nkrumah described his government's formidable task, that is, the generation of economic development and national unity as "almost analogous to a state of war and national emergency which is always met in the older established countries by the formation of coalition or national governments."<sup>180</sup> Nyerere, arguing - in the first decade of Tanzania's independence – in favour of one party rule, referred to "our state of emergency."<sup>181</sup> He expanded the argument in "Democracy and the Party System".

In any country which is divided over fundamental issues you have the 'civil war' situation we have been talking about. If, on the other hand, you have a two-party system where the differences between the parties are not fundamental, then you immediately reduce politics to the level of a football match. A football match may, of course, attract some very able players; it may also be entertaining; but it is still only a game, and only the most ardent fans (who are not usually the most intelligent) take the game very seriously. This, in fact, is not unlike what has happened in many of the so-

called democratic countries today ...Our critics should understand that, in Africa, we have to take our politics a little more seriously.<sup>182</sup>

Returning to Gellner: his depiction of iron cage cognition contains two main emphases: firstly, its seriousness; secondly, its instability. In a subsequent publication, he revisits the relationship between iron cage and lived world, and - five years after the dismantling of the Berlin wall - he takes the side of the argument against importing the iron cage to the lived world since "the attempt to impose it in Marxist societies, at the end proved catastrophic, and helped bring about their eventual disintegration."<sup>183</sup> Citing "the instability, contestability and often incomprehensibility" of serious cognition, he concludes that the contents of an iron cage are "incompatible with any imposition of a social consensus."<sup>184</sup>

If Gellner's assessment is supplemented by Havel's ironic but apt contention that it is the task of (mythologised) ideology to identify the centre of truth with the centre of power,<sup>185</sup> this scenario is clarified. The contents of an iron cage are transported to the lived world in ideological mode, the function of which is to operate to the advantage of elites by representing political leaders and their expert advisors as definitive possessors of scientific truth.

## **Exploring the science - ideology interface**

### *Positivism and ideology*

Since the origins of the expert knowledge of modernisation and Marxist sciences respectively are located in the positivist science of the Enlightenment, this section of the chapter begins with an outline of key characteristics of positivism. In positivist science, 'positive' means that which really exists and can be observed.<sup>186</sup> Positivism thus embraces empiricism which

holds that the basis of science is observation and verification by means of the scientific method in which “the scientist carries out experiments in order to uncover objectively existing, general laws from which hypotheses can be made that can be used to predict what happens.”<sup>187</sup> Empiricism imputes naturalism which maintains that the objects of study exist outside science and can be neutrally observed, along with scientism which denies that there are any significant differences in the methods appropriate to studying social and natural objects,<sup>188</sup> and thus not only argues for the unity of the natural and social sciences but also equates knowledge with science. Finally, positivism incorporates within its operational matrix a realist formula of binary design, defined by Sardar as the basis of modern science’s *modus operandi*, that is, “Either/or Aristotelean logic (X is either A or non-A).”<sup>189</sup> Given an absolute distinction between A and non-A, no substantive, intermediate categories are admissible. As Larrain puts it, “positivism petrifies what is rational and non-rational into autonomous separate entities, given once and forever.” In consequence, “science overcomes ideology as truth overcomes error.”<sup>190</sup>

Like ‘paradigm’, widespread adoption of the term ‘ideology’ in origin can be traced to the work of one person. Operating within the cognitive matrix of the French Enlightenment, Destutt de Tracy coined the term to describe a new science of ideas “based on observation and free from prejudices.”<sup>191</sup> According to Bluhm, the governing assumption of de Tracy and the *ideologues* was that strife and misery were the product of the inexact reasoning of common sense. Bluhm adds that “the first meaning of ‘ideology’ set by its proponents, thus had positive connotations much like those which attach to the word ‘science’ in our own day.”<sup>192</sup>

In its initial manifestation, then, 'ideology' can be viewed firstly, as a cognitive product of the French revolution: a reason-centred concept at the interface between an *ancien regime* embedded in sacral epistemology and the secular 'rule of reason' that in Europe heralded the onset of modernity; secondly, as an 18<sup>th</sup> century tributary of the stream of scientific discourse in Europe that has its point of first origin in the Italian Renaissance. Whereas the spirit of Renaissance science, perhaps best exemplified by Leonardo da Vinci's statement that: "No human enquiry can become true knowledge until it has been proved mathematically"<sup>193</sup> was mathematical and realist, Newtonian physics, that is, a deterministic theory of causal mechanisms that made prediction a requirement of scientific achievement,<sup>194</sup> informed the ethos of the Enlightenment. At roughly the same time that Destutt de Tracy was formulating "an analysis of the origin of ideas"<sup>195</sup> Comte - who coined the term 'sociology' - was proposing a social science modelled on (Newtonian) physics, namely, "a value free, explanatory, descriptive and comparative science of general social laws." Included in his notion of science is "useful and certain knowledge" that in its emphasis on empirical methodology, defines itself in contradistinction to "imaginary knowledge."<sup>196</sup> Overall, the Comtean position, as summarised by Delanty, is that "there can be no truth without observation. The empirical henceforth refers to the domain of objectively existing facts and science is the observation of those facts."<sup>197</sup>

### *Real politics versus ideology*

Unlike Comte who is known as the father of positivism, Destutt de Tracy usually is remembered only as the originator of the term 'ideology'. He certainly would not be called the 'father of political science' (which in its positivist form claims descent from Comte). By-

and-large, the concept of ideology has shared the politically uncertain career of its 18<sup>th</sup> century author. Napoleon, at first an enthusiastic patron of the *idealogues*, turned on them when they opposed his increasingly despotic rule. He ridiculed their scientific pretensions and - in effect - dismissed them as woolly idealists with no understanding of 'real politics'. Destutt de Tracy and the other *idealogues*, having lost their encounter with the centre of power in France, faded into the shadows of past history.

Napoleon's distinction between ideology and politics resonates - albeit on different grounds - in a Cold War differentiation between the 'politics' of Western democracies and (totalitarian) 'ideologies' of fascism and communism. For instance, Crick avers that "ideological thinking is an explicit and direct challenge to political thinking."<sup>198</sup> Crick also defends politics against democracy which he defines as "perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs."<sup>199</sup> Arguing that the label 'democracy' most often is applied to majority rule, or at any rate, majority consent, he points out that the German election of 1933 (in which Hitler acceded to power) was democratic.<sup>200</sup> Crick, therefore, does not use the term 'democracy' to signify the 'self' of Western Europe in contrast to her Eastern European 'other'. Instead, his binary division is between 'politics' (West) and 'ideology' (East).<sup>201</sup> Following Aristotle, Crick defines politics as the 'master science' - not in the sense that it encompasses all other sciences but in the sense that it adjudicates between them and allocates order of priority "in their rival claims on the always scarce resources of any given community." He concludes that political practice comprises deliberate and continuous individual activity that realises itself in politics in its capacity as "the market place and the price mechanism of all social demands."<sup>202</sup>

Against Crick's notion of politics in the West as a master science that occupies the commanding spot in a pluralist marketplace of contending demands, whereas ideology "means an end to politics,"<sup>203</sup> can be set Bottomore and Rubel's interpretation of Marx's assertion that: "It is not the consciousness of men which determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being which determines their consciousness."<sup>204</sup> This statement, or so they argue,

... is not a philosophical (epistemological) proposition, but a statement about the genesis of ideological constructions, law, politics, religion, art, and philosophy. It is these 'ideological forms', according to Marx, which constitute the principle stumbling- block for scientific investigation, when they are considered in themselves, without taking into account the correlations which can be established between a certain stage of economic development and the various cultural products.<sup>205</sup>

That set of activities which Crick counts as 'politics,' Marx would define as an ideological construction since 'politics' secures the interests of an economically dominant class, with Crick himself operating (if one takes into account Gramsci's nuanced branch of the Marxist trunk) as a 'deputy' of the dominant class. In this view, the notion of politics as a master science is a hegemonic deployment of the term 'science' that accordingly hinders scientific investigation. For a Gramscian, Crick's position would be in the connective tissue between a bourgeois state and "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private.'"<sup>206</sup>

#### *Lenin's variation on a theme*

Unlike Marx for whom 'ideology' was epiphenomenal, hence had no real or substantive existence, Lenin posited two separate and distinct categories of both scientific and ideological systems, that is, 'bourgeois' and 'socialist'. (Since he didn't distinguish between ideology as a broad category, and science, it could be said that Lenin attributed to ideology the status of epistemology - in which case, different epistemological positions underwrite bourgeois and

socialist ideologies respectively.) According to Carlsnaes, Lenin's thesis is an "adumbrated doctrine" that is not developed in any length or detail - yet has proven extraordinarily influential.<sup>207</sup> It centres on a notion of ideological duality that occupies the entire superstructure of ideas since "mankind has not created a 'third' ideology, and moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology."<sup>208</sup> For Lenin, then, 'ideology' is a material force to the extent that it is tethered to class and class struggle.

In distinction to Marx, who derives his doctrine of ideology as false or mystifying consciousness from a basically ontological conception of the nature of man as species-being, Lenin's conception is a direct derivative of the sociological concepts of 'class' and especially 'class conflict'. Hence it is not only a broader, simpler and far more palpable doctrine than that of Marx, but also (probably because of this) an eminently practical one, well suited to a frame of mind which, as Trotsky writes, was above all dominated by the ambition of being 'the great engineer of history' rather than - as in the case with Marx - 'the midwife of revolution'.<sup>209</sup>

What are the implications of Lenin's thesis for the relationship between ideology and science?

Firstly, in the context of class struggle, theory is an aspect of the struggle, specifically, "the struggle of and over mind and consciousness in which impartiality is as impossible as within the other and more tangible forms of the revolutionary movement."<sup>210</sup> Secondly, 'ideology' *per se* is a neutral concept. Its scientific content, and concomitantly its veracity, are contingent on the class to which it is attached. As Larrain notes of the Marxist orthodox tradition initiated by Lenin, the allocation of scientific content to an ideology "is sometimes supported by a notion of ascendent and descendent classes. This allows a proletarian ideology to be called 'scientific' whereas bourgeois ideology is considered non-scientific."<sup>211</sup> In short, a scientific ideology by definition is the property of a progressive or revolutionary class. Thirdly, given that a major contribution made by Lenin to Marxism is his

reconfiguration of Marx's (stage of the) dictatorship of the proletariat to fit the contours of a hegemonic AvantGarde (or vanguard party), scientific knowledge - at least, in the first instance - is the property of a "a narrow dedicated band of professional revolutionaries, led from the centre."<sup>212</sup>

### *Behaviouralism and physics envy*

Returning to Crick: he argues the case for non-positivist political theory insofar as he has strong reservations about "the idea of a value-free science of politics" which he defines as "pseudo-science."<sup>213</sup> His rejection of an American science of politics is attendant on his dismissal of the notion that methodology is or can be neutral. He argues as follows: firstly, a science of politics is an attempt to take the politics out of politics by avoiding the purposive element in political theory.<sup>214</sup> Here, Crick can be taken as implying that scientific analyses of political behaviour potentially operate in a normless wilderness. "There are some things, as Leo Strauss has said of the concentration camps, of which a purely objective description would seem like a satire on mankind."<sup>215</sup> Secondly, he contends that American political scientists make a specious distinction between method and doctrine. "Every methodology is itself a political doctrine. It is a case of *Erst kommt die Politik: dann kommt die Methodologie*."<sup>216</sup> On this view, a science of politics begins with a political doctrine and then constructs a methodology that underwrites the doctrine in a scientifically objective way.

Worth inserting at this juncture is a defence of the primacy of scientific method cited by Coleman and Halisi. "Reality must mean something and the question of reality is one of method."<sup>217</sup> In contradistinction to this emphasis on the scientific integrity of method, Crick

posits that in behavioural science, doctrine and methodology combine to produce a series of tautological affirmations for

... a type of specifically liberal and democratic political doctrine of far more limited applicability than the authors supposed. Values were taken for granted amid the enervating unity of belief of American liberalism, so it was believed that the mere discovery of facts would create a kind of spontaneous national therapy.<sup>218</sup>

Crick's sketch of a behavioural tendency in which norms are whittled down to vacuous shadows of their former selves bears comparison with Susser's depiction of what remains after the normative claims of ideology have imploded, namely, "a reductionist position which supports a consensual agreement on the 'rules of the game.'"<sup>219</sup> Crick and Susser differ inasmuch as Crick allocates norms to purposive political theory, Susser to ideology, but the deducible conclusion on both counts is that to drain social norms of their substantive content is to create a so-called science of human action that "is just ... an empty exercise in physics envy."<sup>220</sup>

According to Larrain, positivists hold that ideology is the absolute other of science given that science is "the antithesis of a mythical world."<sup>221</sup> Science achieves its decisively non-mythical content via two closely related routes. One is empirical observation or experimentation; the other is the application of a method that delivers substantive results. The combination, as Larrain notes, "guarantees in a precise manner that knowledge comprehends reality, a reality made of objective facts." Positivism thus represents itself as a "special sphere of knowledge exempt from ideological distortions as long as it complies with method."<sup>222</sup> Method, it reasonably can be concluded, is the alpha and omega of iron cage knowledge in its positivist-behavioural format.

*Bhaskar's critique of empiricism and implications thereof*

Whereas Kuhn challenges an assumption that knowledge in the natural sciences occurs in an environment abstracted from historical contexts and peer consensus, Bhaskar, referring to the social sciences, disputes the notion that the prediction-enabling methods of the natural sciences are applicable to social objects. (It is worth noting that Bhaskar and other 'critical realists' stand for the separation of natural and social sciences<sup>223</sup> and thus stand against scientism). He contends that whether or not the objects of social scientific enquiry are perceivable, that is, susceptible to empirical enquiry, or unperceivable ('imaginary') is not really the point. The point rather is that the objects of social science research "only ever manifest themselves in open systems; that is, in systems where invariant empirical regularities do not obtain. For social systems are not spontaneously, and cannot be experimentally, closed."<sup>224</sup> The key term here is 'invariant'. As mentioned above, behaviouralism assumes the invariance of its methodology. Yet, as Bhaskar points out, the aim of an experiment is to get a single mechanism going in isolation and record its effect.<sup>225</sup> Experimental activity in science is sufficiently intelligible only if conducted within a closed environment, and only on the basis of regularities observed to occur within a closed setting can scientific predictions be made with any degree of certainty.

Put together with Bhaskar's contention that any given social system is not, nor can it be a closed system, the argument suggests overall that in social systems, the conditions which enable scientifically certain predictions are unavailable. "Hence for ontological, as distinct from purely epistemological, reasons, social scientific (unlike natural scientific) theory is

*necessarily incomplete.*"<sup>226</sup> Bhaskar then adds a codicil to his argument: "The most powerful explanatory theory in an open world is a non-deterministic one."<sup>227</sup>

From arguments presented above, the following inferences can be drawn. Firstly, that by combining explanatory with predictive modalities, positivist - behavioural social science is the architect of its own disasters, particularly in the sphere of failed prediction. The second inference is attendant on Delanty's observation that for Bhaskar and other critical realists, the case for an anti-positivist philosophy of social science cannot be made on the basis of an attack on positivism in natural science.<sup>228</sup> This imputes that an examination of the relationship between *social* science and ideology requires an additional dimension of analysis. One way to expand the analysis is to uproot 'X is either A or non-A' from the domain of natural science and plant it squarely in social science territory in order to examine the implications.

For an empiricist, substantive knowledge is arrived at via observation/experimentation → verification. If successful (X is A), the process then can be deployed to uncover causal laws. If, however, X is non-A, the process is abandoned. This process of verification or abandonment dovetails with Bhaskar's observation about empiricist belief "that only the actual (identified as the determinate object of the empirical) is real."<sup>229</sup> Against empiricism, critical realism argues that identifying observable surface phenomena as 'real' requires a concomitant assumption that closure is possible in social systems, whereas "true closure is impossible, for well-known reasons of incomplete experimental conditions and, more fundamentally, because persons are involved in scientific experimentation, and social psychological life is itself an open system."<sup>230</sup>

In other words, empirical realism depends upon a reduction of the real to the actual and of the actual to the empirical, and in so doing presupposes a closed world and a completed science.<sup>231</sup> That this presupposition qualifies as ideological is suggested by Bhaskar's allusion to "the objectionable ideological consequences of an assumption that the social world is a closed system (from the point of view of the practice of science) that whatever men currently experience is unquestionably the world."<sup>232</sup> On this view, reductionism is ideological, as is, for instance, a statement that 'nothing interesting is happening in African politics.'

#### *Gramsci's critique of positivist Marxism and implications thereof*

Gramsci's attack on the positivist methods and assumptions which pervade Bukharin's *Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology* bears comparison with Bhaskar's critique of (Western) empiricism. (An editorial footnote explains that what Bukharin terms 'materialism,' Gramsci understands as empiricism and positivism.<sup>233</sup>) Whereas Bhaskar refers in passing to the objectionable ideological consequences of empiricism, Gramsci is more explicit. One must, he contends, examine the way in which Bukharin "has remained trapped in Ideology."<sup>234</sup> He then makes a distinction between "historically organic ideologies" and ideologies that are "arbitrary, rationalist or 'willed.'" Historically organic ideologies are those that have the power to organise and mobilise "human masses"; arbitrary ideologies, on the other hand, "only create individual 'movements', polemics and so on."<sup>235</sup> Gramsci's motive for relegating Bukharin's *Popular Manual* to a mechanistic slot within the ideological genre can be described in his appraisal of Bukharin's notion of science, equated by Gramsci with sociology as

... the philosophy of non-philosophers, an attempt to provide a schematic description and classification of historical and political facts, according to criteria built up on the

model of natural science. It is therefore an attempt to derive 'experimentally' the laws of evolution of human society in such a way as to 'predict' that the oak tree will develop out of the acorn.<sup>236</sup>

Having highlighted the teleology and scientism of 'mechanistic' Marxism, Gramsci mounts an offensive against the idea that laws of tendency in the political realm unproblematically can be equated with "the laws of statistics or to the laws of large numbers which have helped to advance various of the natural sciences."<sup>237</sup> He points out that it is possible to posit a correspondence only by deploying a series of problematic assumptions, itemised as follows. Firstly, the assumption that the human objects of research are essentially passive. Secondly, the assumption that a simple inversion of idealist logic in which speculative categories are replaced by empirical concepts and classifications is a process that enables scientific discovery yet somehow escapes the abstract and anti-historical bent of idealism.<sup>238</sup> Thirdly, the assumption that everything can be reduced to a single ultimate or final cause that at one blow will resolve "the practical problem of the predictability of historical events,"<sup>239</sup> hence gratifying an immediate need for certainties - a psychological condition Gramsci attributes to young people or "a public which, from the point of view of scientific discipline, is in a condition like that of youth".<sup>240</sup>

Judging by Gramsci's acerbic and quite lengthy attack on Bukharin's rendition of Marxism, he thinks Bukharin culpable of turning Marx's silk purse into a sow's ear of "mechanical (vulgar) materialism"<sup>241</sup> which far from posing a serious challenge to bourgeois ideology, rates as an *reductio ad absurdum*. Against Bukharin, Gramsci defends an idea of science that he believes is closer to Marx's real meaning.

A new science proves its efficacy and vitality when it demonstrates that it is capable of confronting the great champion of the tendencies opposed to it and when it either resolves by its own means the vital questions which they have posed, or demonstrates, in peremptory fashion, that these questions are false problems.<sup>242</sup>

It is worth noting, however, that Gramsci's non-positivist Marxism stems - as mentioned by the editors of *The Prison Notebooks* - from a distinctive feature of his thesis, that is, constant underplaying of the materialist element in Marx's work.<sup>243</sup> Nor is it clear whether, for Gramsci, Marxism is a science or an ideology. It is clear, however, that in his efforts to rescue Marxism from positivism, and hence to critique Marxism *qua* mechanistic ideology, he constructs an alternative version, viz, a notion of 'organic ideology'. This notion bears comparison with Mannheim's 'transcendent idea'. (iii)

### **Social science and ideology: some conclusions**

In wrapping up this chapter, and on the basis of preceding discussions and arguments, I conclude that in positivist social science, the concept of 'ideology' by-and-large occupies the position reserved for non-A phenomena in a formula designed to distinguish that which is real from that which is imagined. Even if Lenin is viewed as an exception to the rule since he allocated the term 'ideology' to a wide spectrum of knowledge, and to this extent did not posit a binary division between ideology and science, he nonetheless reproduced the binary configuration of a realist formula by distinguishing between proletarian ideology and its absolute 'other', bourgeois ideology. As a general rule, A is a substantive category and is reserved for phenomena that the paradigm - whether Marxism or modernisation theory - is

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(iii) Since these somewhat related concepts are integral to an argument that an applied ideology is likely to prove ineffectual if insufficiently grounded in the lived world within which it operates, they are explored in the next chapter.

able to recognise as 'real' and thus as meriting serious consideration. Phenomena that fall outside scientifically recognisable limits, however, are assigned to a kind of cognitive limbo.

I further conclude that each paradigm fits the contours of Gellner's depiction of the god of the excluded middle, namely, a jealous and exclusive god, intolerant of rivals – an intolerance that transmutes into an impulse to systematise and eliminate the incoherence attendant on simultaneously held, contradictory beliefs. This amounts to progress-by-elimination. A paradigm advances, and best serves its own cause, by eliminating the opposition – in which case any phenomenon, be it belief or practice, that the paradigm is unable to assimilate while retaining its own inner coherence rates as an anomaly or problem for the paradigm.

It is the potential problem for the paradigm posed by cultural particularities and regional / local specificities that both Marxism and modernisation theory proposed to iron out by casting themselves in a comparative (viz: the same observations and propositions can be made, and the same conclusions drawn across time and space) and globally applicable mould. This solution to the problem of logical anomalies and local incongruities is justified by both paradigms with reference to universal regularities uncovered by physics. Yet this tendency on the part of the paradigms to align themselves with natural science begs three questions. One (articulated by Bhaskar) is that the objects of social science research are not intransitive, that is, are not objects with which the seeker after knowledge has no necessary relationship. Since social science researchers (or paradigm agents) and the objects of their research are human beings, the reflexivity of social science paradigms is imputed. In short, to some extent at least, the relationship between a social scientist and her or his research material not only is

mutually constitutive, but also is constituted in ways not necessarily intended - or acknowledged - by the researcher or paradigm agent.

Secondly, the question of fault allocation is moot since no natural scientist worth the name would blame the object (viz: nature) of his or her research in the event that an experiment fails to deliver the expected results. In this context, and to this extent, 'Afro-pessimism' more appropriately should be termed 'paradigm-pessimism', in which case, the search for a new paradigm becomes - or at any rate, in a crisis-ridden era should become - a scientific imperative. As Kuhn observes: "As in manufacture so in science – retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it. The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived."<sup>244</sup>

Finally, if a paradigm – crisis notwithstanding – is unable or unwilling to retool, it seems fair enough to question the motive for resistance. At this juncture, a paradigm's temporal and spatial point of origin is of some relevance. By way of illustration, a paradigm that emerged from Eastern Europe or alternatively, North America during the Cold War era well might be configured by affiliation to one or the other ideology. Scriven, for instance, contends that

It is increasingly clear that the influence of ideology on methodology and of the latter on the training and behaviour of researchers and on the identification and disbursement of support is staggeringly powerful. Ideology is to research what Marx suggested the economic factor was to politics and what Freud took sex to be for psychology.<sup>245</sup>

In other, more moderately phrased words, the line between an ideology and a social science paradigm is neither as clear nor as unwavering as social scientists might like to believe.

Moreover, if both a dominant ideology and a dominant paradigm (for instance, a neoliberal development paradigm) are not least the products of an unequal relationship between centre and periphery, then their practitioners in effect, even if not in intention, are conflating the centre of power and the centre of truth. In this scenario, an iron cage or “preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies”<sup>246</sup> doubles as a cognitive and perceptual trap not only for its adherents and practitioners but also for its target constituencies in the Third World. This trap configures not only the parameters of the dominant paradigm but also the conceptual matrix of the counter-discourse it generates. (iv)

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(iv) See Chapter Four, pp 116-118

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **OF PARADIGMS AND LIVED WORLDS**

As indicated in the conclusion to the previous chapter, it is not always easy to locate the point where a paradigm ends and an ideology begins. The difficulty is more than usually pronounced in the case of an ideology that proclaims its scientific status. This chapter begins with a discussion and comparison of aspects of Kuhn's and Mannheim's theses in an effort to uncover and elaborate points of overlap. It moves on to an examination of the similarities between Mannheim's and Gramsci's notion of a definitive characteristic of a non-ideological transcendent idea (Mannheim) and an organic ideology (Gramsci). The chapter then itemises and analyses key facets of Guevara's Congo experience in the light of the above discussions and comparisons, the better to explore the interaction between a paradigm and the lived world - in this case, of post-independence Congo.

#### **Kuhn and Mannheim: crises and worldviews.**

At the heart of Kuhn's thesis is the paradox of 'normal' or 'ordinary' science enabled by a paradigm that both generates the conditions necessary for successful research and contains the seeds of its own and therefore, normal science's destruction. On the one hand, research cannot proceed coherently and systematically in the absence of a paradigm. Kuhn avers that "something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can only be ... 'a bloomin' buzzin' confusion.'"<sup>247</sup> A paradigm "provides rules that tell the practitioner ... what both the world

and his science look like.”<sup>248</sup> *Ergo*: normal science focuses on finding solutions to problems pre-defined by a dominant paradigm as legitimate. “One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.”<sup>249</sup> A paradigm, therefore, is self-limiting. Far from encouraging practitioners to take detours into uncharted territory, it keeps them on the beaten track and focuses their attention on familiar horizons. Within these limits, normal science is capable of steady, systematic and successful prosecution of research.

On the other hand, the limits that enable successful research also constitute the price paid by normal science if its practitioners encounter an anomaly pronounced enough to form a major obstacle in the paradigm’s prescribed route. The paradox is that “anomaly appears only against the background provided by the paradigm.”<sup>250</sup> Paradigms and anomalies, it seems, are coterminous – at any rate, in the final analysis. As I understand Kuhn’s meaning, human scientific knowledge, articulated within the confines of a paradigm, sooner or later generates its own contradictions since normal science is “an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies.”<sup>251</sup> Furthermore, “normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.”<sup>252</sup> In other words, the success of normal science depends both on the presence of a paradigm and the absence of anomaly. A period of ‘revolutionary’ (or ‘extraordinary’) science is preceded by “the awareness of anomaly, ie, with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science.”<sup>253</sup> At this juncture, either a new paradigm emerges or the successful practice of science is indefinitely stalled given that the old, no longer functional paradigm has become “a monster”.<sup>254</sup>

Kuhn thus posits two separate and distinct eras of scientific time: periods of normal science (defined by a paradigm) and periods of revolutionary science (delineated by a major paradigm shift.) In the former era, scientific knowledge progresses steadily and cumulatively; in the latter era, scientific knowledge undergoes a dramatic change, not least of perception given that scientists learn to see things in new ways via “a change in visual gestalt.”<sup>255</sup>

A revolution in scientific knowledge differs from its ‘normal science’ predecessor in that it is characterised by risk-taking, in turn preceded by a crisis. It is precisely because a ‘normal science’ paradigm purveys a steady, cumulative, consistent and – in this sense – stable picture of the world as known to scientists that periods of paradigm change occur at a high-risk premium, and require “neural reprogramming.”<sup>256</sup> Indeed, a paradigm revolution involves so radical a reorganisation of previous (paradigmatic) knowledge that Kuhn explicitly compares it to a political revolution. He cites the “genetic aspect of the parallel between political and scientific development”<sup>257</sup> inasmuch as both constitute radical disruption of a ‘normality’ that has ceased to function adequately. “In both political and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution.”<sup>258</sup> A second aspect of the parallel is that both scientific and political crises herald periods of instability.

Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that these institutions themselves prohibit. Their success therefore necessitates the partial relinquishment of one set of institutions in favour of another, and in the interim, society is not fully governed at all. Initially it is crisis alone that attenuates the role of political institutions as we have already seen it attenuate the role of paradigms. In increasing numbers individuals become increasingly estranged from political life and behave more and more eccentrically within it. Then, as the crisis deepens, many of these individuals commit themselves to some concrete proposal for the reconstruction of society in a new institutional framework. At that point the society is divided into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new one. And, once that polarisation has occurred, *political recourse fails*. Because they differ about the institutional matrix within

which political change is to be achieved and evaluated, because they acknowledge no supra-institutional framework for the adjudication of revolutionary difference, the parties to a revolutionary conflict must finally resort to the techniques of mass persuasion, often including force. Though revolutions have had a vital role in the evolution of political institutions, that role depends upon their being partially extrapolitical or extrainstitutional events.<sup>259</sup>

Kuhn then adds a codicil to his comparison. “Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life.” Further: “As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice – there is no standard higher than that of the relevant community.”<sup>260</sup>

As can be inferred from the above statement, Kuhn argues against the notion of an ‘out there’ reality which in some fashion is external to and independent of human perception of it. He argues for the notion that in the final analysis, ‘reality’ at any given time in any given community is the product of communal consensus. Moreover, ‘reality’ is susceptible – in times of crisis – to radical reinvention. Kuhn thus disposes of two tenets central to positivism, namely, the notion that there is a correspondence between scientific truth and natural necessity, along with the belief that science, whether natural or social, is the study of an objectively existing reality. (v)

The scientific community’s reaction to the publication of Kuhn’s thesis was both dramatic and polarised, dividing scholars into pro- and anti-Kuhn camps.<sup>261</sup> Kuhn was accused by the latter camp of promoting a dangerously relativistic, hence destructively negative perception of scientific progress.<sup>262</sup> Referring to positivistic denouncements of Kuhn’s ‘relativistic’ theory, Gouldner observes that “since science is defined as the dominant form of rationality, any

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(v) See Chapter Two, p 49

critique of it exposes the critic to condemnation as anti-scientific, anti-intellectual, and even as irrational and nihilistic.” He adds that “precisely this attitude prompted the denunciation of Thomas Kuhn’s careful critique of ‘normal’ science, even though the critical facet of Kuhn’s view of science is greatly muted.”<sup>263</sup> According to Fuchs, Kuhn suffered the additional indignity of being taken further than he had intended to go:

Incommensurability has become a popular theme in scepticism with Kuhn, despite Kuhn’s frequent disclaimers that he was not a Kuhnian. The theme comes in varying radical versions. The most radical version, meaning incommensurability, has it that different cultures or forms of life make sense only in their own terms, and cannot really be understood, let alone evaluated, from the outside. Incommensurable forms of life pass each other like ships in the night.<sup>264</sup>

Kuhn himself, responding to his critics, contended that “there is ... no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its ‘real’ counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.”<sup>265</sup> Moreover: “The proponents of different theories are like the members of different language communities. Recognising the parallelism suggests that in some sense both groups may be right. Applied to culture and its development that position is relativistic.”<sup>266</sup> Kuhn, however, did not agree that his thesis necessarily expounds relativism in science. Declaring that he is “a convinced believer in scientific progress”, he emphasises that “Newton’s mechanics improves on Aristotle’s and that Einstein’s improves on Newton’s as instruments for puzzle-solving.” This said, he describes in the puzzle-solving progression (from Aristotle to Newton to Einstein) “no coherent direction of ontological development. On the contrary, in some important respects ... Einstein’s general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle’s than either of them is to Newton’s.”<sup>267</sup> In short, in terms of a current paradigm’s ontology (as distinct from its instrumentality *qua* puzzle-solving activity), it may bear a closer resemblance to a

paradigm constructed in ancient Greece than to a paradigm constructed in 18<sup>th</sup> century Britain.

Given Kuhn's contention that paradigms not only are constitutive of science, they also - in the sense that a paradigm views nature through "a constellation of mental sets"<sup>268</sup> - are constitutive of nature, he asks the rhetorical question: "Is it really any wonder that the price of significant scientific advance is a commitment that runs the risk of being wrong?"<sup>269</sup> From this question of Kuhn's can be distilled the possibility that to Bhaskar's observation that the objects of natural science research are intransitive, (vi) Kuhn might respond 'yes and no' since, while the observation applies to nature *per se*, scientists view nature through a constellation of mental sets – and their perception does not necessarily or inevitably correspond with nature. A given perception is representative of a particular cultural and historical milieu but not necessarily representative of nature as such. In other words, given the limits imposed by cultural and historical finity, paradigmatic perceptions, or the findings of normal science in any given era are 'as good as it gets'. The possibility of this response to Bhaskar is supported, for instance, by Kuhn's injunction to his students, when reading the works of an important thinker, for example, Aristotle's *Physica*, to ...

... look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When you find an answer, I continue, when those passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning.<sup>270</sup>

Kuhn defines the above manner of reading a text as "the discovery of hermeneutics"<sup>271</sup> and attributes it to his realisation that "the permanent ingredients of Aristotle's universe, its

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(vi) See Chapter Two, p 41

ontologically primary and indestructible elements"<sup>272</sup> are quite distinct from the world as perceived by Galileo. It is the ontological element of a paradigm that underwrites Kuhn's contention that an emergent paradigm in key respects is incommensurate with its immediate predecessor (and rival), and – concomitantly - underwrites the notion of scientific revolutions as "changes of world-view".<sup>273</sup>

Returning to Kuhn's comparison between scientific and political revolutions: he makes the comparison in the context of institutional malfunction, of crisis, and of institutional change initiated by an extra-institutional force. He does not refer – in this particular context – to changes in world-view. However, given his contention that a requirement of scientific revolution is change in world-view, the same genre of change reasonably can be assumed to apply in the case of political crisis. In this regard, Mannheim's thesis is illuminating, not least because it bears comparison in certain respects with Kuhn's, that is, the polarising effects of crisis and the incommensurability of competing world-views.

Whereas Kuhn restricts the notion of changes in world-view to a given scientific community, Mannheim applies the notion to social groups in general. Referring to "the alarming fact that the same world can appear differently to different observers",<sup>274</sup> he contends that social mobility, specifically, vertical mobility, impels "the mind to discover the irreconcilability of conflicting conceptions of the world."<sup>275</sup> It is during processes of democratisation "that the thinking of the lower strata, which previously had no public significance, acquires prestige and influence."<sup>276</sup> The ideas of the lower strata then "confront the ideas of the dominant strata on the same level of validity."<sup>277</sup> The dramatic political and social changes of the modern era (from absolute monarch to hegemonic political parties; from exclusive systems of class power

and privilege to the inclusiveness of the universal franchise) precipitated an intellectual crisis that hinged on an “irreconcilable plurality of lifestyles”<sup>278</sup> in relation to which the same object appears differently depending on “the set of concepts with which we view it.”<sup>279</sup>

According to Mannheim, a negative consequence of the clash between competing sets of concepts is that political parties have tried to set the intellectual agenda for society, leading in a number of cases to the creation of the absolute state, which “claims as one of its prerogatives the setting forth of its own interpretation of the world.”<sup>280</sup>

### **Ideology and utopia.**

It is within the context outlined above that Mannheim sets his interrogation of the concepts ‘ideology’ and ‘utopia’. Having first distinguished between absolute utopias (pie in the sky) and relative utopias (ideas which seem unrealisable only from the perspective of status quo vested interests), Mannheim goes on to explain why only certain sorts of ideas qualify as utopian in the relative sense. Both modes are situationally transcendent but “ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed *de facto* in the realisation of their projected contents.”<sup>281</sup> Mannheim provides an example, namely, the idea of Christian brotherly love that - in a society founded on serfdom - remains an unrealisable and ideological idea “even when the intended meaning is, in good faith, a motive in the conduct of the individual.”<sup>282</sup>

If one transfers Mannheim’s concept of an ‘ideological idea’ to Africa, an example that comes to mind is the idea of ‘proletarian internationalism’ in countries where the urban working class comprised a miniscule fraction of the population. Such ideas, as Mannheim emphasises

in relation to beliefs of this type, pose no direct threat to the status quo – which, in post-independence, Cold War Africa, predominantly was that of elite (one party or military) dictatorships. Conversely, utopian ideas directly threaten the status quo in that they both transcend reality and break the bonds of the existing order. A utopia, as Mannheim points out, seems unrealisable only from a status quo perspective.<sup>283</sup> This said, he acknowledges that the most accurate way of distinguishing between ideological and utopian modes is retrospective. “Ideas which later turned out to have been only distorted representations of a past or potential social order were ideological, while those which were adequately realised in the succeeding social order were relative utopias.”<sup>284</sup> As Larrain points out, “this solution by confining ideological analysis to the past, makes difficult the elucidation of ideologies and utopias in the present.”<sup>285</sup>

An additional twist is that ideology and utopia have in common a denial of aspects of reality. This grey area in Mannheim’s thesis is explicable, however, in terms of his bifurcated conceptualisation of ideological thought. On the one hand, ideology is situationally transcendent if in practice somewhat ineffectual. On the other hand, ideology as a mode of reality representation emerges from ruling groups, usually political parties, perceived by Mannheim as the organisations that – with the onset of modernity - replaced the Church. In the Middle Ages, monopolistic control of intellectual production was enjoyed by the clergy; scholasticism gave sanction to the ruling mode of thought, itself embodied in the “organised collectivity” of the Church.<sup>286</sup> Mannheim pinpoints as the “decisive fact” of modern times, “the collapse of the intellectual monopoly of the clergy.”<sup>287</sup> However, the initial stimulus of replacing a religious world view with its “rationalistic-naturalistic”<sup>288</sup> successor and

competitor was experienced only by a small group of intellectuals. Since for a majority of people "a model of life which is devoid of collective myths is scarcely bearable", <sup>289</sup> an alternative – or substitute for the intellectual dominance and control of a priestly caste – had to be found. The rise to prominence of political parties *qua* emblems of modernity enabled in some instances the creation of the absolute state that claimed "as one of its prerogatives the setting forth of its own interpretation of the world." In all instances, political parties "incorporated rational and if possible scientific arguments into their systems of thought" and in consequence, every type of politics "was given a scientific tinge."<sup>290</sup>

In sum: if a link is made between Mannheim's portrayal of the signifiers of modernity and Gellner's, then it seems that political parties provide a bridge between the iron cage of expert knowledge and the lived world, thus taking over the function of the clergy. By the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Europe, parties had become

... public corporations and fighting organisations. This in itself forces them into a dogmatic direction. The more intellectuals became party functionaries, the more they lost the virtue of receptivity and elasticity ... Crises affecting political thinking also became the crises of scientific thought.<sup>291</sup>

Mannheim then describes the two concepts, ideology and utopia, as the final intensification of the intellectual crisis. Here, he describes ideology as a property of the collective unconscious of the ruling groups which "obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilises it." This condition of unconscious denial is shared by utopia, which, "guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain aspects of reality. It turns its back on everything which would shake its belief or paralyse its desire to change things."<sup>292</sup> It is worth noting that in this dimension of Mannheim's exposition, ideology and utopia seem strikingly similar inasmuch as their proponents conceal from themselves and

their constituencies those aspects of reality which might contradict or undermine their verisimilitude.

While there are distinct limits to which an even moderately exact comparison can be made between Kuhn's 'normal science' and Mannheim's 'ideology', these limits do not necessarily vitiate the extent to which a given paradigm reasonably may be termed 'ideological'. In Kuhn's depiction of normal science, for instance, can be glimpsed the potential for the hardening of knowledge into an inflexible format, deeply resistant to novelty and innovation, and thus conducive to the binarisation of reality into 'A or non A' in perpetuity. To the extent, then, that a given centre of power is served by a paradigm's dichotomous configuration, that paradigm serves the status quo, not least by stigmatising other truths, other realities, as fictional. Moreover, freezing the world into an immutable entity renders necessary the extra-institutional character of advocacy for major change, given that the paradigm / ideology itself prohibits such change. In this respect, Mannheim's argument is that an extra-institutional force for change is not inevitably a 'utopia' insofar as – while situationally (or institutionally) transcendent – it incorporates an unrealisable, hence ideological idea and as such, fails to pose a serious challenge to the status quo.

In his preface to Mannheim's book, Wirth provides clear and unambiguous definitions of ideologies (those complexes of ideas which tend to generate activities toward the maintenance of the existing order) and utopias (those complexes of ideas which tend to generate activities toward changes of the prevailing order<sup>293</sup>) that do not reflect the play of light and shade in Mannheim's multi-faceted portrayal of ideology and his nuanced perception of the ambiguities embedded in utopian schema. However, Mannheim makes at

least one point abundantly clear, namely, that situationally transcendent ideas part company with “wish projections”<sup>294</sup> if and only if the utopian conception of the individual is in close alignment with

... currents already present in society and gives expression to them, when in this form it flows back into the outlook of the whole group and is translated into action by it, only then can the existing order be challenged by the striving for another order of existence.<sup>295</sup>

In other words, situationally transcendent ideas escape the perils of wish projection (and therefore of ideology) only if sufficiently in synch with pre-existing social ideas or trends. The point, then, is social agreement that yes, these ideas make sense and represent desirable goals. It seems likely, therefore, that Mannheim would concur with Kuhn’s contention that “there is no standard higher than that of the relevant community.”<sup>296</sup>

Arguing along similar lines to Mannheim, Gramsci defines an organic ideology as a material force in that it is informed by popular conviction. Conversely, an ideology that exists separately from popular belief is no more than an individual fancy with no basis in social (hence, material) reality.<sup>297</sup> It thus is possible to posit a close correlation between Mannheim’s ‘utopian idea’ and Gramsci’s ‘organic ideology’ in that both are informed by and hence enjoy the support of the relevant community. By contrast, their opposite numbers, that is, the wish projection embedded in an ‘ideological idea’ and the sterility of a ‘mechanistic’ or ‘arbitrary’ ideology, seem doomed to failure as developmental schema. In the light of this hypothesis, Guevara’s somewhat disastrous Congo adventure lends itself to analysis in this dissertation not as the failure of an individual leader and his band of Cuban soldiers to accomplish their objectives, but as the inability of a science of revolution to cope with the lived world as anomaly. It further is surmised that the intensely competitive ideological

climate of the Cold War facilitated the development of paradigm-driven expectations, perhaps best described as wish projections or (as Gramsci might say) the psychological condition usually associated with young people.

### **Guevara's *dawa*.**

Che Guevara's Congo adventure provides a telling example of an exercise in would-be proletarian internationalism and the intensification of a world-wide struggle for socialism that became hopelessly bogged down in unanticipated and unwelcome regional and local particularities. The merit of Guevara's Congo diaries is located not only in his retrospective self-criticism but also in the meticulous detail with which he records an assortment of particularisms, diverse and usually incompatible purposes, and contradictory elements that in combination defeated the clear and unambiguous pathway he in advance had mapped for himself and his band of Cuban revolutionaries, viz: "In relation to Yankee imperialism, it is not enough to be resolute in defence. It has to be attacked in its bases of support, in the colonial and neo-colonial lands that serve as the underpinning of its world domination."<sup>298</sup> (It is worth noting in parenthesis that his diaries make instructive reading only if situated within the binary configuration of Cold War grand narratives. Selected aspects lifted from the surface of the text give a misleading, not least because ahistorical, impression.<sup>299</sup>)

Given Mannheim's delineation of a grey area between 'ideology' and 'utopia, it seems apposite to introduce the Congo diaries by highlighting a wish projection element, pronounced enough to remove the Cuban mission to Congo from Mannheim's category of relative utopia and relocate it in one of the dimensions of an ideological mode, namely, situationally transcendent ideas fated not to succeed in the realisation of their projected

contents. This element, best articulated in Guevara's own words, is uncovered by a debriefing process<sup>300</sup> at the conclusion of his seven months in an eastern enclave of Congo's vast and diverse landscape. Guevara poses the question of what selection and training requirements - in the event of further Cuban involvement in armed conflict in Africa - should be applied to "a militant, so that he can overcome the violent trauma of a reality with which he must do battle." He then highlights a salutary discovery. "Revolutionary militants who go off to take part in a similar experience must begin without dreams, abandoning everything that used to constitute their lives and exertions."<sup>301</sup>

The text of Guevara's Congo experience in the main comprises a closely woven chain of Marxist / African disjunctures triggered when a science of revolution collided with the lived world of the Congo. The first link in the chain manifests itself in a tense encounter between the agent (Guevara) of a paradigm, European in its origin but global in its assumptions, and the by-and-large Afrocentric bent of the leaders of various (four in all) fractions of Congolese liberation fronts along with "50 or more people, representing Movements from ten or more countries, each divided into two or more tendencies."<sup>302</sup> Guevara distills into two sentences the primary source of divergence: "Our view was that the Congo problem was a world problem" whereas "they thought the right slogan must be: 'the Congo problem is an African problem.'"<sup>303</sup> The irony is that to the communist bloc, Congo-Kinshasa represented a paradigmatic exemplar. Of the liberation wars fought in Africa during the 1960s and '70s, Congo's was one of very few not waged against an extant colonial regime. It was or seemed to be (at least, from a distance) a reasonably clear-cut case of a petit-bourgeois dictator (Tshombe) in league with neo-imperialism and shored up by white mercenaries from pariah

states in Southern Africa ranged against progressive forces in Congolese society fighting to preserve the radical legacy of Lumumba. "I set off with more faith than ever in the guerilla struggle, yet we failed."<sup>304</sup> This pronouncement encapsulates the paradox in which Guevara became enmeshed.

*'I set off with more faith than ever ...'*

Why? Arguably because the zero-sum nature of the Cold War both generated faith in contending protagonists and trapped them in their faith, constraining them not only to justify their agendas in terms of scientific imperatives but also to believe their justifications. In respect to Africa, the Cuban agenda, "not always appreciated by those who required their help" was to construct "a Third World Alliance of all those opposed to American imperialism."<sup>305</sup> Intrusive, often destructive United States (U.S.) foreign policy in South America, not least a habit of supporting oppressive regimes or providing active assistance in the ejection from power of popular but radical leaders, demonstrates that during the Cold War, U.S. estimation of what constituted acceptable regimes in Third World countries primarily was defined by *realpolitik* factors, and was surprisingly flexible at best, downright bizarre at worst. Chomsky, referring to Figueres and Costa Rica in 1955, illustrates the point. He notes that the attack mounted by a small force of armed dissidents in the border area was met by draconian measures that, however, did not prevent the United States from providing assistance to quash the rebellion. Nor did Figueres forfeit his 'acceptable' credentials by instituting widespread abuse of civil rights "permitted for U.S. clients."<sup>306</sup> By the same token, oppressive and kleptocratic postcolonial African presidents figuratively speaking displayed on their foreheads an indemnity clause: 'permitted for U.S. clients.'

Guevara, present in Guatemala during the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted overthrow of Arbenz' radical regime, "acquired an implacable hatred of the United States,"<sup>307</sup> a hatred which was continually refreshed by further outbreaks of U.S. foreign policy in South America and Asia. Since it's quite likely that Patrice Lumumba, independent Congo's first Prime Minister, signed his own death warrant the moment he applied for assistance (to quell secession and return Katanga to the Congo fold) not merely from the United Nations but also from the Soviet Union, Guevara's dedication of his services to the Congo cause to this extent is explicable. In addition, Congo provided him with an opportunity, perhaps much needed in the wake of Cuba's "bureaucratized revolution"<sup>308</sup> to renew his faith.

It would be disingenuous, however, to assume that Cuban motives were strictly altruistic. Guevara himself, in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations after the 1964 Stanleyville paratroop landings, highlighted the stakes with a reference to "the Congo's vast resources which the imperialists wish to keep under their control."<sup>309</sup> Nzongolo-Ntalaja provides an indication of how high African and global stakes were in 1960s Congo (and still are). Firstly, the most important strategic minerals needed for the 21<sup>st</sup> century are found in three countries of the world: Russia, China and the Congo. Secondly, the ecological diversity of the Congo is such that it also abounds in non-mineral resources, and much of its terrain is fertile enough, claims Nzongola-Ntalja, potentially to feed the entire continent.<sup>310</sup> Thirdly, the Congo river is "one of the five longest rivers in the world and the first with respect to hydroelectric potential"<sup>311</sup> – a potential vast enough to light up Africa from Cairo to Cape Town.

Certainly, the Congo's enormous natural riches are a major factor in explaining its role as an active battleground of the Cold War from independence in 1960 to the eviction from office of Prime Minister Tshombe in 1965 (along with eviction of Belgian and Southern African mercenaries) - a gesture on the part of Congo's then President Kasavubu that enabled a reconciliation between the Congo and other independent states in Africa, thus making the continuing presence of Cuban insurgents an embarrassment Tanzania - as a Cuban-facilitating country - no longer could afford. The Congo's natural riches also help to explain why Mobutu (Tshombe's Commander-in-Chief) then was able to seize power from Tshombe's replacement, Kimba, and, having deposed Kasavubu as well, remain in power for the next 32 years - more than enough time to pillage his country and acquire vast wealth in overseas holdings and Swiss bank accounts, not least thanks to his U.S. endowed indemnity clause. Another explanatory factor for the arrival in Congo of Cuban guerrillas is that the ultimate success of American objectives in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa and the Third World had - as a prerequisite - a clampdown in South America, comprehensive enough to ensure that Cuban revolutionary visitors were *personae non grata* with South American governments. As a result of successfully prosecuting an exclusionary foreign policy in South America, the CIA was able to set up in Panama a training ground in counter-insurgency techniques for the officer corps of an assortment of South American defence forces. As Gott puts it, "the Cubans, on the opposing side, could do no less."<sup>312</sup>

Guevara, therefore, had two immediate and strategic reasons for his project in the Congo. One was to break out of the international straitjacket imposed on the Cuban revolution by the United States by taking advantage of the existing liberated zone on the Congo side of Lake

Tanganyika to create a tit-for-tat training ground for Congolese guerrillas as well as for trainees from other liberation movements in Africa. A related motive, as mentioned above, was to go to the Congo "because it is the hottest spot in the world now ... I think we can hurt the imperialists at the core of their interests in Katanga."<sup>313</sup> (He first had to negotiate with the People's Republic of China, however, since the Chinese were the chief external supporters of the Congolese rebels. This was a delicate mission, given the Sino-Soviet dispute, and China's annoyance because South American communist parties were not of the Chinese faith - for which China held Cuba responsible.<sup>314</sup>)

*'... yet we failed.'*

As indicated above, the Congo, during the course of five tumultuous years of extremely qualified independence, had become an archetypal Cold War zone. Lumumba having been assassinated "on orders from President Dwight D. Eisenhower as part of the anti-communist crusade,"<sup>315</sup> all semblance of national cohesion had disappeared. President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Tshombe and General Mobutu operated out of Kinshasa with a defence force trained and accompanied by exiled Cuban pilots (surviving members of an abortive, U.S. trained Bay of Pigs invasion), Belgian and Southern African mercenaries. In the rest of the country, four territorially distinct and politically fractious liberation movements, whose top echelon leaders spent much of their time in the capitals of independent African states squabbling over the potential spoils, operated with varying and variable degrees of success.

Furthermore, the fraction of the armed struggle notionally led by Kabila in the territory fringing Lake Tanganyika contained - unknown to Guevara prior to his arrival - an admixture

of approximately 4,000 Tutsis. "Many of the Tutsis had lived in these parts for centuries, while others had taken refuge there after a Hutu massacre at the time of independence; ousted from Rwanda, they were hoping to return to their country on the back of a successful revolution in the Congo."<sup>316</sup> In the joint and prolonged absence from the front of Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart, Mundandi, relations between Congolese and Rwandans at best were unfriendly, at worst terminal.<sup>317</sup> Guevara largely was unable to ease the friction. Referring to the Rwandans' "excessive distrust of the Congolese," he recalls that he urged unity, "arguing that the outcome of the struggle in Rwanda depended on the outcome of the struggle in Congo, since the latter involved a broader confrontation with imperialism." While agreeing -at least in principle - to try and improve relations with the Congolese, "they did not touch on the second point - which suggested that they did not agree with my remarks ..."<sup>318</sup> This is scarcely surprising given an entrenched problematic of inter-ethnic hostility, product not least of the imposition of fixed colonial borders where previously had existed porous frontiers and flexible ethnic demarcation.<sup>319</sup>

A number of other postcolonial problematics unknown to or wished away in advance by the Cubans are embedded in Congo's colonial history. Belgian colonialism can be described as brutally exploitative<sup>320</sup> on the one hand, and brutally neglectful on the other, particularly during the era (1855-1908) when Congo was the personal fiefdom of King Leopold of Belgium and in 1885 was named the Congo Free State, as well as given legal status, by the Congress of Berlin.<sup>321</sup> Prior to the Congress, the region's biggest and most notable precolonial polity, the Kongo Kingdom, already had been cannibalised by Leopold, the French in Congo-Brazzaville and the Portuguese in Angola, thus dividing Kongo speaking

peoples into three separate colonial territories. Randrianja notes that this splintering of a language and culture into disparate territorial units is merely "one illustration among countless others" of the negligible importance colonial powers in Africa attached to "the cultural homogeneity of human groups." He observes that, in consequence, Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation as an 'imagined community' applies *par excellence* to postcolonial Africa.<sup>322</sup>

Smith and Tordoff respectively contend that when the Belgian government took over Leopold's fiefdom, renaming it the Belgian Congo, a more humane and welfarist colonial regimen was instituted<sup>323</sup> - but nonetheless, education largely was left in the hands of the Church and did not go beyond primary level, the idea being to delay indefinitely the emergence of an African political elite. As a consequence of this prolonged policy of minimalist education, only a minuscule group of nationalist leaders (caveat: nationalists without a nation) were available to lead Congo to independence and, among them, only Lumumba was capable of generating enough support on the ground to enable the creation - in 1958 - of a political party with an adequate claim to national status. The Belgian government, demonstrably unable to cope with mounting unrest, within three months abruptly orchestrated colonial withdrawal from the Congo - that is, formal withdrawal. (They maintained a strong neocolonial interest in Katanga.) Needless to say, given an imperialism-sustaining education policy, one of the Congo's most severe difficulties on the eve of independence was "the virtual absence of trained technical, political and military personnel."<sup>324</sup>

Since the rural Congolese, compared with Africans in settler colonies like Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa, in the main had not been alienated from their land, this eliminated an

important prerequisite for successful guerrilla movements in the rural areas.<sup>325</sup> Guevara identifies the Congolese peasants as one of the most difficult problems of the war. He explains that he is accustomed to the situation in South America where revolutions in the rural areas are fuelled by land hunger, product of "latifundists, feudal lords and ... capitalist type companies." This is not the case in the Congo which is vast and sparsely populated, where there is an abundance of land, much of it fertile, and where "the concept of land ownership hardly exists." He believes that there is evidence of feudal relations in part of the northern territory, but that otherwise "peasants are completely independent."<sup>326</sup> He notes that capitalism operates only in superficial and peripheral forms through small traders, and that "Imperialism gives only sporadic signs of life in the region; its interests in the Congo is mainly based on the strategic mineral resources of Katanga ..."<sup>327</sup> This unpromising picture is compounded firstly, by the lack of an industrial proletariat (except in Katanga); secondly, by the complete lack of a national bourgeoisie; thirdly, by the fact that even "the petty bourgeoisie of middlemen is not very developed."<sup>328</sup>

Davidson explains as follows the lack of a national bourgeoisie in Congo, as in many other postcolonies. Citing Fieldhouse's statistics, he notes that while the white fraction in the Belgian Congo comprised 1% of the population, it owned 95% of total assets. "Here there was a society in which 110,000 whites and a very few large overseas firms controlled almost the entire modern economy."<sup>329</sup> Guevara therefore found himself asking a largely rhetorical question: "What could the Liberation Army offer these people? That is the question which always bothered us."<sup>330</sup> Against his intense frustration with the unmilitary conduct of

Congolese guerrillas who are "of peasant stock and completely raw"<sup>331</sup> can be set his estimation of the condition of peasant farmers.

Poverty was absolute among the peasantry. But it is a poverty for which the balance-sheet is no more negative today than it was ten years ago. Except in the war zones, the peasant does not feel inclined to pick up a gun because objectively declining conditions of life make it a virtual necessity.<sup>332</sup>

From those peasants who did 'pick up a gun' Guevara, initially at least, seems to have expected a great deal, as if a Marxist-Leninist science of revolution somehow is donned along with guerrilla combat kit. His angry denunciations seem surreal: the anger of a revolutionary caught up in the claustrophobic paradox of a science which bears little resemblance to the lived world of the people among whom he, at that point in time, is operating.

In retrospect, Guevara's traumatic seven months in the Congo induced in him a conclusion that: "If the liberation struggle is to be successful in the present conditions in Africa, it is essential to bring some of the Marxist analytic schema up to date."<sup>333</sup> More specifically, he (now sadder but wiser) recommends to Cuban theorists and strategists that:

The impact of socialist ideas must reach the broad masses of the African countries, not as a transplant, but as an adaptation to new conditions. And it must offer a down-to-earth image of major changes that can be, if not actually felt, then clearly imagined by the population.<sup>334</sup>

The above modification of scientific socialist orthodoxy echoes an earlier statement by Amilcar Cabral when reflecting on the liberation war in Guinea-Bissau:

Keep always in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head.<sup>335</sup> They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.<sup>336</sup>

To Cabral's observation, Davidson adds an assertion that: "Anyone who ran ahead of the majority's willingness to follow would soon be running alone"<sup>337</sup> which resonates in

Guevara's depiction of his embattled retreat from the Congo. "During those last hours of our time in the Congo, I felt more alone than I had done even in Cuba or in any of my wanderings around the globe. I might say: 'Never have I found myself so alone again as I do today after all my travels.'"<sup>338</sup> Perhaps Guevara neglected sufficiently to consult the lessons offered by a struggle he describes as "an incomplete example of a well-conducted people's war"<sup>339</sup> given that Cabral's revolutionary praxis deviates from the beaten path of 'normal science.' According to Turok, Cabral never acknowledged himself as a Marxist.<sup>340</sup> Be that as it may, both Cabral's and Guevara's (eventual) advice regarding a situationally appropriate ideology of revolution bear close comparison with Gramsci's definition of an historically organic ideology.

Nodal points of Gramsci's concept of an ideology that corresponds to the historicity of a given society or culture can be found firstly, in his distinction between common sense and good sense. By the former he means a cognitive mode "mechanically imposed by the external environment." An individual uncritically accepts "in a disjointed and episodic way" the "intellectual activity" (a phrase Gramsci places in quotation marks, presumably to indicate that his tongue is in his cheek) "of the local priest or aging patriarch whose wisdom is law, or in the little old woman who has inherited the lore of the witches ..." <sup>341</sup> By the latter, he means the result of working out for oneself ...

... one's own conception of the world and thus, in connection with the labours of one's own brain, choose one's sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the history of the world, be one's own guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely from outside the moulding of one's personality.<sup>342</sup>

To the above depiction of 'good sense' Gramsci appends a caveat. Good sense is only to a limited extent a product of individual cognition since, in the final analysis, all thought is collectively produced. The same 'collective product' principle applies also to 'common sense,' albeit in uncritical and incoherent form. Gramsci discerns in a 'common sense' individual a "strangely composite" personality which "contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over."<sup>343</sup> In order to chart the route from common sense to good sense, Gramsci recommends a Socratic map as cognitive guide. "The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited you in an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. The first thing to do is to make an inventory."<sup>344</sup>

A second nodal point is located in the link between good sense and philosophy. Given the context in which I am deploying Gramsci's arguments, his depiction of the link is worth citing in its entirety.

Creating a new culture does not only mean one's own individual 'original' discoveries. It also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in a critical form of truths already discovered, their 'socialisation' as it were, and even making them the basis of vital action, an element of co-ordination and intellectual and moral order. For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the real present world, is a 'philosophical' event far more important and 'original' than the discovery by some philosophical 'genius' of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals.<sup>345</sup>

Thus, for Gramsci, if an expert knowledge system is to extend itself into the lived world - which, in order to assist in the development of an organic ideology, it logically must do - the extension should be articulated and configured by "organic intellectuals", that is, the thinking

and organising element of a particular, fundamental social class.<sup>346</sup> (It is in this light that the significance of Dalmayr's assertion that Cabral, "by remaining rooted in the African people he guided while simultaneously learning from them along the way,"<sup>347</sup> qualifies as an organic intellectual best can be grasped).

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that for Gramsci, an organic ideology is the end product of emergent 'good sense' mediated by philosophy. Furthermore, such an ideology, made "coherent on a scientific plane" by the cognitively transformative activities of organic intellectuals, "never forgets to remain in contact with the 'simple' and indeed finds in this contact the source of the problems it sets out to study and resolve."<sup>348</sup> By the same token an organic ideology, once established as a set of guiding and interpretive principles, mediates the relationship between expert knowledge and the lived world.<sup>349</sup>

In concluding this section on Guevara's Congo experience, and in light of Gramsci's thesis, it is illuminating to pinpoint firstly, Guevara's comment regarding Congolese *dawa* - a liquid concoction deemed to provide protection from physical and spiritual harm. "The *dawa* is treated as an article of faith. The most politically advanced say that it is a natural, material force, and that they, as dialectical materialists, recognise its power ..." <sup>350</sup>; and secondly, to take his ironic comment in conjunction with one of his key revelations, namely that:

Despite all the fears, we kept trying to incorporate Congolese into our little army and to give them the rudiments of military training, so that this nucleus might save the most important thing: the soul, the presence of the revolution. But the Cubans charged with imparting the divine breath had an ever weaker grip on it themselves. The effects of the climate were still being felt, as gastro-enteritis was added to the endemic malaria. Until the rigours of the job got the better of my scientific spirit, I noted in my field diary the statistics of my own case: I had the runs more than 30 times in 24 hours. Only the scrub knows how many more there were after that.<sup>351</sup>

It doesn't seem to have occurred to Guevara that the Congolese rebels speak of *dawa* in much the same spirit that he and his band of Cuban revolutionaries speak of Marxism-Leninism, nor that his professed science operates as a kind of magic muti with which to contest the muti of the Cold War 'other', and thereby to fend off the depredations of Western imperialism. Given that the zero-sum essence of the Cold War codified the binary divisions of a realist formula, Guevara, his insights notwithstanding, failed to recognise that '*dawa*' and 'dialectical materialism' share – if nothing else – an element of wish projection.

In sum: it is at the ambiguous frontier between 'ideology' and 'utopia' that it is instructive to locate the unravelling of Guevara's scientific certainties. Under the pressures inflicted on him by the lived world of the Congo, his faith – his *dawa*, as it were – inexorably was crumbling. In such a case, the realist formula 'X is A or non-A' is revealed in all its ontological and epistemological limitations. Moreover, Guevara – in endeavouring to fit the lived world of the Congo within "the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies"<sup>352</sup> – primarily was the architect of his own disaster. Following on from this, I surmise that Guevara and his group of Cuban insurgents were not in any manner or form potentially the Congo's saviours. Rather, they were an aspect of the Congo's postcolonial crisis.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **VARIETIES OF NATIONALISM**

Before leaving the Cuban Embassy in Dar es Salaam and embarking on a course which led to Bolivia and his death, Guevara recommended that a revised Marxist recipe in the Congo should include, as fundamentals, the following ingredients: firstly, the inculcation of a national vision as an antidote to “the tribal concept”<sup>353</sup> that he believed bedevilled the Congo; secondly, “revolutionary seriousness and an ideology that can guide action”;<sup>354</sup> thirdly, a party “with a real national basis and real prestige among the masses”;<sup>355</sup> fourthly, a national leader.<sup>356</sup> His outline highlights a quartet of developmental priorities espoused by both Marxist and modernisation paradigms, as demonstrated below.

#### **Paradigmatic nationalisms**

For adherents and practitioners of both paradigms, the political party is considered to be the most effective nationalist vehicle in which to convey the developmental contents of an iron cage to a newly liberated but largely rural and tradition-bound populace. Leader and party must be capable of simultaneously creating and leading a nation within state boundaries inherited by new nations from old empires. In this regard, ideology putatively has a dual role. It is the binding agent connecting leader and political party to the people, not least by making a development agenda at once explicable and compelling. It also operates as a catalyst in that it speeds up the growth of the nation and therefore, of development. As this by any standards is a dual task of Herculean proportions, the faith necessarily invested by both paradigms in their applied developmental instruments deserves special mention and, in the case of

modernisation theory, requires further investigation since for behaviouralists, the sole worth of an applied ideology is contained in its functionality.

According to Plamenatz, for beliefs to fit the contours of ideology, "they must be shared by a group of people, they must concern matters important to the group, and must be in some way functional to it: they must serve to hold it together or to justify activities and attitudes characteristic of its members."<sup>357</sup> The definition is instructive in that it contains the notions both of attitudes and of functions. Also, as a definition it presumably would be acceptable to behaviouralists because it links together the key variables of attitudes and actions. However, Plamenatz neglects to mention the focal concept, for behaviouralists, of political socialisation. This omission is remedied by Easton.

The literature on nationality and nationalism has dealt exhaustively with the varied devices for stimulating a sense of cohesion. Concrete responses for the expression and reinforcement of a sense of community appear in patriotic ceremonies, the physical symbols of group identity such as totems, flags, songs, canonised heroes ... The processes of political socialisation operate on maturing members of a system and contribute to the internalisation of supportive attitudes towards the political community.<sup>358</sup>

The communal function of ideology, continues Easton, is that of mobilising support for the regime. Ideology carries out this function in two primary ways: firstly, it plays an important role in promoting a sense of political community, described by Easton as "a we-feeling among a group of people, not just that they are a group but that they are a political entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny."<sup>359</sup> Secondly, ideology, by interpreting and codifying the shared history of a political community as well as its current collective experiences "in a form that makes them readily visible, accessible and transmissible over the generations,"<sup>360</sup> functions as a "mechanism contributing to the

persistence of a political community.” If ideology is functioning at optimal levels, it will replace particular ties to “tribe, village, region or class” with a common political bond.<sup>361</sup>

It is noteworthy that Guevara and Easton share a preoccupation with the replacement of tribal particularities and divisions by national unity, and uniformity of vision. Both see ideology as playing a central role in the transformation of ‘tribes’ into ‘nations.’ By definition such an ideology would have to incorporate a strongly nationalist element. It is at this juncture, however, that adherents of Marxist and modernisation paradigms would part company, one set arguing that the inculcation of nationalist affiliations is just one function (that is, the communal function) among a number that an ideology should perform, the other contending that nationalism is the collective property of a given socio-economic class. For instance, for Guevara in his capacity as a paradigm agent, the identity of the class that produces a nationalist discourse is crucial since it flags the divide between scientific- progressive nationalism on the one hand, and bourgeois-liberal or merely ideological nationalism on the other.

