

AN INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LAMONT AND KWAMASHU

by

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ABSTRACT

The field of political violence is introduced with an overview of anti-State political violence in South Africa between 1 January 1977 and 21 July 1985. Incidents of political violence in that period were classified into one of three categories, each of which reflects different sources of political violence. Subsequently, the research analysed what is referred to as 'spontaneous' collective violence in two of Durban's townships, Lamont and KwaMashu.

The theoretical framework for the analysis of this type of behaviour is provided by T.R. Gurr using the formula:

$$MPV = RD + (RD \times JUST \times BALANCE)$$

where MPV is the magnitude of political violence; RD is discontent; JUST is the justifications for engaging in violence; and BALANCE is the ratio of support for, and coercive capacity of, dissidents vis-à-vis the State.

The weight of each variable (RD, JUST and BALANCE) was assessed in Lamont and KwaMashu through interviews with 25 group leaders from both townships and by various inferential techniques. While discontent was found to be universal in both townships, the justifications for engaging in violence as a strategy to alleviate that discontent and alter existing power relations were found to be a function of ideology. For the purposes of this research two ideological classifications were employed: 'reactionaries' (those organisations operating within government created institutions, including bantustans, e.g. Inkatha); and 'progressives' (those organisations operating outside government created institutions and which are popularly labelled the Left, e.g. the United Democratic Front). In Durban there is a specific spatial distribution of ideology which has resulted in support for, and the coercive capacity of, 'reactionaries' being greatest in bantustan townships (e.g. KwaMashu), while among 'progressives' support and coercive capacity are highest in townships in 'white' South Africa (e.g. Lamont). The distribution of ideology has its origins in historical forces which are discussed in detail.

The question to be answered thus remains, at what point does political violence reach a crescendo? This question was answered by identifying

the issues precipitating political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu and then analysing specific incidents. Frequently, the most intense collective violence erupted when resistance to State hegemony was interpreted by the State, or its proxies, as challenging the existing status quo. In Lamont the State has directly intervened to crush resistance through the use of its security forces while in KwaMashu Inkatha vigilantes have acted as proxies for the State.

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This work is entirely my own and has not been submitted in any form to another University. Where the use has been made of the work of others it is duly acknowledged in the text.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

Abbreviations used in the text are spelled out in full on first usage but for ready access are listed below.

| | |
|--------|---|
| ANC | African National Congress |
| AZAPO | Azanian People's Organisation |
| AZASO | Azanian Students' Organisation |
| BAAB | Bantu Affairs Administration Board |
| BESG | Built Environment Support Group |
| BLA | Black Local Authority |
| BRA | Black Revenue Account |
| CIS | Centre for Intergroup Studies |
| COSAS | Congress of South African Students |
| COSATU | Congress of South African Trade Unions |
| DCC | Durban City Council |
| DEC | KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture |
| DET | Department of Education and Training |
| DMR | Durban Metropolitan Region |
| DTC | Durban Town Council |
| DTMB | Durban Transport Management Board |
| FOSATU | Federation of South African Trade Unions |
| IBR | Institute for Black Research |
| ICU | Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union |
| INCH | Institute of Contemporary History |
| IPSA | Indicator Project South Africa |

| | |
|-------|---|
| JCC | Joint Commuter Committee |
| JORAC | Joint Rent Action Committee |
| KLA | KwaZulu Legislative Assembly |
| KTC | KwaMashu Township Council |
| LCA | Lamont Civic Association |
| LECC | Lamont Education Crisis Committee |
| NAB | Native Advisory Board |
| NAD | Native Affairs Department (Municipal) |
| NAF | Native Administration Fund |
| NDB | Natalia Development Board |
| NECC | National Education Crisis Committee |
| NCC | Ningizimu Community Council |
| NOW | Natal Organisation of Women |
| NPA | Natal Provincial Administration |
| NRA | Native Revenue Account |
| NUSAS | National Union of South African Students |
| PFP | Progressive Federal Party |
| PNAB | Port Natal Administration Board |
| PWV | Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Region |
| PUTCO | Public Utility Transport Company |
| SABC | South African Broadcasting Commission |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SAP | South African Police |
| SASM | South African Students' Movement |
| SATS | South African Transport Services |
| SPCC | Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee |
| SSRC | Soweto Students' Representative Council |
| TRSC | Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee |
| UBC | Urban Bantu Councils |
| UDF | United Democratic Front |
| UWUSA | United Workers Union of South Africa |

CHAPTER 1.

AN APPROACH TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

" Really, there would be no violence at all if we did not have the violence of the apartheid system.¹¹ And even if there was, and there has been for two decades, it's been restrained. But if you look at what comes from the other side, during those two decades there has been massive violence. So then we have to say to ourselves: of course we can stop our struggle, we can stop even our violent actions, but on that basis what would be the reason for that? And in return for what? "

Oliver Tambo¹

The subject of this research is political violence (meaning "anti-government or anti-system violence occurring within a political system and having political consequences"²) in Durban's black townships.³ The South African State classifies most political violence as thuggery and criminal activity and euphemistically refers to it as 'unrest' . That is, this thesis is concerned with the nature, causes, forms and limitations of anti-state political violence. Here I wish to describe the motives for undertaking such a study and the approach adopted to the subject.

1.1 RATIONALE: THE GREAT SOUTH AFRICAN PARADOX

My interest in political violence in South Africa derives as much from a natural curiosity about the conditions for non-violence as it does about the conditions for violence. It is in fact one of the paradoxes of South

Africa that the two conditions should coexist. As the Black Sash has observed: "South Africa's future is riddled with fear and hope. Fear, because the epidemic of violence which threatens to engulf the country shows no sign of abating; and hope because the spirit of goodwill still flourishes in many different situations."⁴ That spirit of goodwill speaks volumes about the conditions for non-violence as a small personal experience can demonstrate. Having lost my way while driving through one of Durban's black townships I stopped next to a stationary bus and leaned out of the car to ask the black bus driver for directions. The driver not only alighted from the bus but virtually sprinted to my car to render assistance. What I clearly remember of this incident was the incongruity of the fact that here I, a strikingly visible, not to mention vulnerable, symbol of oppression, was being treated with undue respect that would not be so readily given in New York's Haarlem or Sydney's Redfern. It is a fact that in South Africa violence is highly selective.

Political theorists of many different persuasions have long wondered at the acquiescence of oppressed and underprivileged people and in South Africa two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the mass of people are not prepared to risk their security and meagre privileges against the powerful and efficient State security forces. The second explanation lies in the prevailing socio-economic climate; people with no reason to expect or hope for anything better are less discontented with what they have and may even be grateful to simply maintain their lot. Thus, if oppression and powerlessness are used to explain non-violence in the South African township milieu the question remains, under what conditions will such people resort to violence?

In South Africa considerable research has been devoted to analysing the causes of specific incidents of political violence. However, the most common approach has been to merely identify the 'fuse factors', that is the catalysts, or stimuli, which cause given situations to explode, on the assumption that the causes of political violence are easily isolated. Examples of 'fuse factors' used to explain specific incidents of political violence include: Afrikaans language as a medium of educational instruction as the cause of the June 1976 Soweto 'riots'; rent increases as the cause of the September 1984 Vaal townships' violence; and, the assassination of Victoria Mxenge as the cause of the

August 1985 Durban 'riots' . While providing some insight into what precipitates specific acts of political violence, 'fuse factors' do not identify the conditions that predispose people to violence in general. Similarly, matrices of conditions correlating with political violence⁵ are misleading. In the words of Salert: "It is difficult to decide whether these correlations are spurious, artifacts of misleading statistical techniques, artifacts of extremely poor measuring devices, or genuine associations ..."⁶

In an attempt to identify the predisposing causes of political violence in South Africa this research assigns itself the task of a comparative study of political violence in two of Durban's black townships, Lamont (as an example of a township in 'white' South Africa) and KwaMashu (as an example of a bantustan township).

1.2 APPROACH

The research begins with a macro-overview of the nature, intensity and distribution of political violence in South Africa between 1 January 1977 and 21 July 1985 (this latter date being the declaration of a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts). Incidents of political violence were quantified using a three division typology based on the intentions and level of planning adopted by the actors. Three facts emerge from this approach. The first concerns the nature of political violence. Evidence is presented which clearly demonstrates that in any one year approximately 20 percent of all incidents are acts of self-defence in response to State directed violence. The second concerns the intensity of political violence. The conclusions drawn are that political violence has been a characteristic of South African society since 1976, that political violence can be sustained, and that no region is immune. These views run counter to those articulated by many analysts who see political violence as limited and cyclical in nature. Unfortunately, the debate has been clouded by the absence of comprehensive statistics and typologies of political violence, and the typology used in this research is an attempt to overcome this deficiency. Finally, the typology is revealing of the distribution of political violence, and in this regard Durban's black townships have clearly experienced less violence than other townships in the four major

urban areas in South Africa. Nonetheless, political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu has become increasingly prevalent since the 1980 school boycotts in KwaMashu, and as the events of 1986 bear testimony this trend shows no signs of abating.

Having presented an overview of the nature and dimensions of political violence in South Africa, Chapter 3 offers a theoretical base for understanding the preconditions which predispose people to political violence. The study of political violence has a long history but an understanding of it is a long way off given that its causes are highly complex and that its analysis must incorporate an understanding of numerous related phenomena. A multitude of theories purport to explain why people participate in political violence and revolutionary movements, but those that focus on the frustrations that induce people to participate in activities deviating from customary norms have considerable personal appeal given the rationale of the research. T.R. Gurr's theory, put forward in his book Why Men Rebel,⁷ and subsequently modified by Gurr and Duvall some years later,⁸ offers the most comprehensive social-psychological explanation of both the preconditions and conditions for such behaviour put forward to date. Gurr's theory is expressed in the following formulation:

$$MPV = RD + (RD \times JUST \times BALANCE)$$

where MPV is the magnitude of political violence; RD is the scope and intensity of relative deprivation (which Gurr treats as synonymous with discontent) in a given population; JUST is the scope and intensity of beliefs in that population about the justifiability and utility of engaging in political violence; and BALANCE refers to the coercive capacity and institutional support for dissidents vis-à-vis the government. The term in parenthesis indicates that the justifications for violence and the coercive capacity and institutional support for both the State and dissidents have no significant effects on political violence independently of relative deprivation, rather they act to amplify or inhibit its effects.⁹

Briefly, Gurr argues that the actualisation of political violence is dependent upon relative deprivation which gives rise to discontent. Discontent, however, must become politicised before violence is

politicised. Discontent is politicised when people perceive that political actors, or their policies, are responsible for depriving conditions. The manifestation of political violence will depend upon whether or not people believe violence is an appropriate or desirable response, vis-à-vis other responses, capable of enhancing their lot. If violence is justified then each incident will depend upon the relative strengths of the dissidents versus the government. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 detail the three variables in Gurr's formulation while Section 3.4 subjects the theory to a rigorous evaluation. While Schlemmer warns against the use of single-stranded theories of political violence, which he argues are "inevitably wrong or oversimple",¹⁰ theory development involves the modification and reinterpretation of hypotheses and in this sense a study such as the one proposed serves as a building block for better theories.

Chapters 4 to 6 examine each of Gurr's three variables respectively in the context of conditions and events in Lamont and KwaMashu.

Chapter 4 assesses the degree of discontent in both townships utilising two different approaches. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2. the level of discontent is inferred through an historical and contemporary examination of the general societal conditions conducive to discontent. By tracing the establishment, development and administration of Lamont and KwaMashu the striking feature is that the grievances articulated by township dwellers today were first heard 60 years ago but have been repeatedly dismissed by successive intransigent administrations in collaboration with white business interests. (Political violence erupted in Durban in 1929 and 1959 and is briefly referred to in a historical context with regard to the establishment of Lamont and KwaMashu respectively. The inter-racial violence (Indian/black) of 1949 and 1953 is not considered here, although it was most certainly political in the sense that it was consistent with the Nationalist's policy of divide and rule.¹¹) The second approach makes use of the more direct opinion survey method. A model, referred to as the 'D Score' model, was designed to quantify discontent and was tested on a sample of 25 carefully selected group leaders from both townships. (See Appendix 1 for the interview schedule.) The interviews were conducted on an individual basis by a well qualified and experienced black fieldworker between February and

May 1986. Prior to conducting the interviews the interviewer was fully briefed and carried out a pilot survey in Umlazi in my presence. The 'community leader' approach¹² was chosen for two reasons: first, because of the often contradictory results produced by mass household type questionnaires currently in vogue in South Africa; and second, the research sought to elicit the issues which contribute to discontent rather than to quantify discontent on the basis of the uniformity of the stimuli. Although circumstances had forced several sought-after respondents into hiding, it was fortuitous that the interviews were conducted in the period between two declared States of Emergency since a number of the respondents were subsequently detained.

Respondents were divided into two groups, 'reactionaries' and 'progressives'. These labels were chosen on the basis of both background socio-political analysis and general popular perceptions, but because popular perceptions generally ascribe subjective impressions to these terms they have been parenthesized throughout this thesis. The term 'reactionary' is used to describe those people and organisations operating within State created institutions. The State describes 'reactionaries' as 'moderates' and in Natal they typically fall within the ambit of Inkatha. On the other hand, the term 'progressive' describes those who operate outside State created institutions. Their various ideologies offer alternatives to the present order and as such challenge State hegemony and threaten the existing status quo. The State variously describes 'progressives' as 'agitators' and 'revolutionaries' and has been at pains to stress the links between 'progressives' and Moscow regardless of how tenuous. Representatives of several banned organisations in South Africa were interviewed without prejudice for reasons expanded upon in Chapter 2. Frequent comparisons of results between the two groups, such as the 'D Scores', are made throughout this thesis and where appropriate the comments of individual respondents are used to reinforce points.

According to Gurr the relative effectiveness of different ideologies in their appeals to discontented people depends upon the extent to which they explain sources of discontent in terms consonant with specific interests, focus their anger on the agents of responsibility and stress

symbols of mutual awareness. In Chapter 5 the ideologies of both Inkatha and various 'progressive' organisations are examined with particular emphasis on the extent to which each ideology justifies violence. Empirical evidence of the willingness to engage in violence, subsequently referred to as the 'V Score', was also sought and to this end respondents were questioned about the type of protests in which they would be prepared to participate. As with the 'D Scores' the results were compared across the two camps.

The third and final variable in Gurr's model concerns the pattern of social control and support that minimises or facilitates violence in response to politicised discontent. According to Gurr MPV is greatest when the relative strengths of dissidents and governments are most evenly matched. Gurr defines this balance in terms of coercive capacity and institutional support. In Chapter 6 it will be argued that the relative strengths of 'progressives' and the State differs in Lamont and KwaMashu because of the presence of a third force - Inkatha. In Chapter 6 specific incidents of political violence in the contemporary period in Lamont and KwaMashu are described in terms of three key precipitating factors - transport, rent, and education - and then analysed in terms of the coercive capacity and institutional support for dissidents and the government.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by tying all the results together and offering an assessment of the research. The aim of this research is not to make predictions about impending violence or calm (such predictions are more than likely to turn sour with any twist of fate) but rather to identify the predisposing conditions for political violence in the South African township milieu.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES CHAPTER 1:

1. Quoted in, "A conversation with Oliver Tambo of the ANC", Cape Times, 4/11/85.

2. Zimmermann, E., Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research, G.K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1983, p. 1.

3. TERMINOLOGY: The use of racial terminology reflects the reality of apartheid society and in academic circles the current fashion is to use the terms African (indigeneous black South African), coloured (mixed race), Indian (Indian descent) and white (European ancestry) to denote the four principle racial groups in South Africa. However, the monopolisation of the term African by black South Africans I consider unacceptable - clearly many white South Africans are as indigeneous as black South Africans, a point in fact made on numerous occasions by black South Africans themselves:

" ... our white compatriots will learn to understand
... that we don't really see them as whites in the
first instance. We see them as fellow South Africans
... In fact ... they are Africans. We live on this
continent. Let's move away from these distinctions
of Europeans and non-Europeans. "

Oliver Tambo, quoted in, Cape Times, op. cit.

Consequently, in this thesis the term black is substituted for African despite the fact that this term has been adopted by the Black Consciousness movement to denote all racially oppressed groups, i.e. including coloureds and Indians. My argument is that the collective use of black denies the reality of the current situation, however unacceptable it may be; clearly there is a class of black people who are no longer oppressed in South Africa just as there are many whites who are committed to the ideal of liberation and who are prepared to make sacrifices. Historically blacks have been variously referred to as Natives, Bantu and the derogatory term kaffirs. These terms are used in this text only where they occur in direct quotations.

The term township refers to the segregated urban locations for blacks while bantustan is used in favour of the common term homeland, i.e. a segregated tribal reserve.

4. See, "Fear and hope", Financial Mail, 28/3/86.

5. Schlemmer, L., "South Africa's Urban Crisis: The Need for Fundamental Solutions", Indicator SA (Political Monitor), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1985, pp. 3 - 5.

6. Salert, B., Revolutions and Revolutionaries, Elsevier, New York, 1976, p. 133.

7. Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970.

8. Gurr, T.R., and Duvall, R., "Civil Conflict in the 1960's: A Reciprocal Theoretical System with Parameter Estimates", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1973, pp. 135 - 169.

9. Ibid., p. 137.

10. Schlemmer, op. cit., p. 3.

11. Muller, E., "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence", American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, 1972, No. 3, p. 933.

12. See, Kirk, S.L., "The 1949 Durban Riots: A Community in Conflict", Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1981. Kirk concluded that the 1949 'riots', which were precipitated by the actions of an Indian shopkeeper who pushed a black boy through a glass window during an argument, did not so much express black attitudes towards Indians but white attitudes in which blacks were used as an instrument of convenience. Gurr makes two relevant points on the subject of inter-racial violence: if people already dislike a group for any reason they are susceptible to rumours that associate their discontent with the group; and the more visible or 'different' the disliked group is the more readily discontented people learn external and mental cues that associate such groups with discontent. See, Gurr, op. cit., p. 207.

CHAPTER 2.

A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1977 - 1985

" Violence ... occurs when the challenging group senses that the surrounding community will condone it, when hostility toward the victim renders it a relatively safe strategy. "

William Gamson¹

2.1 INTRODUCTION

There is by no means unanimous agreement on the intensity and distribution of political violence in South Africa, much less on its causes or direction. Two diverse views of the nature of political violence in South Africa are commonly held.

On the one hand are those who argue that political violence (euphemistically referred to as 'unrest') is inherently restricted to isolated black townships and thus poses no immediate threat to the integrity of 'white' South Africa. Further, these observers argue, political violence is distinctly cyclical with brief periods of 'unrest' followed by periods of 'normality'. This interpretation rests primarily on the comparison of events in Sharpeville (March 1960), Soweto (July 1976) and 'Vaal townships (September 1984) with all other events being relegated 'flashpoint' status, i.e. brief and isolated episodes of violence. This interpretation has in fact been stretched to absurd limits in some quarters. For example, John Kane-Berman, Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, when commenting on the declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency, wrote:


" Sixteen years elapsed between Sharpeville and the Soweto riots, eight between Soweto and the start of the present upheavals. Does this mean that the next angry explosion ... (is) but four years away?²

Such interpretations cause observers to draw misleading conclusions about political violence.³


This oversimplification makes dramatic omissions, not the least being the exclusion of sustained violence. For example, the 1980 countrywide coloured school boycotts evoked considerable violence which is overlooked because there was neither a heavy loss of life nor a substantive South African Defence Force (SADF) involvement. These views appear to rest on the belief that violent incidents occur in isolation, are unrelated and moreover easily contained within the confines of black townships. On the contrary, the point that will be made in this thesis is that the structural causes of political violence, be it the 1929 or 1959 Durban 'beerhall riots', or Inanda 1985, essentially remain the same. The significance of political violence is not the frequency or the magnitude of incidents but rather their continual recurrence.

On the other hand, implicit in the writings of the likes of Gerhart, Lodge, and Magubane⁴ is that political violence is symptomatic of South African society. These researchers make no attempt to quantify political violence for the purpose of dismissing isolated incidents because only two people were killed instead an arbitrary 10 or 15, or because only one school was set alight in one week instead of three or four. Rather they examine the overall picture, which includes tracing the historical origins of political violence, and conclude that violence as a means of resistance is neither a new nor isolated phenomenon. Critical to this approach is that the conditions predisposing people to political violence relate to structural inequalities and that political violence will not abate until basic inequalities are removed. These analyses assign no space to notions of cyclical 'unrest'. Of course this is not to say that South Africa has not experienced more intense periods of political violence than others but rather that it is a misrepresentation to argue that such episodes are interspersed in a sea of calm.

The purpose of this Chapter is to present a macro-overview of political violence in South Africa through time (1 January 1977 to 21 July 1985) and space (for the purposes of this research the country was divided into seven regions - see Maps 1 and 2). Such a perspective is critical to this research for three reasons:



Map 2 Durban Metropolitan Region



- it will help to identify the sources of violence which is consistent with the rationale of this thesis;
- it will help to dispel the myth of cyclical and unsustainable violence; and
- it enables the intensity of violence in Durban's townships to be compared with other major urban areas.

The task is by no means straightforward and suffers from the lack of comprehensive statistics on incidents of political violence in South Africa and the often contradictory views of the actors themselves. For example, assessments of violence in South Africa variously range between "the final phase of an inevitable bloody revolution" and neither a "prerevolutionary" nor "revolutionary" situation.⁵

2.2 DEFINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The problem of assessment is, however, as much a problem of definition for there is no universally accepted definition of the term political violence. Gurr once defined violence as "deliberate uses of force to injure or destroy physically" which he noted was independent of agents, objects or contexts of violence.⁶ From this it is obvious that any definition of violence should denote intentions and means. This leaves the term political to be defined, which as Zimmermann notes is particularly problematic: "the distinction between violence and political violence ... often remains arbitrary" and it is recommended that "general criteria for political violence ... be given".⁷ He suggests that the number of persons involved, the intentions of the actors, and the reactions of the public be used as the basic criteria to distinguish whether or not violence has political connotations,⁸ but acknowledges that:

"As long as the concept of political violence has so many connotations ... agreement as to the usefulness of a single definition of political violence cannot be reached. Consequently, we forgo developing our own definition and merely suggest using Nieburg's as a kind of working definition."⁹

Nieburg defines political violence as:

" Acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is tend to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system. "¹⁰

The advantage of Nieburg's effect-orientated definition over Gurr's definitions of political violence is that the former includes violence instigated by the State and/or its institutions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, however, this research is specifically concerned with "anti-government or anti-system violence" and Gurr's definition given in Why Men Rebel is used as working definition despite its obvious omission of State violence. There Gurr defined political violence as:

" All collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies";¹¹

2.3 TYPOLOGIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Typologies of political violence are used to categorise empirical evidence of the various forms of violence. Zimmermann identifies seven basic typologies which he labels, goals, objects, means, participants, spreading, intensity, and forms of organisation.¹² Although numerous organisations in South Africa keep records of incidents of political violence comprehensive typologies are conspicuously absent. The Centre for Intergroup Studies (CIS) at the University of Cape Town, and the Indicator Research Project (IPSA)¹³ at the University of Natal have initiated some research in this area and it is instructive to briefly examine their efforts to expose the magnitude of problems encountered in this field.

Both IPSA and CIS use typologies cutting across Zimmermann's basic categories. IPSA classifies means (for example, consumer boycotts,

attacks on personnel and property, and bomb attacks), participants (for example, South African Police, SAP, and African National Congress, ANC), and spreading or distribution (the location of each incident is given).¹⁴ The intensity of political violence can only be inferred from IPSA typologies although accompanying articles attempt to quantify the level of violence. CIS classifies participants (for example, Government, Right Wing, and ANC), objects (distinguishing between property and/or personnel), and intensity (for example, the number of human injuries and deaths).¹⁵

2.3.1 IPSA

IPSA utilise four broad categories; Non-Collaboration Politics, General Civil Unrest, Government Response, and Black Nationalist Activity. Each category is further divided into sub-categories and contains a description of incidents by date and location. For example, one entry under the Black Nationalist Activity category reads: "29 April - South African Communist Party (SACP) pamphlet bomb explodes in Durban." The Non-Collaboration Politics category is divided into three sub-categories (school and consumer boycotts and worker stayaways) and is a particularly interesting attempt to classify important incidents of resistance which, although not inherently violent, often end in violence because of external factors (almost invariably the indiscriminate actions of the SAP and SADF). However, apart from this notable positive feature of the IPSA typologies there are some serious shortcomings.

The first of these shortcomings is the failure to clarify the aims of the typologies which leaves the reader without direction. Similarly, there is no acknowledgement of obvious limitations. Second, neither the approach nor the categories used are justified which raises several questions. For example, why are strikes, of which many have obvious political connotations, excluded from the category Non-Collaboration Politics and why are Government reforms included at all in a typology headed "Township Revolt?" It appears IPSA is attempting to incorporate elements of social change into a typology of political violence. A third problem is that definitions are either absent or open and vague. For example, the sub-category township revolt conjures images of thousands of angry people massing to attack their oppressors, yet not infrequently, incidents described under this sub-heading include funeral

goers fleeing police teargas in fear of their lives and stoning a few vehicles in retaliation. Where attempts have been made to clarify terminology the invariable result is that the meaning is further clouded. For example, civil 'unrest' is defined as "a euphemism obscuring a widespread township uprising".¹⁶ This problem is compounded by the annoying habit of using synonymous terminology. For example, in one instance the terms, "political rebellion", "resurgent rebellion", "civil strife", "civil upheaval", "civil unrest", "unrest", "township revolt", and "township uprising" are all used synonymously with political violence within the space of four pages.¹⁷ Each of these terms should have their own definition. Unfortunately, all these problems combine to reduce IPSA's efforts to academic otioseness.

2.3.2 CIS

In contrast to IPSA, CIS is meticulous in spelling out their aims ("to illuminate the spectrum of the manifestations of violence in South Africa",¹⁸ and "it is important that specific acts of violence ... be interpreted within (the) wider context"¹⁹), and defining and clarifying terms used in their typology.

Violence is defined as:

" the wilful application of force, act, motive or thought in such a way (overt or covert, direct or indirect) that the person or group is intentionally injured, controlled or destroyed in a physical, psychological or spiritual sense. "²⁰

Consequently, political violence is defined as:

" violence of a political nature or committed for political reasons, i.e. either to maintain the status quo or to bring about change".²¹

CIS have constructed a typology of political violence covering 91 months from 1 January 1977 to 12 July 1984 which they divide into three periods for comparative purposes: January 1977 to 23 May 1983 (post-Soweto to the SADF attack on Maputo - following the Pretoria carbomb of 20 May

1983); 24 May 1983 to 16 March 1984 (post-Maputo to Nkomati Accord); and, post-Nkomati to 12 July 1984. In this period a total of 341 separate incidents were classified into one of four categories: Intended Use, Structural Damage, Human Injury, and Human Death.

The Intended Use category is an interesting attempt to categorise potential, planned and failed attempts of political violence:

" The lowest indicator (of political violence) is the mere possession of arms indicating potential use; next comes the act of carrying arms en route to a target; followed by an actual failed attempt. "²²

These sub-categories are, however, purely subjective and raise problems of interpretation. The original aims of the perpetrators are difficult if not impossible to identify - is structural damage separate from human injury or death by intention or circumstance? Let us look at some examples of the types of problems that permeate this form of classification.

First, what exactly constitutes a failed attempt? In August 1982 the Voortrekkerhoogte military base near Pretoria came under rocket fire. The characteristic feature of the attack was that most of the rockets actually missed their targets causing minimal damage. This incident was categorised under Structural Damage (sub-category military) but a more objective classification would be failed attempt. The Death category distinguishes between military, paramilitary and civilian deaths. Are off-duty military personnel classified as civilian or military personnel? This question has important implications as the following example bears testimony.

On 20 May 1983 a carbomb exploded outside the Air Force Headquarters in central Pretoria as many military personnel were leaving work for the day. Nineteen people, a mixture of off-duty military personnel and civilians, were killed. The ANC claimed responsibility for the blast which by their definition was directed against a military installation. The Government, however, defined the attack as terrorism directed

against civilian targets.²³

2.3.3 Evaluation

While these two typologies include some positive features, for example, IPSA's Non-Collaboration politics and CIS's Intended Use are particularly useful categories, they both suffer significant problems, the major one being an approach based on means. The result is that they invariably end up as merely descriptions. As we shall see, innumerable incidents of violence have been a direct consequence of indiscriminate police intervention in peaceful and legitimate protest marches or funerals, yet neither typology reflects this violence.

As they stand the most serious problem is that of inadequate definitions for the categories and terms employed. This is, of course, not peculiar to the two typologies examined. The difference between the two typologies is the way they attempt to overcome the problem: IPSA neglects the problem while CIS makes a positive effort to define each term and classifies each incident according to its own rigid rules. The advantage of the CIS typology is that all the incidents are quantified which makes for easy comparisons, although the problem with quantifying political violence is that it 'hides' the magnitude of incidents unless appropriate scales are devised. For example, 1 000 people stoning a police station should score more than half a dozen youths stoning a single bus. What the CIS typology does lack is an indication of where the incidents took place, which IPSA does provide. Nonetheless, both institutions provide valuable services and in the violent South African milieu it is somewhat incredible that other organisations have not entered into this important area of research where unsubstantiated comments about the level of violence are the norm.

2.4 A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

As neither of the two typologies evaluated above meet the requirements of this research, namely to identify the sources of anti-State political violence and to assess its intensity and distribution, a more appropriate typology was constructed.

2.4.1 Approach

The rationale of this research dictates that the aim of the typology should be to classify the source of violence and what is proposed is a three-fold classification of sources that partly reflects the attitudes of blacks towards violence and also quantifies the intensity and distribution of political violence at a regional level.

To the overwhelming majority of South Africans the State, which includes bantustan institutions and authorities, is illegitimate. Zimmermann argues that "a loss of legitimacy of the State, of its institutions or actors, is one of the fundamental conditions conducive to severe forms of political violence, crises, and revolutions".²⁴ Zimmermann in fact suggests a typology of political violence using the dichotomies legal/illegal violence and legitimate/illegitimate. However, this approach is most confusing because all violence is legitimate from the point of view of the source, especially within the theory of relative deprivation. Even where disaffected numerical minorities are being dealt with in terms of spatial definitions violence still contains an element of legitimacy. Further, legality is a function of power relations and when violence is defined by the source then legality is self-evident. Closely related to the concepts of legality/legitimacy is that of innocence and at this point it is worth quoting a respondent interviewed in the course of this research: "I will take up weapons against those who vote for the system. Those so called civilians are the very people who vote for the system (and) treat us as criminals and half human beings because they do not want to share with us." In this paradigm it will be argued that when defined in terms of the source all violence is legitimate. Of course this argument is not intended as a moral judgement but is simply a statement.

Despite KwaZulu Chief Minister Buthelezi's recent comments of "how disgusted ordinary black South African's are with the politics of violence",²⁵ evidence suggests otherwise. Since the banning of open-air gatherings, except religious services and meetings of 'recognised' political parties, in 1976, funerals have become public forums where black values, attitudes and conventions, including those towards violence, are expressed. At funerals martyrdom status is conferred upon those killed in the struggle. For example, at the funeral of two ANC personnel killed on 13 May 1984 following a rocket attack on a Durban oil refinery one of the speakers said: "We are not here to shed tears or cry, we are assembled to canonise them. We are declaring them saints ..."²⁶ Consider also the following:

" We are in a situation where we are being forced, where we are being compelled by the sheer existence of State violence to think, not in New Testament terms, but in Old Testament terms, where we speak of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. If the State thinks it has a moral right to use violence, why should the oppressed then not resort to violence as a viable means of changing the status quo? ... the white Government speaks about 'terrorists', but we shall always speak of 'freedom fighters', and the deceased we are honouring today, we see as our martyrs. "²⁷

While the proposed typology distinguishes between two broad forms of violence; collective or group violence (what the State refers to as township 'unrest'), and guerrilla operations (referred to as terrorism in the jargon of the State), it is with the former that this research is primarily concerned. Collective violence is divided into two sub-categories, reactive and spontaneous violence. Definitions and examples of each category are provided below and the limitations of each category and the problems associated with classifying acts of political violence are discussed in Section 2.4.2.

2.4.1.1 Reactive Violence

Reactive violence is defined as acts committed in response to State-

directed violence. It is self-defensive violence precipitated by the direct actions of State functionaries, including vigilantes, which antagonises actors and provokes reaction. This form of violence typically erupts when large numbers of people gather in response to the likes of school and consumer boycotts, stay-aways, commemorative services, strikes, funerals and community meetings (e.g. to discuss forced removals, increased rents and transport tariffs etc.), and find themselves being dispersed by teargas, baton charges, sjamboks and live ammunition. The reaction usually involves stoning both the police and close at hand symbols of oppression including Government property. Casualties invariably occur among the protesters who are confronted by well trained and equipped State security personnel.

2.4.1.2 Spontaneous Violence

This form is a variant of reactive violence. The difference between the two is that spontaneous violence is driven by both predisposing and precipitating factors. For example, issues such as pending forced removals predispose discontent which may precipitate spontaneous, or 'reflex', violence under certain conditions. The trigger precipitating violence maybe as innocuous as an ill-timed word, the sight of troops, or a young boy throwing a stone. Spontaneous violence is thus defined as hastily or ill-planned crowd or mob type violence where the acts are directed against both the symbols and instruments of oppression including public and private property and State personnel. Typical acts of spontaneous violence include stoning, arson or petrol bombing SAP and SADF vehicles and patrols, Community Councillors and Government officials, schools, Development Board offices, Council Chambers, beerhalls, transport services and Community Councillors' and policemen's homes. Such violence also includes the intimidation of pupils, shoppers and workers who defy boycotts and stayaways. Not infrequently this form of violence results in injury and death and what Ngidi refers to as "blunders", that is unco-ordinated and indiscriminate violence.²⁸

2.4.1.3 Planned Retaliatory Violence

Planned retaliatory violence refers to sabotage and attacks designed to disrupt the economy and the efficiency of the State, raise the morale of the powerless and undermine confidence in the Government. Such violence

is mainly conducted under the auspices of the ANC, and between 1976 and 1986 398 acts of violence were attributed to the ANC.²⁹ Notwithstanding the occasional carbomb and limpet mine placed in supermarkets, the ANC has primarily directed its campaign against "officials of apartheid",³⁰ including Community Councillors, Development Board officials, security force personnel and farmers, and strategic installations such as police stations, military bases, courts, nuclear reactors, oil storage depots, power plants, railway lines, and electricity pylons.

Figure 2.1 Three General Types of Political Violence in South Africa

| <u>COLLECTIVE</u> | | <u>GUERRILLA OPERATIONS</u> |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <i>Reactive</i> | <i>Spontaneous</i> | <i>Planned Retaliatory</i> |
| <i>Precipitated by direct</i> | <i>Predisposing and</i> | <i>Predisposing factors</i> |
| <i>State provocation</i> | <i>precipitating factors</i> | <i>(limited precipitating</i> |
| <i>Self-defensive</i> | <i>Hastily planned</i> | <i>factors)</i> |
| <i>Directed at</i> | <i>Unco-ordinated</i> | <i>Well planned</i> |
| <i>a) Instruments of</i> | <i>Directed at</i> | <i>Directed at strategic</i> |
| <i>oppression</i> | <i>a) Symbols of</i> | <i>installations</i> |
| <i>b) Symbols of</i> | <i>oppression</i> | <i>Casualties</i> |
| <i>oppression</i> | <i>b) Instruments of</i> | <i>- State personnel</i> |
| <i>Casualties</i> | <i>oppression</i> | |
| <i>- protesters</i> | <i>Casualties</i> | |
| | <i>- protesters/blunders</i> | |
| | <i>- State personnel</i> | |

The three categories above, while by no means problem free, represent a considerable improvement over the typology utilised by IPSA and is better suited to the demands of this research than that proposed by CIS. Disagreement with the choice of category into which incidents are placed will undoubtedly arise but every classified incident was checked for consistency against the definitions. Before setting out the results it is pertinent to briefly evaluate the sources and reliability of the database.

2.4.2 Problems

There are essentially two types of problems associated with constructing a typology of political violence; collecting and coding the data. In the following discussion some of the inadequacies of the two typologies evaluated above in fact resurface.

2.4.2.1 Collecting Data

The South African Government does not release detailed statistics of political violence. The language used in official reports of 'unrest' ("stone throwing youths dispersed by teargas") is unrevealing of circumstances, numbers and methods. Not surprisingly, researchers delving into political violence have no alternative but to rely on newspaper sources the limitations of which are exposed in the following quote:

" In May, Mr Louis Le Grange said that since the beginning of the year, 19 acts of terrorism had been committed. Six insurgents had been shot dead and eight arrested, he said. Records compiled by various institutes showed only 12 acts of sabotage had occurred at that stage, while only two alleged insurgents had been shot dead. ... it has become increasingly difficult to compile meaningful statistics and ... trials were often the first public knowledge of attacks. "³¹

Despite severe restrictions and constant threats to its integrity, fractions of the South African press remain one of the more positive aspects of the country.³² Nonetheless, two common distortions need to be considered when quoting from newspaper sources; the selection of information reported, and the content of information reported.

In selecting information for publication editors are subjected to both Government restraint and self-censorship. In their normal day to day operations South African editors face a 'minefield' of laws and regulations. Since the 1985/86 State of Emergency specific restrictions on the reporting of political violence have been imposed and the media

is now banned from independently reporting political violence. Newspapers substantially rely on police reports, issued by the Bureau for Information. In addition to Government censorship editors also limit the independent reporting of certain types of political activity on the basis of what they perceive as acceptable to their advertisers and readers. Similarly, the content of reporting will vary according to the political persuasion of the editorial and writing staff. Compare, for example, the headlines of two newspapers reporting the same incident. The first caters for a white readership the second for a black readership: "Lamontville schoolgirl dies after police action" (Daily News, 9/4/86), and "'Lamontville pupil shot by cops'" (City Press, 13/4/86).

The data for this typology was gathered by the National Press Cutting Service, Institute of Contemporary History (INCH), University of the Orange Free State. INCH daily classifies more than 600 articles from over 100 South African newspapers and magazines. Each article is, analysed by means of a comprehensive 'key word' list, coded, micro-filmed and stored on microfiche which can be purchased from INCH. Articles are retrieved by the use of key words. INCH provides researchers with a computer printout of coded articles which can be consulted with the aid of a microfiche reader. The University of Natal, Durban, possesses the microfiche dating back to 1978. The 1977 data used in this research was based on a search of Natal newspapers only.