In general, the two paradigms are emblematic of two variants of nationalism, one reformist and the other revolutionary. The variants share a common objective predicated on their mutual apprehension of the flawed (colonial) origins of the modern state in sub-Saharan Africa, and a corresponding and urgent need to remedy the perceived problems of particularist identities and tribal rivalries. Both variants of nationalism are vested in the politics of identity but while the Marxist version avowedly is the scientifically informed praxis of a national proletariat, the variant propagated by modernisation theory realises itself in a concept of ‘the nation’.

In the above respect, Munck contends that from the viewpoint of revolutionary nationalism "the nation is understood as the product of the creative activity of the masses" whereas bourgeois nationalism "presents the nation as something abstract and symbolic, separating it from the concrete labour of those who have built it."<sup>362</sup> *Prima facie*, it does seem paradoxical that modernisation theory should posit as the end point of an ideological function an abstract concept of the nation. Here, one would have to bear in mind that for a theory such as modernisation with its positivist-behavioural parentage, there is an exact correspondence between the reality of a concept and its function/s. No positivist would posit the substantive existence of a concept (X) if its function (A) does not demonstrably exist. Since the existence of X is a consequence of empirically observable and quantifiable behaviour mediated (engineered?) by an ideology performing its communal function, one reasonably could argue that there is nothing notably abstract about modernisation theory's concept of the nation since it, too, is a product of concrete labour, albeit divorced from considerations of class struggle. The difference, then, is situated not so much in the aim - in both cases, a concretely produced 'nation' - but in the method of achieving it. In other words, what category of human action and interaction is deemed to produce 'a nation' as distinct from 'a tribe' or an ethnic group?

*The authoritarian trend: 'revolutionary nationalism'.*

A theory of the revolutionary production of an African or more generally, Third World, nation can be presumed to encode Lenin's belief that bourgeois and socialist (proletarian) ideologies are locked in a struggle for exclusive possession of a scientific apprehension of reality. By extension, then, if an iron cage or expert knowledge system is to infiltrate the lived world of Africans, in the process achieving the conversion of a pre-scientific (non-A)

concept of tribe into a scientifically constituted nation, then revolution itself is an implicitly, or at any rate, potentially scientific process. This in turn presupposes a scientific category of leadership for, without such leadership, a revolution merely will be 'spontaneous'. Since a spontaneous revolution itself presupposes the existence of an ordinary or non-scientific class of leadership, a nation produced by a spontaneous revolution of the workers cannot be a scientifically constituted entity. It instead will approximate to a bourgeois or abstract concept of the nation.

The ease with which a workers' revolt, if unsupervised by a revolutionary AvantGarde, eventuates in domination by bourgeois elements, is explained by the Leninist thesis that bourgeois ideology is far older in origin, more fully developed and has at its disposal far more resources than its socialist counterpart.<sup>363</sup> For this reason, the active presence and vigilance in the struggle of a revolutionary AvantGarde rates as an objective necessity. Further, Lenin shared with Kautsky a belief that "modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge."<sup>364</sup> In this way, Marxism-Leninism co-opts nationalism to the service of the vanguard party.

Lenin's thesis of decolonisation is modelled on a Russian (economically undeveloped) scenario and thus posits a double manoeuvre in the struggle for national liberation. Firstly, both bourgeois and proletarian nationalists of necessity must unite to eject reactionary (whether feudal or colonial) regimes. Success in this initial stage of the struggle then necessitates a second phase in which protagonists of a science of revolution ensure that the struggle continues. In other words, a period of revolutionary watchfulness is necessary to contain reformist elements among the national bourgeoisie and ultimately, to eliminate all ties

to Western capitalism. In Lenin's view, communist movements in the Third World were still too weak to achieve the first phase on their own, and thus temporary rapprochement with all elements of the national bourgeoisie was called for. Munck highlights the intervention of an Indian Marxist, M.N. Roy, who "argued vigorously that the colonial world was not an undifferentiated category, and that with capitalist penetration the indigenous bourgeoisie would lose its nationalist inclinations." Roy further contended that the bourgeoisie in the colonies is not "an objective revolutionary force."<sup>365</sup> At the back of Roy's argument was his thesis of decolonisation, namely, that the basic trend in the colonies was one of increased capitalist penetration achieved with the cooperation of the indigenous bourgeoisie, and that therefore the objective interests of imperialist and indigenous bourgeoisie are one and the same – in which case, the national bourgeoisie in perpetuity (or for as long as imperialism lasts) by definition is a counter-revolutionary force.

After Lenin's death, and despite the reservations of Roy and others, the Comintern took Stalin's line, namely, that imperialism retards industrialisation in the colonies, in which case the struggle for independence of a nationalist elite counts as revolutionary, bourgeois tendencies notwithstanding, and is organically linked to the revolutionary aspirations of the masses. From this thesis was derived the concept of an undifferentiated national front, along with a Comintern resolution that it is the duty of communists actively to support all and any nationalist movements in the Third World.<sup>366</sup>

A critique of the Stalinist notion of an undifferentiated popular front against imperialism is imputed by Ake's critical analysis of ideologies in Cold War era Africa – at any rate, to the extent that a concept of 'national front' forces against imperialism elides the objective

distinction between progressive and reactionary regimes. Commenting on the material absence of radical ideology in post-independence Africa, Ake contends that so-called radical ideologies exist only on an epiphenomenal plane. Regimes that call their economies 'socialist' in fact have adopted institutional structures and policies similar to capitalist regimes. He itemises the similarities on both sides of an apparent ideological divide between 'capitalist' and 'socialist' states in Africa. Firstly, in all cases, leaders have held tenaciously to power, and a change in regime is brought about only by force. Secondly, political systems in Africa uniformly are administered from the top, and power increasingly is centralised. Thirdly, all African countries are *de facto* one party systems in which the political participation of the masses has been reduced to inconsequential choices.<sup>367</sup>

From Ake's argument can be extrapolated a notion that the category of human action deemed to produce a nation - as distinct from a 'tribe' - is derived from the *modus operandi* of a nationalist political party, not from a state's citizenry as such, and further, that this notion applies across the board irrespective of (more apparent than real) socialist / capitalist or radical / bourgeois distinctions. Nationalism, then, is configured as an elite discourse whether its roots are in a behavioural, 'nation-building' paradigm or in a scientific socialist paradigm, since science - of whatever ideological colouration - exclusively is the possession of a party elite.

However, the above argument begs the question of capitalism's status – *strictu sensu* – as an economic system, not a political ideology. Thus, an issue that remains to be addressed is that of the conversion of pre-independence liberal-nationalist discourse into post-independence,

capitalist one party systems in which a liberal ethos typically is abandoned along with the banning of opposition parties.

*The authoritarian trend: 'bourgeois nationalism'.*

In charting the changing contours of bourgeois nationalism in Africa during the eras of decolonisation and postcolonialism, aspects of Ake's, Mazrui's and Davidson's respective theses in combination provide an instructive guide to the conversion of liberal nationalist discourse pre-independence into authoritarian (single party) nationalism post-independence.

Ake and Mazrui take as their point of departure the ideology (Ake) or political values (Mazrui) of imperialism. Mazrui cites imperialism's dual mandate "of civilisation and of exploitation." These mandates "are carriers of explicit and implicit political values." Against them, African opponents of imperialism propounded two sets of political values: pluralism and nationalism.<sup>368</sup>

Liberal values were adopted by African nationalists for two primary reasons. Firstly, colonial education policy. "Schooling in colonial Africa was linked to the promotion of religion rather than the dissemination of science."<sup>369</sup> As Ake explains: "a minimum of technical and scientific education was offered because colonial domination owed much to the spell of the coloniser's technological and scientific superiority."<sup>370</sup> However, an educational programme designed to preserve colonial domination contained the seeds of African resistance since liberal education led to the discovery of Western liberal ideas and from there to political consciousness and the development of political skills. "Liberal education generated an

indigenous leadership and equipped its members with a common language. It helped create the conditions for eradicating colonialism."<sup>371</sup>

While future elites were garnering the skills necessary to oppose imperialism on liberal and nationalist grounds, labourers and peasants, denied welfare schemes by colonial administrations, resorted to "traditional solidarity groups, especially ethnic groups. These became centres of resistance, means of self-affirmation ..." <sup>372</sup> It was from these associations that nationalism in African colonies derived its popular impetus and mass base. Davidson adds that "without the mass pressure that surged into the streets of colonial cities and made its impact felt even in remote corners of the bush, the educated elite would have remained upon the sidelines of everyday life ..." <sup>373</sup>

Secondly, Ake maintains that in an era of decolonisation, the great virtue for African nationalists of liberal ideology was its dual utility. On the one hand, it could be utilised to mobilise public opinion in the European metropole against colonialism by deploying values and doctrines that made sense in the political and cultural world of Europeans. On the other, liberalism is the companion ideology of the capitalist mode of production that a number of nationalist leaders fully intended to retain after independence.<sup>374</sup> Mazrui, having noted that the value of political pluralism was expressed most forcefully by African leaders who had adopted a course of negotiated evolution towards independence, adds that liberal ideology provided an arsenal of legal formulae and political methods. Thus nationalism and liberalism were in strategic and tactical alliance<sup>375</sup> in a fashion not dissimilar to the strategic and tactical alliance between imperialism's twin themes of civilisation and exploitation. Against imperialism's self-endowed mandates, firstly, to exploit natural resources and human labour

in the colonies, African nationalists set the right to national self-determination; secondly, to civilise 'backward' tribes, African elites set the liberal discourse of human rights.

To the above apt formula in opposition to Europe's clutch on African territories and peoples was added a third element, defined by Mazrui as follows:

In their struggle for independence, African nationalists were often aiming not at the emancipation of a particular territory but at putting an end to the submission of African peoples. The values of nationalism were almost always associated with the values of African unity as indissolubly linked elements.<sup>376</sup>

This third element - in which pan-African unity is perceived as the most effective and durable method of combating (neo) imperialism - derived its primary (and on-going) impetus not least from the link made by imperialism between the concepts of 'race' and 'civilisation', itself a product of 19<sup>th</sup> century European science. (vii)

Mazrui distinguishes between nationalism - "the defence of or the quest for nationhood and its sociocultural attributes" - and 'dignitarianism' - "a defence of collective dignity in the face of a hostile or condescending environment." He contends that it was out of dignitarianism that Pan-Africanism first emerged as "a deep-seated African rebellion against humiliation" whereas "at best, nationhood has been just the means to an end."<sup>377</sup> In similar vein, Davidson contends that the aims of nationalism were indistinguishable from demands for "the removal of the colonial incubus."<sup>378</sup> By extension, it is inappropriate to interpret or apply the concept of 'nationalism' in Africa from within an historical and cultural matrix shaped by European experience. To Davidson's way of thinking, 'African nationalism' in the main meant no more and no less than anti-colonialism and anti-racism - "which amounted in practice to the same

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(vii) See next section of this chapter

thing.” He further avers that while African nationalism mostly is not informed by a concept of the nation, it is thoroughly imbued with a concept of freedom.<sup>379</sup>

Arguably, a potential danger in equating nationalism with freedom may become actual if markedly different perceptions of freedom inform the periphery of the post-independence state and its newly empowered centre. If differences then are made concrete in constitutional statute or military decree, the discourse of African nationalism mutates into party-state or - in some cases - military-state ideology in which the centre of truth is coextensive with the centre of power and, in practice, power is concentrated in a few expert hands.

Once the pre-independence conflation of nationalism and liberty had mutated into a post-independence, single party discourse of national unity, it stands to reason that a pre-independence strategic alliance with (multi-party) liberalism lost its utility for ‘Afro-capitalist’ regimes. With the abandonment of liberalism, nationalism acquired an increasingly authoritarian trend.

Moreover, that capitalist one-party regimes “generally deny any ideological attachments at all; ‘pragmatism’, it is said, is their only creed”<sup>380</sup> is logically congruent with modernisation theory’s privileging of functional efficacy and political order (as key facilitators and indices of development) at the expense, for instance, of ideas about social justice and the redistribution of wealth - unless, that is, a climate of social unrest is severe enough to constitute a developmental crisis.

Referring to the analytical tradition embodied in the American Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Comparative Politics Committee, “often labelled liberal modernisation theory”, Young alludes to the SSRC’s argument that development can be understood as the resolution of a series of ‘crises’ encountered on the pathway toward consolidation of the nation state, and that crisis resolution entails (among other things) responding to “the increasingly powerful normative claims for equality.” The SSRC, however, failed to translate this and other crisis triggers “into measurable indicators.”<sup>381</sup> Noting the search by Eckstein and the SSRC for “a set of empirical measures that could be reliably assessed by quantitative indicators,”<sup>382</sup> Young observes that:

Survival and absence of collective disorder, in an authoritarian setting, do not seem very convincing indicators of developmental accomplishment. Legitimacy and decisional efficacy are more reasonable standards, though highly resistant to the kind of measurement Eckstein sought. This venture into performance measurement quietly expired; it is most interesting for its demonstration of the severe difficulties of the task.<sup>383</sup>

Since orthodox modernisation theory in post-independence Africa proved unable or unwilling to salvage the pre-independence marriage of nationalism and liberalism, a minor paradigm shift from orthodox to revised modernisation occurred. Modernisation revisionism (viii) explicitly equated social order and economic growth with political authoritarianism, thus underwriting a conflation of nationalism and authoritarianism in ‘Afro-capitalist’ states.

In sum: once the authoritarian leanings implicit in orthodox modernisation theory (ix) had been made fully explicit by its revisionist successor, a science of modernisation did not markedly differ from its Marxist-Leninist rival in respect the following methods and

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(viii) Particularly in its Huntingtonian incarnation – see Chapter Seven, *passim*

objectives. Firstly, the elimination of factional differences by dint of institutionalising one-party regimes; secondly, an authoritarian brand of elite-formulated nationalism; thirdly, the injection 'from without' of expert knowledge into the lived world of Africans; fourthly, strong and charismatic leadership as *sine qua non* of national development, thus reinforcing and expanding the central role of 'big men' in postcolonial Africa.

Scott, who applies a concept of "high modernist ideology" to modernisation and Marxist-Leninist paradigms alike, compares "late colonial rule" and its "social engineering aspirations and ability to ride roughshod over popular opposition"<sup>384</sup> with a postcolonial authoritarian state that brings to bear the full weight of its coercive power, the better to implement its developmental designs. Further, Scott contends that both the late colonial and the postcolonial state typically ignore or negate the fund of valuable knowledge embedded in local practices.<sup>385</sup> In general, Mudimbe's definition of colonialism as "a discourse in which an explicit political power presumes the authority of a scientific knowledge and vice-versa"<sup>386</sup> equally can be applied to postcolonial single party nationalism, whether 'revolutionary' or 'bourgeois'.

### **Inverting a realist formula: cultural nationalism**

In contradistinction to exogenous paradigms that advocate varieties of nationalism deemed appropriate for the developing world in general, cultural nationalism is an endogenous and sub-continent-specific discourse, with origins in early 20<sup>th</sup> century Pan-Africanist resistance to European imperialism.

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(ix) See Chapter Six, pp 155-158

### *Science, race and culture*

By the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, European science had been raised to an absolute standard both of knowledge and of justification for imperial over-lordship, in the process endowing an imperial 'super-subject' with rights commensurate with scientific status. Lesser scientific status meant lesser human rights, as illustrated by Bancel *et al* in a discussion of late 19<sup>th</sup> century human zoos in Western Europe. Their focus on the rationale behind commercial display of 'exotic natives' to a credulous European public reveals that it mirrored imperialism's dual mandate, viz, an interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship between that which is commercially profitable and that which is promoted as civilised (or civilising). Among the exhibits on display were Africans, Aborigines, Samoans and Lapps, all defined as 'natural tribes.' As commercial demand increased, travelling exhibits were formed and moved from town to town with their cargo of exotic prototypes.

This was how millions of Europeans first encountered people different from themselves - as exotic strangers in cages. The social effect of such spectacles in forming the image of the other was enormous. The creation of human zoos, and their huge success, was the outcome of three concurrent developments: the construction of a social image of the other; the emergence of scientific theories of racial superiority; and the pursuit of colonial empires, then in full swing.<sup>387</sup>

Bancel *et al* discern a dialectical relationship between imperialism on the one hand, and on the other, positivism (with its emphasis on observable and measurable phenomena), phrenology (that constructed a grammar of the physical characteristics of racial groups), eugenics (that proposed the improvement of hereditary characteristics of population groups by systematic selection) and social Darwinism (that distinguished between primitive and civilised races).<sup>388</sup> Thus, a visual representation of 19<sup>th</sup> century scientific knowledge was conveyed to the lived world of Europeans in sensationalist format. In the process, travelling

cages and their human cargoes - or objects of research - popularised scientific perceptions of reality while simultaneously underwriting imperialism's dual mandate.

In order to elucidate a 'science is might is right' supposition, Biakolo cites Taylor's argument that even if we can find no theoretical grounds for adducing superior rationality to Western scientific and technological culture, there remains one hard and unassailable fact, that of Western technological and therefore, military superiority. "Indeed" comments Biakolo, "confronted with a Gatling gun argument such as Taylor's, what hope of refutation have we?"<sup>389</sup> When science is utilised to negate the history of a conquered people or a silenced majority by banishing it "to the kingdom of unmeaning" along with the stories that are "mysteriously able to impart meaning to human life",<sup>390</sup> then:

The web of direct and indirect instruments of manipulation is a straitjacket that binds life and necessarily limits the fundamental ways it can appear to itself and structure itself. And so it languishes, declines, wastes away. It is cheapened and levelled. It becomes pseudo-life.<sup>391</sup>

Havel's assessment, above, of the long-term effects of protracted and widespread penetration of the lived world by an ideology that asserts its superiority on scientific grounds bears comparison with the penetration of Africa by imperial science, notably in regard to theft of history and concomitant erosion of an endogenous world of meaning. Masolo defines the ultimate effects of this process as "double alienation - alienation from history, alienation into cultural staticism and anachronism, alienation into underdevelopment."<sup>392</sup> This said, the science that invaded the lived world of Czechs and other Eastern European peoples largely was devoid of an element that - arguably - represents the definitive point of contact between

imperial Europe and the lived world of Africans, that is, a 19<sup>th</sup> century science of race which allocated to people with black skins a lowly niche in a linear schematic of civilisation.

In his critique of a schematic that hinges on a notion of inherent racial difference, Appiah isolates as follows a few key assumptions. Firstly, an assumed connection between a 'race' and a 'nation' that in turn posits the nation as a product of culture informed by inherited racial traits. From the outset, European nations conceived of themselves in terms of descent. Given this conception, "all that happened was that descent came in the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century to be understood in terms of *race*". Secondly, the view "that the cultural inferiority of the non-white races flowed from an inherited racial essence."<sup>393</sup>

When examining the consequences for Africans of a racial hierarchy that places people of European descent at its apex in tandem with a conflation of (superior) race and (imperial) nation, Mamdani's observations are illuminating. He notes that the concept of 'tribe' was deployed not least to justify treating Africans as subject peoples in their own territories since - in the cognitive inventory and circular logic of imperialism - tribes were presumed to have no social history and therefore no legitimate claim to political rights.<sup>394</sup> In this fashion, imperialism's dual mandate was established, justified, and then shored up by the findings of European anthropologists and administrators. In the former category, as Biakolo sees it, "the anthropology of Levy-Bruhl marked a watershed in the understanding of the 'Other'".<sup>395</sup> Levy-Bruhl characterised the "collective representations of primitives" as evidence of a "prelogical mentality"<sup>396</sup> in which objective validity and abstract reasoning are absent; instead, memory and participation mystique are allocated priority in the collective cognitive representations of tribes. Although Levy-Bruhl's conclusions moved away from an earlier

anthropological dichotomy of 'civilised' and 'savage', instead contrasting 'logical' with 'prelogical', he nonetheless reproduced a binary configuration, as well as pinning down and specifying the previously rather nebulous meanings associated with notions of 'savage' and 'civilised'. "Primitive culture is participated in collectively, it is a shared reality. The idea of individual, and, by implication, dissident, grasp or assessment of reality, individual creativity, and so on, runs counter to the ethos of primitive culture."<sup>397</sup>

*Pan-Africanist counter-narratives: Negritude and African personality*

It was in the context of the formulaic reduction of non-European races that the philosophy of Negritude <sup>398</sup> arose as a resistance discourse by taking a formula of A (European) and non-A (non-European) and re-configuring it to affirm the authenticity of 'blackness' as a substantive category. In this respect, Negritude's position is clarified if viewed in the light of Mamdani's and Derrida's respective critiques of binary logic. According to Delanty, Derrida argues against the logocentrism inherent in Western culture (that is, the idea that there is a truth to be uncovered by science) "by saying that for every fixed idea there is also an 'absent' idea: identity requires non-identity; the self needs an other."<sup>399</sup> For Mamdani, a paradigmatic representation of social reality that deploys a series of binary oppositions as methodological devices necessarily operates along a bipolar continuum of 'lead' and 'residual' terms. Whereas the lead term has analytical content, the residual term lacks "both an original history and an authentic future."<sup>400</sup> From within this interpretive matrix, the mission<sup>401</sup> of Negritude can be conceptualised as a reaction to the negation of Africa by Europe.

We had been taught, by our French masters at the Lycee, that we had no civilisation, having been left off the list of guests at the Banquet of the Universal. We were *tabula rasa*, or, better still, a lump of soft wax which the fingers of the white demiurge would mould into shape.<sup>402</sup>

Senghor, having made his point, then defines Negritude as "*the whole complex of civilised values - cultural, economic, social and political - which characterise the black peoples, - or, more precisely, the Negro-African world.*"<sup>403</sup>

The term 'Negritude' was coined in 1939 by Aimé Césaire, an African of the Diaspora (in his case, Martinique). In Césaire's work, Negritude, a phrase that encompasses the humanity and dignity of Africans, is conceptualised in tandem with a notion of 'return.' 'Return' endows African dignity and humanity with historicity, and in so doing "opens the way to the definition of negritude as a historical commitment, as a movement."<sup>404</sup> It is worth noting that Negritude, like Pan-Africanism, in its first inception was a cognitive product of the African Diaspora - the descendants of slaves in North and South America and the West Indies - and was informed by a dual conceptualisation of space: firstly, Africa as a space of origin and of spiritual return, a symbolic referent both of suffering and of pride; secondly, current spatial location whether American or Caribbean.

In the second location, the purpose of expressing Pan-African solidarity and the humanity of black peoples is less metaphysical than the notion of spiritual return given that the objectives are concrete political and civil rights. In the context of the first space, and referring to the writers, poets and artists associated with the Harlem Renaissance movement of the 1920s and '30s, Masolo contends that "All these people saw Africa, with its rawness and anchorage to base natural forces, as an essential antithesis to the domineering industrial civilisation of the white world."<sup>405</sup> Africa was re-imagined and, in that sense, re-claimed by Africans of the Diaspora. A re-imagined Africa was an emblem of creatively conceptualised 'African

difference' and a symbolic assertion both of equal human rights and equal global citizenship as Africans, not as imitators of Europe or America. In the words of du Bois:

... the advance guard of the Negro people - the 8,000,000 people of Negro blood in the United States of America - must soon come to realise that if they are to take their just place in the van of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is *not* absorption by the white Americans. That if in America it is to be proven for the first time in the modern world that ... Negroes are ... a nation stored with wonderful possibilities of culture, then their destiny is not a servile imitation of Anglo-Saxon culture, but a stalwart originality which shall unswervingly follow Negro ideals.<sup>406</sup>

In the quotation above, it is noteworthy that European perceptions (as itemised by Appiah, above) of essentialist connections between nation, race and culture, all are present and correct. A conceptual matrix designed as a vehicle of Europe's self-expression is utilised to assert the singularity, dignity and cultural creativity of the black race. It is somewhat ironic, as illustrated by an excerpt from Senghor's poem, *New York*, that European essentialism is adopted and adapted by the discourse of Negritude to highlight African exceptionalism in contradistinction to that which is perceived as intrinsically European: "New York! I say New York, let the black blood flow into your blood / Let it wash the rust from your steel joints, like an oil of life / Let it give your bridges the curves of hips and the pliancy of vines."<sup>407</sup>

In an analysis of Senghor's *New York*, Mezu, having described Senghor's observations as "poetically true and acceptable" nonetheless expresses reservations. He notes that *New York*, and other poems along similar lines, contain disturbing echoes of the work of de Gobineau who, in 1854, described Africans as prodigiously endowed with emotions and artistic prowess but almost completely lacking in rational and scientific intelligence or mathematical vision.

Senghor ... seems to be giving credence to the erroneous belief that the blacks alone are endowed with artistic talent, to the exclusion of other races, a position as false as

the theory of Gobineau that whites and more particularly Germans are endowed with more intelligence than other peoples.<sup>408</sup>

Images embedded in Senghor's depiction of the mechanistic, mathematically configured and numbingly scientific culture of the 'other' in contradistinction to the warm, organic and lyrical landscape of the 'self', are expressed with more force and defiance in Césaire's representations of African 'self' and European 'other', as illustrated by an excerpt from *Return To My Native Land*.

Those who invented neither powder  
Nor the Compass  
But who ecstatically leave themselves  
To be carried away  
Toward the essence of everything  
Not caring about dominating others ..<sup>409</sup>

"My Negritude" continues Césaire, "is neither a tower nor a cathedral. It thrusts into the red flesh of the soil, it thrusts into the warm flesh of the sky ..."<sup>410</sup> Irele emphasises that Césaire's vision is not merely personal but also, and more importantly, collective. It is firstly, a vision of the black race "founded upon a novel apprehension of the meaning of Africa, which serves as the mediating symbol of a new consciousness" and secondly, the contestation of a colonial hierarchy of values and the constitution of a counter-myth. In both meanings of the term 'negritude' is contained a purpose defined by Césaire as "the invention of souls."<sup>411</sup>

That which Irele depicts as 'counter-myth' is defined by Appiah (along with other varieties of cultural nationalism or 'nativism') as "reverse discourse" in which ...

... the terms of resistance are already given us, and our contestation is entrapped within the Western cultural matrix we affect to dispute. The pose of repudiation actually presupposes the cultural institutions of the West and its ideologies. Railing against the cultural domination of the West, the nativists are of its party without knowing it.<sup>412</sup>

It is worth noting that Appiah's incisive critique of 'reverse discourse' as a meta-phenomenon, rather than as a discourse specific to French or former French colonies is modified by Irele's contention that Negritude forms a distinctive current of a larger movement of African nationalism. It is distinctive because French-speaking intellectuals, whether of the diaspora or the continent, "faced special problems in their relationship to French colonial rule."<sup>413</sup> They produced a body of imaginative and ideological writings that incorporated "a romantic myth of Africa", (alternatively known as 'romantic primitivism'<sup>414</sup>) and to some extent distinguished them from their English-speaking counterparts.<sup>415</sup> Irele suggests, however, that differences between French and English speaking Pan-Africanists should not be exaggerated since nationalist leaders in both French and British colonies were united by their rejection of colonialism irrespective of whether colonial policy was that of assimilation or indirect rule. The notion of 'African Personality' utilised by English-speaking nationalists - notably, Nkrumah - invests in the same conceptual matrix, viz, firstly, a notion of the collective personality of black people; secondly, the idea that a nation is the product of cultural unanimism informed by race.<sup>416</sup>

Nkrumah delineates as follows the significance of a concept of 'African Personality':

For too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others. Now, what I have called an African Personality in international affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it is through the voices of Africa's own sons.<sup>417</sup>

As defined by Nkrumah, African Personality would seem to refer to the post-independence role of African states in world affairs, in which case the notion of an essentialist African personality is utilised to assert the right of African leaders to speak on behalf of their peoples.

The quotation also suggests that Nkrumah expects the leaders of African states to speak with one voice in international forums. Irele interprets as follows Nkrumah's meaning.

... he took 'the African personality' as a given point of departure; primarily, his intention was to go beyond the framework of its affirmation - of its 'defence and illustration' - in order to conceptualise a new relationship of this personality with the modern world. In this sense, Nkrumah sought to transcend Negritude; it was no longer a question of defining the African personality but of inserting it within the historical process.<sup>418</sup>

Irele concludes that there is a fundamental unity of African thought underlying the various forms of ideological expression in Africa, and that this unity is the product of efforts "to define as it were a founding myth."<sup>419</sup> He clarifies the point (of a single founding myth for an assortment of decolonising and newly independent states) by referring to the way that Du Bois conceptualised 'nation' in an African context. Since an African-American imaginative projection of Africa is all of a piece, that is, a cognitive and visceral space of spiritual return for any member of the black race irrespective of where s/he resides in corporeal space, Du Bois advocated and practised loyalty to an 'African nation' conceived as a single spiritual entity.<sup>420</sup> This conception of 'nation' undergirds the African nationalism of the Diaspora, as well as the theory of Negritude and, in general, Pan-Africanism.

#### *Pan-Africanism and territorial nationalisms*

To the above discussion, Irele appends a caveat, namely that "the practical divergence between the Pan-African ideal and the concrete objectives of African nationalism which began to take place as soon as the latter took the form of independence movements, took what one might call a 'territorial turn.'"<sup>421</sup> Given the territorial division of colonial Africa to suit the interests and ambitions of imperial powers rather than the cultural homogeneity of human groups, African nationalism is the somewhat paradoxical product of widespread disjunctures

between relatively homogenous cultural and linguistic communities on the one hand, and territorial states on the other. In theory, leaders of nationalist movements upheld the unifying principles of Pan-Africanism; in practice, they were riven by "the idea of national unity as a political need, and that of African unity as an ideological value."<sup>422</sup> The tensions between principles and practices in the run-up to territorial independence then were entrenched in a post- independence era of nation-building and state sovereignty. Citing Ghana as a primary example, Irele notes that ...

... in order to emphasise Ghana's new status after 1957, Nkrumah expended considerable effort in giving to the state those external attributes of sovereignty that would not only mark its formal break with the colonial past but also foster a new sense of national belonging among the various peoples of the state... the same logic obliged Julius Nyerere to abandon his first intention to wait for the other two East African countries with which his country shared common frontiers and services, and to press for independence in Tanganyika.<sup>423</sup>

Since Nkrumah also devoted considerable energy to arguing the case, in various continental forums, for a United States of Africa,<sup>424</sup> Irele's assertion requires clarification. He to an extent unravels the conundrum by describing Nkrumah as "the living pivot on which the ideological and affective reciprocity between Pan-Africanism and African nationalism revolved."<sup>425</sup> As I understand the gist of Irele's meaning, Nkrumah's role in newly independent Africa is emblematic of stresses and strains inherent in "the peculiarity of African nationalism."<sup>426</sup> On the one hand, the reinvention of Africa, or retrieval of the continent from the disempowered margins of Eurocentric ontology, requires a significant measure of continental unity premised on a notion of shared cultural essence from which, in turn, is distilled an African *vox populi*. Essentialist perceptions in Europe and North America of 'self' in contradistinction to 'other' thus are reproduced, albeit in inverse order, in a

nationalist emphasis on African one-ness, not least for the purpose of constructing collective fortifications against the depredations of imperialism and, more latterly, neoimperialism. On the other, the Europe-endowed exigencies and anomalies within which territorial independence occurred, when taken in combination with the developmental paradigms adopted by newly independent states, made nation-construction within received state borders a top priority. The outcome of the relationship between these two, by no means compatible imperatives is "the triumph of the territorial principle" - a triumph that "underlines the minor role of the national principle in African nationalism."<sup>427</sup>

### *Critique of cultural nationalism*

In the light of the paradox adumbrated above, it is scarcely surprising that post-independence narratives of cultural nationalism and nation-construction tend to conflate essentialist and functionalist premises. An illustration of this conflation of logically incompatible elements can be found in Abraham's carefully crafted argument in *The Mind of Africa* (1962).

Abraham posits a dual thesis in which culture is valuable both for its functional contribution to nation-building (in his case, construction of a national political culture in Ghana), as well as for what he believes is the ability of African cultural essence to transcend national and regional boundaries. Arguing the unanimity in key respects of African cultures, Abraham contrasts Africa with Europe: "Indeed, the fullness of Africa's cultures is the strength of the cultural argument for pan-Africanism, just as the fullness of Europe's economies is the strength of the economic argument for pan-Europe."<sup>428</sup> He juxtaposes European economies and African cultures, attributing to them equal weight as harbingers of continental unity. In other words, what Africa lacks in an economic context, she more than makes up for in a

cultural context, hence Pan-African unity is within reach - as long as (an important caveat) Africans can be convinced both of the functionalist utility and the essentialist value of culture. "I wish to put forward culture as that knock-down rhetoric by means of which political objectives are sold."<sup>429</sup>

Commenting on Abraham's thesis, Kanneh contends that "for him, 'real' Africa, as a unified concept, is to be found in rural peasantry, and its paradigm is the world-view of the Akan in Ghana." Conversely, Kanneh believes that "Africa, with its plural cultures and influences cannot be reduced to a single political aspiration or spiritual unity."<sup>430</sup> The attempt to do so arguably has resulted in an over-simplified and to that extent distorted portrayal of social realities and meanings in Africa. This effect perhaps is more pronounced in Chinweizu's polemical variation on a cultural nationalist theme than in Abraham's generally well received text.<sup>431</sup>

In *Decolonising the African Mind* (1987) Chinweizu takes a markedly interventionist (social engineering) stance. He cites, as the central objective of decolonising the African mind, elimination of the authority that "alien traditions exercise over the African."<sup>432</sup> Such elimination, he argues, will allow Africans to establish distance between themselves and alien cultures; distance sufficient, he believes, to enable the retention of that deemed to be useful. Even so, foreign items should be retained only if no equivalent African item exists - "otherwise, we will clutter our culture with unnecessary borrowings."<sup>433</sup> In addition, a crucial aspect of the process of nation construction is "the willed enactment into history of some myth or idea of a nation." This role should be reserved for African writers, given that their

“stock in trade is the inventing of lives for individual characters, and of plausible worlds for sets of characters.”<sup>434</sup> Chinweizu refers to the literary genre in question as “national-patriotic” and contends that:

African literature would have to be consciously didactic. It would have to supply us with an abundance of appropriate fables, proverbs, exemplary tales of heroic and unheroic behaviour which, from being told and retold, would form the ethical fibre of the new African who would accomplish the project.<sup>435</sup>

Above all, national patriotic literature must assert and affirm “African identity and bring out its historical significance.” Chinweizu singles out Chaka as an archetypal African nation builder, and, as an archetypal African identity fable, a Zulu tale about an eagle reared among chickens who discovered his eagle-ness only when taught by a hunter to fly. “Essentially, the job is to din into each of us that ‘You are an eagle, not a chicken!’”<sup>436</sup>

Thus, against all non-African communities which would like us to adopt their identity, and so give our primary loyalty to them (Christendom, Islam, the Free World, the Socialist World, the various European ‘Commonwealths’ etc) African literature must affirm, validate and give concrete meaning to our African-ness, and proclaim the high destiny of African civilisation.<sup>437</sup>

Three analyses in particular - Appiah's, Kanneh's, and Masolo's - provide illuminating critiques of an essentialist-functionalist conflation that configures nationalist discourse in postcolonial Africa. Appiah, having noted that most nationalist discourse has moved beyond monolithic notions like Negritude or ‘African personality’, warns that even so, insufficient attention is paid to the real nature of modern African identities which, like all other identities, are constructed. Citing Ranger's findings, he argues that identities assumed by nationalists to be natural to Africans often are the product of imperial imagination that, particularly in the case of indirect rule in British colonies, “had the effect of monumentalising the flexible

operations of pre-colonial systems of social control as what came to be called 'customary law'.<sup>438</sup>

... the very invention of Africa (as something more than a geographical entity) must be understood, ultimately, as an outgrowth of European racialism; the notion of Pan-Africanism was founded on the notion of the African, which was, in turn, founded not on any genuine cultural commonality but ... on the very European concept of the Negro.<sup>439</sup>

Appiah concludes that cultural nationalism, with its persistent pursuit of alternative genealogising, ends always in the old location, and that its only achievement is to have invented a different past for the same place.<sup>440</sup>

Kanneh alludes to nationalism's "tortured relationship with and resistance to cultural imperialism in such a way that claims of equality interchange with claims of radical difference."<sup>441</sup> He further argues that Chinweizu's self-conscious elaboration of African identity is couched in terms that both reject and mirror European discourse. The notion of 'culture' posited by Chinweizu and others is implicitly a philosophy of racial determinism.<sup>442</sup> "In this way, African-ness overreaches itself to become an expression of *national* identity, *racial* identity, political consciousness and heritage which achieves its only coherence in opposition to the (White) West."<sup>443</sup>

Masolo, having cited Dewey's assertion that humankind is given to formulating beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognises no intermediate possibilities, argues that the nationalist school in Africa "bases its reasoning on the 'Either A or not-A, but not both A and non-A' logic of the excluded middle."<sup>444</sup>

Extrapolating from and extending Masolo's argument: this formulaic method of arriving at an exclusive knowledge of reality is problematic in that culture is conceptualised as a phenomenon that in some fashion is external to the human beings who constitute it – in other words, it is assumed that African culture comprises a reality 'out there'. Further, proponents of African cultural nationalism assume, as do Marxists and modernisation theorists, that nationalist ideologies can and should be engineered by elites. By inverting a realist formula, the icon of 'African culture' is substituted for 'Western science', and processes of reification and binarisation are replicated. Operating in African terrain and at the behest of 'big men', the logic of the excluded middle repudiates – for instance – Said's notion of hybrid, permeable cultures of "appropriations, common experiences and interdependencies of all kinds ..."<sup>445</sup> Rather, African and Western cultures are conceptualised as by-and-large impermeable entities in more-or-less permanent differentiation from one another, thereby excluding the possibility of substantive intermediary cultural categories.

Arguably, cultural nationalism's claim to innovation rests on its perceived task of recasting diverse African histories in a mould at once heroic and monolithic, thereby creating a 'new African'. If, in the process, real histories are obfuscated, even obliterated (for instance, by nationalist systems of education) a constructionist conjuncture between cultural imperialism and cultural nationalism stands revealed, rendering problematic the notion of an innate 'African essence' given that this essence, in its first incarnation, was the invention of imperial Europe.

In sum: the outcome of a mutually reinforcing relationship between (neo) imperialism and African cultural nationalism is that the latter, outraged by the former, persistently invokes the

past in an elite-driven attempt to re-invent the present and in so doing, to endow incumbent regimes with cultural authenticity, hence political legitimacy. In this respect and to this extent, cultural nationalism, like its paradigmatic counterparts, qualifies as ‘ideological’, not least in terms of its delineation of the attributes of the ‘other’, in contradistinction to which the ‘self’ is conceptualised.

### **Section One: summary of argumentation.**

As argued in this section of the dissertation, it is at the contested frontier between a social science paradigm and a political ideology that an ‘ideological paradigm’ is located, efforts by paradigm practitioners to make an unequivocal distinction between the science of the ‘self’ and the ideology of the ‘other’ notwithstanding. It further is argued that if a given paradigm conflates the centre of scientific truth and the centre of power, it qualifies as ideological in the sense of serving the vested interests of a miniscule – relative to overall population - quota of African elites.

This section, however, does not contend that paradigm practitioners necessarily or inevitably perceive their paradigms as operating at the behest of power elites, whether in Africa or elsewhere. In this respect, Mannheim’s explication of a mutually occupied territory of ‘wish projection’ between ‘ideology’ and ‘utopia’ is instructive. In short, paradigm practitioners well may operate in good – if misconceived – faith. The example utilised to elaborate this supposition is Che Guevara’s attempt to apply a universal science of revolution to the locus-specific, lived world of the Congo.

Nor does the dissertation in general contend that good intentions are the exclusive terrain of Marxist revolutionaries in the Third World. For instance, modernisation theory – at any rate, in its early incarnation – is informed by an optimistic - albeit teleological - assumption about rapid and relatively smooth economic and political development in the Third World.

However, citing Kuhn's thesis of paradigm revolution in the natural sciences, I argue that if a paradigm is unable significantly to retool in response to anomaly, it is more of a liability than an asset. Further, in the case of social science, the reflexivity of theory renders a reconfiguration of mental sets all the more urgent given that an ideological paradigm, far from providing a solution to a given crisis, itself is an aspect of that crisis.

Both modernisation theory and scientific Marxism are grounded in key tenets of positivist social science first propounded during the Enlightenment era in Europe. Both privilege a realist formula of binary design which excludes the possibility of substantive intermediate categories, and thus both paradigms – whether putatively or actually – underwrite political authoritarianism. For instance, both paradigms endorse nationalist ideologies that – while varying widely in other respects – are notably similar in their support for the installation and indefinite maintenance of developmental elites. To this extent, both paradigms reasonably can be regarded as implicated in the mythology that a given elite's perception of a given reality is generally and objectively true, hence developmentally compelling - alternate realities and other truths notwithstanding. In consequence, locus-specific configurations of social knowledge and meaning are relegated to the "kingdom of unmeaning"<sup>446</sup> – subjugated, as it were, to the god (or logic) of the excluded middle. In sum, this section argues that in the case of an ideological paradigm, the realist formula 'X is A or non-A' is premised on the location

of power – as distinct from legitimacy - both in Africa and globally, and reflects configurations of reality only to that extent.

However, it is not contended that a Pan-African discourse of cultural nationalism offers a substantive challenge to paradigmatic ontology and epistemology. Rather, it is argued that cultural nationalism is emblematic of the cognitive restrictions imposed by binary reasoning, given that it operates – albeit in inverse order – within the same conceptual matrix of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Further, to the extent that cultural nationalism invests in the myth that African leaders also are ‘cultural heroes’ (x) it, too, is implicated in authoritarian outcomes.

In order to uncover a source of political and social legitimacy which enables avoidance of the plethora of retributive techniques commonly associated with failed ideology, the section investigates Mannheim’s concept of a ‘transcendent idea’ in conjunction with Gramsci’s concept of ‘organic ideology’. (xi) Mannheim’s and Gramsci’s theses are strikingly similar inasmuch as Mannheim advocates epistemology at least partially grounded in “currents already present in society”,<sup>447</sup> and Gramsci espouses ideology that “never forgets to remain in contact with the ‘simple’”,<sup>448</sup> On this basis, it is concluded that non-coercive conveyance of a developmental agenda to the lived world requires an ideology that to an adequate extent has integrated itself with local realities and knowledges, thus enabling development along lines that make sufficient ‘good sense’ (xii) to local populations.

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(x) See Chapter One, pp 16-17

(xi) See Chapter Three, pp 74-75

(xii) See Chapter Three, p 87

## **SECTION TWO**

### **PARADIGM AND LITERATURE**

### **REVIEW AND CRITIQUE**

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **AFRICAN STUDIES: GENESIS AND CONTEXTS**

While the chapters in the second section are informed by the first section's thematic trajectory, they take the form of a detailed review and critique of thematically relevant literature. The section begins with a chapter that provides a brief overview of the genesis of African studies – set against both its decolonising and Cold War backdrops – and situates the origins of modernisation and (neo-Marxist) dependency theories within the post-1945 era. By contrast, application of a scientific socialist paradigm to African, and more generally, Third World conditions can be traced back to the second decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In the mid-20th century that which previously had been the raw material of imperial and anti-imperial narrative underwent a process of filtering and absorption into a number of academic disciplines, notably in the social sciences. In roughly the same post Second World War era, conceptual binaries such as 'modern' and 'traditional', 'First World' and 'Third World', 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' made increasingly regular appearances in newspaper columns and academic texts. African Studies, as the genre came to be known, commonly was located within the broad context of 'Third World' or 'Development' Studies which included, as part of its territory, Latin America and much of Asia. More particularly, the events that triggered exponential growth of Africanist academe can be symbolically located in the *annus mirabilis* of 1960, a year that was followed by four decades of ongoing decolonization throughout the continent.

The second section's tour of the literature largely is confined to intellectual production that is informed by one paradigm or another. This said, it would be misleading to depict the paradigms as monoliths, or even as necessarily representative of methodological orthodoxies since each plays host to a wide range of variably paradigmatic research.<sup>449</sup> However, not least because each paradigm is named for the broad epistemic locale within which it situates itself, a name that indicates not only methodological terrain but also explanatory and predictive framework, a certain amount of simplification unfortunately seems inevitable when embarking on a review and critique of selected protagonists.

Any paradigm which has been publicised and popularised by its best known adherents offers a secure base camp from and within which to conduct research. The advantages of following in accredited footsteps along well-trodden paths are self-evident, particularly if the general direction and design bear some resemblance to one's own preferences, priorities - and preconceptions. On the other hand, there is a disadvantage in that individual scholars may find themselves tied in with a particular paradigm in a fashion tantamount to oversimplification and perhaps even outright mislocation. Right from the start, therefore, a paradigm and literature review should operate on the understanding that nomenclature and categorisation are deployed as ways of systematising and organising intellectual production into reasonably coherent formats, and are not necessarily intended to confine scholars and activists within paradigm 'boxes'.

It stands to reason - given the Cold War context within which this review of the literature is conducted - that both modernisation and (neo-) Marxist paradigms to greater or lesser extents are informed by the ideological preoccupations of a bipolar era.<sup>450</sup> This said, some of the

most notable intellectual production to come out of a bifurcated and adversarial era is attributable to scholars, activists and political leaders who, while they work within the broad context of their respective locales, nonetheless have blazed their own distinctive and influential trails. This section therefore focuses on selected authors and materials not only because in one way or another they contribute to the subject matter of this study, but also because none of the texts to which close attention is paid can be described as paradigmatic potboilers. Thus, all the authors quoted and discussed in this survey can be considered leaders – in one way or another – in the field of Cold War era Africanist production.

### **Decolonising contexts.**

As mentioned above, in the recent history of Africa a label commonly applied to 1960 is *annus mirabilis*. The 'miracle year' flags an historic watershed. Colonised areas of North Africa, including Sudan, became independent states in the early to mid-1950s, followed, in sub-Saharan Africa, by Ghana in 1957. In 1960, French colonies in West Africa achieved territorial independence, along with Nigeria, a former British colony. By the mid-1960s, thirty postcolonial states had emerged from the demise of imperialism. In the mid-1970s, the path to independence was followed by the Lusophone countries which - owing to the territorial aggression of both metropolitan power and settler populations - pursued a more violent course than was the case in British and French colonies - with the exception, that is, of Algeria and Rhodesia (liberation wars) and to a lesser extent, Kenya (Mau-Mau rebellion). In 1980, protracted combat between liberation forces and a settler-led army in Rhodesia culminated in the negotiated victory of the former and majority rule in the territory renamed Zimbabwe. Namibia, also the scene of armed struggle, in 1990 became a sovereign state with

a democratically elected government. Finally, in 1994, internal and external pressures having broken the tenacious and increasingly brutal grip of Africa's 'white tribe', the Afrikaner ruling elite, South Africa made a negotiated transition from white minority to black majority rule.

In the spectrum of newly independent African states, relatively few had pursued the armed struggle path to 'national self-determination'. At the end of the imperial day, a majority of transitions to sovereign independence were negotiated by African and metropolitan elites, both sets making global media mileage out of an appearance of ritualised, mutually agreeable transfers of power in which necessity was dressed up as virtue, and - as Davidson observes - withdrawal was more speedy than substantive.

It is fruitless to believe that the end of political empire was a programme arranged and designed to give colonised peoples 'the best possible start' to their independence. Much was said and done, true enough, to present the imperial withdrawal as a process planned and prepared in advance, and any subsequent mishaps and miseries were to be explained as entirely the fault of Africans failing to carry out 'the plan'. But the full extent of any plan, most obviously in the case of the French empire, was to conserve as much as possible of the colonial legacy; and even that much of a plan, when perceived, looks like mere opportunism.<sup>451</sup>

The scramble out of Africa, continues Davidson, "gave rise to understandable African rejoicing as huge inherent problems were swallowed or thrust aside."<sup>452</sup> Given that "the state as it exists in Africa today is a legacy of colonialism",<sup>453</sup> a number of flaws and fissures that characterised the colonial state were passed forward to the postcolonial state. A representative sample is sketched below.

- Arbitrarily delineated borders<sup>454</sup> and concomitant balkanisation of - in particular - Africa south of the Sahara. Africa (at roughly double the land mass of South America) comprises 53 states (in comparison to South America's 14 states). Of these

53 states, 6 (including Mauritania and excluding Sudan) are north of the Sahara. As Mazrui puts it, "this fragmentation is a handicap in Africa's struggle for social and material improvement."<sup>455</sup> Yet, as Cohen points out, even Nkrumah, a well known and more than usually emphatic critic of the splintering effects of Europe's scramble for Africa, agreed to accept territorial decolonisation on the model proposed by the British, thus effectively conceding the balkanisation of the continent.<sup>456</sup>

- Colonial systems of education and administration were based on policies of firstly, coopting or constructing indigenous traditions in tandem with traditional elites<sup>457</sup> thus undermining their perceived authenticity and legitimacy; secondly, corralling a majority of Africans into rural ghettos while – thirdly - constructing a new Western educated elite from an infinitesimal percentage of the population. For instance, even in Ghana, regarded by British administrators as a model colony, and "which boasted some of the finest educational institutions in Africa, over 70% of the population was illiterate on the eve of independence."<sup>458</sup> The educated leadership of the nationalist movement in Ghana in the early 1950s comprised less than a thousand people. "In comparative terms, the African elite was even smaller in most other colonies."<sup>459</sup> Newly independent states, therefore, typically were led by (relative to overall population) a minuscule Western-educated, urban fraction that - as leaders of nationalist resistance movements - had guaranteed materially to improve the lives of Africa's rural majority, most of whom were subsistence farmers, and were further separated from their leaders by a not inconsiderable cultural divide, given the selectively Westernising trajectory of colonialism.

- Colonial economic systems entrenched a process begun by the slave trade of allocating to Africa a profoundly unequal place in the global market, and of defining her primary role as that of contributor to the economic development of metropolitan powers.<sup>460</sup> At independence, African leaders typically inherited firstly, in rural areas, mono-crop export economies that accordingly made postcolonial economies vulnerable to fluctuations in global market prices; secondly, in urban and industrial areas, a focus on extractive (as distinct from manufacturing) industry, often largely limited to one mineral in particular. The generally fragile and unstable (because unevenly developed) economic configurations of postcolonial states then were exacerbated by ill-affordable economic mismanagement among other negative factors. Increasing pauperisation impacts most acutely in the rural areas, further reducing the in any case limited bargaining power of rural majorities.
- While the form of administrative policies differed between metropolitan powers, a definitive feature, that is, highly centralised, bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial rule applied across the board. In this key respect, the liberal, multi-party constitutions with which newly sovereign states were endowed added an anomalous note to the pomp and ceremony that accompanied the death throes of empire. Taken in conjunction with firstly, optimistic nationalist refrains that raised the hopes and expectations of marginalised majorities; secondly, underdeveloped and unstable national economies, and thirdly, the *de facto* lack, in many cases, of anything amounting to a postcolonial national consensus, an almost uniform outcome was the abandonment of liberal constitutions in favour of *de jure* and in the main,

authoritarian one party or military regimes, the better to cope with national 'states of emergency'.

In sum, the euphoria that animated African independence ceremonies in a majority of cases proved brutally short lived. At this juncture, it is worth noting that not only Africans 'swallowed or pushed aside huge inherent problems.' On the contrary, it was a process replicated and reinforced in the field of scholarship by orthodox modernisation theory. In the 1950s and early 1960s, 'overseas experts' typically were American social scientists.<sup>461</sup> Their privileged educations, lifestyles and resource packages comparatively speaking were of Olympian proportions (not unlike their mistakes). As Apter retrospectively put it when referring to the conceptual parameters of an orthodox developmental paradigm: "we need to become aware of the ways in which these concepts deny negative possibilities, filtering out inconvenient variables that might pollute the models and the teleologies they represent."<sup>462</sup>

The key term in the above quotation is 'teleologies' given that the confident expectations which informed orthodox modernisation theory were enabled by a vision of Africa's future that bore more than a passing resemblance to the present of the United States of America. Then again, if Samuel Huntington's revisionist text, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, is interpreted not least as a reaction to the misconceptions of his predecessors and peers, he can be described as a leader in the field of Afro-pessimism, and to that extent a trail-blazer. However, it wasn't until dependency theory began to make an impact on Africanist discourse in (approximately) the early 1970s that long-term legacies of colonialism, along with the on-going effects of neocolonialism were taken into adequate account. Even so, while dependency theory highlighted and to some extent rectified the more glaring lacunae and

defects of modernisation theory, it is arguable that *dependistas* (xiii) - at least to some extent - and more orthodox Marxists - to a greater extent - replicated modernisation theory's tendency to promote an exogenous knowledge system as the primary and formative reality, in the process generating epistemological distortions marked enough to necessitate methodological gymnastics.

To round off this portion of the chapter, a phrase deployed by Chabal - "the politics of the mirror" - connotes a key ingredient in processes both of 'othering' and of assigning elsewhere the culpability for failed paradigms.

I refer here to the way in which Africanists have approached Africa, nowadays as in the past. Partly because Africa has been seen as both mysterious and exotic, Africanists have been prone to seek in Africa a counterpoint to their own history ... This is particularly noticeable and consequential when it comes to the work of postcolonial (economic or political) developmentalists. Indeed, the assumptions they have made on the trajectory of contemporary Africa have in large part issued from their notion of the 'backwardness' of the continent in relation to the development of the West. 'Politics of the mirror', therefore, is that the main effect of such a teleological perspective has been to search in Africa for an image of the African that would confirm our developmentalist assumptions about ourselves.<sup>463</sup>

Chabal highlights the extent to which explaining the politics of the 'other' is "such an eminently subjective activity"<sup>464</sup> along with "the general handicap under which we, Western Africanists, labour is our heritage - by which I mean the accumulated weight of what our culture says about Africa."<sup>465</sup> Since culture can either be inherited or adopted, the 'politics of the mirror' also is an aphorism applicable to Africanists who adopted (some version of) Marxist culture as their own.

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(xiii) Also known as *dependentistas*. This dissertation utilises the shorter form throughout.

### **Cold War contexts.**

A definitive shift in 'old Europe's' imperial order of things was signified by the consolidation of America's status as a fully-fledged global power<sup>466</sup> - but she did not hold the field alone. The emergence of Soviet Russia as the other commanding protagonist in the struggle for global dominance led to a Cold War between West and East. Superpower manoeuvring for spheres of influence did not leave unaffected the world of social science research. Not least due to strategic considerations as perceived by American foreign policy mandarins, American social scientists were actively encouraged to broaden their research interests and activities to encompass the developing world<sup>467</sup> - a process in which the Comintern already was engaged.<sup>468</sup>

Given the era-defining role of superpower rivalry, as well as the problematic context of decolonisation, Young's claim, in one of relatively few texts published during the Cold War that provide an overview of an assortment of ideologies in Africa, that Afro-Marxist and Afro-Capitalist regimes "emerged largely through internal processes, not through the machinations of external forces"<sup>469</sup> seems dubious. According to Menkhaus, for instance, the Africanist debate about what type of developmental ideology, that is, state capitalism or state socialism, postcolonial states should adopt, in retrospect appears highly politicised by Cold War and radical nationalist logic.<sup>470</sup>

Betts points out that in its post 1945 role as one of two ascendant superpowers, an international dispensation in which the 'Great Powers of Europe' became secondary states, the position of the United States on the colonial question was notable for its ambivalence. On the one hand, U.S. foreign policy was liberal and anti-colonial in regions where communist

influence was perceived as relatively negligible. On the other hand, in regions where Cold War tensions were marked, such as Indochina (for example, Korea in 1950) America supported imperialist regimes that resisted the spread of communist influence. Again, America's intervention in Vietnam is in strong contrast to Eisenhower's punitive reaction to British and French intervention in Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1956. Betts further notes that Cold War tensions reached new heights with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 - a crisis that gave even greater impetus to a U.S. policy of aggressive containment of communism. Citing the Belgian Congo where rival factions received rival support in a country which as a colony had been offered no preparation in the art of self-government, he argues that it was in Africa that the chilling effect of the Cold War was most strongly felt.

The CIA saw in the person ... of Joseph Mobutu a likely client and supported his brutal takeover of power in 1965. Restyled Mobutu Sese Seko, he stood against communism and allowed the gross exploitation of his nation's resources by foreign corporations; for which reason his own bank accounts rose as the nation's population sank into poverty.<sup>471</sup>

Also worth noting is Bett's inference that East-Central Europe functioned as a Soviet backyard in much the same way as Latin America was regarded by the U.S. as its backyard. Once Soviet troops had crushed the Hungarian uprising in 1956, thus securing, *pro tem*, Moscow's grip on the 'lands inbetween', Soviet Russia was in a position to turn its attention to decolonising regions of the world. "Cuba and Ethiopia were the most obvious beneficiaries of Russian aid, but support to the liberation forces in Angola was also disconcerting to the United States."<sup>472</sup>

A process of ever-deepening American conservatism was given further impetus by the trauma of Vietnam along with outbreaks of acute civil unrest in the late 1960s at home and in

Western Europe. The liberal multi-party models that had been applied to decolonising and postcolonial Africa now fell out of favour, in particular with U.S. based Africanists - assuming that the liberal model had been regarded as wholly suitable for modernising African states in the first place<sup>473</sup> - to be replaced by a preoccupation with political order as a necessary prerequisite of modernisation. For instance, Menkhaus cites Wallerstein (in his early incarnation as a modernisation theorist) as contending that the first problem for all African governments is how to hold the country together.<sup>474</sup> Ironically, given a not inconsiderable Western contribution to chaos in the Congo, Menkaus observes that the "first generation of Africanists was influenced by the aftermath of the Congo crisis and its leitmotif of disintegration and political chaos, an image that would be even more difficult to dispel with the advent of the Nigerian civil war in 1966."<sup>475</sup> The disingenuous quality of Western reactions is highlighted by Nigeria's status as an emblematic 'state in search of a nation,' as emphasised by Awolowo's statement in 1947 that "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression."<sup>476</sup> The civil war that induced consternation in Western-based Africanists not least was the product of arbitrary borders conjoined with colonial policies of divide and rule, hence exacerbating ethnic and regional tensions. In a postcolonial era, imperial dynamics in this beleaguered section of West Africa were replaced by Cold War *realpolitik* - to a destructive extent.<sup>477</sup>

#### *The State and Eurocentricity.*

According to Lonsdale, the territorial configurations and political, social and economic dispensations of precolonial polities did not necessarily correspond to the European notion of the state.<sup>478</sup> He argues that until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most Africans did not live under

states as conceptualised in the First World, and contends that a defining characteristic of the state as it exists and has developed in Europe is command over the instruments of coercion, whereas most African polities had little or no concentrations of force to use against their people. He concludes that "compared with European states of the time, even African kingdoms commanded, most of them, very little violence. For Europe has been the continent of war, not Africa. And it has been war that has built states, states that have sustained war."<sup>479</sup>

The absence in much of precolonial sub-Saharan Africa of 'jealous and exclusive' (xiv) monotheistic, text-based religions, and therefore of the religious wars that in Europe laid the bloody foundations of the early modern state<sup>480</sup> clearly distinguishes much of African historicity from that of Europe. To this extent, then, a thesis such as Callaghy's that postcolonial African states bear a strong resemblance to their (alleged) early modern forebears in Europe<sup>481</sup> is derived from an ahistorical premise. The wars that reconfigured Europe were fought between Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations of the Christian faith, and also between Christianity and Islam. In short, it is a history of conflict between and within monotheistic, scriptural religions that shaped modern Europe as well as – involuntarily - the 20<sup>th</sup> century destinies of other regions of the world.<sup>482</sup>

Grey updates an equation connecting monotheism, religious wars and early modern states by adding to it the dominant ideologies of the Cold War.

For polytheists, religion is a matter of practice, not belief; and there are many kinds of practice. For Christians, religion is a matter of true belief. If only one belief can be true, every way of life in which it is not accepted must be in error. Polytheists may be

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(xiv) See Chapter Two, p 46

jealous of their gods, but they are not missionaries. Without monotheism, humankind would surely still have been one of the most violent animals, but it would have been spared wars of religion. If the world had remained polytheist, it could not have produced communism or 'global democratic capitalism.' It is pleasant to dream of a world without militant faiths, religious or political. Pleasant, but idle. Polytheism is too delicate a way of thinking for modern minds.<sup>483</sup>

Arguments along the above lines notwithstanding, the natural necessity of state creation in Europe, and colonial state creation elsewhere, has been taken for granted by a critical mass of Africanists. One assumption in particular has proven formative in the constitution of Africa as an object of research, namely, a mutual modernisation - Marxist assumption that precolonial Africa materially is 'without history.' If sub-Saharan African polities gained at least partial admission to a substantive lexicon of world affairs only when welded into lesser but still recognisable rational-legal, bureaucratic colonial shape, it is scarcely surprising that both paradigms in the main assume that in Africa, substantive political activity begins with the colonial state.<sup>484</sup> A related constitutive factor is that while the universalising trajectories of modernisation and (neo-) Marxist paradigms are shaped by globally-applicable concepts that enable systematic analysis of and comparison between Africa and other regions of the world in a way that disenables "the theory of the exotic and the particular which had so marked colonial accounts of Africa"<sup>485</sup> there is a corresponding disadvantage insofar as any paradigm that is or purports to be universally applicable denies an assortment of cultures their respective historicity and to that extent, their cultural singularity, or at any rate, very much downplays same. As Bayart puts it, "both groups, led astray by their structuralist precepts, invoke explanatory categories which, thanks to their lack of historical consideration, shared a fictional coherence."<sup>486</sup>

Additionally, a dynamic worth highlighting in the constitution of Africa as an object of research is a world order informed by a working assumption that real politics necessarily occurs in a world composed of nation states. As Young, writing after the Cold War, points out: "In contrast to such other master concepts in contemporary paradigms as world capitalist system, bourgeoisie, or system adaptation and maintenance functions, state is a living reality and not simply an abstract analytical category."<sup>487</sup>

In the above respect, and despite Marx's vision of communist society without borders, Stalin dealt the cause of proletarian internationalism a heavy blow with his notion of socialism in one country. Stalin's death and subsequent de-canonising notwithstanding, the vested interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) as one of two global superpowers ensured that Marx's vision of world communism continued to take a back seat to the ideology of the Soviet state. (xv) As Munck notes, following the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, many radicals looked to what would become the Third World for the realisation of proletarian internationalism. Expectations were heightened when "victorious revolutions in Algeria and Cuba cemented the legend of the people's war against imperialism." However, far from charting a utopian course, "Che Guevara died and Castro supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. *Realpolitik* was taking over from utopia again."<sup>488</sup> It seems reasonable to infer from Munck's depiction that to the Soviets, and thereafter, to the Cubans, the only Third World political ideology of any *realpolitik* significance was 'pro-Soviet' and/or 'pro-Cuban'. By the same token, Betts contends that: "Determined to assure the United States and its way of life against any potential threats,

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(xv) See Chapter Eight, p 228-229

postwar administrations made a blanketing ideology of anti-communism and a regular practice of military support to friendly nations the two principal elements of their foreign policy."<sup>489</sup>

In a dissection of the major characteristics of a received from Europe concept of the state, Young singles out 'legitimacy' as a typical imperative of the operational code of the state. "Through investing its institutions with legitimate authority, the state seeks habitual acquiescence in and consent to its rule ... Ideology as an expression of the ultimate aims and final source of authority plays a critical role."<sup>490</sup> Historically, religion *qua* legitimating doctrine preceded the ascent to prominence of ideologies. Since by-and-large only Islamic states retain religion as *de jure* instrument of legitimation, secular state ideologies from which religion either is explicitly excluded (Marxism-Leninism) or retained as a matter of lifestyle choice, thus conforming with liberal principles (Western democracy) dominated the Cold War era.

In the vanishing domain of state socialism, the state clothed its operation in Marxism-Leninism, justifying its behaviour in terms of its congruence with this official dogma. The capitalist state advances liberal democracy, individual rights, and protection of property as its legitimating creed.<sup>491</sup>

(Note that the statist nature of Marxism-Leninism is imputed.)

Given, firstly, the hegemonic global trajectory of the European concept of the state in conjunction with its definitive status in international law beginning with the rise of the Westphalian system of states<sup>492</sup>, and secondly, a Cold War dispute concerning the legitimating ideology of the state, a Cold War political dispensation emerged in which the legitimating motifs projected by contending power blocs restricted choices of ideology in

other parts of the world. Putatively, the same limitation applied to the developmental paradigms of newly independent states in Africa.