2.4.2.2 Coding Data ω

Coding data for typologies is problematic and compounded by the number of categories employed: the fewer the categories the broader, and vaguer, is the definition of each category, and such definitions increase the room for error. Let us look at the two main practical problems encountered in classifying the data.

The major problem was to define what constitutes one incident. For example, if it was reported that 100 buses were stoned over a three day period of bus boycotts in one township the coder could record up to 100 incidents. For the purposes of this typology such circumstances were coded as one incident per township per day, unless the report detailed the specific circumstance surrounding each incident. The second problem

was distinguishing between categories. This problem manifests itself in two ways; as a result of the inadequacies of the definitions, and as a result of inadequate reporting of incidents. For example, at what point does the presence of security forces in the townships become an act of provocation precipitating a reaction? However, it is the second manifestation that is of greater concern. For example, Government reports of police actions invariably stress that they were carried out in self-defence yet these claims are invariably contradicted by independent accounts which assign the role of aggressor to the police. Similarly, what constitutes criminal activity and what constitutes political resistance? As Zwelakhe Sisulu, editor of The New Nation, notes it is difficult to tell them apart because they thrive on each other.³³

2.4.3 Results: 1977 - 1985

The typology of political violence is presented in Figure 2.2. The total number of incidents per category per year are shown by region. For the purposes of this research South Africa was divided into seven regions (see Maps 1 and 2)): Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vereeniging (PWV); Transvaal, excluding PWV; Durban Metropolitan Region (DMR); Natal, excluding DMR; Eastern Cape; Western Cape; and, Orange Free State. These regions include the bantustans although incidents of political violence in these areas are typically under-reported. For comparative purposes the last line of each year lists the total number of incidents coded by CIS. In accordance with the aims of the research Figure 2.3 reflects the number of incidents in Lamont and KwaMashu.

Figure 2.2 A Typology of Political Violence in South Africa: 1 January
1977 - 21 July 1985

Figure 2.2.1 1977*

| LOCATION | CLASSIFICATION | | | TOTAL |
|----------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | |
| PWV | 38 | 128 | 14 | 180 |
| TRANS. | 3 | 31 | 3 | 37 |
| DURBAN | 1 | 6 | 2 | 9 |
| NATAL | - | 10 | 1 | 11 |
| E. CAPE | 14 | 53 | 1 | 68 |
| W. CAPE | 5 | 39 | 3 | 47 |
| O.F.S. | 1 | 7 | - | 8 |
| TOTAL | 62 | 274 | 24 | 360 |
| CIS | | | | 28 |

*Based on Natal newspaper reports only.

Figure 2.2.2 1978

| LOCATION | CLASSIFICATION | | | TOTAL |
|----------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | |
| PWV | 5 | 20 | 11 | 36 |
| TRANS. | 1 | 1 | 8 | 10 |
| DURBAN | 1 | 2 | 9 | 12 |
| NATAL | - | 10 | 4 | 14 |
| E. CAPE | 11 | 39 | 3 | 53 |
| W. CAPE | 1 | 5 | 1 | 7 |
| O.F.S. | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |
| TOTAL | 20 | 78 | 36 | 134 |
| CIS | | | | 34 |

Figure 2.2.3 1979*CLASSIFICATION*

| <i>LOCATION</i> | <i>Reactive</i> | <i>Spontaneous</i> | <i>Planned Retaliatory</i> | <i>TOTAL</i> |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| <i>PWV</i> | 3 | 10 | 10 | 23 |
| <i>TRANS.</i> | — | 7 | 3 | 10 |
| <i>DURBAN</i> | 2 | 6 | — | 8 |
| <i>NATAL</i> | 7 | 11 | — | 18 |
| <i>E. CAPE</i> | — | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>W. CAPE</i> | — | — | 1 | 1 |
| <i>O.F.S.</i> | — | — | — | — |
| <i>TOTAL</i> | 12 | 38 | 15 | 65 |
| <i>CIS</i> | | | | 23 |

Figure 2.2.4 1980*CLASSIFICATION*

| <i>LOCATION</i> | <i>Reactive</i> | <i>Spontaneous</i> | <i>Planned Retaliatory</i> | <i>TOTAL</i> |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| <i>PWV</i> | 20 | 33 | 5 | 58 |
| <i>TRANS.</i> | 1 | 28 | 10 | 39 |
| <i>DURBAN</i> | 24 | 32 | 1 | 57 |
| <i>NATAL</i> | 3 | 4 | 4 | 11 |
| <i>E. CAPE</i> | 39 | 87 | 3 | 129 |
| <i>W. CAPE</i> | 30 | 111 | 1 | 142 |
| <i>O.F.S.</i> | 9 | 20 | — | 29 |
| <i>TOTAL</i> | 126 | 315 | 24 | 465 |
| <i>CIS</i> | | | | 39 |

Figure 2.2.5 1981

CLASSIFICATION

| LOCATION | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | TOTAL |
|----------|----------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| PWV | 8 | 32 | 12 | 52 |
| TRANS. | 2 | 5 | 16 | 23 |
| DURBAN | 11 | 19 | 9 | 39 |
| NATAL | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 |
| E. CAPE | 1 | 9 | 13 | 23 |
| W. CAPE | 9 | 13 | 3 | 25 |
| O.F.S. | — | 1 | — | 1 |
| TOTAL | 32 | 80 | 59 | 171 |
| CIS | | | | 66 |

Figure 2.2.6 1982

CLASSIFICATION

| LOCATION | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | TOTAL |
|----------|----------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| PWV | 2 | 3 | 10 | 15 |
| TRANS. | — | 7 | 10 | 17 |
| DURBAN | 13 | 24 | 8 | 45 |
| NATAL | 8 | 19 | 5 | 32 |
| E. CAPE | 1 | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| W. CAPE | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 |
| O.F.S. | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 26 | 64 | 40 | 130 |
| CIS | | | | 28 |

Figure 2.2.7 1983

CLASSIFICATION

| LOCATION | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | TOTAL |
|----------|----------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| PWV | 4 | 17 | 19 | 40 |
| TRANS. | 3 | 6 | 8 | 17 |
| DURBAN | 17 | 53 | 9 | 79 |
| NATAL | 5 | 10 | 6 | 21 |
| E. CAPE | 14 | 26 | 4 | 44 |
| W. CAPE | 5 | 11 | - | 16 |
| O.F.S. | - | - | 5 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 48 | 123 | 51 | 222 |
| CIS | | | | 90 |

Figure 2.2.8 1984 (i. 1 Jan - 2 Sep; ii. 3 Sep - 31 Dec)

CLASSIFICATION

| LOCATION | | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | TOTAL |
|----------------------|----------|----------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| PWV | i. | 17 | 62 | 16 | 95 |
| | ii. | 68 | 251 | 2 | 321 |
| TRANS. | i. | 5 | 9 | 4 | 18 |
| | ii. | 3 | 18 | 3 | 24 |
| DURBAN | i. | 5 | 11 | 12 | 28 |
| | ii. | 5 | 8 | 3 | 16 |
| NATAL | i. | 5 | 10 | 3 | 18 |
| | ii. | - | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| E. CAPE | i. | 14 | 21 | - | 35 |
| | ii. | 21 | 72 | - | 93 |
| W. CAPE | i. | 8 | 10 | - | 18 |
| | ii. | 4 | 3 | - | 7 |
| O.F.S. | i. | 4 | 16 | 4 | 24 |
| | ii. | - | 7 | - | 7 |
| SUB TOT | i. | 58 | 139 | 39 | 236 |
| CIS (1 Jan - 12 Jul) | | | | | 33 |
| | ii. | 101 | 365 | 10 | 476 |
| TOTAL | i. + ii. | 159 | 504 | 49 | 712 |

Figure 2.2.8 1985 (1 January - 21 July)

CLASSIFICATION

| LOCATION | Reactive | Spontaneous | Planned Retaliatory | TOTAL |
|----------|----------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| PWV | 69 | 298 | 20 | 387 |
| TRANS. | 23 | 32 | 17 | 72 |
| DURBAN | 7 | 20 | 18 | 45 |
| NATAL | 4 | 14 | 12 | 30 |
| E. CAPE | 121 | 572 | 15 | 708 |
| W. CAPE | 17 | 28 | 21 | 66 |
| O.F.S. | 27 | 76 | 8 | 111 |
| TOTAL | 268 | 1040 | 111 | 1419 |


The following broad trends can be discerned from Figure 2.2 above and Figure 2.3 overleaf. Between 1977 and 1979 political violence tapered off before sharply rising in 1980 to new post-1976 levels. Although violence subsided following this 1980 peak it tended to level out between 1981 and the first nine months of 1984, in contrast to the definite post-Soweto decline. The third major peak occurred in 1985 prior to the limited State of Emergency, in which period a total of 1 419 incidents were categorised.

Let us now look in more detail at the trends within each category and the general nature of political violence in South Africa.

The most disturbing feature of the typology is not only the number of incidents of reactive violence as a proportion of the total number of incidents (753 or 20.5 percent) but also the fact that incidents of direct provocation and indiscriminant action on behalf of the security forces, and more recently State functionaries in the form of vigilantes, are increasing. Further, this percentage should be viewed as an under-representation for two reasons. First, there are the problems associated with coding data: there is little doubt that many incidents classified as spontaneous violence were undoubtedly provoked by various degrees of interference. Second, there are cases where retaliation is delayed. For example, on 21 March 1985, police fired on a peaceful crowd

FIGURE 2.3 POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA:

1 JANUARY 1977 — 21 JULY 1985



of 4 000 in Uitenhage killing 19 people. Although four days of rioting followed this incident there was no immediate reaction.

Despite the State President's (none too convincing) assurances that the SAP is "one of the best police forces in the world",³⁴ their role as a source of political violence should not be underestimated. The security forces in general have been the subject of intense debate, with even the State controlled South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC), 'critically' evaluating riot and crowd control procedures. Many police actions have led to an escalation of violence and ultimately outright repression. For example, on 11 July 1980, police in the process of dispersing school pupils in Joza (Grahamstown, Eastern Cape), shot and killed a young girl standing in the yard of her house. Her funeral on 19 July was attended by 15 000 people and precipitated further violence with an alleged stone thrower being killed by police. At his funeral on 26 July a crowd attacked a police vehicle and two more people were killed. At this point a local magistrate placed severe restrictions on funerals in the area. For their part the police dismiss criticism and are not averse to laughing-off their actions in the most contemptible manner. For example, on 6 November 1980 New Brighton's streets (Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape) were blocked by burning car tyres and four people were killed and 18 wounded by police fire. Commenting on the incident a police commander said "the police experience similar outbreaks every year when people celebrate Guy Fawkes day".³⁵

An added dimension was introduced to violence in South Africa in October 1984 with the first regular deployment of SADF troops in the townships to help the already heavily militarised SAP quell 'unrest'. Troops were first sent into Joza, Port Elizabeth's townships and Soweto in early October, and on 23 October a 7000 strong contingent of police and troops were deployed in Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong (PWV) to "rid these areas of criminal and revolutionary elements".³⁶ Similarly, the SADF was deployed in Tembisa and Tsakane (PWV) on 6 November. The deployment of troops, of course, has put paid to the long held myth that the Government could crush dissent without military support and troops now appear to be permanently deployed in the townships.

The second main characteristic of the typology is that incidents of planned retaliatory violence make up only a small proportion (409 or 11.1 percent) of the total number of incidents, and although the most violent of these acts invariably generate hysterical publicity they should be examined in the light of the overall picture of political violence.

Some 4 000 blacks left the PWV region alone after the 1976 violence to undergo military training, principally under the auspices of Umkonto we Sizwe (the ANC's military wing).³⁷ The initial returnees infiltrated the country from as early as September 1976 and according to Lodge, began establishing lines of communication, gathering intelligence about strategic installations, building arms caches and organising cell structures within the main urban townships.³⁸ Thus in the period 1977 - 1979 one arena of this dimension of political violence was the border regions of Transvaal where South African border patrols both intercepted, and were ambushed by, returnees. Once in South Africa those who carried out attacks restricted themselves to grenade, rocket and bomb attacks on police stations in black townships, assassinating black security police, and destroying railway tracks. One notable attack occurred on 3 May 1979 when three ANC members entered the Moroka Police Station (PWV) and fired into the charge office with automatic weapons killing one policeman and wounding six people including three civilians. The importance of such acts "seems to have been to inspire confidence amongst the dominated population rather than terror within the white community".³⁹

Since 1980 the ANC has generally selected targets according to their strategic and economic importance with the intention of creating political support. For example: the synthetic oil refinery at Sasolburg, 1 June 1980; power stations at Secunda, 21 July 1981; the Voortrekker-hoofte military base, 11 August 1981; Koeberg nuclear power station, 19 December 1982; and, the Durban oil refinery, 13 May 1984. However, three new strategies have emerged since 1983 which have resulted in increased civilian casualties; car bombs in urban areas (since May 1983), land mines on rural roads (since November 1985), and mines in public places such as supermarkets and bus stops (since December 1985). These tactics are the result of two factors: the decision taken at the ANC's June 1985 policy conference at Kabwe (Zambia) to attack military and strategic

targets without regard to the risk to civilians; and "over-zealous cadres" operating on their own initiative.⁴⁰ With regard to the escalation of violence in rural areas the ANC argues that the farming community has been drawn into the State's security system and as such is a prime target for attack.⁴¹

The third trend revealed in compiling this typology is the increasing number of incidents classified within the spontaneous category (68.4 percent) directed against Government collaborators (both real and imagined) including, township councillors, teachers, school principals, and police. This trend intensified in the aftermath of the Community Council elections of November/December 1983 and has been popularly labelled 'black on black' violence (yet another euphemism to disguise political violence and intended to give solace to the white community). While attacks against township officials are consistent with the ANC's strategy of making townships 'ungovernable', collaborators are vulnerable frontline State functionaries and are easily identifiable instruments and symbols of oppression under conditions of collective violence.

Regional trends are also evident in the typology. At the macro-level townships in the PWV and urban areas of the Eastern Cape (i.e. Port Elizabeth and East London) have been most affected by political violence followed by urban townships in the Western Cape. Increasingly, political violence is embracing the rural areas particularly in the Eastern Cape and the bantustans of the Northern Transvaal. Although Durban emerges as South Africa's "most bombed" city⁴² the region's townships have not experienced the same intensity of collective political violence as the other major urban centres (this of course does not mean that all townships in the PWV region, for example, have experienced intense political violence). In accordance with the aims of this research a separate typology of political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu, the two case study townships, is provided in Figure 2.4.

In the period under consideration both townships experienced only one year in which considerable political violence was recorded. In Lamont initially rent increases, and later the issue of incorporation into KwaZulu, precipitated violence in 1983, while in KwaMashu school boycotts precipitated violence in 1980 (see Chapter 6 for details).

Figure 2.4 A Typology of Political Violence in Lamont and KwaMashu:
1 January 1977 - 21 July 1985

Figure 2.4.1 Lamont: 1977 - 1985

| CLASS./YEAR | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 |
|--------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| <i>Reactive</i> | - | - | - | - | 2 | 4 | 14 | 4 | 3 |
| <i>Spontaneous</i> | - | - | - | - | 7 | 11 | 35 | 7 | 8 |
| <i>Retaliatory</i> | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <i>TOTAL</i> | - | - | - | - | 10 | 16 | 39 | 11 | 11 |

Figure 2.4.2 KwaMashu: 1977 - 1985

| CLASS./YEAR | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 |
|--------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| <i>Reactive</i> | - | - | - | 12 | 5 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |
| <i>Spontaneous</i> | - | 1 | - | 15 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| <i>Retaliatory</i> | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>TOTAL</i> | 1 | 2 | - | 27 | 12 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 5 |

Finally, while collective political violence in South Africa is predominantly an urban black township phenomenon the popularly held belief that white areas are immune from such violence is not wholly correct. For example, on 8 September 1980 1 000 pupils rampaged through Westaria, a white residential suburb of Kimberley, stoning residents, houses and police following a community meeting addressed by the Minister of Education. More recently on 20 October 1985, 1 500 blacks protesting at the hanging of ANC member Benjamin Moloisi, smashed shop windows, assaulted whites and fought with police for three hours over an area of 12 city blocks in Johannesburg. Violence erupted in central Cape Town on 24 October 1985 when demonstrators over-turned parked cars.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The alternative typology of political violence devised for this research arose out of dissatisfaction with existing approaches and also as a contribution to the debate about the nature and dimension of political violence in South Africa, and particularly the source of that violence.

Any argument that political violence in South Africa is cyclical and unable to sustain itself is challenged by the empirical evidence presented in this research. It is an unsubstantiated argument based largely on inadequate attempts to quantify political violence and overlooks a myriad of incidents. Further, it ignores recent trends, particularly the fact that political violence has not abated since 1980. What has happened in South Africa is that continuous violence has had a declining psychological impact. People have become inured to new norms of violence, that is they have adjusted and adapted to a new environment in which violence has become institutionalised. In such a milieu only large body counts or unusual circumstances attract comment and the daily toll of incidents is passed over.

As to the source of political violence in South Africa, it is the State which, not infrequently, appears to be its own agent provocateur despite the Government's insistence that "revolutionary forces" and "terrorists" are the cause. As we shall discuss in the following Chapters containment and repression of opposition by the State has only accelerated mass support for protest and resistance. While some concessions have been afforded by the Government in response to protest and resistance, in the main the State has retaliated with violence and suppression.

Having provided an overview of the nature and dimension of political violence in South Africa attention now turns to the analysis of collective political violence and the case study of two of Durban's black townships, Lamont and KwaMashu. Chapter 3 focusses on the theoretical framework in which this analysis is carried out.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES CHAPTER 2:

1. Gamson, W., "Violence and Political Power: The Meek Don't Make it", Psychology Today, Vol. 7, 1974, p. 39.
2. Quoted in, "Ten-point peace package", Financial Mail, 26/7/85.
3. Lawrence Schlemmer, for example, argues that, "the current unrest will die down because it is not able to secure rewards". See "Professors talk out on township violence", Berea Mail (Durban), 7/3/86. Yet, measured in terms of almost any statistic political violence in South Africa is intensifying, not dying down and it will be argued in later Chapters that violence in South Africa has secured rewards.
4. Gerhart, G., Black Power in South Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978; Lodge, T., Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983; Magubane, B.M., The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979.
5. For examples of the former see, "Inevitable bloody revolution, Winnie Mandela", The Age (Melbourne), 25/7/85; and, "When the war starts 'they won't even trust the maid'", The Age (Melbourne) 30/8/85, and for the latter see, "Unrest is no threat to the Government, says US report", Daily News, 30/7/85. It is worth noting that on New Year's eve 1978 Jimmy Carter, then President of the United States of America, "lauded the Shah's Iran as an oasis of peace and stability" just months before violence erupted in dozens of Iranian cities. See, Parsons, A., The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974 - 1979, Jonathan Cape, 1985, p. 59.
6. Gurr, T.R., "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses", Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1973, p. 360.
7. Zimmermann, E., Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research, G.K. Hall & Co., Boston, Massachusetts, 1983, p. 6.
8. Ibid., pp. 6 - 8.

9. Ibid., p. 9.

10. Nieburg, H.L., Political Violence: The Behavioral Process, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1969, p. 13; quoted in Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 8.

11. Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, pp. 3 - 4.

12. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 13.