*Post-1945 origins of modernisation and dependency theories.*

As depicted by Chabal, modernisation theory derives from an attempt, in the main by American political scientists, to meet foreign policy imperatives generated by the related challenges of Third World poverty and the spread of communist influence. "They endeavoured to spread a non-Marxist science of politics which would both reveal the superiority of Western polities and explain the politics of the new nation states."<sup>493</sup> This process had been preceded, as Almond recalls, by the addition, beginning during the interwar years, of a behavioural dimension to social science research. In an instructive contribution to the history of the academic discipline of political science, Almond describes a process of secondment to the war effort enabled by disciplinary developments that originated in the Chicago school (1920-1940), led by Merriam whose "wartime experience with foreign affairs and propaganda sensitised him to 'new aspects' in political science."<sup>494</sup> Merriam's empirical and quantitative innovations then were taken up and extended, particularly in the realm of political psychology, by Lasswell who was "the first investigator of the interaction of physiological and mental-emotional processes to use laboratory methods." Lasswell then published the results of his experiments "in relating attitudes, emotional states ... and physiological conditions as they were ... reflected in pulse rates, blood pressure, skin tension and the like."<sup>495</sup> This research was followed up during the war and subsequently during the post war behavioural revolution.

World War Two, asserts Almond, was "a laboratory and an important training experience for many of the scholars who would seed the 'behavioural revolution.'"<sup>496</sup> Among other endeavours, he lists recruitment and training of soldiers, sale of war bonds, control of consumption and inflation, and monitoring internal and enemy morale and attitudes. The war effort "created pools of social science expertise which ... were fed back into the growing academic institutions of the cold war decades."<sup>497</sup> In conjunction with a burgeoning Cold War climate, social scientists increasingly were seconded to the service of government and big business. In addition, "the new and developing nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, now seen as threatened by an aggressive Soviet Union, required area specialists and specialists in economic and political development processes and problems."<sup>498</sup>

In regard to funding and stimulation of research, Almond refers to the Social Science Research Council, in particular to two political science research committees, the Committee on Political Behaviour and the Committee on Comparative Politics. Thanks not least to funding and support from these committees, "Talcott Parsons and others developed 'system' frameworks for the comparison of different types of societies and institutions, building on the work of such European sociological theorists as Weber and Durkheim. Drawing on these and other sources David Easton pioneered the introduction of the 'system' concept into political science."<sup>499</sup> (Noteworthy is Almond's interchangeable use of the terms 'behavioural' and 'scientific' revolutions as if to indicate that they constitute the same phenomenon.)

The increasing sense of urgency that drove the cross-disciplinary quest for a scientific paradigm in the interwar years is attributed by Apter to the following factors: firstly, the failure of the Weimar regime in Germany and its replacement by totalitarianism (fascist

species), a development replicated - *mutatis mutandis* - in Italy; secondly, the rise of totalitarianism (communist species) in Russia; thirdly, in other parts of Europe, the strengthening of Marxist parties and other radical groups. These factors in combination posed an increasing threat not only to the way democracy works, but also to democracy itself. Thus it "became obvious that more attention had to be paid to psychological, economic, social and organisational factors"<sup>500</sup> in ways outside the purview of the old-fashioned, unscientific study of politics.

Apter goes on to describe the essential ambivalence of the first decades of the post-war era. A sense of optimism infused the new science of comparative politics with its emphasis on growth and development; conversely, the gathering clouds of a Cold War climate cast a lengthening shadow over sunny teleological assumptions. "If the premise and promise of development represented the good, the evil was communism and the Cold War. In the west, every move to the left was a gain for the Soviet Union. Every move towards democracy was a gain for the United States and its allies."<sup>501</sup> In addition to the binary reasoning that increasingly infiltrated the research designs of Western-based social scientists, the creed of developmentalism acquired a certain ambiguity owing to the Manichean nature of Cold War foreign policy in which developmental agendas in the Third World "were to some degree morally diluted (if not contaminated)" by an intention to defeat Soviet objectives. Apter adds, however, that Third World regimes were not slow to take advantage of Cold War fever. "Indeed, so morally clouded were the politics of development that the main metropolitan countries allowed themselves to be almost as much manipulated as manipulating."<sup>502</sup> This

said, he singles out U.S. developmentalist practices in Latin America - under the Alliance For Progress - as positing an ambiguous and questionable neutralism.<sup>503</sup>

Johnson locates the adversarial origins of dependency theory in neo-Marxist reactions to the U.S. role in Latin American economies in the 1950s, not least through the medium of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In order to combat “the nationalist and reformist formulations” of the ECLA and to redress “the inability of the left ... to develop a coherent response to developmentalist reformism”,<sup>504</sup> Baran and Frank published groundbreaking texts that launched dependency theory. Frank introduced his thesis with a statement “which sums up his position admirably: ‘I believe, with Paul Baran, that it is capitalism, both world and national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and which still generates underdevelopment in the present.’”<sup>505</sup>

Menkhaus notes that although the transfer of neo-Marxist dependency theory from Latin America to postcolonial Africa “was largely absent in the early to mid-60s, by the late 1960s it constituted an important intellectual current.”<sup>506</sup> He adds that:

A cursory glance at the theoretical literature of the 1970s (and much of the 1980s as well) suggests that divisions between theorists were both bitter and absolute. The once genteel and clubby atmosphere of the Africanists of the 1960s was transformed into acrimonious debate between warring ideological camps.<sup>507</sup>

The volume of ‘acrimonious debate’ increased with the addition, in the mid-1970s, of a current of more orthodox Marxism. By the 1980s, according to Menkaus, this trend among Marxist Africanists “towards a return to class analysis and away from dependency theory would gain strength in studies throughout Africa”<sup>508</sup> – fuelled not least by Marxist reaction to

the pessimism of dependency theory and its insufficiently – that is, by the standards of orthodox Marxists - scientific premises and conclusions. (xvi)

Whereas a major portion of the impulse that launched modernisation and neo-Marxist dependency theories on a polarised course can be located in their very different reactions to post-1945 U.S. foreign policy objectives, the first stage of Marxist-Third World involvement is traceable to an antecedent world order, that of 'old Europe'. Marxist interest and investment in the Third World goes back at least as far as Lenin's conditions for membership of the Third International or Comintern. (xvii) At this juncture, it is worth noting that Marxism-Leninism clashed with Pan Africanism in key respects. For instance, a concept of worldwide black solidarity is incompatible with a scientific socialist objective to unite the world's workers irrespective of race.<sup>509</sup>

The differences between Marxism-Leninism and Pan Africanism perhaps are best exemplified in the decision to opt for the latter by two prominent members of Africa's intellectual diaspora, George Padmore and Aimé Césaire. Padmore, a member of Comintern, resigned not least as a result of his attendance at the 1945 Pan African Congress in Manchester. In 1956, Césaire resigned from the French communist party. While Césaire's disillusionment perhaps was more pronounced than Padmore's - who, according to Cohen, made a clear distinction between rank and file communists on the one hand, and high level representatives of Soviet foreign policy on the other<sup>510</sup> - they were mutually suspicious of Comintern and Euro-communist party motives for encouraging African membership. For his part, Padmore

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(xvi) See Chapter Eight, pp 210-212

(xvii) See Chapter Eight, p 222

asserted that "the oppressed Negro workers and peasants are regarded by the Communists as 'revolutionary expendables' in the global struggle of Communism against Western capitalism." <sup>511</sup> Césaire, in his letter of resignation, condemned not only the excesses of Soviet communism, but also the acquiescence of the French communist party. He further contended that adoption of an ideology conceived in Europe and constructed by European experience would have a negative effect on African potentials, which would "sicken and fade in organisations that are not their own; not constructed for them; not built by them and adapted to ends only they can fix." <sup>512</sup>

Césaire's observation, while at the time intended to criticise the Eurocentrism of scientific socialist premises, equally could be applied to the North America-centric design of the orthodox modernisation paradigm which - as argued in the next chapter – incorporates an implicitly authoritarian, top-down orientation.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **ORTHODOX MODERNISATION THEORY**

A defining feature of the orthodox version of the modernisation paradigm is its formulation of a teleological solution to the problem of retarded growth in which Third World acorns, or so it was predicted, would develop into oaks at greatly accelerated speeds owing to intensive fertilization by American expert knowledge and financial aid.<sup>513</sup> Two mutually reinforcing methodologies most often applied at this time to unravel, reassemble, label and file societies and polities in Africa were structural-functionalism and systems analysis. Both were undergirded by behaviouralism, in turn informed by psychology's science of behaviourism.

As Scruton indicates, a behaviourist sub-text in a political science paradigm is informed by an intention to manipulate the human objects of research.

The leading idea is that behaviour is formed in response to previous behaviour, and to the 'rewards' or 'reinforcements' of the environment which condition it, so that the self-consciousness of the subject plays no important part in the process of social development. Hence political activity should be directed towards creating the conditions which reinforce the behaviour that is desired. This raises the question, Desired by whom?<sup>514</sup>

As suggested in the previous chapter, a partial answer to the above question is: desired by American foreign policy mandarins. In this respect at least, modernisation theory can be depicted as the academic equivalent of cannons fired to announce the imminent arrival of American hegemonic intentions.

A distinguishing characteristic of orthodox modernisation theory is its curious combination of 'cold' behavioural analysis and 'hot' teleological optimism. Genesis rewritten suggests that

on the seventh day, orthodox modernisers can rest. Huntington explains as follows an assumption by his peers that American experience can be universalised:

In confronting the modernising countries the United States was handicapped by its happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being and political stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal aids in the achievement of others. In American policy toward modernising countries this experience was reflected in the belief that political stability would be the natural and inevitable result of the achievement of first, economic development and then of social reform.<sup>515</sup>

It is noteworthy that in Huntington's *apologia*, America appears to be exclusively populated by direct descendants of Pollyanna, counting in unison their multitude of blessings. Not only does he expand the experience of all Americans to include blessings most often enjoyed by a predominantly WASP elite, he also presents American foreign policy in the best possible light.<sup>516</sup>

This chapter unpacks the various epistemological and methodological facets – as indicated by sub-headings - that in combination configure an orthodox paradigm of modernisation. Some conclusions then are drawn, prior to proceeding to an analysis – in Chapter Seven – of a minor paradigm shift from orthodox to revised modernisation.

### **Systems theory.**

Modernisation theory's systemic base of operations owes much to David Easton's elaboration of systems analysis as a means of constructing "reliable, empirically based research" with which to inform policy decisions. In the preface to the 1979 edition of *A Systems Analysis Of Political Life*, Easton, referring to American social science research in the 1950s and 60s, concedes that: "Incentives and rewards tended to go to those whose research seemed to

promise movement towards this ideal."<sup>517</sup> A 1979 retrospective, however, does not serve to disillusion him with 'this ideal' of government funded and policy driven empirical research.

On the contrary, given the turbulence of the 1960s and 1970s:

In the world at large, the stirring of the student generation, the emerging self-awareness of various ethnic groups, the gathering resistance against racism and sexism; in the United States, the temporary mobilisation of the black ghettos, Vietnam, Watergate; in France, the student revolt - these and similar events all served to nibble away at the trust and confidence in governing authorities in mass industrialised societies.<sup>518</sup>

Easton concludes that the need for a science of politics to uncover and remedy the factors underlying a steady erosion of popular support for democratically elected governments is even more urgent in the 1970s than it was in the socially stable 1950s. His thesis therefore interrogates (among other phenomena) the relationship between systemic norms and their corresponding functions. He embarks on this investigation by isolating the normative features of a system and subjecting them to microscopic enquiry as to function. Value-imbued sub-systems are perceived as no different, for instance, to organisational or distributive sub-systems when viewed in terms of their function.

It is with the question: "What elements of a system are most relevant to its capacity to persist in the face of a threatened loss of support?"<sup>519</sup> that Easton launches an enquiry into what he terms "Three basic political objects: the authorities, regime and political community."<sup>520</sup>

It is worth noting that Easton's methodological innovations made a formative contribution to non-Marxist political science's paradigmatic format. Prior to examining his depiction of political objects of support, I therefore shall address his methodological approach.

According to the inner logic of systems theory, any given political system may be assessed in terms of firstly, the sub-systems that comprise it and, secondly, the interaction between the system and the environment in which it is located. The latter relationship Easton examines with reference to 'outputs' and 'inputs'. The environment feeds the system with inputs → the system in turn produces outputs which are fed back into the environment → the response to the outputs is returned to the system in the form of the newest set of inputs. Each sub-system receives, processes and returns the input (now an output) appropriate to its particular function. Ideally, then, a political system should function like a well-oiled machine, built to weather its environment and operating smoothly and efficiently to fulfil its central task, that is, the conversion of inputs into outputs. When considering the phenomenon of political stability, it stands to reason that the extent to which a system is able to control its environment will determine the extent of the stable equilibrium between the two. (The environment is described by Easton as the broader society of which the system is a part). In his diagram, 'a simplified model of a political system', Easton reduces inputs and outputs to two broad types within each category, viz: inputs consist of demands on the one hand and support on the other; outputs consist of decisions followed by actions.<sup>521</sup>

Turning now to the political objects whose function it is to receive, process and maximise support:

- *Political community.* This may be likened to a political environment generated by the system and interacting in a variety of ways with broader society. The political community encompasses the political nodes of society and thus has the function of constructing and maintaining the political identities of social actors, in the process

producing “affective solidarity” and “subtleties of sentiment”<sup>522</sup> which nourish the system. The more tightly-knit and cohesive an object of support the political community is, the more oriented it is towards affirmation of the system. Conversely: “Perhaps the most decisive indicator of the withdrawal of support from a political community consists of group separation.”<sup>523</sup> Group separation automatically knocks off course the trajectory of support; this in turn has a negative impact on the effectiveness of the system.

- *Regime.* It is the regime which orders and regulates the political relationships within a community according to basic rules and procedures. In the absence of a regime, political community would be no more than potential. Regime function therefore is to refine and drive the potential of a political community firstly, by setting constraints and secondly, by providing purpose and coherence. These functions within a function are enabled by the authoritative allocation of values.<sup>524</sup>
- *Authorities.* Effective allocation of values requires that authority roles are occupied by people whose occupational legitimacy is widely accepted. It is this sub-system of occupation, as it were, that Easton designates ‘the authorities’ as distinct from authority roles themselves which are part of - instituted and maintained by - the regime.<sup>525</sup> Support is channelled by the instruments of the system along two parallel routes: one leads to the authority roles, or institutions, which exist in perpetuity - or for as long as the system lasts. The other route leads to the occupants - by definition, temporary given the fact of mortality - of the permanent institutions. Accordingly, the scope of political authorities is wider than that implied by the concept of

government. Easton states that "the authorities need not be co-extensive with the politically relevant members."<sup>526</sup> Bearing in mind that his analytical emphasis is *function*, an authority is anyone who holds a commanding position in respect of the allocation of values which binds environment to system.<sup>527</sup>

The focus of Easton's discussion now shifts to those aspects of a system whose function it is to negotiate the safe passage of support from the environment to the appropriate political objects. The success of this exercise in logistics is fully related to the perceived legitimacy of authorities and regime. Legitimacy, as Easton points out, is generated in different ways by different systems. To establish method of generation, one first must locate source of legitimacy. Here, ideology in its legitimating capacity plays a seminal role. Echoing Rousseau,<sup>528</sup> Easton contends that "the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime."<sup>529</sup> He defines a legitimating ideology as comprising "those sets of beliefs which go to the heart of the regime"<sup>530</sup> and adds that the identification of a regime already presupposes the experience of ideological or belief systems in all political systems.

As noted above, a regime can be presumed to exist in any community that operates according to basic rules and procedures. Those sets of beliefs that go to the heart of a regime therefore are "the *operating values* of the system."<sup>531</sup> It is the task of the authorities to apply in practice the operating values that embed a system in its community. The values are normative or expressive, comprising ethical interpretations and principles, and have the potential to capture

the imagination.<sup>532</sup> They therefore, argues Easton, 'can be used for manipulative or instrumental purposes "to corral the energies of men."<sup>533</sup>

It is worth noting that Easton's identification of the mobilising capacity of ideology shifts his thesis into behavioural gear. If an ideology is enacted in policies that meet the expectations of the members, it will stimulate gratification that in turn will generate support for the system.

In general, the extent to which an ideology offers a means for promoting diffuse support will depend upon its success in capturing the imagination of most of the members in the system and in thereby fostering in them sentiments of legitimacy towards the authorities and the regime. It is clear that ideologies will vary in their effectiveness. They represent means that can be controlled or manipulated to achieve given ends.<sup>534</sup>

Easton then adds a rider: to *work*, an ideology must convince its adherents that it "correctly or truthfully explains the real world", as well as "allay anxieties and concerns roused by the apparently unpredictable turns of a rapidly changing culture and society."<sup>535</sup> Referring again to systems going through processes of rapid change, he contends that in such cases it is useful if the affective aspects of ideologies are concretized in the persons of vigorous and trusted leaders who embody the new norms and personally bridge the gap between norms and authority structures. "Without this personal focus for the membership of a system, it would be extremely difficult to mobilise its energies."<sup>536</sup>

Easton distinguishes between ideology viewed 'from below' as a vehicle for self-expression, and ideology as it necessarily appears to a ruling elite, that is, as an instrument of control. "From the point of view of the leadership among the authorities, the ideology provides it with categories of thought for manipulating the support of the members in a direction interpreted

by the leaders themselves as appropriate.”<sup>537</sup> In sum, Easton outlines a behavioural schematic for the manipulation and control of societies by ruling elites.

Easton further contends that in systems undergoing wide-ranging changes, power *should* - functionally speaking - be personalised. He arrives at this conclusion by way of a distinction between normative and instrumental values in which it is clear that no matter how ‘good’ or ‘right’ the normative content of an ideology might seem to be, if it lacks manipulative capabilities, it is functionally useless. In other words, and according to behavioural tenets, the normative or affective dimensions of ideological belief are politically relevant only insofar as they enhance the capacity for control of people by leaders. Since the potential for disorder is commensurately greater in systems undergoing processes of rapid and comprehensive change, so is the need for an ideology that enables a climate of social quiescence. Noting that “some students of modernising nations have observed ... that the breakdown of a sense of obligation to the old authorities leaves attitudes of ‘free floating obedience’” Easton suggests that:

These can readily be attached to an appropriate leader who is clever enough to recognise and take advantage of such loosened attitudes. The new leaders fill the void created by the absence of objects to which these attitudes of obligation may attach themselves.<sup>538</sup>

### **Modernising systems.**

Apter, when applying systems theory to an analysis of change, denotes ‘environment’ as the socio-economic context within which the system operates. A system develops by keeping pace with and adapting itself to changes in the socio-economic context.<sup>539</sup> The configurations of Apter’s model suggest that the system plays a somewhat passive role and that the environment provides the dynamic element. His notion of the relationship between system

and environment thus corresponds with neo-liberal notions of the minimal state in which 'outputs' are intended to secure the system while allowing the environment *qua* free market forces a maximum of free play.

However, an extension from home base in the United States to the developing world of a rather more active version of systemic *modus operandi* earlier had been undertaken by Almond and Coleman. They took Easton's notion of 'feedback loop', that is, the process by which inputs are converted into outputs, and elaborated the notion of 'conversion functions' by distinguishing between input and output functions. Input functions they designate as those of political socialisation and political recruitment, followed by interest articulation and interest aggregation. Output functions they define and organise within the categories of rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-adjudication.<sup>540</sup> Finally, a meta-function straddling input and output functions is isolated and described as political communication, that is, the manner in which "differentiated media of communication" conveys opinions back and forth between system and environment.<sup>541</sup>

Since environment and system interact with and influence one another, it stands to reason that the more efficiently a political system functions, the more compelling is its effect on the environment. It seems reasonable to surmise, then, that the effective application of systemic functions must be the primary objective of systemic structures. In order to achieve its primary objective, the system perforce must survive. One thus can deduce that firstly, the survival of the political system and secondly, the authoritative allocation of values by the system are the twin pivots on which systems theory turns. Furthermore, according to Almond, political

socialisation provides the fertile ground - both cerebral and visceral - in which the political system embeds and then reproduces itself.

What do we mean by the function of political socialisation? We mean that all political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and that they do this mainly by means of the socialising influence of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation.<sup>542</sup>

Earlier in the text, Almond refers to Hyman's depiction of political socialisation "as a continuous learning process involving both emotional learning and manifest political indoctrination ..." <sup>543</sup> From this strong behavioural intimation can be inferred the role of ideology in developing systems, deduced as follows from aspects of Almond's analysis.

Almond refers to ideology only once and then in a context other than systemic survival. However, in the light of Easton's postulates, it seems reasonable to assume that in the spectrum of legitimating ideologies, the ideology that represents a peak of functional excellence closely will conform with and feed into formative learning experiences derived from political socialisation. Ideology in its capacity as legitimating instrument cannot exist in a social vacuum. It must mesh itself with the institutions and techniques of political socialisation. Further, Almond's ideal model is American-style democracy. Political pluralism, subsumed under "interest articulation" <sup>544</sup> is presented as the systemic Mecca towards which developing countries should angle their prayer mats.

Finally, in regard to the system's ability to control the environment, a process of authoritatively allocating values is fundamental. The function of value allocation is to ensure that the mediating pluralist virtue of the interactive pattern does not enable the environment to

get the upper hand and dominate the system to the detriment of political and social order.

Note, however, that it is the orthodox emphasis on the functional virtue of pluralist interaction and mediation between system and environment - in other words, political pluralism itself - and its application to developing systems that Huntington subsequently problematises, viz, where systemic structures are weak and the environment, by contrast, is awash with strong social forces, it is all too likely that environment will dominate system to the detriment of development.

### **Structural-functionalism.**

Almond and Powell provide guidelines for developing systems within a structural-functional framework. Their schematic is based on an assumption that the more complex, that is, modern, a system is, the more differentiated are its functions, and hence the greater its capabilities.<sup>545</sup> A key objective of their research is to isolate the capabilities of a new political system and then to match them up with an analysis of the problems attendant on modernising traditional environments. This accomplished, the equation also will work in reverse - roughly as follows: extension of capabilities → functional differentiation → expansion of problem-solving activities → evolving development of a network of specialised structures. Thus the modernising equation moves back and forth between ever-expanding structures and functions, with problems at one end of the equation and problem-solving capacities at the other end.

Since the definitive problem with which a modernising system must contend is its traditional environment, a focal task of the system is transformation, that is, of environment by system.

The modernisation dynamo revolves on an axis of prompt problem identification, followed by on the spot solutions courtesy of rapid development of appropriate structures + functions.

Challenges identified are:

- Nation building (or identity)
- State building (or penetration)
- Legitimacy
- Participation
- Distribution

Corresponding functions are:

- Symbolic
- Extractive
- Regulative (a dual function mechanism that deals with problems of both legitimacy and participation)
- Distributive

and finally ...

- Responsive (a kind of supervisory or facilitating function which ensures that systemic conversion functions stay in touch with the environment to an extent that enables rapid and effective conversion of inputs into outputs).<sup>546</sup>

What of political socialisation, bedrock - as mentioned above - of system survival? Political socialisation is defined as "the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed."<sup>547</sup> Given that Almond and Powell are offering strategic guidelines for modernising political systems whose meta-task is the transformation of traditional environments, it stands to reason that the process under consideration is one of controlled and managed change. In this respect, the two main agents of political socialisation cited are firstly, the family and

secondly, the school structure.<sup>548</sup> As schooling is a function largely of the system and as family is a unit of the environment, one reasonably can assume that in the case of a modernising system and a traditional environment, no small amount of complex 'problem-solving' will be engendered by inevitable conflicts of values between these two main agencies of socialisation. In short, the component units within traditional lived worlds - family, extended family, village, clan - must be reconfigured by a modernising educational function. In this way, non-useful aspects of traditional culture will undergo the necessary process of conversion, thus facilitating further modernisation of the system.

Almond and Powell appear to perceive culture in a peculiarly mechanistic way; almost as something provided by a benevolent providence for American social scientists to spend many useful hours tinkering with. It also is evident, given the linear development of the argument, that aspects of culture which actively hinder teleological systemic trajectories should be purged and replaced with appropriately sanitised modern versions. As Apter observes, in effect summarising the objectives of orthodox modernisation theory: "We can therefore compare societies in terms of degrees of modernisation by assessing the spread and proliferation of modernising roles."<sup>549</sup>

With regard to nation building, Almond and Powell observe that the creation of a national sense of purpose is made more difficult by the existence within the environment of a number of "sub-cultures"<sup>550</sup> that putatively are sub-nationalist. Yet, apart from a passing remark about the introduction of African cultural history to the school syllabi of emergent nations,<sup>551</sup> Almond and Powell pay surprisingly little attention to the central - or so one reasonably may presume - issue of education. They do, however, emphasise the vital role of ideology as

channel of affirmative obedience to the appropriate political objects. Echoing Easton, they refer to “the desperate need for the support of a familiar ideology, a political party, or a charismatic leader, which even the most secularised citizen may feel in those moments of crisis when the social, economic and political structures of society seem to be crumbling.”<sup>552</sup>

### *Anticipating Huntington.*

In the context in which the above quotation occurs, Almond and Powell’s reference is to modern societies and secularised political cultures. How much more vital, then, is the question of a legitimating ideology to shore up a modernising political system? It is the instability of transitional systems with which, in the final analysis, Huntington is overwhelmingly concerned. According to the logic of systems theory, the position of a modernising political system *ipso facto* is endangered, given an incompatible environment. By deciding that pluralism is a luxury that fragile systems are ill-equipped to afford, Huntington merely takes to its logical conclusion the application of behavioural tenets to modernising systems.

The teleological bias of orthodox modernisation theory inclines its adherents to favour political pluralism as a universally good thing, a position that contrasts too sharply with behavioural science, as does the optimistically expansive framework of structural-functionalism, not to generate anomalies. This said, a section of Almond and Powell’s text, sub-titled ‘Interest aggregation and political parties’ is worth a visit since its contents indicate the fertile nature of the soil in which Huntington planted his authoritarian departure from pluralist liberal orthodoxy.

Having first distinguished in some detail between totalitarian and democratic - or monolithic and pluralist - systems in highly developed regions of the world, Almond and Powell broach the issue of the function of political parties in developing countries. Their premise that: "Political stability and achievement of political goals are dependent upon the ordered behaviour of the masses of individuals composing the society"<sup>553</sup> sets the tone. Aspects of their follow-up argument acclaim the function of the political party as a powerful agent for socialisation in a modernising system. Here, they differentiate between two broad categories of party-system, namely, 'hegemonic' and 'turnover', as well as between two strata in the bedrock of political socialisation, that is, firstly, reinforcement of existing political culture and secondly, initiation of significant political-culture patterns.<sup>554</sup> They then develop their thesis along lines that strongly suggest their preferred style of party-system, namely, a hegemonic party that will enable a modernising system more effectively to convert inputs into outputs and therefore to survive.

The symbols of 'party' and 'leader' are capable of imposing a coherence and order upon the frightening newness and instability of a transitional society. They may satisfy underlying emotional needs for security and identification engendered by the breakup of traditional society.<sup>555</sup>

Almond and Powell then isolate two important elements, ideology and charisma, in an implicit supposition that a hegemonic party system is functionally best suited to order and control a problematic environment. They argue that the function of both elements is to engender a sense of security. In the case of ideology, "adherents are rewarded by a sense of order, a sense of identity, and a respite from the emotional confusion brought about by change."

In the case of charisma: the party “harnesses charisma as a foundation for stable authority”, thus “touching deep-seated psychological needs in a way which provokes widespread response”<sup>556</sup>

Earlier in their thesis, Almond and Powell identified contrasting dimensions within any given political culture, notably, cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions.<sup>557</sup> Thus, from the adumbrated formula, namely: hegemonic party + charismatic leader + reassuring ideology = stable and orderly environment – can be adduced the extent to which the affective dimension is privileged, presumably with the intention of reconstructing the cognitive and evaluative dimensions to ensure the survival of the system.

All things considered, one now can see why Almond and Powell paid a minimum of attention to the schooling function, despite stating their token approval of a “five nation study” which established that an educated citizen is usually an aware and politically competent citizen.<sup>558</sup> Indeed, it seems possible that not despite but *because* of the empowering potential of education, Almond and Powell seem strongly inclined to promote ideology and charisma as functionally more useful to the survival of the incumbent political objects. This possibility invites a question: which environment is more threatening to the survival of a modernising system pre-configured by colonialism to be led and administered by a minuscule fraction of the overall population? An environment comprising increasingly educated and politically aware citizens or an environment tightly controlled by a hegemonic party, in turn reinforced by the ubiquitous and persistent presence of a charismatic authority figure? In sum, the above analysis suggests that prior to the publication of Huntington’s

paradigm revision, the number of cheers for American style pluralism in postcolonial Africa already had been reduced to two.

### **Behaviouralism**

As indicated earlier in the dissertation, (xviii) behavioural science posits that human values are encapsulated in human attitudes which in turn affect group behaviour: *ergo*, values are quantifiable. To this extent, behaviouralists deviate from the behaviourist premise that the *mind* ('black box') is inaccessible to science. On the contrary, behavioural political science, or so Apter claimed at the time, "looks inside the actors."<sup>559</sup> How does Apter support his claim?

Referring to his methodology, Apter explains that he deploys both the structural and the behavioural modes: "The structural deals with the organisation of roles and their functional relationships. The behavioural deals with the ideas of right conduct embodied in the roles and the consequences of those ideas in the formation of personalities."<sup>560</sup> Thus he affirms cognitive phenomena, including value systems, as processes susceptible to empirical enquiry utilising behavioural methods. More particularly, behavioural techniques are employed to sift through value systems in order to determine whether the values in question are 'consummatory' or 'instrumental.' Consummatory values are "methodologically non-rational" in the sense that they "have consequences for individual and social actions that go beyond purely empirical ends ... they involve empirical means germane to non-empirical ends."<sup>561</sup> Instrumental values, on the other hand, are "methodologically rational" in the sense

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(xviii) See Chapter Two, pp 37-39

that they are "empirical means germane to empirical ends." Furthermore, "most economic objectives are of this nature."<sup>562</sup>

Observation of instrumental values in operation - that is, deploying empirical means to an economic end - provides, or so Apter argues, "a norm of rationality." Societies with predominantly instrumental values are societies in pursuit of predominantly rational, that is, economic ends. Hence they also are societies in which "consummatory aspects are reduced to a minimum or segregated."<sup>563</sup> Apter further contends that social mobility is a key consequence of the pursuit of instrumental ends. To the degree that the values of a society are predominantly instrumental, "it may be assumed to be interested in maximising resources and, therefore, concerned with social mobility." This type of society, then, is "the one most directly involved in modernisation and development."<sup>564</sup>

Apter's *prima facie* deployment of neutrally descriptive modalities and his seeming avoidance - to a greater extent than Almond, Coleman and Powell - of prescriptive inferences in the final analysis is somewhat deceptive since his thesis demonstrably assumes that Western style (scientific) modernisation is a universally good thing. He does not have to spell it out that consummatory values are all very well - in their place and within reason - but should not be allowed to block or decelerate the free flow of instrumental values, or to frustrate resource- maximisation pursuits, since it is this presumption that drives his discourse.

What, then, of societies where consummatory values irrationally are privileged? According to Apter, such societies by definition are traditionalist. He defines traditionalism as

"validation of current behaviour by reference to immemorial prescriptive norms."<sup>565</sup> A definitively traditionalist society is one that does not draw a clear line between sacred and secular, and in which "religion is pervasive as a cognitive guide. Such systems have been hostile to innovation ... not only ancient Greece and Rome but many contemporary African societies are examples of this type of system."<sup>566</sup> Progress begins when such societies convert religion from consummatory to instrumental purposes.

Among the examples cited by Apter are firstly, the rise of the Athenian trade empire once the Delphic oracle had been persuaded to dispense advice favourable to Athenian economic interests and secondly, 17<sup>th</sup> century Igbo use of their best known oracle, the Aro Chuba, which had a status in the region akin to the Delphic oracle's status in Greece, for predominantly economic ends, that is, the establishment and maintenance of Igbo trade colonies.<sup>567</sup> It can be inferred from Apter's argument that the beginnings of modernisation in traditionalist societies are located at the juncture where religion is put to instrumental as well as consummatory use, an innovation that inserts a 'norm of rationality' into social values and attitudes. Conversely, where religion permeates all aspects of life and retains its ability to hold people in thrall to sacral purposes, a pervasive and persistent norm of irrationality suggests that modernisation, in the absence of outside intervention, will be indefinitely delayed.

Drawing on a study by Evans-Pritchard, Apter cites the Nuer people of the Sudan as a prime example of a society whose values appear to be irredeemably consummatory. In a discussion leading up to his inclusion of Evans-Pritchard's observation that "it is impossible to live among Nuer and conceive of rulers ruling over them"<sup>568</sup> Apter argues as follows:

Embodied in the structural differences between the sacred and the secular, and of interest from a behavioural point of view, are the patterns of gratification peculiar to each. Gratifications that follow from the transcendental values associated with an act we will call consummatory, and gratifications that come from the empirical ends realised through an act we will call instrumental. In the comparison of different kinds of traditionalism, it becomes important to distinguish the kinds of gratifications common in a system and the varying and diverse patterns in which they are combined.<sup>569</sup>

The significance of making a clear distinction between consummatory and instrumental patterns of stimulus and response is that it enables a behavioural scientist to assess the degree of difficulty that new governments of predominantly traditional societies in Africa are likely to experience when implementing modernising policies. To facilitate the construction of a continuum - with instrumental value systems at one end and consummatory value systems at the other - along which to locate a series of African societies in order of their modernising potential, Apter suggests that a useful indicator is their "different adaptive responses to colonialism, a force for modernisation."<sup>570</sup> Segmental societies, such as the Nuer, whose structural flexibility preserves the consummatory belief system, are profoundly indifferent to the advantages of innovation and development, and therefore are able "to resist modernisation without fighting it." Their indifference to progress is a product of "a wide range of emotional relations that serves as the primary satisfaction."<sup>571</sup> However, segmental organisation *per se* is not a definitive factor given that the Igbo, also a segmental society, are placed by Apter at the opposite end - to the Nuer - of a developmental continuum. The privileged place in a modernisation scheme of things awarded to the Igbo hinges on the transformation of consummatory values into instrumental values. Once the award of social titles had shifted to favour individual achievement, particularly in an economic sphere, Igbo cultural norms "easily translated into local commercial lending and other trade associations."<sup>572</sup>

At this point in my review, it is worth emphasising that Apter is not rating African societies on a scale of their response (submission/resistance) to colonialism. On the contrary, he notes that the Igbo became a major force in nationalist politics in Nigeria. Instead, societies are rated in terms of economic adaptability and capacity for innovation. For instance, in the case of the Asante who mounted protracted and determined resistance to the onset of territorial imperialism,<sup>573</sup> Apter notes that firstly, "the chiefs had to be ordered to send their children to school"; secondly: "In Ashanti, those in power serve the present by serving the past"; thirdly, only the introduction and spread of Christian values undermined "the control exercised by the dead ancestors over the living."<sup>574</sup> Accordingly, Apter concludes that a consequence for the postcolonial state of Ghana of Asante consummatory values in which there is no distinction between sacral and secular purposes, is that "the past became a dead weight on the government ... the burdens of modernisation in Ghana were intense and resulted in a relatively autocratic system."<sup>575</sup> Here, Apter seems to be making a direct causal link between the increasingly authoritarian intervention of the Convention People's Party (CPP) - he refers in passing to "kicks and blows"<sup>576</sup> - and a society that obdurately privileges consummatory values, thus impeding economic progress. The Igbo, on the other hand, "willingly adjusted their local organisations and communities to modernisation" while resisting active administration by the British, and "readily took to exogenous innovations in the economic sphere."<sup>577</sup>

A key presumption that emerges from Apter's depiction of a plethora of African societies in terms of their structures and their value systems is that the key enabling / disabling variables are not so much structural as behavioural, and therefore not so much a matter of

societal organisation as of collective value systems. As noted above, both Nuer and Igbo societies are segmentally organised, whereas Asante society is structured along "pyramidal" lines.<sup>578</sup>

The emergence - as Apter's thesis unfolds - of the relationship between instrumental value systems and behaviour that conforms to a norm of rationality as - so to speak - alpha and omega of modernisation has important implications for his suppositions concerning ideology in modernising societies. In his discussion of ideologies, Apter equates consummatory value systems with "vulgar ideologies" of nationalism and socialism, and instrumental value systems with an ideology of science. In Apter's teleological hierarchy, instrumental values → ideology of science represent a peak of functional excellence, *ergo*, the ideology of science reigns supreme in Western societies.<sup>579</sup> His estimation of a definitive connection between ideological configuration and category of value system is examined in more detail below.

#### *Science as hegemonic ideology.*

Apter begins by distinguishing between ideology as dogma and ideology as science. He explains that he includes science as an ideological category because it is "a more hopeful alternative"<sup>580</sup> to dogma. Thus he launches a discussion of ideological beliefs and resultant behaviour by delineating a seminal binary opposition between science and dogma. To this delineation he appends a prediction inherent in his thesis: "An underlying assumption is that socialism and nationalism will fluctuate vis-a-vis each other and that in the process of modernisation, and especially industrialisation, the ideology of science will increasingly gain influence."<sup>581</sup>

The argument that elaborates Apter's prediction therefore focuses on "nationalism, socialism and science (considered as an ideology)."<sup>582</sup> In order to establish the right of science to occupy the top rung in a linear evolutionary scheme, he itemises stages of the development of ideology in reverse order of evolutionary rank. Firstly, "the growth of *multiple images*" held in common by elites and counter-elites. Hence, despite divisions in society, there is "a common denominator of meaning."<sup>583</sup> Secondly, the stage of "*selective recall*"<sup>584</sup> in which earlier points of agreement are pushed out to the margins, and disagreements move to centre stage. Thirdly, a "*relative threshold*"<sup>585</sup> is passed. Disagreements harden and become fixed; society is dotted with points of polarised conflict. Fourthly, "*hortatory realism*"<sup>586</sup> is a product of the combination of various points of disagreement in a way that configures a wider theoretical context. This is rapidly followed by fifthly, "*political fantasy*" which, according to Apter, emanates from "the particular talent of the charismatic leader to manipulate political fantasy, which also serves to create new consummatory values."<sup>587</sup> Apter further contends that:

Nationalist and socialist ideologies are typical during the periods of hortatory realism and political fantasy. Such periods, common immediately after a revolution or after a new nation has obtained its independence, give exceptional opportunities to political leaders to exert their leadership in the moral sphere.<sup>588</sup>

Sixthly, science in its capacity as ideology provides the ultimate stage, that of "*practical realism*."<sup>589</sup> Once a society has evolved to this point, the grievance, anger and bitterness that to greater or lesser degrees have informed all previous stages now have disappeared. The ideology of science involves both the application of rational methods and experimentalism to social affairs and the logic of fact and verification as the basis of rationality.<sup>590</sup> However, the

secure position of science as the primary ideology in "highly advanced development communities"<sup>591</sup> is contingent on the existence of the following socio-economic conditions:

- The redundancy of nationalism as an explicit cohesive mechanism given widespread acceptance of common social membership
- Since the main objectives of development have been achieved, "social dislocations require fine adjustments rather than 'gross' solutions"<sup>592</sup>
- Broad social consensus on fundamental issues of policy and the meaning of progress.<sup>593</sup>

Implicit in Apter's thesis is an 'end of ideology' presumption in the sense of termination in the West of ideologies of nationalism and socialism along with the foreseeable end of same in other parts of the world. Also noteworthy is Apter's contention that the post-Stalinist Soviet system is exhibiting a shift to instrumental values.

As the system has become industrialised ... and as new generations have emerged that are less committed to Marxism as a consummatory value, instrumentalism and the measurement of achievement as material output rather than moral expression have become more and more evident.<sup>594</sup>

He adds that the process is by no means complete, but that although Marxism and the older forms of socialism continue to operate, they are a steadily decreasing source of moral inspiration. Instead they function as ritualised expressions of antecedent values.<sup>595</sup>

At this juncture it is worth emphasising that Apter clearly distinguishes between the purportedly scientific content of Marxism and science *per se*. While socialism "may claim to be scientific, as in the case of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union ... sooner or later the

scientist will implicitly ignore this claim and possibly reject it."<sup>596</sup> Even lower down the scale are varieties of socialism in developing areas. While the claims of socialism to be scientific boost the authority of leaders, "their socialist ideologies do not belong in the same intellectual class as nineteenth century socialism or, for that matter, Marxism."<sup>597</sup> Accordingly, while he pays lip service to African choices between revolutionary and African socialism,<sup>598</sup> Apter tends to treat socialist ideologies in Africa as an undifferentiated whole. Additionally, his distinction between socialist ideology (motivational and disciplinary) and an ideology of nationalism (solidary) is qualified by his assertion that "quite often, the socialism of Africa is merely another name for nationalism."<sup>599</sup> In this scenario, nationalism's emphasis on common membership in the national state is supplemented by socialist ideological features, namely, developmentalism, egalitarianism, "and a sense of shared purpose in the scientific evolution of the society."<sup>600</sup>

Given Apter's uncompromising distinction between socialist science and science *per se*, it seems reasonable to deduce that a shared notion of scientific social evolution is equivalent to a collective political fantasy. The deduction is supported by Apter's contention that "the leaders may draw a picture of a new society in terms of socialism and nationalism, both ideologies being manipulated to prevent the operation of political realism."<sup>601</sup> Apter's statement imputes the incompatibility of ideology as dogma and ideology as science. He - slightly mystifyingly - adds that:

The ideology of science functions only in a period of practical realism, and is ultimately antagonistic to any other ideology, even though in the short run it may work for it. For this reason, the ideologues of modernising societies which for political reasons use ideology to maintain authority, cannot fully accept science.<sup>602</sup>

In regard to Apter's point in the passage quoted above, revisiting his distinction between instrumental and consummatory values provides a measure of clarification. *Prima facie*, a modernising system - functionally speaking - ought to downgrade or relegate to the social periphery consummatory values since - if permitted to flourish - they are impediments to science. However, the developmental necessity of periods of hortatory realism + political fantasy preclude dispensing with or marginalising consummatory values since they provide moral imperatives conducive to mass participation in nation building and other developmental activities. In short, a modernising system utilises consummatory values to inject a sense of unity and commitment into an environment that otherwise might splinter into hostile camps or sink into apathy.<sup>603</sup>

Because consummatory and instrumental values are so often in direct conflict with one another (for example, the 'old' versus the 'new'), coercion is required to restrict such conflicts and information is needed to avoid them. Quite often it becomes a primary aspect of government activity to create new consummatory values and therefore establish, as much as possible, different solidarities and identities. Characteristically, mobilisation systems do this by elevating ideology to the level of a religion.<sup>604</sup>

Apter further contends that the successful operation of a mobilisation system is contingent on the existence and nation-wide activities of a party of solidarity. He describes the paradox in which a party of solidarity finds itself. On the one hand, it is the main instrument for carrying out the mobilisation objectives of government - a role that not infrequently requires it to operate as an instrument of coercion. On the other, "it is supposed to remain close to the people and by this means gather information." The way in which the party attempts to reconcile its conflicting objectives is by displaying "a devotion to populism."<sup>605</sup> The party's populist recipe contains two major ingredients: heroic leadership + a strong utopian element

that provides the basis of social discipline.<sup>606</sup> In combination, these elements comprise an ideology that amounts to a political religion.

The essence of Apter's behavioural methodology arguably is contained in his assertion that "political religion is the means used because it translates morality into authority."<sup>607</sup> Firstly, this statement suggests that political religion is the medium through which a phenomenon - morality - which is unmeasurable and belongs to 'the shadowy domain of quasi-phenomena' (xix) is translated into a quantifiable factor - authority. Secondly, it facilitates a structural approach in that "another use of political religion is to impose an organisation on the political structure of society - that of a secular church in which party cadres carry the primary role of indoctrinating the youth."<sup>608</sup>

Apter thus simultaneously affirms the necessary existence of firstly, a mobilising system, secondly, a party of solidarity, and thirdly, their mutual and interdependent *modus operandi* (coercion / populism) that, once it has generated authority roles and concomitant loyalty or obedience, can be unravelled, categorised and projected into a scientifically hypothesised future by behavioural science. In short, the conclusions he draws from his research validate the methodological approach with which he started out. To the extent that Apter's thesis is circular, or self-fulfilling, Hawkesworth's critical comment seems apposite:

Political scientists have used their leverage as 'experts' to advise developing nations to adopt strategies that produce the world prophesied by political scientists. However flawed their foundation, scientific assertions have been used to dictate 'rational strategies' for political development which foreclose options and drastically curtail the freedom of citizens in developing countries.<sup>609</sup>

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(xix) See Chapter Two, p 40

According to my reading of Apter's text, his purportedly descriptive and empirical exercise contains a dual wish projection in the form of firstly, an assumption about the future of modernising societies, namely that the ideology of science will increasingly gain influence, that emerges from his teleological framework of analysis, and secondly, an affirmation of the scientific method (behavioural-structural) utilised by Apter in his capacity as a proponent of the modernisation paradigm. If assumption and affirmation are symbiotic, then it equally can be argued that Apter applies his wishful perception of reality to the objects of his research. In this respect, a question posed by Susser is pertinent:

If conviction, moral outlook and values cannot penetrate the epistemological framework of the behavioural world, and if these convictions and the actions that stem from them can be analysed only in terms of being 'systematically related' to a series of empirically accessible factors, are we not very close to a full blown doctrine (implicit though it may be) of social and psychological determinism? Conviction cannot justify itself but must be stated in terms of some other supporting factor. It follows that thought is a derivative conditioned process.<sup>610</sup>

Susser concludes that it is in the "inclination to social and psychological reductionism or determination" that behaviouralism merges with its counterpart in psychology.<sup>611</sup>

By way of conclusion, I revisit Apter's binary division between ideology as science and ideology as dogma in order to highlight a linkage between his binary logic and his teleological framework. Western policy, asserts Apter, is based on the assumption that the long-term prognosis for democracy is hopeful, just as:

Soviet policy vis-a-vis the modernising nations is based upon an opposite viewpoint, namely that mobilisation systems will eventually build up those forms of unity essential to the collectivist society as conceived in Marxian terms. I hold to the first view as an article of faith. But I also hope to show the superior utility of the libertarian system in its handling of complexity. In this sense I believe that modernisation ultimately produces libertarian systems.<sup>612</sup>

As defined by Apter, the libertarian model is like a vast marketplace in which

governments are the sellers, citizens are the buyers, and the primary value is liberty. "This concept of the polity parallels the pure theory of economic competition and accepts the same values."<sup>613</sup> In other words, a libertarian system is one in which economic values take pride of place and the dominant "behavioural characteristics of human beings" are "the ability to reason and the ability to know self-interest."<sup>614</sup> Liberty is pivotal because it allows real science (as opposed to the dogma-imbued science of socialism) to flourish. In addition, "in a functional and rationalistic universe, scientists (and social scientists) are accorded an increasingly powerful position in political life." The increasing power of scientists is not least a product of their "superior insight into the conduct of their fellows."<sup>615</sup>

Implicit in Apter's supposition is the conflation of knowledge (or information) and power, albeit incrementally since he contends that scientists do not actively seek power, and that it is only in the stage of practical realism that politicians are able to accept the comprehensive extent of their dependence on scientific expertise in the formulation and application of policy.

"The information elite is a scientific elite ... In societies where modernisation has been extensively achieved, this elite tends not only to displace the older elites (lawyers, for example) but, in addition, to make the old-fashioned politicians obsolete."<sup>616</sup> In highly industrialised countries, appropriately enlightened leaders are aware that the ideology of science "buttresses the authority of politicians with a universal appeal to scientific reason."<sup>617</sup>

However, because the ideology of science can do little to promote solidarity and identity,<sup>618</sup> in modernising nations the position of scientists vis-a-vis politicians is considerably less privileged given the primacy of consummatory values. Nonetheless, Apter believes that scientific experts in modernising countries have two major advantages over other elites.

Firstly, they are members of a universal scientific community and as such, they look to “their much more powerful counterparts in the industrial countries for support.”<sup>619</sup> Secondly, scientists are teleological signifiers. In this regard, scientific elites in the industrial nations show to their less fortunate counterparts in Africa the image of their own future. Here, it is worth bearing in mind that according to Apter, his ‘article of faith’ is supported by scientific evidence – in which case, Marxist systems by definition are constructed on a pseudo-scientific base.

Finally, while *prima facie* scientific, hence value-neutral, the research and recommendations reviewed above clearly are oriented towards prescriptive analysis. As Menkhaus puts it, “no meaningful distinction can be made between the field of political development and the study of politics in Africa. Most works written on African politics since 1960 have had a decidedly prescriptive tone.”<sup>620</sup> It thus seems reasonable to conclude that modernisation theory is purposively reflexive inasmuch as it combines an intention to liberate target constituencies from unscientific, *ipso facto*, false belief with prescriptive endorsement of a Western, more specifically, American ‘ideal model’. Yet, the orthodox modernisation paradigm also exhibits a somewhat paradoxical – given its pluralist ideal model - leaning towards incipiently authoritarian solutions to Third World problems. This normatively ambivalent trajectory prefigures Huntington’s conflation of ‘might’ and ‘right’.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### REVISED MODERNISATION THEORY: HUNTINGTON

The text at the centre of this chapter, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, is a quasi-revisionist modernisation classic.<sup>621</sup> While Huntington's thesis is informed by behaviouralism and structural functionalism, his version of the modernisation paradigm is distinctive in a number of ways. For instance, from the outset he explicitly draws attention to burgeoning problems of violence and disorder in modernizing countries.

Apter, when revisiting modernization theses that emerged during the middle decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, identifies two main trends within the paradigm's broad spectrum. The first trend, Modernization I, concerned itself exclusively with the modernisation of traditional societies. This "development project," having delineated structural, normative and behavioural components, then added ideology to the mixture. These components, it was assumed, would become mutually reinforcing and so achieve "the same 'steady state' in the 'periphery' as obtains in the 'metropole.'"<sup>622</sup> The framework sketched by Apter fits the Americanism<sup>623</sup> of orthodox modernisation theory, not least the blithe assumption that a scientifically conceived and managed political system can simultaneously exercise effective control over the environment and peacefully co-exist with it in a (modernising) relationship of dynamic equilibrium.

The second trend Apter defines in contradistinction to Modernization I. Modernization II concerns itself with transitional societies and "describes the contradictions of growth ... It is a

form of conflict theory.”<sup>624</sup> In the case of *Political Order In Changing Societies*, it perhaps would be more accurate to posit that Huntington defines and then argues a form of conflict *management* theory since his central preoccupation is how best to bring order, discipline and stability to disorderly, violence prone and haphazardly (if at all) governed transitional societies. More specifically, and by way of introduction to Huntington’s thesis, its distinctive attributes are summarised below.

Firstly, some of his more trenchant premises and arguments, for instance, when referring to the modernising countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America:

With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War II was characterised by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d’etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties.<sup>625</sup>

... offer a punchy antidote to the anodyne insinuations of paternalist social engineering deployed by his more orthodox counterparts. This said, it - more pertinently - is contended in this chapter that the tenor of his main premises, arguments and conclusions imputes authoritarian, potentially oppressive solutions to the problems encountered by modernising political systems. As these recommended solutions purportedly derive from strictly empirical analysis, given that Huntington, like his peers, operates on the assumption that behavioural science enables its practitioners to produce clinical diagnostics and prognoses, the implications, for instance, of the purportedly objective relegation of African polities and societies to the very bottom of a teleological heap, are disturbing. In this respect, Huntington

may be argued to have lent considerable impetus to an Afro-pessimistic trend that - despite subsequent modifications in behavioural methodology <sup>626</sup> - continues to thrive in Western academies.

Secondly, Huntington seems to be advising America (and the West in general) to make common cause with the Soviet Union. His analysis of the modernizing potential of single party systems takes the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as an ideal model. In addition, he brackets the Soviet Union in the same 'civic polity' category as Western states, and describes the strength and durability of the CPSU and its organs of governance with an unmistakable air of approval. Explicitly to privilege considerations of functional efficacy ahead of the ideological imperatives of the Cold War *prima facie* seems to affirm him as a practitioner of value-free, neutrally descriptive and evaluative political science. However, as argued below, this impression is not much more than superficial. At a deeper level, Huntington substitutes one value-laden concept, authority, for another, liberty. In so doing he both affirms and predicts the teleological necessity of developmental dictatorships in postcolonial Africa.

Thirdly, a particularly innovative aspect of Huntington's thesis is his rejection of the notion that the American system is an appropriate model for modernising countries. Here, he departs markedly from the conventional wisdom of his predecessors and contemporaries - but not, however, from a teleological orientation. Eschewing North America as developmental exemplar, he instead locates the ancestry of all modernizing political systems in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Fourthly and relatedly, it is not difficult to discern the spirit of Thomas

Hobbes at the back of Huntington's intense preoccupation with political authority and its functional concomitant, order.

### **Binary organisation of key concepts.**

As Mamdani observes, modernisation theory views social reality as though it plausibly can be reduced to and adequately understood within an organisational framework of binary pairs.<sup>627</sup>

Huntington's text is emblematic of this approach. The binaries that construct his thesis are deployed as foundational concepts on the basis of which he formulates his arguments and conclusions. In the discussion below, key binary pairs are isolated and the manner in which a given binary pair plays host to a number of contingent binaries is indicated.

#### *Political institutions / social forces*

*Prima facie*, the above concepts in polar juxtaposition do not necessarily contain binary inferences. However, as Huntington's argument proceeds, their binary character<sup>628</sup> emerges. Institutions are defined as "the behavioural manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest"<sup>629</sup> and as "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour."<sup>630</sup> Moving from concept to process, Huntington defines institutionalisation as "the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability."<sup>631</sup> Since political institutions do not take shape overnight, "political development, in this sense, is slow, particularly when compared to the seemingly much more rapid pace of economic development."<sup>632</sup>

The true test of an institution is its capacity to survive - not as a result of resistant immobility but through a process of dynamic adaptation - major changes in its operational environment. Huntington therefore contends that "functional adaptability, not functional specificity, is the

true measure of a highly developed organisation."<sup>633</sup> Since political parties are included under the rubric of institutions, it stands to reason that the more functionally adaptable a party, the greater the probability of its survival.

A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism.<sup>634</sup>

The example most often cited by Huntington of a functionally adaptable, hence enduring political party in a modernising country is India's Congress Party which proved able to adapt its function from the attainment of independence to the meta-task of governance. In general, one can deduce from Huntington's argument that political institutions, as long as they meet the criterion of functional adaptability, inherently are valuable<sup>635</sup> in the sense that they create and maintain stability as well as public morality. By contrast, the meaning invested by Huntington in the category of social forces seems somewhat sinister. In effect, social forces are conceptualised as the problem political institutions perforce must overcome in order to survive. "Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces."<sup>636</sup>

Huntington's initial definition of 'social forces' is provided early in the text. "A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group."<sup>637</sup> As the definition *prima facie* is free of pejorative inference, its wider significance is not immediately evident. Only as his argument proceeds does a perception emerge that what primarily defines a social force is the very quality it most lacks: "a sense of political community."<sup>638</sup> Furthermore, without a sense

of political community, there can be no “art of associating together.”<sup>639</sup> It follows, then, that neglect or ignorance of the art of association undermines or stunts the development of political institutions in their structural and moral capacities.

Since Huntington by degrees has moved from a neutral seeming proposition about institutional function to a conclusion overtly informed by a notion of institutional construction of public morality, it is of some importance to uncover the meaning he vests in ‘public morality.’ He asserts that “morality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behaviour.”<sup>640</sup> It is noteworthy that in the discussion following this statement, he substitutes ‘interest’ for ‘morality’ as if, in a context of political institutions, the two concepts are one and the same. By inference, then, his understanding of public morality corresponds to that which is in the public interest. He develops this line of argument by addressing the question of who is responsible for defining and promoting the public interest. His answer is that political institutions are key sites of public morality. Since Huntington equates morality with interest, and since public interest is vested in institutions of governance, it is possible to surmise that public morality corresponds to that which is in the best interests of such institutions.

As an aid to clarifying the position thus far, the steps in argumentation via which Huntington arrives at his conflation of public morality and the interests of political institutions are itemised below.

- Following in Easton’s footsteps, Huntington makes a distinction between public office and office holder, for example, between the institution of the Presidency and the

current incumbent. The latter, being mortal, has short-term interests whereas the interests of the former are long term. By inference, then, the first law of public morality is long-term institutional survival.

- The interests of political institutions not only are long-term, they also are finite, hence susceptible to empirical observation and measurement. Huntington maintains that previous approaches to estimating the precise nature of the public interest have deployed problematic because abstract reasoning.<sup>641</sup> In contradistinction to such approaches, he asserts that “governmental institutions have interests of their own. These interests not only exist, they are also reasonably concrete.”<sup>642</sup>
- The interests of political institutions correspond to that which is in the national interest. From this equation can be extrapolated a formula that proceeds as follows: public morality → long term interests (functional survival) of institutions of governance → permanent national interest. “What’s good for the Presidency is good for the country.”<sup>643</sup>
- The next step in the argument is summarised by Huntington’s assertion that:

Ask any reasonably informed group of Americans to identify the five best presidents and the five worst presidents. Then ask them to identify the five strongest presidents and the five weakest presidents. If the identification of strength with goodness and weakness with badness is not 100 per cent, it will almost certainly be not less than 80 per cent.<sup>644</sup>

As a consequence of this step, Huntington has developed a proposition that equates public morality not only with national interest but also with the strength and durability of institutions of governance. In this scenario, strength is good and its binary opposite,

weakness is bad. The example he cites (above) is the Presidency. At this juncture it is instructive to note a reworking of the same theme in a subsequent text. Unlike orthodox modernisation theorists who posit a teleology in which the American polity represents an ideal - in both senses of the word - model, Huntington is preoccupied with the weakness, *ipso facto*, badness of the American political system. He defines the central problem of American politics as the weakness of political institutions relative to the strength of society. He underpins his argument with a comparison between the historical development of the modern American polity with that of the modern state in Europe, and indicates his approval of the latter process of historical development, or at any rate, its outcome which assured the paramountcy of political institutions over social forces.<sup>645</sup>

- Huntington now takes his line of argument one step further by extending it into a comparative realm and then drawing a general proposition from the regularities he has uncovered. "Just as a strong Presidency is in the American public interest, so also a strong party is in the Soviet public interest."<sup>646</sup> He thus draws attention to structural similarities across nations and continents that derive from institutions, their functional adaptability and strength. By inference, ideological differences between states and regions of the world pale into insignificance compared with Huntington's primary criterion, namely that "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government."<sup>647</sup> In other words, do governments *govern*? If so, to what extent and how effectively?

- Note, however, Huntington's link between two distinct institutions, that is, (American) presidency and (Soviet) party. By inference, a stable and enduring political party is equivalent to a permanent executive arm of the state. It therefore is deducible that the significant link between the American presidency and the CPSU is not so much institutional (or structural) as functional (authority → order).
- Huntington's focus is not on ideology *per se*. Unlike his orthodox counterparts, he does not really address the extent to which authority, and therefore legitimacy, are tied in with ideology. Instead, he argues that "governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but to the extent to which they have interests of their own apart from all other groups."<sup>648</sup> Again, he cites the presidency in support of his case: "The interest of the Presidency ... coincides with that of no-one else ... the Presidential perspective is unique to the Presidency. Precisely for this reason it is both a lonely office and a powerful one. Its authority is rooted in its loneliness."<sup>649</sup>

The above final step in argumentation heralds the onset of another key binary configuration.

"The existence" continues Huntington, "of political institutions (such as the Presidency or Central Committee) capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones."<sup>650</sup>

#### *Politically developed / undeveloped societies*

Huntington's elaboration of this binary site highlights a curious anomaly in a purportedly scientific thesis, viz, value-imbuéd concepts and definitions. A binary distinction between

developed and undeveloped societies utilises structural and functional criteria. What, then, is one to make of Huntington's use of normative criteria in delineating contingent binaries? Whereas defining a weak government as a bad government is not too startling a departure from a value-free standard, the criteria contained in "a weak government, a government which lacks authority, fails to perform its function and is immoral" to say the least are mixed. In similar vein, he declares that a distinction between politically developed and undeveloped societies "also distinguishes moral communities from amoral societies."<sup>651</sup> In general, Huntington's use of normative terms such as 'amoral', 'moral' and 'immoral' in conjunction with structural-functional estimates such as 'simple', 'complex', 'undeveloped' and 'developed' bears close investigation. To this end, the sequential development of criteria briefly is revisited and unpacked below.

- Proposition 1.

The existence of political institutions capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes *politically developed* societies from *undeveloped* ones. (*Structural-functional*)

- Proposition 2.

It also distinguishes *moral* communities from *amoral* societies. (*Normative*).

- Proposition 3.

A government with a low level of institutionalisation is not merely a *weak* government, it is a *bad* government. (*Structural-normative blend*)

- Proposition 4.

A *weak* government is a government which lacks authority, fails to adequately perform its functions and is *immoral*. (*Normative-functional blend*.)

The above itemisation outlines an area of fact-value overlap in Huntington's thesis in which structural and functionalist designations inexplicably are conflated with moral worth. By 'inexplicable' I mean that he does not offer any overt or compelling justification, *ergo*, the reasoning behind the conflation perforce has to be inferred from the direction and design of his thesis – an exercise on which I embark below.

The meaning vested by Huntington in the term 'moral community' has been noted above. To reiterate and expand, he defines a moral community as one in which people have developed the art of associating together. Civic associations are formed in society to fulfil specific functions. An example cited is that of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. A town chairman is quoted as saying: "We can fight polio .. if we can organise people. If we can organise people like this we can fight anything."<sup>652</sup> The inference is that for good deeds to flourish and worthy causes to be won, society needs organisation. Given that the growth of organisations makes society more complex, there is a connection between organisations, achievement of worthy causes and social complexity, and hence there is a connection between that which is complex and that which is beneficial to society as a whole.

However, against Huntington, it can be argued that there is nothing inherently or necessarily beneficial about the existence of social organisations. To what extent, for instance, is a Flat Earth society a developmental asset? How socially beneficial are the causes of neo-fascist,

racist or xenophobic associations? The art of associating together and the complexity that ensues as increasing numbers of civic groups form and organise themselves, is not an inherently advantageous or necessarily developmental process - yet Huntington presents his definition of a 'moral community' as though it is self-evidently true. Perhaps he is merely positing that there can be no developmentally progressive activity or long lasting social benefit *without* association and social organisations? If so, he fails to state or clarify his position. In short, an argument that hinges on a materially unargued assumption that only a complex society rates as a 'moral community' is logically incoherent.

In addition, his equation of a plethora of civic associations with social complexity and therefore with morality begs the question of his inclusion of the Soviet Union in the category of participatory or civic polities. Since independent civic associations were not permitted to form at all, let alone flourish in the Soviet Union, Huntington's reasoning does not make sense.

A final point is that his social complexity → moral society formula includes an inference that any society complex enough to have formed a variety of civic associations by definition already has developed political institutions. In other words, developed political institutions are the *sine qua non* of a moral community. Q.E.D. By extension, the idea of a moral community *sans* political institutions and formal governance is a non-starter.

Turning now to Huntington's definition of an amoral society. Given his antecedent proposition, it seems reasonable to deduce that a society qualifies as amoral if it has no political institutions separate and distinct from itself, that is, if its political and social

functions are fused, for instance, in a group of elders or a village council. How, then, does such a society achieve moral status?

An (indirect) answer to the above question can be found in Huntington's depiction of the era of state building in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe. "Historically, political institutions have emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces, and the gradual development of procedures and organizational devices for resolving these disagreements."<sup>653</sup>

It thus is through a developmental process of generating authoritative political institutions that a formerly amoral society ultimately acquires moral status. Prior, however, to crossing this developmental Rubicon:

In a society lacking political community, ... loyalties to the more primordial social and economic groupings - family, clan, village, tribe, religion, social class - compete with and often supersede loyalty to the broader institutions of public authority. In Africa today tribal loyalties are strong: national and state loyalties weak.<sup>654</sup>

By the same token, it seems that in a linear ascent from amoral to moral, the normative Rubicon is crossed when a society separates itself from its political institutions. More than this, society - having created something superior to itself - must defer to its own creation. By contrast, primordial loyalties are those offered by a society to itself.

Summing up: a moral community is not moral in and of itself, it is moral because it has developed and renders obedience to the authority of political institutions. The test of the morality of a society is whether or not it is willing to submit to political institutions. The test of a moral political institution is whether or not it is able to assert its authority over society. In both cases, if yes, it is moral. If no, it is immoral. However, this method of defining a society and its institutions begs two (related) questions. Firstly, is Huntington equating

morality with society's submission to the authority of organically developed, endogenous political institutions? Secondly, if he is, how does he rate forceful imposition on a simple (amoral) society of exogenous institutions? For instance, does a simple (amoral) society which resists conquest and the imposition of exogenous political institutions, and which musters an array of social forces to fight an occupying power then qualify as an immoral society? If morality is equated with modernity, then colonialism in its capacity as harbinger of modernity presumably rates as moral. If so, might (as long as it is modernising might) is right.

In following up an intimation in Huntington's argument that modernising might by definition is right, it is instructive to revisit his contention that "historically, political institutions have emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces and the gradual development of procedures and organisational devices for resolving these disagreements."<sup>655</sup> At first glance, he might almost be describing a moderately peaceful, if lengthy process of negotiation among social forces. However, as his argument proceeds, this impression is rapidly dispelled. Referring to an era of state building in Europe, Huntington asserts that "the prevalence of war directly promoted political modernisation. Competition forced the monarchs to build their military strength"<sup>656</sup> and "war was the great stimulus to state building."<sup>657</sup>

It is in the context of the above causal link between the history of war and the history of modernisation in Europe that a connection made by Huntington between the art of war and the art of politics slots into place.