13. Examples of organisations which keep records of incidents of political violence are the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Progressive Federal Party and the Terrorism Research Centre. IPSA falls under the jurisdiction of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal, Durban, which was headed by Lawrence Schlemmer until 1987. Indicator SA is a quarterly journal published by IPSA.

14. See, Bennett, M., "Countdown to the State of Emergency", Indicator SA (Urban Monitor), Vol. 3, No. 2, 1985, pp. 6 - 9, Bennett, M., "Resurgent Rebellion", Indicator SA (Urban Monitor), Vol. 3, No. 3, 1986, pp. 10 - 13, and Quin, D., "A National Civil Disorder", Indicator SA (Political Monitor), Vol. 3, No. 4, 1986, pp. 10 - 13.

15. See, Van Der Merwe, H.W., and Hendricks, J., Manifestations of Violence in the South African Conflict, Workshop on Conflict Accommodation in South Africa, 1983; and, Geldenhuys, O., and Van Der Merwe, H.W., Conflict and Violence in Regional Perspective, Conference on Conflict Accommodation and Management in South Africa, 21 - 23 August 1984.

16. Howe, G., "Deadlock in Emergent States: 1960/61 & 1984/85", Indicator SA (Urban Monitor), Vol. 3, No. 2, 1985, p. 2.

17. Ibid., pp. 1 - 4.

18. Van Der Merwe and Hendricks, op. cit., p. 1.

19. Geldenhuys and Van Der Merwe, op. cit., p. 5.

20. Van Der Merwe and Hendricks, op. cit., p. 1.

21. Ibid., p. 11.

22. Ibid., p. 6.

23. Interestingly, the Government's interpretation proved most convenient when it came to assessing costs. Several off-duty military personnel, injured in the blast, were classified as civilians and subsequently deemed ineligible for disability pensions. This example demonstrates, of course, that every statistic not only has potential propaganda value but can also be exploited to avoid responsibility.

24. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 11.

25. "Play fair, Mr Editor, it's time your paper supported the politics of decency", Sunday Tribune, 13/4/86.

26. South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1984, Johannesburg, 1985, p. 97.

27. Sermon by parish priest at Regina Mundi Church, Soweto, 22/2/81, to commemorate the death of 12 ANC personnel killed during an SADF raid on an ANC base in Maputo, Mozambique. Quoted in, Frederikse, J., South Africa: A Different Kind of War, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1986, p. 136.

28. Ngidi, S., Resistance and Containment - The Vigilante Phenomenon, Paper presented at a seminar on Unrest in African Townships, University of Natal, Durban, 22/8/86, p. 1.

29. "Surge in terror activity sees 136 incidents last year", Business Day, 10/1/86.

30. "In August 1981 ... Oliver Tambo announced that the ANC would in future attack 'officials of apartheid'", Lodge, op. cit., p. 341.

31. South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1983, Johannesburg, 1984, p. 568.

32. For a good summary of increasing Government imposed media censorship since the 1985 State of Emergency see, "The noose gets tighter", Business Day 12/12/86.
33. Sisulu, Z., "People's Education for People's Power", Transformation, No. 1., 1986, p. 106.
34. Quoted in, "Getting to know the President", Financial Mail, 5/9/86.
35. South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1980, Johannesburg, 1981, pp. 517 - 518.
36. South African Institute of Race Relations, 1985, op. cit., p. 75, and pp. 751 - 752.
37. Lodge, op. cit., p. 339.
38. Ibid., p. 340.
39. Loc. cit.
40. See, "Tambo talks of fullscale ANC 'people's war' into white and farming areas", Business Day, 17/1/86, and "Why I did it, by the teenage Toti bomber", Natal Mercury, 2/4/86.
41. Business Day, 17/1/86, op. cit.
42. "Durban is 'most bombed' city", Business Day, 17/10/85.

CHAPTER 3.

A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

" The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicisation of that discontent, and finally its actualisation in violent action against political objects and actors. "

T.R. Gurr¹

The rationale of this research dictates that the theoretical framework should seek to explain participation in collective political violence. T.R. Gurr's theory of political violence put forward in his book Why Men Rebel offers a widely acclaimed social-psychological explanation of political violence. In Gurr's own words: "this is an attempt to analyse and develop testable general hypotheses about three aspects of political violence: its sources, magnitude and forms."² That is, Gurr examines the processes by which the potential for political violence develops and the kinds of conditions and events that channel its outcome. Consistent with his attempts to develop a macro-theory to facilitate comparative (cross-national) analyses, Gurr and Duvall modified Gurr's theory in 1973.³ Whereas Gurr's 1970 theory stood proxy for a micro- or group-level theory of political violence this was clearly not the case with the revised theory which disposed of the psychological basis for political violence. Since this research proposes to identify the sources of political violence at a group-level Gurr's earlier theory forms the basic theoretical framework for this research. In this Chapter a detailed description and critical evaluation of Gurr's theory is provided.

The proposed model of political violence to be utilised is presented as:

$$MPV = RD + (RD \times JUST \times BALANCE)$$

where;

- MPV is the magnitude of political violence,
- RD is the scope and intensity of relative deprivation (synonymous with discontent) in a population,
- JUST is the scope and intensity of beliefs in that population about the justifiability and utility of engaging in political violence, and
- BALANCE is the coercive capacity and institutional support for dissidents vis-à-vis the government.

The term in parenthesis indicates that the justifications for violence and the coercive capacity and institutional support for the State and dissidents have no significant effects on political violence independently of relative deprivation, rather they act to amplify or inhibit its effects.⁴ Before evaluating Gurr's theory let us examine each of these three variables in more detail.

3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCONTENT

" Beat and cuff your slave, keep him hungry and spiritless, and he will follow the chain of his master like a dog, but feed and clothe him well, work him moderately, surround him with physical comfort and dreams of freedom intrude. "

Frederick Douglass⁵

" When people are really hungry they are too busy seeking food to do much else; or else they die. "

E.J. Hobsbawm⁶

Gurr's theory extends the basic frustration-aggression hypothesis,⁷ developed in psychological studies, into the political realm. The frustration-aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed relationship between discontent and violence. Simply put, the frustration-aggression hypothesis states that people who are frustrated are more likely to respond aggressively to a given stimulus than they would had they not been frustrated. As a stimulus frustration is taken as an event external to the person being frustrated and is not a mental state characterising a frustrated individual. Gurr argues that discontent and political violence on the one hand and frustration and aggression on the other are social analogues. The development of discontent arises from the perception of relative deprivation. In other words, relative deprivation is a cognitive variable and its perception gives rise to discontent which acts as a psychological motivating force for participants in violence.

Relative deprivation is defined in psycho-social terms as:

"actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities."⁸

Put simply, relative deprivation develops when people perceive a discrepancy between what ought to be (i.e. expectations) and what is (i.e. capabilities).

The theory of relative deprivation embraces two essential concepts. First, deprivation is not absolute but rather relative: that is people compare themselves to some standard of reference. In sociological research the standard of reference is usually a group or status which an individual wishes to emulate. Second, because deprivation is relative, those who are most deprived in an objective sense are not necessarily the ones experiencing deprivation. As Runciman reminds us:

"Although at first sight a paradox, it has become common place that steady poverty is the best guarantee of conservatism: if people have no reason to expect or hope for any more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have,

or even grateful to be able to hold onto it. But if ... they ... see as a possible goal the relative prosperity of some more fortunate community ... then they will remain discontented with their lot until they have succeeded in catching up. "9

Comprehensive and detailed theories of relative deprivation have been articulated by Davis (1959), Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970), and Crosby (1976).¹⁰ Each stipulate three common preconditions for relative deprivation. An individual who lacks X: must perceive that another individual, within his reference group, has X; he must want X; and he must feel entitled to X. Gurr adds a fourth precondition, the feasibility of obtaining X - an individual experiences deprivation only when he thinks it is not feasible to obtain X. These four preconditions for relative deprivation are replicated in Gurr's primary causal sequence of political violence: an individual perceives that another individual within his frame of reference has X; this perception prompts the onset of discontent motivating the individual to want X; discontent is politicised when the individual feels entitled to X; and finally, if X is not readily forthcoming then political violence offers the means by which obstructing conditions, impeding the obtainment of X, are removed.

3.1.1 The Intensity of Relative Deprivation

The intensity, or degree, of relative deprivation is determined by the relationship between expectations and capabilities and is simply the perceived distance between expectations and capabilities.

Expectations are measured in terms of "values ... (which) ... are desired events, objects and conditions for which men strive".¹¹ Value expectations are goods and conditions to which people believe they are rightly entitled, not merely what they dream of attaining. Capabilities are measured in terms of "value opportunities ... (which) ... are the courses of action people have open to them for attaining their value positions".¹² Value capabilities are goods and conditions which people think they are capable of getting and keeping. 'Value position' is the present connotation of value capability while 'value potential' is the future connotation.

Gurr distinguishes between welfare, power and interpersonal values:

- Welfare values are the material goods of life and the development and use of physical and mental abilities. Welfare values include,
 - i) economic values - those contributing to physical wellbeing, and
 - ii) self-actualisation - those contributing to self-realisation;
- Power values determine the extent to which people can both influence others and avoid unwarranted interference. Power values include,
 - i) participation - the desire to participate in collective decision making, and
 - ii) security - the desire for self determination and freedom from oppression; and
- Interpersonal values are psychological satisfactions sought in non-authoritative interaction with other people. They include,
 - i) status - the sense of prestige,
 - ii) communality - the need to participate in stable supportive groups, and
 - iii) ideational coherence - "the sense of certainty that derives from shared adherence to beliefs about the nature of society and one's place in it, and to norms governing social interaction".¹³

Value opportunities are classified as either personal, societal, or political.

- Personal opportunities are individuals' inherited and acquired capacities that increase senses of personal competence.
- Societal opportunities include the range, number, and ease of access to employment opportunities, and the extent to which the political system interferes in various activities, particularly family and communal life.
- Political opportunities include the means by which people can demand benefits from both the government, such as unemployment benefits, and from employers, such as pay increases and participation in decision making.

Inherited capacities generally display a normal distribution in most communities and have little relevance to collective political violence. On the other hand, acquired capacities, such as education, have particular relevance because they can greatly increase or decrease senses of self-worth. Given the extent to which governments can directly and indirectly moderate acquired capacities through control over access to the likes of education it is clear that there is an overlap between personal and societal value opportunities. The effect of this overlap manifests itself when it comes to assessing discontent.

In the following discussion an overview of the general conditions which Gurr suggests act to enhance or interfere with perceptions of expectations and opportunities is provided. In Chapter 4 these same conditions are examined with reference to Lamont and KwaMashu.

3.1.1.1 Expectations

Rising expectations are a consequence of what Gurr terms 'the demonstration effect'. The demonstration effect evolved within the framework of modernisation studies where it was proposed that people with a low standard of living who are exposed to a higher standard desire, demand and work towards that higher standard. Rising expectations are a function of: the salience of existing values; exposure to new values; the value gains of reference groups; value disequilibria; and, past value gains. These are discussed in turn.

3.1.1.1.1 Salient Values

Some theories of political violence assume monocausality, that is violence occurs when a group's fundamental value is threatened. For example, in Marx's conflict theory the salient value is economics. Other theories assume pancausality. Gurr contends that relative deprivation with reference to any class of commonly held values can lead to discontent and violence,¹⁴ although he ranks values in terms of their probability of inducing relative deprivation (i.e. economic values followed by security, communality, participation, self-realisation, status and ideational coherence).¹⁵ Schlemmer suggests that welfare values are salient among urban blacks in Natal but that:

" Among a significant number of groups, such as those with higher education and the people who are most discontented with life ... political concerns tend to overshadow other concerns. "¹⁶

The more committed to the maintenance of a value, the more people resent interference. However, the response to relative deprivation affecting one class of values is partly determined by people's capability to attain substitute satisfactions.¹⁷ For example, the intensity of relative deprivation caused by interference with participation values may be alleviated if economic opportunities are increased.

3.1.1.1.2 Exposure to Values

Leaders who encourage people to believe in the immanence of progress and change, the media, the growth of urban centres, and increased literacy, are common value shaping forces and sources of increasing aspirations. But if aspirations are unmatched by achievement (i.e. if jobs are scarce and pay is low) disillusionment and anger are likely consequences. However, Gurr argues that mere exposure to material benefits is unlikely to change the values of even intensely discontented people unless they believe they have some chance of attaining those values. This interpretation may help to account for the generally lower levels of participation in political violence by blacks living in 'informal' settlements compared with formal townships in South Africa.¹⁸

3.1.1.1.3 Reference Groups

It is commonly believed that one source of rising expectations is the comparative reference group that demonstrates upward mobility over other groups. When people identify with such groups then the "greater the ... discrepancy the greater (the) relative deprivation".¹⁹ Quoting Runciman, Gurr reminds us that comparative reference groups tend to be limited to groups of similar socio-economic status and that expectations are set by those experiencing the most rapid increase in well-being.

3.1.1.1.4 Value Disequilibria

The demonstration effect can be extended across values. If a group has

attained a high rank relative to other groups in the distribution of one value, its members will demand an equal rank on other values.²⁰ This is particularly so when a group makes economic gains but are held back from political advancement. To stress this point Gurr quotes a South African study that identified tensions among blacks arising from their high occupational status in conflict with their low social and civil status.²¹

3.1.1.1.5 Past Value Gains

Any period in which improvements are made with reference to a single value generates expectations of continued mobility on that value. Groups which experience some gains will expect more,²² even if the improvements are marginal. Political violence has long been associated not only with the interruption of medium to long term trends of economic and participatory mobility but also with the mere promise of reform. This is particularly the case where governments offer reforms to the masses who have few means of political participation.

3.1.1.2 Capabilities

Gurr identifies three factors that limit people's capabilities: perspectives on the limitations of opportunities; past conditions; and, the number and range of opportunities. These factors are discussed in turn.

3.1.1.2.1 Perspectives on Opportunities

Both intrinsic and perceived limitations on the availability of opportunities in a society vary among societies and among groups. In a society opportunities are either 'fixed-sum' or 'variable-sum'. 'Fixed-sum' refers to "a fixed amount of a desired good or condition".²³ For every group that experiences an increase in opportunity under 'fixed-sum' conditions another experiences a decrease. In contrast, in 'variable-sum' situations opportunities may exist, for example, in the form of undistributed land or unoccupied elite positions.²⁴

3.1.1.2.2 Past Conditions

Perceptions of opportunities are determined in part by the past experience of a group (i.e. whether the group's access to opportunity has been interfered with or not) and its social circumstances. These will determine whether a group's members believe they can maintain or improve their lot. It has been suggested already that any experience of gains generates expectations about future gains. Analogous to this relationship is that groups experiencing change, in whatever direction, are likely to expect those trends to continue.²⁵

3.1.1.2.3 The Number and Range of Opportunities

Relative deprivation can be decreased by increasing the number and variety of opportunities. If a group is barred, on ascriptive grounds, from using value enhancing techniques open to other groups their perceived capabilities are likely to be low and their sense of grievance intense. Discriminatory barriers preventing trained blacks from getting jobs with pay and status equal to whites with comparable training serve as an example.²⁶ In their attempt to create new opportunities governments frequently embark on new programmes that typically promise more than they can deliver. Unsuccessful programmes tend to sharpen discontent and focus it on the agents of false hope.

3.1.1.3 Time

Finally, Gurr examines the effect of time on the intensity of relative deprivation. He argues that people readjust their expectations in accordance with past gains (see Section 3.1.1.1.5) and similarly with repeated interference.²⁷ For example, under continuous repression, organisations tend to adopt the most passive and least politically threatening forms and expectations decline to what is obtainable within the system. As an example Gurr refers to the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre and makes the point that in the late 1960's political violence in South Africa was minimal when the level of restrictions were greatest.²⁸

To sum up, the intensity of relative deprivation is the perceived distance between expectations and capabilities. Gurr proposes that


expectations and capabilities are moderated by a range of conditions each of which was briefly discussed above. In Chapter 4 these conditions are discussed with reference to Lamont and Kwamashu.

3.1.2 The Scope of Relative Deprivation

" The intensity of relative deprivation is a psychocultural variable; the basic unit of analysis is the individual, and the intensity of consequent anger in a collectivity is the aggregate (or average) anger felt by its members. The scope of relative deprivation is a societal variable; the unit of analysis is the collectivity and the operational question is the proportion of its members who share specified levels of discontent ... "29

In any given group there is likely to be a range of discontent, the crucial empirical question is, what proportion or specific segments of a group are likely to be discontented beyond the threshold x ?

Figure 3.1 Hypothetical Distribution of Intense Relative Deprivation in a Collectivity



Gurr does not propose hypotheses about the determinants of the scope of relative deprivation but instead suggests two broad approaches for determining it; by using opinion survey techniques, or by making inferences from structural properties of the social system.

Using the opinion survey technique respondents may be asked whether they agree or disagree with statements such as: the only way of bringing about improvements for blacks is by making trouble in public and by strikes; or, blacks will never get improvements without fighting and violent action. In a 1977 opinion survey of urban blacks in Natal and the Witwatersrand Schlemmer asked these two questions by projecting the South African situation onto Rhodesia. He reported that 10 percent of all respondents approved of "making trouble in public and by strikes", and that 28 per cent believed change would not be forthcoming without violence.³⁰ Of course, this example presupposes planned violence and additional questions would need to be asked about responses to State provocation.

Where inferences are made from structural properties of the social system Gurr suggests two possible approaches. The first is what he terms a social stratification approach. This requires that the scope of groups potentially affected by relative deprivation be assessed and that the intensity of each group's relative deprivation, with respect to each class of values, be evaluated. Such an evaluation will depend on a knowledge of the value hierarchies of each group, and of their past and present social conditions.³¹

The second approach, which Gurr refers to as the 'pattern of deviation approach', requires an operational specification of adverse conditions that are assumed to induce discontent and the identification of groups most likely to suffer under those conditions. For example, inflation and unemployment can be assumed to be depriving conditions affecting welfare values, but both these conditions will be felt most severely by wage and salary workers. The banning of a political organisation, legislation designed to keep one party in power, or proposals to implement a new legislative procedure opposed by many people are examples of conditions affecting power values. Low polls in black Community Council elections are good indicators of the scope of people who feel discontented with regard to participation values. Relative deprivation affecting security

and interpersonal values may be inferred from indicators of repression such as a state of emergency and the suspension of civil liberties, or the forced relocation of settlements.

In the Chapters that follow I propose to use a combination of these measures to determine the scope of discontent in Lamont and KwaMashu.

To conclude, it can be said that intense discontent in any group at any time is greatest where most of its members feel deprived with respect to their most deeply valued goals.

3.2 THE POLITICISATION OF DISCONTENT

In the previous section we examined the complex interplay of factors that induce discontent. Here attention focusses on the politicisation of discontent and what Gurr refers to as the justifications for political violence.

Discontent becomes politicised when people's attitudes and beliefs are focussed on the political system. For example, if a government is held responsible for discontent by acts of commission or omission, then it tends to become the focus of discontent. While empirical evidence suggests that people are considerably more concerned with their personal welfare than with political issues, the worldwide preponderance of political violence suggests that people are becoming increasingly politicised. Gurr suggests two factors that focus diverse causes of discontent on political systems:

" ... the ambiguity of origin of many deprivations in increasingly complex societies, and the widening scope of government responsibility in fact and in popular expectation for resolving ... conflicts and generating new values. "32

Where complex social and economic interdependencies have developed over wide areas the origins of many socio-economic deprivations, such as unemployment, have become increasingly obscure and ambiguous. As a result of expectations being generated by new ideologies, elites and the media, and as a consequence of their command over resources and authority, governments are increasingly being held as ultimately

responsible for the general welfare of their citizens. The more a government affects, or is perceived to affect, the lives of its citizens the more politicised they become, and if a government is unable to alleviate social problems generating discontent then the discontent becomes politicised. For example, in South Africa the political system limits educational opportunities for blacks and in so doing severely retards their future prospects. Not surprisingly, black pupils and students realise that their prospects now depend on political solutions.

However, even if discontent is politicised, people hold "specific beliefs about the uses of political violence in response to specific situations".³³ Gurr proposes two variables that determine such beliefs, which he terms, the normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence.

3.2.1 Normative Justifications

Normative justifications for political violence are defined as:

"... the attitudes and beliefs men hold about the intrinsic desirability of taking or threatening such action."³⁴

In other words, people hold norms about the extent to which and conditions under which political violence is considered desirable. Two basic types of normative justifications for violence can be identified: psycho-cultural and ideological. These are discussed in turn.

3.2.1.1 Psycho-cultural Justifications

Socialisation processes that encourage or discourage violence as a response to depriving conditions may exist at 'individual', or 'cultural' levels. This research is concerned with the latter, the extent to which violence is accepted or rejected by custom and convention, rather than with differences in individual socialisation and personality patterns that lead to deviance within a society.

The two characteristics of cultural systems that have the most direct effects on people's perspectives of political violence are the

legitimacy of the government and the tradition of violent conflict.

The extent to which a government, its institutions and incumbents, are regarded as "proper and deserving of support",³⁵ is a characteristic that normally inhibits political violence. People who regard a government as legitimate are less likely to justify political violence.³⁶ Gurr draws on both theoretical and empirical evidence to support the proposed relationship between illegitimacy, the polar opposite of legitimacy, and justifications for political violence. Evidence to be cited in Chapter 5 supports this relationship in the South African context where there is a high correlation among those people who believe that the South African Government is illegitimate and their willingness to engage in political violence.

Gurr also identifies a 'violence-expectancy-justification-violence' pattern: the more frequent violence is, the more people will expect it to occur, and depending upon the effectiveness of violence in alleviating discontent, attitudes of expectancy may be converted into norms justifying violence.³⁷ This relationship also gives rise to the development of beliefs about the utility of violence which is discussed in Section 3.2.2.

3.2.1.2 Ideological Justifications

Gurr argues that discontented people who are unable to satisfy their expectations by accepted norms are susceptible to new ideologies, or "frameworks of consciousness",³⁸ which justify different courses of action including violence. Accordingly, ideologies that justify violence are most likely to be accepted by discontented people when they: explain the sources of discontent in terms consonant with specific interests and experiences; focus their anger on the agents of responsibility; and, stress symbols of mutual awareness.

In South Africa a myriad of subordinated groups have identified sources of discontent and prescribed remedial action justifying both non-violent and violent strategies and one brief example can be used to demonstrate how violence can be subtly justified. Inkatha is one group that portrays itself as part of the wider 'liberation movement' but which has publically adopted a strategy of non-violence. Gurr argues that such strategies seem to have the greatest appeal to groups who sense their

powerlessness against clearly identifiable oppressors - an argument repeatedly endorsed by Inkatha's President, Chief Buthelezi. To ensure support Inkatha stresses the symbols of mutual awareness which vary according to the audience (whether it be black or white, worker or businessman), but largely it appeals for Zulu solidarity and attempts to provide discontented Zulus with a sense of community through the organisation. However, Inkatha has failed to secure tangible rewards, a fact it ascribes to opposition within the 'liberation movement'. In casting the blame elsewhere for its misfortunes and divisions within Zulu culture, Inkatha has repeatedly justified the use of violence against these agents.

3.2.2 Utilitarian Justifications

In contrast to many theorists, Gurr avoids making assumptions about the rationality of participants in political violence but rather assumes people have "utilitarian motives about political violence to the extent that they believe violent action will improve overall value position."³⁹ To reinforce this assumption Gurr observes the social conditions which can be inferred to directly influence utilitarian justifications and isolates two phenomena which have particularly potent effects. These are, 'revolutionary appeals' used to persuade people that political violence can provide rewards, and people's previous success in attaining their ends through violence.

The emphasis organisations place on violence as a means of attaining goals obviously varies. In South Africa violent and non-violent strategies are pursued by different organisations. As Gurr reminds us, however, most 'revolutionary appeals' prescribe violence as just one of many strategies and this is certainly true when one thinks, for example, of the ANC. The 'armed struggle' is but one of many strategies employed by the ANC, others being diplomatic pressure, civil disobedience, boycotts and strikes.

In Section 3.2.1.1 the 'violence-justification-expectation-violence' cycle was introduced. A similar condition is that people who obtain demands through violence are likely to continue to use it as a tactic even where it succeeds only occasionally. For example, illegal tactics employed by blacks in South Africa have resulted in some changes: trade union rights were granted after illegal strikes in 1973; school boycotts

in 1984/85 resulted in free books and stationery; and intimidation of local Councillors has resulted in the collapse of Township and Community Councils. The implication is not that violence is the most effective strategy but that it works often enough not to be excluded. As the cycle of violence-change is reinforced the danger is, however, that violence becomes institutionalised.

A related source of utilitarian perspectives on violence is the demonstration effect of other groups which have been successful in using violence as a tactic. Even if members of a community with a non-violent tradition see other comparative groups elsewhere making gains through violence they may adopt such tactics themselves. The spread of political violence from black urban centres in South Africa to progressively smaller and more isolated rural communities, particularly in the Eastern Cape, may be partly due to the demonstration effect.

In Gurr's causal sequence of political violence the development of discontent is followed by the politicisation of that discontent. The South African Government's far reaching control over blacks has undoubtedly generated expectations among blacks about the Government's responsibility for meeting their expectations. Consequently this has increased the level of politicised discontent. However, politicised discontent is not a sufficient condition on its own to induce violence, people must hold certain beliefs about the desirability and utility of violence to enhance their positions in society. Political violence does not necessarily manifest itself even if people are commonly motivated towards violence; the final determinant is what Gurr refers to as the balance of organisational and coercive capacities between dissidents and governments. This balance is discussed in the following Section.

3.3 THE ACTUALISATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The final stage in Gurr's model is the pattern of social control and support that minimises or facilitates violent responses to politicised discontent. The magnitude of political violence is greatest when the relative strengths of dissidents and governments are most evenly matched or balanced. Gurr defines this balance in terms of coercive capacity and institutional support. In other words, if dissidents exercise pervasive and consistent coercive control and/or have the support of strong

organisations the impetus to violent political opposition is facilitated. However, violence does not necessarily manifest because one side senses victory, violence may be inspired simply to stress a point or to contain oppression. Coercive capacity and institutional support are discussed in turn.

3.3.1 Coercive Capacity

Dissidents and governments have coercive control "to the extent that they can obtain consistent compliance (not fleeting compliance) with their demands and directives through the use or threat of negative sanctions".⁴⁰ Negative sanctions result in deprivations and include not only force but also the likes of censure and the redistribution of goods and services. Of course where governments utilise coercive force this is usually defined in terms of 'policing functions' and similarly governments tend to 'criminalise' the activities of dissidents. Gurr argues that dissidents tend to use their coercive capacities to defend their organisations and in attacks on government and political opponents. Where governments resort to coercion they run the risk of alienating people. Gurr argues that "the higher the level of regime coercive activity and the more severe the sanctions it imposes, the greater the hostility of citizens affected".⁴¹ If people are politically discontented but not enough to take overt action new repressive measures may increase anger to the point where people will retaliate. If the coercive forces are effective and powerful enough to inhibit retaliation but then are reduced, violence is also likely.

Gurr distinguishes between the factors which determine the ability of governments and dissidents to apply coercive force. The former is determined by: the proportion of the population under direct rule; the size and resources of the security forces; the loyalty of the security forces; and, the severity and consistency of sanctions. The latter is determined by: the concentration of support; resources; and the extent to which government forces are willing to support dissidents. A mere glance at these determinants immediately intimates that the balance of coercive control in South Africa rests in the hands of the Government.

3.3.2 Institutional Support

Dissidents and governments have institutional support "to the extent

that they direct organisations through which they obtain consistent compliance with their demands and directives without resort to (coercion)".⁴² The use of coercion to control discontent is potentially self-defeating and enduring support is best achieved when organisations can offer rewards to their followers. If governments rely on force dissidents can increase their support by offering those rewards that governments fail to provide.

Government institutional weaknesses do not increase relative deprivation but, contrary to Gurr and Duvall, they do facilitate the conditions by which dissidents can take strategic advantage and as such intensify the magnitude of political violence.⁴³ In South Africa the State can no longer rely on institutional support and has been forced to resort to coercion and co-optation. Against this background let us look in more detail at the various forms of dissident institutional support.

Gurr distinguishes between structural and functional determinants of institutional support. Structural characteristics determine the capacity of organisations for carrying out plans of action and functional characteristics are the means by which organisations satisfy the motivations of participants in political violence. Such motivations may be satisfied by the provision of rewards and/or the means by which anger can be expressed.⁴⁴ Hence, institutional support does not necessarily rely on the promise of material rewards.

3.3.2.1 Structural Determinants

Structural characteristics include:

- scope, which refers to the proportion of a population that participates in the activities of dissident organisations;
- cohesiveness, which is the extent of co-operative interaction among members and is primarily a function of high levels of interaction and group homogeneity; and,
- complexity, which refers to the extent of hierarchial and functional differentiation within an organisation.

While the importance of leadership in articulating ideological

justifications for violence and in the face of organised resistance is stressed, Gurr makes it clear that "there is no exact correspondence between the existence of dissident leadership and organisation, and the extent of violence, competent leadership and complex organisation enhance dissident institutional support."⁴⁵ Further, Gurr argues neither cohesiveness nor complexity are conditional upon the other but are "reinforcing conditions ... and the degree of institutional support is probably a function of their product rather than their sum".⁴⁶ For example, angry street mobs are usually highly cohesive but lack complexity; aggregate political parties typically display organisational complexity but less cohesiveness; while revolutionary movements are generally both cohesive and complex.

3.3.2.2 Functional Determinants

Gurr distinguishes between instrumental and expressive functional determinants of institutional support.

Instrumental functions of organisations are those that provide members with the means by which their expectations will be directly satisfied. For example, membership of an organisation in itself may provide interpersonal satisfactions and the means by which people can attain power values. The command over material resources will determine the extent to which organisations can satisfy welfare expectations. Most dissident organisations lack the resources necessary to satisfy economic deprivations but they generally attempt to create bonds of loyalty that provide the organisation with resilience.

Expressive functions refer to the provision of "safety-valve mechanisms (or) channels for protest"⁴⁷ which permit the expression of considerable hostility and which are increasingly important as discontent intensifies. Gurr argues that under conditions of intensifying discontent, existing organisations tend to transform from satisfying instrumental functions to satisfying expressive functions.⁴⁸ This is especially true where gross power disparities exist.

In conclusion, Gurr argues that political violence is most likely to occur in societies that rely on coercion to maintain order in lieu of providing adequate patterns of value-satisfying action. There is little doubt that the South African Government is highly coercive and that its

institutional support in the townships is eroding with the demise of Community Councillors.

Having described Gurr's theory in some detail let us now proceed to an evaluation.

3.4 A CRITICAL EVALUATION

" Gurr's theory has considerable intuitive appeal. The idea that relative deprivation, mediated by such factors as government legitimacy, the efficacy of past violence, and the strength of the rebel movement, induces political rebellion makes a good deal of sense. "

Barbara Salert⁴⁹

" Despite all its faults, Gurr's book is one of the most systematic in its field. Because of its faults, we must conclude that we do not yet have a convincing theoretical treatment of revolution. "

Michael Freeman⁵⁰

Any theory of political violence should meet the following criteria:

- it should stipulate the factors relevant to political violence;
- it should include theoretical and empirical justifications as to why, how, and to what extent these factors are relevant; and
- it should be testible and confirmed by available evidence.

Gurr's theory is thus evaluated under the following headings to determine whether these criteria are met and to expose possible limitations:

- Selection of Variables;
- Theoretical Considerations; and
- Empirical Findings.

The principal methodological issues are discussed under both theoretical considerations and empirical findings.

3.4.1 Selection of Variables

The first problem to arise here is that many of the variables used in Gurr's theory are analogous to variables used in psychological studies of aggression: for example, relative deprivation is similar to frustration; past success of violence is similar to reinforcement; coercion is similar to punishment; and legitimacy is similar to the arbitrary-non-arbitrary nature of frustration. Strong analogies would provide Gurr with the necessary justification for the inclusion of these variables in his theory, but the strength of the frustration-aggression and relative deprivation-political violence analogy is a contentious issue, as is outlined below under Theoretical Considerations.

A second possible weakness relates to the issue of plausibility when Gurr shifts the focus of attention from psychological studies to societal characteristics to explain the politicisation of discontent: for example, the extent of institutional support for dissidents is one variable affecting political violence. According to Gurr, institutional support is partly determined by the structural characteristics (scope, coherence and complexity) of dissident organisations and by their capacities to satisfy the motivations of participants in political violence. Violence is most likely when government and dissident support balances and both have the capacity to resist the other's demands. This is certainly a plausible variable, but its inclusion, and the inclusion of other variables, raises critical questions. If the inclusion of a variable cannot be justified on theoretical grounds then it remains merely a plausible consideration. The point is that considerations of plausibility exclude very little and it is not difficult to construct other variables that are at least as plausible as those included. Three

such variables readily come to mind: first, the building of coalitions; second, the role of intellectual revolutionaries vis-à-vis non-intellectual revolutionaries; and third, non-involved organisations that gain from violence.

How then does Gurr justify the inclusion of variables in his general and parsimonious theory of political violence? Simply, he justifies the inclusion of variables on the strength of their relationship to the dependent variable they are trying to explain:

" A minimum strength of relationship is postulated for each hypothesis in correlational terms; if the relationship found in an empirical test is weaker than stipulated ... the hypothesis is rejected. "⁵¹

On these grounds it would thus appear that Gurr has overcome the question of plausibility.

3.4.2 Theoretical Considerations

Gurr's theory is based on the frustration-aggression hypothesis emanating from psychological theory. Gurr writes:

" The basic frustration-aggression ... postulate provides the motivational base for an initial proposition about political violence: the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence. "⁵²

The use of the frustration-aggression hypothesis as a theoretical base is contentious on three grounds, each of which are discussed in turn.

3.4.2.1 Alternative Approaches to Aggression

The frustration-aggression nexus is far from axiomatic. Two dominant approaches to the study of aggression have emerged, the frustration-aggression approach and the social learning approach. In the former it is argued that anger and/or cues, if sufficiently strong, may lead to

aggression; in the latter, 'model effects' are considered stronger determinants. However, in a review of the debate Stonner was only able to conclude that "the exact nature of the interaction between arousal and its effects on the perceived consequences of aggression is an area deserving more attention".⁵³ Thus, it would seem that despite doubts about the strength of the relationship between frustration and aggression there is as yet no better alternative approach to the study of aggression.

3.4.2.2 Contextual Problems

Second, there is a contextual problem: while similar, the concepts of relative deprivation and political violence and frustration and aggression are not identical sets of ideas. There is one significant difference between the theoretical contexts of frustration and relative deprivation. While frustration is used in interpersonal contexts, relative deprivation is used in social contexts and the differences between the two concepts suggest that they are not entirely analogous. Relative deprivation is induced by unfavourable social comparisons, that is, a comparison with either one's own past condition or a comparison with some reference group. The latter poses the problem of which people form an individual's reference group - a problem that does not arise in interpersonal contexts.

Relative deprivation theory is really a sub-case of reference group theory. One of the differences between the two is that reference group theory stresses positively evaluated reference groups (i.e. groups to which individuals aspire membership) while relative deprivation theory stresses unfavourable social comparisons or negative discrepancies (i.e. groups which are negatively evaluated and blamed for discontent). If conditions of relative deprivation are eliminated an individual's own membership group tends to be more positively evaluated.⁵⁴ Gurr does not address the question of negatively evaluated reference groups but merely suggests:

" most people probably choose their reference groups from groups ... socio-economically similar to themselves ... but ... they are most likely to set their

expectations by those experiencing the most rapid increase in well being. "⁵⁵

What needs to be established in this research is whether or not urban blacks measure their expectations against the baseline of their own circumstances or against white standards. Gurr cites a 1959 study of urban black clerks in South Africa to argue that urbanised blacks measure their expectations against white standards.⁵⁶ Schlemmer concurs with Gurr but suggests that this is a recent phenomenon:

" In the past the tendency was for (blacks) to be motivated more by a sense of their own absolute deprivation than by ... relative deprivation. It seemed to them to be a luxury to compare themselves with (whites) ... The position appears to have shifted in recent times ... "⁵⁷

3.4.2.3 The Level of Analysis

The third theoretical problem concerns the level of analysis: whereas the frustration-aggression hypothesis applies to individuals, Gurr's hypotheses are formulated for whole societies. Gurr uses the language and theoretical foundation of individual data but his empirical testing uses aggregate social and economic indicators. In other words, assertions about the perceptual basis of individual behaviour are made from theoretically remote indicators.

The relative deprivation and frustration-aggression hypotheses are concerned with the traits of individuals - their experiences and behaviour. However, as Davies reminds us, the theory of political violence concerns itself with the behaviour of large groups of people: "political stability and instability are ultimately dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society".⁵⁸ Gurr's theory outlines societal conditions affecting the magnitude of political violence within that society but the question remains does group behaviour follow the same laws as individual behaviour? The attributes of groups may well be defined in terms of the individuals, and relations among these individuals, making up the group, but this does not lead to the

conclusion that the laws of group behaviour are the same as the laws of individual behaviour.

Further, in indexing discontent and violent attitudes using objective aggregate indicators at the national level Gurr runs the risk of committing the group fallacy (measuring at one level of analysis and inferring from the results what is the case at another level of analysis). However, Gurr avoids the group fallacy by stating his inferences in limited probabilistic terms. He spends some time justifying the use of aggregate data but at no point advocates a reductionist argument, rather that:

" analysis on one level can and should inform the other, and that hypotheses whose relationships are manifested at, and subject to examination at, different levels of analysis are usually more interesting and fruitful than those which refer to one level of analysis only. "⁵⁹

The problem is that Gurr ignores the nature of intragroup relations. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that groups of people do not behave the same as isolated individuals. Two issues thus need to be resolved:

- does the frustration-aggression relationship hold for groups; and
- to what extent does interaction among individuals in a group affect political violence?

On the first question there is no conclusive evidence to either support or reject the claim that the frustration-aggression hypothesis does not hold for groups. Cantril argues that violent behaviour is, in the final analysis, the action of individuals:

" Whatever characteristics the crowd or the mob exhibit must be owing solely to the mental process and reactions of congregate individuals. "⁶⁰

On the second issue it must be remembered that group behaviour is determined by the strength of an external stimulus. The stimulus will direct group behaviour but not necessarily interaction within the group. For example, intense frustration may motivate people to conduct either severe and brief attacks, or less severe and prolonged attacks against the source of frustration. Either tactic is a function of anticipated gain, opportunity and fear of retribution, which in political violence are all situationally dependent.