Unity, esprit, morale and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. Numbers, weapons and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in politics. The problems of creating coherent political organisations are more difficult but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent military organisations ... The capacities for coordination and discipline are crucial to both war and politics, and historically societies which have been skilled at organising the one have also been adept at organising the other.<sup>658</sup>

The above analogy, if taken in combination with Huntington's methodological deployment of binary pairs contains an unmistakable inference that in the final analysis, 'survival of the fittest' is the organising principle of modernisation and that just as some polities in early modern Europe were better able to survive a protracted process of war and state building than others, so can today's transitional societies be classified as 'fit' or 'unfit'.

However, despite his evident attachment to a 17<sup>th</sup> century model, Huntington in effect acknowledges that the passage of time weighs against an exact comparison. Having noted that in modernising Europe "the centralisation of power was necessary to smash the old order" and appended the assertion that "in modernising societies, the centralisation of power varies directly with the resistance to change,"<sup>659</sup> he concedes that the development in 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe of democratic aspirations led to the expansion of participation via the gradual extension of the franchise.<sup>660</sup> Since it no longer is practicable entirely to exclude the masses from the political arena, the 17<sup>th</sup> century European monarch retires into the shadows of past history to be replaced in 20<sup>th</sup> century modernising societies by the monolithic party.

In elaborating the connections and developments sketched above, Huntington reasons as follows. The new doctrines in Europe of absolute sovereignty and concomitantly, of the subject's absolute duty of obedience to his king, are "the seventeenth century counterparts of

the theories of party supremacy and national sovereignty which are today employed to break down the authority of traditional local, tribal and religious bodies."<sup>661</sup> In the absence of a theory of absolute sovereignty with which to forge the modernisation of Europe, developmental progress, Huntington intimates, would have been indefinitely disabled by "the medieval pluralistic order."<sup>662</sup> The same principle applies in today's transitional societies.

In the twentieth century, the broadening of participation and the rationalisation of authority occur simultaneously, and hence authority must be concentrated in either a political party or in a popular charismatic leader, both of which are capable of arousing the masses as well as challenging traditional sources of authority. But in the seventeenth century the absolute monarch was the functional equivalent of the twentieth century's monolithic party.<sup>663</sup>

However, against Huntington's Eurocentric teleology, hence inference of the necessary hegemony of Western-style modernity, it can be argued that there is nothing inevitably progressive about the long duration of a European habit of war and conquest. If Huntington's analogy between war and politics is taken as evidence, not of the survival of the fittest but of the origins of European imperialism, it then can be contended that having temporarily fought herself to a standstill, Europe turned her warlike attention to foreign parts. Once an imperial pattern of conquest complemented by the subordination of indigenous societies to imperial political institutions is taken into adequate account, Huntington's teleology looks like tautology, given his conflation of conquest and modernisation. By the same token, his binary trajectory leaves a trail of self-fulfilling prophecy in its wake. *Iipse dixit*. It is so because the conqueror says it is so - in which case, the closing passage of Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* is apposite commentary.

The Commissioner went away, taking three or four of the soldiers with him. In the many years in which he had toiled to bring civilisation to different parts of Africa he had learnt a number of things. One of them was that a District Commissioner must

never attend to such undignified details as cutting down a dead man from the tree. Such attention would give the natives a poor opinion of him. In the book which he planned to write he would stress that point. As he walked back to the court he thought about that book. Every day brought him some new material. The story of this man who had killed a messenger and hanged himself would make interesting reading. One could almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps not a whole chapter but a reasonable paragraph, at any rate. There was so much else to include, and one must be firm in cutting out details. He had already chosen the title of the book, after much thought: *The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger*.<sup>664</sup>

Prior to investigating a third binary site, I include below a tabular version of Huntington's evaluative categories. (Note that within Huntington's system of categorisation, the United States occupies a unique if ambiguous position. It is rated as a developed, complex polity, comprising a strong society and a comparatively weak set of political institutions).

<u>SOCIETY</u>	<u>STRUCTURAL CONDITION</u> →	<u>MORAL CONDITION</u> ←	<u>AUTONOMOUS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS</u>	<u>FUNCTIONAL CONDITION</u> →	<u>VALUE CATEGORY</u> ←	<u>RATIO OF POLITICAL STRENGTH TO WEAKNESS</u> →	<u>REALPOLITIK CATEGORY</u> ←	<u>IDEOLOGY</u>	<u>EXAMPLE</u>
TRADITIONAL	SIMPLE	AMORAL	NIL	FUSED	NON- EXISTENT	BECOMING EXTINCT	BOTTOM OF THE FOOD CHAIN	TRADITIONAL (religious/ mythical)	DISPERSED POWER STRUCTURES <sup>665</sup> (autonomous village systems)
TRANSITIONAL (GOOD)	BECOMING COMPLEX	BECOMING MORAL	DEVELOPING	SIMPLE → COMPLEX. BECOMING ADAPTABLE	BECOMING RIGHT	BECOMING STRONG	UPWARDLY MOBILE	MODERNIZING	INDIA
TRANSITIONAL (BAD)	UNRAVELLING	IMMORAL	DECAYING	CHAOTIC	WRONG	WEAK	DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	IRRELEVANT	THEIR NAME IS LEGION
MODERN	COMPLEX	MORAL	DEVELOPED	COMPLEX & ADAPTABLE	RIGHT	STRONG	POWERFUL	MODERN	STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE U.S.S.R

Huntingtons's evaluative categories.

*Civic polity / praetorian polity*

It is in his definition of a praetorian polity that Huntington deviates most markedly from orthodox modernisation theory. He re-evaluates and reconfigures received wisdom about theoretically well-adjusted political systems and their meekly behaved environments, in the process displacing liberty from its commanding position on the functional high ground of pluralism, and substituting authority.

Huntington's given reason for a reconstitution of priorities is - or appears to be - straightforward:

The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.<sup>666</sup>

In this account, authority and its behavioural signifier, order, are prerequisites for liberty - a notion not necessarily offensive to liberals. The proposition with which Huntington opens his argument at first glance does not seem hostile to liberty as such. On the contrary, he quotes Rousseau's contention that: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty."<sup>667</sup>

However, Huntington subsequently indicates his opinion of Rousseau's utopian solution to the vexed question of the proper location of sovereignty:

Men are, however, reluctant to give up the image of social harmony without political action. This was Rousseau's dream ... It is the eschatological goal of the Marxists who aim to recreate at the end of history a perfect community where politics is superfluous. In fact, this atavistic notion could only succeed if history were reversed, civilization undone and the levels of human organisation reduced to family and hamlet.<sup>668</sup>

It seems evident that Rousseau's moral community which is administered but not governed as such, and Marx's vision of a self-regulating global socialist community are the very antithesis of Huntington's perception of modernity. However, 'modernity' is a condition Huntington seems unable to define in and of itself. Instead, every definition of modernity contained in his text is arrived at via a process of comparison with the 'other' - not, as in the orthodox version, a traditional 'other' but instead a praetorian (transitional) 'other'. It is this alteration of conventional binary design that perhaps most notably flags Huntington's distinctive place within the modernisation paradigm. His underlying motives are less straightforward than his given reason suggests, hence for purposes of clarification his supporting arguments are unpacked and itemised below.

- Traditional societies usually are stable societies. They also are dying out - overtaken by the teleological imperatives of modernisation - at an exponential rate. 'Traditional' therefore no longer is a particularly useful category: the only real interest Huntington demonstrates in polities ruled along traditional lines is whether or not the type of rule is likely to facilitate modernisation. For instance: "Tribes and villages with more highly concentrated power structures innovate more easily and more rapidly than those with more dispersed power structures."<sup>669</sup>
- Huntington's focus on traditional societies *per se* then is abandoned for an intensive evaluation of the modernising process, an evaluation he mainly conducts by isolating and then reviewing its component parts. From this process of evaluation emerges a conception of modernity ('that which is') in contradistinction to modernisation ('that which might become'). For instance: "Modernity breeds stability, but modernisation

breeds instability."<sup>670</sup> "Modernity means stability and modernization instability."<sup>671</sup>

"In the absence of strong and adaptable institutions ... increases in participation mean instability and violence. Here in dramatic form can be clearly seen the paradox that modernity produces stability and modernisation instability."<sup>672</sup>

- Simply put, the component parts of the modernisation process are economic, political and social. They are linked by social responses to modernisation itself. If economic modernisation is not accompanied by a sufficient degree of political modernisation, the inevitable result is social violence. A society that tends to manifest violent responses to the inequalities and contradictions of economic modernisation is a disorderly society, rent and distorted by competing social forces. If recourse to violence sets in and becomes endemic, the polity then is distinguished by its instability, and fits the category 'praetorian'. It is a society in which "participation in politics has outrun the institutionalisation of politics."<sup>673</sup>
- In this context of violence, disorder, instability, what does Huntington mean by 'participation'? In relation to a praetorian society, participation in politics may take either of two forms, depending on who has the upper hand at any given time. If forces that defy the authoritative process of governance, such as an angry mob or disaffected elements in the military, are able to dominate the political arena, then praetorianism is a system "where social forces using their own methods act directly in the political sphere."<sup>674</sup> If, however, at a given time the political leadership has an adequate grip on the reins, then the "masses are available for mobilisation by elites."<sup>675</sup>

In the final analysis, the factor that configures Huntington's interpretation of the dynamics at work in a praetorian polity is the lack of weighty, well-developed and authoritative political institutions to act as safety barriers and shock absorbers between alienated intellectuals, rioting students, rambunctious colonels *et al*, on the one hand, and the political leadership on the other. The chaotic scenario depicted by Huntington is a far cry from Easton's smooth rendition of a political system converting inputs to outputs like a precisely conceived and well-maintained machine, simultaneously pacifying and managing its environment, or Almond's elastic structural functional model which, python-like, ingests problems whole and then filters them through various sub-strata of the system until they have been reduced to manageable proportions.

In sum, the steadily ascending graph adumbrated by orthodox modernisers<sup>676</sup> is replaced in Huntington's thesis by an image of steep descent into political decay and social chaos: in a word, by praetorianism. Huntington certainly cannot be accused of constructing a Pollyanna paradigm, or even of telling American foreign policy makers what they want to hear. On the contrary, he depicts the CPSU, post-Stalin, as having fulfilled the functionally admirable task of retrieving Soviet Russia from its Stalin-induced descent into praetorianism.<sup>677</sup> In this view, the CPSU is the political institution that enables the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the category of 'civic polity'. In the Cold War decades, this was a view not altogether likely to be well received by a political establishment that favoured a perception of America as a moral superpower, and by extension, the Soviet system as irredeemably 'other' to the American 'self'.

However, it should not be assumed on this basis that Huntington bore then or bears now any resemblance to a radical academic and bane of the establishment like Noam Chomsky, for instance. On the contrary, Huntington seems to be advising the American establishment to 'get real' along lines not dissimilar to Machiavelli's advice, in *The Prince*, to Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici.

... the one thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority. Their ideology furnishes a basis of legitimacy, and their party organisation provides the institutional mechanism for mobilising support and executing policy. To overthrow the government in many modernising countries is a simple task: one battalion, two tanks and a half-dozen colonels may suffice. But no communist government in a modernising country has been overthrown by a military coup d'état. The real challenge which the communists pose to modernising countries is not that they are so good at overthrowing governments (which is easy), but that they are so good at making governments (which is a far more difficult task). They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do provide governments that can govern. While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists offer a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernising countries, they provide some assurance of political order.<sup>678</sup>

In his mission statement above, which occurs early in the text, Huntington indicates and in some sense justifies the order of his binary design. At this early stage, however, he has not explained how a vanguard party in the Soviet mould responds to that cumbersome item of 20<sup>th</sup> century *haute couture*, popular participation in politics. Additionally, an issue left hanging is that of the correct rules of navigation through the rocky shoals of popular participation for non-communist political parties. It is only as the trend of Huntington's reasoning unveils itself that his position emerges. In general, his suppositions hinge on the key factor of party organisation, and his argument proceeds as outlined below.

## **Endorsement of authoritarian one-party states**

Two factors configure Huntington's evaluation of the slow maturation and traumatic delivery of a modern polity from a modernising polity: firstly, social and economic equality or rather, an idea of equality disseminated by rising levels of education and literacy; secondly, mass participation in politics. These factors flag the centuries' wide gap between modernising states in Western Europe and their 20<sup>th</sup> century counterparts in the Third World. The gap between the low expectations of 17<sup>th</sup> century masses in Europe and the high expectations of their 20<sup>th</sup> century counterparts is what gives modernising polities in the Third World their uniquely problematic configuration.

The political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionalisation, moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to political instability.<sup>679</sup>

It already has been demonstrated how the negative scenario unfolds. It is a forcefully depicted map of the road most travelled by transitional societies. What, then, distinguishes the road less travelled? Towards what ideal model should a modernising polity lay in a course? It is not easy to uncover a clear and unequivocal response to this question since the term 'modern' makes rather random appearances throughout the text of Huntington's thesis, and alternates with the terms 'civic' and 'participatory', hence creating a somewhat disjointed big picture. I thus have selected the criteria cited below on the basis that they convey an adequately consistent message.

"Political systems ... can be distinguished by their levels of political institutionalisation and their levels of political participation."<sup>680</sup> "As political participation increases, the complexity,

autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained."<sup>681</sup> Further, "political systems with a high ratio of institutionalisation to participation may be termed civic polities."<sup>682</sup>

Given the criteria so far cited, it seems that Huntington's ideal model caters for expanding levels of popular participation in politics through a process of institutional adaptability and expanding complexity. In addition, an essential feature of political institutions in a civic polity is their independence of social forces, in general, their independently authoritative existence. Thus far, his definition of a civic polity hinges on functional qualities of adaptability, complexity and autonomy and does not significantly differ from a pluralist ideal type. Summing up: "In the participant polity ... a high level of popular involvement is organised and structured through political institutions"<sup>683</sup> and "the distinctive institution of the modern polity consequently is the political party."<sup>684</sup>

However, it is in the comparison with praetorianism that Huntington's ideal model shifts into Hobbesian gear. "In the mass society political participation is unstructured, anomic and variegated. Each social force attempts to secure its objectives through the resources and tactics in which it is strongest."<sup>685</sup> Since praetorian polities and mass societies are two sides of the same coin, the anarchic interaction between them is such that "apathy and indignation succeed each other: the twin children of the absence of authoritative political symbols and institutions."<sup>686</sup> In sharp contradistinction to a civic polity and its participatory society, "mass society lacks organised structures which can relate their political desires and activities to the goals and decision of their leaders."<sup>687</sup> As a result, "a direct relationship exists between leaders and masses"<sup>688</sup> whereas in a participant polity:

Each social force must transform its sources of power and forms of action - be they numbers, wealth, knowledge or potential for violence - into those which are legitimate in and institutionalised in the political system. The structure of a participant polity may assume a variety of forms and power may be dispersed or concentrated. In all cases, however, participation is broad and is organised and structured into legitimate channels.<sup>689</sup>

It is at this juncture, and as a direct outcome of a continuous process of comparison with its binary opposite, that Huntington's depiction of a civic polity makes a definitive break with the pluralist model, viz, "constitutional democracies and communist dictatorships are both participant polities."<sup>690</sup> Judging by this development in Huntington's argumentation, it matters not whether a civic polity allows for the *de jure* existence of only one or a number of political parties. The idea of a *de jure* multi-party dispensation at the heart of liberal theory of the state thus summarily is dismissed by Huntington.

As can be highlighted by revisiting an assertion that appears early in the text, it is a reasonable assumption that Huntington's linear apotheosis, the civic polity, has as its lowest common denominator and - in the final analysis - definitive characteristic, strong and effective governance: "The one thing communist governments can do is govern; they do provide effective authority."<sup>691</sup> It therefore follows logically that his primary recommendation to the government of a transitional society is along the lines sketched below.

If a society is to maintain a high level of community, the expansion of political participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex and more autonomous political institutions. The effect of the expansion of political participation, however, is usually to undermine the traditional political institutions and to obstruct the development of modern political ones. Modernisation and social mobilisation, in particular, thus tend to produce political decay unless steps are taken to moderate or to restrict its impact on political consciousness and political involvement.<sup>692</sup>

This final point, that is, the moderation or restriction of political consciousness and involvement instructively is supplemented firstly, by a contention made early in the text:

Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organisation. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organisations. In many, if not most, modernising countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority.<sup>693</sup>

Secondly, by a claim made towards the end of the text that “in modernising states one party systems tend to be more stable than pluralistic party systems.”<sup>694</sup> In short, orthodox modernisation theory’s two cheers for pluralism now have been replaced by Huntington’s three cheers for authoritarian one-party states.

### **The long shadow of Hobbes’ *Leviathan*.**

An investigation of certain thematic conjunctures between *Leviathan* and *Political Order in Changing Societies* seems apposite given that Huntington’s ‘modernisation as conflict’ model has a teleological point of origin in 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe, specifically in an idea of absolute sovereignty that was closely linked to the concept of the state as *Leviathan*. Referring to Hobbes’ idea of absolute sovereignty, Huntington locates its primary significance in the doctrine of “the subject’s absolute duty of obedience to his king.” This doctrine, he asserts, “helped political modernisation by legitimising the concentration of authority and the breakdown of the medieval pluralistic political order.”<sup>695</sup> He then draws a line that spans centuries and continents firstly, from monarchical state sovereignty to party-state sovereignty; secondly, from medieval pluralism to Third World local, tribal and religious bodies.<sup>696</sup> Since Huntington cites Hobbes’ doctrine of political obligation to a monarch as equivalent to the political obligation of Third World masses to a monolithic party, his thesis to this extent can be conceptualised as a 20<sup>th</sup> century counterpart of Hobbes’ thesis. Moreover, Hobbes and

Huntington start from the same baseline, that is, a strongly worded depiction of an undesirable condition, the better to articulate and defend their preferred scenario.

*Leviathan* is grounded in Hobbes' perception of the quality, or rather lack of it, of life in the absence of strong and sovereign political authority.

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war ... where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth: no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.<sup>697</sup>

*Leviathan* emerged from the depths of Hobbes' experience of civil war in England. "For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, and then to ruin ..." <sup>698</sup> *Political Order In Changing Societies* has been described as "part of the vanguard of conservatism reacting to America's experience with the trauma of Vietnam and other disorders in the late 1960s." <sup>699</sup> Further, a report on the governability of democracies, co-authored by Huntington and published in 1975, contended that democracies are overloaded by claims to social justice and participation, and that governability and democracy are warring concepts. The report recommended that the balance should be tilted back in favour of governments. <sup>700</sup>

Comment along the above lines locate Huntington within the emergence and consolidation of 'new right' thinking in the late 1960s and 1970s. By extension, I surmise that Hobbes'

depiction of 'men who live without a common power to keep them all in awe' penetrated the passage of the centuries and lodged itself deep within the inner ear of conservatism.

Both Hobbes and Huntington envision human equality (or, in Huntington's case, an idea of equality) as a primary source of conflict. For Hobbes, however, conflict-inducing human equality is real (in the sense of natural<sup>701</sup>) whereas for Huntington, a demand for equality in a transitional society is the wishful product of increased expectations generated by urbanisation, literacy, education, and mass media that "expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction."<sup>702</sup> Since Huntington makes no definitive pronouncements about human essence, he avoids the conundrum of that which is 'natural' to human beings. He, however, ventures into normative territory to the extent that he defines as immoral a political system that is unable to authoritatively allocate values, thus unable to control the expectations and by extension activities of its citizens.

Hobbes in the main deploys severely instrumental and prudential reasoning - that is, within the cognitive limits set by a deeply religious era of purportedly divine monarchy. Plamenatz avers that Hobbes speaks of religion much as Machiavelli did before him, viz, as a powerful influence on behaviour, and, since he recognises its power, he wants it controlled by the sovereign in the interests of peace.<sup>703</sup> Plamenatz describes Hobbes as "the heir of Ockam and the ancestor of Hume"<sup>704</sup> and goes on to contend that since God is useless to Hobbes' argument, indeed an "unnecessary hypothesis," his references to commands of God are puzzling. Since Plamenatz isn't sure how to understand Hobbes' apparent fidelity to that which is God-given, he concludes that "it is idle to speculate."<sup>705</sup>

Plamenatz' retreat in the face of the passage of centuries and concomitant obscuring of Hobbes' motives seems reasonable enough. However, to retreat before Huntington's curious combination of empirical and normative criteria is less reasonable, not least because firstly, bearing Ockham's razor in mind, his addition of normative criteria to a purportedly scientific analysis rates as superfluous, and secondly, his conflation of descriptive and prescriptive reasoning provides one party developmental systems in Third World countries with moral potential, hence normative justification. Yet if political authority and its behavioural signifier, social order, provide their own (developmental) justification, thus rendering ideology in its normative capacity irrelevant, why bother with value criteria? A partial answer to this question can be discerned in the answer to another question: 'why obey?' Since for both Hobbes and Huntington, achievement and maintenance of political authority and social order are the imperatives that drive their respective explanatory, evaluative and exhortatory exercises, the issue of political obligation accordingly is pivotal, and in turn is tied in with legitimacy.

Both theorists posit a social contract, Hobbes explicitly, Huntington implicitly since the independently authoritative nature and long term interests of political institutions in, or rather above society imputes a contract of some sort. However, Hobbes' theory of contractual legitimacy is not only far more overt, it also is a good deal simpler since there is no inbuilt modernisation clause, nor a teleological endpoint - both functional and normative - towards which to strive. There merely, at its most basic, is the sovereign's undertaking to preserve peace and order in return for loyal obedience from his subjects. Thus, the contract that produces a Leviathan state is grounded in solidly prudential imperatives of self-preservation.

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; which once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection.<sup>706</sup>

In sum: inasmuch as Hobbes' theory of political obligation contains a normative element, it is vested in a contract between society and the political institution it simultaneously creates and sets above itself. If the contractual bottom line is breached, the contract itself is rendered null and void since no normative claim to loyalty and obedience can outlast the termination of a sovereign's power to protect his subjects. By extension, sovereign might is right to the extent that it is directed towards the preservation of subjects' lives. No matter what one thinks of *Leviathan* qua ideal model, it has to be conceded that Hobbes demonstrates the courage of his instrumental convictions, and thus that his argument at least is logically coherent.

The same cannot really be said of Huntington. The lengthy paragraph with which he launches his thesis contains a welter of conflated categories and logically contradictory reasoning, thus setting a standard he successfully maintains throughout.

Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the community is based. All three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organised political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict. These governments command the loyalties of their citizens and thus have the capacity to tax resources, to conscript manpower, and to innovate and to execute policy. If the Politburo, the Cabinet, or the President makes a decision, the probability is high that it will be implemented through

the government machinery. In all these characteristics, the political systems of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union differ significantly from the governments which exist in many, if not most, of the modernising countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>707</sup>

In the quotation above is contained Huntington's meta-binary pair, viz, functional / dysfunctional states. In this respect, a point worth emphasising is that Huntington's mutually constitutive epistemological position and methodological approach between them construct an assumption that the universal grounds of knowledge are rooted in the state building history of the West. Yet, paradoxically, the Soviet Union is deemed to be the functional *and* normative ('legitimate', 'associative', 'participatory', 'based on an overwhelming consensus' and so forth) equivalent of Western political systems. In the final analysis, then, the function of the normative aspects of Huntington's thesis is to promote an ideology of common cause between global power blocs.<sup>708</sup> 'Might is right.'

I conclude that modernisation revisionism – at least, in its Huntingtonian incarnation – did not significantly retool in response to anomaly. Rather, by relating a given society's normative status to its degree of functional complexity and efficacy, Huntington took the modernisation paradigm one step further into a normless wilderness. (xx)

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(xx) See Chapter Two, pp 54-55

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### INTRA-MARXIST DISPUTES AND EUROCENTRIC ANTECEDENTS.

Chapters Eight and Nine explore issues of Marxist epistemology and its application in decolonising and postcolonial Africa. More specifically, Chapter Eight delineates the broad and disputed theoretical framework within which is set Chapter Nine's review and critique of selected scientific socialist, neo-Marxist or Marxist-oriented scholars, leaders and activists in decolonising and postcolonial Africa.

This chapter begins by sketching the contours of dependency theory which – in the Cold War era – posed a major challenge to modernisation theory. However, since Marxists by no means uniformly endorsed dependency theory's premises and conclusions, the chapter includes scientific Marxism's critique of dependency theory.

Whereas the rise of science-centred and human-centred interpretations of Marxian theory date back to the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, dependency theory is a relative newcomer which first emerged from Latin America in the 1960s – not least in reaction to the modernisation paradigm - as a theory of Third World underdevelopment. Before embarking on an outline of general tenets of dependency theory, it should be noted that not all *dependistas* subscribe to Marxist analysis of Third World conditions. For instance, of the two political economists primarily responsible for launching the theory, Paul Baran argues from a Marxist standpoint,<sup>709</sup> but Andre Gunder Frank has never claimed to be a Marxist.<sup>710</sup> While the focus

in this dissertation is on the neo-Marxist category of dependency theory, it nonetheless is not presented as an undifferentiated category of analysis.

**General tenets of dependency theory.**

- European mercantile expansion from the 15<sup>th</sup> century onwards in the long run is responsible for economic conditions in the Third World that are unpropitious for development.
- The development of the highly industrialised Northern hemisphere was and is made possible by corresponding underdevelopment in the South. Since they are two sides of the same coin, underdevelopment in the regions at the periphery is necessary for continuing economic progress in the regions at the highly developed centre. The dominant position of highly developed countries in the international capitalist arena ensures that economic surplus flows from periphery to centre, thus perpetuating the development of underdevelopment, and accordingly ...
- maintaining "a chain of dependence extending from the very centre of the world (capitalist) economic system down to its furthest periphery."<sup>711</sup>

More particularly, points of departure and lines of argument that distinguish neo-Marxist dependency theory from other Marxist configurations are located in dependency theory's recasting of premises about capitalism and class.

According to Marx and Engels, capitalism is a dynamic source of economic and industrial development, and thus is the *sine qua non* of socialism. Conversely, dependency theory defines capitalism in the case of regions at the periphery as a source of stagnation and, in the

context of a profoundly unequal distribution of global power, set to remain so - that is, unless anti-capitalist revolutions in the Third World succeed in altering the balance. Samir Amin, one of the best known *dependistas* domiciled and researching in Africa, outlines as follows the disjunctures between Marx and his dependency descendents.

Marx ... considered that no power would be able to hinder for long the local development of capitalism on the European model ... In fact, the monopolies, the rise of which Marx could not imagine, were to prevent any local capitalism that might arise from competing. The development of capitalism in the periphery was to remain extraverted, based on the external market, and could therefore not lead to a full flowering of the capitalist mode of production in the periphery.<sup>712</sup>

Marx, Amin implies, was unable to make forecasts that extended beyond the parameters of his own time, that is, a time before "capitalism developed and became monopolistic" and hence "the world conditions of the class struggle altered."<sup>713</sup>

*Dependistas* shifted the focus from national dispensations of class conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat centred in the contradictions of developed capitalism in the First World to the contradictions inherent in unequal exchange between the developed and underdeveloped regions of the world.<sup>714</sup>

Since underdevelopment - particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where the condition is at its most extreme<sup>715</sup> - predicates against the growth of a national bourgeoisie in its capacity as indigenous class of owners of the means of production, *dependistas* outlined the contours of an intermediary class, or *comprador* bourgeoisie, which is absent from Marx's class analysis. "Marx did not use the word 'imperialism', nor is there anything in his work that corresponds at all exactly to the concepts of imperialism advanced by later Marxist writers."<sup>716</sup>

Magubane explains the emergence and contours of a comprador class in the Third World by comparing it with a process of organic revolution in Britain that produced an indigenous capitalist class "securely rooted in the social structure and culture."<sup>717</sup> By contrast, exogenous dispensations in the colonised regions meant that the commanding heights of colonial economies were occupied by expatriate groups with privileged access to resources in their respective metropolises "which were far in excess of anything which indigenous groups could hope to acquire."<sup>718</sup> The privileged position and economic dominance of expatriate groups configured the emergence of indigenous social formations in ways that impeded their ability to establish "an autonomous base for the exercise of political and economic power."<sup>719</sup>

Magubane concludes that the net result for post-independence states in Africa ...

.. has been well described by Fanon, who distinguished between the dynamic entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe and the corrupt, enfeebled administrative bourgeoisie of postcolonial Africa ... As a group, these elites had no autonomy of their own; they had no being without metropolitan backing which dominated the colonial economies. That is, their class position did not stem from the classical ownership of the means of production; they were rather class agents or allies of the foreign bourgeoisie.<sup>720</sup>

Finally, Amin, for instance, grounds dependency theory in Lenin's theory of imperialism.

Referring to monopoly capitalism, a development beyond the reach of Marx's crystal ball,

Amin asserts that:

This was clearly expressed by Lenin ... namely that, 'in the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, China, India etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe.' This meant that the central nucleus of the proletariat henceforth lay at the periphery and not at the centre.<sup>721</sup>

However, Amin's invocation of Lenin begs two issues highlighted by Brewer. Firstly, while Lenin extended and adapted Marxian theory to include imperialism, he, like Marx, divined a worldwide acceleration of capitalist development,<sup>722</sup> modelled on capitalist development in

Europe. Secondly, or so Brewer argues, Lenin's theory of imperialism is "slight and derivative."<sup>723</sup>

According to Chazan, dependency theory has been almost uniformly pessimistic in its evaluation of the prospects for the continent. She adds that "barring revolution or total global structural transformation, dependency theory provided precious few indications of possible guidelines for action in local arenas."<sup>724</sup> Chazan's rather negative estimate is reflected in orthodox (or scientific) Marxism's reaction to dependency theory. On the other hand, Marxists commend *dependistas* for their definitive refutation of key premises of the modernisation paradigm. These mixed reviews are explored below.

#### **Dependency theory's critique of the modernisation paradigm.**

Dependency theory is considered to have exposed modernisation theory's major fault lines in the following areas. Firstly, modernisation theory's presentation of binary concepts as givens. For example, concepts of 'developed' and 'backward' were divorced, in the case of the latter, from historical and exogenous factors such as the slave trade and colonialism. 'Backward' societies were examined as isolated, almost pristine units and analysed solely in terms of their internal functioning. By tracing the underdevelopment of African societies by European mercantile capitalism back to the 15<sup>th</sup> century, and by outlining the long term effects of the slave trade on African demographics and economies, Rodney, for instance, comprehensively addresses the historical vacuum in which behaviouralists situated their analyses, thereby exposing the extent to which modernisation theory ignored or avoided the issue of Africa's historical role in the development and expansion of European capitalism.<sup>725</sup>

- Secondly, modernisation theory's absolute distinction between 'modern' and 'traditional'.

The concepts are linked only by the stages of growth which separate them. Again, this linear and crudely empiricist perspective seems to operate on the assumption of a more-or-less complete lack of historical contact between Africa and Europe, and hence of Africa's 'undeveloped' condition as entirely her own doing. Commending dependency theory's critique, Goulbourne points out that:

A crucial assumption in this type of analysis has been the view that the backward areas have remained in this condition because they have failed to move from this state of backwardness ... There is a tautology in the argument which of course explains nothing - these areas are backward because they are backward - and the tautology is avoided only by identifying tradition as the fount of backwardness.<sup>726</sup>

In similar vein, Angotti - while generally antagonistic to dependency theory – endorses its "critique of dualism."<sup>727</sup> He notes that prominent in bourgeois development theory is an assumption that 'traditional' and 'backward' are phenomena inherent in underdeveloped societies and cultures; this assumption is an inevitable corollary of the notion that 'modernity' and 'development' are inherently Western qualities. Dependency theory's critique of so ahistorical an approach is its most progressive feature, and "has helped direct attention to imperialism's role in national oppression and underdevelopment."<sup>728</sup>

Thirdly, in line with dependency theory's critique of the modernisation paradigm's teleological stages of development in which 'traditional' moves up to 'transitional' and then to 'modern', *dependistas* dispose of the idea of developmental stages. Instead, they reconfigure the pattern into two broad categories: developed (centre or core) and underdeveloped (periphery). In order for the former to maintain its primacy, the latter perforce must remain underdeveloped. *Dependistas* thus posit a mutually inter-locking pattern of continuous

reinforcement in which the condition of one category is contingent on the condition of the other. It is noteworthy, however, that it is this 'static' configuration for which dependency theory came under heavy fire from scientific Marxists who argued that it offered no viable alternative to an indefinite perpetuation of the development of underdevelopment and thus undermined faith in and progress towards world socialist revolution. (xxi)

Finally, modernisation theorists ignored class - or rather, they subsumed class under political culture, an extremely broad category that seems to incorporate a wealth of human collectivities from 'tribe' to 'status group'. As a result, "politics and the state appear to exist without a socio-economic base thus giving the false impression that the political is independent from these forces."<sup>729</sup> *Dependistas* address this lacuna by paying detailed attention to the economic base of intra and inter-state relations.

### **Scientific Marxism's critique of dependency theory.**

From the standpoint of scientific Marxists, perhaps the most controversial aspect of dependency theory is its reconfiguration of class and class struggle. *Dependistas* by no means neglect class struggle, but in the process they - logically contiguous though their reconfiguration is with the general tenor of their thesis - commit a form of heresy (that caused something of a schism in the Marxist church in Africa.<sup>730</sup>) Dependency theory removes class formation and struggle from their position as focal elements within national relations of production, and instead makes class formation and struggle contingent on modes of exchange, thereby shifting the geography of class from states to regions, and the demography of revolutionary forces to the regions at the periphery.

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(xxi) See next section of chapter

By way of critique, Edelstein contends that:

In its beginnings as a negation of bourgeois theories of development, radical dependency had strength in simplicity, but also a weakness ... It ignores the labour process and thus tends to understand history as a conflict among the owning classes. It fails as a guide to revolutionary action.<sup>731</sup>

He concludes that "an analysis can only be useful as a guide to revolutionary action if it includes an understanding of the labour process as the locus of social existence, shaping class consciousness and the forms of class struggle."<sup>732</sup> In similar vein, Weeks - who, for liturgical reasons, defines himself as a materialist<sup>733</sup> - finds dependency theory wanting in that "accumulation is not related to the social relations under which a surplus product is produced or appropriated..."<sup>734</sup>

Angotti asserts that "the most significant political impact of dependency theory has been to divert and dampen support for socialist revolution."<sup>735</sup> He locates this negative effect largely in dependency theory's treatment of class which ...

... tends to substitute a schematic stratification of society for an objective, particularised analysis of the class struggle. According to the ultra-`left' version, all classes in the `periphery' are somehow `dependent' and all classes in the `core' are `dominant'. This blurs the distinction between the working class and the peasantry, obviates the need for any vanguard society, and ... leads to pessimism. It removes any independent role for the national bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist front ... In effect, it abandons the class struggle ... It does not allow for a scientific understanding of the historical process of the transition from capitalism to socialism.<sup>736</sup>

Angotti then explains his emphasis on the scientific trajectory of historical materialism. "Our concern here is not in `preserving' a `pure' Marxism, but in demanding that dialectical and historical materialism, like every science has a certain integrity upon whose maintenance depends the future course of the revolutionary process."<sup>737</sup>

It is noteworthy that Angotti makes a causal link between 'scientific Marxism' and the 'revolutionary process.' It thus can be inferred that to abandon one's fidelity to the scientific integrity of historical materialism is to cast doubt on the socialist nature and by extension, on the *point* of revolution. Extrapolating from Angotti's denunciation of dependency theory, I surmise that the real heresy is to formulate premises and arrive at conclusions that are at odds with historical materialist epistemology and methodology, in the process raising doubts about the value of revolutions depicted as socialist. This close and mutually reinforcing relationship between science and normative belief arguably is somewhat characteristic of orthodox critiques of dependency theory. For instance, from the combined arguments of Edelstein, Weeks and Angotti can be deduced a sub-text that to lose sight of the immanently scientific nature of historical materialism is also to endanger normative conviction. This dual loss heralds the onset of pessimism. ('God is dead, Marx is dead and I'm not feeling too well myself.')

#### *Conflation of science and values*

According to Walicki, the conflation of a scientific understanding of history and normative belief can be traced back to Marx's invocation of the authority of science the better to underwrite the historical necessity of dialectical movement from capitalism to socialism, not least through the medium of class conflict. In 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe, the idea that history had immanent meaning was strong and influential, particularly for Marxists who "used the term *necessity* as a value-laden concept."<sup>738</sup> Walicki cites Merleau-Ponty's contention that "to remain a Marxist in the classical sense ... meant to believe in the rationality of history, and to uphold this intense belief even at the time of universal skepticism and despair"<sup>739</sup> and argues that Merleau-Ponty was right to perceive the Marxist philosophy of history as one of

boundless optimism predicated more on subjective faith in science than on science *per se*.

The origin of 'this intense belief' can be located in Marx's ontology in which socialism is equated with man's ultimate fulfilment, not as an individual, nor even as a proletarian, but as a species-being.

By 'true self' ... Marx meant nothing less - and nothing more - than man's species essence. He assumed, therefore, that all other more narrow and concrete areas of identification such as group consciousness, corporate ties, religious affiliation, historical tradition, nationality, and so forth - were ultimately different forms of alienation from man's essential nature.<sup>740</sup>

Since Marx's conception of freedom is tied in with his ontology, a consequence is that for Marx, "freedom was conceived of not as individual freedom here and now, but rather as a collective salvation in history."<sup>741</sup> Worth noting is Walicki's reminder that the long term perspective contains heavy but - in Marx's view - necessary human costs.

The habit of conceiving human liberation as a long, cruel historical process in which entire generations and classes have to be ruthlessly sacrificed for the sake of the unfettered development of human beings in the future is perhaps one of the most characteristic, although sometimes conveniently forgotten, features of Marx's thought.<sup>742</sup>

Walicki further points out that as a consequence of the long-term historical necessity of collective human suffering, "the liquidation of different forms of personal dependence, such as direct slavery or feudal bondage, should not be treated as the equivalent of achieving freedom" and "in many respects the rise of capitalism brought about a marked increase in unfreedom."<sup>743</sup>

Aspects of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* underwrite Walicki's analysis. Having lavishly praised the achievements of capitalism,<sup>744</sup> Marx and Engels take note of the

inevitable costs in the suffering of wage labourers. However, the upside is that capitalism forges its own destruction, not least by trading in the misery of workers.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies not in the immediate result but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles ... into one national struggle between classes.<sup>745</sup>

Since dependency theory presents firstly, capitalism in a thoroughly negative light and secondly, highly developed nations as uniformly advantaged, the nature of its heretical detour is demonstrable. For much the same reasons, Goulbourne contends that dependency theory is not really a theory at all.

The radical critique of development theory rests largely upon a moral injunction of capitalism, or, at any rate, the critique levelled at capitalism is a moral one. Consequently, underdevelopment theory in most cases where it addresses itself to the political does so from the perspective of capitalism's supposed failure to develop the backward areas and a humanistic political creed is juxtaposed with the apparently heartless development theory.<sup>746</sup>

Arguing along similar lines, Angotti characterises dependency theory as idealist. "The idealist world is made up of substances or things that are simply 'transformed' gradually in time but do not significantly alter their inner essence."<sup>747</sup> He contends that the consequence of idealism "is either reformist politics ... or pessimism."<sup>748</sup> In consequence, *dependistas* are unable to provide a correct strategy for changing the world.<sup>749</sup> In much the same vein, Goulbourne asserts that "a decade or more after the appearance of radical underdevelopment theory there is still no adequate theoretical structure in which analysis of the political in backward or underdeveloped formations may be carried out."<sup>750</sup>

In sum: scientific Marxists contend that dependency theory's scientific deficiencies result in lack of an adequate political theory thus defeating the cause of socialist revolution, since the scientifically delineated window of opportunity for total transformation also is absent.

Dependency theory is perceived as indulging in a kind of shallow humanism in the form of moral criticism of monopoly capitalism; furthermore, this short-term humanist impulse obscures the ontological imperative of substantive transformation in the long run, that is, the realisation of species-being. In other words, dependency theory is deemed to sacrifice science to spontaneity, thereby reducing the objectively – because scientific – normative ontology of Marxism to shallow humanist critique and subjectively normative criteria.

#### **Issues of Marxist identity in Cold War era Africa.**

Needless to say, Marxist discourse in decolonising and postcolonial Africa was not immune to wider disputes about Marxist identity. For instance, the purposive reflexivity of humanist Marxism is imputed by Waterman's definition of radical Africanists as having two distinct tendencies in common. Firstly, an overt moral or political commitment which manifests itself "as a declaration of personal values, as identification with national interests, or with the masses within the continent." Secondly, "opposition to imperialism (seen as a social system dominating Africa politically and exploiting it economically)"<sup>751</sup> Waterman distinguishes between this radical brand of engaged scholarship and the dogmatism and Eurocentrism of "official Marxism".<sup>752</sup>

Allen, when compiling a bibliographical guide to radical themes in African Social Studies, explains as follows a significant omission: "I have cited very little material from official communist publications. This is in part because much of it is strident, misinformed and

irrelevant.”<sup>753</sup> Benot attributes to Stalinism a definitive schism between Western-based Marxist scholars and their Soviet oriented counterparts. Further, as he dryly notes, “the Stalinist system itself, the control of a single party, of the news media, and of statistical information (to mention but three aspects which are found in independent African states) has not failed to impress and captivate African politicians.”<sup>754</sup>

However, while there is evidence of marked divergence between Western and Soviet oriented Marxists in Africa, this does not necessarily mean that Western Marxists escaped Cold War era polarities. Much radical literature, as Allen observes, is devoted to critiques of rival concepts,<sup>755</sup> in particular the concepts put forward by “American idealogues”<sup>756</sup> and other bourgeois theorists. According to Law, Marxists of all hues and persuasions are “agreed on the superiority of the Marxist method to ‘bourgeois’ thought.” This said, “there seems to be little agreement among them about the precise nature of this Marxist method.”<sup>757</sup> As Copans puts it, “the theoretical divergences between Marxists are as numerous as those between Marxists and non-Marxists.”<sup>758</sup>

In sum, during the Cold War era in Africa, otherwise conflicting Marxisms were united in – if nothing else – their rejection of bourgeois theory, notably the version propounded by American political scientists *qua* idealogues. Apart from this solitary confluence of various streams of Marxist theory, epistemological and methodological divergences are quite profound. Marxist humanism, for instance, is a more flexible and inclusive category than the scientific variant, and designates as “radical” – hence acceptable – the “implicit Marxism”<sup>759</sup> of Basil Davidson, as well as the non-Marxist dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank,<sup>760</sup> not least because radical theories – whether Marxist or not – are characterised by a normative

commitment to people, as distinct from their ruling elites. This identification with ‘ordinary’ people distinguishes radical humanism not only from the elite privileging thrust of modernisation theory, but also from Marxist-Leninist advocacy of a scientifically advantaged AvantGarde.

In the case of Marxism-Leninism, the reflexivity of theory is subsumed under the ‘natural necessity’ of socialist science, and social norms are defined according to their place – or lack of it – within the progressive trajectory of scientifically ordained global revolution.

Putatively, then, an outcome of Marxism-Leninism - informed as it is by the positivism of Engels - is the infliction of a normless wilderness on the lived worlds of Africans.

Bearing this potential outcome in mind, and given that epistemological disputes between Marxists in Africa originated in Europe, the next section of the chapter addresses lines of division in 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe.

### **Science-centred versions of Marxism in Europe.**

In the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, two influential streams of Marxist thought – Kautsky’s and Lenin’s – propounded the scientific status of Marxism. Both streams drew from Marx’s later work, since his early, more humanist than scientific work wasn’t published until the late 1920s.<sup>761</sup> Prior to the publication of Marx’s pre-1848 work, his most influential posthumous interpreter was Engels who – according to Lukacs – completely misunderstood the epistemological implications of Marx’s concept of praxis, instead replacing it with a positivist concept of scientific experiment.<sup>762</sup> Walicki, however, adds a caveat to Lukacs’ contention that Marxist positivism derives solely from Engels:

Lukacs obviously forgot that Marx himself, in his preface to the first German edition of *Capital*, chose to stress that his method was similar to that of the physicist who 'either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form and most free from disturbing influence, or, whenever possible, he makes experiments under conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its regularity.'<sup>763</sup>

Walicki's observation notwithstanding, it is arguable that the full range of Marxian ambiguity and nuance escaped Engels' attention, and thus that his retrospective interpretation was more positivist than was strictly justified. However, as clearly demonstrated by *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx and Engels mutually endorsed a proposition that expert knowledge is the possession of an intellectual elite, viz, "a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole."<sup>764</sup> As this chapter now illustrates, both Lenin and Kautsky followed Marx and Engels' lead by vesting in an intellectual elite the capacity to arrive at an objective overview of the historical process.

### *Iron cage knowledge*

A point at which the evolutionary science of Kautsky converges with the revolutionary science of Lenin – respectively derived from differing interpretations of the scientificity of Marxism – is their mutual perception of expert knowledge as by definition injected into the labouring masses 'from without'. Lenin makes derogatory reference to

... all those who talk about 'overrating the importance of ideology', about exaggerating the role of the conscious element, etc, imagine that the labour movement pure and simple can elaborate, and will elaborate, an independent ideology for itself, if only the workers 'wrest their fate from the hands of the leaders'. But this is a profound mistake. To supplement what has been said above, we shall quote the profoundly true and important words of Karl Kautsky ...<sup>765</sup>

The aspect of Kautsky's thesis of which Lenin approves, and quotes at length, runs (in part) as follows:

Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist production as, say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other ... The vehicle of science is not the proletariat but the *bourgeois intelligentsia* ... Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something that arose within it spontaneously.<sup>766</sup>

Lenin concludes that: "Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the *only* choice is - either bourgeois or socialist ideology."<sup>767</sup> (xxii) Furthermore, if the AvantGarde allow the working class movement to develop spontaneously, the inevitable result will be "its subordination to bourgeois ideology" in the form of trade-unionism, itself a symptom of "the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie."<sup>768</sup> It therefore can be surmised that for both Lenin and Kautsky, the lived world is the backdrop against which science realises itself. However, given Lenin's emphasis on revolution in contradistinction to Kautsky's evolutionary trend, they arrived at different conceptualisations of the structure and *modus operandi* of the party in its capacity as vehicle of iron cage knowledge.

While Kautsky did not abandon all commitment to revolution, he made a seminal distinction between a revolutionary party and a revolution-making party. The former he designated 'revolutionary' in the sense that: "We know that our goal can be attained only through revolution. We know that it is just as little in our power to create this revolution as it is in the power of our opponents to prevent it."<sup>769</sup> From Kautsky's argument can be deduced a notion

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(xxii) See Chapter Two, pp 53-54, for Lenin's conflation of science and the ideology of an ascendant class.

that a revolution-making party, such as Lenin's Bolshevik party, forces the pace of social and economic evolution, thus flouting iron laws of economic development. Hence, while Kautsky and Lenin agree that the party is a necessary vehicle of scientific progress, Kautsky favours a mass party - albeit led by an intellectual elite - operating openly and within legal limits.<sup>770</sup> According to McLellan, Kautsky believed that the inevitable evolutionary outcome would be the majority rule of the proletariat under fully democratic - and parliamentary - institutions.<sup>771</sup> Thus, given time, the proletariat indubitably will be in a position to radically, yet democratically, reconfigure the bourgeois state.

Conversely, Lenin, citing conditions in Tsarist Russia, asserts the necessity for a party of professional revolutionaries since "it is more difficult to unearth a dozen wise men than a hundred fools."<sup>772</sup> It is noteworthy that he makes a distinction between the 'organisation' - professionally trained in the art of combating the political police - and the 'movement'. The latter comprises the broad mass of working class Bolshevik supporters, whereas the former operates with "that degree of secrecy without which there can be no question of persistent and continuous struggle against the government."<sup>773</sup>

In line with their divergent perceptions of the operational code of the party, Kautsky and Lenin differed in their interpretations of Marx's notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whereas Kautsky, as noted above, interpreted the phrase as meaning 'the majority rule of the proletariat', Lenin's position was somewhat more ambiguous. According to McLellan, it is not clear whether he meant the dictatorship of the AvantGarde or of the proletariat *per se* - and, as things turned out in post 1917 Russia:

The gradual shift from dictatorship of the proletariat to dictatorship of the party and the equivalence of party and state was aided and abetted by three main factors: the fact that the Party found power thrust into its hands; the growth of bureaucracy; and the lack of an effective workers' voice.<sup>774</sup>

By 1921, an explicitly elitist party had emerged from Bolshevism. It declared itself to be the only organisation in Russia that "is capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations" of the working masses, as well as "the inevitable traditions and relapses of narrow craft unionism or craft prejudices of the proletariat."<sup>775</sup> Two years after Lenin and the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia, Kautsky accused them of throwing overboard all their democratic principles. "When democracy was being abandoned in the State they became fiery upholders of democracy within the proletariat, but they are repressing this democracy more and more by means of their personal dictatorship."<sup>776</sup>

#### *Comintern and the god of the excluded middle*

Lines of division between evolutionary and revolutionary variants of scientific Marxism were codified by Lenin's conditions for membership of Comintern. The creation of Comintern in 1919 was the product of a decisive break between Lenin and a majority of the Second International's socialist parties and movements, attendant on Lenin's definition of the 1914-18 war as imperialist, and his corresponding expectation that the war should be utilised to hasten the destruction of capitalism in Europe. Instead, most socialist parties came out as 'social patriots' – hence Lenin's decision to replace the Second International with "a genuinely revolutionary body ... with the result that the Third International (or Comintern) was founded in March 1919, and the world labour movement was sharply divided into Marxists and social-democrats."<sup>777</sup> As Lenin put it in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*: "Kautsky's followers all over the world have now united in practical politics with

the extreme opportunists (through the Second, or Yellow International) and with the bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which socialists take part.)”<sup>778</sup>

Comintern set strict conditions for membership, and drew an implacable distinction – for instance, in condition 17 – between social democrats and communists:

The Communist International has declared a decisive war against the entire bourgeois world, and all the yellow Social Democratic parties. It is indispensable that every rank-and-file worker should be able clearly to distinguish between the communist parties and the old official ‘Social Democratic’ or ‘Socialist’ parties which have betrayed the cause of the working class.<sup>779</sup>

Of twenty-one conditions, eight contain explicit reference to the mandatory exclusion of reformists / social patriots / yellow labour organisations / petty bourgeoisie from the ranks of *bona fide* communist parties. The only reality permitted by Comintern was that of Soviet designed and led communism – thus condition 14 asserted the dominant position of Russia in relation to Euro-communist parties: “Every party ... should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counter-revolutionary forces”.<sup>780</sup> Taken in conjunction with condition 3’s contention that “the class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering the phase of civil war”,<sup>781</sup> condition 12, which definitively asserts the right of the Soviet communist party to absolute power, comes as no surprise.

At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only be able fully to do its duty when it is organised in a sufficiently centralised manner, when it possesses an iron discipline and when the party centre enjoys the confidence of the party membership and is endowed with complete power, authority and ample rights.<sup>782</sup>

In sum, by 1919, Marxist intra-science disputes had mutated into lines of battle, and accordingly, Lenin's theory of the party had hardened into battle formation, as had his conception of morality. "We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat"<sup>783</sup> – a subordination attendant on his perception of "the *struggle of classes* as the basis and the driving force of all development."<sup>784</sup>

### **Extension to the Third World of Lenin's science of social reality.**

Condition 8 commits members of Comintern to anti-colonial struggles. "Every party desirous of belonging to the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of 'its own' imperialists in the colonies, supporting not in words only but practically a movement of liberation in the colonies."<sup>785</sup> From Lenin's perception of class struggle as the motor that powers economic and social development world-wide can be inferred his premise that a binary formula of irreconcilable, class-bound versions of reality in Europe also is applicable to the colonised regions of the world. This is a premise elaborated by his thesis that capitalism in the era of imperialism is "*based* on the economic division of the world; while parallel to it and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the 'struggle for spheres of influence.'"<sup>786</sup> Lenin described imperialism's drive for domination as leading to "annexation, to increased national oppression",<sup>787</sup> and predicted that imperialism would generate its eventual destruction in the increasing resistance of the oppressed classes, as well as in the internal tendencies of finance capital.<sup>788</sup>

Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination and not for freedom, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the

richest or most powerful nations – all these have given birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism.<sup>789</sup>

He concluded his theory of capitalism in the era of imperialism by paying homage to the enduring veracity of “Marx’s precise, scientific analysis”<sup>790</sup> in contradistinction to bourgeois science which “strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to hide the forest behind the trees.”<sup>791</sup>

While declaring his fidelity to the precision of Marx’s scientific analysis, Lenin, via his theory of imperialism, extended Marx’s thesis of class struggle to incorporate a common front of the peoples of the oppressor countries and those of the oppressed. This extension meant that every country at the sharp end of imperialist exploitation “became *ipso facto* a suitable target for revolution irrespective of its stage of economic development.”<sup>792</sup> However, Lenin did not necessarily believe that ‘backward countries’ were ready for immediate proletarian revolution.<sup>793</sup> This caveat leaves open to question the applicability to the Third World of Lenin’s assertion that class struggle is the engine of social and economic development.

Alavi unravels as follows the conundrum of Marxism-Leninism’s application to Third World conditions. Lenin projected on to the colonised world a Russian model in which the concurrent existence of two modes of production, capitalist and feudal, produced social and economic contradictions. However, in terms of class-based revolutionary leadership, Lenin distinguished between a strong proletarian vanguard in Russia and a weak indigenous bourgeoisie in the colonies. In an attempt to reconcile these incompatible leadership modes, he deployed two assumptions. Firstly, an assumption that bourgeois democratic revolution in

the colonies in time would do away with pre-capitalist formations, thus enabling the rapid development of a proletarian class. Secondly, an assumption about the uniformity, hence predictability, of capitalist development.<sup>794</sup>

Given Lenin's estimate that the bourgeois fraction of colonised peoples constituted the vanguard of the liberation struggle, he insisted on an alliance between the communist movement in Europe and the national bourgeoisie in the colonised territories. However, according to Alavi, Lenin conceded that the indigenous bourgeoisie in the colonies were "as capable of compromise with imperialism as of opposition to it."<sup>795</sup> This concession was accompanied by a differentiation between 'bourgeois democratic movements' and 'revolutionary liberation movements'. The latter were deemed to represent the progressive national bourgeoisie in the colonies, as distinct from their less progressive counterparts. An outcome of Lenin's conceptual juggling and problematic assumptions was that "the distinction between the 'progressive national bourgeoisie' and the reformist bourgeoisie in later years became convenient designations used by the Soviet state to legitimate its dealings with postcolonial states in accordance with the exigencies of Soviet interests."<sup>796</sup>

In sum: Lenin's Eurocentricity is imputed by his bourgeois versus proletariat dichotomy, and his corresponding inability convincingly to transfer a binary formula of class struggle to pre-capitalist and / or peripheral capitalist formations in the Third World. This intimation of Eurocentricity further is highlighted by Lenin's belief that proletarian revolution in Western Europe was imminent,<sup>797</sup> and thus – in its capacity as teleological end-point – would operate as a globally applicable role model.

### **Stalinist and post-Stalinist mutations.**

Löwy makes an instructive comparison between on the one hand, the positivism of Engels and Lenin, and on the other, Stalin's dialectical materialism, or 'diamat'.

With Stalinism, a new and unprecedented phenomenon appears in Marxism: an attempt to 'ideologize' the natural sciences themselves. It is true that Engels and Lenin ventured into the field of the natural sciences, but (rightly or wrongly... ) they did so in order to develop philosophical considerations relating to natural facts (their dialectical or materialist character) and not in order to impose ideological norms on research in the natural sciences as such. The idea that the existing natural sciences are 'bourgeois' is quite alien to classic Marxist thought: it is a Stalinist theoretical innovation that might be described as an inverted positivism. Whereas positivism wanted to 'naturalise' the political and social sciences, Stalinism attempts to 'politicise' the natural sciences. Both fail to recognise the specificity of the human sciences and the methodological differences between them and the natural sciences.<sup>798</sup>

Löwy cites Lysenkoism as emblematic of the pitfalls firstly, of diamat, and secondly, of "a political ideology (the Cold War ideology of the two worlds)."<sup>799</sup> Lysenko was a Soviet biologist of humble origins who, like many other members of Russia's proletarian and peasant classes, benefited from the termination of Lenin's rapprochement with bourgeois experts and rose rapidly to not altogether deserved prominence. In 1927, Lysenko made known his opposition to a science of plant genetics, developed in the West but with adherents in the Soviet bloc, which contradicted his own theories and findings. It wasn't until 1948, however, that his theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics received Stalin's full backing and became Soviet orthodoxy, whereupon "western genetics was denounced, and its Soviet practitioners persecuted, imprisoned and in some cases killed."<sup>800</sup> Löwy notes that the year which triggered Lysenko's rise to power coincided with a "Cold War conjuncture of confrontation between the two blocs" that on both sides led to clampdowns, ideological monolithism and witch-hunts.<sup>801</sup>

Marxism's status as a scientific worldview thus was taken to extremes by Stalin. Stalinist orthodoxy was extended into all spheres of science and culture. In the process, the natural sciences lost the relative autonomy accorded to them by Lenin and were subsumed - along with the social sciences, since to distinguish between them counted as bourgeois fakery - under the tutelage and ideological rubric of party and state.<sup>802</sup>

Another distinctive feature of Stalinism as scientific Marxist mutation is 'socialism in one country.' Here, Stalin departs markedly from Lenin's notion that socialism in Russia is endangered by the absence of proletarian revolutions in highly industrialised countries, and that the latter are prerequisites for world revolution. Stalin's assertion that the success of socialism in Russia no longer depended on its ability to trigger revolutions elsewhere can be interpreted as follows. Firstly, as a pragmatic adjustment to Leninism given that the anticipated revolutions in the West still had not occurred. In this respect, Stalinism was a product of the defeat and isolation of the world revolution.<sup>803</sup> Secondly, the confrontational climate of the Cold War facilitated a scenario in which revolution in the West was not possible until and unless the Soviet bloc liberated itself from 'capitalist encirclement'. America's Marshall plan (designed to revive faltering post-war economies in Western Europe) indicated that "the existence of the USSR propelled capital to act against its own competitive instincts", and duly was countered by Soviet-backed consolidation of 'revolutions from above' in East-Central Europe in which "capitalism was destroyed overnight, but so was any hope of socialist democracy."<sup>804</sup>

Deutscher summarises as follows Stalin's effect: "Having risen to power, he carried the habits of clandestine Bolshevism to a grotesque extreme, and transplanted them into the Soviet state and into the life of a whole nation, in which, anyhow, all democratic impulses had become atrophied."<sup>805</sup> Deutscher further contends that "under Stalin the story of Bolshevism came to be rewritten in terms of sorcery and magic, with Lenin and then Stalin as the chief totems" the better to secure Stalin's immunity from criticism and attack.<sup>806</sup> Deutscher's argument is reinforced by Walicki's assertion that Stalin's "unshakeable belief in the magic power of Marxist 'science' justified all sorts of voluntarist experiments with human beings, if backed by the authority of the 'most advanced scientific theory'."<sup>807</sup>

In 1956, Khrushchev's secret report heralded an official break between Stalinist and post-Stalinist versions of scientific socialism. Khrushchev condemned not only Stalin's cult of personality but also his use of terror, in particular his persecution of high ranking members of the Soviet Communist party.<sup>808</sup> The principle of the collective leadership of the Central Committee thus was restored post-Stalin, and the party abandoned the purges which had been so marked a feature of the Stalinist era. Further, the Soviet Union declared its commitment to peaceful co-existence with the West while at the same time retaining its right to leadership of progressive forces worldwide. This somewhat contradictory foreign policy was initiated by Khrushchev and subsequently formalised by the Brezhnev constitution of 1977 "which bound the Soviet state consistently to follow 'the Leninist policy of peace' while simultaneously declaring the Soviet commitment to reinforcing the position of world socialism and to supporting national liberation (ie anti-imperialist) struggles."<sup>809</sup>

In sum, notwithstanding Stalinist and post-Stalinist declarations to the effect that Marxism-Leninism constituted the ideology of the Soviet state, Lenin's revolutionary emphasis was abandoned by Stalin for 'socialism in one country'. Thereafter, Marxism-Leninism ossified into 'actually existing socialism'; this was particularly the case during Brezhnev's lengthy period in power (1964-1982) when entrenchment of the *nomenklatura* as a distinct and privileged group – a process which began, albeit insecurely, under Stalin – was consolidated. Furthermore, it was a process replicated throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Since evidence exists of collaboration between national *nomenklatura* in East-Central Europe and the Soviet prototype,<sup>810</sup> Soviet and satellite state *nomenklatura* can be conceptualised as an elite alliance with a joint investment in the survival of the Soviet state and thus of its buffer states. In general, 'actually existing socialism' reasonably can be regarded as ideological in the sense of obscuring the real condition of society the better to secure the interests of ruling groups – hence “the thesis of Brezhnev's regime that maintenance of the existing order is the highest state wisdom.”<sup>811</sup>

Walicki highlights the extent to which both Soviet and American ideological legitimation depended on the perceived existence of a powerful and fanatical 'other'. Given their mutually reinforcing mythologies of struggle for or against communism, it suited both sides to disguise the Soviet bloc's *de facto* retreat from Lenin's objective of global socialist revolution. The Soviet Union feared the loss of its claim to the leadership of anti-imperialist forces in the Third World; concomitantly, militant anti-communists in the West exaggerated the global reach and strength of Soviet ideology in order to shore up the legitimacy of their anti-communist crusade.<sup>812</sup> Ruling elites on both sides of a Cold War divide were trapped inside

their respective ideological laagers – a claustrophobic scenario they endeavoured to reproduce in the Third World.<sup>813</sup>

### **Humanist Marxism.**

Given that the ideological phenomena of Stalinism, followed by post-Stalinism in the Soviet bloc occurred in tandem with the non-fulfilment of Lenin's prediction of proletarian revolution in the West, humanist Marxism became the last – and somewhat beleaguered – bastion of situationally transcendent Marxist discourse in highly industrialised countries. Following in the footsteps of Lukacs, humanist Marxists privilege aspects of 'early' Marx that are not amenable to positivist interpretation. Thus, a primary divergence between humanist and scientific Marxists hinges on the question of whether Marxism is a science or a philosophy.<sup>814</sup> Whereas, in its capacity as a science of social reality, Marxism enables prediction imbued with certainty, as a philosophy, Marxism enables emancipation via critique. As Benton puts it, "a genuinely emancipatory social theory will be reflexive and interpretive, alive to the potentialities which lie beyond the current situation, rather than tied obediently to the depiction of its empirical reality."<sup>815</sup>

Humanist Marxists share a notion of critique as a tool of emancipation, along with a notion of praxis which emphasises the transformative capacity of human agency as distinct, for instance, from Engels' and Lenin's reflection theory of knowledge. It is noteworthy, however, that the texture of humanist Marxist discourse contains differentiated strands. As Anderson put it when conducting a retrospective assessment of forty years of *New Left Review* (NLR): "Intellectually, the journal devoted much of its energies to the introduction

and critical reception of the different schools of Western Marxist thought, a sufficiently large enterprise to occupy it for over a decade.”<sup>816</sup> Having defined the journal’s intellectual bent, Anderson outlines its political trajectory: “Politically, the review set its compass towards anti-imperialist movements in the Third World.”<sup>817</sup>

As indicated by a 1974 editorial, the *Review of African Political Economy* (ROAPE) shared NLR’s Cold War era preoccupations and trends. The editorial asserts ROAPE’s rejection of “the orthodoxy of bourgeois social science”, while also describing the journal as “at odds with a position claiming the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy.”<sup>818</sup> Yet the editorial concedes that “it cannot be said that even among radical students of Africa there is consensus about the diagnosis of the ills, much less about the appropriate cure.”<sup>819</sup>

Academic journals such as NLR and ROAPE to some extent lend themselves to a supposition that during the Cold War era, at least one strand of humanist Marxism sought consolation for the defeat of mass politics in the West (xxiii) by shifting its analytical and normative focus to Third World anti-imperialist struggles. In the process, this purposively reflexive strand of Marxism assisted in the construction of “the legend of the people’s war against imperialism ... with many in the West acting as cheerleaders.”<sup>820</sup> Arguably, this legend fits the contours of Mannheim’s delineation of a conjuncture between otherwise disparate utopian and ideological modes, viz, wish projection. (xxiv) While this dissertation does not intend to underestimate the value of radical critiques of capitalism and (neo) imperialism, it nonetheless is surmised that radical humanist analysis, once transported from home base in

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(xxiii) See Chapter One, p 20

(xxiv) See Chapter Three, pp 74-75

Europe to Third World contexts, tended to assume that the transition to socialism would be “the natural outcome of a nationalist war based on the mobilisation of the rural areas.”<sup>821</sup> In this respect and to this extent, it is arguable that humanist and scientific Marxists arrived at a not dissimilar destination, albeit via different routes.