Gurr's use of the frustration-aggression hypothesis as a theoretical base for relative deprivation-political violence has therefore proved contentious. Two main issues have surfaced:

- the different theoretical contexts of frustration and relative deprivation; and
- whether the frustration-aggression hypothesis holds in the context of groups.

In reply, while Gurr's theory is dominated by the frustration-aggression hypothesis not only does he acknowledge that "other perceptual and motivational factors are relevant to political violence", but, he argues, many of these are subsumed by the deprivation concept.⁶¹ Second, it is clearly necessary to adopt a measure of eclecticism: the explanations for human behaviour must be sought not only in individual reactions to circumstances, but in the circumstances themselves.

3.4.3 Empirical Findings

Gurr presents a wealth of evidence in support of his hypotheses. In this context he relies on two main types of supporting evidence: case studies of political violence and statistical studies of cross-national data.

One problem Gurr faces is the lack of correspondence between operational definitions and theoretical definitions. The difficulty lies in converting available quantitative data into convincing indicators of the theoretical variables related to violence. Theoretical expressions - for example, relative deprivation and values - are not directly observable

and they must be linked in some way to things that can be observed in the real world. Gurr's indicators, in Crosby's words, "lack 'face validity'".⁶² Gurr's definition of relative deprivation illustrates Crosby's point. In theoretical terms relative deprivation is defined as the discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities, but in practice relative deprivation is obtained by calculating the sum of six weighted measures: economic discrimination; political discrimination; potential separatism; dependence on private foreign capital; religious cleavages; and the lack of educational opportunity.⁶³ It could easily be argued that among the objectively deprived in a non-egalitarian system, the consistent sanctioning of economic, political and educational discrimination could decrease relative deprivation. In the words of Miller et al, "a chasm separates objective societal conditions from subjective perceptions".⁶⁴

Operational definitions for participation in political violence are particularly problematic. Classification procedures have yet to accommodate the person who intermittently engages in legal and illegal acts during civil disorder. For example:

"within an hour ... a person might walk from a ... residence to the scene of a street arrest; chat with friends ... ; curse the police; make a pass at a girl; throw a rock at a departing police car; light someone's cigarette; run down the street and join others rocking and overturning a car; watch someone set the car on fire; drink a can of looted beer; assist firemen in extinguishing a fire, etc. "⁶⁵

In other words, most people are not continuously or exclusively engaged in violence; rather, some people are intermittently engaged in a wide range of routine and illegal activities during the course of disorder.

Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that the problem of 'correspondence' is not peculiar to Gurr's theory but to social science in general. Gurr is fully aware of the problem, citing Blalock's recommendation and then his own approach:

" 'when dealing with unmeasured variables it will usually be advisable to make use of more than one indicator for each underlying variable', ... each of the summary measures used in this study is derived by combining two to seven indicators of the underlying variable. "66

Case study evidence should be regarded, strictly speaking, as a retrospective procedure.

" The general procedure for using case studies is: given a hypothesis of the form 'if a, then b', examine an instance of 'a' and see if it is also an instance of 'b'. In examining instances of political violence, however the tests are actually examining an instance of 'b' to see if it is an 'a' . "67

For example, Gurr presents evidence to support the view that severe relative deprivation (indicated by economic depression combined with the denial of political rights) in a society is likely to lead to political violence. Gurr's evidence focusses on incidents of political violence rather than the antecedent conditions. There have undoubtedly been many cases where severe economic depression and the lack of political rights have not been followed by political violence, and to adequately test Gurr's hypotheses we need to examine cases where violence has erupted in societies that have not experienced severe relative deprivation as well as in societies that have experienced deprivation. On the other hand, a retrospective procedure does provide an assurance that the actual events (in this case political violence) have taken place and there is no requirement to make futuristic predictions.

Gurr's assertions are bound up in probabalistic hypotheses and in a sense this can be regarded as a one sided procedure: if a case conforms to the evidence it is used as confirming evidence; if it does not conform it does not provide disconfirming evidence since the hypotheses do not rule out such cases but rather state that they are unlikely to occur.

Gurr's statistical evidence is based on the simple Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient, and Salert strongly criticises his reliance on this method: a measure designed to determine the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables. Salert writes:

" the theory specifies that one of the assumptions underlying the use of correlation coefficients - that all relevant variables are included in the equation - is violated for the case of bivariate correlations. "⁶⁸

As stated earlier the theory incorporates 51 variables. However, Gurr only states the strength of correlation between the independent (causal) variables and dependent (effect) variables he is trying to explain. For example, poor economic conditions (assumed to be one indicator of relative deprivation) is a causal variable of the degree of discontent and thus the two are correlated. Under these conditions bivariate correlation coefficients are often misleading measures of the strength of association between two variables, especially if a third uncontrolled variable is masking the 'true' effects. Multiple regression and partial correlation coefficients are more appropriate techniques in these situations. Salert in fact draws on instances where Gurr has computed partial correlation and regression coefficients to demonstrate the serious "problem of interpreting bivariate correlations".⁶⁹ For example, the bivariate correlation of institutionalisation as a determinate of the magnitude of political violence is - .33, "a figure that is not outstandingly high but is nevertheless in the right direction",⁷⁰ while the partial correlation coefficient, computed by controlling for the effects of seven other independent variables is .07, "a figure that is not only exceedingly low but also in the wrong direction".⁷¹

A further problem with Gurr's theory is that the inter-relationships between independent secondary variables are largely ignored. For example, as Freeman notes, Gurr ignores the relationship between the balance of regime and dissident forces and utilitarian justifications for political violence: "The relative strength of you and your opponent must be an important factor in any rational calculation of the utility of ... political violence".⁷² In their revised theory Gurr and Duvall

note this criticism ("the independent variables have a number of plausible causal connections among themselves"⁷³) and attempt to show that the variables relevant to political violence constitute a non-recursive system (i.e. circular causation where a is dependent upon b, b is dependent upon c, and c is dependent upon a). However, only two studies have ever attempted to demonstrate that the variables relevant to political violence are related in complex non-recursive ways⁷⁴ and the precise nature of these interactions remains purely speculative.

Problems do exist in evaluating Gurr's evidence. Nonetheless, to argue that Gurr's evidence is questionable should not be misconstrued as saying it is worthless. Individual pieces of evidence may be highly questionable, but as a whole the evidence appears to support the view that there are empirical associations among hypothesised variables. It seems probable that some relationships are spurious while others are more complex than Gurr's theory would suggest.

One final criticism of Gurr's theory must be made: the complexity of the theory has made it unwieldy, in the sense that variables and hypotheses frequently lack clarity. The problem is compounded by a plethora of unnecessary jargon. Under the circumstances it is not surprising to find that many of Gurr's hypotheses are tautological; for example, "the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation". The potential for collective violence is treated as a single variable although it is defined as the scope and intensity of dispositions to violent action. At first glance it is not clear how the combination of scope and intensity variables can be combined into a single variable and Gurr spends considerable time clarifying the concepts of scope and intensity.

3.4.4 Conclusion

Gurr's theory has been subjected to some rigorous criticisms, the main concerns being the:

- method of selecting variables;
- use of the frustration-aggression hypothesis;

- use of the relative deprivation-political violence analogy;
- use of aggregate indicators; and
- failure to correlate independent variables.

Notwithstanding these criticisms a considerable amount of empirical evidence assembled to date does support the theory to various degrees and it is certainly worth testing in the South African context. What is proposed here is to treat Gurr's theory as a micro-theory paradigm and to test it empirically among urban blacks in Lamont and KwaMashu. In the following Chapter this task commences with an assessment of relative deprivation induced discontent.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES CHAPTER 3:

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4. Ibid., p. 137.
5. Quote by the freed slave Frederick Douglass, in, Crosby, F., "A Model of Egoistical Relative Deprivation", Psychological Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, 1976, p. 85.
6. Hobsbawm, E. J., Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels, The Free Press, New York, 1959, p. 79, quoted in, Gurr, op. cit., p. 131.
7. Ibid., pp. 23, 30 - 37.
8. Ibid., p. 24.
9. Runciman, W.G., Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 9.
10. Davis, J.A., "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation", Sociometry, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1959, pp. 280 - 296. Runciman, op. cit., Gurr, op. cit., and Crosby, op. cit., p. 90.
11. Gurr, op. cit., p. 25.
12. Ibid., p. 27.
13. Ibid., p. 26.

14. Ibid., p. 66; Gurr formally states the hypothetical relationships and each is given an alphanumeric descriptor. The first term in each hypothesis is its dependent variable. For example, ID.1: The intensity of relative deprivation varies strongly with the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities. Hypotheses may be qualified by corollaries. For example, ID.1 is qualified by two corollaries: C.ID.1.1 - Any increase in the average level of value expectations in a collectivity without an accompanying increase in value capabilities increases the intensity of relative deprivation; C.ID.1.2 - Any decrease in the average level of value capabilities in a collectivity without an accompanying decrease in value expectations increases the intensity of relative deprivation.

15. Ibid., p. 71.

16. For the results of this attitude survey see, The Buthelezi Commission: The Requirements for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal, Vol. 1, H & H Publications, Durban, 1982, p. 197.

17. Gurr, op. cit., p. 66

18. Ibid., p. 102. Notwithstanding some notable exceptions (e.g. Inanda 1985 and Crossroads 1986) most anti-State political violence has occurred in formal townships.

19. Ibid., p. 105.

20. Ibid., p. 112.

21. Kuper, L., An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1965, quoted in Gurr, op. cit., p. 111. See also, Zulu P.M., Socio-Political Attitudes of the Urban African Elites in Durban, Unpublished M. Soc. Sci. thesis, University of Natal, 1981.

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23. Ibid., p. 70.
24. Loc. cit.
25. Ibid., p. 127.
26. Ibid., p. 128.
27. Ibid., p. 79.
28. Ibid., p. 81.
29. Ibid., p. 83.
30. Hanf, T., Heribert, W., and Vierdag, G., South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change, David Philip, Cape Town, 1981, p. 325.
31. Gurr, op. cit., pp. 85 - 86.
32. Ibid., p. 179.
33. Ibid., p. 155.
34. Ibid., p. 157.
35. Ibid., p. 185.
36. Ibid., p. 186.
37. Ibid., p. 170.
38. Ibid., p. 194.
39. Ibid., p. 157.
40. Ibid., p. 234.

41. Ibid., p. 330.
42. Ibid., p. 277.
43. In their revised theory Gurr and Duvall argue that government institutional weaknesses merely facilitate the conditions by which dissidents can take strategic advantage and are not conditions in themselves which intensify the magnitude of political violence. Gurr and Duvall, op. cit., p. 140.
44. Gurr, op. cit., p. 297.
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47. Ibid., p. 304.
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50. Freeman, M., "Review Article: Theories of Revolution", British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1972, p. 355.
51. Gurr, op. cit., p. 18.
52. Ibid., p. 9.
53. Stonner, D.M., "The Study of Aggression: Conclusions and Prospects for the Future", in Geen R.G. and O'Neal E., (eds.), Perspectives on Aggression, Academic Press, New York, 1976, quoted in Zimmermann, E., Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: Theories and Research, G.K. Hall & Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983, p. 22.
54. Ibid., p. 443.

55. Gurr, op. cit., p. 107.

56. Sherwood, R., The Bantu Civil Servant, Unpublished M.S. thesis, Human Sciences Research Council, Johannesburg, 1959, cited in Gurr, op. cit., p. 106.

57. Quoted in, Buthelezi Commission, op. cit., p. 216. Schlemmer's absolute deprivation is in fact relative deprivation: there would be no absolute deprivation if 'having' were not a viable concept.

58. Davies, J.C., "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1962, p. 6.

59. Gurr, op. cit., p. 20.

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68. Ibid., p. 71.

69. Ibid., p. 72.

70. Ibid., p. 71.

71. Ibid., p. 72.

72. Freeman, op. cit., p. 353.

73. Gurr and Duvall, op. cit. p. 139.

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CHAPTER 4

ASSESSING DISCONTENT IN LAMONT AND KWAMASHU

" These restless broken streets
 where definitions fail ... a
 'place'; a position whose con-
 tradictions those who impose
 them don't see, and from which
 will come a resolution they
 haven't provided for. "

Nadine Gordimer¹

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The cornerstone of Gurr's theory is the concept of relative deprivation. Simply, Gurr proposes that "discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participants in collective violence".² He argues that the "linked concepts of discontent and deprivation comprise most of the psychological states implicit or explicit in such theoretical notions as frustration, alienation, (and) drive and goal conflicts".³ While relative deprivation is clearly a psychological variable its source is located in societal conditions and the analysis of these is crucial to an understanding of the nature of discontent. In this Chapter the societal conditions conducive to discontent in Lamont and Kwamashu are identified in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents empirical evidence of the intensity and scope of discontent in the two townships. This evidence was collected using an approach referred to as the 'D Score' model.

The visible structures of inequality in South Africa suggest that black township dwellers experience relative deprivation. Comparisons between the urban space of black and white are inevitable since the townships are not only located on the periphery of white urban metropolises but blacks invariably migrate into white areas on a daily basis. That blacks should compare the inadequate facilities in their townships with well //

equipped and well maintained resources in modern white cities and towns is but common sense. Let us look briefly at the physical environment of Lamont and KwaMashu.

While Lamont was conceived in the 1930's as a "'model village' ... to provide an adequate standard of accommodation for married Africans employed in Durban; to develop communal life among the township's inhabitants; and to provide the necessary amenities generally associated with a self-contained society",⁴ today it is anything but a model village. In 1977 two social workers released a report for the church organisation Diakonia which described the township as:

" a place fraught with problems - crime, alcoholism, illegitimacy, unemployment, fear, insecurity and pent up frustrations. The township is just a dormitory, a place where you come back to sleep. There is no neighbourliness, no sense of community and no real home life. "⁵

Situated some 15 kilometers south of Durban's central business district (CBD), Lamont township covers an area of 330 hectares and consists of 2 757 dwellings (houses and flats) accommodating a population of 33 350 (average population density equals 11.9 persons per site). Educational requirements are met by eight Primary Schools and three Secondary Schools. The township is serviced by two health clinics, five creches, a library, post office, police station, half a dozen general dealers and butcheries and numerous hawkers, venders and backyard workshops. The latter provide motor repairs, panel beating, painting and building services. Recreational facilities are scarce with one community hall, five soccer fields, two tennis courts and one bowling green. There are several beerhalls and liquor outlets and 13 churches.⁶

The origins of KwaMashu township date from the early 1950's and the Nationalist's slum clearance programmes and apartheid policies. Located approximately 18 kilometers north of Durban's CBD, KwaMashu township covers an area of 1 500 hectares and houses an estimated 215 000 people in 15 400 formal housing units with an average population density of nine persons per site. Educational requirements are catered

background
origins
of KwaMashu

for with 20 Lower Primary, 11 Higher Primary and four High Schools and one primary teachers' Training College. The township is serviced by two health care clinics, 15 creches, a police station and law courts, a clinic for alcoholics, an old age home (the latter two being established by voluntary organisations), 110 formal businesses including, general dealers, tea rooms, restaurants, butcheries, supermarkets, service stations and agencies for commercial banks and building societies, and innumerable informal businesses. A large formal shopping complex is situated opposite the railway station and is one of the few centres in black townships in South Africa that offers sites to white owned retailers. Recreational facilities include, 15 'sports fields', (ungrassed, littered with weeds and strewn with rocks), two small swimming pools, six tennis courts, one cinema and five community halls.⁷

In South Africa comparisons between conditions in 'third world' black townships and 'first world' white cities and towns not only suggest relative deprivation but also structural inequalities which assume a political dimension. It is to this political dimension of the State's control over the process of black urbanisation, and employment and residential opportunities that attention now turns. An understanding of the historical context of these processes is instructive to this research because it facilitates an understanding of the objective conditions experienced in black townships today. It is these very conditions which give rise to relative deprivation induced discontent.

4.2 THE SOCIETAL CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO DISCONTENT: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

[Controls over black urbanisation and employment and residential opportunities began in the nineteenth century in what Browett refers to as the "era of segregation",⁸ a period lasting until 1948 when the National Party came to power. It was during this era that Lamont was conceived as Durban's first segregated black location.] As I shall demonstrate, the discriminatory attitudes towards urban blacks in this period still prevail, reflecting themselves particularly in the insouciant manner in which the township continues to be administered.

After the discovery of diamonds and gold and the concomitant need to

to link inland mines to ports with a railway network, there was a critical need for a cheap and docile labour force. For example, the Mayor of Durban commented on the need for black labour in 1893:

" We look upon them as of paramount importance to the wealth of Natal ... and consider that unless ... (these) ... are secured to us the Colony must retrogress. " ⁹

Securing adequate supplies of black labour, which were essentially independent of the white economy during the nineteenth century, proved problematic: black peasants not only fed themselves but produced an agricultural surplus to service their cash needs for taxes and simple durables. The supply of black labour was ensured by the removal of the primary means of production from black peasants in their tribal lands through Government policies of neglect and enforced decline of peasant commercial output. Congestion, landlessness and crop failure were all welcomed as stimulants to the labour supply and poor small and marginal peasants were permanently attracted to the white owned labour market for minimum periods to supplement farm production, to earn money to pay taxes, or to cover crop failure. Later, territorial segregation was introduced, confining black landownership to rural reserves and forcing blacks to seek temporary wage-employment in the white economy.)

Thus, black urbanisation proceeded under conditions of coercion and the appropriation of traditional lands. The process, however, created a dilemma among urban whites: on the one hand, white expansion and economic growth were inextricably interwoven with the supply of black labour, on the other hand, urban blacks were regarded as a threat to white economic integrity and social cohesion. White attitudes to black urbanisation were initially defined solely in terms of their labour requirements. However, as the rate of black urbanisation increased fears were expressed about the loss of white privilege and calls were made to

the authorities, at all levels, to protect white 'rights' and guard against black advancement.¹⁰ Swanson argues that segregation evolved in response to the problem of defining the terms of association between whites and blacks.¹¹

In Durban it was recommended that land in Grey Street be used for a black location in 1863. At the time the black labour force was housed haphazardly in employer's back yards, in wash houses, store rooms and private compounds.¹² Attempts to regulate black labour, particularly independent day-labourers, or 'togts', were instigated in 1874. Togt workers reflected free labour market conditions in their demand for higher wages than monthly contracted workers and challenged white hegemony. Controls rested in the municipal pass, vagrancy and curfew by-laws, liquor laws, and togt regulations (including, registration, identification by badges, employer levies, and wage fixation). Although these attempts to regulate labour generally failed because of the refusal of employers to comply on the grounds that such regulations were both an infringement and an inconvenience,¹³ by 1877 £731 had accrued from togt registration and employer levies and in 1878 barracks were completed in Bell Street on the Point for dock workers.¹⁴

The influx of blacks resulted in the rapid growth of shanty towns and shacks, particularly at the Western Vlei (Greyville) and the Point. These shanty towns were perceived as a "threat to the 'civilised' standards of ... white(s)":¹⁵ unsanitary conditions aroused fears of cholera, smallpox and bubonic plague epidemics; unemployment and casual labour were associated with unruliness, vagrancy, and drunkenness; and finally, slum gangs, housebreaking and theft conjured images of underworld crime havens.¹⁶ These nuisances gave rise to the popularly labelled 'black social pest' and redirected white perceptions of the labour problem towards imaginary racial differences so that by the twentieth century the labour question was popularly viewed as a police and health authority problem.¹⁷

Two Durban Town Councillors proposed three fenced compounds be built near centres of employment and that blacks be allotted daily work by a white supervisor on employers' notification. However, private compounds,

kept by some employers, weakened municipal controls, and the lack of finance curtailed this scheme. Municipal policy vacillated between those who perceived the shanties as health and crime 'threats', the business community's demand for cheap labour (for which it was not willing to finance accommodation) and the Colonial Government's desire to control black movement. Two options emerged:

" to retain the essentially laissez-faire approach afforded by the long established togt administration and tighten its partial controls through a viable barrack housing programme, or to embark upon ... a comprehensive urban location system imposing direct and compulsory controls over all Africans and their employers. "18

Under pressure from local business the Durban Town Council (DTC) opted for the former course, but the Colonial Government was determined to pursue the latter:

" It is ... desirable ... that natives should be located outside the towns. And not togt natives only, not even natives only ... (but all) coloured people of the working class whose services after sundown are not indispensable should live in their own locations ... The haunts of the labouring class would then be known - confined to the place of work and the legitimate place of residence. "19

Earlier proposals to house blacks in segregated accommodation failed due to the common unwillingness to finance segregation. The Natal Natives Location Act, No. 24 of 1904, provided the necessary legislation for black locations but did not directly address the question of finance. This problem was solved in a deviously simple manner: blacks would finance their own accommodation indirectly through the sale of sorghum beer, or utshwala, labelled 'kaffir beer' by whites. Although alcohol as an instrument of social control had long been utilised by the mining houses in their compounds on the Witwatersrand it was the DTC, through the Natal Native Beer Act, No. 23 of 1908, that monopolised the manufacture and distribution of sorghum beer as an instrument to segregate

and subordinate blacks.