### *Critical theory*

A less wishful strand of humanist Marxism can be found in the ‘critical theory’ of adherents and descendents of the Frankfurt School which originated in Germany but relocated to the United States in 1933. Central to the discourse of the School were the theses of Horkheimer and Adorno. The former outlined the basis of critical theory as a critique of positivism.<sup>822</sup> The latter contended that contradictions are inherent in reality and hence cannot be eliminated by advances in scientific theory. In consequence, “the essence of critical theory is the dialectical method which aims to grasp the contradictory nature of society.”<sup>823</sup>

According to Delanty, the critical theory that emerged from the ranks of the Frankfurt School is renowned for its pessimism<sup>824</sup> given a preoccupation with “the fate of critical thought in a century dominated by the three great repressive and integrating forces of fascism, Stalinism and the culture industry of advanced capitalism.”<sup>825</sup> Delanty’s assessment of critical theory is underwritten by Marcuse’s<sup>826</sup> contention that “at the advanced stage of industrial civilisation, scientific rationality translated into political power, appears to be the decisive factor in the development of historical alternatives.”<sup>827</sup>

In Marcuse’s *One Dimensional Man*, the various strands of his hypotheses and argumentation are threaded through the framework of a bifurcated world order, defined by Marcuse as

hostile coexistence that closes the universe of discourse. "In the contemporary period, all historical projects tend to be polarised on the two conflicting totalities - capitalism and communism".<sup>828</sup> Within each monolithic ideological bloc, choices between alternatives primarily are "the privilege of those groups which have attained control over the productive process."<sup>829</sup> It is worth noting that in making a close comparison between Western and Eastern blocs, Marcuse expands the term 'totalitarian' beyond its conventional usage:

For 'totalitarian' is not only a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic, economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests. It thus precludes the emergence of an effective opposition against the whole. Not only a specific form of government or party rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production and distribution which may well be compatible with a 'pluralism' of parties, newspapers, 'countervailing powers,' etc.<sup>830</sup>

Marcuse perceives positivist social science as the harbinger of one dimensional thought, a cognitive mode as ubiquitous in the Soviet Union as in the West, not least given a mutual dependence on the construction of normal 'self' and deviant 'other' via an assortment of "self-validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions or dictations."<sup>831</sup>

On both sides of a Cold War divide, the potential for a revolutionary alternative seems remote. In this respect, Marcuse describes his overall argument as vacillating between two contradictory hypotheses. "(1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (2) that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society."<sup>832</sup> Marcuse believes that the first tendency is dominant. Nonetheless, he outlines two putative sites of revolutionary transformation. One is located in the possibility that organised labour's resistance to increasing automation of

the mode of production without compensating employment - "it insists on the extensive utilisation of human labour power in material production, and thus opposes technical progress" - will "weaken the competitive national and international position of capital, cause a long range depression, and consequently reactivate the conflict of class interests."<sup>833</sup> The other is located in "the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable"<sup>834</sup> that lies beneath the conservative popular base of parliamentary democracy. This substratum comprises people who exist outside the democratic process and thus "their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not."<sup>835</sup> Their forceful resistance, suggests Marcuse, might signify "the beginning of the end of a period." However, he appends a caveat: "Nothing indicates that it will be a good end."<sup>836</sup>

Marcuse does not subscribe to "the often-heard opinion" that the Third World constitutes a "'third force' that may grow into a relatively independent power."<sup>837</sup> On the contrary, he argues that - to the best of his knowledge - there is no evidence that the former colonial areas "might adopt a way of industrialisation essentially different from capitalism and present-day communism." Moreover, even if such evidence does exist, "the brute limits of self-determination must be acknowledged"<sup>838</sup> given that "indigenous progress would presuppose a change in the policy of the two great industrial power blocs which today shape the world - abandonment of neo-colonialism in all its forms. At present, there is no indication of such a change."<sup>839</sup>

Extrapolating from Marcuse's outline of the situation in the Third World, it stands to reason that elite configurations in postcolonial countries also will take either of two routes to an incipiently totalitarian destination, albeit within the limitations and distortions attendant on the twin conditions of underdevelopment and dependency. Despite his depiction of a 'wretched of the earth' substratum in highly industrialised countries as a potentially - although not consciously since they largely are outside the productive process - revolutionary group, Marcuse does not suggest that there is similar revolutionary potential in the deprived masses of the Third World. Rather, he sketches a possible alternative, namely that in circumstances of strong resistance to modernising policies "from the indigenous and traditional modes of life and labour", <sup>840</sup> a planned policy of extending and improving these modes on their own grounds might be sufficient if supplemented by "the gradual and piecemeal aid of technology"<sup>841</sup> to develop natural resources – enough so, at any rate, to improve the lives of the rural majority. Even so, indigenous progress *ipso facto* is constrained by the neo-imperialism of global power blocs.

In short, there is no space in Marcuse's thesis for the legend of the people's war against imperialism. On the contrary, he cites the example provided by the Soviet Union of "the argument from historical backwardness - according to which liberation must, under the prevailing conditions of material and intellectual immaturity, necessarily be the work of force and administration". <sup>842</sup>

To sum up: discrete trends in Cold War era Marxist humanism emerged not least from the defeat of the emancipatory capability of the proletariat in highly industrialised countries.

Since - in the absence of a collective revolutionary agent - the issue of purposive reflexivity seems somewhat abstract,<sup>843</sup> one strand of Marxist humanism transferred its quest for transformative human agency to the Third World. In the process, this utopian strand overlapped with scientific Marxism in the grey area between a utopian and an ideological idea. Critical theory, however, given its assessment of the ideological stranglehold achieved by contending Cold War power blocs, reposed no great faith in the prospect of revolutionary transformation, whether in highly developed countries or in the Third World.

In the light of scientific Marxism's critique of dependency theory, as outlined in a previous section of this chapter, it seems that *dependistas* share critical theory's doubts regarding the prospect of world socialist revolution beginning in the regions at the periphery. This is variably the case, however, as demonstrated by the next chapter's comparison between the theses of Amin and Wallerstein.

## CHAPTER NINE

### VARIETIES AND VICISSITUDES OF MARXISM IN AFRICA

Marxism gained currency in Africa in several capacities. It was utilised as a revolutionary ideology deployed in resistance to colonial, neo-colonial, and white minority regimes. It also served as a would-be legitimating ideology and developmental paradigm for postcolonial states, identified by Turok as states “whose ruling parties espouse Marxism or some related form of scientific socialism as the official ideology”, viz, Ethiopia, Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Burundi, Malagasy, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe.<sup>844</sup> Further, Marxist analysis was deployed by an assortment of scholars and activists either domiciled or temporarily operating in African countries. Additionally, Marxist analysis in Africa not infrequently was informed by aspects of dependency theory, as illustrated, for instance, in the theses of Fanon, Cabral and Nkrumah.

In the light of the previous chapter’s exploration of Marxism’s fractured trajectory in Europe, it is worth (re-) emphasising that – while post World War Two social democracy in Western Europe introduced the welfare state, thus modifying the impoverishing effects of capitalism on the working class – Marxism as a theory of socialist transformation failed to acquire a proletarian mass base during the Cold War era. Moreover, in the East, Lenin’s revolutionary trajectory *de facto* was replaced by ‘actually existing socialism’, the function of which was to reinforce the status quo.

Outcomes in Europe duly impacted on the underdeveloped regions in at least two respects. In one respect, Marxism in its revolutionary capacity attempted to find an outlet in the Third World. In so doing, Marxism – whether science or human centred – in effect projected on to the underdeveloped regions a utopian hope, or alternatively a scientific expectation, of socialist revolution. In another respect, Marxism in its Soviet or Soviet-oriented capacity exported to Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, a developmental paradigm designed to install and maintain a purportedly ‘vanguard’ elite while simultaneously serving the interests of the Soviet state and its Cold War allies.

Via a survey of relevant literature, this chapter investigates varieties of Marxism in Africa. The chapter begins by detailing and comparing Fanon’s and Cabral’s respective and innovative efforts to combine Marxist tenets with armed struggle against colonial regimes. More conformist African perspectives on the presumed scientificity of Marxism then are sketched. Finally, the chapter shifts its focus to the neo-Marxist theses of Amin and Wallerstein.

Prior to embarking on an investigation and comparison of the revolutionary theories of Fanon and Cabral, it is worth noting that while the theories are comparable in that both are strongly influenced by Marxism as well as contextually innovative, there also is a seminal difference. Fanon contends that application of Marxism to African contexts requires merely that Marxist analysis be “slightly stretched”.<sup>845</sup> By contrast, not only did Cabral decline to label himself as a Marxist, he did not regard decolonising Guinea-Bissau’s brand of revolutionary ideology as necessarily or inevitably ‘socialist’.<sup>846</sup>

## **Fanon: 'the wretched of the earth'.**

### *Context-specific departures from Marxism*

In his preface to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, Sartre distinguishes between workers in Europe who are free to sell their labour, on the one hand, and on the other, forced labour in the colonies. "You said they understand nothing but violence? Of course; first the only violence is the settlers; but soon they will make it their own; that is to say, the same violence thrown back upon us as when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go towards a mirror."<sup>847</sup> Fanon himself, when referring to colonialism, cites - not different classes - but different species. "This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species" - and asserts "the originality of the colonial context", namely that ...

... economic reality, inequality and the immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. That is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem. Everything up to and including the very nature of pre-capitalist society, so well explained by Marx, must here be thought out again. The serf is in essence different from the knight, but a reference to divine right is necessary to legitimise this statutory difference. In the colonies, the foreigner coming from another country imposed his rule by means of guns and machines. In defiance of his successful transplantation, in spite of his appropriation, the settler still remains a foreigner. It is neither the act of owning factories, nor estates, nor a bank balance which distinguishes the governing classes. The governing race is first and foremost those who come from elsewhere, those who are unlike the original inhabitants, 'the others'.<sup>848</sup>

From the passage quoted above can be distilled a number of suppositions, each flagging a context-specific departure from Marxism. These suppositions are explored below.

Given the near complete reliance of the colonial regime on the threat or use of force, Fanon's first supposition is that colonial ideology largely is unable to mask the reality of exploitative

economic relations. By extension, a society of the colonised is significantly less infiltrated by false consciousness than are workers operating in Western (bourgeois capitalist) states. Correspondingly, it is comparatively easy for an African AvantGarde to inject the spontaneous violence of the masses with revolutionary consciousness.

Secondly, Fanon presupposes the conflation of class and race in the colonial context. *Prima facie*, this mirrors the material realities of colonial capitalism, but Fanon takes the notion further, extending it into the absolute otherness of the coloniser. Thirdly, and *ex hypothesi*, Fanon presupposes the primacy of race as ontological category. Not only is the accumulation of wealth and property in the objective sense exclusively reserved for whites but also, in the ontological sense, Fanon adopts from the colonisers a notion of racial essentialism.

Extrapolating from this, there can be no question of assimilating a colonial 'other' into the mass of the colonised. Whereas Marxism posits the expansion of the proletariat via a process of incorporating bourgeois elements ejected from their own class by the increasingly zero-sum nature of capitalism, in Fanon's thesis, a settler is forever alien, irrespective of his or her objective position vis-a-vis the means of production.

Finally, a definitive supposition can be distilled from Fanon's contention that:

Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there's nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving; and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly marking time.<sup>849</sup>

Violence, both as cognitive and affective property, and as *sine qua non* of revolution forms the connective tissue between the elements that comprise Fanon's decolonisation thesis.

Given the 'originality of the colonial context', violence both creates and in itself is a window of opportunity; in short, it is a fully accessible route to the sure and certain destruction of colonialism. Further, once that condition has been reached, the advantage of violence as a means of transporting expert knowledge to the lived world pithily is summed up by Fanon: "To wreck the colonial world is henceforward a mental picture of action which is very clear, very easy to understand and which may be assumed by each one of the individuals which constitute the colonised people."<sup>850</sup> Since the extensive use of violence in its capacity as revolutionary praxis requires that settlers either are expelled or extirpated, there is no possibility, for instance, of following Lenin's example and retaining the services, *pro tem*, of 'bourgeois experts'.

To break up the colonial world does not mean that after the frontiers have been abolished lines of communication will be set up between the two zones. The destruction of the colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country.<sup>851</sup>

### *Multi-purpose violence*

For Fanon, the violence of the colonised against the coloniser demonstrably has multiple significance. For instance, it is the primary ingredient in an alienation-banishing formula, and also the catalyst that sets the formula in motion. "At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."<sup>852</sup>

A psychiatrist by profession, Fanon believed that alienation is inherent in the lived experience of the colonised since systemic racism induces acute identity crises in its victims. "Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other

person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly: 'In reality, who am I?'"<sup>853</sup> Such a question, if contemplated solely on an abstract plane, leads to unreality, that is, the recreation of an imagined past, of wallowing in "the most outlandish phantoms", including "the phenomena of the dance and of possession."<sup>854</sup> By contrast, when "the native, gun in hand, stands face to face with the only forces which contend for his life - the forces of colonialism", he "discovers reality and transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom."<sup>855</sup> Thus for Fanon, it seems, the ontological significance of violence is that it configures the path from non-being to being.

However, the significance of violence is not restricted to an ontological dimension given copious instances of the brutal alienation of the colonised from their material base of existence: land. "For a colonised people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost their land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity."<sup>856</sup> Violence inflicted on the coloniser thus serves a dual function firstly, by restoring identity to the native *qua* self-affirming subject, and secondly, by reinstating land as the property of the colonised, hence restoring the dialectical relationship between land and labour on which their sense of self ultimately depends. It follows, then, that violence is emancipatory praxis, and as such, opens the path not only to substantive decolonisation but also to the creative and vigorous construction of national culture. Fanon's dialectical method thus invokes a seeming paradox, viz, out of death (of the other) comes life (of the self). "For the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler."<sup>857</sup>

According to Bulhan's reading of Fanon's binary conundrum, revolutionary violence demystifies the power of the oppressor, detoxifies all negative accumulations of oppression, restores self and group-confidence, and promotes strong social cohesion among the oppressed.<sup>858</sup> In short, the coloniser dies as a means of ensuring that the formerly colonised fully are able to experience life.

Finally, violence is of instrumental significance inasmuch as it provides both a cognitive and corporeal link between intellectuals and masses. In other words, shared belief in the revolutionary necessity of violence, as well as collectively violent activity binds the leaders to the mass of workers and peasants. Concomitantly, violence generates unity and loyalty among its practitioners since both intellectuals and masses have burnt their boats. It closes the space for non-violent negotiation and ensures that "know-all, smart, wily intellectuals", those "spoilt children of yesterday's colonialism"<sup>859</sup> are unable to emerge from the ranks of the AvantGarde, since in the eyes of the colonisers they have committed unforgivable crimes. "In Algeria, for example ... you could be sure of a new recruit when he could no longer go back into the colonial system."<sup>860</sup>

Given the above cited, less than comprehensive instances of the ubiquity of violence in Fanon's theory of decolonisation, it is arguable that Gibson's observation that "with Fanon, violence is a problematic, which conceptually has to do too much"<sup>861</sup> understates the case. It also is arguable that during a process in which Marxist analysis is 'slightly stretched', Fanon substitutes violence for science or - put differently - that for Fanon, violence is the alchemistic property that transforms an objectively unpropitious set of socio-economic conditions into a window of revolutionary opportunity. Certainly, Fanon commits himself to an explicit

declaration of specificity attendant on colonialism with his assertion that "it is clear that in the colonial countries peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays."<sup>862</sup> However, as Gibson remarks, "though Fanon construes decolonisation as a violent process, violence, whether symbolic or actual, is not sufficient for the development of a national consciousness: Fanon insists on a concomitant 'enlightening of consciousness.'"<sup>863</sup>

While Gibson's observation flags a marked change in emphasis attendant on Fanon's movement from narrative of violent decolonisation to postcolonial critique, and thus to considerations of "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness", my reading of the change in emphasis is that in the latter section of Fanon's text, class, not race, is the primary signifier. In short, having posited and passionately argued an immediate and readily accessible solution to the problematic of decolonisation he, as it were, then returns to the Marxist fold. It further is noteworthy that in so doing, he abandons essentialist intimations of race and 'otherness'.

#### *Revolutionary agency and leadership*

Before turning to Fanon's attack on the counter-revolutionary outcome of non-violent negotiation with the colonial oppressor, his appraisal of 'the wretched of the earth' as revolutionary agent *because* of their position 'outside the class system' is worth revisiting since it overturns a foundational premise of Marxism-Leninism, namely the primacy of class agency and class struggle both during the revolution and in the construction of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is here that one finds a seminal methodological weakness in Fanon's thesis - not only because he effectively restricts his explanation for so unscientific a

detour to one short phrase: 'they have nothing to lose' - but also because unlike Cabral, who makes a detailed itemisation of discrete groups of peasantry in Guinea-Bissau, Fanon – in the text under consideration - tends to treat the Algerian peasantry as an undifferentiated whole. The only clear distinction he makes is between peasants in the countryside and "that fraction of the peasant population which is blocked on the outer fringe of the urban areas, that fraction which has not yet succeeded in finding a bone to gnaw in the colonial system."<sup>864</sup> Even then, the distinction largely is one of locale since both sets of peasantry, urban and rural, are equally marginalised by the system.

It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shanty towns, at the core of the *lumpen-proletariat* that the rebellion will find its urban spear-head. For the *lumpen-proletariat*, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionised forces of the colonised people.<sup>865</sup>

Moreover, whatever difference exists between "even tribes whose stubborn rivalry is well-known" is completely overcome by the sheer momentum of armed struggle. "Each village finds that it is itself both an absolute agent of revolution and also a link in the chain of action."<sup>866</sup>

If revolution occurs and acquires momentum spontaneously, what role do leaders play?

Fanon's answer is that leadership provides organisation and staying power. He approvingly cites Holden Roberto, leader of Angola's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), who reacted to the mass casualties inflicted by colonial troops on a spontaneous uprising by reorganising the liberation army, using experience gained in other wars of liberation, and employing guerrilla techniques.<sup>867</sup> In short, the task of a revolutionary leader is rapidly to transform sporadic peasant revolts into revolutionary war. At this juncture in his

thesis, Fanon explicates the limitations of spontaneous "hatred and resentment." Such emotions, while legitimate, "cannot sustain a war of liberation."<sup>868</sup> Nor are they sufficient defence against the enemy's strategic retreat into acts of conciliation and courtesy. "Hatred is disarmed by these psychological windfalls."<sup>869</sup> In order, therefore, to keep the fires of revolutionary violence burning, "in each fighting group and in every village hosts of political commissioners spring up and the people ... will be shown their bearings by these political pilots."<sup>870</sup> In general: "The task of bringing the people to maturity will be made easier by the thoroughness of the organisation and the high intellectual level of its leaders."<sup>871</sup>

#### *Class and the postcolony.*

Once Fanon has scaled the heights of violent decolonisation, and is descending into the abyss of neocolonialism, his frame of reference undergoes a marked alteration. His point of departure now is a postcolonial problematic in which "the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state."<sup>872</sup> He deplores the racist division of Africa along the fault-line of the Sahara into 'white' north and 'black' south,<sup>873</sup> the chauvinism of neocolonial nationalism, and the tribalism engendered by competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources.<sup>874</sup> In this section of the text, divisions between races and tribes in Africa are portrayed as artificial: neocolonial constructs that serve the interests of a dominant, albeit epiphenomenal class of comprador bourgeoisie operating in service to a metropolitan master-class. This notable shift from fighting, triumphal mode in which the alienating effects of settler colonialism comprehensively are overcome by the purifying fire of revolutionary violence, to a gloomily ominous depiction of the debased and distorted nature of neocolonial regimes is disconcerting. Another point - perhaps merely semantic - is that while Fanon

repeatedly deploys the word 'violence' in the first section of the text, in a later section, he alternates between two words with two different connotations: 'force' is positively deployed whereas 'violence' is negatively utilised to flag instances of intra-African racism and tribalism.

Given the above disjunctures, it is quite tempting to treat the two sections of text as by-and-large separate entities, loosely connected by Fanon's consistently impassioned style. This said, seeds of "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness" are discernible in "Concerning Violence." For instance:

The national political parties never lay stress upon the necessity of a trial of armed strength, for the good reason that their objective is not the radical overturning of the system. Pacifists and legalists, they are in fact partisans of order, the new order - but to the colonialist bourgeoisie they put bluntly enough the demand which to them is the main one: 'Give us more power.' On the specific question of power, the elite are ambiguous. They are violent in their words and reformist in their attitudes.<sup>875</sup>

The above analysis of the indigenous bourgeoisie during an era of decolonisation dovetails with Fanon's subsequent critique of class configuration in a postcolonial era. Here, his depiction of the "national bourgeoisie" is compatible with dependency theory's notion of a comprador class. He describes the class as "the Western bourgeoisie's business agent",<sup>876</sup> as having "practically no economic power", as "completely canalised into activities of the intermediary type"<sup>877</sup> and as "a profiteering caste."<sup>878</sup> On these grounds, he raises "the theoretical question ... of whether or not the bourgeois phase can be skipped" and asserts somewhat obscurely that in underdeveloped countries, the question "ought to be answered in the field of revolutionary action, and not by logic."<sup>879</sup>

As it transpires, revolutionary action in a neocolonial context translates as a call to oppose the national bourgeoisie "because, literally, it is good for nothing."<sup>880</sup> By this Fanon means that it not only is unproductive in a material sphere, it also is sterile in the field of ideas. He makes the point by way of contrasting a "get-rich-quick middle class" in Africa with "a bourgeoisie similar to that which developed in Europe."<sup>881</sup> A *bona fide* bourgeoisie, in contradistinction to the *ersatz* variety, "is able to elaborate an ideology and at the same time strengthen its own power. Such a bourgeoisie, dynamic, educated and secular, has fully succeeded in its undertaking of the accumulation of capital and has given to the nation a minimum of prosperity."<sup>882</sup>

At this juncture, Fanon's analysis of a comprador class is of particular significance for the themes of my dissertation if applied to the seeming inability of Afro-capitalist states to elaborate an ideology other than an increasingly authoritarian brand of nationalism.(xxv) Put briefly, his argument suggests that ideological vacuity is a consequence of endemic and ubiquitous economic dependence. On both levels, a neocolonial dispensation is "not even the replica of Europe, but its caricature."<sup>883</sup> Fanon does not stop here, however. He develops his sketch of an arid class, "incapable of great ideas or of inventiveness" into a depiction of elite criminality "reminiscent of the members of a gang, who after every hold-up hide their share of the swag from other members who are their accomplices and prudently start thinking about their retirement."<sup>884</sup>

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(xxv) See Chapter Four, p100

While advocating opposition and offering advice to “a small number of honest intellectuals”<sup>885</sup> in neocolonial counties, Fanon does not appear to be advocating armed revolt against incumbent regimes but instead - given his fairly numerous references to Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) strategies with the peasant masses in Algeria - teaching by example. He maintains that “if we have taken the example of Algeria to illustrate our subject, it is not at all with the intention of glorifying our own people, but simply to show the important part played by the war in leading them towards consciousness of themselves.”<sup>886</sup> Nor is he necessarily arguing for across-the-board use of anti-colonial force. “We know for sure today that in Algeria the test of force was inevitable - but other countries through political action and through the work of clarification undertaken by a party have led their people to the same results.”<sup>887</sup> This statement imputes that Fanon’s theory of revolution, including the necessary (because transformative) use of violence is restricted to colonies either where a relatively substantial number of settlers would rather fight than concede, or where an intransigent metropolitan power refuses to withdraw, and reinforces its decision with troops. It thus is arguable that “Concerning Violence” applies to an extreme version of decolonisation<sup>888</sup> and not to decolonisation *per se*.

Contrary to popular perception, then, it seems that Fanon does not recommend violence as a generally applicable solution to any and all forms of colonial oppression. However, having noted his selective application of violent strategies of decolonisation, a question remains: to what extent does his argument concerning violence approximate to a theory as such? This question generates another: assuming that Fanon's discourse accurately can be termed ‘Marxist,’ within which of the Marxist camps is he situated? According to Gibson, Fanon’s

critique of the nationalist bourgeoisie "is often associated with the underdevelopment school."

"Yet," continues Gibson "unlike the dependency theorists' preoccupation with external relations, Fanon's dialectic enabled him to discern internal social conflicts."<sup>889</sup> Gibson also defines Fanon as a Marxist humanist "in the sense that he is not championing a static notion of human nature, but a notion of human potential 'created by revolutionary beginnings.'"<sup>890</sup>

Certainly, Fanon does not evince a noticeable preoccupation with a scientific theory of revolution. While he contends, in a style somewhat reminiscent of Lenin's notion of ethics as the property of the ascendant class, (xxvi) that:

In every age, among the people, truth is the property of the national cause. No absolute verity, no discourse on the purity of the soul can shake this position ... Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the foreigners. In this colonialist context there is no truthful behaviour: and the good is quite simply that which is evil for 'them'.<sup>891</sup>

... Fanon's notion of truth is not configured by a materialist base given that in his thesis, the binary opposite of a colonial regime is not a revolutionary class but a nation; furthermore, a nation that is built on and by a peasant collective whose revolutionary credentials he has not convincingly established. Nor is it clear that the FLN have a substantive claim to AvantGarde status. Instructive in this regard is Clegg's assessment of Algeria as "yet another revolutionary failure."<sup>892</sup>

#### *Fanonism as false knowledge: a Marxist-Leninist perspective*

Clegg's point of departure is the hijacking of the Algerian revolution by "a banal state capitalism" and "a new bourgeoisie" of "previously unknown careerists and bureaucrats."<sup>893</sup>

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(xxvi) See Chapter Eight, p 222

In other words, not long after independence, Algeria plunged into a version of the neocolonial abyss that the purportedly transformative heights of Fanonist revolution were designed to avoid. While agreeing with Fanon's premise that the distinguishing characteristic - violence - of anti-colonial revolution in Algeria "gave expression to the violence already implicit in the relations between coloniser and colonised: a violence that was itself a product of the process and mode of colonisation",<sup>894</sup> Clegg's perception of the role of violence in Algeria's decolonisation is diametrically opposed to Fanon's. Far from transforming the consciousness of the colonised, the violence with which the anti-colonial struggle was waged "largely created the myth of the revolutionary nature of the fight for independence. Fanonism, in particular, was responsible for the widespread misconceptions over the nature of the struggle"<sup>895</sup> given that in reality, the FLN was no more than "a loosely coordinated front for a wide assortment of political tendencies and personalities," and that the presence of AvantGarde elements within the FLN made no significant difference since "they did not control the state and had no mass base among the working class or peasantry."<sup>896</sup>

Additionally, Gibson's assertion that Fanon's thesis incorporates internal class analysis cannot really be applied to "Concerning Violence" - a lacuna that Clegg highlights: "The lack of critical analysis of the modes of class formation stems, once again, from Fanonist-inspired simplifications. During the war, the internal class contradictions of the indigenous society were largely subsumed under the wider definitions of race and culture."<sup>897</sup> Clegg adheres to the scientific premise that class-based analysis of objective conditions is the only way to distil the true nature of a revolution from the ideological mystifications - in this case, Fanonist - that envelop it. He contends that the conscious aspirations of the Algerian peasantry reflect

the true nature of the struggle in the rural areas, viz, at once nationalist in the sense of reclaiming their land from foreign conquerors, and utopian - "a recreation of a glorious past to which all their values are intimately related."<sup>898</sup> He likewise disposes of the revolutionary role of the "urban sub-proletariat" - whom he describes as existing "in a half world that is neither the traditional nor the modern"<sup>899</sup> - by contending that "it is this very desperation and extreme acculturation which deprives them of the ability to act on the external in a conscious manner."<sup>900</sup>

Applying class analysis to formerly colonised territories, Clegg identifies three stages of struggle. The initial stage is the struggle for national liberation that, once achieved, enables the subsequent stages but cannot itself be defined as class struggle given that "it is only after independence that the existence of contradictions over and above those of colonialism become explicit."<sup>901</sup> Clegg contends that colonialism's primary signifiers, race and culture, inhibit the development of class antagonisms and class consciousness among the colonised. Further, a struggle in which almost all anti-colonial combatants in the rural areas are peasants cannot properly be designated a class struggle since "revolution, as a concept, is alien to the peasant consciousness while their relationship to the environment remains one of passive endurance rather than active transformation."<sup>902</sup> In other words, taking up arms against colonialism does not by definition revolutionize peasant mentalities.

However, once independence has been achieved, Clegg concedes that the second stage of struggle – if it occurs - to some extent is class driven since it ends in the seizure of the means of production, and is the product of conflict between "the national bourgeoisie and the mass of the population."<sup>903</sup> This struggle, however, is incomplete since the state remains under the

control of party and government bureaucracy. Thus, the third and definitive stage occurs only in the event of “conflict between the working class (and peasantry) and the state and party bureaucracy, ending in the seizure of the state.”<sup>904</sup>

It is worth emphasising that Clegg’s stages theory of revolutionary development allocates primacy to the working class while allocating to the peasantry parenthetical status only, thus demonstrating fidelity to a Leninist paradigm in which an increasingly proletarianised peasantry follow in the footsteps of the workers. While Clegg does not explicitly accuse Fanon of abandoning the class struggle, and along with it the scientificity of Marxism, he defines Fanonism as “the practice of revolution with no concomitant theory.”<sup>905</sup> Following on from this, “Fanonism is pure ideology.”<sup>906</sup> A definition of Fanonism as ideology relates to Fanon’s misrepresentation, hence mystification of the peasantry who in reality are incapable of revolutionary praxis given their location outside the class system. It seems likely that Clegg’s contrast between ‘ideology’ and ‘theory’ is informed by Lenin’s assertion that science is the product of the only truly progressive class, the proletariat. By logical extension, then, Clegg conceptualises ‘ideology’ as false knowledge, ‘theory’ as true knowledge, and places Fanonism in the former category.

#### *Fanonism: conclusion.*

By contrast to Clegg’s austere scientific onslaught, Gibson takes a more flexible, human-centred perspective: “Rather than viewing Fanon’s Marxism simply in terms of stretching class categories in the colonial context, what is especially provocative is the expression of the creativity of ideological intervention as a political act.”<sup>907</sup> However, it seems to me that this slightly mystifying observation does not adequately confront the problematic of Fanon’s

overly extensive deployment of violence in the colonial context, viz, as cause, consequence and cure. While Fanon's critical analysis of the generic neo-colonial state is astute to the point of being downright prophetic, overall his thesis does not offer a sufficiently substantive alternative to the perils of neo-colonialism. In short, I surmise that Fanon is better at tearing down than he is at re-building, and therefore – inasmuch as his thesis has European ancestry – that Fanonism more closely resembles Bakunin's anarchism than it does Marxism.

Briefly put, Bakunin believed that the ethics of revolution "can only be effectively taught among the bewildered masses swarming in our great cities and plunged in the utmost boundless misery."<sup>908</sup> After visiting Italy, he expanded his premise. He contrasted workers in the more industrialised parts of Europe with the revolutionary masses in Italy. The former he defined as "dominated by the principles of the bourgeois, by their ambition and vanity, to such an extent that they are different from the bourgeois only in their situation and not in their way of thinking."<sup>909</sup> By contrast, workers and peasants in Italy are revolutionary "by circumstances and by instinct" but have no conception of "the true causes of their miserable situation."<sup>910</sup> However, rather than recommending a potentially lengthy process of political education, Bakunin insisted that "we must not teach the people but lead them to revolt."<sup>911</sup> Joll's interpretation of Bakunin's emphasis on revolutionary immediacy is that he believed that "the act of revolution would be sufficiently educational in itself."<sup>912</sup> In this respect, at least, Fanon made a markedly similar assumption. Conversely, Cabral's thesis of decolonisation looks ahead to the national, cultural and normative foundations of post-independence Guinea-Bissau.

**Cabral: 'the human beings in our country'.**

While Fanon represented the FLN in Ghana, as well as negotiating with liberation movements in other parts of Africa in an effort to open up a new front, his primary task was to generate support in Europe, and particularly in France, for the Algerian revolution. Cabral, on the other hand, was both the main theoretician and intermittently<sup>913</sup> leader in the field of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC).

A telling disagreement between Fanon and Cabral occurred in 1960, three years prior to the onset of liberation war in Guinea-Bissau. As Davidson recalls the episode, Fanon, operating on behalf of Algeria's FLN, urged liberation movements in the Portuguese territories to launch their armed struggles without further delay. However, only the FNLA in Angola were ready to start an insurrection without having prepared it inside the country. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Guinea-Bissau's PAIGC instead opted to continue their exercises in political education of the masses. Having found only Holden Roberto's FNLA amenable to his plan, Fanon "threw Algerian military and political aid behind that fruitless 'movement'. Disasters accordingly followed. Cabral and the PAIGC ... flatly refused 'to begin', and were roundly abused for thus having minds of their own."<sup>914</sup>

*Differentiated social groups and variable revolutionary potential*

As can be inferred from Davidson's anecdote, Cabral did not perceive the peasantry as naturally or axiomatically revolutionary. On the contrary ...

... it must be said that the peasantry is not a revolutionary force - which may seem strange, particularly as we have based the whole of our armed liberation struggle on the peasantry. A distinction must be drawn between a physical force and a revolutionary force; physically, the peasantry is a great force in Guinea; it is almost the whole of the population, it controls the nation's wealth, it is the peasantry which

produces: but we know from experience what trouble we had convincing the peasantry to fight.<sup>915</sup>

Cabral grounds his analysis in a discussion of differentiated social groups. He distinguishes between groups whose organisation he identifies as feudal (the Manjacks); semi-feudal (the Fulas); "without any defined form of state organisation"<sup>916</sup> (the Balantes); and a nomadic people who are itinerant traders,<sup>917</sup> primarily interested in "bigger and better profits"<sup>918</sup> (the Dyulas).

In general, Cabral examines groups of people in Guinea-Bissau according to their dependence or otherwise on the colonial regime, and assesses their revolutionary potential in terms of whether or not they experience colonialism as immediately and intolerably oppressive. Fula peasants, for instance, "have a strong tendency to follow their chiefs." Since Fula chiefs and the colonial regime have a long-established relationship of mutual convenience, mobilising the Fula peasants requires "thorough and intensive work."<sup>919</sup> The Dyula, because permanently on the move, have "provided us with a most valuable element in the struggle."<sup>920</sup> Even though at least some of the Dyula play the same role for the Portuguese, Cabral concludes that their value to the struggle as a kind of revolution-broadcasting-and-mobilising service makes of them a more positive than negative factor, and merits giving them some reward, "as they usually would not do anything without being paid."<sup>921</sup> He singles out the Balantes as maintaining intact their tradition of resistance to colonial penetration, and hence the group "that we found most ready to accept the idea of national revolution."<sup>922</sup>

Since Cabral neither treats the peasants as an undifferentiated whole, nor casts them in an iconic mould, his detailed analysis and sober tone are in striking contrast to Fanon's

impassioned polemic and vivid generalisations. Another example of Cabral's attention to detail can be found in his depiction of "*declasses*". Within this group are two sub-groups. The first comprises "really *declassé* people, such as beggars and prostitutes and so on" and is defined by Cabral as "the lumpenproletariat."<sup>923</sup> He then shifts his attention to the second sub-group:

The other group is not really made up of *declassé* people, but we have not yet found an exact term for it; it is a group to which we have paid a lot of attention and it has proved to be extremely important in the national liberation struggle. It is mostly made up of young people who are connected to petty bourgeois or workers' families, who have recently arrived from the rural areas and generally do not work.<sup>924</sup>

In similar vein, he distinguishes between three sub-groups within the category of petty bourgeoisie: firstly, higher officials and some members of the liberal professions who are "heavily committed and compromised with colonialism."<sup>925</sup> Secondly, a group he defines as nationalist and revolutionary, and "which was the source of the idea of national liberation in Guinea." Thirdly, a vacillating group "which has never been able to make up its mind between the national liberation struggle and the Portuguese."<sup>926</sup> His depiction of "the Europeans" is equally dispassionate. "They are the human instruments of the colonial state in our country and they therefore reject *a priori* any idea of national liberation."<sup>927</sup> However, he does not treat settler society as an undifferentiated whole. "It has to be said that the Europeans most bitterly opposed to the idea of national liberation are the workers, while we have sometimes found considerable sympathy for our struggle among certain members of the European petty bourgeoisie."<sup>928</sup>

Cabral's delineation of the awakening of revolutionary consciousness and hence the origins of the armed struggle reveals that he perceives urban areas as primary sites of dawning

awareness of oppression and inequality. He supports his perception as follows: firstly, because - given the relative scarcity of Europeans in the rural areas - rural Africans, unlike town dwellers, mostly are unable to make a direct comparison between their situation and that of the Europeans. Secondly, because rural peasants by-and-large operate outside or on the fringes of the money economy since they are "subjected to a kind of exploitation equivalent to slavery."<sup>929</sup> By contrast, an urban worker who is doing the same job as a European but earning far less is easier to convince that he is being exploited. Cabral simultaneously sums up these points and differentiates between Algeria and Guinea-Bissau: "The importance of this urban experience lies in the fact that it allows comparison: this is the key stimulant required for the awakening of consciousness. It is interesting to note that *Algerian nationalism largely sprang up among the emigre workers in France*. As far as Guinea is concerned, the idea of the national liberation struggle was born not abroad but in our country ..."<sup>930</sup>

To take my own case as a member of the petty bourgeois group which launched the struggle in Guinea, I was an agronomist working under a European who everybody knew was one of the biggest idiots in Guinea; I could have taught him his job with my eyes shut but he was the boss: this is something which counts a lot, this is the confrontation which really matters. This is of major importance when considering where the initial idea of the struggle came from.<sup>931</sup>

Cabral's analysis of the wellspring of consciousness in Guinea-Bissau leads him to conclude that "while many people say that it is the peasants who carry the burden of exploitation",<sup>932</sup> it would be a mistake to assume that suffering in itself brings consciousness of oppression. The production of active awareness requires another ingredient: immediate and personal experience of the contradictions inherent in colonialism. In the rural areas, this ingredient in the main is restricted to groups such as the Balantes whose tradition, for instance, of collective ownership of land, is markedly at odds with private ownership of the means of

production in agriculture.<sup>933</sup> Finally, Cabral argues that higher levels of revolutionary consciousness in urban areas notwithstanding, "there is no conflict between the towns and the countryside, not least because we are only town dwellers who have just moved in from the country."<sup>934</sup> His argument suggests that the rural origins of every native Guinean comprise an important source of collective strength in the struggle against colonialism - but he adds a caveat: potential - "which colonialism tries to aggravate" - exists for town-country conflict.<sup>935</sup>

### *Leadership problematics*

The paper summarised above was delivered in 1964 at a seminar in Milan. Cabral does not address in any detail the issue of leadership - but from his concluding observations can be inferred a potential hazard for the revolution in that leaders often although not exclusively<sup>936</sup> are members of the urban petty bourgeoisie. This is a theme he develops (in 1966 at a conference in Havana) as follows.

In Guinea-Bissau, as in many other colonies, there is no national bourgeoisie *per se*. Here, Cabral, like Fanon, utilises dependency theory's notion of a *comprador* class, defined by Cabral as a "pseudo-bourgeoisie, controlled by the ruling class of the dominating country" whose submission to economic imperatives of neo-colonialism "prevents the development of the national productive forces." Quite irrespective of how strongly nationalist this class believes itself to be, it by definition impedes national development.<sup>937</sup>

Revolutionary leadership therefore devolves upon the petty bourgeoisie. However, since Cabral defines the petty bourgeoisie as "a class not directly involved in the process of production", he concludes that it "does not possess the economic base to guarantee the taking

over of power",<sup>938</sup> and cannot be considered to constitute, on its own, a vanguard. He distinguishes between a highly industrialised setting in which a proletariat conscious of its existence constitutes a vanguard class and a colonial situation in which "the generally embryonic character of the working classes"<sup>939</sup> necessitates the creation of a popular front in opposition to colonialism, viz, embryonic working class + peasantry + revolutionary element of the petty bourgeoisie = vanguard or, as Cabral also defines it, "nation class".<sup>940</sup> Of this combination of elements, the petty bourgeois fraction currently has the most developed consciousness ...

... since by nature of its objective and subjective position (higher standard of living than that of the masses, more frequent contact with the agents of colonialism, and hence more chances of being humiliated, higher level of education and political awareness, etc.) it is the stratum which most rapidly becomes aware of the need to free itself from foreign domination.<sup>941</sup>

Given that the power of the petty bourgeoisie as leaders of the revolution lacks an economic base, Cabral fears that it will follow the path already taken by the pseudo-bourgeoisie, ally itself with imperialism and betray the objectives of the revolution in order to retain political power. As Cabral sees it, there is only one way to avoid the trap of objective conditions lying in wait for a leadership cadre whose lack of economic substance potentially makes it easy prey for the agents of imperialism. He contends that ...

... the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong. This alternative - to betray the revolution or commit suicide as a class - constitutes the dilemma of the petty bourgeoisie in the general framework of the national liberation struggle. The positive solution in favour of the revolution depends on what Fidel Castro recently correctly called the development of revolutionary consciousness ... this shows us, to a certain extent, that if national liberation is essentially a political problem, the conditions for its development give it certain characteristics which belong to the sphere of morals.<sup>942</sup>

### *Class suicide*

At this juncture, a nodal point of comparison between Fanon's and Cabral's theses of decolonisation is worth elaborating. The contrast between their respective methods of transporting expert knowledge to the lived world of a majority (the peasantry) of the population is conceptualised as follows.

For Fanon, mass adoption of violence as primary instrument of the struggle against settler colonialism is the binding agent that welds AvantGarde and masses together, at least partly because a representation of the colonial world as divided into two distinct and irreconcilable race-species in which the rebirth of one is contingent on the death of the other is 'very clear, very easy to understand'. Violence thus comprises the shared episteme and method of the struggle. It also has an ontological dimension inasmuch as it configures the path from non-being to being.

For Cabral, who factors in class distinctions and intra-class differentiations, thus producing a nuanced picture of the colonial world, violence is a necessary but insufficient condition of national liberation. Put briefly, his argument is that independence will not be achieved in settler colonies without "the use of liberating violence by the nationalist forces to answer the criminal violence of the agents of imperialism", but that the important thing is to determine which forms of violence have to be used in order to ensure the attainment of true national independence. Thus, "the normal way of national liberation, imposed on peoples by imperialist repression, is armed struggle."<sup>943</sup>

As is his wont, Cabral employs differentiation as a means of isolating the significant ingredient, in this case, collective armed struggle. Yet if he believed that armed struggle plus political education 'from outside' (à la Lenin) are sufficient to overcome objective contradictions between leaders and masses, he would not find it necessary to posit class suicide as imperative if neocolonialism is to be avoided. In effect, Cabral's perception of the obligation of leaders in Guinea-Bissau is that they should convey expert knowledge to the lived world of the people via a process of (re-) becoming the people. As his reference to 'the sphere of morals' suggests, this is a normative requirement for putative leaders of the struggle, as well as the only way to avoid replicating - in a postcolonial era - the injustices and inequities of colonialism. In short, it is an attempt to ensure that a colonial binary of 'self' and 'other' is not passed forward to the postcolonial state.

According to my reading of Cabral's notion of 'class suicide,' he intended that it should be implemented in two related spheres of existence. Firstly, in the material sphere. Given his depiction of their objective and subjective position, it is deducible (Cabral does not spell it out) that members of the petty bourgeoisie who aspire to lead the popular front against colonialism perforce should abandon whatever material advantages and class privileges they have acquired under colonialism and actively submerge themselves in the lived world of the struggle. Cabral thus posits conscious intervention in the objective conditions generated by colonial capitalism, and postulates such intervention as a transformative factor if taken in conjunction with the unifying effect of the struggle. In this respect, Davidson's account of a conversation with Cabral is edifying.

'My own view', he said in 1967, 'is that there are no real conflicts between the people of Africa. There are only conflicts between their elites. When the people take power

into their own hands, as they will do with the march of events in this continent, there will remain no great obstacles to effective African solidarity. Already we see in our own case how the various people of Guinea are finding cooperation more and more possible and useful as they free themselves from attitudes of tribal strife - attitudes encouraged, directly or indirectly, by colonial rule and its consequences.<sup>944</sup>

If for Cabral, conflicts between elites in Africa are power struggles between colonially constructed comprador classes, and tribal conflict, while pre-existing colonialism, in its exacerbated form also is a colonial construct, then nation and continent-wide counter-colonial struggle ultimately should negate or at least, very much modify the harmful effects of class and tribal divisions. In short, deploying a detailed assessment of the situation in Guinea-Bissau as his baseline, Cabral extends his thesis to encompass 'effective African solidarity'. To arrive at this outcome, his underlying assumption (logically) must be 'class suicide' throughout decolonising and postcolonial Africa - or so I deduce.<sup>945</sup>

In the above respect, it is worth noting that generalisation from Guinea-Bissau to the rest of Africa by no means is usual for Cabral. For instance, in the paper under consideration, he is emphatic that "on the political level our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality of others may be - can only be transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by our own efforts, by our own sacrifices."<sup>946</sup> This said, he adds a rider: "We ourselves and the other liberation movements in general (referring here above all to the African experience) have not managed to pay enough attention to this important problem of our common struggle."<sup>947</sup> Here, Cabral argues two interconnected points. On the one hand, a detailed knowledge of conditions specific to each country is a prerequisite for the success of individual national struggles. On the other, given a continent-wide experience of the struggle to decolonise, colonialism and its consequences are a common problem for Africans. He concludes that:

The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology within the national liberation movements - which is basically due to ignorance of the historical reality which these movements claim to transform - constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all. We believe, however, that a sufficient number of different experiences has already been accumulated to enable us to define a general line of thought and action with the aim of eliminating this deficiency.<sup>948</sup>

Thus Cabral posits a continent-wide and continent-specific 'line of thought and action' with which to motivate and direct a common struggle not only against imperialism but also against postcolonial drift towards neocolonial leadership. He doesn't make the latter target explicit but - given his demonstrable concern to avoid the trap of a neocolonial future for Guinea-Bissau - it can be surmised that he bases his perception of a lived world congruent ideology on a continentally applicable notion of class suicide in the material realm, and that a key role of such an ideology would be to reduce the gap between the people of Africa and their elites.

#### *Cultural alienation and its remedy*

The gap between nationalist leaders and the people – and therefore, the remedy - not only is material, it also is cultural. The issue of cultural alienation as a weapon of imperialism is outlined by Cabral in a paper delivered in 1970 and dedicated to the memory of Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique who was "liquidated with impunity" by "Portuguese colonialism and imperialist agents"<sup>949</sup> (a fate inflicted on Cabral three years later). Having defined Nazism as "the most tragic expression of colonialism and its thirst for domination", he asserts that "to take up arms to dominate a people is, above all, to take up arms to destroy, or at least to neutralise, to paralyse, its cultural life."<sup>950</sup> Concomitantly, "national liberation is necessarily an *act of culture*."<sup>951</sup> Cabral extends his assertion about culture into the realm of ideology:

The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated ... culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of that history ...<sup>952</sup>

In regard to culture, Dalmeyr perceives Cabral as operating in a quasi-Marxist vein<sup>953</sup> inasmuch as he conceptualises culture as the outcome of the level of productive forces and the mode of production, thus lapsing "into somewhat reductive formulations."<sup>954</sup> In the main, however, Dalmeyr - citing in particular a paper delivered by Cabral shortly before his assassination - believes that he favours a more 'culturalist' than determinist approach to identity formation. "If one accepts that culture is a dynamic synthesis of the material and spiritual conditions of the society ... one can assert that identity is at the individual and collective level and beyond the economic condition, the expression of culture."<sup>955</sup>

In sum: for Cabral, culture, while a product of history and thus tied in with the development of a given society's mode of production, also is a realm of purposive human agency. In the case of the petty bourgeoisie, either of two choices are available. They can continue along the path on which their feet were set by the Western education and cultural values offered to a fraction of the colonised, or they can "return to the upward paths of their own culture which is nourished by the living reality of its environment ..."<sup>956</sup> Cabral attributes to the former choice the failure of some national liberation movements (he doesn't specify which) since the leaders have ignored the popular character of the movement, hence the popular nature of liberation itself. In so doing, they unnaturally increase the lifespan of a colonial policy of "cultural alienation of a part of the population, either by so-called assimilation of indigenous people, or by creating a social gap between the indigenous elites and the popular masses."<sup>957</sup>

By adopting the mentality of the coloniser, leaders of independence movements perpetuate not only the bifurcation of society into culturally incompatible groups, but also a binary division between 'superior' and 'inferior' cultures. "A reconversion of minds - of mental sets - is thus indispensable to the true integration of people into the liberation movement."<sup>958</sup> Such reconversion, Cabral contends, is best achieved during the course of the struggle, "through daily contact with the popular masses in the communion of sacrifice required by the struggle."<sup>959</sup> The struggle itself - the mingling of peoples, ideas and practices - is the crucible in which the foundations of a new national culture are created. As the phrase 'upward paths' suggests, opting for 'reconversion' does not imply return to a frozen-in-time, traditional 'essence'. On the contrary, Cabral emphasises the critical importance of cultural progress, and for that reason, singles out aspects of traditional culture that constitute impediments to upward growth.<sup>960</sup> Nor is he an advocate of African cultural unanimitism. "The fact of recognising the existence of common and particular features in the cultures of African peoples, independent of the colour of their skin, does not necessarily imply that one and only one culture exists on the continent."<sup>961</sup>

In the paper cited above, my impression is that the pivot on which Cabral's thesis turns is a perception of cultural synergies enabled and empowered by a national liberation struggle in which leaders and people engage in a process of reciprocal learning. By bringing together various social groups and ethnicities, the struggle encourages peasants to "break the bonds of the village universe" and to "acquire an infinite amount of new knowledge."<sup>962</sup> Petty bourgeois leaders, for their part, re-establish contact with the deep wells of rural culture that "survived the storms, taking refuge in the villages, in the forests ..."<sup>963</sup> In the final analysis, it

is arguable that 'class suicide' corresponds to revolutionary praxis and as such, is intrinsic to the maturation and delivery of a cohesive national unit that - midwifed by the struggle for liberation - surmounts precolonial and colonial ethnic and class divisions. As Serequeberhan (albeit referring specifically to Cabral's concept of 'return') puts it:

European values and skills are thus absorbed into a new synthesis. This is possible because in embracing the indigenous historicity - in the very act of doing so - the Westernised native purges himself of the Eurocentric frame that structures his consciousness. The 'return' is thus a two-way process of cultural filtration and fertilisation.<sup>964</sup>

### *Cabral: conclusion*

In rounding off this section of the chapter, it is worth reiterating that Cabral's nationalist trajectory, while revolutionary, is not immediately or necessarily socialist. Rudebeck affirms that the word 'socialism' in the main is conspicuous by its absence from PAIGC documents, and that "according to Cabral ... the achievement of a socialist society in Guinea-Bissau is very far in the future because Guinea-Bissau is an economically and technologically undeveloped agricultural country that has become *under-developed* through the mechanisms of colonial dependency."<sup>965</sup> This said, the tenets of the ideology bequeathed by Cabral to the PAIGC clearly are anti-imperialist and informed by class analysis.<sup>966</sup>

Turok, while defining Cabral as "one of the most important bearers of Marxism in Africa and beyond",<sup>967</sup> concedes that Cabral never acknowledged himself as a Marxist. According to Davidson, Cabral disliked doctrinal labels, not least because "he considered that labels were a probable source of error."<sup>968</sup> My own impression, distilled from my reading of a selection of his papers, as well as from assessments in the literature, is that while Cabral was well-versed in the theses of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he primarily was a fiercely independent thinker who

operated extra-paradigm in the sense that he did not fear to engage the 'threshold of unrespectability' (xxvii) and venture into territory uncharted by 'normal science', using his detailed map of Guinea-Bissau to find his way. Furthermore, like Kuhn, he believed that paradigm revolution entails a reconversion of mental sets.

Cabral's critical approach to bedrock paradigmatic assumptions comes across strongly during the course of a paper (cited above) delivered in Havana. Addressing an audience comprising delegates to the first Tricontinental Conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, he highlights the Eurocentricity of Marx and Engels' contention that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles"<sup>969</sup> by posing the question ...

... does history begin only with the development of the phenomenon of class, and consequently of class struggle? To reply in the affirmative ... would ... be to consider - and this we refuse to accept - that various human groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America were living without history, or outside history, at the time when they were subjected to the yoke of imperialism. It would be to consider that the peoples of our countries, such as the Balantes of Guinea, the Coaniamas of Angola and the Macondes of Mozambique, are still living today - if we abstract the slight influence of colonialism to which they have been subjected - outside history, or that they have no history.<sup>970</sup>

Another example of Cabral's preference for locus-congruent ideology can be found in his statement that "we have certain reservations about the systematisation of phenomena ... We are not completely certain that, in fact, the (Cuban) scheme is absolutely adaptable to our conditions."<sup>971</sup> In regard to Marxism-Leninism's universal applicability *qua* science, Cabral counterpoised an assertion that "national liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities; they are, and increasingly so every day, the outcome of local and national elaboration, more or less influenced by external factors ... but essentially determined and

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(xxvii) See Chapter Two, p 34

formed by the historical reality of each people."<sup>972</sup> In the case of Guinea-Bissau, Cabral's legacy - even if it did not long survive his death - in the words of Chabal was "a tough indigenous ideology fashioned on the ground."<sup>973</sup>

While devoutly opposed to imperialism in all its forms, as indicated by his speech "In Homage to Kwame Nkrumah" in which he described *Neocolonialism: The Last Stage Of Imperialism* as "a profound, materialist analysis of reality, the terrible reality which neocolonialism is in Africa",<sup>974</sup> Cabral was not inclined to emphasise externally imposed problematics to an extent that glossed over internal fault lines. "True, imperialism is cruel and unscrupulous, but we must not lay all the blame on its broad back. For, as the African people say: 'Rice only cooks inside the pot.'<sup>975</sup> Nor did he hesitate to reject European Marxism's preoccupation with variations on a theme of epistemological correctness. Speaking at the University of London to an audience composed mainly of academics, he responded as follows to questions regarding his paradigm affiliation:

Is Marxism a religion? I am a freedom fighter in my country. You must judge what I do in practice. If you decide that it's Marxism, tell everyone that it is Marxism. If you decide it's not Marxism, tell them it's not Marxism. But the labels are your affair; we don't like those kinds of labels. People here are very preoccupied with the questions: Are you Marxist or not Marxist? Are you Marxist-Leninist? Just ask me, please, whether we are doing well in the field. Are we really liberating our people, the human beings in our country, from all forms of oppression? Ask me simply this, and draw your own conclusions.<sup>976</sup>

### **Scientific Socialists.**

Cabral's refusal to succumb to the lure of an iron cage format is in marked contrast to Samora Machel's response to a British journalist's definition of his regime as 'Afrocommunist' - a

definition Machel believed belittled Frelimo's commitment to carrying out an authentic Marxist-Leninist revolution.

Frelimo identifies with Marxism-Leninism as it is ... as a science of the workers ... as a fundamental instrument for the analysis of society ... as the greatest instrument for understanding class struggle. The divergencies are secondary. The great thing about Marxism is that, it being a science, it can adapt to all conditions. There is no African Marxism, Asian Marxism, European Marxism. There is only one Marxism.<sup>977</sup>

Similarly, Lara, described by the Ottaways as the MPLA's main theorist, asserted that "for the MPLA there has always been only one expression of socialism, known precisely as scientific socialism."<sup>978</sup> Yet in Angola, according to Bhagavan, employed wage labour in agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing and services comprised less than two percent of the total population, and "the employed industrial proletariat, which in Marxist-Leninist theory is regarded as the leading revolutionary class, is even smaller, at about one percent. This working class is almost totally unskilled."<sup>979</sup> Further, the peasantry - by far the largest percentage of the population - are "isolated in the countryside and ... involved in a class struggle only in so far that their sons in the armed forces are so engaged."<sup>980</sup> Likewise, despite the contextual incongruities of Marxism-Leninism as official ideology, Siad Barre of Somalia declared that "our socialism cannot be called Somali socialism, African socialism or Islamic socialism ... our socialism is scientific socialism founded by the great Marx and Engels."<sup>981</sup>

Nkrumah, initially an influential contributor to the notion of an indigenous African socialism, soon enough shifted towards a Marxist-Leninist paradigm. This especially was the case after elements of the Ghanaian military with CIA connivance had evicted him from office. In an investigation of the "real meaning" of the term 'socialism' in the context of African politics,

he distinguishes between two brands of socialist policy in Africa: policies "that do not really promote social and economic development"<sup>982</sup> and policies that do. He compares the socialist divide in Africa with the split in the Second International between social democrats and Marxist-Leninists, and concludes that much like its social democratic forbear in Europe, 'African socialism' is "meaningless and irrelevant"<sup>983</sup> and that "its foreign publicists include not only the surviving social democrats of Europe and North America, but other intellectuals and liberals who themselves are steeped in the ideology of social democracy."<sup>984</sup>

Nkrumah further depicts African socialism as espousing an historically inaccurate view that traditional African societies were classless, practised communalism, and were imbued with the spirit of humanism. Citing African cooperation with slave traders, as well as the feudal systems that existed in some parts of Africa before colonisation and involved profoundly exploitative social stratification based on the ownership of land, Nkrumah criticises the notion that an anthropological approach to traditional African society sufficiently has demonstrated the existence of classlessness.<sup>985</sup> While conceding that there is evidence of principles of egalitarianism in traditional African society, he argues that the implications of egalitarianism "for socio-political practice have to be worked out scientifically."<sup>986</sup>

Nkrumah maintains that in the absence of "objectively chosen policies",<sup>987</sup> humanism is meaningless - hence the need for a scientific socialism which "depends on dialectical and historical materialism, upon the view that there is only one nature, subject in all its manifestations to natural laws and that human society is, in this sense, part of nature and subject to its own laws of development."<sup>988</sup> Yet, while upholding the connection between a science of nature and a science of socialism, thus imputing the natural necessity and universal

applicability of scientific socialism, Nkrumah also contends that differences in the particular circumstances of the countries themselves necessitate that national policies are shaped by "the specific circumstances of a particular state at a definite historical period." He is emphatic, however, that the historical particularities which exist within the otherwise universal framework of scientific socialism cannot be equated with a supposition "that there are tribal, national or racial socialisms", since to so suppose would be to "abandon objectivity in favour of chauvinism."<sup>989</sup>

For Nkrumah, inasmuch as African specificity exists, it is a product of the impact of Islamic civilisation and European colonialism on traditional African values and social organisation. This conjoint experience has permanently altered the complexion of African traditions. Present day African societies thus "are not traditional, even if backward, and they are clearly in a state of socio-economic disequilibrium." African societies are in this condition, Nkrumah contends, "because they are not anchored to a steadying ideology."<sup>990</sup> For this reason, he recommends a synthesis in which "the quintessence of the human purposes of traditional African society reasserts itself in a modern context, in short, to socialism, through policies that are scientifically devised and applied."<sup>991</sup>

Overall, Nkrumah seems to be attempting to arrive at a compromise position somewhere between the subjectivity of traditional African humanism and the objectivity of Marxism-Leninism. On balance, however, he leans towards a science of social reality and away from a notion of African specificity in any particularly significant sense. Accordingly, despite his nod in the direction of human-centred African traditions, Nkrumah's notion of an anchor to hold African societies steady is the universally applicable ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

Adoption of a 'steadying ideology' seems all the more urgent in the light of the perils of neo-colonialism, defined by Nkrumah as "the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress."<sup>992</sup> Further, Nkrumah's acquaintance with dependency theory can be inferred from his contention that "neo-colonialism, like colonialism, is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries. The temporary success of this policy can be seen in the ever-widening gap between the richer and poorer nations."<sup>993</sup> After World War Two, colonial policy was reorganised not least to ensure that profits gleaned from the colonies were channelled into metropolitan welfare states, thus modifying the worst effects of class antagonism in the metropolises. In consequence, "conflict between the rich and the poor has now been transferred on to the international scene ..."<sup>994</sup>

While, as demonstrated above, aspects of dependency theory are deployed by a number of radical Africanists, it would be stretching a point to portray the theory as representative of general consensus among *dependistas*. On the contrary, even neo-Marxist *dependistas* vary, for instance, in their approach to the class problematic in the Third World. Accordingly, they differ in their assessment of Third World revolutionary potential. Variable responses to the anomaly of incomplete class development are illustrated below with specific reference to the theses of Amin and Wallerstein.

### **Amin and Wallerstein: variations on a 'world systems' theme**

A seminal passage in *Unequal Development* highlights the 'neo' or explicitly revised texture of Amin's Marxism.

... the general law of accumulation and of impoverishment expresses the tendency inherent in the capitalist mode of production, the contradiction between productive forces and production relations, between capital and labour. This contradiction rules out an analysis of the capitalist mode of production in terms of harmony, and leads us to understand that the quest for an ever increasing rate of surplus value in order to compensate for the downward trend of the rate of profit makes a harmonious development impossible. This law operates within a concrete historical framework. In Marx's time, England provided this framework because the world system was not yet established. Today, this framework has been enlarged to include the capitalist world as a whole. Hence the 'harmony' achieved here, at the centre, where the rate of surplus value cannot be raised, must be counter-balanced by an increasing 'disharmony' elsewhere, at the periphery, which is made to pay for the fundamental contradictions of the mode.<sup>995</sup>

According to Amin, the law of the falling rate of profit posited by Marx as a key factor in the demise of capitalism was the product of a specific time and place in history, as was Marx's contention "that no power would be able to hinder for long the local development of capitalism on the European model."<sup>996</sup> The rise of monopoly capitalism, a development "which Marx could not imagine"<sup>997</sup> has frustrated the fulfilment of Marx's predictions. Instead, capitalist survival at the centre depends on retarding the capitalist mode of production in the periphery.<sup>998</sup>

Amin pinpoints three features that "oblige us not to confuse the underdeveloped countries with the now-advanced countries as they were at an earlier stage of their development."<sup>999</sup> Firstly, extreme unevenness of productivity in the periphery that itself is the outcome of prices dictated at the centre; secondly, the disarticulation which is the result of the periphery's orientation towards the needs of the centre; thirdly, economic domination of the periphery by the centre, not least in the form of the dependence of underdeveloped countries on foreign capital.<sup>1000</sup> The deepening pauperisation of great swathes of the population in the periphery

imputes that "these are the masses, in our contemporary world, 'who have nothing to lose but their chains.'"<sup>1001</sup>

Amin completes his sequence of neo-Marxist propositions with a conclusion that doubles as a prediction, viz, that mass revolt at the periphery will induce a crisis of capitalism at the centre. He arrives at this conclusion during the course of analysis and argumentation in a section entitled "Social Formations at the Periphery" which is unpacked below.

*"We must try to transcend a sterile controversy."*<sup>1002</sup> (Emphasis added)

The controversy to which Amin refers is between two different premises concerning the location of significant - because revolutionary - classes and class conflict. Firstly, "the contention of some that the proletariat at the centre remains the principal nucleus of the world proletariat." This position, contends Amin, "is not Leninist: it denies the worldwide character of the system." Secondly, "the thesis that suggests an opposition between bourgeois nations and proletarian nations" also "denies the worldwide character of the system."<sup>1003</sup> While *prima facie* this looks like a contradiction in terms, Amin explains that the second position denies

... the effect that the revolt at the periphery must have on conditions at the centre, and implies that the bourgeoisie of the periphery, equally 'exploited' ... can oppose its counterpart at the centre. But the violence of the main revolt means precisely the opposite for the bourgeoisie of the periphery is obliged to make its own proletariat pay for the plundering for which it suffers. Furthermore ... the picture that represents the proletariat at the centre as being collectively privileged, and therefore necessarily in league with its own bourgeoisie in the exploitation of the Third World, is only an oversimplification of the facts.<sup>1004</sup>

While on the one hand, it is true that "the proletariat at the centre receives, on average, a better reward than the worker at the periphery," on the other hand, "in order to counteract the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall at the centre itself, capital imports labour from

the periphery at a lower wage ... in order to depress the labour market and thus assist in the process of increasing the misery of the central proletariat."<sup>1005</sup>

*"In reality, the class struggle takes place not within the context of the nation but within that of the world system."*<sup>1006</sup> (Emphasis added)

The above is Amin's statement of position. Firstly, the globalisation of labour is a product of the globalisation of capitalism. Secondly, given capitalism's expansion into a world system, the capitalist mode of production as class determinant has been replaced by "a system of capitalist formations, central and peripheral." Thirdly and accordingly, "the contradiction is not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of each country in isolation but between the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat."<sup>1007</sup>

*"The problem is: what constitutes the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat?"*<sup>1008</sup>  
(Emphasis added)

Amin's depiction of the constitution of the world bourgeoisie is straightforward. It comprises the bourgeoisie at the centre plus, at the periphery, the bourgeoisie that has been constituted in its wake, in other words, a parasitic class whose existence is dependent on that of the host class at the centre. However, the identity of the world proletariat requires a more complex definition which Amin provides at some length, in the process acknowledging the problem of incomplete class development in the periphery given its underdeveloped nature.

For Marx, there was not the least doubt: in his time, the main nucleus of the proletariat was to be found at the centre. At that stage of the development of capitalism it was impossible to understand the full implication of what was later to become the colonial problem. Since the socialist revolution did not take place at that time at the centre, and since capitalism continued to develop and become monopolistic, the world conditions of the class struggle altered.<sup>1009</sup>

Amin then cites Lenin's prediction that the outcome of the struggle will be decided by "Russia, China, India etc." that is, by countries and sub-continent where the majority of the world's population is located, and asserts that Lenin "meant that the central nucleus of the proletariat henceforth lay at the periphery and not at the centre."<sup>1010</sup> The passage quoted above, especially if taken in combination with Amin's rendering of Lenin's meaning, apparently removes the definitive historical role from the proletariat at the centre, instead allocating it to the proletariat in the periphery. This transfer of the revolutionary class from centre to periphery is explicated by Amin with reference to an alteration in capitalism's *modus operandi*. In contradistinction to Marx's time, both the rate of surplus value and the level of exploitation today are much higher in the periphery than at the centre.

Overall, Amin's argument suggests that since contradictions generated by capitalism at the centre have been ironed out just enough to relieve the Western bourgeoisie of any immediate prospect of socialist revolution, revolutionary prospects have been transferred to the periphery. However, his conclusion raises a question, viz, how does he preserve the scientific integrity of socialist prospects, given the embryonic nature of the proletariat in the periphery?