Beer sale profits were channelled into the Native Administration Fund (NAF), a fund tied to the 1904 Locations Act, and revenue was used to finance all urban black 'welfare' including, locations, schools, hostels and hospitals. Between 1908 and 1928 the DTC raised £283 627 from sorghum beer sales but of this only £7 681 was spent on black education while £230 209 was spent on barracks and hostels, £19 023 on eating houses and £17 581 on a brewery.²⁰ In 1916 the DTC built limited housing for black families ("respectable families ... married by Christian rites ... and ... people of some education and status ...²¹) constructing 36 houses at Baumannville (near Greyville race course). Twenty four additional houses were completed at the site in 1919 and a further 60 by 1928.

The togt system, as a source of revenue, was thus reduced to a subsidiary role.

" Beer revenues became the key financial support of a more intensive and comprehensive program of paternalistic administration than ever before, tending with relative efficiency to restrain Africans to barracks and locations. The apparatus of registration and passes associated with the togt system was perpetuated and extended in pursuit of its long established though elusive objective of influx control, surveillance and labour exchange ... Compulsory residence in barracks, compounds and hostels was underway. "²²

In 1916 the DTC established its own Native Affairs Department (NAD), financed by profits from the beer monopoly, to control the movement of blacks. Controls such as the registration of black workers and the issuing of passes later became known as influx control. On 15 June, 1916 Durban's Native Location By-Laws became the first official promulgation of penalties upon blacks and proprietors of housing to enforce residential segregation.

By 1923 the principle denying blacks permanent residence in white cities

was well recognised. The Transvaal Local Government (Stallard) Commission of 1922 concluded (as had Government magistrate James Stuart in Durban as early as 1904) blacks would only be welcome while serving white needs:

" They should ... be regarded as mere visitors to the town ... and though they give us labour they ... have no right to share in the same privileges that regular citizens do ... "23

Henceforth urban blacks were regarded as temporary sojourners within the framework of the migrant labour system. The Native Urban Areas Act, No. 21 of 1923, charged local authorities with the responsibility of controlling urban black movements and in effect replaced Natal's Native Beer Act in encouraging other municipalities throughout South Africa to replicate what was known as the 'Durban system' of control. Both the Housing Act, No. 35 of 1920, and the Native Urban Areas Act required local authorities to provide urban blacks with segregated accommodation, including 'locations' for those blacks who were classified, "non-redundant, (that is) acceptable as urban migrants ... who ministered to the wants of the white man or to the legitimate wants of their fellow men".²⁴ Most importantly the Housing Act prevented blacks from acquiring freehold property rights. Government funds were insufficient to enforce this Act and local authorities were expected to finance their obligations through a Native Revenue Account, NRA, which derived income from fines, rents and beer sales. In Durban funds from the NRA (which superseded the NAF) financed the construction of cheap single sex hostels. During the 1920's municipalities considered themselves exempt from providing family housing schemes because the cost of labour reproduction was carried by the rural reserves to where black migrant labour returned after completing their contracts. The Native Urban Areas Act also required employers of more than 25 labourers to house their employees but this regulation was not enforced in Durban so as not to "impose hardship on small industries".²⁵

During the late 1920's black grievances were being articulated and opposition to the 'Durban system' was being mobilised, particularly by A.W.G. Champion, leader of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Natal (ICU).

" The white people of this country must either pay us a living wage or else employ people of their own colour. It is our intention to force white men to pay for their native servants or else do without them. ... I want to see the native and the European on an equal social standing. I want to be able to travel in the front seats of your trams. I want to book a seat in front of the Town Hall at entertainments; in fact I see no reason why natives should not be represented on the Council or in parliament. We have contributed to the building of this town in every respect we are entitled to the freedom enjoyed by the other people here. "26

On 8 March 1929 the Sydenham (at that time outside the Durban municipal boundaries) Local Administration and Health Board gave notice in the Government Gazette that in terms of Section 21 (1) of the Native Urban Areas Act it would have the exclusive right to manufacture, supply and sell sorghum beer in the area under its jurisdiction from 1 April 1929. The Liquor Act, No. 30 of 1928, had prohibited home brewing without magisterial permission and made the possession of sorghum beer in the reserves illegal.²⁷ As a result of the Liquor Act a traditional domestic function of women was usurped, men were forced to spend income on sorghum beer that could have been supplied by women at a much lower cost and women were denied a potential source of income.²⁸

On 3 May 1929 Champion addressed the Board and argued that the ICU was against the manufacture and sale of sorghum beer by Health Boards or municipalities.

" They (the ICU) protest strongly against any attempt to obtain money from the poor natives by selling to them intoxicating liquor brewed by the local Governments."29

On 5, 12, 19 and 26 May protest marches were organised from the ICU Hall in Prince Edward Street through central Durban to Sydenham and minor violence broke out on 19 May. On 29 May a compound manager at the Point was accused of deliberately overturning a barrel of mahewu (cooked

mealie meal soaked in water) belonging to Mcijelwa, a resident at the compound. In retaliation Mcijelwa advocated a boycott of beerhalls and subsequently his togt badge was withdrawn. On 12 June Champion called for a boycott of beerhalls in sympathy with Mcijelwa. By 14 June the boycott was total and incidents of violence erupted when picketers stoned beerhall buildings. On 17 June a crowd of whites, estimated at between 500 and 1 000 besieged and imprisoned blacks in the ICU Hall. The imprisoned blacks rushed from the Hall and killed two whites. The crowd returned to the Hall and merged with the SAP and Municipal Police forces when confronted by a crowd of some 2 000 blacks who had marched from the Point on hearing of the siege. The black crowd dispersed when whites began firing and five blacks were killed and 84 people were injured during the violence. The beerhall boycott continued throughout 1929 and into 1930.

The De Waal Commission of inquiry, appointed to investigate the violence held the civilian attack on the ICU Hall as the precipitating cause of the violence but attributed the predisposing cause to both "the lack of accommodation in a properly constituted native township or location ... and communist agitation".³⁰ Led by organisations such as the Joint Council for Europeans and Natives, the Rotary Club, and the Natal Missionary Council, pressure mounted on the DTC to rectify black grievances and defuse discontent. In 1930 the DTC established a Native Administration Committee to advise on matters relating to blacks and a 'native village' (outside municipal boundaries) to house black families was high on the DTC's agenda. In its recommendations the De Waal Commission of inquiry stated that: "It cannot be too strongly urged upon the Borough that the establishment of a native location is a pressing need."³¹ Torr points out that white liberals discerned the need to separate black workers from the black middle-class "especially as these two classes coexisted in backyard premises (and) because there were few facilities for family living 'natives were drifting into the grossest immorality'".³² The DTC was also motivated towards providing the black middle class with housing, reasoning that a location would facilitate the co-optation of blacks with a stake in the status quo and willing to resist political agitation. The problem of finance remained and an impasse developed between the Government, DTC, and employers, none of whom were willing to contribute towards housing schemes for blacks.

In 1930 an amendment to the 1923 Urban Areas Act enabled the DTC to establish a black location in an area outside its jurisdiction and in 1931 the DTC was given permission by the Minister of Native Affairs to purchase 172 hectares of Woods Estate, on the north bank of the Umlaas River, for a black location (although only 20 percent of the area was suitable for immediate building purposes, the remainder being too steep³³). Ironically, after the debate over financing, the initial construction at Woods Estate, including 100 houses, administrative offices, superintendent's quarters and entertainment hall began during the worst years of the 1930's depression (using only white labour) and Lamont was opened without fanfare in February 1934.³⁴

Interestingly, despite accommodation shortages, overcrowding, and demands for family housing, the first 100 houses at Lamont were not fully occupied until nearly two years after their completion. Torr identifies several factors to explain the lack of interest in Lamont.

- Distance and transport costs.

Many prospective tenants simply could not afford the monthly train fare of 8s 6d to the city. The lack of facilities such as schools and shopping centres in the township compounded the problem because it meant additional travelling expenses.

- Construction and design of the cottages.

Neither guttering nor stormwater drains were provided and the cottages were constantly either flooded or undermined. The absence of water-borne sewerage compounded these problems. The main rooms were too small, the cramped cooking area prevented communal eating, privacy was limited in the absence of inner doors between rooms and sanitary conditions were primitive.

- Regulations governing township life.

One regulation, for example, prevented residents from engaging in informal sector activities. Income derived from activities such as hawking, sewing, and washing clothes was regarded as an essential supplement to household income.

The sum total of these conditions was that although rent for a three roomed cottage in Lamont was considerably cheaper than a single room in

a shack in a shanty town (between 12s 6d - 17s 6d per month compared with between £1 - £1.10.0 in Cato Manor) the township was not viewed favourably.³⁵

Thus, Lamont was built in the era of segregation in accordance with Stallardist principles. This amounted to the first major thrust in Durban to control all aspects of urban black life. Interestingly, blacks' grievances were articulated during the period and resistance to the 'Durban system' of control resulted in violence in 1929. However, any anticipated gains from the beerhall boycotts never materialised: the Hertzog Government ("newly elected on a 'black peril' platform"³⁶) responded not with concessions but with tighter restrictions. Further curbs on the influx of blacks into urban areas were introduced and the Native Laws Amendment Act, No. 25 of 1930, provided for the deportation of idle blacks and forced women to apply for permits to enter urban areas. Under the Act over 1 000 people were deported from Durban.

By the 1940's, however, segregationist policies, including attempts to confine black domicile to rural reserves by urban containment, were breaking down: the rural reserves were unable to bear the cost of labour reproduction thus quickening the pace of urbanisation and there was an increasing number of permanent urban blacks who no longer retained ties with the reserves. Nonetheless, when the National Party came to power in 1948 they introduced "tighter, more comprehensive and strictly enforced control ... over blacks in their movement to urban areas", thus ushering in the era of apartheid.³⁷ Smith describes apartheid as "an explicit spatial planning strategy implemented by the state (which) serves the interests of white domination and exploitation of black labour".³⁸ The grand design of apartheid was the creation of ten bantustans (officially referred to as 'homelands') within the Republic to preserve the distinctive ethnic and cultural identity of tribal groups and where blacks could exercise their political rights. However, the bantustans merely replicated the functions of the former Reserves acting as reservoirs, from which employers drew labour at will, and dumping grounds where the unemployed, old, sick, and disabled were sent when the economy had no use for them. The origins of KwaMashu date back to the 1940's and the proliferation of shanty towns in Durban and the Nationalist's determination to contain the permanent urban black population by limiting residential and employment opportunities and ultimately relocating blacks in the bantustans.

On 1 September 1932, the municipal boundaries of Durban were extended, thereby increasing the municipal area to 173.5 square kilometers and the population by 51 000 Indians, 21 000 blacks and 20 000 whites.³⁹ While blacks still occupied houses in the 'Old Borough' (for example, in 1936 2 506 private houses and flats were occupied by blacks, of which 22 per cent were privately owned⁴⁰), the majority congregated in shanty towns, particularly around Cato Manor which was now within the extended municipal boundaries. Between 1936 and 1943 the official black population of the area grew from 2 500 to over 17 000.⁴¹ Cato Manor had been bought by Indians who turned it into productive banana plantations. In their search for accommodation, however, blacks increasingly turned to Indian landowners who subsequently found selling and leasing land more profitable than selling bananas. In 1930/31, for example, 36.8 hectares of privately owned land adjacent Cato Manor was sold in lots of just over 1 000 square metres to blacks for £25 each and many of these were further divided into three or four parcels and sub-let.⁴²

The '1949 Durban riots' resulted in some Indian landlords losing control of their land at Cato Manor and the number of blacks in the area increased considerably. In November 1950 the Mayor of Durban reported that "40 000 blacks in Durban are living in shacks" and that their numbers were increasing by 6 000 per year.⁴³ The Durban Housing Survey estimated that there were over 8 500 shacks housing 67 500 people in Durban, of whom between 45 000 and 50 000 were in Cato Manor.⁴⁴ By 1952 Maasdorp and Humphreys estimate that Cato Manor supported 10 100 dwellings and 89 000 people.⁴⁵

The '1949 Durban riots' fuelled apartheid ideology. The Nationalists argued that segregationist policies would control racial (and tribal) conflicts which were the result of the juxtaposition of peoples of different cultures. During the 1950's reams of legislation, including the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, the Native Laws Amendment Act, and the Abolition of Passes and the Co-ordination of Documents Act, both of 1952, and the Bantu Resettlement Act of 1954 were passed to variously segregate, control and remove urban blacks. The Native Services Levy Act, No. 64 of 1952, was the first legislation forcing employers to contribute towards the cost of housing their black employees by levying them 2s 6d in respect of every six days worked by an adult male. The levies were paid into the Native Services

Levy Fund which formed part of the NRA. (This Act remained in force until it was replaced by the Contributions in Respect of Black Labour Act, No. 29 of 1972.) The Nationalists also tightened up the arbitrary 'qualifications' for township residence. In Lamont, for example, the 'right type' of resident was someone of the Nguni race who had been employed south of the Umbilo River and resident in Durban for at least two years and preferably who had resided as a lodger in Lamont for five years.⁴⁶

In November 1950, five months after the passing of the Group Areas Act, the Durban City Council⁴⁷ (DCC) appointed a technical sub-committee to demarcate Durban into racial zones.

" Of all the major cities in the Union, Durban, through its City Council, has shown the greatest enthusiasm for compulsory segregation, and has indeed contributed to the planning of the Group Areas Legislation for the country as a whole. "⁴⁸

In the interim, pending the Group Areas sub-committee's report which would determine the long term future of urban blacks in Durban, the DCC established an emergency camp at Cato Manor providing basic services (roads, stormwater drainage and ablution blocks) and allowed blacks to erect temporary shelters. Government approval to proceed with the emergency camp was only granted after assurances were given by the DCC that Cato Manor would be reserved solely for white occupancy in terms of the Group Areas Act.⁴⁹ In 1952, having acquiesced to the Government's terms, the DCC acquired 226 hectares of land at Cato Manor for its emergency camp.⁵⁰ But as Maasdorp and Humphreys point out:

" The emergency camp ... proved totally inadequate to cope with the rapidly growing population of Cato Manor. The ... countryside surrounding the emergency camp precluded any significant expansion of the camp area with the result that uncontrolled shack areas, lacking even the most rudimentary community services, continued to grow on the fringes ... "⁵¹

When fully developed the camp consisted of 4 427 sites housing an

estimated 90 000 people.⁵² In the camp itself there was little improvement in living conditions and the DCC in fact compounded the problem: "they harassed unlicensed traders, demolished overcrowded buildings, and ... contributed to the overcrowding by moving the occupants of other shanty areas into Cato Manor."⁵³

In the early 1950's the Department of Native Affairs embarked on a massive nationwide black housing programme and selected the Umlazi Mission Reserve as the most suitable site for development in Durban despite having rejected earlier DCC plans to develop Umlazi.⁵⁴ The Department's aim at Umlazi was to create "a fully integrated satellite town housing a population of 60 000",⁵⁵ but as with Lamont twenty years earlier the first 200 houses at Umlazi, completed in 1952, stood empty because of high rents.

To ensure that the DCC met its housing responsibilities the Government coerced the DCC into purchasing land north of the Umgeni River for a black township by "withholding permission for the establishment of a controlled squatting area at Umlazi".⁵⁶ The DCC acquired 915 hectares of sugar-cane estates at Duffs Road, 18 kilometres north of Durban in 1953, and in 1956 KwaMashu was proclaimed a municipal housing scheme for the proposed accommodation of 120 000 people. The first homes at KwaMashu were completed in 1958 and the process of removal from Cato Manor began in March 1958. Only families legally entitled to be in Durban were rehoused, and between 30 000 and 40 000 persons 'disappeared' during resettlement.⁵⁷ Shack areas on the periphery of the emergency camp were cleared by October 1960, the emergency camp was cleared by September 1964, and finally, the black free-hold areas surrounding Cato Manor were cleared by August 1966. Other areas were also cleared in Durban and 7 036 shacks were demolished and 95 000 shack dwellers resettled in KwaMashu and Umlazi.⁵⁸ Baumannville and several city hostels were also evacuated.⁵⁹

Higher rentals in KwaMashu, increased transport costs to the city, poor facilities, an onerous administration, and the loss of a relative degree of freedom from bureaucratic interference that was enjoyed in the shanty towns resulted in a grass roots mobilisation and considerable initial resistance to the removals. These local issues were fought in conjunction with broader based campaigns, such as the removal of

freehold rights and restrictions on trading rights for blacks, organised by the Congress Alliance and the ANC.