... the proletariat at the periphery takes different forms. It does not consist solely or even mainly of the wage earners in the large modern enterprises. It also includes the mass of peasants who are integrated into the world trade system and who, like the working class, pay the price of unequal exchange.<sup>1011</sup>

Amin further asserts that even though the social organisation of the peasant masses "is very precapitalist in appearance", peasants nonetheless ...

... have eventually become proletarianised or are on their way to suffering this fate, through their integration into the world market system. The peripheral structure - the condition for a higher rate of surplus value - also gives rise to an increasing mass of urban unemployed. These are the masses, in our contemporary world, 'who have nothing to lose but their chains.'<sup>1012</sup>

*"Their revolt, the most important one, leads to a worsening of conditions of exploitation at the centre ..."*<sup>1013</sup> (Emphasis added)

This said, Amin does not explicitly refer to mass *socialist* revolutions in the periphery.

Instead he highlights firstly, "the violence of the main revolt"<sup>1014</sup> given extremes of suffering; secondly, its inevitable effect on conditions at the centre, and thirdly, an implied link, (again, he is not explicit) given the world-wide nature of the system, between exploited masses in the periphery *per se*, and peripheral formations at the centre, for instance, the southern half of Italy and the black minority in the United States.<sup>1015</sup>

Arguably, it is possible to infer from the trend and direction of Amin's thesis that violent revolts in the periphery will trigger similar revolts among marginalised peoples at the centre, thus heralding the global demise of capitalism. At this juncture, it is worth noting that Amin's analysis bears comparison with Marcuse's inasmuch as both scholars locate immediate revolutionary potential in marginalised groups at the centre. For Marcuse, however, nothing indicates that it will be a good end. Amin - or so I deduce - is less pessimistic given his estimation that a chain of revolts in the periphery in time will lead "to a worsening of the conditions of exploitation at the centre, since this is the only means available to capitalism to compensate itself for the shrinking of its area of influence".<sup>1016</sup>

In short, for Amin, the eventual outcome of revolts by incompletely proletarianised masses in the periphery, in tandem with similar uprisings on the part of marginalised groups at the centre, will be a significant worsening of conditions for the industrial proletariat at the centre. Based on his estimate, it can be surmised that the objective conditions that are a prerequisite for socialist revolution then will obtain - sufficiently so to rouse the *bone fide* working class

from its status quo-serving passivity, and precipitate scientifically conceived, hence epistemologically and methodologically correct, revolutionary action. Marx's prediction thus will be fulfilled, albeit in a different era with an altered configuration of revolutionary forces in which a series of *populist* revolts in the periphery ultimately trigger *socialist* revolution at the centre.

It is arguable, then, that in the final analysis, Amin - like Lenin - relies on the decisive role of the scientifically socialist team at the centre. If this is the case, then Amin's version of dependency theory does not merit scientific Marxism's critique (xxviii) since he has found a way to circumvent the problem of incomplete class formation at the periphery. Nor is his thesis notably pessimistic since in the final analysis, he believes that objective conditions of capitalism at the centre will oblige the Western proletariat to reinvent themselves as a revolutionary class. In short, it seems reasonable to conclude that central to Amin's thesis is a presumption that revolts in the periphery in combination will act as a curtain raiser for the main event at the centre, thus preserving the integrity of a science 'upon whose maintenance depends the future course of the revolutionary process.' (xxix)

Moving from Amin to Wallerstein: the latter launches a discussion of class and status in Africa by distinguishing between classes "*au sich* and *fur sich*."<sup>1017</sup> He argues that in Africa, as elsewhere, classes *fur sich*, that is, classes conscious of themselves as forces for change, exist not as axiomatic adjuncts of technological change or social transformation, but in "a far rarer circumstance, in a 'revolutionary' situation of which class consciousness is both the

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(xxviii) See Chapter Eight, pp 210-212

(xxix) See Chapter Eight, p 211

ideological expression and the ideological pillar."<sup>1018</sup> By contrast, in 'normal' times, "status group loyalties are binding and effective in a way that it seems difficult for class loyalties to be other than in moments of crisis".<sup>1019</sup> Since unlike classes, status groups are not necessarily grounded in an economic base, they, firstly, are a transient medium of analysis; secondly, serve to conceal the realities of class differentiation, and thirdly, incorporate arbitrary and changeable lines of division, whether ethnic, religious or racial. This said, Wallerstein allocates significance to race inasmuch as "it is the only international status group category. It has replaced religion which played that role since at least the eighth century AD."<sup>1020</sup>

Wallerstein's next step is to situate race as status group signifier within the ambit of the 'proletarian nations'. Arguing that: "As a status group category, race is a blurred collective representation for an international class category, that of the proletarian nations", he distinguishes between racism and racial discrimination. Whereas racism refers to actions that maintain the existing international social structure, and thus to actions within the world arena, discrimination refers to actions within relatively small scale social organisations.<sup>1021</sup>

It thus is evident that Wallerstein's conceptualisation of race is systemic.<sup>1022</sup> Status and prestige in the national system cannot be viewed separately from status and rank in the world system since the former is a reflection, albeit in microcosm, of the latter, and "in terms of this international dichotomy, skin colour is irrelevant. 'White' and 'non-white' have very little to do with skin colour."<sup>1023</sup> In a national setting, perceived conflict between races in actuality is conflict between status groups, which in turn is a reflection of international status group differentiation. It is when races or alternatively, ethnicities cease to operate as signifiers of

difference that the reality of class differentials surfaces. "If the society were to become ethnically 'integrated', class antagonisms would not abate; the opposite in fact is true."<sup>1024</sup>

In sum: at both national and international levels, the objective reality of class is cloaked by the mystifying effects of status group categories. Further, class formation and conflict cannot adequately be comprehended within a context of individual nation states; instead, the world capitalist economy is a more apposite medium of analysis. Wallerstein argues the latter point as follows:

In peripheral areas of the world-economy ... the primary contradiction is not between two groups within a state, each trying to gain control of that state structure or to bend it. The primary contradiction is between the interest organised and located in the core countries and their local allies on the one hand, and the majority of the population on the other. In point of fact, then, an 'anti-imperialist' nationalist struggle is a mode of expression of class interest. This is what Cabral means by using the term 'nation-class'.<sup>1025</sup>

As can be deduced from the above quotation, Wallerstein transfers class struggle to an international context in which a proletarian nation such as Guinea-Bissau is locked in conflict with a bourgeois nation such as Portugal, and in which the reality of objective class struggle has emerged - given a revolutionary situation - from behind the subjective mask of racial conflict.

It is worth emphasising that Wallerstein's thesis of international class struggle does not necessarily assume a revolutionary outcome since postcolonial states are enmeshed in a systemically configured relationship with global capitalism from which it is extremely difficult to extricate themselves.<sup>1026</sup> During the course of an analysis of Africa's incorporation into the world economy from 1975 onwards, he outlines alternative scenarios.

“In the coming fifty years this incorporation will take one of two forms: dependent development or revolutionary transformation as part of a network of forces within the world-economy as a whole, which will further the transformation to a socialist world system.”<sup>1027</sup>

Thus, in Marcusean vein (xxx) Wallerstein posits two contradictory hypotheses. In a post Cold War publication, he elaborates as follows his first hypothesis:

... states are located within a world system operating on a capitalist logic and ... if the state political structures ... seek to make decisions in terms of some other logic (and of course they often do), they will pay a heavy price for it. As a consequence, they will either change their mode of operation, or they will lose power or their capacity to affect the system.<sup>1028</sup>

Wallerstein asserts that “this is the clear lesson to be learnt from the collapse of the so-called communisms.”<sup>1029</sup>

As illustrated in this section of the chapter, two versions of radical dependency theory, both drawing on class analysis, arrive at presumptively different conclusions. Whereas Wallerstein casts a measure of doubt on the scientificity of Marxism-Leninism, Amin – who invests heavily in Lenin – tends to affirm it. In light of this significant point of divergence between neo-Marxisms, it seems apposite to revisit Lenin’s dubious reasoning regarding the colonies (xxxi) and relate it to Padmore’s decision to resign from Comintern because, as he put it, “the oppressed Negro workers and peasants are regarded as ‘revolutionary expendables’ in the global struggle of communism against Western capitalism.” (xxxii) In short, on the evidence cited in Chapters Eight and Nine of this dissertation, I am inclined to endorse Padmore’s estimation.

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(xxx) See Chapter Eight, p 233

(xxxi) See Chapter Eight, pp 225

### **Summary and conclusions.**

Chapters Eight and Nine, by examining schisms between varieties of Marxism in 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe, highlight and explicate the positivist texture of Marxism-Leninism in both its revolutionary and official guises. By disabling alternate realities, and by empowering purportedly ‘vanguard’ elites, scientific Marxism not only made a significant contribution to despotic outcomes in postcolonial African states but also intentionally inhibited the emergence of ideologies adequately congruent with African contexts. Further, from the creation of Comintern onwards, Marxism-Leninism effectively shored up the vested interests of the *nomenklatura* in Eastern and Central Europe and thus reasonably can be defined firstly, as Eurocentric and secondly, as conflating the centre of truth and the centre of power.

Humanist Marxism, however, cannot be denoted ‘ideological’ given its critique of positivism and its unabashedly normative identification with the interests of the African masses as distinct from their scientifically empowered elites. Nonetheless, it is arguable that in the process of transporting itself from highly developed home base to underdeveloped regions, humanist Marxism ventured into the ambiguous territory between a utopian and an ideological idea.

*Prima facie*, dependency theory, given its Latin American origins and subsequent adoption by scholar-activists elsewhere in the Third World, escapes Eurocentricity. However, I surmise that to the extent that a given neo-Marxist theory buys into Leninist analysis it – even if only implicitly – to some extent leans towards Eurocentrism, hence truth-power conflation.

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(xxxii) See Chapter Five, p140

By contrast, Marcuse's and Wallerstein's respective theses are cited in Chapters Eight and Nine as positing, not a single, scientifically assured outcome, but two alternative scenarios. In other words, Wallerstein's version of dependency theory, like Marcuse's critical theory, avoid commitment to an exclusive version of reality. Both theses therefore elude the redundancy inflicted on scientific Marxism by the collapse of Soviet-style communism, and their critiques of capitalism and neo-imperialism are of continuing relevance in a post Cold War era.

Two innovatory attempts to adjust Marxist tenets to African contexts are closely examined in Chapter Eight. While noting Gibson's definition of Fanon as a Marxist humanist, I offer no opinion regarding Fanon's presumed position within Marxist categories. Rather, I suggest that aspects of his thesis bear comparison with Bakunin's version of anarchism. Accordingly, I argue that – Fanon's astute and enduringly relevant critique of neo-colonial states notwithstanding – his substitution of violence for science failed to adequately address issues of political legitimacy and social cohesion in post-independence Algeria. Conversely, Cabral's detailed and substantive analysis of conditions in Guinea-Bissau launched a process, tragically stalled by his assassination, of addressing precisely these issues.

Overall, Section Two of the dissertation engages with a seminal feature of social science discourse in decolonising and postcolonial Africa, namely, a binarised and exclusionary ethos generated by two competing sciences of social reality. Both sciences are rooted in 19<sup>th</sup> century European positivism, and both are informed by Cold War superpower rivalry.

While the above is a greatly simplified rendition of Section Two's paradigm and literature review, it usefully highlights a formative outcome of Cold War era obsession with social scientific verities, viz, the reduction of socio-cultural values in Africa to their conformity or non-conformity with developmental imperatives. Arguably, the reductionism practiced by exogenous paradigms was instrumental in the construction of a normative vacuum, duly filled by a host of developmental regimes that were equivalent to dictatorships, whether denoted 'capitalist' or 'communist'.

Since the dissertation takes the view that a quest for an alternative, locus-specific route to political legitimacy and social cohesion in effect also is a quest for an interstitial, substantive form of epistemology, the next section's case study focuses on Tanzania's pursuit of this conjoint objective.

## **SECTION THREE**

### **CASE STUDY AND CONCLUSION**

## CHAPTER TEN

### *UJAMAA* IN TANZANIA

For purposes of this dissertation, *Ujamaa* in Tanzania is conceptualised as a sustained attempt to escape ideological and epistemological binaries generated firstly, by the ‘either communist or capitalist’ ethos of the Cold War,<sup>1030</sup> secondly, by two dominant and competing sciences of social reality that - notwithstanding their incommensurability in other respects – share a notion of scientifically-empowered elites that imputes, as residual category, an unscientific (or pre-scientific) ‘other’. It is argued in this chapter that by situating Tanzanian (and African) specificities within a wider context of human commonality, *Ujamaa* is emblematic of a substantive, interstitial space that, while neither A nor non-A, contains elements of both. It is further averred that – not least given the innovation-disenabling constraints of the time – the success of *Ujamaa* in its capacity as a politically legitimating and socially cohesive ideology reasonably can be judged in terms of Tanzania’s avoidance of the military takeovers, personal dictatorships and, in general, excessively harsh authoritarian regimes that have disfigured postcolonial states in Africa.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of key events and issues in (Cold War era) Tanzania. It then moves on firstly, to situate the country within paradigmatic discourse, and secondly, to explore the colonial and postcolonial contexts from which *Ujamaa* ideology emerged. The chapter then focuses on the political thought of Julius Nyerere in his capacity as *Ujamaa*’s main spokesperson.

## Overview.

In 1961, mainland Tanganyika gained independence from the British in their role as United Nations' mandated trustee. A predominantly non-violent drive for freedom from colonialism had been spearheaded by the country's pre-eminent party of liberation, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius Kambarage Nyerere. In the independence elections, TANU gained all but one of the seats in the national legislature. In 1963, TANU followed the route most travelled by nationalist parties of liberation in post-independence Africa by implementing legislation that converted the country from *de facto* to *de jure* one party rule. In 1964, Tanganyika entered into a loose federal union with three offshore islands, Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia (generically known as 'Zanzibar'). The union, while solving some pressing difficulties, also generated potential sources of conflict, for instance, a large admixture of Muslims to the mainland's predominantly Christian (except for the coastal area) population. Further, a source of tension for the mainland with its comparatively open political system and far better than usual human rights record, were the dictatorial methods and human rights abuses deployed by Zanzibar's ruling Revolutionary Council under the somewhat dubious leadership of Abeid Karume.

In general, the presence of two major, monotheistic religions in the new United Republic of Tanzania, together with an assortment of historically and linguistically differentiated ethnic groups were potential arenas of national disunity – a situation exacerbated by the oppressive trajectory of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council.<sup>1031</sup> Another – and abiding – problematic was that post-independence Tanzania's condition of economic underdevelopment was more than usually severe.<sup>1032</sup>

However, while adopting an at the time standard one-party solution to potential and actual problematics of historical, ethnic and religious differences in tandem with chronic economic underdevelopment, Tanzania pursued the road less travelled by formulating and attempting to implement an ideology that combined humanist socialist premises with country-specific elaboration and articulation. In the process, Nyerere and TANU developed a socialist theory that while opposing capitalism, eschewed Marxism.<sup>1033</sup> This project is all the more remarkable in that it was embarked upon and subsequently sustained in the teeth both of the polarising trajectory of the Cold War and of overwhelming tendencies in postcolonial Africa either to adopt authoritarian vanguard solutions to problematics of ‘nation-building’, or to take a capitalist route, ideologically – and somewhat contradictorily – justified by an authoritarian-elite overlay of African cultural nationalism. Even John Saul, a rigorously Marxist commentator on ideology in Tanzania, retrospectively concedes that “Where Nyerere saw further than most ... was in the fact that he complemented his nationalism ... with his own version of a socialist analysis and a socialist vision.”<sup>1034</sup>

The ‘socialist vision’ to which Saul refers is *Ujamaa* socialism. Explaining why the word ‘*Ujamaa*’ was chosen, Nyerere highlighted two main reasons. “First, it is an African word and thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to follow. Second, its literal meaning is ‘family-hood’, so that it brings to the mind of our people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as we know it.”<sup>1035</sup>

Cold War era Tanzania was atypical in a number of ways, not least in its post Arusha Declaration focus on rural development.<sup>1036</sup> Rural socialism – in its ideal form – typified relationships of mutual respect combined with communal ownership, production and

marketing, all conducted within an economically self-sufficient environment. In other words, it was intended to be an updated, materially more productive and consciously socialist version of traditional village life. As Mukandala notes, in every ideology are embedded institutions distinctive to it. The *Ujamaa* village thus was a distinctive institution of ideology in Tanzania.<sup>1037</sup>

### **Tanzania in paradigmatic context.**

“The struggle between Marxism and bourgeois ideology is the dominating ideological struggle of our time.”<sup>1038</sup> Shivji’s statement, issued in his capacity as a Marxist critic of Tanzania’s ‘unscientific’ brand of socialism, is emblematic of a (predominantly) Cold War era binarisation of ideology and epistemology in decolonising and postcolonial Africa. Shivji’s assertion also is applicable to debates between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘Marxist’ scholars in Africa. That many of these debates were conducted in – and about – Tanzania testifies both to the comparatively open and flexible nature of TANU - subsequently re-named Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM))<sup>1039</sup> and to the ideology propagated by the party.

It is noteworthy, however, that much of the discourse emerging from Tanzania during the era under review was socialist of one category or another. A key distinction, then, was between Marxist and non-Marxist socialists – although, as Siddiqui observes, Marxist perspectives in Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, could not be described as uniform.<sup>1040</sup> Having noted that in the 1960s, both the University of Dar es Salaam and the Tanzanian civil service appointed a number of Marxist and non-Marxist scholars to research and advisory positions, and having referred to controversies between the two groups, Siddiqui settles for the terms ‘Marxist socialist’ and ‘democratic socialist’. Whereas the latter, on the whole, were sympathetic to

TANU's efforts to create and implement *Ujamaa* socialism, the former were inclined towards a more critical view.<sup>1041</sup> "Marxist socialist scholars ... hoped that TANU would be transformed into a Marxist vanguard party."<sup>1042</sup>

Referring to the above-mentioned groups, Pratt makes an initial distinction between 'vanguard' and 'democratic' socialists. He notes, however, that by-and-large the Marxist camp is too diverse to fit an umbrella category of 'vanguard'. On consideration, he, like Siddiqui, opts for the labels 'Marxist socialist' and 'democratic socialist'.<sup>1043</sup> In a subsequent publication, Pratt observes that – given the relative decline of the American dominated structural-functional school from the late 1960s onwards – the best example of an active and influential school of analysis "is provided by radical scholars broadly identifiable as Marxists."<sup>1044</sup> Elaborating the term 'school of analysis', Pratt defines it as an active body of scholars who share a notion of what is important in their study, along with a view of how it should be studied.<sup>1045</sup> While taking schools of analysis within social science as givens, he highlights a potentially negative outcome, namely, "an uncritical acceptance of ideas and data which are commonplace within the writings of the school ..."<sup>1046</sup> More specifically, Pratt alludes to a bedrock assumption prevalent among Marxist commentators that party and government leaders in Tanzania constitute a new ruling class that serves its own interests in tandem with the interests of international capitalism. He cites – as a case in point - Issa Shivji's publication, *The Silent Class Struggle*.<sup>1047</sup>

Perusal of Shivji's work reveals the compatibility of his thesis with aspects of dependency theory. He contends that Tanzania's petty-bourgeois leadership incorporates an "economic bureaucracy which in turn is allied with the international bourgeoisie." As long as Tanzania's

economy remains the appendage of imperialism, Marxist strategies to defeat rural capitalism or to take militant decisions will “ultimately mean nothing.”<sup>1048</sup> Tanzania’s economic (or bureaucratic) bourgeoisie is too dependent on the international bourgeoisie to merit the label ‘national bourgeoisie’. It is for this reason, Shivji avers, that the struggle against imperialism is at the same time a class struggle, both against the international bourgeoisie and against “its allies, the local dependent bourgeoisie.”<sup>1049</sup>

Freund commends Shivji’s thesis that Tanzania is a capitalist society marked by class differentiation and class struggle. However, he targets Shivji’s “too uncritical endorsement of ‘underdevelopment theory.’”<sup>1050</sup> Freund’s view of socialism in Tanzania is that it is an attempt to apply an ideology of utopian socialism - as distinct from the scientific variety - “to African social conditions by a petty bourgeoisie caught between the values of Tanzanian workers and peasants on the one hand and industrial capital on the other.”<sup>1051</sup> In contradistinction to Pratt’s assertion that authoritarian tendencies within TANU have been counter-balanced by a democratic tendency within Tanzanian political culture “that Nyerere has nurtured”<sup>1052</sup>, Freund contends that grassroots “popular radical culture” in Tanzania is a significant factor weighing against right-wing fractions within the regime, and furthermore, that this culture has not been nurtured ‘from above’ by Nyerere. On the contrary, it is “part of a sub-continental upheaval, an awakening of a large and extremely oppressed working class, in the wake of which class struggle in Tanzania is certain to play its part.”<sup>1053</sup> By inference, then, Freund views Tanzania as a cameo representation of the big picture of class struggle in Africa. By extension, *Ujamaa* socialism is of no particular consequence in the wider scheme of things.

Freund's thesis is in sharp contrast, for instance, with Bennett's depiction of Tanzania as "a country boldly experimenting in democracy and socialism when so many other parts of the continent have descended into chaos."<sup>1054</sup> In similar vein, Lonsdale asserts the significance of Tanzanian specificity:

...Tanzania was virtually alone among the independent nations of Africa in thinking through the institutional arrangements for bridging the gap between the governing and political elites on the one hand and the common man on the other. Early in ... 1966, it seemed that much of the rest of Africa was turning to an alternative means of combating the instability that resulted from this gap – namely, the military coup.<sup>1055</sup>

As already mentioned, literature emanating from and / or about Cold War era Tanzania broadly speaking was embedded in socialist discourse. However, as briefly demonstrated above, scholars and commentators were sharply divided in their interpretations of Tanzania's postcolonial regime and the ideology it promoted. Arguably, such divisions can be traced back to the Second International, and the split between Marxist-Leninists and – as Lenin put it – 'the yellow Social Democratic parties'. (xxxiii)

Nyerere's awareness of – and reservations about – application by scholars of paradigms whose point of origin is Europe is evidenced by an aspect of his opening speech at the International Congress on African History, convened at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1965.

I am not saying that the 'non-alignment' of Africa's policies is strictly applicable to your subject of discussion. But I am asking that those who adhere to the Marxist philosophy of history, and those who adhere to various Western philosophies, should both examine honestly the strict applicability of their approach to our problems. An exchange of pre-formulated views would be a waste of a great opportunity; what is required here is a discussion and a thinking aloud, by scholars of different

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(xxxiii) See Chapter Eight, p 221

persuasions, about the extent to which their own approach has proved valid and useful in the context of African evidence of history.<sup>1056</sup>

Nyerere's distinction between political non-alignment in the struggle between communist and capitalist blocs on the one hand, and on the other, scholarship informed by paradigms of European origin, indicates that just as adherents of 'various Western philosophies' were not necessarily supportive of American-style capitalist democracy, nor were Marxists operating in Tanzania necessarily admirers of Soviet-style socialism - a point applicable to radical Africanists in general. Thus, the Soviet critique of African socialism - a *genre* of ideology which, in the early 1960s, was one of Nyerere's points of departure - represents the official ideology of the Soviet bloc as distinct from the wider discourse of Marxist scholarship.

#### *The Soviet perspective*

Potekhin provides an overview of the Soviet perspective. Briefly put, his thesis runs as follows. African countries have a great deal of catching up to do owing to the backward condition in which colonialism left them. There are two 'catch-up' paths available: one is capitalist - a path defined by economic injustice and social ills. Potekhin quotes the Communist Party Programme to the effect that "*Capitalism is the road of suffering for the people.*"<sup>1057</sup> The other path to development is scientific socialism.

Potekhin then confronts the argument that given Africa's underdeveloped condition, objective conditions necessary for the accomplishment of scientific socialist objectives are not present. He contends that on the contrary, "any honest person"<sup>1058</sup> would concede that requisite conditions indeed obtain, foremost among them the existence of the world socialist system led by the Soviet Union. Not only can socialist countries in Africa depend on the aid and

expertise of their forerunners on the scientific socialist path, but also there is a wealth of theory available for the purpose. While conceding that “there is no detailed theory of noncapitalist development in the works of Marx and Engels”, Potekhin maintains that “Lenin and his successors were responsible for such a theory.”<sup>1059</sup> He further contends that “there exists in Africa an intelligentsia which has mastered the scientific principles of socialism and is ready to devote all its strength and knowledge for the good of its people.”<sup>1060</sup> In this respect, he commends Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) for abandoning the illusions of African socialism, for example, the notion that it is possible to recreate the classlessness of Africa’s remote past. “The new CPP programme adopted in 1962 acknowledges that its ideology ‘is based on scientific socialism’.”<sup>1061</sup>

Potekhin denies that scientific socialism necessarily connotes complete uniformity, and cites Cuba as a prime example of the successful application of Marxist-Leninist formulae in the Third World. “Why” he asks, “are people who sincerely wish to build a socialist society ... unwilling to accept the scientific theory of socialism, tested in practice, and instead engage in a search for some other kind of socialist theory?”<sup>1062</sup> He argues that the main answer to this question lies in “the effect of anti-communist propaganda.”<sup>1063</sup> He includes Western social democrats in the category of anti-communist propagandists, and perceives the democratic socialism of the British Labour party, for instance, as false socialist theory which “has created much confusion about true socialism.”<sup>1064</sup> Potekhin wraps up his polemic by quoting Lenin. “The great historical service rendered by the founders of scientific socialism is that they substituted science for dreams.”<sup>1065</sup> In sum, as Klinghoffer observes, the position taken by

Potekhin and other Soviet scholars was that the nations of Africa must proceed to either capitalism or socialism. “There is no third path.”<sup>1066</sup>

### *Modernisation and the World Bank*

While Soviet aid to postcolonial Tanzania was relatively minimal,<sup>1067</sup> not least, perhaps, because Nyerere explicitly rejected the ‘revealed truth’ of scientific socialism, the same cannot be said of the World Bank. The significance of Tanzania’s protracted engagement with World Bank programmes, more specifically with regard to the distinction between ‘*ujamaa*’ and ‘development’ villages, is highlighted by Mukangara. Referring to a period of intensive villagisation beginning in 1973, he associates the shift from an era of “voluntary *Ujamaa*-isation” to a somewhat less voluntary exercise in the creation of development villages with “the thinking of the World Bank.” He adds:

I want to stress this because people have usually thought that villagisation in Tanzania was purely the act of the state of Tanzania. It was not. The idea came from them, that’s true, but it was fully supported by the World Bank ... which is why I’ve usually argued that villagisation in Tanzania was not collectivisation. It wasn’t. This is a point I want to emphasise.<sup>1068</sup>

Mukangara observes that for the better part of a decade, “the idea of *Ujamaa* villages had been voluntary. From the early ‘70s, it stops being voluntary – the idea of villagisation, not *Ujamaa* villages. They now called it development villages.”<sup>1069</sup>

During the period to which Mukangara refers, 13.5 million people were moved from their scattered rural homesteads and resettled in approximately 7,500 villages. The operation was preceded by a World Bank ‘fact finding’ mission to Tanzania in 1973. In 1978, by which time resettlement was complete, the World Bank allocated approximately \$600 million worth of credits and loans to Tanzania.<sup>1070</sup>

According to Mukangara, the massive resettlement of scattered homesteaders was in accord both with the welfare needs (free provision of primary education, health care, clean water, electricity and so on) of rural people, and with the objectives of a socialist regime that “never abandoned the idea of the welfare of the people.”<sup>1071</sup> He further notes that the scheme was not applied in the comparatively well-off Kilimanjaro district, where agricultural production was sufficiently well organised, not least because the population was not scattered. In general, while emphasising that the resettlement exercise was coercive, Mukangara seems to perceive villagisation as – in the final analysis - commensurate with rural welfare requirements.<sup>1072</sup> This said, he highlights an important distinction between on the one hand, welfare provision enabled by the creation of development villages, and on the other hand, fulfilment of Tanzanian socialist ideology in the form of *Ujamaa* villages – a separate and “very rare species” of which the World Bank “were not at all supportive.”<sup>1073</sup>

Coulson and Scott respectively contend that modernisation theory informed the trajectory of World Bank supported programmes in developing countries. Scott links the underlying logic of enforced villagisation with a 1961 World Bank report associated with Tanzania’s first Five Year Plan. The report, observes Scott, “was laced with the era’s standard discourse about having to overcome the habits and superstitions of a backward and obstinate peasantry. The report also doubted whether persuasion alone would get the job done.”<sup>1074</sup> In regard the transformation of peasant attitudes, the report warned that it well might prove necessary to resort to “enforcement or coercive measures of an appropriate sort.”<sup>1075</sup> Coulson, referring to British colonial policy as well as postcolonial World Bank reports, contends that both colonial and World Bank development plans drew on “the ideology of ‘modernisation theory’

or ‘dualism’, which distinguishes between the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional: everything ‘modern’ (or Western) is good, while the traditional is bad.’<sup>1076</sup>

Citing the striking parallels between villagisation in postcolonial Tanzania and late colonial policies of economic development in East Africa as a whole,<sup>1077</sup> Scott suggests that both the Tanzanian government and World Bank planners had failed to learn from the abject failure of colonial exercises in large-scale, across-the-board agricultural planning that omitted to take into account local specificities and knowledges. Thus, colonial and postcolonial developmental endeavours were informed by a science of modernisation that was abstract and teleological. Applied uncritically in widely divergent settings, it had disastrous results.<sup>1078</sup> Reinforcing the point, Hobart argues that a largely neglected aspect of severe developmental crises in the Third World is the part played in such disasters by Western scientific knowledge.<sup>1079</sup> For instance, modernisation theory’s categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are teleologically constructed, that is, defined by reference to the dominant category, itself derived from an assumption that the means to progress is scientific knowledge that “requires the homogenisation and quantifiability of what is potentially qualitatively different.”<sup>1080</sup> Further, modernisation theory views society or culture as an obstacle to change,<sup>1081</sup> thus imputing coercive measures as a necessary element in the modernisation of traditional societies.

In sum, ‘Operation Planned Villages’ reasonably can be regarded as a coercive, science-centred blot on the otherwise humanist and voluntarist landscape of ideology in Tanzania. However, it is worth noting firstly, that the exercise was conducted in accordance with the only politically ‘neutral’ developmental alternative to scientific socialism available at the

time. Secondly, that failure to achieve the desired economic objectives was at least as much the responsibility of a Western science of modernisation and its World Bank adherents as it was the responsibility of internal policy formulation and implementation. Thirdly, as Scott – who in general is highly critical of villagisation as rural developmental blueprint – concedes, extensive research and concomitant critical onslaughts were then, and still are facilitated by “the relatively open character of Tanzanian political life.”<sup>1082</sup>

The relative openness of political life in Tanzania not least was the product of a relatively open ruling party. In this respect, McHenry’s distinction between ‘ideological’ and ‘pragmatic’ socialists is instructive as it highlights the variegated ideological texture of the ruling party, ranging from “radical ideological socialists who differ little from Marxists to conservative pragmatic socialists who differ little from capitalists.”<sup>1083</sup> Additionally, Tordoff and Mazrui refer to “committed Maoists” within the party.<sup>1084</sup> A picture thus emerges of a political party able to accommodate a number of ideological trends, some of them distinctly oppositional. Locating the intermediate terrain between competing ideologies, and then utilising it to inform the overall purpose and direction of governance is a task fraught with difficulties - yet between independence in 1961 and his resignation as Tanzania’s President in 1985, Nyerere walked this delicate line. His accomplishment played no small part in holding both party and country together despite, for instance, the exacerbation by a revolution in Zanzibar of extant internal and external tensions.

Since the actually and potentially disruptive effects for the mainland of the 1964 Zanzibari revolution are closely related to problematics passed forward by colonialism, the next section of the chapter illustrates the contexts from which TANU’s ideology emerged.

### **Colonial-postcolonial problematics.**

At independence in 1961, mainland Tanzania (at that time still known as Tanganyika) was one of the poorest, most underdeveloped countries in the world.<sup>1085</sup> It in the main comprised a rural society living in scattered settlements and practising subsistence agriculture.<sup>1086</sup>

However, there were pockets of indigenous commercial farming – encouraged by the colonial administration – such as Kilimanjaro district and the Ismani region of Iringa district. In Ismani, for instance, the development of large farms utilising mechanised means of production and relying on hired labour had generated a distinction between a landed and a labouring class.<sup>1087</sup> Settler owned and managed plantations (coffee, rubber and sisal) had introduced a third type of agricultural production, in this case with racially differentiated categories of ‘landed’ and ‘labouring’. In the main, however, the British had restricted the expansion of settlers.

Iliffe notes that had Tanganyika remained part of German imperial territory, it would have become a settler colony since the German administrators “wanted their colony to be a white man’s country like Rhodesia or Kenya ... Only the expulsion of the Germans after the First World War prevented this.”<sup>1088</sup> While the British, in their capacity as League of Nations (followed by United Nations) mandated trustee, limited the alienation of rural Tanzanians from their land, this did not mean that subsistence farmers necessarily were free from British interference. On the contrary, colonial intervention in farming methods and production techniques caused indignation and resistance.<sup>1089</sup>

The potential for nationalist - as distinct from local - resistance to colonial rule in the rural areas was increased in 1951 when, in a departure from their usual procedure, the British

evicted more than 3,000 Meru from their land and replaced them with Europeans. The Meru Lands case was taken up by the predecessor – the Tanganyikan African Association (TAA) – of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and utilised to stimulate nationalist opposition to British rule. As one of the TAA leaders put it: “The eviction woke our Meru people up to the indignity of being ruled without our consent by foreigners. Now we are going to wake up all of Tanganyika.”<sup>1090</sup>

According to Cliffe and Cunningham, however, rural Tanzanians in the main “do not harbour a deep bitterness as a result of oppression and exploitation”, given that – with the exception of a few expatriate owned units – the colonial mainland harboured no large estates.

Distinguishing between post-independence Tanzania on the one hand, and on the other, Cuba and the People’s Republic of China, they contend that there is no “burning demand for land redistribution.”<sup>1091</sup>

Arguably, then, it was in the towns – which at independence contained less than 10% of the mainland’s population – that the injustice of racial discrimination most strongly was felt. For instance, at independence, only 547 of about 4,000 middle and higher-level government posts were held by Africans, and the British had left a legacy of minimal educational provision for Africans.<sup>1092</sup> Less than 15 Africans had completed their degrees at Makerere University in Uganda (at that time, the only tertiary institution in East Africa that issued University of London degrees). The newly independent country had 1 African civil engineer (compared with 83 from European and Asian minorities); 16 African physicians (compared with 168 from minority races); no African mechanical engineers (compared with 52 from minority races)<sup>1093</sup> ... and so the list continues, painting a stark picture of protracted discrimination

against an overwhelming majority of Africans, with bleak implications for the newly independent state. As Coulson and Leys respectively emphasise, Tanzania's national and developmental prospects were in the hands of a tiny political and administrative elite,<sup>1094</sup> TANU's mass base notwithstanding.

#### *Intra-TANU disputes*

Furthermore, this miniscule (relative to overall population) elite group by no means was fully supportive of Nyerere's policies firstly, of pre-independence negotiation and compromise with the British, and secondly, of post-independence non-racism. In regard to the first arena of contestation, Sungura recollects the opposition encountered by Nyerere at a 1958 TANU general meeting, convened in Tabora "to discuss responsible government."<sup>1095</sup> More specifically, the meeting focussed on the British administration's insistence on holding elections during the run-up to full independence in which each constituency would elect one African, one Asian and one European member to the Legislative Assembly. As Sungura recalls it:

The colonialists said that they would think of giving us independence and freedom if we agreed on three votes. Some of us didn't understand *Mwalimu* – why was he agreeing to vote on three separate rolls? We were after all fighting for the independence of the Africans and we didn't want to be given conditions by colonialists ... Despite the great difficulty, we finally reached agreement for the three votes ... after all, we did have white supporters.<sup>1096</sup>

In regard to the second arena of contestation, a proposal, put before the first independence parliament in 1961, to extend automatic citizenship to people of any race born in the country, and having one parent born in the country, generated an equivocal response. As Leys notes, while the proposal was "in keeping with the non-racialist philosophy of Mr. Nyerere",<sup>1097</sup> its

elevated sponsorship did not prevent heated debate. One TANU MP in particular made an impassioned speech against the proposal:

I think 75% of the non-Africans in Tanganyika still regard an African in Tanganyika as an inferior human being. Why is it so? It is because the white population has been dominating us, both economically and politically, and their neighbours, the Asians too have been economically dominating us, we Africans ... Do you think the ordinary African forming the vast majority of the population will agree to have equal rights with the Europeans and the Asians? My answer is No.<sup>1098</sup>

Nyerere's response to the above and other objections also is worth quoting:

Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against. This is what we have formed TANU for ... and so soon, so soon, ... some of my friends have forgotten it. Now they are preaching discrimination, colour discrimination, as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race ... These people are telling us exactly what Verwoerd says: 'The circumstances of South Africa are different'. This is the argument used by the racialists. My friend here ... talks as if it is perfectly alright to discriminate against the whites, against the Indians, against the Arabs, against the Chinaman. It is wrong when you discriminate against a black man.<sup>1099</sup>

Whereas Iliffe highlights TANU's strengths and merits as a nationalist movement,<sup>1100</sup> Leys contends that the relative ease of TANU's rise to prominence as the country's pre-eminent party of national liberation to an extent was responsible for subsequent altercations and divisions between party members. Citing evidence of large promises made by a number of TANU candidates to their electoral constituencies, Leys points out that the country's endemic poverty made it impossible for the newly elected government to fulfil expectations of rapid economic advance. Outcomes were heightened social tensions and a search for scapegoats, reflected in the party by a split "between the political leaders who formed the new cabinet and so became responsible for the limitations of the government, and those outside, including some who had made the largest promises to their followers."<sup>1101</sup>

### *Poverty and underdevelopment*

At this juncture in the discussion, a post-independence condition of widespread and endemic poverty – not least a product of a British policy of “benign neglect”<sup>1102</sup> – requires emphasis.

As already noted, while the countryside contained a limited number of comparatively well-off commercial farmers, known in the lexicon of World Bank-style modernisation as ‘progressive farmers’ in contradistinction to scientific socialism’s ‘kulaks’, a majority of rural Tanzanians were subsistence farmers. Given the concentration of the population in the rural areas, and the deliberately slow pace of colonial-era industrial and urban growth in conjunction with the exclusion of Africans from commercial and business opportunities, only a limited amount of class differentiation occurred under first German, and then British rule. While a working class was in the process of formation, it was very small, if increasingly well-organised.<sup>1103</sup>

Moreover, as Coulson points out, at independence the working class “was not predominantly an *industrial* working class, since there were so few industries. The independent country would have to arrange most of its own industrialisation in the highly competitive world markets of the 1960s and 1970s, starting from a virtually non-existent base.”<sup>1104</sup>

In regard to the country’s extremely low quality of life index (QLI), Legum supplies further details of material deprivation and daily struggle for survival. For instance, in 1962, the infant mortality rate was 225 per 1,000 live births, and adult life expectancy was 35.<sup>1105</sup> As Nyerere himself put it: “Our country is bedevilled by its present poverty; people are sick, ignorant, and live in very poor conditions because we do not produce enough wealth to be able to eradicate these evils.”<sup>1106</sup>

To sum up: it is evident that the issue of improvement in economic conditions and, in general, material welfare was immediate and urgent. Moreover, as noted, popular expectations had been raised by large promises embedded in nationalist discourse. Tensions and divisions generated by these issues then were exacerbated by army mutiny on the mainland and revolution in Zanzibar.

#### *Armed revolts and Cold War tensions*

The army mutiny of 1964 was precipitated by inadequate salaries for soldiers in tandem with retention of British officers who continued to dominate the army hierarchy. Demands were for increased pay, plus the rapid Africanisation of the officer corps. As Pratt puts it: “During the five days of uncertainty and irresolute leadership which followed the mutiny, the fragility of the power base of Nyerere’s government was painfully revealed.”<sup>1107</sup>

Coulson links the mutiny with the increasing militancy of trade union leaders who were campaigning for immediate nationalisation of the sisal industry, as well as much more rapid Africanisation of the civil service.<sup>1108</sup> However, the potential for concerted action on the part of mutineers and trade unionists was obviated by the army’s lack of a plan to take over the state. In consequence, four days after the mutiny began, its leaders “were only beginning to negotiate with the more militant trade union leaders.”<sup>1109</sup> The implications of such negotiations precipitated Nyerere’s request for British military assistance. The arrival of a contingent of British marines effectively terminated the mutiny. According to Kariuki, “Nyerere was deeply humiliated by the mutiny” given that “to invite the ex-colonial master to quell the rebellious army of an independent and proud country was indeed a humbling experience.”<sup>1110</sup> A second request for military back-up was made, this time to the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) who responded by sending Nigerian troops to replace the British contingent.

Another and costly crisis for the newly independent mainland was a revolution in Zanzibar which violently ousted a tradition of autocratic Arab leadership - shored up by the British during the period when Zanzibar was a British protectorate - and replaced it with a Revolutionary Council led by Karume, comprising members both of the Afro-Shirazi party (ASP) and Babu's militant *Umma* party. According to Pratt, Nyerere had warned the British that if – at independence for Zanzibar in 1964 – they continued to facilitate concentration of power in an Arab-led minority elite, they would “bequeath to Zanzibar an extremely unstable situation.”<sup>111</sup> As Lofchie explains, the origin of Zanzibar's instability was “the pattern of racial inequality in its social structure.” Land ownership was monopolised by a small minority of Arab descent. Additionally, “the presence of an Asian minority ... which monopolised virtually all of the middle-class positions in the society prevented Africans from achieving all but a few of the intermediate and clerical positions in government and commerce.”<sup>112</sup> Historically divisive problematics of race and class thus were exacerbated by British manipulation of electoral processes, and hence of the outcome of Zanzibar's independence election, Nyerere's warning notwithstanding.

Not only did a violent outbreak of revolutionary socialism in Zanzibar operate as a contributory factor to army mutiny on the mainland,<sup>113</sup> it also pulled Nyerere and TANU into the centripetal trajectory of the Cold War. Whereas the ousted, Arab-dominated Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) had been the beneficiary of continuing British involvement in Zanzibari affairs, the new regime and its Revolutionary Council acquired almost instant

political recognition and offers of material support from Soviet bloc countries. Clearly, the revolution in Zanzibar was regarded as a victory for vanguard-style socialism and, accordingly, as a defeat for the West.

However, at this critical juncture in the build-up of Cold War tensions off the mainland's coastline, Nyerere decisively intervened. A few months after the revolution, "suddenly and without prior announcement, Nyerere and Karume announced that they had signed an agreement of union between their two countries."<sup>114</sup> In this regard, it is noteworthy that Karume lobbied for support of the merger by the Revolutionary Council at a time when the lead figure (Babu) of the Council's particularly militant element was out of the country.

Supporters of scientific socialism (or, in Pratt's phrase, "the communist left"<sup>115</sup>) regarded the union of mainland and islands, jointly renamed the United Republic of Tanzania, with dismay. In Rey's perception, for instance, "it seemed that the brightest spark in Africa had been snuffed when the news came through of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar *anschluss*."<sup>116</sup>

Nonetheless, Rey glimpses light at the end of the tunnel. Citing among other factors the inclusion – Babu among them – of five members of the Revolutionary Council in the Union cabinet, he contends that "there is a good chance that the Union will lead to the 'spreading' of the Zanzibar revolution..."<sup>117</sup> According to McHenry, however, the union between mainland and islands did not – as things turned out – signify an advance in the vanguardist cause given that both Karume and Nyerere "feared the consequences of the rise of a militant left in Zanzibar."<sup>118</sup> Babu himself subsequently argued that by providing Marxists in the newly appointed Union cabinet with the appearance but not the substance of power, Nyerere "used the appointments to weaken the progressive forces."<sup>119</sup>

It seems evident that Nyerere acted not least to contain and thereafter manage the potential of the situation in Zanzibar to exacerbate extant race and class based dissonances on the mainland. Additionally, given Nyerere's critique of scientific socialism along with the Leninist notion of a vanguard party,<sup>1120</sup> Marxist-Leninist members of a merged cabinet were unlikely to find themselves in a particularly enabling environment. However, Nyerere's intervention to reduce the likelihood of violent upheavals on the mainland did not necessarily situate Tanzania in a Western ideological camp. Rather, his commitment to non-alignment was underlined by the Tanzanian government's refusal to succumb to the Hallstein doctrine, according to which West Germany would sever relations with any state that established diplomatic relations with East Germany.<sup>1121</sup> Instead, Nyerere offered a compromise: East Germany would be permitted to open a consulate in Dar es Salaam (now the capital of the Union), thus keeping open lines of communication between the two countries, but without actually committing Tanzania to political recognition of the East German government. West Germany rejected the compromise, and withdrew from mainland Tanzania a substantial amount of financial aid and technical advice.<sup>1122</sup>

Nyerere subsequently summed up the absurdity of Cold War-driven intransigence:

"The current position ... is that Tanzania does not recognise East Germany: it recognises West Germany and has an ambassador from Bonn in Dar es Salaam. Aid from East Germany continues to arrive in one part of the union: no aid comes from the West German government to any part of the Union."<sup>1123</sup>

Finally in this section on colonial - postcolonial problematics, Tanzania's status as a 'nation' was not something that Nyerere and TANU could afford to take for granted since, like the

vast majority of postcolonial states in Africa, Tanzania was the artificial product of imperial design. In a 1966 speech delivered at the inauguration ceremony of the University of Zambia, Nyerere addressed a key dilemma for proponents of Pan-African unity:

None of the nation states of Africa are ‘natural’ units. Our present boundaries are ... the result of European decisions at the time of the scramble for Africa. They are senseless; they cut across ethnic groups, often disregard natural physical divisions, and result in many different language groups being encompassed within a state. If the present states are not to disintegrate it is essential that deliberate steps are taken to foster a feeling of nationhood.<sup>1124</sup>

Taken all round, therefore, Nyerere’s definition of a “state of emergency” in his country (xxxiv) seems self-explanatory. Given so unpromising a post-independence context, maintaining equidistance between the dominant paradigms and ideologies of the Cold War could not be done if Tanzania had no distinctive ideology to call her own – an ideology which, as Nyerere put it, “involves building on the foundations of our past, and building also to our own design. We are not importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to smother our distinct social patterns with it.”<sup>1125</sup> By consciously endeavouring to construct a locus-specific category of socialist ideology, Nyerere made a sustained if not invariably successful attempt to refrain from invoking the god of the excluded middle.

### **The development of Nyerere’s political thought.**

It should be noted at the outset that this chapter does not operate on the assumption that Nyerere’s political thought and Tanzania’s ideology necessarily were one and the same phenomenon, nor even that Nyerere was the first Tanzanian to articulate premises central to the ideology’s subsequent elaboration. As Mukandala points out, as early as the 1930s,

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(xxxiv) See Chapter Two, p 48

Martin Kayamba and other leading figures in the Tanganyikan African Association “were propagating ideas of sharing, of equality, of classless society.”<sup>1126</sup> Referring to “ownership of ideologies”, Mukandala asks:

Who owns these ideologies? Is it the most eloquent? Or does it mean that the most eloquent is the originator of these ideas? Or he just picks up, collects these ideas and gives them expression (and publicity) in a powerful way? So he becomes associated with them but actually, some of these ideas were percolating around here long before Nyerere started talking about them.<sup>1127</sup>

Mukandala cites, for instance, Coulson’s comparison between Kayamba and Nyerere.<sup>1128</sup> As Coulson highlights, Kayamba argued against firstly, industrialisation and secondly, the emergence of an indigenous class of large land-owners. He observes that “both men had visions for the future of their people which in certain respects were remarkably alike”.<sup>1129</sup> While Coulson maintains that Nyerere is not the only source of ideology in Tanzania, he nonetheless suggests that a weakness of Shivji’s seminal work, *Class Struggles In Tanzania*, is that “it is so preoccupied with class struggles that it omits any discussion of Nyerere’s writing and his role as a creator of ideology ...”<sup>1130</sup>

In Siddiqui’s view, a study of the emergence of ideology in Tanzania to a significant extent is the study of the development of Nyerere’s political thought.<sup>1131</sup> In this respect, Legum sums up the mixed results for Nyerere of a close identification between the development of his thought and the development of ideology in Tanzania.

Although by no means an autocrat, Nyerere’s personal authority and political influence enabled him to stamp his own ideas on the country’s societal, constitutional and economic pattern of development so strongly that it is not possible to separate Tanzania’s achievements from the role of its leader, nor is it possible to avoid putting the blame on him personally for mistaken policies even though the decisions may have been taken against his advice and wishes, as did occur.<sup>1132</sup>

Finally in this preface to an investigation of Nyerere's political thought, I revisit Cabral's argument that "national liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities; they are ... the outcome of local and national elaboration, more or less influenced by external factors ... but essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of each people." (xxxv) This argument, among others put forward by Cabral in relation to Guinea-Bissau, bears comparison with Nyerere's emphasis on constructing a Tanzania-compatible ideology. In general, there are some notable similarities in Cabral's and Nyerere's efforts to formulate context specific ideologies for their respective countries - the difference being that Cabral did not live long enough to deploy his ideas *qua* crucible of post-independence ideology.

In its earliest published incarnation, Nyerere's thinking evidenced cultural essentialist leanings. For instance, in an article written prior to independence, he contends that the ability to conduct democratic discussion "is as African as the tropical sun" since "the traditional African society ... was a society of equals."<sup>133</sup> Utilising an idealised notion of traditional society as a baseline, he argues in favour of African unanimism. "The new nations of the African continent are emerging today as the result of their struggle for independence. This struggle for freedom from foreign domination is a patriotic one which necessarily leaves no room for difference."<sup>134</sup>

Here, Nyerere conflates essentialism and instrumentalism within an undifferentiated African nationalism. Had his thinking remained trapped within the matrix of reverse

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(xxxv) See Chapter Nine, pp 268-269

discourse, (xxxvi) it would not have advanced his quest to provide TANU with a distinctive theoretical base. However, in January 1962 he resigned from government office and devoted the better part of a year - prior to his election as the mainland's President in December 1962 - to formulating central premises of his party's variation on a humanist theme.

*'Changing the mood'*

In an interview with Cranford Pratt in 1966, Nyerere addressed his reasons for resigning from office in 1962. As Pratt records, among other motivating factors was a conversation with a TANU branch secretary who wanted to know what he and others like him would get out of independence in terms of bigger salaries and so forth. Nyerere responded: "We were seeking independence and we have it. It is no use asking what I get out of this." He, however, perceived his response as inadequate given that "I was in a weak position to explain the difficulties of change as long as I was heading the government."<sup>135</sup> In short, his own position in government compromised the moral high ground with which to combat the individual economic expectations of Tanzania's governing fraction – expectations that, if fulfilled, would further widen an extant gap between leaders and people. As he put it, "I had to leave government in order to be an effective teacher. I had to change the mood."<sup>136</sup>

More than three decades later, Nyerere discussed his 1962 mission with Bill Sutherland. In this interview, he emphasised elitist tendencies inherent in a rush to acquire government posts, and concomitant weakening of the party he regarded as ...

... the real cement of the country ... It had built the unity of the people, it had achieved the independence from colonialism, and it was quite clear to me that if I continued in government ... the Party, which I saw as more important than

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(xxxvi) See Chapter Four, p110

government for the people, would disintegrate. The cadres we had built up all wanted to join the government: they all wanted to join the government! ... I had to get out and organise.<sup>1137</sup>

That members of TANU at the time were aware of the main thrust of Nyerere's mission is suggested by Sungura: "*Mwalimu*, after being the first Prime Minister in 1960, came to find that the government had much power rather than the party, so the party was not fulfilling its objectives. He decided to resign so to strengthen the objectives of the party."<sup>1138</sup>

It seems evident, then, that for Nyerere, Tanzania was TANU 'writ large'. During 1962, he launched an ongoing process of constructing guidelines for both party and country, while simultaneously drawing on autochthonous value systems and forms of political and economic organisation. From the outset, these guidelines contained overtly ethical connotations, as demonstrated by a paper written by Nyerere during his leave of absence, viz, "*Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism*."<sup>1139</sup> While this paper does not markedly depart from a one dimensional portrayal of traditional society,<sup>1140</sup> it utilises socialist humanism as an ethical baseline from which to confront the predatory tendencies of postcolonial elites in the related realms of wealth and power. Having (famously – or infamously from a scientific Marxist perspective) defined socialism as "an attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern",<sup>1141</sup> Nyerere denounces "acquisitiveness for the purpose of gaining power and prestige" as "unsocialist." Further, "in an acquisitive society wealth tends to corrupt those who possess it."<sup>1142</sup>

It is therefore up to the people of Tanganyika ... to make sure that this socialist attitude of mind is not lost through the temptations to personal gain (or to the abuse of positions of authority) which may come our way as individuals, or through the temptation to look on the good of the whole community as of secondary importance to the interests of our own particular group.<sup>1143</sup>

### *A National Ethic*

In a 1962 speech to Parliament, Nyerere emphasised the importance of a national ethic as the only truly effective means of safeguarding democratic freedoms. “If the people do not have that kind of ethic, it does not matter what kind of constitution you frame. They can always be victims of tyranny.”<sup>1144</sup> Extending his definition of socialism as an attitude of mind to incorporate democracy as a “declaration of faith in human nature”, he contended that “every enemy of democracy is some person who somewhere has no faith in human beings. He doubts. He thinks he is all right, but other people are not all right.”<sup>1145</sup>

As was – by 1962 – already evident, Nyerere both drew on broad humanist principles and articulated such principles in context-specific mode. His stated objective in the speech noted above is a government and a people who say: we cannot implement or tolerate tyrannical forms of governance because “it is un-Tanganyikan.”<sup>1146</sup>

Early in 1966, during a ‘meet-the-people’ tour of Mafia island, Nyerere elaborated this theme in a speech entitled “Leaders must not be masters”.<sup>1147</sup> Referring to his use of the word ‘*Ujamaa*’, he explained that in the first instance, it “denotes the kind of life lived by a man and his family – father, mother, children and near relatives” – an extended family system in which “no-one used wealth for the purpose of dominating others.”<sup>1148</sup> In the second instance, *Ujamaa* is emblematic of a national ethic in which – as far as possible – the nation lives as one family.<sup>1149</sup> This process of ‘nation-family’ creation embedded in an egalitarian ethos requires that the Tanzanian people reject a habit that colonialism attempted to instil, namely, that of not questioning their leaders. In order to avoid the replication – in a postcolonial era –

of binary divisions between leaders and led, oppressors and oppressed, rich and poor, “our aim is to remove fear from the minds of our people.”<sup>1150</sup>

Butiku defines this inclusive principle with which to replace fear-induced colonial binaries as inherent in the notion of *Ujamaa*, which is “a way of life. And the idea is: at national level, is it possible to transfer the way of life at the higher level?”<sup>1151</sup> He then illustrates the point with reference to ethnic differentiation within Tanzanian borders. “We are all living together in one country ... we are human. We have needs. Can we continue a life of love, a life of working with one another, a life of ensuring that everybody is respected, gets basic needs before any of them lives in luxury?”<sup>1152</sup> Nyerere’s objective, then, was not only to replace the exclusivity engendered by a colonial ethos with the inclusivity of an extended family tradition, but also to modify colonial legacies of fear and subservience by utilising a notion of ‘love’ that according to Butiku, translates as:

I’m human, you are human, to that extent we are equal. A relationship should be on the basis of that equality as human beings. You have a duty towards me, you have a duty towards yourself. I have a duty towards you, I have a duty towards myself. Both of us together have a duty towards ourselves plus towards humanity as a whole. So ... *Ujamaa* is inclusive.<sup>1153</sup>

The inclusivity embedded in the concept of *Ujamaa* is of particular significance in the light of Tanzania’s *de jure* conversion, in 1963, to a one-party state – a conversion that in most post-independence African states heralded the arrival of that generic phenomenon, the postcolonial ‘developmental dictatorship’. Nyerere’s effort to avoid this all too common outcome first was articulated at a TANU annual conference in 1963 where he outlined the case for intra-party, *ipso facto*, intra-country democracy, and argued that “where there is one party, and that

party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community.”<sup>1154</sup> He, however, did not leave his premise stuck on this somewhat polemical level. Rather, he substantiated it in terms of institutional requirements for safeguarding democratic freedoms. Firstly, TANU should be a mass party, with membership open to all Tanzanian citizens. Secondly, elections regularly should be held. He then conflated the two requirements: “As long as TANU membership is open to every citizen, we can conduct our elections in a way which is genuinely free and democratic.”<sup>1155</sup>

In 1965, Nyerere visited the People’s Republic of China. Sungura, one of fourteen TANU officials subsequently selected to personally investigate socialism in China, recalls the frugality of the life-style along with an overwhelming ethic of hard work. He contends that the Arusha Declaration of 1967 significantly was influenced by Tanzania’s connection with China.<sup>1156</sup> Lwehabura, however, modifies this contention by describing Tanzania’s socialist ideology as a mixture of ingredients, some of which were adopted from the ideologies of other countries, and then adapted to suit Tanzania’s specific needs.<sup>1157</sup> Nyerere himself, in an otherwise laudatory speech made in honour of Chou en Lai’s return visit, inserted a minatory note: “Neither our principles, our country, nor our freedom to determine our own destiny are for sale.”<sup>1158</sup> This assertion was elaborated in an address to the International Press Club in London in 1965. Having emphasised the concrete results - in terms of much needed financial aid - of Tanzania’s exchange of state visits with China, Nyerere attributed a Western concern that Tanzania has been “‘contaminated’ by these contacts” to a polarised and paranoid Cold

War ethos. “I gather” he observed, “that even the suits I wear have been adduced as evidence of pernicious Chinese influence!”<sup>159</sup>

### *The Arusha Declaration*

In 1967, Nyerere’s draft of the Arusha Declaration was submitted to TANU’s National Executive Committee (NEC) for consideration. As the preface to the declaration emphasises, amendments subsequently were made by the NEC. “The declaration thus is a Party document, not the exclusive work of the President.” The preface further asserts that the declaration “marked a turning point in Tanzanian politics” since “the ideology of the country was made specific by it.”<sup>160</sup>

Although demonstrably informed by the various strands of Nyerere’s thought, differences of opinion between the President and the NEC arguably can be detected in aspects of the Declaration’s content. For instance, whereas in 1963, Nyerere had argued that party membership should be open to all Tanzanian citizens, the Arusha Declaration asserted that “a socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves practice, the principles of socialism.”<sup>161</sup> This said, ‘the principles of socialism’ are broadly defined, and include “the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of association within the context of the law.”<sup>162</sup> Further, ubiquitous references in the declaration to ‘peasants and workers’ were modified by Nyerere in his introduction to *Freedom And Socialism*. Here, he contended that it is not necessary to distinguish – for instance – between manual labourers, office workers, and professionally trained people since “all who contribute to the society by their work are workers.”<sup>163</sup>

Three tenets in particular can be considered central to the Arusha Declaration's attempt to construct and, thereafter, implement a pervasively egalitarian ethos in Tanzania. While nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy<sup>1164</sup> did not markedly distinguish Tanzania from other attempts in postcolonial Africa to implement socialist economic policies, two additional – and related – tenets are indicative of Tanzanian specificity. Firstly, replacement of a previous emphasis on urban and industrial development with a national focus on the development of agriculture.<sup>1165</sup> Secondly, and perhaps most notably given Nyerere's preoccupation with elite / people disjunctures, a leadership code. The Declaration defined 'leaders' as members of the NEC, as ministers and members of parliament, as senior officials in TANU and TANU-related organisations, and as high and middle level civil servants. It prohibited leaders from owning shares or holding directorships in privately owned enterprises, from receiving more than two salaries, and from owning houses in order to rent them out.<sup>1166</sup>

At this point in the chapter's exposition of Nyerere's and the NEC's attempt to forestall – or at any rate, meaningfully restrict – the development in Tanzania of an entrenched property owning<sup>1167</sup> elite, it is instructive to revisit Cabral's notion of 'class suicide'. While Cabral formulated his thesis in the context of pre-independence armed struggle against a metropolitan power, as distinct from the Arusha Declaration's codification of ideology in post-independence Tanzania, it nonetheless is arguable that 'class suicide' and TANU's leadership code are connected by their respective intentions to anticipate, and thereby short-circuit, the abiding problematic of the formation and reproduction of rapacious elites in postcolonial Africa.<sup>1168</sup> As Nyerere put it in his introduction to *Freedom and Socialism*,

“there will be no ‘masters’ who sit in idleness while others labour on ‘their’ farms or in ‘their’ factories. Nor will there be too great a degree of inequality between the incomes of different members of the society.”<sup>1169</sup>

### *Freedom and Socialism*

In the introduction cited above, Nyerere’s opening move is to qualify an earlier and markedly essentialist depiction of a hypothetically classless traditional society. While asserting that “we have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out of our own roots”, he does not claim that society in precolonial Tanzania was undifferentiatedly egalitarian. Rather, he avers that “we are emphasising certain characteristics of our traditional organisation”,<sup>1170</sup> and argues that:

Speaking generally, and despite the existence of a few feudalistic communities, traditional Tanzanian society had many socialist characteristics ... Despite the low level of material progress, traditional society was in practice organised on a basis which was in accordance with socialist principles.<sup>1171</sup>

In short, he contends that there are structures and attitudes already in place that “provide a basis on which modern socialism can be built.”<sup>1172</sup>

As I see it, the significance of the intention to construct socialism on the foundations of egalitarian elements within traditional beliefs and practices is that it represents an attempt to formulate an ideology that in key respects adequately is congruent with the lived experience of rural Tanzanians, hence modifying the impact on lived worlds of iron cage knowledge. In this regard, Nyerere’s distinction between socialism and science is noteworthy. Rejecting the notion of science as absolute and unconditionally applicable knowledge, he argues for its finite and conditional application to social reality.

A scientist works to discover truth. He does not claim to know it, nor is he seeking to discover truth as revealed – which is the job of the theologian. A scientist works on the basis of the knowledge which has been accumulated empirically, and which is held to be true *until new experience demonstrates otherwise ...*<sup>1173</sup> (emphasis added)

Nyerere then highlights the extent to which Marx's thesis was the product of a specific time and place, viz, "Europe in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century."<sup>1174</sup> Arguing that "it is ... unscientific to appeal to his writings as Christians appeal to the Bible, or Muslims to the Koran", he concludes that

It is no part of the job of a socialist in 1968 to worry about whether or not his actions and proposals are in accordance with what Marx and Lenin wrote, and it is a waste of time and energy to spend hours – if not months and years – trying to prove that what you have decided is objectively necessary is really in accordance with their teachings.<sup>1175</sup>

Given Nyerere's finite and cautious estimate of knowledge that qualifies as scientific, it is not surprising that he does not launch an attack on capitalism from a scientific baseline. Rather, his critique is humanist and normative. Having stated that "under socialism, Man is the purpose of all social activity",<sup>1176</sup> he lambastes the "social evils" of capitalist systems in which progress is judged according to the production of consumer goods, preceded by the creation of a market, and in which man *qua* consumer is king.<sup>1177</sup> Such systems generate destructive (because overly-competitive) individualism, along with social aggressiveness and a proliferation of human indignities.<sup>1178</sup> In short, instead of treating people as equal in their humanity, their right to dignity, and their need for respect, capitalism's cult of consumerism both entrenches and glorifies inequality.

Further, since Tanzania is attempting to minimise the damage wrought by class, ethnic, religious and racial divisions, Nyerere defends the suitability of one party – albeit inclusive

and consensual – democracy. He asserts that that this brand of democracy was adopted in response to Tanzania's specific conditions and "special problems."<sup>1179</sup> He adds that:

The resultant constitution is not perfect but we believe that it suits us better than any system operating elsewhere, and we believe that it safeguards the people's sovereignty at the same time as it enables the effective and strong government so essential at this stage of our development.<sup>1180</sup>

Nyerere moves on to query the notion that 'true' socialism necessarily is the product of a violent upheaval. Cautioning that "socialism does not spring ready-made out of the womb of violence", he highlights a "legacy of bitterness, suspicion and hostility"<sup>1181</sup> attendant on violent solutions to oppression and discrimination. While conceding that violent revolutions on occasion are "a regrettable necessity" since they represent the only available way forward, he asserts that "violence cannot be welcomed by those who care about people",<sup>1182</sup> *ergo*:

Violence itself is the opposite of a socialist characteristic. Brigands can govern by violence and fear; dictatorships can establish themselves and flourish. Socialism cannot be imposed in this way, for it is based on equality. It denies the right of any individual or small minority, to say, 'I know and the others are fools who must be led like sheep.'<sup>1183</sup>

Nyerere then addresses problems of building socialism in postcolonial contexts. As he sees it, the postcolonial state has inherited a dilemma attendant on nationalism's lack of an inclusive, forward-looking ideology, hence its tendency simply to demand Africanisation – the replacement, as he puts it, of white and brown faces by black ones – as an end in itself.

Creating still more difficulties was the fact that the colonialism we fought against was that of a people who happened to be of a different race than ourselves. It was fatally easy to identify the thing you were fighting against as people of this other race ...<sup>1184</sup>

Thus, an all too frequent outcome of nationalist struggle was that "humanity took second place."<sup>1185</sup>

### ***Ujamaa: conclusion.***

The beneficial effects for Tanzania of Nyerere's focus on an inclusive notion of humanity as distinct from the reproduction – in a postcolonial era - of colonialism's 'self' and 'other' binaries, is argued below. I do not contend, however, that *Ujamaa* was an unmixed success. Had the ideology adequately fulfilled its economic objectives, Tanzania would not have had to implement a World Bank structural adjustment programme in 1982, nor – in 1985 - agree to undertake economic liberalisation (with all attendant social welfare reductions) in return for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. Indeed, given Tanzania's status as one of the world's least developed countries in tandem with a world order unfavourable to poor countries,<sup>1186</sup> it seems reasonable to speculate that *Ujamaa's* long-term objective of economic self-reliance was doomed from the start. As Saul observes: "Here it is important to underscore the correctness of the basic premise from which Nyerere's policies flowed: the global capitalist system did not then, does not now serve Africa well."<sup>1187</sup>

My retrospective, however, is not utilised to minimise – by dismissing as futile or significantly misconceived – TANU-CCM's attempt to construct and implement a mode of development congruent with social realities in Tanzania. Rather, it is suggested that under Nyerere's guidance, the party made a sustained effort to avoid following in either capitalist or communist footsteps by adopting a formula that Marcuse tentatively defined as the only available alternative for Third World countries, namely, a planned policy of extending and improving traditional modes of life and labour on their own grounds. (xxxvii)

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(xxxvii) See Chapter Eight, p 235

Since – in the first instance – humanist voluntarism was at the heart of this policy, the party in its capacity as vehicle of ideology in the main abstained from coercively conveying iron cage or expert knowledge to the lived world of Tanzanians. In the second instance, however, voluntarism was abandoned in favour of rapid modernisation of traditional environments, informed by a universal, purportedly neutral science of development, and thus – while facilitating welfare objectives – was inconsistent with the humanist trajectory of Nyerere's thought, and his repudiation of ideology as universally applicable development paradigm.

In regard to this conundrum, it is instructive to revisit Nyerere's focus – arguably, his over-focus – on the party in its role as the glue that held together the otherwise fissiparous texture of decolonising and postcolonial Tanzania. While intra-party democracy was practiced in Tanzania to an extent unreplicated elsewhere in *de jure* one party states in Cold War era Africa, the act of outlawing opposition parties itself is of questionable democratic legitimacy, and potentially imputes an authoritarian outcome, thus underwriting Gellner's inference that in developing countries, separation between iron cage and lived world is not really a viable option. (xxxviii) There is thus a contradiction at the heart of Nyerere's thesis which expressed itself in a tendency to view the party as knowing better than did the people themselves what was good for them.<sup>1188</sup> It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that this tendency enabled – at certain junctures – a supposition that the party represented the 'general (or real) will' as opposed to the 'apparent will' of the people.<sup>1189</sup>

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(xxxviii) See Chapter Two, pp 47-48

However, it also is arguable that Nyerere was aware of this incipiently authoritarian contradiction between his humanist beliefs, on the one hand, and his stout defence of one-party democracy on the other, and that he felt it was justified as long as Tanzania's party and government elite adequately conformed with the strictures of the Arusha Declaration's leadership code, and as long as the welfare needs of the people were given priority. Since Tanzania's 1985 agreement with the IMF, signed into effect after Nyerere had stepped down as President, decimated the network of state subsidised welfare previously available to Tanzanians, and since CCM's 1991 abrogation of the leadership code removed both justifications for maintaining *de jure* one party rule, it is unsurprising that Nyerere's voice was foremost in calling for the legalisation of opposition parties.

By way of elaborating the above argument, I revisit Mannheim's notion of 'relative utopia' as a set of transcendent ideas that part company with wish projections if and only if the utopian conception is in close alignment with currents already present in society. (xxxix) At the juncture, therefore, where structures that had underpinned a relative utopia in Tanzania definitively were eroded, CCM transmogrified into a party that – by combining wish projection with defence of the status quo – embodied an 'ideological idea'. At this juncture, Nyerere no longer was able to sustain a utopian vision, and thus ceased to endorse the notion of intra-party democracy, instead advocating inter-party competition. Viewed in this light, his change of direction is consistent with his democratic principles. By challenging the legitimacy of CCM's claim exclusively to represent the people, Nyerere was instrumental

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(xxxix) See Chapter Three, pp 74-75

in reviving the flagging (given a marked decline in party membership<sup>1190</sup>) legitimacy of the Tanzanian state.

Lastly in this conclusion, I address the proposition that *Ujamaa* has continuing and beneficial effects for Tanzania. It has to be said that the proposition generates a potential problem for this dissertation. If, in 1985, *Ujamaa* in its capacity as a politically legitimating and socially cohesive ideology effectively was rendered obsolete in the economic sphere by International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored liberalisation, is it feasible to argue that the ideology nonetheless has endowed post Cold War era Tanzania with a substantive political and social legacy? After all, as Mukandala puts it:

There are people who maintain that there were aspects of *Ujamaa* ... the social policies were good; the economic policies were disastrous. But my point to them is: this is a package. The schools were run on the profits of the nationalised banks. If you did not have nationalised banks generating these profits, the school system wouldn't have run, and so on.<sup>1191</sup>

However, Mukandala, having imputed a problem for the research, subsequently supplies an answer. Referring to social cohesiveness and a sense of national unity in Tanzania, he observes that “these things are not given, they are not given. These were the results and products of *Ujamaa* policy ... to the extent that they are valued even today. And so the leadership will not go beyond a certain point to undermine this.”<sup>1192</sup> Citing an outbreak of police brutality in Zanzibar in which (at least) thirty people were killed, he attributes a subsequent government decision to “put in place a mechanism to correct these problems”<sup>1193</sup> to the lasting effects of *Ujamaa* which “made people feel that they were valued. That they counted.” He further contends that in Tanzania there still exist “strong feelings of equity, of fair play and so forth, which, I think, is a legacy of *Ujamaa*”.<sup>1194</sup> In similar vein, Butiku

underlines the inclusive humanism of Nyerere's vision. "People ... at first they thought he was just fighting for black people. No. Here, he fought for humanity ...", and asserts that Tanzanians remember Nyerere to this day "because he gave them peace and unity. The peace they see; the unity they see."<sup>1195</sup>

In sum, by combining elements of socialist humanism with Tanzania-specific articulation in the form of *Ujamaa*, Nyerere – as Masolo puts it – came up with a crucial statement about the role of the community in the shaping of personhood. This sociality of personhood in which the role of the community and the responsibility of the individual closely are intertwined, "is at the very foundation of being human, part of the human ideal."<sup>1196</sup> Masolo markedly distinguishes between this project of 'relationism', as he terms it, and postcolonial regimes in which "rule by the dictator became the way of life" paradoxically justified with reference to "the consolidation and preservation of the national community."<sup>1197</sup>

I conclude that *Ujamaa* occupies a "third space of enunciation" that, while not axiomatically liberatory, contains liberatory possibilities.<sup>1198</sup> By exploring and building on such possibilities, the ideology succeeded in creating a national ethic that served the country well in the related realms of peace and stability, and that continues to inform state-societal relations in post Cold War era Tanzania.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### CONCLUSION

This conclusion begins by revisiting the conceptual base of hypotheses, themes and argumentation that in combination constitute the dissertation. In the process, links between concepts are systematised and clarified. Having itemised the contributions made by exclusionary paradigmatic epistemology to ideological outcomes, I then outline the dissertation's concluding arguments.

The study is premised on a notion of 'African crisis', specifically a crisis of the state in the related spheres of political legitimacy and social cohesion. Since both spheres fall within the operational ambit of the concept of 'ideology', the dissertation hypothesises that – far from being irrelevant to an investigation of state crisis – a failed ideology both contributes to and is an aspect of state crisis.

The better to investigate the problematic of ideology in Africa, the dissertation distinguishes between ideology *per se* and phenomena or practices deemed 'ideological'. In regard the latter category, I avoid oversimplification of complex issues by utilising Mannheim's nuanced definitions. According to Mannheim, an 'ideological idea' manifests itself in two main ways. One ideological manifestation can be found in a representation of reality which emerges from ruling groups, usually political parties, and which is configured by an intention to suppress alternate realities. Mannheim's definition does not necessarily impute conscious mendacity on the part of ruling groups. Rather, he suggests that this type of ideological manifestation is

a product of unconscious denial, the function of which is to protect and maintain the status quo. (xl) The second manifestation of an 'ideological idea' includes an intention – or wish – to transform the status quo, and in this respect at least, is not dissimilar to a situationally transcendent 'utopian idea'. (xli)

It is noteworthy that both ideological manifestations share with utopia a wish projection element that obscures certain aspects of reality. However, whereas the status quo manifestation by definition resists transformation of the existing order, and thus is clearly distinguishable from a utopian idea, a would-be transformative, if ineffectual, ideological idea can be difficult to distinguish from a utopian idea. In short, Mannheim's thesis imputes a grey area in which ideological and utopian ideas co-exist.

In the final analysis, however, Mannheim defines a utopian idea as – unlike its ideological counterpart – drawing from currents already present in society, and giving expression to them. (xlii) Thus, the ineffectiveness of a would-be transformative idea is explicable in terms of its failure adequately to connect with extant social realities: hence the designation 'ideological' appended to it by Mannheim. Further, it is argued in the dissertation that Mannheim's conception of a utopian idea bears comparison with Gramsci's depiction of an organic ideology as informed by popular conviction in contradistinction to a mechanistic or arbitrary ideology that by definition is insufficiently rooted in social beliefs. (xliii)

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(xl) See Chapter Three, p 73

(xli) See Chapter Three, pp 73-74

(xlii) See Chapter Three, p 75

(xliii) See Chapter Three, pp 75

The dissertation draws on Mannheim's and Gramsci's respective definitions and distinctions when considering the ability of ideology in Africa to surmount the formidable obstacles passed forward to postcolonial states by their colonial forebears. In this respect, it is contended that ideologies at least adequately congruent with the lived worlds of African societies have attained – both in decolonising and postcolonial contexts - levels of political legitimacy and social cohesion unreplicated by nationalist movements and political parties that buy into exogenous, purportedly universal models.

In general, it seems reasonable to suppose that an ideology which to an adequate extent is informed by the lived world to which it applies itself is less rather than more ideological. Conversely, an ideology that imposes a uniform, universalised grid on complex and diverse local realities is more rather than less ideological, issues of good faith or transformative purpose notwithstanding.

The hypothesis outlined above is closely linked to another, namely that two dominant social science paradigms in Cold War era Africa - modernisation theory and scientific Marxism - are implicated in the crisis of the state. Accordingly, the dissertation develops and elaborates the concept of an 'ideological paradigm' by exploring the positivist roots of modernisation and Marxist paradigms, and also by investigating the interface between ideology and science. It is noted that from this interface emerged a notion that ideology is the property of the 'other' while science is the property of the 'self'.

In other words, beginning with the European Enlightenment, ideology increasingly came to be defined as false knowledge, science as true knowledge. This dispute over the 'real' or

'proper' grounds of knowledge reached its apotheosis in a Cold War dispute between Western and Soviet epistemological positions. Each side defined its own epistemology as scientific, hence true, while defining the epistemology of the other as ideological, hence false. States in the underdeveloped regions of the world duly were affected by the epistemological dichotomy that characterised the Cold War era inasmuch as they were presented with two competing modes of development, one purportedly scientific, the other purportedly ideological – and vice versa.

The dissertation contends that the struggle to apply contextually apposite ideology also is a struggle to formulate an epistemological base that, while substantive, eludes the inflexibility and reductionism of the Euro- North America–centric epistemological binaries that inform the dominant social science paradigms of the Cold War era. Further, to the extent that the post Cold War era is characterised by the dominance of a neoliberal paradigm, (xliv) this contention is of continuing relevance.

In order to clarify and round-off the above argument, I now summarise and elucidate key features of an ideological paradigm.

A paradigm qualifies as ideological firstly, if its linear and teleological trajectory in effect conflates the centre of power and the centre of truth. In the respective cases of modernisation theory and scientific Marxism, teleological endpoints are located either in Europe or in North America, thus effectively relegating Africa to the periphery both of knowledge and of power.

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(xliv) See Chapter One, pp 20-25

Secondly, and concomitantly, a paradigm is deemed ideological if it is embedded in a realist formula that conclusively disempowers alternate realities. Drawing on Gellner's thesis, (xlv) the dissertation likens an 'X = either A or non-A' binary formula to the 'god of the excluded middle', and argues that this formula, if adopted by developmental regimes, enables the coercive conveyance of iron cage or expert knowledge to the lived world. Bearing in mind that the scientificity of the dominant paradigms in Cold War era Africa respectively endorse a wholesale concentration of power in the hands of nationalist elites, (xlvi) both paradigms reasonably can be charged with contributing to an outcome in which "social and intellectual legitimacy belong to those who hold power and who believe themselves to be authorised to define, often violently, the standards of behaviour."<sup>199</sup>

Thirdly, a paradigm qualifies as ideological if it subscribes to a positivist interpretation of social reality as closed-ended, hence amenable to the imposition of scientifically conceived solutions and future predictions. Here, the dissertation draws on Bhaskar's critique of empiricism and Gramsci's critique of positivist trends in Marxism (xlvii) in order to highlight the implications of a quest for certainty in the social sciences. This problematic quest, and its interconnectedness with the reigning ideologies of the Cold War, is summed up by the Gulbenkian Commission:

Social scientists, no less than political or religious leaders, have missions; they seek the universal acceptance of certain practices in the belief that this will maximise the possibility of certain ends, such as knowing the truth. Under the banner of the universality of science, they seek to define the forms of knowledge that are scientifically legitimate and those that fall outside the pale of acceptability. Because the dominant ideologies defined themselves as reflecting and incarnating reason, both presiding over action and determining presumptively universal paradigms, to reject

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(xlv) See Chapter Two, pp 44-48

(xlvii) See Chapter Four, pp 93-102

(xlvii) See Chapter Two, pp 56-60

these views was said to be choosing ‘adventure’ over ‘science’, and seemed to imply opting for uncertainty ...<sup>1200</sup>

In short, this dissertation defines as ideological any social science paradigm that perceives itself as operating ‘under the banner of the universality of science.’

Fourthly, a paradigm qualifies as ideological if it incorporates a self-sustaining mythology in which the ‘other’ (that is, the human object/s of social science research) is held culpable for the presence of an anomaly, or problem for the paradigm. Basing my analysis on Kuhn’s thesis of paradigm change in the natural (or ‘hard’) sciences, (xlviii) I surmise that a social science paradigm is in danger of becoming ‘a monster’ if it elides the reflexivity of theory in the sense of a mutually constitutive relationship between researcher and researched, whether purposive or not, welcome or not. To deny all and any responsibility in the event of unintended and / or unwelcome outcomes in the lived world, while at the same time asserting the universality of one’s paradigm is logically untenable. As the Gulbenkian Commission puts it: “If social science is an exercise in the search for universal knowledge, then the ‘other’ cannot logically exist, for the ‘other’ is part of ‘us’ – the us that is studied, the us that is engaged in studying.”<sup>1201</sup>

Fifthly, a paradigm qualifies as ideological if – by claiming equivalence with the ‘hard’ sciences – it markets itself as a purveyor of scientifically guaranteed progress. In so doing, it absolutises itself as a scientific world view, thereby reducing the pluralism and multiple realities of the lived world to a single common equation.<sup>1202</sup> In short, it resorts to ‘scientism’, that is, a denial that there are significant differences in the methods appropriate for studying

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(xlviii) See Chapter Three, pp 64-70

social and natural objects,<sup>1203</sup> combined with an assertion that a social science paradigm is capable of – and should – replicate the precision and objectivity of the ‘hard’ sciences.<sup>1204</sup> By identifying knowledge with science,<sup>1205</sup> scientism excludes from substantive consideration human values, and norms of ‘right conduct’, whether culturally specific or generally applicable, thus relegating socio-cultural ethics to the shadowy domain of quasi-phenomena. Further, since proponents of scientism by definition cannot seriously entertain alternate possibilities, it seems reasonable to suppose that paradigms stand or fall by the efficacy and accuracy - or otherwise - of their solutions and predictions.

The dissertation thus suggests not only that modernisation and Marxist paradigms failed in their respective developmental endeavours in Africa, but also that they are implicated in the normative vacuum at the heart of many, if not most, developmental one-party states in Cold War era Africa. Overall, the universal pretensions of paradigms are queried. Instead, the study leans toward Mudimbe’s perspective on the social sciences.

All social sciences can be really understood in the context of their epistemological realms of possibility. The histories of these sciences as well as their trends, their truths as well as their experiences, being derived from a given space, speak from it and primarily about it.<sup>1206</sup>

However, the dissertation does not endorse the notion of an exclusively African epistemology, not least since to do so would be to uncritically accept the ‘counter-myth’ or ‘reverse discourse’ of cultural nationalism which, in the process of inverting a realist formula, paradoxically reproduces its ontological and epistemological binaries. (xlix)

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(xlix) See Chapter Four, pp 114-120

Moreover, to the extent that intellectual and political elites in Africa have represented themselves as possessors and interpreters of truths derived from an essentialised notion of African culture, they are culpable of imposition 'from above' of undifferentiated cultural presumptions. I argue that such an imposition has disturbing implications. It is all too easy, for instance, to reject a universal discourse of human rights on the basis that it is 'un-African' and thus does not reflect indigenous cultural norms and practices. In general, elite-privileging deployment of an assumed cultural essentialism potentially enables the binarisation of African peoples into A (authentically African) or non-A (not African enough, or not really African at all) and thus putatively underwrites coercive conversion (or expulsion or slaughter) of the 'other'.

In a discussion of the search for an autonomous framework of knowledge in Africa, Ashcroft, commenting on "the difficulty many people have with the apparent ambiguity of 'using the master's tools to dismantle the master's house'", contends that this difficulty stems from an extremely restricted perception of identity.<sup>1207</sup> Against this restricted perception, Ashcroft asserts the diversity and pluralism of African identities. Elaborating his argument, he cites Masolo's critique of a common misconception, namely, the assumption ...

... first, that all formerly colonised persons ought to have one view of the impact of colonialism behind which they ought to unite to overthrow it; second that the overthrow of colonialism be replaced with another, liberated and assumedly authentic identity. So strong is the pull toward the objectivity of this identity that most of those who speak of Africa from this emancipatory perspective think of it only as a solid rock which has withstood all the storms of history except colonialism. Because of the deeply political gist of the colonial / postcolonial discourse, we have come to think of our identities as natural rather than imagined and politically driven.<sup>1208</sup>

In sum, by asserting the objective, 'out there' existence of a monolithic African cultural identity, nationalist elites in effect subscribe to the binarisation of human knowledge and human groups into 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' categories. In this respect and to this extent, cultural nationalism shares both with colonialism and with Cold War era (exogenous) sciences of social reality, a coercive impulse. Given that widespread deployment of state or state-sanctioned coercion both entrenches and symbolises the state's lack of legitimacy, an overbearing cultural nationalism is implicated, along with modernisation and Marxist paradigms, in the crisis of the state in Africa.

Kom asks the question: "Today just as in the past, doesn't everything happen as if most of the countries in Africa were irredeemably extrovert, the quest for knowledge being organised mainly so as to be able to claim some sort of extra-continental legitimacy?"<sup>1209</sup> To this question, however, he appends a caveat: "Obviously, the autonomy that is being claimed has nothing to do with a type of intellectual nationalism, confinement or entrenchment in a suicidal isolation."<sup>1210</sup> Reflecting on Kom's question, Ashcroft suggests, as 'legitimate' African knowledge, a transcultural amalgam of knowledge which, while addressing local needs and local purposes, would not need - in the name of intellectual nationalism - to dispense with "the technologies of knowing." Legitimation, he concludes, "may not depend upon the establishment of an 'autonomous framework' of knowledge so much as a direction of appropriated forms of knowing to local uses, and the interpolation of global systems with a locally specific practice."<sup>1211</sup>

The dissertation argues that both Amílcar Cabral, leader of the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau and Julius Nyerere, main spokesperson for *Ujamaa* in Tanzania, made innovative

contributions to the construction of a hybridised epistemology on which to base a locus-specific ideology. Neither leader focussed exclusively on Africans (as distinct from a non-African 'other'.) Rather, they spoke of human beings, thus situating their countries within a wider, human-centred discourse. In so doing, they avoided ideological dogmatism and doctrinal rigidity. As Chabal points out:

Cabral, who used Marxist theory in his analytical texts, consistently refused to be drawn into ideological discussions or definitions. He emphasised to the PAIGC cadres and to the outside world that a successful national revolution would evolve its own ideology partly from the general body of socio-political doctrines but more importantly from the economic, social and political reality it faced in the country itself.<sup>1212</sup>

Chabal further emphasises that the PAIGC expressed its revolutionary nationalist ideology "through a medium readily intelligible to all cadres and villagers." By avoiding ideological and abstract jargon, separation between "those who know how to manipulate the changing ideological idiom" and those who do not significantly was reduced. Additionally, the absence of an "immutable body of 'correct ideas'" facilitated both party and national unity.<sup>1213</sup>

Similarly, Nyerere's rejection of doctrinal (scientific) socialism as unsuitable for the economic, social and political realities of his country, coupled with his critique of capitalism as producer of profound socio-economic inequalities, enabled the emergence of an open-ended, composite ideology, that is, both locus-specific and infused with generally applicable principles of human-centred socialism. Further, the innovatory trajectory of *Ujamaa* made it possible for TANU-CCM, much like the PAIGC,<sup>1214</sup> to pursue a policy of non-alignment that - unusually in sub-Saharan Africa - was more substantive than rhetorical, polarising imperatives of the Cold War notwithstanding. Moreover, Nyerere's accessible mode of

articulation and his people-friendly style signified a genuine and sustained, if not necessarily or invariably successful, attempt to – like Cabral – bridge the chasm between expert knowledge and the lived world.

Finally, the dissertation argues that the examples offered by (decolonising) Guinea-Bissau and (postcolonial) Tanzania, specifically in the realm of politically legitimating and socially cohesive national ideologies, contain instructive lessons. It is contended that these lessons are of relevance not only for regimes in Africa that continue to pursue coercive, hence de-legitimating and socially fragmenting routes to acquiring and / or maintaining power; but also for social scientists in regard to an epistemological challenge, namely, how not to entrench and absolutise a perceived gap between those who know and those who do not.<sup>1215</sup>

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

## Chapter One

1. Bayart, J-F. (1986) "Civil Society in Africa" in Chabal, P, ed. *Political Domination In Africa. Reflections On The Limits Of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p115
2. Bayart, J-F. (1993) *The State In Africa. The Politics Of The Belly*. London: Longman. p 215
3. Examples of current crises of political legitimacy and social cohesion in African states range from cases where armed conflict is territorially extensive, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Burundi, Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire, to cases where armed conflict is territorially limited, for instance, to Uganda's northern and Nigeria's Niger Delta corners. While peace deals have been brokered by various and prestigious representatives of the African Union and the United Nations in formerly war-ravaged countries such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Angola, solutions at best are fragile. In DRC, Burundi, Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire, peace-brokering is ongoing and contested. Additionally, in a country such as Zimbabwe where possession of arms (and the will to use them) largely is restricted to the incumbent regime and its supporters on the ground, regime tolerance of dissent ranges from very limited to violently non-existent. In Zimbabwe as in other countries not officially in a state of war, such as Equatorial Guinea, one either is for or against the ruling party and its leader; human rights are honoured more in the breach than in the observance, and the middle ground is endangered.
4. Joseph, R. (2003) "Africa: States in Crisis." *Journal of Democracy*. 14, 3. p159
5. See Kasfir, N. (1998) "No-Party Democracy in Uganda." *Journal of Democracy*. 9, 2. See also Hameso, S. (2002) "Issues and Dilemmas of Multi-Party Democracy in Africa." *West Africa Review* (online). 3, 2.  
<http://www.westafricareview.com/war/vol3.2/hameso.html>
6. Joseph, R. (2003) *op cit*, p160
7. Joseph, R, *ibid*
8. Joseph, R. (2003) "Facing Africa's Predicament: Academe Needs to Play a Stronger Role." p 4. *allAfrica.com* <http://allAfrica.com/stories/200303110641.html>
9. Joseph, R, *ibid*, p 5
10. Joseph, R, *ibid*, p 2. Mohan & Zack-Williams make a similar point, extending it to incorporate the major powers when noting the deafening silence of most countries on the Nigerian crisis, prior to Ken Saro-Wiwa's death. They assert that Western leaders in general are not interested in intervening in conflicts which lack immediate economic or political gains. Mohan, G & Zack-Williams, A. (1995) "Imperialism in

- the Post Cold War Era." *Review of African Political Economy*. 66. p 483
11. Joseph, R. (2003) "Africa: States in Crisis" *op cit*, p166.
  12. Joseph, R, *ibid*
  13. Krasner cited in Joseph, R, *ibid*, p167
  14. Joseph, R, *ibid*
  15. Joseph, R, *ibid*, pp164-165
  16. Joseph, R. (2003) "Facing Africa's Predicament" *op cit*, p 7
  17. Joseph, R, *ibid*, p 5
  18. Leys, C. (1994) "Confronting the African Tragedy." *New Left Review*. 204, I. p 34
  19. Leys, C, *ibid*
  20. Leys, C, *ibid*
  21. Leys, C, *ibid*, p 35
  22. Leys, C, *ibid*, p 37. Van Allen both reinforces and expands Leys' point when noting that 'American political scientists ... often were simply cheerleaders for bourgeois nationalist leaders in the 1960s, and found themselves totally at a loss for explanations in the 1970s as government after government was overthrown by its own military.' She further notes that 'cheerleading is easy; critical analysis is much more difficult and sometimes leads to vociferous attacks on the critic.' She, however, does not limit her retrospective to the overly optimistic, 'cheerleading' assessments of mainstream Western political science in the 1960s. She also refers to 'those of us who as Marxist feminists wrote glowingly of the potential for various Marxist-led national liberation movements to liberate African women were seriously disillusioned as those movements came to power and sent women back to their pre-guerrilla struggle roles. We failed our responsibility as critical observers, and so did no good for the women we were studying or for the theory and understanding of the relationship between revolutionary movements and gender.' Van Allen, J. (1998) "Who Will Teach About Africa? A Personal View." *Mots Pluriels* (online) 8. p 4.  
<http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP898jva.html>
  23. See Davidson, B. (1994) *The Black Man's Burden. Africa And The Curse Of The Nation-State*. London: James Currey.
  24. Leys, C. (1994) *op cit*

25. Leys, C, *ibid*, pp 38-39
26. Leys, C, *ibid*, p 45
27. Arrighi, G. (2002) "The African Crisis." *New Left Review*. 15, II.
28. Arrighi, G, *ibid*, p 25
29. Arrighi, G, *ibid*, p 28
30. Arrighi, G, *ibid*, p 27
31. Arrighi's focus on labour shortages in the long duration begs the question of exponential population growth in postcolonial states. However, a determinant he omits to mention gives his argument extra resonance. The AIDS pandemic in Africa killed 2.2 million people in 2002 alone, and 25 million people in Africa are HIV positive. The pandemic has slowed down growth rates and - more importantly - distorted population structures. For instance, a recently conducted survey in Botswana shows that although population is growing, 'it will be horribly distorted - with much larger numbers of dependants to producers.' Prins, G & Whiteside, A. (2004) "AIDS Sceptic Lost the Plot." *Sunday Times*. Sept 26. Extra detail is provided in The World Disasters (2004) Report by the International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies. In 2003, 3 million people worldwide died of AIDS, 2.2 million in Africa. The report predicts that some southern African countries will lose half their working population within the next decade. In addition, according to Francois Le Goff (the Federation's Southern Africa Head), food insecurity, poverty, worsening health care, uncontrolled urbanisation & common disease are causing 'unprecedented social calamity'. According to Ibrahim Osman, the Federation's director of policy, the correlation between disasters and underdevelopment is clear. See Hooper-Box, C. (2004) "Disaster Report Warns of 'Social Calamity'". *The Sunday Independent*. October 31. However, an article by South African academic, W. M. Gumede, contradicts Arrighi's emphasis on the availability of a large, low-cost labour supply as a primary requirement for economic success. Commenting on 'the spectacular economic rise of the Asian "tigers"', Gumede points out that 'few of these "tigers" are as blessed as, say, Nigeria with oil deposits or as rich in mineral deposits as, say, Angola.' While agreeing that 'the magic phrase is "human capital", Gumede emphasises the significance of talent, education and skills, and contends that the Asian Tigers over the years have 'invested enormous amounts in raising the skill and education levels of their populace.' Gumede, W. (2005) "Don't Go West, Young Man - Come to Sunny South Africa". *The Sunday Independent*. March 6.
32. Arrighi, G. (2002) *op cit*, p 31
33. See Mamdani, M. (1996) *Citizen And Subject. Contemporary Africa And The Legacy Of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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37. Cheru, F, *ibid*, p 34
38. Cheru, F, *ibid*, p 35
39. Cheru, F, *ibid*, p 42
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42. Ake, C, *ibid*, pp 2-3
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46. Ake, C, *ibid*, p 5
47. Ake, C, *ibid*, p 7
48. Ake, C, *ibid*, p 9
49. Ake, C, *ibid*, p 6
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51. Ake, C, *ibid*, p10
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62. Rattansi cited in Quayson, A, *ibid*, pp14-15
63. Quayson, A, *ibid*, p16
64. Quayson, A, *ibid*, p15
65. Quayson, A, *ibid*, p16
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<http://www.marxists.org/subject/humanism/index.htm>
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94. Some examples (among a number) can be found firstly in Mamdani, M. (1998) "There Can Be No African Renaissance Without An Africa-Focussed Intelligentsia". (Text of a talk delivered at the African Renaissance Conference, Johannesburg, 28 September.) Secondly, in Sawyerr, A. (1999) *op cit*, p14. Sawyerr quotes Ki-Zerbo: 'Intellectuals should act as sentinels and night watchmen, searching the surrounding shadows, and, as Okomfo Anokya once did with Osei Tutu, inventing new paradigms and alternative projects required by our past, our present and our future.'  
A more recent example can be found in an African Union organised and sponsored Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora (CIAD) held in Dakar, Senegal in October 2004. Addressing delegates, President Wade of Senegal urged them 'to forge a new consciousness that will liberate one from Afro-pessimism to Afro-optimism.' Nxumalo, C. (2004) "Intellectuals Face Historic Task of Making the African Renaissance a Reality." *The Sunday Independent*. October 17.  
Referring to the same conference, Roberts reports that President Mbeki of South Africa, 'quoting Karl Marx, emphasised in Dakar that the philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it'. Roberts avers that: 'It is this concern for the practical effect and implementation of ideas at work in the real world that finally separates the worthy intellectual from the mere academic, and that potentially makes the thinking African statesman a genuine intellectual.' Roberts, R. (2004) "Unfettered Bodies, Unfettered Minds." *The Sunday Independent*. October 17  
Also referring to the CIAD conference, Secka notes that: 'Opinions were divided between those who felt Africa's underdevelopment stemmed from external causes - the slave trade, plundering of resources by the West, the debt burden, harmful structural adjustment programmes - and those who attributed underdevelopment to internal causes - bad governance, responsibility of elites, and the need to accept necessary changes to maintain the momentum of development.' Secka reports a decision reached by CIAD participants 'that academics should challenge themselves to be more original in their thinking and come up with more viable solutions to Africa's problems.' Secka, M. (2004) "Leaders Must Work with Academia." *New African*. 435 p 33
95. At the 5<sup>th</sup> Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945, leaders of nationalist movements comprised a majority of delegates, among them future heads of state like Nkrumah and Kenyatta. Prominent on the agenda was a demand for total emancipation from colonial rule.
96. See Quayson, A. (2000) *op cit*, pp 6-11
97. Abrahamsen, R. (2003) "African Studies and the Postcolonial Challenge." *African Affairs*. 102, 407. p195.
98. Taking Zimbabwe as an emblematic case, see - for an account of ZANU-PF's anti-democratic backlash, not least with reference to 'myth-heavy nationalism' - Bond, P

- & Manyanya, M. (2002) *Zimbabwe's Plunge. Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism And The Search For Social Justice*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. pp 70-71 in particular. See also Alexander, J, McGregor, J & Ranger, T. (2000) *Violence And Memory. One Hundred Years In The 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland*. Oxford: James Currey. In this minutely detailed case study, one of the authors' stated objectives is to highlight nationalism's shift from the defining ideology of the liberation war which provided guerrillas and civilians with a common cause to ideological facilitator of a state campaign of grotesque repression in the 1980s. For a point of view diametrically opposed to the above cited texts, see Ankomah, B. (2004) "The Land of Good Hope". *New African*. 435. pp 8-9. Ankomah declares that: 'The green shoots of success are sprouting in Zimbabwe. African nationalism is on the way to a major victory in the land once called Monomotapa.'
99. In a post-apartheid context, Richard Calland's thumbnail sketch of 'two competing traditions of the ANC - its racial nationalism and its class socialism' is instructive. See Calland, R. (2004) "Stable But Far From tranquil." *Mail & Guardian*. December 24 to January 6.
- 100 Plamenatz, J. (1971) *Ideology*. London: Macmillan. p 27
- 101 De Crespigny, A & Cronin, J, eds. (1975) *Ideologies Of Politics*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. p 5
- 102 Larrain, J. (1979) *The Concept Of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson. p13
- 103 Larrain, J, *ibid*, p14
- 104 De Crespigny, A & Cronin, J. (1975) *op cit*
- 105 Plamenatz, J. (1971) *op cit*, p15
- 106 De Crespigny, A & Cronin, J. (1975) *op cit*, p 5
- 107 Larrain, J. (1979) *op cit*, p14
- 108 Plamenatz, J. (1971) *op cit*, p16. A fairly recently published illustration of Plamentatz's point can be found in Jacobs, S & Calland, R, eds. (2002) *Thabo Mbeki's World. The Politics And Ideology Of The South African President*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. Jacobs & Calland make a link between the ideology of an individual and ideology in its collective sense by addressing the extent to which Mbeki, as President, has 'managed to capture and articulate a clear vision and a set of collective values.'
109. De Crespigny, A & Cronin, J, eds. (1975) *op cit*, p1

110. See Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit, passim*.
111. Hountondji, P. (1983) *African Philosophy. Myth And Reality*. London: Hutchinson. p 69
112. Havel, V. (1985) *The Power Of The Powerless. Citizens Against The State In Central-Eastern Europe*. New York: Palach Press. p 28
113. Mannheim, K. (1936) *Ideology And Utopia*. London: Kegan Paul. p175
114. Guevara, E. (1999) *The African Dream. The Diaries Of The Revolutionary War In The Congo*. London: Harvill.
115. Apter, D. (1987) *Rethinking Development. Modernisation, Dependency, And Postmodern Politics*. London: Sage. p13
116. Bhaskar, R. (1979) *The Possibility Of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique Of The Contemporary Human Sciences*. Brighton: Harvester.
117. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence & Wishart. p 428
118. Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p 24
119. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p11
120. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 42
121. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p186
122. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p109

## Chapter Two

123. Kuhn, T. (1970) *The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p15
124. Kuhn, T. (1977) *The Essential Tension. Selected Studies In Scientific Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp 318-319
125. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 293

126. Sardar, Z. (2000) *Thomas Kuhn And The Science Wars*. Cambridge: Icon. p 33
127. As Pieterse puts it: 'Kuhn's position was that social science is 'pre-paradigmatic' because a scholarly consensus such as exists in physics or biology is not available in social science.' See Pieterse, J. (2001) *Development Theory. Deconstructions / Reconstructions*. London: Sage. p 92. However, it is worth noting that Kuhn dismisses his initial deployment of the term 'pre-paradigmatic'. 'Whatever paradigms may be, they are possessed by any scientific community, including the schools of the so-called pre-paradigm period. My failure to see that point clearly has helped make a paradigm seem a quasi-mystical entity or property which, like charisma, transforms those infected by it.' Kuhn, T. (1977) *op cit*, p 295
128. Oakley, A. (2000) *Gender And Method In The Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Polity. p 27
129. Oakley, A, *ibid*
130. Patton, M. (1986) *Utilisation Focussed Evaluation*. Beverley Hills, California: Sage. pp 181-182
131. Berger, P. (1963) *Invitation To Sociology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p 60
132. Berger, P, *ibid*
133. See Comaroff, J and Comaroff, J, eds. (1993) *Modernity And Its Malcontents. Ritual And Power In Postcolonial Africa*. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press. p xiii. The Comaroffs describe this type of simplification as 'those typologies whose neat oppositions, nice determinations and nefarious teleologies are preserved by short-circuiting the more complicated pathways of human practice.'
134. Rosenburg, A. (1988) *Philosophy Of Social Science*. Oxford: Clarendon. p 96
135. Rosenburg, A, *ibid*, p 97
136. Delanty, G. (1997) *Social Science. Beyond Constructivism And Realism*. Buckingham: Open University Press. p 70
137. Susser, B. (1992) *Approaches To The Study Of Politics*. New York: Macmillan. p 79
138. Easton quoted in Susser, B, *ibid*, p 84
139. Bentley quoted in Susser, B, *ibid*
140. Wallicki, A. (1995) *Marxism And The Leap To The Kingdom of Freedom. The Rise And Fall Of The Communist Utopia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p 39

141. Rosenberg, A. (1988) *op cit*, p 52
142. Isaac, A. (1975) *Scope And Methods of Political Science*. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press. p 379
143. Rosenberg, A. (1988) *op cit*
144. Hall, S. (1977) "The Hinterland of Science; Ideology and the 'Sociology of Knowledge.'" Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. *Ideology*. London: Hutchinson. p 22
145. Hall, S, *ibid*
146. Hall, S, *ibid*
147. Susser, B. (1992) *op cit*, p 83
148. Susser, B, *ibid*, p 93
149. Susser, B, *ibid*
150. Walicki, A. (1995) *op cit*, p 566.
151. Rosenberg, A. (1988) *op cit*, p 96
152. Ladyman, J. (2002) *Understanding Philosophy Of Science*. London: Routledge. p 65
153. Bhaskar, R. (1978) *A Realist Theory Of Science*. Sussex: Harvester. p 21
154. An object which has no necessary relationship with the seeker after knowledge of it.
155. Pieterse, J. (2001) *op cit*, p 92
156. Susser, B. (1992) *op cit*, p 91
157. Susser, B, *ibid*, pp 91-92
158. Marx, K. (1969) "Theses on Feuerbach" in Feuer, L, ed. *Marx And Engels. Basic Writings On Politics And Philosophy*. London: Collins. p 286. 'The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it.'
159. See, for instance, Bay, C. (1992) "Politics and Pseudopolitics" in Susser, B, *op cit*, p 60. Referring to the manner in which behaviouralists conduct their business, Bay notes that: 'A demeanour of scientific objectivity is maintained'. See also Hawkesworth, M. (1992) "The Science of Politics and the Politics of Science" in Hawkesworth, M & Kogan, M, eds. *Encyclopaedia Of Government And Politics*. Volume.1. London: Routledge. p 34. 'Behaviouralism conceived the political

scientist as a passive observer who merely described and explained what exists in the political world.'

160. Pieterse, J. (2001) *op cit*, p 23
161. Pieterse, J, *ibid*
162. Susser, B. (1992) *op cit*, pp 91-96
163. See Rosenberg, A. (1988) *op cit*, p 98 for an illustration of this point with reference to rational choice theory in economics.
164. Elshtain, J. (1997) *Real Politics At The Centre Of Everyday Life*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. pp18-19
165. Elshtain, J, *ibid*, p 14
166. Cooper, F. (2000) "Africa's pasts and Africa's historians." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*. 34, 2. p 328
167. Gellner, E. (1987) *Culture, Identity And Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p 153
168. Gellner, E, *ibid*, p154
169. Gellner, E, *ibid*
170. Gellner provides – in the specialised domain of the internal combustion engine – another illustration of the distinction between iron and rubber cages. Resident in the former is a small number of people who are able to design and produce ever-more advanced models. Resident in the latter is anyone who is able to drive a car. Gellner, E, *ibid*, pp154-155
171. Gellner, E, *ibid*, p 163
172. Gellner, E, *ibid*
173. Gellner, E, *ibid*, p163
174. Gellner, E, *ibid*, p164
175. Gellner, E, *ibid*
176. Gellner, E, *ibid*
177. Gellner, E, *ibid*, pp 155-162. Among a number of examples, Gellner cites the brand

of American pragmatism which rates theory on a sliding scale of applicability to social practice. 'Big corporations of propositions face reality in the confident expectations that such errors as may and will occur can be corrected by tinkering with some part or other of the large and safe cognitive corpus. The overall happy outcome is guaranteed by a tacitly presiding spirit called scientific method ... the sheer size of these cognitive corporations ensures that the price of individual mistakes will not be too great; in general, their reserves are such that they can carry the strain ...'

178. Gellner, E, *ibid*, p 165
179. Gellner, E, *ibid*
180. Nkrumah quoted in Menkhaus, J. (1992) "Political and Social Change" in Delancy, M, ed. *Handbook Of Political Science Research On Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends From The 1960s To The 1990s*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. p18
181. Nyerere quoted in Menkhaus, J, *ibid*
182. Nyerere, J. (1975) "Democracy and the Party System" in Mutiso, G and Rohio, S, eds. *Readings In African Political Thought*. London: Heinemann. pp 478-481
183. Gellner, E. (1994) *Conditions Of Liberty. Civil Society And Its Rivals*. London: Hamish Hamilton. p 95
184. Gellner, E, *ibid*, p 36
185. Havel, V. (1985) *The Power Of The Powerless. Citizens Against The State In Central Eastern Europe*. New York: Palach. p 25
186. Scruton, R. (1983) *A Dictionary Of Political Thought*. London: Pan & Macmillan. p 364
187. Delanty, G. (1997) *op cit*, p12
188. Bhaskar, R. (1979) *The Possibility Of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique Of The Contemporary Human Sciences*. Brighton: Harvester. p 3
189. Sardar, Z. (2000) *op cit*, p 53
190. Larrain, J. (1970) *The Concept Of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson. p195
191. Larrain, J, *ibid*, p 27
192. Bluhm, W. (1974) *Ideologies And Attitudes. Modern Political Culture*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. pp 1-2

193. Leonardo da Vinci quoted in Leigh, D. (1992) "The Empire Paints Back. Reflections on the Colonisation of Vision." *Theoria*. 80. p 89
194. Rosenberg, A. (1988) *op cit*, p 14
195. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence & Wishart. p 376
196. Delanty, G. (1997) *op cit*, p 25
197. Delanty, G, *ibid*
198. Crick, B. (1964) *In Defence Of Politics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p 34
199. Crick, B, *ibid*, p 56
200. Crick, B, *ibid*, p 59
201. Note that Germany occupies an ambivalent position on the frontier between West and East. Between the late 1940s and late 1980s, political Germany was situated in Europe's Western 'self', ideological Germany in the Eastern 'other'. When J.F. Kennedy asserted that '*ich bin ein Berliner*' he presumably was not identifying himself with that ideological lot on the Eastern side of the wall.
202. Crick, B, *ibid*, p 23
203. Crick, B, *ibid*, p 55
204. Marx quoted in Bottomore, T & Rubel, M, eds. (1961) *Karl Marx. Selected Writings In Sociology And Social Philosophy*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p 39
205. Bottomore, T & Rubel, M, *ibid*
206. Hoare, Q and Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *op cit*, p 12
207. Carlsnaes, W. (1981) *The Concept Of Ideology And Political Analysis. A Critical Examination Of Its Usage By Marx, Lenin, And Mannheim*. London: Greenwood Press. p 103
208. Lenin, V.I. (1968) "What is to be done?" in *Selected Works*. Volume 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers. pp121-122
209. Carlsnaes, W. (1981) *op cit*, p 104
210. Carlsnaes, W, *ibid*

211. Larrain, J. (1979) *op cit*, p 172
212. Kilroy-Silk, R. (1972) *Socialism Since Marx*. London: Allen Lane. p118.  
Kilroy-Silk includes Trotsky's comment that: 'Lenin's methods lead to this: the party organisation at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole: then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organisation; and finally a single 'dictator' substitutes himself for the Central Committee.'
213. Crick, B. (1964) *op cit*, p190
214. Crick, B, *ibid*, p192
215. Crick, B, *ibid*, p 46
216. Crick, B, *ibid*, p192
217. Marenin quoted in Coleman, J & Halisi, C. (1983) "American Political Science and Tropical Africa: Universalism vs Relativism." *African Studies Review*. 26, 3/4  
p 43
218. Crick, B. (1964) *op cit*, p192
219. Susser, B. (1992) *op cit*, p 85
220. Rosenberg, A. (1988) *op cit*, p187
221. Larrain, J. (1979) *op cit*, p189
222. Larrain, J, *ibid*, p193
223. Delanty, G. (1997) *op cit*, pp129-131
224. Bhaskar, R. (1979) *op cit*, p 57
225. Bhaskar, R. (1978) *op cit*, p 53
226. Bhaskar, R. (1979) *op cit*, p 58
227. Bhaskar, R, *ibid*, p 82
228. Delanty, G. (1997) *op cit*, p 129
229. Bhaskar, R. (1978) *op cit*, p 64
230. Sylvan, D & Glassner, B. (1983) *A Rationalist Methodology For The Social Sciences*. Oxford: Blackwell. p 93

231. Bhaskar, R. (1978) p 58
232. Bhaskar, R, *ibid*
233. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *op cit*, p 425
234. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 376
235. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 377
236. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 426
237. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 428
238. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 437
239. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*
240. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, pp 433-434
241. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 434
242. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 433
243. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p xxii
244. Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p 76
245. Scriven quoted in Patton, M. (1986) *op cit*, p196
246. Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p 24

### **Chapter Three.**

247. Kuhn, T. (1970) *The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p113
248. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 42
249. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 37
250. Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 65

- 251 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 24
- 252 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 52
- 253 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, pp 52-53
- 254 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 69. Kuhn derives the term from Copernicus' rejection of the Ptolemaic paradigm in astronomy.
- 255 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 85
- 256 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 204
- 257 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 93
- 258 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 92
- 259 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, pp 93-94
- 260 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 94
- 261 For a succinct description, see Sardar, Z. (2000) *Thomas Kuhn And The Science Wars*. Cambridge: Icon.
- 262 Larrain cites Benton's criticism that: 'Kuhn's thesis of successive, incommensurate paradigms make any conception of continuity through scientific revolution unthinkable.' Larrain, J (1979) *The Concept Of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson. p 247
- 263 Gouldner, A. (1980) *The Two Marxisms*. Chapter Two. "Marxism as Science and Critique." pp 8 & 19. Online at:  
<http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/DSS/Marx/toc.htm>
- 264 Fuchs, S. (2001) *Against Essentialism. A Theory Of Culture And Society*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p 92
- 265 Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p 206
- 266 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 205
- 267 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 207
- 268 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p 204
- 269 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p101

- 270 Kuhn, T. (1977) *The Essential Tension. Selected Studies In Scientific Tradition And Change*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p xii
- 271 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p xiii
- 272 Kuhn, T, *ibid*, p xii
- 273 Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p111
- 274 Mannheim, K. (1936) *Ideology And Utopia*. London: Kegan Paul. p 5
- 275 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 7
- 276 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 7
- 277 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 8
- 278 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 36
- 279 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 91
- 280 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 32
- 281 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p175
282. Mannheim, K, *ibid*
283. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p177
284. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 184
285. Larrain, J. (1979) *op cit*, p 114
286. Mannheim, K. (1936) *op cit*, p 9
287. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 11
- 288 Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 31
289. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 32
290. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 33
291. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 34

292. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p 36
293. Wirth, L, in Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p xxiii
294. Mannheim, K, *ibid*, p187
295. Mannheim, K, *ibid*
296. Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p 94
287. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence & Wishart. pp 376-377.
298. Guevara, E. (1999) *The African Dream. The Diaries Of The Revolutionary War In The Congo*. London: Harvill. p3
299. An exemplar of this genre can be found in Pienaar, H. (2003) "A Great Man, Revered By His Generation." *The Sunday Independent*. August 31 2003. Revealingly sub-titled 'Che Guevara didn't return the compliment. Admitting failure, he was pessimistic about Africa's future', Pienaar's article speaks solely to the converted.
300. According to Gott in his introduction to Guevara, E. (1999) *op cit*, p xi, Guevara put the book together from a compilation of diary entries, letters and field reports in a small upstairs room in the Cuban Embassy, Dar es Salaam over a period of 2 months.
301. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 232
302. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 6
303. Guevara, E, *ibid*
304. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 235
305. Gott, R, in Guevara, E, *ibid*, p xxi
306. Chomsky, N. (1989) *Necessary Illusions. Thought Control In Democratic Societies*. London: Pluto. p 112
307. Gott, R, in Guevara, E, (1999) *op cit*, p xii
308. Gott, R, in Guevara, E, *ibid*
309. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p xx
310. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (1999) "The Crisis in the Great Lakes Region" in Makgoba, M, ed. *African Renaissance. The New Struggle*. Tafelburg: Mafube. p 63

311. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G, *ibid*, p 65
312. Gott, R, in Guevara, E. (1999) *op cit*, p xxviii
313. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p xviii
314. Gott, R, in Guevara, E, *ibid*, p xxii
315. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (1999) *op cit*, p 69
316. Gott, R, in Guevara, E, (1999) *op cit*, p xxx
317. See Guevara, E, *ibid*, pp 188-189
318. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 81
319. For the multiple identities associated with porous ethnicities before the onset of colonial policies herded Africans into fixed tribal identities, see Ranger, T. (1999) "The Nature of Ethnicity: Lessons from Africa" in Mortimer, E, ed. *People, Nation And State. The Meaning Of Ethnicity And Nationalism*. London: Tauris.  
For ongoing border and ethnic disputes between DRC and Rwanda, see numerous (South African) newspaper reports covering the uneasy, on-off peace accord in DRC. For instance, Schmidt, M. (2004) "Rwandan Retaliation Turns Up Congo Heat." *Sunday Independent*. December 5. Blomfield, A. (2004) "Rebel Leader Says He Invaded Eastern Town to Prevent Genocide of Congolese Tutsis." *Sunday Times*. June 6.
320. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (1999) *op cit*, p 66. 'According to the best demographic analyses now available, the human toll of the repression, together with diseases associated with European penetration, like syphilis, amounted to the death of nearly 10 million people.'
321. M'bokolo, E. (1999) "Equatorial West Africa" in Mazrui, A, ed. *General History Of Africa. Volume VIII. Africa Since 1935*. Paris: Unesco. p 192
322. Randrianja, S. (1996) "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy" in Ellis, S, ed. *Africa Now*. London: James Currey. p 24
323. Smith, A. (1983) *State And Nation In The Third World*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. p 31  
Tordoff, W. (1984) *Government And Politics In Africa*. London: Macmillan. pp 38-39
324. Konassi, E. (1999) "Africa and the United Nations since 1945" in Mazrui, A, ed, *op cit*, p 879
325. Mkwandire, T. (2003) "Post-Colonial 'Rebel Movements' in Africa. Violence Against the Peasantry." *New Agenda*. 10. p134

326. Guevara, E. (1999) *op cit*, p 221
327. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 223
328. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 224
329. Davidson, B. (1992) *The Black Man's Burden. Africa And The Curse Of The Nation State*. London: James Currey. p 219
330. Guevara, E. (1999) *op cit*, p 223
331. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 226
332. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 239
333. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 236
334. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 240
335. It is interesting to compare Cabral's pragmatic recommendation with Guevara's ringing announcement that the revolution in the Congo 'was part of a concept of struggle that had fully taken shape in my brain'. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 216
336. Cabral quoted in Davidson, B. (1986) "Practice and Theory: Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde" in Munslow, B, ed. *Africa. Problems In The Transition To Socialism*. London: Zed Books. p 96. Cabral's assessment resonates in a tribute to the late Chris Hani made by Cosatu's Zwelinzima Vavi. 'Let us not forget that Comrade Chris himself said that socialism is not about big concepts and heavy theory but about decent shelter for those who are homeless, water for those who have no drinking water, health care and a life of dignity for the old.' Reported by Battersby, J. (2003) "Shock of Hani's Death Made Time Stand Still." *The Sunday Independent*. April 13.
337. Davidson, B. (1986) *op cit*, p 96
338. Guevara, E. (1999) *op cit*, p 218
339. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 235
340. Turok, B. (1986) "The Left in Africa Today" in Munslow, B, ed, *op cit*, p 58
341. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *op cit*, p 323
342. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, pp 323-324
343. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 324
344. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 324

345. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 325
346. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 3
347. Dalmayr, F. (1996) "Return to the source: African identity after Cabral." *Theoria*. 88. p 17
348. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, eds & transl. (1971) *op cit*, p 330
349. Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl, *ibid*, p 427
350. Guevara, E. (1999) *op cit*, p15
351. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p135
352. Kuhn, T. (1970) *op cit*, p 24

#### Chapter Four

353. Guevara, E. (1999) *The African Dream. The Diaries Of The Revolutionary War In The Congo*. London: Harvill. p 239
354. Guevara E, *ibid*, p 244
355. Guevara E, *ibid*, p 240
356. Guevara, E, *ibid*, p 244
357. Plamenatz, J. (1970) *Ideology*. London: Pall Mall. p 31
358. Easton, D. (1965) *A Systems Analysis Of Political Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p 332
359. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 332
360. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 333
361. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 334
362. Munck, R. (1986) *The Difficult Dialogue. Marxism And Nationalism*. London: Zed Books. p118

363. Carlsnaes, W. (1981) *The Concept Of Ideology And Political Analysis*. London: Greenwood. p105
364. Carlsnaes, W, *ibid*, p111
365. Roy cited in Munck, R. (1986) *op cit*, p 93
366. Munck, R, *ibid*, p 94
367. Ake, C. (1985) "The Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa" in Gutkind, P & Wallerstein, I, eds. *Political Economy Of Contemporary Africa*. London: Sage. pp 237-239
368. Mazrui, A, Ki-Zerbo, J & Wondji, C. (1999) "Nation-building and Changing Political Values" in Mazrui, A, ed. *General History Of Africa. Volume VIII. Africa Since 1935*. Paris: Unesco. p 471
369. Mazrui, A & Ade Ajayi, J. (1999) "Trends in Philosophy and Science in Africa" in Mazrui, A, ed, *ibid*, p 640
370. Ake, C. (1985) *op cit*, p 231
371. Ake, C, *ibid*
372. Ake, C. (1993) "What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?" *Transformation*. 22 p 3
373. Davidson, B. (1992) *The Black Man's Burden. Africa And The Curse Of The Nation State*. London: James Currey. p166
374. Ake, C. (1985) *op cit*, p 234
375. Mazrui, A, Ki-Zerbo, J & Wondji, C. (1999) *op cit*, pp 469-472
376. Mazrui, A, Ki-Zerbo, J & Wondji, C, *ibid*, p 476
377. Mazrui, A. (2001) "Ideology and African Political Culture" in Kiros, T, ed. *Explorations In African Political Thought. Identity, Community, Ethics*. London: Routledge. p107
378. Davidson, B. (1992) *op cit*, p164
379. Davidson, B, *ibid*, p165
380. Young, C. (1982) *Ideology And Development In Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. p 12. See also Clapham, C. (1970) "The Context of African Political Thought."

- Journal of Modern African Studies.* 8, 1. p 4. Clapham notes that President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast did not profess to have come up with an ideological orientation for his country, thus reducing Zolberg (when conducting research on ideologies in Africa) to 'culling comments from ministers and the party newspaper, and arranging them so as to fit the themes sounded by more self-conscious ideologues in other countries.'
- 381 Young, C. (1982) *op cit*, p14
- 382 Young, C, *ibid*, p15
383. Young, C, *ibid*
- 384 Scott, J. (1998) *Seeing Like A State*. New Haven: Yale University Press. p 5
- 385 Scott, J, *ibid*, p 6
- 386 Mudimbe, V. (1988) *The Invention Of Africa. Gnosis, Philosophy And The Order Of Knowledge*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p16
- 387 Bencel, N, Planchard, P & Lemaire, S. (2000) "‘Natives on Show’: Theme Parks for Colonialists." *Mail and Guardian*. September 15 to 21.
- 388 Bencel, N, Planchard, P & Lemiare, S, *ibid*.
389. Biakolo, E (1998) "Categories of Cross-Cultural Cognition and the African Condition" in Coetzee, P & Roux, A, eds. *Philosophy From Africa*. Johannesburg: Thomson. p 11
390. Havel, V. (1997) "Czechoslovakia: Stories and Totalitarianism" in Petrie, R, ed. *The Fall Of Communism And The Rise Of Nationalism*. London: Cassell. p 92
391. Havel, V, *ibid*, p 99
392. Masolo, D. (1994) *African Philosophy In Search Of Identity*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p195
393. Appiah, K. (1992) *In My Father's House. Africa In The Philosophy Of Culture*. London: Methuen. pp 76-77
394. Mamdani, M. (1998) "Africa: Democratic Theory and Democratic Struggles" in Mohanty, M, Mukherji, P & Tonquist, O, eds *Social Movements And The State In The Third World*. New Delhi: Sage. p 91

395. Biakolo, E. (1998) *op cit*, p 5
396. Levy-Bruhl quoted in Biakolo, E, *ibid*
397. Biakalo, E, *ibid*, p 6
398. See Irele, A. (1990) *The African Experience In Literature And Ideology*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p 68. According to Irele, negritude represents 'the equivalent on the French-speaking side of what has come to be known as Pan-Africanism.'
399. Delanty, G. (1998) *Social Science. Beyond Constructivism And Realism*. Buckingham: Open University Press. p100
400. Mamdani, M. (1996) *Citizen And Subject. Contemporary Africa And The Legacy Of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 9
401. See Senghor, L. (1975) "What is Negritude?" in Mutiso, G & Rohio, S, eds. *Readings In African Political Thought*. London: Heinemann. p 83  
'And so we set out on a fervent quest for the 'holy grail': our collective soul. And we came upon it.'
402. Senghor, L. (1998) "Negritude and African Socialism" in Coetzee, P & Roux, A, eds, *op cit*, p 438
403. Senghor, L, *ibid*, p 440
404. Masolo, D. (1994) *op cit*, pp 1-2
405. Masolo, D, *ibid*, p 13
406. Du Bois, W. (2003) "The Conservation of Races" in Alcoff, L & Mendieta, E, eds. *Identities. Race, Class, Gender And Nationality*. Oxford: Blackwell. p 45
407. Reed, J & Wake, C, eds. (1972) *French African Verse*. London: Heinemann.
408. Mezu, S. (1973) *The Poetry Of L.S. Senghor*. London: Heinemann. p 64
409. Césaire quoted in Masolo, D. (1994) *op cit*, p15
410. Césaire quoted in Irele, A. (1990) *op cit*, p136
411. Césaire quoted in Irele, A, *ibid*, p137
412. Appiah, K. (1992) *op cit*, p 95
413. Irele, A. (1990) *op cit*, p 68

414. See Mazrui, A. (2001) *op cit*, p109. To illustrate the point, Mazrui quotes Césaire: 'Hooray for those who never invented anything / Hooray for those who never discovered anything / Hooray for joy! Hooray for love! / Hooray for the pain of incarnate tears' and Senghor: 'Emotion is black ...Reason is Greek.'
415. Irele, A. (1990) *op cit*, p 68
416. Irele, A, *ibid*, pp105-106
417. Nkrumah, K. (1975) "The African Personality" in Mutiso, G & Rohio, S, eds, *op cit* p 57
418. Irele, A. (1990) *op cit*, p108
419. Irele, A, *ibid*, p120
420. Irele, A, *ibid*, p121
421. Irele, A, *ibid*, p122
422. Irele, A, *ibid*, p123
423. Irele, A, *ibid*, p123
424. See (among other speeches and publications) Nkrumah, K. (1975) "Towards African Unity" and "Continental Government for Africa" in Mutiso, G & Rohio, S, eds, *op cit*, pp 341-346
425. Irele, A. (1990) *op cit*, p120
426. Irele, A, *ibid*
427. Irele, A, *ibid*, p122
428. Abraham, W. (1962) *The Mind Of Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p195
429. Abraham, W, *ibid*, p 37
430. Kanneh, K. (1998) *African Identities. Race, Nation And Culture In Ethnography, Pan-Africanism And Black Literatures*. London: Routledge. p 43
431. See Hountondji, P. (1996) *African Philosophy. Myth And Reality*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p 59. Even so rigorous and acerbic a critic of 'ethnophilosophy' as Hountondji has a good word or two for Abraham's text: 'I believe that a book can be instructive, interesting, useful, even if it is founded on

erroneous assumptions.'

- 432 Chinweizu. (1987) *Decolonising The African Mind*. Lagos: Pero Press. p 6
- 433. Chinweizu, *ibid*, p 7
- 434. Chinweizu, *ibid*, p 217
- 435. Chinweizu, *ibid*, p 222
- 436 Chinweizu, *ibid*, p 219
- 437. Chinweizu, *ibid*
- 438. Appiah, K. (1992) *op cit*, p 97
- 439. Appiah, K, *ibid*, p 98
- 440. Appiah, K, *ibid*, p 108
- 441 Kanneh, K. (1998) *op cit*, p 38
- 442. Kanneh, K, *ibid*, p 39
- 443. Kanneh, K, *ibid*, p 40
- 444. Masolo, K. (1994) *op cit*, p 249
- 445 Said, E. (1993) *Culture And Imperialism*. London: Chatto & Windus. pp 262-263
- 446 Havel, V. (1997) *op cit*, p 92
- 447 Mannheim, K. (1936) *Ideology And Utopia*. London: Kegan-Paul. p187
- 448 Hoare, Q & Nowell-Smith, G, ed & transl. (1971) *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence & Wishart. p 330

## Chapter Five

- 449 For instance, regarding the modernisation paradigm see Menkaus, K. (1992) "Political and Social Change" in DeLancey, M, ed. *Handbook Of Political Science Research On Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends From The 1960s To The 1990s*. Westport, Connecticut:

Greenwood Press. pp11-12. Referring to modernisation theory, Menkhaus contends that 'what came to be known as the 'orthodox' approach dominated this first decade of research. Rooted in structural-functional and systems analysis, most research assumed a developmental process that was unilinear and universal; that is, all political systems were seen as developing along a traditional-to-modern continuum, experiencing essentially the same 'stages' of development'. He notes that: 'It is easy to caricature this approach and dismiss it as naive (because it assumes the compatibility of developmental goals), ethnocentric (because it assumes the West is the model), ahistorical (because it posits a unilinear process of development disregarding different historical contexts), reductionist (because it reduces all African precolonial polities to an ill-defined 'traditional political system') and unsystematic (because it fails to account for African political development in the context of an international capitalist system).' However, he warns that 'such caricatures are not fully warranted' and cites Spiro (1962), Hodgkin (1965) and Pye (1965) as examples of exceptions to the rule.

450. *Caveat*: see Waterman, P. (1977) "On Radicalism in African Studies" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds. *African Social Studies. A Radical Reader*. London: Heinemann. pp1-15. In deference to Waterman's argument, wide divergences within the literature ranged against 'conservative African studies' should be noted. According to my reading of Waterman's paper, the link between Soviet Africanists and Western 'radical' Africanists was tenuous at best. In addition, within the broad field of non-Soviet African studies, some scholars who fit the label 'radical' were anti-Soviet. Basil Davidson is cited by Waterman as an exemplar of this position. However, all scholars on the left of the political spectrum were united, at least, by their rejection of 'banal and trivial' findings derived from 'the superficial and epiphenomenal' that is, modernisation theory.
451. Davidson, B. (1992) *The Black Man's Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. London: James Currey. p179
452. Davidson, B, *ibid*, p181
453. Drame, T. (1996) "The Crisis of the State" in Ellis, S, ed. *Africa Now. Peoples, Policies And Institutions*. London: Heinemann. p 202
454. On the matter of the arbitrary borders of modern African polities, see (in addition to sources cited in Section One ) Thomson, A. (2000) *An Introduction to African Politics*. London: Routledge. pp 11-13. Referring to postcolonial problematics of contested borders and internecine disputes, Thomson summarises the problem as follows: 'The imperial powers' imposition of state borders on African territory had major ramifications. The problem lies with the fact that, when they were delineated, these state boundaries rarely matched existing precolonial political, social or economic divisions. They were 'arbitrary'. Not arbitrary in the sense of random, but arbitrary because they reflected the short-term strategic and economic interests of the imperial powers and not the interests of the Africans they housed.' Citing the tiny (no

more than 50 kilometres wide at any given point) state of Gambia, Thomson notes that: 'British commercial interests had established a trading post at the mouth of the river Gambia. Despite French cajoling, the British government refused to give up this territory.' Thomson further points out that 14 African states are landlocked, and a number of others - Niger, for example - are without significant resources on which to build their economies. See also Clapham, C. (1998) "Discerning the New Africa." *International Affairs*. 74, 2. p 263. 'Carved almost randomly out of the continent's complex pattern of societies and ecological zones, usually lacking much internal coherence, feebly provided with the infrastructural basis for effective statehood, these 'new nations' (as they were inaccurately dubbed) were improbable candidates for survival.'

455. Mazrui, A. (1980) *The African Condition. The Reith Lectures*. London: Heinemann. p vi
456. Cohen, R. (1986) "Marxism in Africa: the Grounding of a Tradition" in Munslow, B, ed. *Africa. Problems In The Transition To Socialism*. London: Zed Books. p 45
457. For an analysis of mutually constituted colonial / traditional elite inventions, see Ranger, T. (1983) "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa" in Hobsbawm, E & Ranger, T, eds. *The Invention Of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Ranger's modification of his 1983 position in Ranger, T. (1993) "The Invention of Tradition Revisited: the Case of Colonial Africa" in Ranger, T & Vaughan, O, eds. *Legitimacy And The State In Twentieth-Century Africa*. Oxford: Macmillan.
458. Chazan, N, Mortimer, R, Ravenhill, J & Rothchild, D. (1988) *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p 26
459. Owusu, M. (1996) "Democracy and Africa. A View from the Village" in Nyang'oro, J, ed. *Discourses on Democracy: Africa in Comparative Perspective*. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press. p 278
460. Cheru, F. (2002) *African Renaissance. Roadmaps To The Challenge Of Globalisation*. London: Zed Books. p 2
461. See, for instance, DeLancy, M, ed. (1992) *op cit*, and Staniland, M. (1991) *American Intellectuals And African Nationalists, 1955-1970*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
462. Apter, D. (1987) *Rethinking Development. Modernisation, Dependency, And Postmodern Politics*. London: Sage. p10
463. Chabal, P. (1996) "The African Crisis. Context and Interpretation" in Werbner, R & Ranger, T, eds. *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. London: Zed Books. pp 45-46

464. Chabal, P, *ibid*, p 29
465. Chabal, P, *ibid*, p 45
466. See McCormick, J. (2003) *Contemporary Britain*. New York: Palgrave. p 22. McCormick cites the Suez crisis of 1956 as an emblematic instance of the new *pax americana*. Britain and France were humbled by the decisive intervention of President Eisenhower, and British PM Anthony Eden 'resigned, ostensibly on medical grounds but reputedly at the demand of President Eisenhower. Britain's international prestige suffered, public opinion began to question Britain's role in the world, the process of decolonisation stepped into high gear, and the focus of British interests shifted from the empire to Europe.'
467. Menkhaus, K. (1992) *op cit*, pp 9-20. Commenting on funding for and ideological ambience of research conducted in Africa in the 1960s, Menkhaus notes 'the massive increase in government and private foundation financial support for development research, a function of the rise of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy and, more fundamentally, the importance accorded to development and area studies that grew out of cold war competition.' He adds that 'an entire generation of social scientists made their reputation in Africa.'
468. Cohen - having pointed out that both Lenin's and Luxemburg's theories of imperialism 'focussed on *European* rivalries and *European* expansion' and that 'with the exception of South Africa, the continent remained as obscure to them as to their non-Marxist contemporaries' - notes the Comintern's efforts to remedy this deficiency. 'The Communist International ... spent much of the 1920s debating the character and relative strength of anti-colonial movements. It also made a number of attempts ... to weld nationalist sentiments to socialist ends.' He cites the Red International of Labour Union's Committee for Negro Workers 'which had strong African representation', and adds that 'the Comintern itself eagerly sought delegates from the colonised world, while, within the USSR, specialist training and research units were created to serve the needs of 'the toilers of the East' - an expression that was intended to cover the whole colonised world.' Cohen, R. (1986) *op cit*, pp 41-42
469. Young, C. (1982) *Ideology And Development In Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. p 8
470. Menkhaus, K. (1992) *op cit*, p19
471. Betts, R. (1998) *Decolonisation*. London: Routledge. p 34
472. Betts, R *ibid*, p 35
473. See Staniland, M. (1986) "Democracy and Ethnocentrism" in Chabal, P, ed. *Political Domination In Africa. Reflections On The Limits Of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. pp 57-58, regarding the limits to American liberalism in Africa.

474. Wallerstein cited in Menkaus, K. (1992) *op cit*, p13
475. Menkhaus, K, *ibid*
476. Awolowo quoted in Afolayan, F. (1997) "Nigeria: a Political Entity and a Society" in Beckett, P & Young, C, eds. *Dilemmas Of Democracy In Nigeria*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press. pp 45-52. As Afolayan recalls, the name 'Nigeria' first was officially applied to that section of west Africa during a House of Commons debate in 1899. Prior to the onset of full-blown territorial imperialism, there were three major polities in the regions subsequently cordoned off by the British. The polities were separated by different histories, languages, cultures and gods, as well as by different forms of political and economic organisation.
477. See Normandy, E. (1992) "Nigeria" in DeLancey, M, ed. *op cit*, pp 334-336, for an outline of 'the underlying motives for foreign intervention and the effect of foreign involvement on the course and outcome of the war.'
478. Lonsdale, J. (1986) "Political Accountability in African History" in Chabal, P, ed, *op cit*, p139
479. Lonsdale, J, *ibid*, p140
480. Parker, G. (1984) *Europe In Crisis. 1598-1648*. London: Fontana. pp 50-75. According to Parker, 'almost every major political crisis in Christian Europe during early modern times involved religious disagreement.' See also Young, C. (1994) *The African Colonial State In Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Young quotes Amilcar Cabral: 'We are not interested in the preservation of any of the structures of the colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash, all aspects of the colonial state in our country to make everything possible for our people. The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence.'
481. Callaghy, T. (1986) "Politics and Vision in Africa: the Interplay of Domination, Equality and Liberty" in Chabal, P, ed, *op cit*, p 13
482. See Young, C. (1994) *op cit*, p16, for an outline of the dominance of the European form of the state due to 'the globalization of imperialism, its strategic position at the core of the contemporary world system of states, and its virtually exclusive place in the field of vision of moral philosophers and contemporary theorists.' Young adds that: 'In states that escaped the imperial yoke, survival required a conscious state reconstruction largely based on European images and ideologies.'

483. Grey, J. (2003) *Straw Dogs. Thoughts On Humans And Other Animals*. London: Granta. p 36
484. See Bayart, J-F. (1993) *The State In Africa. The Politics Of The Belly*. London: Longman. p11 'Bearing the marks of teleological evolutionism, the two approaches taken by the academic world following independence were closely linked to the praxis of the postcolonial state as a 'well policed state' (*policeystaat*), supreme architect of modernity, and in this respect close in its philosophy to the monarchies of central Europe by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.'
485. Chabal, P. (1992) *Power In Africa. An Essay In Political Interpretation*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p14
486. Bayart, J-F. (1993) *op cit*, p11
487. Young, C. (1994) *op cit*, p17
488. Munck, R. (2000) *Marx @ 2000. Late Marxist Perspectives*. London: Zed Books. p14
489. Betts, R. (1998) *op cit*, p 34
490. Young, C. (1994) *op cit*, pp 37-38
491. Young, C, *ibid*, p 38
492. Young, C, *ibid*, p 26
493. Chabal, P. (1992) *op cit*, p11
494. Almond, G. (1996) "Political Science: the History of the Discipline" in Goodlin, R & Klingemann, H, eds. *A New Handbook Of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 66
495. Almond, G, *ibid*, p 67
496. Almond, G, *ibid*, p 68
497. Almond, G, *ibid*
498. Almond, G, *ibid*, pp 69-70
499. Almond, G, *ibid*, p 73
500. Apter, D. (1996) "Comparative Politics, Old and New" in Goodlin, R & Klingemann, H, eds, *op cit*, p 379

501. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 380
502. Apter, D, *ibid*
503. Apter, D, *ibid*
504. Johnson, D. (1982) "Economism and Determinism in Dependency Theory" in Chilcote, R, ed. *Dependency And Marxism. Towards A Resolution Of The Debate*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. p108
505. Brewer, A. (1980) *Marxist Theories Of Imperialism. A Critical Survey*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: Routledge. p161
506. Menkhaus, K. (1992) *op cit*, p 21
507. Menkhaus, K, *ibid*, p 22
508. Menkhaus, K, *ibid*, p 26
509. July, R. (1987) *An African Voice. The Role Of The Humanities In African Independence*. Durham: Duke University Press. p 40
510. Cohen, R. (1986) *op cit*, p 43
511. Padmore quoted in Cohen, R, *ibid*
512. Cesaire quoted in July, R. (1987) *op cit*, p 41

## Chapter Six.

513. See Randall, V & Theobald, R. (1985) *Political Change And Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan. pp12-13
514. Scruton, R. (1982) *A Dictionary of Political Thought*. London: Macmillan. p 38
515. Huntington, S. (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp 5-6
516. See Chomsky's trenchant criticisms of the obfuscation and whitewashing of U.S. foreign policy by American intellectuals, political scientists in particular. Among other caustic comments, Chomsky avers that 'it is an article of faith that American motives are pure and not subject to analysis.' Chomsky, N. (1992) "The

Responsibility of Intellectuals" in Peck, J, ed. *The Chomsky Reader*. London: Serpent's Tail. p 64

- 517. Easton, D. (1965) *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p x
- 518. Easton, D, *ibid*
- 519. Easton, D, *ibid*, p171
- 520. Easton, D, *ibid*, p172
- 521. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 52
- 522. Easton, D, *ibid*, pp176-177
- 523. Easton, D, *ibid*, p180
- 524. Easton, D, *ibid*, pp190-196
- 525. Easton, D, *ibid*, pp 212-213
- 526. Easton, D, *ibid*, pp 211-212
- 527. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 214
- 528. Rousseau, J-J. (1960) "The Social Contract" in Barker, E, ed. *Social Contract*. Locke, Hume, Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p172. 'However strong a man, he is never strong enough to remain master always, unless he transform his Might into Right, and Obedience into Duty.'
- 529 Easton, D. (1965) *op cit*, p 278
- 530 Easton, D, *ibid*, p 291
- 531 Easton, D, *ibid*, p 290
- 532 Easton, D, *ibid*, p 294
- 533. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 290
- 534. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 294
- 535. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 295
- 536. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 305

537. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 297
538. Easton, D, *ibid*, p 309
539. Apter, D. (1973) *Political Change*. London: Frank Cass. pp102-117
540. Almond, G & Coleman, J. (1960) *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp12-25
541. Almond, G & Coleman, J, *ibid*, p 45
542. Almond, G & Coleman, J, *ibid*, p 27
543. Almond, G & Coleman, J, *ibid*, p26
544. Almond, G & Coleman, J, *ibid*, pp 33-45; pp 575-576
545. Almond, G & Powell, G. (1966) *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*. Boston: Little, Brown & co. p19
546. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, pp 25-41
547. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p 64
548. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, pp 66-67
549. Apter, D. (1973) *op cit*, p v
550. Almond, G & Powell, G. (1966) *op cit*, p 71
551. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p 67
552. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p 72
553. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p115
554. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p121
555. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p125
556. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p126
557. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p124
558. Almond, G & Powell, G, *ibid*, p 67
559. Apter, D. (1965) *The Politics of Modernisation*. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press. p 20

- 560. Apter, D. (1965) *op cit*, p 24
- 561. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 250
- 562. Apter, D, *ibid*
- 563. Apter, D, *ibid*
- 564. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 251
- 565. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 53
- 566. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 86
- 567. Apter, D, *ibid*, p117
- 568. Evans-Pritchard quoted in Apter, D, *ibid*, p 93
- 569. Apter, D, *ibid*, pp 84-85
- 570. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 88
- 571. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 98
- 572. Apter, D, *ibid*, p120
- 573. See Davidson, B. (1992) *The Black Man's Burden. Africa And The Curse Of The Nation-State*. London: James Currey. pp 66-73
- 574. Apter, D. (1965) *op cit*, pp102-103
- 575. Apter, D, *ibid*, p110
- 576. Apter, D, *ibid*, p110
- 577. Apter, D, *ibid*, p119
- 578. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 95
- 579. Apter, D, *ibid*, pp 343-354
- 580. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 315
- 581. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 317

- 582 Apter, D, *ibid*
- 583 Apter, D, *ibid*, p 320
- 584 Apter, D, *ibid*
- 585 Apter, D, *ibid*
- 586 Apter, D, *ibid*
587. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 321
- 588 Apter, D, *ibid*
- 589 Apter, D, *ibid*, p 321
590. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 343
- 591 Apter, D, *ibid*, p 344
- 592 Apter, D, *ibid*
593. Apter, D, *ibid*
594. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 427
595. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 428
- 596 Apter, D, *ibid*, p 355
597. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 354
598. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 339
599. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 329
600. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 336
601. Apter, D, *ibid*, pp 325-326
602. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 326
603. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 362
604. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 240

605. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 363
606. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 365
607. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 366
608. Apter, D, *ibid*
609. Hawkesworth, M & Kogan, M, eds. (1992) *Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics*. Volume 1. London: Routledge. p 34
610. Susser, B. (1992) *Approaches To The Study Of Politics*. New York: Macmillan. pp 83-84
611. Susser, B, *ibid*, p 84
612. Apter, D. (1965) *op cit*, p 38
613. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 29
614. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 28
615. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 326
616. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 432
617. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 346
618. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 345
619. Apter, D, *ibid*, p 317
620. Menkhaus, J. (1992) "Political and Social Change" in Delancey, M, ed. *Handbook Of Political Science Research On Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends From The 1960s To The 1990s*. Westport: Greenwood Press. p10

## Chapter Seven

621. Huntington, S. (1968) *Political Order In Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press. It would be inaccurate to define this text as fully revisionist since (as argued in the preceding chapter) seeds of Huntington's revisionism already were embedded in the discourse of pluralist (orthodox) modernisation theory.

623. Apter, D. (1987) *Rethinking Development. Modernization, Dependency, And Postmodern Politics*. London: Sage. p16
623. Huntington, S. (1981) *American Politics. The Promise of Disharmony*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp 22-25. Huntington argues that what separates Americans from all other nations is the political, as opposed to organic, basis of their commonality. 'The United States had its origins in a conscious political act, in the assertion of certain basic principles ... It is possible to speak of a body of political ideas that constitutes 'Americanism' ... Americanism in this sense is comparable to other ideologies or religions.'
624. Apter, D. (1987) *op cit*, p17
625. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p 3
626. Marsh, D & Stoker, G, eds. (1995) *Theory And Methods in Political Science*. London: Macmillan. p 9 The editors maintain that behaviouralism has backed away from some of its early assumptions. For instance: 'Behaviouralists now acknowledge that facts do not speak for themselves but only make sense in the context of a framework of investigation. Ideas about what is important and the way things work structure all observations. Theory and facts are not independent of one another. Further, claims to value-free analysis have been played down.'
627. Mamdani, M. (1998) *Citizen And Subject: Contemporary Africa And The Legacy Of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 9
628. Ashcroft, B, Griffiths, G, & Tiffin, H. (2000) *Post-Colonial Studies. The Key Concepts*. London: Routledge. p 23. According to Ashcroft *et al*, the binary opposition is the most extreme form of difference possible.
629. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p10
630. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p12
631. Huntington, S, *ibid*
632. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p14
633. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p15
634. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p17
635. It is not always easy to distinguish, in Huntington's thesis, between instrumental and inherent value of institutions and concepts. In general, it is possible to surmise that he sees a normative concept such as 'public morality' as having no intrinsic value unless realised in a political institution. As, in Huntington's reasoning, stable and adaptable

political institutions *ipso facto* represent public morality, one further can surmise that in his perception a stable and adaptable political institution inherently is valuable or moral.

636. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p 24
637. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 8
638. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 31
639. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 4
640. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 24
641. Huntington, S, *ibid*, pp 24-25
642. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 25
643. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 26
644. Huntington, S, *ibid*
645. Huntington, S. (1981) *op cit*, p 35. Huntington argues that: 'Indicative of the American antipathy to power and government is the virtual absence of the concept of 'the state' in American thought. In its modern form, the idea of the state originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and came to full fruition in the age of absolutism that followed. Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bodin were its prophets; the continental absolute monarchs its creators. The idea of the state implied the concentration of sovereignty in a single, centralized government authority. This concept never took hold among the English North American colonists who brought with them an older tradition rooted in medieval constitutionalism.' Needless to say, the promise of disharmony which takes pride of place in the title is vested in the contradiction - as Huntington sees it - between a weak government and a strong society.
646. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p 27
647. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p1
648. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 27
649. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 28
650. Huntington, S, *ibid*
651. Huntington, S, *ibid*

652. Quoted in Huntington, S, *ibid*, p17
653. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p122
654. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 30
655. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p122
656. Huntington, S, *ibid*
657. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p123
658. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 23
659. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p126
660. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p127
661. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p102
662. Huntington, S, *ibid*
663. Huntington, S, *ibid*
664. Achebe, C. (1958) *Things Fall Apart*. Johannesburg: Heinemann. pp149-150
665. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p142.
666. Huntington, S, *ibid*, pp 7-8
667. Rousseau quoted in Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 9
668. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p11. An inference worth noting in the passage quoted is a distinction between 'Marxists' and the CPSU to the detriment of the former.
669. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p142
670. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 41
671. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 43
672. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 47
673. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 82
674. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 80

675. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 81
676. Chabal, P. (1992) *Power In Africa*. New York: St Martin's Press. p 6. According to Chabal, the liberal wing of the modernisation school assumed a reciprocal causal relationship between economic and political development. Economic development provided the material basis for political development; conversely, political development created the organisational structure for economic development.
677. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p 27
678. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 8
679. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 55
680. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 70
681. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 71
682. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 80
683. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 88
684. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 89
685. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 88
686. Huntington, S, *ibid*
687. Huntington, S, *ibid*
688. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 88
689. Huntington, S, *ibid*, pp 88-89
690. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 89. This remarkable statement of Huntington's brings to mind BBC political commentator and comedian David Frost's joke to the effect that 'someone broke into the Kremlin last night and stole next year's election results.'
691. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 8
692. Huntington, S, *ibid*, pp 85-86
693. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 7
694. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p 422

695. Huntington, S, *ibid*, p102
696. Huntington, S, *ibid*
697. Hobbes, T. (1962) *Leviathan*. London: Fontana p143
698. Hobbes, T, *ibid*, p 72
699. Menkhaus, K. (1992) "Political and Social Change" in DeLancey, M, ed. *Handbook Of Political Science Research On Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends from The 1960s To The 1990s*. Westport: Greenwood Press. p 33
700. Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki cited in Panitch, C, & Leys, C. (2001) *The End Of Parliamentary Socialism*. London: Verso. p 5
701. Hobbes, T. (1962) *op cit*, p141. 'Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend as well as he.'
702. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p 53
703. Plamenatz, J. (1962) "Introduction" in Hobbes, T, *op cit*, p 20
704. Plamenatz, J, in Hobbes, T, *ibid*, p 6
705. Plamenatz, J, in Hobbes, T, *ibid*, p 21
706. Hobbes, T, *ibid*, p 212
707. Huntington, S. (1968) *op cit*, p 2
708. See Huntington, S. (1996) "The West: Unique, not Universal." *Foreign Affairs*. 75, 6. In a 1990s reworking of 1968's binary opposites, the former Soviet Union, now merely Russia, is depicted as non-Western, hence 'other'. An ideology of common cause between global powers now is restricted to countries that share the values and belief systems characteristic of 'Western Civilisation'.

## Chapter Eight

709. Randall, V & Theobald, R. (1985) *Political Change And Underdevelopment. A Critical Introduction To Third World Politics*. London: Macmillan. p100
710. Randall, V & Theobald, R, *ibid*, p105
711. Randall, V & Theobald, R, *ibid*, p108
712. Amin, S. (1976) *Unequal Development. An Essay On The Social Formations Of Peripheral Capitalism*. Sussex: Harvester. p199
713. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 364
714. Cliffe, L. (1985) "Rural Political Economy of Africans" in Gutkind, P & Wallerstein, I, eds. *Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: Sage. p122  
Cliffe defines the relationship as follows: 'Unequal exchange does not mean simply an adverse shift or a generally negative trend in the terms of trade of agricultural or other goods of primary producing countries relative to the (manufactured) products of developed countries. Whether the trend is adverse or favourable, it is only a relative movement. The notion is analogous to the relationship between capitalist and worker.'
715. Brewer, A. (1980) *Marxist Theories Of Imperialism. A Critical Survey*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: Routledge. p 9
716. Brewer, A, *ibid*, p 25
717. Brett quoted in Magubane, B. (1985) "The Evolution of the Class Structure in Africa" in Gutkind, P & Wallerstein, I, eds, *op cit*, p 210
718. Brett quoted in Magubane, B, *ibid*
719. Brett quoted in Magubane, B, *ibid*
720. Magubane, B, *ibid*, p 220
721. Amin, S. (1976) *op cit*, p 360
722. Brewer, A. (1980) *op cit*, pp 20-21
723. Brewer, A, *ibid*, p116
724. Chazan, N, Mortimer, R, Ravenhill, J & Rothchild, D. (1988) *Politics And Society In Contemporary Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p 5

725. Rodney, W. (1972) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. pp 84-112
726. Goulbourne, H. (1979) "Some Problems of Analysis of the Political in Backward Capitalist Social Formations" in Goulbourne, H, ed, *Politics And State In The Third World* London: Macmillan. pp12-13
727. Angotti, T. (1982) "The Political Implications of Dependency Theory" in Chilcote, R, ed. *Dependency And Marxism. Towards A Resolution Of The Debate*. Boulder: Westview Press. p126
728. Angotti, T, *ibid*.
729. Goulbourne, H, ed. (1979) *op cit*, p 22
730. Menkhaus, K. (1992) "Political and Social Change" in DeLancy, M, ed. *Handbook Of Political Science Research On Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends from the 1960s To The 1990s*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. p 26.
731. Edelstein, J. (1982) "Dependency: A Special Theory Within Marxist Analysis" in Chilcote, R, ed, *op cit*, pp103-105
732. Edelstein, J, *ibid*, p106
733. Weeks, J. (1982) "The Differences between Materialist Theory and Dependency Theory and Why They Matter" in Chilcote, R, ed, *op cit*, p118. In a footnote, Weeks strikes a blow for liturgical rigour. 'Since a central conclusion of the theory Marx initiated is that great people do not make history, it is inconsistent for one in the analytical tradition of Marx to refer to his or her framework as 'Marxian theory'. This implies that theory is the work of one (or several) people, while in fact it is the result of material conditions. Therefore, the term 'materialist theory' will be used throughout this discussion.'
734. Weeks, J, *ibid*, p122
735. Angotti,, T. (1982) *op cit*, p 126
736. Angotti, T, *ibid*, p129
737. Angotti, T, *ibid*, p130
738. Walicki, A. (1995) *Marxism And The Leap To The Kingdom Of Freedom. The Rise And Fall Of The Communist Utopia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p17
739. Merleau-Ponty quoted in Walicki, A, *ibid*

740. Walicki, A, *ibid*.
- 741 Walicki, A, *ibid*, p16
742. Walicki, A, *ibid*
743. Walicki, A, *ibid*, p 21
744. Marx, K & Engels, F. (1969) "Manifesto of the Communist party" in Feuer, L, ed. *Marx And Engels. Basic Writings On Politics And Philosophy*. London: Collins. p 53.
745. Marx, K & Engels, F, *ibid*, p 59
746. Goulbourne, H, ed. (1979) *op cit*, p17
- 747 Angotti, T. (1982) *op cit*, p 28
- 748 Angotti, T, *ibid*
749. Angotti, T, *ibid*, p 29
750. Goulbourne, H, ed. (1979) *op cit*, pp17-18
- 751 Waterman, P. (1997) "On Radicalism in African Studies" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds. *African Social Studies. A Radical Reader*. London: Heineman. p1
- 752 Waterman, P, *ibid*, p7
- 753 Allen, C. (1977) "Radical Themes in African Studies: a Bibliographical Guide" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds, *ibid*, p 425
- 754 Benot, Y. (1977) "The Impact of Stalinism on Radical African Socialists" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds, *ibid*, p 325
- 755 Allen, C. (1997) *op cit*, p 247
- 756 Allen, C, *ibid*
- 757 Law, R. (1978) "In Search of a Marxist Perspective". *Journal of African History*. XIX, 3. p 445
- 758 Copans, J. (1977) "African Studies: A Periodisation" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds, *op cit*, p 26

- 759 Waterman, P. (1977) *op cit*, p 4
- 760 Waterman, P, *ibid*, p 6
- 761 Notably, the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. See Mezaros, I. (1975) *Marx's Theory Of Alienation*. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. London: Merlin Press. p11 according to Mezaros, 'the key concept of these manuscripts is the concept of Alienation.' The first – but incomplete – version of Marx's early work was published in 1927 on the initiative of Director Riasnov of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. Riasnov subsequently fell victim to internal political struggles in Soviet Russia, and 'disappeared' in 1931. See Bottomore, T & Rubel, M, eds. (1963) *Karl Marx. Selected Writings In Sociology And Social Philosophy*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. p 7
- 762 Lukacs cited in Walicki, A. (1995) *op cit*, p115. In time, Stalinist pressures obliged Lukacs to disown his departure from Soviet orthodoxy. See Munck, R. (2000) *Marx @ 2000. Late Marxist Perspectives*. London: Zed Books. p 5. For Engels' positivist conception of praxis, see, for example, Engels, F. (1969) "On Historical Materialism" in Feuer, L, ed, *op cit*, p 92. '... before there was argumentation, there was action. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense perceptions.' For Lenin's adoption of Engels' positivist version of praxis see, for instance, his assertion that Engels provided a definitive portrayal of materialist epistemology in which praxis constitutes 'recognition of the rule of objective laws in Nature and of the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom.' Lenin, V. (1963) "Karl Marx" in *Selected Works*. Volume 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers. p 92. For Lenin's correspondence theory of knowledge in which cognition merely copies or reflects reality, see Lenin, V. "The Three Sources and the Three Component Parts of Marxism" in *Selected Works*, *ibid*, pp 45-46
- 763 Walicki, A. (1995) *op cit*, p 566
- 764 Marx, K & Engels, F. (1969) "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in Feuer, L, *op cit*, p 59
765. Lenin, V. (1963) "What Is To Be Done?" in *Selected Works*, *op cit*, p120
766. Kautsky quoted in Lenin, V, *ibid*, p121
767. Lenin, V, *ibid*
768. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p122
- 769 Kautsky quoted in Hook, S. (1955) *Marx And The Marxists. The Ambiguous Legacy*. New York: Van Nostrand. p 51

770. See McLellan, D. (1998) *Marxism After Marx*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. London: Macmillan. p 34. Commenting on Kautsky's 'passive stance', McLellan suggests that it was 'reinforced by consideration of the immense power at the disposal of the Prussian state, including the most powerful army in the world.'
771. McLellan, D, *ibid*.
772. Lenin, V. (1963) "What Is To Be Done" in *Selected Works*, *op cit*, p187
773. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p188
774. McLellan, D. (1998) *op cit*, p108
775. Resolution of the Tenth Party Congress quoted in McLellan, D, *ibid*, p 98
776. Kautsky, K. (1955) "Terrorism and Communism" in Hook, S, *op cit*, p 203
777. Carew-Hunt, R. (1956) *The Theory And Practice Of Communism*. 5<sup>th</sup> (revised) edition. Harmondsworth: Pelican. p156
778. Lenin, V. (1963) "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" in *Selected Works*, *op cit*, p 639
779. Lenin, V. (1955) "Communist Organisation and Strategy" in Hook, S, *op cit*, p142
780. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p191
781. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p188
782. Lenin, V, *ibid*, pp190-191
783. Lenin, V. (1955) "On Communist Morality" in Hook, S, *op cit*, p195
784. Lenin, V. (1963) "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" in *Selected Works*, *op cit*, p 47
785. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p189
786. Lenin, V. (1963) "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" in *Selected Works* *op cit*, p 689-90
787. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p 725
788. Lenin, V, *ibid*, p 726

- 789 Lenin, V, *ibid*, pp 727-728
- 790 Lenin, V, *ibid*, p 731
- 791 Lenin, V, *ibid*, p 658
- 792 Carew-Hunt, R. (1956) *op cit*, p 209
- 793 Carew-Hunt, R, *ibid*
- 794 See Alavi, H. (1983) "Marxism and the Third World" in Bottomore, T, ed. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell. p 313
- 795 Alavi, H, *ibid*, p 314
- 796 Alavi, H, *ibid*
- 797 Kilroy-Silk, R. (1972) *Socialism Since Marx*. London: Allen Lane. p133
798. Löwy, M. (1984) "Stalinist Ideology and Science" in Ali, T, ed. *The Stalinist Legacy. Its Impact On Twentieth Century World Politics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p169
- 799 Löwy, M, *ibid*, p170
800. Young, R. (1983) "Lysenkoism" in Bottomore, T, ed, *op cit*, pp 294-295
801. Löwy, M. (1984) *op cit*, p170.  
 Regarding 'Lysenkoism' it is worth noting that it is a phenomenon not necessarily restricted to Stalin's era. For instance, in a comment on the HIV/Aids policy of the South African government, Paul Trewhela (a former member of the South African Communist Party) argues that 'it reflects ... the cloistered, driven mind-set that produced the sham biology of Lysenko in the final years of Stalin'.  
 Trewhela, P. (2000) "Mbeki and Aids in Africa: a comment" *New York Review of Books* (online). 47, 16. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/13868>  
 Writing in reply, Anthony Sampson and Nadine Gordimer contend that 'to compare the black South African communists with the Moscow apparatchiks has always been misleading' and that 'it is helping no-one to try and connect Mbeki's approach to AIDS with supposed Stalinist policies ...'  
 Sampson, A & Gordimer, N. (2000) "President Mbeki's career". Letter to the editors, *The New York Review of Books* (online). 47, 18  
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/13915>  
 The missile fired back by Trewhela begins as follows: 'It is absurd for Nadine Gordimer and Anthony Sampson to suggest that the South African Communist Party was not really a communist party: it was one of the most Stalinist parties in the world.

Not once did it disagree with the current Soviet line. In this spirit it supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ... along with the African National Congress.' Trehwela, P. (2000) Letter to the editors. *New York Review of Books* (online), *ibid*. In an article discussing a link made by a New York Times editorial between the 'pseudo-science' of the Bush administration and that of President Mbeki, Caroline Hooper-Box notes that the Bush administration has been accused of 'manipulating and distorting science for political purposes' by 'a group of more than 60 top US scientists, including 20 Nobel laureates' who were reacting to the US global Aids coordinator's attack on the efficacy of condoms in preventing the spread of HIV/Aids. 'By freezing the Agency for International Development's budget for providing condoms in developing countries, and promoting abstinence rather than condoms, the Bush administration was 'using pseudo-science to explain its choices, bowing to pressure from right-wing religious movements' and 'following the tragic example of putting ideology above medical science set by President Mbeki in the dispute over HIV/Aids.' Hooper-Box, C. (2004) "US fund slammed for condom put-down." *The Sunday Independent*. May 30

802. Löwy, M. (1984) *op cit*, p176
803. Ali, T. (1984) "Introduction" in Ali, T, ed, *op cit*, p17
804. Ali, T, *ibid*, p19
805. Deutscher, I. (1984) "Marxism and Primitive Magic" in Ali, T, ed, *op cit*, p112
806. Deutscher, I, *ibid*, p115
807. Walicki, A. (1995) *op cit*, pp 438-439
808. See Khrushchev, N. (1984) "Secret Report to the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of the CPSU" in Ali, T, ed, *op cit*
809. Walicki, A. (1995) *op cit*, p 526
810. Schlopflin, G. (1981) "The Political Structure of Eastern Europe as a Factor in Intra-bloc Relations" in Dawisha, K & Hanson, P, eds. *Soviet-East European Dilemmas*. London: Heinemann. p 78
811. Shlapentokh quoted in Walicki, A. (1995) *op cit*, p 521
812. See Walicki, A, *ibid*, pp 499-526
813. This particularly was the case in Angola where three liberation armies were engaged in a struggle for power after Portuguese withdrawal in November 1975. The dominant MPLA formed a government with the active support of Cuba, seconded by the Soviet Union. The FNLA (headquartered in Kinshasa and backed by Mobutu), and to a

lesser extent, UNITA, had the support of the United States. Kissinger, despite his denials then and later, was aware and approved of South Africa's intention covertly to invade Angola – an incursion to which Castro responded by dispatching 30,000 Cubans to Angola in 1975-6. In January 1976, the Soviet Ambassador in Havana agreed to provide Cuba's Angolan force with air transport and other logistical support. See: Memorandum of January 6, 1976. Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. "Conversation with Soviet Ambassador." *The National Security Archive* (online). *Secret Cuban Documents on History of Africa Involvement*.

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/index.html> Interviewed in 1998 by Piero Gleijeses, Robert Hultslander, former CIA station chief in Luanda, commented as follows: 'Instead of working with the moderate elements in Angola, which I believe we could have found within the MPLA, we supported the radical, tribal, 'anti-Soviet' right. You write that 'Kissinger feared that an MPLA victory would have destabilising effects throughout Southern Africa.' Of course, the opposite proved true; it was our policies which caused the destabilisation.' See: "Interview with Robert W. Hultslander" *The National Security Archive* (online).

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/transcript.html> In a review of Piero Gleijeses' 'remarkable record of Cuban assistance to African insurgencies', Victoria Brittain, while emphasising the autonomous nature of Cuban foreign policy, appends a caveat: 'There are notably few instances where Cuban and Soviet foreign policy are in conflict. This is especially the case after 1968 and the crushing of the Prague Spring, to which – after a silence – Havana lent its support.' See: Brittain, V. (2002) "Cuba in Africa". *New Left Review*. 17, II. p171

- 814 See, for example, Marx, K. (1969) "Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" in Feuer, L, ed, *op cit*, pp 306-307. 'As philosophy finds its *material* weapon in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *spiritual* weapon in philosophy.' Further: 'The head of this emancipation is *philosophy*, its heart is the *proletariat*.'
- 815 Benton, T. (1983) "Positivism" in Bottomore, T, ed, *op cit*, p 383
- 816 Anderson, P. (2000) "Renewals." *New Left Review*. 1, II. p 8.
- 817 Anderson, P, *ibid*
- 818 "Editorial" (1974) *Review of African Political Economy* 1. p1.
- 819 "Editorial" *ibid*, p2
- 820 Munck, R. (2000) *op cit*, p14
- 821 Chabal, P. (1994) *Power In Africa. An Essay In Political Interpretation*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p 26 . Chabal's critical comment usefully can be applied to Leys' hope that liberation struggles in Southern Africa would inject new life into the

otherwise stagnant cause of socialist transformation in Kenya. See Leys, C. (1975) "Contradictions of Neo-Colonialism." *Marxism And Anti-Imperialism In Africa* (online) p18. <http://www.marxists.org/subject/index.htm>

- 822 Delanty, G. (1997) *Social Science. Beyond Constructivism And Realism*. Buckingham: Open University Press. p 71
- 823 Delanty, G, *ibid*, p 72
- 824 Delanty, G, *ibid*, p 73
- 825 Delanty, G, *ibid*, p 74
- 826 Delanty, G, *ibid*, p 71. 'Marcuse was one of the famous representatives of critical theory, although he was not directly related to the Frankfurt School.'
827. Marcuse, H. (1972) *One Dimensional Man*. London: Abacus p181
- 828 Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p175
829. Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p176
830. Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p17
831. Marcuse, H, *ibid*, pp 25-26
832. Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p13
833. Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p 43
- 834 Marcuse, H, *ibid*, pp199-200
- 835 Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p 200
836. Marcuse, H, *ibid*
- 837 Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p 49
- 838 Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p 51
839. Marcuse, H, *ibid*
- 840 Marcuse, H, *ibid*
841. Marcuse, H, *ibid*

842. Marcuse, H, *ibid*, p 45
- 843 *Caveat*: 'Marcuse's 'somewhat pessimistic analysis of modern capitalism and consumerism struck a chord with young student radicals in France and the U.S. particularly, and *One Dimensional Man* achieved a mass audience'. *Marxism And The New Left*. Marxist Internet Archive (online).  
<http://www.marxists.org.subject/humanism/index.htm>

## Chapter Nine.

844. Turok, B. (1986) "The Left in Africa Today" in Munslow, B, ed. *Africa. Problems In The Transition to Socialism*. London: Zed Books. p 64. Regarding Zimbabwe, Turok comments that it is 'a puzzling new addition to Marxism-Leninism in Africa', and explains his comment as follows: 'Although the ruling party ZANU made great play of Marxism-Leninism during the war of liberation, it was often claimed by critics that this was somewhat artificial. Indeed, its early years in power have not been notable either for a dismantling of white economic power, or for a curbing of that tendency which has been the hallmark of African independence in most countries, the rapid evolution of an African petty bourgeoisie using political and administrative office for personal accumulation. One explanation is that in its insecurity, the Mugabe regime finds it necessary to reintroduce the ideology of the war to keep the loyalty of the thousands of militants who fought the war in the name of Marxism-Leninism, rather than for African power or ethnic hegemony.'
- 845 Fanon, F. (1967) *The Wretched Of The Earth*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p 31
- 846 Rudebeck, L (1979) "Socialist-oriented Development in Guinea-Bissau" in Rosberg, C,& Callaghy, T, eds. *Socialism In Sub-Saharan Africa. A New Assessment*. Berkely: University of California, Institute of International Studies. p 325
847. Sartre, J-P. (1967) in Fanon, F, *op cit*, p15
848. Fanon, F, *ibid*, pp 30-31
849. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p118
- 850 Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 31
851. Fanon, F, *ibid*
852. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 74

853. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 200
854. Fanon, F, *ibid*, pp 44-45
855. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 45
856. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 34
857. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 73
858. Bulhan, H. (1985) *Frantz Fanon And The Psychology Of Oppression*. New York: Plenum Press. p 74
859. Fanon, F. (1967) *op cit*, p 37
860. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 67
861. Gibson, N. (2003) *Fanon. The Postcolonial Imagination*. Cambridge: Polity Press. p105
862. Fanon, F. (1967) *op cit*, p 47
863. Gibson, N. (2003) *op cit*, p105
864. Fanon, F. (1967) *op cit*, p102
865. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p103
866. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p106
867. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p107
868. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p111
869. Fanon, F, *ibid*
870. Fanon, F, *ibid*, pp114-115
871. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p117
872. Fanon, F, *ibid*, pp119
873. Fanon, F, *ibid*, pp129-130
874. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p127
875. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p 46

876. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p122
877. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p120
878. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p140
879. Fanon, F, *ibid*
880. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p141
881. Fanon, F, *ibid*
882. Fanon, F, *ibid*
883. Fanon, F, *ibid*
884. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p139. For a recent variation on the theme of 'executive lawlessness', see Agozino, B. (2003) *Counter-Colonial Criminology. A Critique Of Imperialist Reason*. London: Pluto Press. pp113-139
885. Fanon, F, *ibid*, p155
886. Fanon, F, *ibid*
887. Fanon, F, *ibid*
888. The endemic violence that characterised French colonialism in Algeria, and its brutalising effects are chillingly illustrated in the case notes with which Fanon concludes *The Wretched Of The Earth*.
889. Gibson, N. (2003) *op cit*, pp184-185
890. Gibson, N, *ibid*, p186
891. Fanon, F. (1967) *op cit*, p 39
892. Clegg, I. (1977) "Workers' control: the Algerian experience" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds. *African Social Studies. A Radical Reader*. London: Heinemann. p 358
893. Clegg, I, *ibid*
894. Fanon cited in Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 359
895. Clegg, I, *ibid*

896. Clegg, I, *ibid*, pp 363-364
897. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 363
898. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 361
899. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 360
900. Clegg, I, *ibid*, pp 361
901. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 364
902. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 360
903. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 364
904. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 365
905. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 362
906. Clegg, I, *ibid*, p 361
907. Gibson, N. (2003) *op cit*, p186
908. Bakunin quoted in Joll, J. (1960) *The Anarchists*. London: Methuen. p 56
909. Bakunin quoted in Joll, J, *ibid*, p 91
910. Bakunin quoted in Joll, J, *ibid*, p 93
911. Bakunin quoted in Joll, J, *ibid*
912. Joll, J, *ibid*
913. See Peterson, C. (2001) "Returning to the African Core: Cabral and the Erasure of the Colonised Elite." *West African Review* (online). 2,2. p 28.  
<http://www.westafricareview.com/war/vol2.2/peterson.html>
914. Davidson, B. (1994) *The Search For Africa. A History In The Making*. London: James Currey. p 228
915. Cabral, A. (1977) "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea-Bissau" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds, *op cit*, p 229
916. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 226

- 917 Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 918 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 229
- 919 Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 920 Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 921 Cabral, A, *ibid*
922. Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 923 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 228
924. Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 925 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 230
926. Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 927 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 229
928. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 230
- 929 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 231
- 930 Cabral, A, *ibid*
931. Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 932 Cabral, A, *ibid*
933. Cabral, A, *ibid*
- 934 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 232
935. Cabral, A, *ibid*
936. For an account of peasant leadership in Como sector, see Davidson, B. (1994) *op cit*, p199
937. Cabral, A. (1979) "The Weapon of Theory" in Langley, J, ed. *Ideologies Of Liberation In Black Africa. 1856-1970*. London: Collings. p 693
- 938 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 701

- 939 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 697
940. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 698
941. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 700
942. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 702
943. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 699
944. Davidson, B. (1994) *op cit*, p 354
945. The inference I draw from Cabral's argument is not supported by Davidson's contention that 'the theory of petty-bourgeois suicide' is intended to be 'a strictly limited option in a strictly defined situation.' See Davidson, B, *ibid*, p 220
- 946 Cabral, A. (1979) *op cit*, p 684
947. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 685
948. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 865
949. Cabral, A. (1979) "National Liberation and Culture" in Langley, J, ed, *op cit*, p 721
950. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 703
951. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 707
952. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 705
953. Dalmeyr, F. (1996) "Return to the Source: African Identity (After Cabral)." *Theoria*. 88. p 3
954. Dalmeyr, F, *ibid*, p 21
955. Cabral quoted in Dalmeyr, F, *ibid*, p 9
956. Cabral, A. (1979) *op cit*, p 707
957. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 709
- 958 Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 709
959. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 710
960. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 715

961. Cabral, A, *ibid*
962. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 712
963. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p 713
964. Serequerberhan, T. (1994) *The Hermeneutics Of African Philosophy. Horizon And Discourses*. New York: Routledge. pp108-109
965. Rudebeck, L. (1979) *op cit*, p 325
966. Rudebeck, L, *ibid*, p 326
967. Turok, B. (1986) *op cit*, p 64
968. Davidson, B. (1994) *op cit*, p 230
969. See Marx, K & Engels, F. (1969) "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in Feuer, L, ed, *op cit*, p 48
970. Cabral, A. (1979) "The Weapon of Theory" in Langley, J, ed, *op cit*, p 687
971. Cabral quoted in Jowitt, K. (1979) "Scientific Socialist Regimes In Africa" in Rosberg, C & Callaghy, T, eds, *op cit*, p153
972. Cabral, A, *ibid*, pp 684-685
973. Chabal, P. (1986) *op cit*, p 86
974. Cabral, A. (1979) *Unity And Struggle*. New York: Monthly Review Press. p115
975. Cabral, A, *ibid*, p116
976. Cabral quoted in Rudebeck, L. (1979) *op cit*, p 326. It is worth adding that Cabral's outspoken defence of his and the PAIGC's right to fight their own fight and fashion their own ideology on the strength of it, has earned him brickbats as well as bouquets. For instance, Brittain incorporates in her review of Piere Gleijeses' *Conflicting Missions*, criticism of Cabral's determination 'to make self-reliance the key to his movement' in that it caused him consistently to refuse offers to increase the size of the Cuban military mission, even though 'the 50 to 60 Cubans present in the country - instructing Guineans in the use of increasingly sophisticated Soviet artillery and land mines - were vital to the war of attrition waged by the PAIGC against the Portuguese.' Citing Gleijeses' interviews with Guinean and Cuban Doctors, she also contends that 'Despite the PAIGC's claims to the contrary ... 40 Cubans bore the brunt of all medical work in the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau.' Brittain, V. (2002) "Cuba in Africa" *New Left Review*. 17, II. p169

977. Machel quoted in Ottaway, D, & Ottaway, M. (1981) *Afrocommunism*. New York: Africana. p 25. According to the Ottaways, Frelimo 'went to great lengths to demonstrate that Marxism-Leninism was not a foreign ideology, artificially implanted in the country by a group of ivory tower intellectuals, but rather an answer to specific Mozambican problems formulated in the heat of a prolonged struggle ... Frelimo insisted that its ideology was true Marxism-Leninism and not yet another variety of African Socialism.' Given Frelimo's fidelity to strict tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the development of revolutionary consciousness imputed the necessity of class struggle - a necessity, the Ottaways argue, that 'is very difficult ... to relate to the concrete situation in Mozambique. This difficulty was well symbolised by the cartoon character, Xiconhoca, the class enemy, which appeared widely in magazines, newspapers, school books and wall posters. Xiconhoca's sins ranged far and wide. He was the worker shirking his duty, the citified dandy in bell-bottom pants and dark glasses, the bureaucrat harassing people with his incompetent paper-shuffling, the male chauvinist, the collaborator with the imperialists. Yet Xiconhoca was not clearly a member of a well-defined class. His sins appeared subjective, the result of bad attitudes; in the final analysis this class enemy was a rather shapeless, though quite despicable, figure'. pp 76-79
978. Lara quoted in Ottaway, D, & Ottaway, M, *ibid*, p 25.
979. Bhagavan, M. (1986) "Establishing the Conditions for Socialism. The Case of Angola" in Munslow, B, ed, *op cit*, p175
980. Bhagavan, M, *ibid*, p176
981. Quoted in Ottaway, D, & Ottaway, M. (1981) *op cit*, p 26. See also Laitin, D. (1979) "Somalia's Military Government and Scientific Socialism" in Rosberg, C & Callaghy, T, eds, *op cit*, pp 203-204. Laitin highlights the anomalies in Siad Barre's adoption of scientific socialism attendant on his deference to Islam. In his effort to establish parity, Siad Barre contended that 'there is no conflict between Islam and Socialism as they both enshrine the principles of human dignity, mutual respect, cooperation, progress, justice and well-being for all.'
982. Nkrumah, K. (1967) "African Socialism Revisited." *Marxism and Anti-Imperialism In Africa* (online). p 2 <http://www.marxists.org/subject/index.htm>
983. Nkrumah, K, *ibid*
984. Nkrumah, K, *ibid*
985. Nkrumah, K, *ibid*, p 3
986. Nkrumah, K, *ibid*, p 4

- 987 Nkrumah, K, *ibid*
- 988 Nkrumah, K, *ibid*, p 6
- 989 Nkrumah, K, *ibid*
- 990 Nkrumah, K, *ibid*, p 5
991. Nkrumah, K, *ibid*
992. Nkrumah, K. (1975) "A Re-Definition of Neo-Colonialism" in Mutiso, G, & Rohio, S, eds. *Readings In African Political Thought*. London: Heinemann. p 415
- 993 Nkrumah, K, *ibid*, p 416
994. Nkrumah, K, *ibid*, p 417
995. Amin, S. (1976) *Unequal Development. An Essay On The Social Formations Of Peripheral Capitalism*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press. p 364
- 996 Amin, S, *ibid*, p199
- 997 Amin, S, *ibid*
998. Amin, S, *ibid*
- 999 Amin, S, *ibid*, p 201
1000. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 202
- 1001 Amin, S, *ibid*, p 361
1002. Amin, S, *ibid*
1003. Amin, S, *ibid*
1004. Amin, S, *ibid*
1005. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 362
1006. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 359
1007. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 360
1008. Amin, S, *ibid*

1009. Amin, S, *ibid*
1010. Amin, S, *ibid*
1011. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 361
1012. Amin, S, *ibid*
1013. Amin, S, *ibid*
1014. Amin, S, *ibid*, p 362
1015. Amin, S, *ibid*
1016. Amin, S, *ibid*
1017. Wallerstein, I. (1977) "Class and Status in Contemporary Africa" in Gutkind, P & Waterman, P, eds, *op cit*, p 277
1018. Wallerstein, I, *ibid*, p 280
1019. Wallerstein, I, *ibid*, p 281
1020. Wallerstein, I, *ibid*, p 282
1021. Wallerstein, I, *ibid*
1022. Wallerstein explains the systemic method as follows: 'All systemic analysis denies the real autonomy of parts of a whole ... the alternatives available for each unit are constrained by the framework of the whole, even while each actor opting for a given alternative in fact alters the framework of the whole.' Wallerstein, I. (1985) "The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World-Economy" in Gutkind, P & Wallerstein, I, eds. *Political Economy Of Contemporary Africa*. London: Sage. p35
1023. Wallerstein, I. (1977) *op cit*, p 281
1024. Wallerstein, I, *ibid*
1025. Wallerstein, I. (1979) *The Capitalist World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp193-201
1026. Wallerstein, I. (1984) *The Politics Of The World Economy: The States, The Movements And The Civilisations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p 84
1027. Wallerstein, I. (1985) *op cit*, p 54
1028. Wallerstein, I. (1998) *Utopistics. Or, Historical Choices Of The Twenty-First*

*Century*. New York: The New Press. p10

1029 Wallerstein, I, *ibid*

## Chapter Ten

- 1030 By way of illustration, a Tanzanian journalist who acquired her degree in the Soviet Union proffers a small but telling anecdote: 'The Soviets actually disliked Nyerere because he was not 'one of them'. Whenever we went to the History of the Communist Party class, I was attacked by my lecturer for being a Nyerere follower ... 'You are either a communist or a capitalist ... we do not like people in the grey areas ... they can be easily swayed to the enemy side.' Ntema, V. (1999) "Nyerere: a Personal Recollection". *BBC News* (online). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/463136.stm>
- 1031 According to Kariuki, the authoritarianism of the Zanzibari Revolutionary Council was 'a source of deep embarrassment to the leadership of mainland Tanzania'. Kariuki, J. (1979) *Tanzania's Human Revolution*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. p115
- 1032 See Nursey-Bray, P. (1980) "Tanzania: the Development Debate." *African Affairs*. 79, 314. p 57
- 1033 Nursey-Bray, P, *ibid*
- 1034 Saul, J. (2005) *The Next Liberation Struggle. Capitalism, Socialism And Democracy In Southern Africa*. Toronto: Between the Lines. p146
- 1035 Nyerere, J. (1968) *Freedom And Socialism*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press. p 2.
- 1036 *Caveat*: having sketched 'the conventional depiction' of post-independence development in Tanzania, in which policy prior to the Arusha Declaration 'has been regarded as operating within largely orthodox development principles, a modernist agenda, and the legacy of colonial planning', Jennings contends that this is an oversimplified picture. He points out that a strategy of rural self-help was incorporated in 1962 as a formal element in development policy. Jennings, M. (2003) "'We Must Run While Others Walk': Popular Participation and Development Crisis in Tanzania, 1961-9." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41, 2. pp 163-165 Addressing the same point, Mukangara isolates 1964 as the year in which 'Nyerere's group starts pilot *Ujamaa* Villages ... which were scattered all over the place.'

- Personal Interview with Professor Daudi Mukangara (Department of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam) 10th July, 2003.
- 1037 Personal interview with Professor Rwekaza Mukandala (Department of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam) 10th July, 2003.
- 1038 Shivji, I. (1976) *Class Struggles In Tanzania*. London: Heinemann. p14
- 1039 In 1977, the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) merged with the Afro-Shirazi party (ASP) of Zanzibar. The merged party was renamed Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
- 1040 Siddiqui, R. (1990) "Socialism and the Ujamaa Ideology" in O'Neill, N & Mustafa, K, eds. *Capitalism, Socialism And The Development Crisis In Tanzania*. Aldershot: Avebury p 23
- 1041 Siddiqui, R, *ibid*, pp 23-24
- 1042 Siddiqui, R, *ibid*, p 27
- 1043 Pratt, C. (1979) "Reflections of a Democratic Socialist" in Mwansasu B & Pratt, C, eds. *Towards Socialism In Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. p194
- 1044 Pratt, C. (1980) "Tanzania: The Development Debate – A Comment." *African Affairs*. 79, 316. p 343
- 1045 Pratt, C, *ibid*
- 1046 Pratt, C, *ibid*, p 344
- 1047 Pratt, C, *ibid*, p 345-346
- 1048 Shivji, I. (1973) "Tanzania – The Silent Class Struggle" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds. *Socialism In Tanzania*. Volume 2. Dar es Salaam: East Africa Publishing House. p 305
- 1049 Shivji, I. (1976) *op cit*, p 86
- 1050 Freund, W. (1981) "Class Conflict, Political Economy and The Struggle For Socialism in Tanzania." *African Affairs*. 80, 321. p 485
- 1051 Freund, W, *ibid*

- 1052 Pratt, C. (1979) *op cit*, p 219
- 1053 Freund, W. (1981) *op cit*, p 499
- 1054 Bennett, G. (1968) "Tanzania and Tanzaphilia. A Review Article." *African Affairs*. 67, 268. p 248
- 1055 Lonsdale, J. (1968) "The Tanzanian Experiment." *African Affairs*. 67, 269. p 332
- 1056 Nyerere, J. (1968) *op cit*, p 84
- 1057 The Communist Party Programme quoted in Potekhin, I. (1964) "On African Socialism: a Soviet View" in Friedland, W & Rosberg, C, eds. *African Socialism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p100
- 1058 Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p101
- 1059 Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p 99
- 1060 Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p105
- 1061 Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p111
- 1062 Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p107
- 1063 Potekhin, I, *ibid*
- 1064 Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p108
- 1065 Lenin quoted in Potekhin, I, *ibid*, p112
- 1066 Klinghoffer, A. (1968) "The Soviet View of African Socialism." *African Affairs*. 67, 268. p 202
- 1067 See Ogunbadejo, O. (1980) "Soviet Policies in Africa." *African Affairs*. 79, 316
- 1068 Mukangara, D. (2003) *op cit*
- 1069 Mukangara, D, *ibid*
- 1070 Ergas, Z. (1980) "Why Did The Ujamaa Village Policy Fail? Toward A Global Analysis." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 18, 3. p 404

- 1071 Mukangara, D. (2003) *op cit*
- 1072 Mukangara, D, *ibid*
- 1073 Mukangara, D, *ibid*
- 1074 1961 World Bank report cited in Scott, J. (1998) *Seeing Like A State*. New Haven: Yale University Press. p 231
- 1075 1961 World Bank report quoted in Scott, J, *ibid*, p 232
- 1076 Coulson, A. (1982) *Tanzania: A Political Economy*. Oxford: Clarendon. p 92
- 1077 Scott, J. (1998) *op cit*, p 224
- 1078 Scott, J, *ibid*, p 253
- 1079 Hobart, M. (1993) "Introduction: the Growth of Ignorance" in Hobart, M, ed *An Anthropological Critique Of Development*. London: Routledge. p1
- 1080 Hobart, M, *ibid*, p 7
- 1081 Hobart, M, *ibid*
- 1082 Scott, J. (1998) *op cit*, p 223
- 1083 McHenry D. (1994) *Limited Choices. The Political Struggle For Socialism In Tanzania*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Reinner. p17
- 1084 Tordoff, W & Mazrui, A. (1972) "The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 10, 3. p 437
- 1085 Bryceson, D. (1988) "Household, Hoe and Nation: Development Policies of the Nyerere Era" in Hodd, M, ed. *Tanzania After Nyerere*. London: Pinter. p 37
- 1086 Cliffe, L & Cunningham, G. (1973) "Ideology, Organisation and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds, *op cit*, p131. Cliffe and Cunningham's estimate at the time was that approximately eleven out of twelve million Tanzanians lived in scattered rural homesteads.
- 1087 Nindi, B. (1990) "Compulsion in the Implementation of Ujamaa" in O'Neill, N, & Mustafa, K, eds, *op cit*, p 61. See also Coulson, A. (1982) *op cit*, p58, in regard to the development of an indigenous class of capitalist farmers

- 1088 Iliffe, J. (1972) "Tanzania Under German and British Rule" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds. *Socialism In Tanzania*. Volume 1. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House. p10
- 1089 See Cliffe, L. (1972) "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika During the Colonial Period" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds, *op cit*, p 131
- 1090 Quoted in Iliffe, J. (1972) *op cit*, p15
- 1091 Cliffe, L & Cunningham, G. (1973) *op cit*, p131
- 1092 Yeager, R. (1982) *Tanzania. An African Experiment*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. p 42
- 1093 Coulson, A. (1982) *op cit*, pp 90-91
- 1094 Coulson, A, *ibid*, p 90. Leys, C. (1972) "Tanganyika: the Realities of Independence" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds, *op cit*, p188
- 1095 Personal interview with Mr. Sungura (formerly TANU chairman, Coastal Region, latterly CCM Street Chairman, Dar es Salaam), 8th July 2003. (Translated from Kiswahili by Yvonne Firoz)
- 1096 Sungura, *ibid*
- 1097 Leys, C. (1972) *op cit*, p191
- 1098 Quoted in Leys, C, *ibid*
- 1099 Nyerere quoted in Leys, C, *ibid*, pp191-192
- 1100 See Iliffe, J. (1972) *op cit*, *passim*
- 1101 Leys, C. (1972) *op cit*, p189
- 1102 Kariuki, G. (1979) *op cit*, p10
- 1103 Shivji, I. (1976) *op cit*, p 52
- 1104 Coulson, A. (1982) *op cit*, p 80
- 1105 Legum, C. (1988) "The Nyerere Years: a Preliminary Balance Sheet" in Hodder, M, ed, *op cit*, p 4 Legum also supplies details of improvements in the years

between 1962 and 1985, for instance, infant mortality rates down by 40%; life expectancy raised to 51 years; a national literacy rate of 85%

- 1106 Nyerere, J. (1968) *op cit*, p 9
- 1107 Pratt, C. (1976) *The Critical Phase In Tanzania, 1945-1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p178
- 1108 Coulson, A. (1982) *op cit*, p140
- 1109 Coulson, A, *ibid*
- 1110 Kariuki, J. (1979) *op cit*, p191
- 1111 Pratt, C. (1976) *op cit*, p138
- 1112 Lofchie, M. (1972) "Was Okello's Revolution a Conspiracy?" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds, *op cit*, p 35
- 1113 The mutiny took place one week after the Zanzibari revolution began. See Coulson, A. (1982) *op cit*, p140
- 1114 Pratt, C. (1976) *op cit*, p138
- 1115 Pratt, C, *ibid*, p139
- 1116 Rey, L. (1972) "The Revolution in Zanzibar" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds, *op cit*, p 29
- 1117 Rey, L, *ibid*, p 31
- 1118 McHenry, D. (1994) *op cit*, p 205
- 1119 Babu quoted in McHenry, D, *ibid*, p 203
- 1120 In a 1974 interview with Cranford Pratt, Nyerere observed that a vanguard party would need to be a party of angels, and 'we are not angels'. Quoted in Pratt, C. (1976) *op cit*, p 261
- 1121 Kariuki, J. (1979) *op cit*, p 76
- 1122 Pratt, C. (1976) *op cit*, p140
- 1123 Nyerere quoted in Pratt, C, *ibid*, p141

- 1124 Nyerere, J. (1968) *op cit*, pp 208-209
- 1125 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 2
- 1126 Mukandala, R. (2003) *op cit*
- 1127 Mukandala, R, *ibid*
- 1128 Mukandala, R, *ibid*
- 1129 Coulson, A. (1982) *op cit*, p103
- 1130 Coulson, A, *ibid*, pp 4-5
- 1131 Siddiqui, R. (1990) in O'Neill, N & Mustafa, K, eds, *op cit*, p 22
- 1132 Legum, C. (1988) in Hodd, M, ed, *op cit*, p 3
- 1133 Nyerere, J. (1967) *Freedom And Unity*. London: Oxford University Press.  
p103
- 1134 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p106
- 1135 Nyerere quoted in Pratt, C. (1976) *op cit*, p118
- 1136 Nyerere quoted in Pratt, C, *ibid*
- 1137 Nyerere quoted in Sutherland, B & Meyer, M. (2000) *Guns And Gandhi In Africa* Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press. p 73
- 1138 Sungura (2003) *op cit*. (Translated by Johnson Rugoya).
- 1139 Nyerere, J. (1967) *op cit*, pp162-171
- 1140 Penetrating critiques of Nyerere's overly selective representation of traditional societies can be found - for instance - in Spalding, N. (1996) "The Tanzanian Peasant and Ujamaa: A Study in Contradiction." *Third World Quarterly*. 17,1. Also in Caplan, P. (1992) "Socialism From Above: The View From Below" in Forster, G & Maghimbi, J, eds. *The Tanzanian Peasantry: Economy In Crisis*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- 1141 Nyerere, J. (1967) *op cit*, p162
- 1142 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p163

- 1143 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p167
- 1144 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p174
- 1145 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p175
- 1146 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p174
- 1147 Nyerere, J. (1968) *op cit*, pp136-142
- 1148 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p136
- 1149 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p137
- 1150 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p140
- 1151 Personal interview with Mr. Joseph Butiku (Director of the *Mwalimu* Julius Nyerere Foundation, Dar es Salaam) 7th July, 2003
- 1152 Butiku, J, *ibid*
- 1153 Butiku, J, *ibid*
- 1154 Nyerere, J. (1967) *op cit*, p196
- 1155 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 200
- 1156 Sungura (2003) *op cit*. (Translated by Johnson Rugoya.)
- 1157 Personal interview with Dr. Jonathon Lwehabura (Senior Programme Officer, *Mwalimu* Julius Nyerere Foundation, Dar es Salaam) 12th July 2003
- 1158 Nyerere, J. (1968) *op cit*, p 34
- 1159 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 51
- 1160 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 231
- 1161 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 234
- 1162 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 232
- 1163 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 6
- 1164 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, pp 233-234

- 1165 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, pp 241-244
- 1166 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 249
- 1167 Anticipating the restrictions imposed by the Arusha Declaration, in 1966's Mafia island speech Nyerere pointed out that 'we have stopped TANU leaders from owning farms. We have taken similar steps with other leaders ... yesterday we were all poor. If we hear you have a big farm, we shall ask you how you got it.' Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p141
- 1168 Nursey-Bray, operating within the parameters of class analysis, makes a brief comparison between Cabral's 'class suicide' and 'progressive fractions of the petty bourgeoisie' in Tanzania that have initiated policies 'with a genuine radical content.' While on the evidence of this article) he cannot be considered an unqualified admirer of a type of socialism he defines as 'in essence idealist', he – a trifle grudgingly - concedes that 'the level of privilege is not as high as that enjoyed by the ruling stratum in other African countries.' Nursey-Bray, P. (1980) *op cit*, p 55; pp 77-78
- 1169 Nyerere, J. (1968) *op cit*, p 6
- 1170 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 2
- 1171 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p16
- 1172 Nyerere, J, *ibid*
- 1173 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, pp16-17
- 1174 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p16
- 1175 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p15
- 1176 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 4
- 1177 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, pp 8-11
- 1178 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p18
- 1179 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p19
- 1180 Nyerere, J, *ibid*
- 1181 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 23
- 1182 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 24

- 1183 Nyerere, J, *ibid*
- 1184 Nyerere, J, *ibid*, p 27
- 1185 Nyerere, J, *ibid*
- 1186 As the Tanzanian delegation to the meeting of Non-Aligned countries put it in 1970: 'The poverty of the Third World and the economic dependence of the Third World are ... an integral part of the present world order. To a large degree, the Third World is poor because the rest is rich and getting richer. The functioning of the present economic system ensures that it is so.' Quoted in Cliffe, L. (1973) "The Policy of *Ujamaa Vijijini* and the Class Struggle in Tanzania" in Cliffe, L & Saul, J, eds, *op cit*, p196
- 1187 Saul, J. (2005) *op cit*, p 148
- 1188 Hence the otherwise puzzling closure in 1968 by TANU of the Ruvuma Development Authority (RDA), a spontaneous and notably successful exemplar of the principles that informed *Ujamaa*, is explicable in terms of the RDA's relative independence from party-driven initiatives and control.
- 1189 Here, I draw on the authoritarian potential of Rousseau's distinction between 'general (or real) will' and 'apparent will'. See Barker, E, ed. (1960) *Social Contract. Locke, Hume, Rousseau*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp193-195
- 1190 McHenry notes that TANU-CCM membership declined sharply between 1970 and 1990. 'In 1970 there were between 2.5 and 3 million TANU members. This number is identical to the estimates for membership in CCM twenty years later, after TANU's union with ASP and after the population had doubled!' McHenry, D. (1994) *op cit*, p 52
- 1191 Mukandala, R. (2003) *op cit*
- 1192 Mukandala R, *ibid*
- 1193 Mukandala, R, *ibid*. The incident to which Mukandala refers was a product of disputed (in the islands) results in the October 2000 national elections. In January 2001, supporters of CCM's main opposition in Zanzibar, the Civic United Front (CUF) held a protest demonstration. Police fired indiscriminately into the crowd. According to Human Rights Watch, Police brutality accounted for 35 deaths as well as at least 600 people injured. In January 2001, President Mkapa announced the creation of an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate these human rights violations. *Human Rights Watch* (online) [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/01/31/tanzan199\\_txt.htm](http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/01/31/tanzan199_txt.htm) Further, in October

- 2001, CCM & CUF signed a joint peace deal which included instituting a power-sharing administration in Zanzibar. See Msusa, S. (2002) "New Beginnings?" *Africa Today*. 8, 2. pp 24-25
- 1194 Mukandala, R. (2003) *op cit*
- 1195 Butiku, J. (2003) *op cit*
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[www.cas.ucf.edu/philosophy/fpr/journals/volume3/issue1/masolo5.pdf](http://www.cas.ucf.edu/philosophy/fpr/journals/volume3/issue1/masolo5.pdf)
- 1197 Masolo, D, *ibid*, p 74. Additionally, in an end note Masolo cites Hountondji's criticism of 'authoritarian ethnophilosophy' as deployed, for instance, by 'the extremely murderous regime of Sekou Toure' in Guinea. p79
- 1198 See Bhabha, H. (1994) *The Location Of Culture*. London: Routledge. pp 37-39. According to Bhabha, the inbetween space 'carries the burden of the meaning of culture' and 'makes it possible to begin envisaging national, anti-nationalist histories of the people'. Further, 'by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves.'

## Chapter 11

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- 1201 Wallerstein, I, *et al*, *ibid*, p 57
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- 1212 Chabal, P. (1981) "National Liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 1956-1974." *African Affairs*. 80, 318. p 88
- 1213 Chabal, P, *ibid*, pp 88-89
- 1214 See Chabal, P, *ibid*, p 89
- 1215 See Wallerstein, I, *et al.* (1996) *op cit*, p 80

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