In June 1959 violence erupted at Cato Manor led by thousands of embittered women who, lacking the necessary legal documents to remain in the urban area, were threatened with deportation by the resettlement programme.⁶⁰ The precipitating cause of the violence was the DCC's order to destroy liquor stills, As in 1929 this had the effect of forcing blacks into beerhalls. On 17 June a group of women invaded a beerhall, and on 18 June a crowd of 2 000 women was broken up by police. In the following two weeks municipal buildings and vehicles were destroyed, and with the help of the ANC a beerhall boycott was initiated. By the end of June the issue had subsided,⁶¹ although the removal programme was halted until November when it resumed under police protection.⁶² During early 1960 further violence erupted. On 24 January nine policemen were killed at Cato Manor after destroying liquor stills during a raid. (In 1961, with the principle of the municipal beer monopoly firmly entrenched, municipalities were also given the monopoly over the retailing of liquor in black townships.) At the Durban City Hall, on 18 February, at a meeting called by the ANC and attended by 4 500 people, plans were made for a general strike and a bus and beerhall boycott in protest against the removals.⁶³ On both 31 March and 1 April, following the Sharpeville massacre on the 21 March and the ensuing arrest and detention of black leaders, huge processions attempted to march by various routes to the city centre from Cato Manor:

" On both occasions the marchers were intercepted by police and driven back to the accompaniment of shooting by white civilian onlookers. One group of 1 000 people succeeded in getting through the police cordon and marched through Durban's shopping centre to end up outside the central gaol demanding the release of ANC men ... "⁶⁴

The unrest continued over the next week as the ANC tried to mount a ten day stayaway which was "fiercely contested by the authorities". In Lamont, on 5 April, police dispersed a crowd of 1 000 who were waylaying workers during the stayaway, resulting in one death and 17 injuries.⁶⁵

In the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre the 1960's appeared as a period of relative tranquility in which the black political dissent of the 1950's was crushed by the State. The 1960's must be seen, however, as the beginning of the Verwoerdian period when the removal of blacks from what apartheid ideology refers to as 'white' South Africa to the bantustans began in earnest. As we shall see, the bantustan policy has continuing implications for blacks, particularly those with permanent residence in the 'white' cities (e.g. Lamont residents). While the largely ad hoc segregationist measures of the pre-Nationalist era primarily interfered with residential opportunities, the net of interference was broadened in the apartheid era to include employment. The mechanisms used to impinge on residential and employment opportunities for blacks are discussed below.

Prevention of hostile expression

At this point we can conclude that both Lamont and KwaMashu were built as part of a strategy of containment. As we have seen, however, that strategy was resisted initially with disinterest (in the case of Lamont), and later, when force was used to relocate people, with violence (in the case of KwaMashu). Removal and segregation meant the loss of both residential and employment opportunities. At a theoretical level the loss of opportunity may manifest in discontent if expectations remain at a consistent level. This was quite possible, in the short term, as people took time to adjust to new conditions under apartheid ideology and this interpretation is certainly consistent with Gurr's theory.

Over the past ten years controls over urban blacks have been in a state of flux (the term 'reform' is popularly used to describe this condition). Much of the new legislation affecting the lives of urban blacks, however, must be treated with scepticism for there is little to suggest that the number and range of opportunities have been increased.

In Lamont four sets of interacting factors can be identified as the sources of discontent.

18 - Macro-issues concerning low wages and a deteriorating economy.

Unskilled and poorly educated blacks are particularly ^{capable} ~~susceptible~~ to unemployment, retrenchment and inflation. Any increase in the cost of

essential goods and services (including food, clothing fuel and transport), produces anguish in the townships.

- Attempts by successive township administrations to make Lamont self-sufficient.

NB To achieve this condition housing rents and service charges have been regularly increased without taking cognisance of the low wages paid to blacks, the eroding purchasing power of those wages, or the fact that neither adequate services nor maintenance are provided. Lamont suffers from a lack of resources and facilities and without comprehensive Government funding improvements will not be forthcoming.

- Insecure tenure and incorporation.

Until recently Lamont residents have been faced with insecure tenure, and the threat of incorporation into the KwaZulu bantustan still exists and generates tremendous uncertainty in the community.

- Lack of political representation.

Lamont residents have been unable to express their specific grievances through an effective third tier government.

On the other hand, two sets of conditions make KwaMashu 'different' from Lamont. First, many of the typical township grievances and irritants are on a smaller scale. For example, KwaZulu residents were not subjected to police raids to enforce influx control and KwaMashu residents have been able to buy and own homes on a deed of grant basis (where the house but not the land could be purchased) since 1977 by simply holding a permanent job in Durban. In KwaMashu 89 percent of houses have or are being bought. Average monthly repayments are R10 and service charges are R3.40 per month. Further, rentals in KwaMashu are only R12.70 per month (including service charges)⁶⁶ compared with R40.85 in Lamont. One effect of these conditions has been that Township Councillors in KwaMashu have been subject to less resentment and hostility. Zulu's claim that there is general apathy towards Township Councillors⁶⁷ is supported by the low polls in the most recent elections (see Figure 4.2). Second, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, Inkatha has emerged as

a dominant ideological force in the township and 'progressive' organisations articulating residents' grievances have a restricted power base.

Two issues need to be expanded upon here:

- the administration of townships and the mechanisms used by successive administrations to control residential and employment opportunities in accordance with the Government's bantustan policy; and
- political representation and the Nationalist's denial of an effective political voice for township residents.

4.2.1 Administration

Prior to 1 August 1973 both Lamont and KwaMashu were administered by the DCC. On that date the Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB) was placed in charge of urban black affairs in Durban. On 1 February 1977 KwaZulu was declared a 'self-governing' territory in accordance with the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, No. 21 of 1971, and subsequently on 1 April 1977 KwaMashu was incorporated into KwaZulu and the PNAB relieved of direct administration of KwaMashu. Lamont continued to be administered by the PNAB until 1 April 1984 when it was succeeded by the Natalia Development Board (NDB). On 1 July 1986 the NDB itself was succeeded by the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA). Successive changes in administration are merely consistent with the Nationalist's determination to reverse the process of black urbanisation. The first change involved relieving local authorities of their agency role in the control of urban blacks and the introduction of Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAAB's).

Nationalist policy towards urban blacks often brought the Government into open conflict with local authorities, particularly those which resented merely 'rubber stamping' Nationalist policy. In 1967 a report by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development presented three options: to retain white local authorities as the agents of control; to pass direct control over to the Department; or to create Labour Boards as Government agents. On 15 December 1970 a draft Bill was gazetted vesting controls over black housing and labour in the hands of Labour Boards and in February 1971 the Bantu Affairs Administration Act, No. 45 of 1971, was passed by parliament.⁶⁸

On 1 August 1973 the PNAB, (one of 22 BAAB's in South Africa) assumed responsibility for urban black affairs generally in Durban. Maasdorp and Humphreys neatly sum up the importance of the PNAB to the Nationalists:

" In terms of apartheid ideology ... the seizure of township control was a logical and inevitable step; in important centres such as Durban, ... the city councils are controlled by non-Nationalists so that, despite the fact that local authorities are obliged to implement government legislation, the application of policy from the National Party's point of view would be facilitated by direct control. "69

Bekker and Humphries argue that while BAAB's became responsible for the delivery of local authority services, the prime objective of the Government in creating the Boards was to "improve the efficiency of the labour regulation function, influx control in particular".⁷⁰

In 1979 the Riekert Commission's report on the control and regulation of the labour market and the Government's white paper in response were released heralding a new labour policy for urban blacks living in 'white' South Africa. According to the Riekert White Paper urban blacks were to be accorded permanent status. Nonetheless, despite this change in strategy critics argued that it merely served both Government interests and those controlling the modern sector. In this regard a parallel can be drawn between the recommendations of De Waal (1929) and Riekert.

" The Riekert Report is a clever and highly sophisticated piece of work which will probably result in a longer period in which the status quo will be maintained through the creation of a relatively small African privileged group which will serve as a buffer against unrest. In the interim, dreadful human suffering in the homelands, and problems experienced by migrants and non-permanent workers will increase. "71

As a consequence of the Riekert Report BAAB's (by then consolidated into

14) were required, on the one hand, to relax their controls over permanent urban blacks, and on the other hand, not only to tighten up their controls over blacks who did not qualify for permanent urban status but also continue to 'develop' the bantustans in collaboration with the then Department of Co-operation and Development.⁷² In line with this shift in policy BAAB's were no longer simply Government agents in charge of townships and black labour, but also agents for other Government Departments, notably the Department of Manpower, and responsible for assisting urban black communities to 'develop'. The expanded roles of the BAAB's, however, created new problems the most serious being the unrealistic expectation that they could continue to be financially self-sufficient.⁷³

Between 1972 and 1982 the financial positions of BAAB's underwent a dramatic reversal, from healthy NRA's (subsequently referred to as the Black Revenue Account, BRA) with guaranteed annual surpluses on their current accounts to large deficits. Throughout the 1970's BAAB's recorded surpluses, with the exception of 1977/78 when political violence resulted in widespread damage to Board property. For example, in 1979/80 the aggregated surplus was R19 696 375, yet by 1982/83 the deficit stood at R32 140 057.⁷⁴ The deteriorating financial position of the Boards can be attributed to four factors.⁷⁵

- Over half the income of BAAB's derived from beer and liquor sales.

For example, in 1982/83 alcohol sales accounted for 53.8 per cent of the PNAB's income.⁷⁶ The Boards' monopoly over beer and liquor sales has been challenged by the increasing preference among blacks for commercial beer and hard liquor and, forced to compete with liquor outlets in white areas, BAAB's lost significant revenue. The importance of finance deriving from beer and liquor sales is revealed by the fact that profits from this source enabled the DCC to maintain the same service charge between 1959 and 1973.

- Funds raised by employer contributions under the Contributions in Respect of Black Labour Act, which accounted for approximately 16 percent of the BAAB's income in 1977, were not increased after 1977.

In 1983 BAAB's urged that monthly employer contributions be increased

from R2.15 to R3.65 per worker for those who did not provide accommodation and R2.20 for those who did. The increases, however, were never introduced.

- The roles of BAAB's were expanded to embrace non-local authority functions such as labour placement, employment aid, policing and inspecting functions, and welfare provision.

These functions were undertaken by BAAB's on an agency basis for other Government Departments which did not contribute financially to the Boards.

- Expenditure by BAAB's on housing and services increased as a result of inflation, attempts to improve facilities, and as a result of the termination of municipal subsidisation of the BRA.

Prior to the take over of townships by BAAB's many white local authorities had both directly and indirectly subsidised black townships. Direct subsidisation included covering deficits by drawing funds directly from general rates while indirect subsidisation included only partially debiting the costs of providing services and staff against the BRA. With the introduction of BAAB's local authorities saw the opportunity to recoup their expenditure on services not taken over by the Boards including the supply of water and electricity and the removal of refuse. Subsequently, regular increases in service charges were introduced. For example, in April 1979 the PNAB announced a series of six monthly increases in service charges to continue for three years. Despite the increases, the deficit continued to mount forcing the PNAB to continue six monthly increases for another two years from 1982. The consequences of these increases are examined in Chapter 6.

// Under the Black Communities Development Act, No. 11 of 1984, BAAB's were abolished and their functions taken over by Development Boards. In Natal the Drakensberg Administration Board and PNAB amalgamated on 1 April 1984 to constitute the NDB. Although Development Boards were charged with providing for the "purposeful development" of black communities outside the bantustans, they remained agents for the Department of Co-operation and Development, retained wide ranging powers to enforce influx control, and were unaccountable to township residents.

At this point it is pertinent to examine strategies utilised by the Development Boards to regulate black urbanisation and influx control. These strategies rested primarily upon control over employment opportunities and housing.

Under the control of Development Boards, Labour Bureaux utilised a hierarchy of preferential labour allocation to jobs. At the top of the job queue were those blacks, living in townships in 'white' South Africa, who held what is referred to as Section 10 rights. Under Section 10 (1) of the Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945, as amended, blacks 'qualified' to live in these areas if they had either: (a) been born and resided there since birth; (b) worked for ten years in any prescribed area; (c) been the wife, unmarried daughter or son under 18 of a person in class (a) or (b); or (d) been granted a permit by a Labour Bureau.

Underneath this group were 'frontier commuters' - blacks living in bantustan townships who had lost their Section 10 rights when the township in which they lived was incorporated into a bantustan as, for example, KwaMashu was incorporated into KwaZulu. Frontier commuters fell into one of two categories: those authorised to enter white cities and towns to seek employment; and, those who could enter only after having obtained an employment contract. The former group were defined by Development Board officials as 'administrative' Section 10 qualifers (those who for all intents and purposes held Section 10 rights) while the latter group were treated as 'migrant workers' and obliged to reapply in their bantustan if they wanted to change employment. According to Bekker and Humphries 'administrative' Section 10 rights were granted to all bona fide residents of KwaMashu and Umlazi.⁷⁷

Two strategies were employed to make bantustan townships more attractive than those in 'white' South Africa with the aim of enticing blacks living in 'white' South Africa to relocate:

- Housing development was promoted in the bantustans.

In 1982, for example, 60 percent of the workload of the PNAB's Department of Technical Services (responsible for the development and maintenance of townships, infrastructure, housing projects and other community facilities) was taken up with projects in KwaZulu;⁷⁸ and

- Housing development was frozen in 'white' South Africa.

In Lamont, for example, comprehensive freezing policies have been employed since the early 1960's. The freezing of housing development in townships can take one of three forms:

a) a total halt on construction.

In 1984 the Hankinson Commission's report on housing in Natal said that not one new dwelling had been provided in Lamont in the past 22 years;⁷⁹

b) a freeze on the acquisition of new land; and,

c) prohibitions on the acquisition of 99-year lease hold rights.

In Lamont residents faced other restrictions including, bans on housing loans, the occupation of homes on a letting basis only, and preventing homes owned under the homeownership scheme⁸⁰ from being bequeathed to heirs.

Insecurity of tenure among Lamont residents was further exacerbated by the threat of incorporation into KwaZulu and the spectre of losing their Section 10 rights, deteriorating services, and being administered by the 'illegitimate' KwaZulu Government. In April 1984 the Minister of Co-operation and Development assured Lamont residents that they would not lose their Section 10 rights after incorporation.⁸¹ Technically this was not true because Section 10 rights only pertained to blacks living in 'white' South Africa and bantustans fall outside this definition. However, as mentioned above, Lamont residents would have undoubtedly been treated by NDB officials as 'administrative' Section 10 qualifiers.

Controls over urban blacks entered a new phase on 1 July 1986. The introduction of a new provincial system of administration, the extension of full property rights for urban blacks, and the abolition of influx control and Development Boards are all part of the Government's 'orderly urbanisation' strategy, the direction of which is unclear and remains to be assessed despite Government assurances that it is committed to 'reform'. Prior to judicial interpretations, only the more obvious limitations of the new strategy for urban blacks can be noted.

On 1 July a new second tier system of government was introduced into South Africa when the Provincial Government Act abolished white elected Provincial Councils and replaced them with appointed Administrators and Executives. Officially the Provincial Councils were "unacceptable to government because they dealt with matters affecting all population groups, but were elected by members of one group only" whereas the new system represents a devolution of power by including representatives from the other population groups.⁸² On the contrary, the appointment of Administrators and Executives on a political basis, regardless of which population group they belong to, concentrates Nationalist power. A former member of the Natal Provincial Council aptly described the change: "The Government just couldn't win the game with us, so they ran onto the field and took the stumps away."⁸³

Under the Abolition of Development Bodies Act, Development Boards were abolished and taken over by Provincial Administrations. Thus, for example, the functions of the former NDB are now carried out by the NPA. Given that NPA policy is now determined by a Nationalist appointed Administrator there is no justification for believing that controls over urban blacks will be any different from when they were determined by Development Boards acting as Government agents.

During the first parliamentary session of 1986 a number of acts addressed the question influx control. For example, the pass laws were abolished and the South African Citizenship Act was introduced to enable blacks, who lost South African citizenship when the bantustans to which they are tied became 'independent', to reapply for South African citizenship and/or permanent residence. However, clauses in both pieces of legislation make it clear that controls over the process of black urbanisation and particularly restrictions on black mobility remain a Government priority. For example the Minister of Constitutional Development is still empowered to remove people "for any reason not in the public interest".⁸⁴ Instead of needing a pass to enter and live in urban areas blacks now need 'approved accommodation' which is in critically short supply. Further, the opportunity to enter 'white' South Africa by reclaiming citizenship is limited and dependent on stringent conditions including, proving lawful and permanent residence (Section 10 rights now fall away) and having permanent employment in South Africa. Employers who hire 'aliens' (citizens of Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda

and Ciskei) face fines of up to R5 000.⁸⁵ Plainly, people who meet neither condition remain vulnerable to forced removal to the bantustans.

Finally, under the Black Communities Development Act restrictions on blacks owning property in urban areas were abolished. While an obvious advantage to residents in townships such as Lamont it must be remembered that the Government continues to create artificial shortages of land in metropolitan areas which aggravates the housing problem.⁸⁶ According to one NPA housing official it will be "some time" before Lamont residents are eligible for either 99 year lease-hold or free-hold title.⁸⁷

The implications of successive shifts in township administration from white local authorities to the Central Government have been felt particularly hard by Lamont residents who have suffered from controls over housing and employment, witnessed deteriorating living conditions, and regular increases in rents and service charges. For all its 'reforms' the Government still restricts the mobility of blacks and controls their employment and housing opportunities.

4.2.2 Political Representation

Officially, blacks are supposed to exercise their political rights through the bantustans with limited representation for urban blacks being afforded through either Township Councils, Community Councils or Black Local Authorities (BLA's). These bodies are, however, little more than extensions of the Native Advisory Boards (NAB's) that were established during the 1930's to co-opt the urban black middle class. As such these bodies have been rejected and condemned by communities throughout South Africa with violent consequences. It is pertinent to describe how these Councils serve Government interests.

The 1923 Urban Areas Act empowered white local authorities to create NAB's as "forum(s) for communication between municipal officials and township residents".⁸⁸ The Lamont NAB, made up of four City Councillors and ten elected black representatives, was inaugurated in July 1936 as a "goodwill gesture" and "as a means of co-opting Durban's African petty bourgeois".⁸⁹ The Lamont NAB was a purely advisory body and powerless and ineffective, particularly when articulating the demands of residents

on issues such as home-brewed beer, rising rents and transport costs, poor facilities and insuperable administrations. The DCC rarely followed its advice and the Board was reduced to a vehicle through which the narrow grievances and aspirations (particularly trading rights) of the co-opted black middle class were expressed.⁹⁰

During the 1950's Lodge notes that NAB's throughout South Africa worked closely with the ANC in articulating local discontent.⁹¹ However, Torr stresses that the Lamont NAB:

" seems to have been involved rather with local conflicts between opposing factions in the township. These differences ... reflect (the) ... quest for control of the NAB through which limited rights could be gained for its members. "⁹²

From the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's as a result of the 'programme of action', 'Defiance Campaign' and 'Freedom Charter' NAB's were increasingly seen as institutions of the oppressor and the Freedom Charter demands that minority unrepresentative bodies be replaced by democratically elected organisations. Consequently, in an effort to portray the NAB's in a more positive light the Urban Bantu Councils Act, No. 79 of 1961, was promulgated to empower white local authorities to replace NAB's with Urban Bantu Councils (UBC's) to represent urban black interests. UBC's were vested with exactly the same powers and functions as their predecessors and still comprised both selected and elected members although they could be granted limited executive powers, subject to the Minister's discretion. That UBC's were popularly referred to as 'Useless Boys' Clubs' and 'United Bantu Crooks',⁹³ suggests their ineffectiveness and public perceptions of them as corrupt bodies.

In terms of the Urban Bantu Councils Act the first elections for the KwaMashu and Ningizimu (embracing the townships of Lamont, Chesterville, and Jacobs, and the Dalton Road, S.J. Smith and Umlazi Glebe hostels) UBC's were held in March 1968. Dissatisfaction with the UBC's was quick and blacks pressed for direct representation on white local authorities. Bekker and Humphries note that BAAB and local authority officials pressed for the abolition of UBC's and their replacement by a system of

urban bantustan representatives which was concomitant with Government policy of identifying urban blacks with an assigned bantustan.⁹⁴

The political violence of 1976/77 further proved the inadequacy of UBC's which had neither the power nor the influence to intervene and end the violence. In June 1977 the Soweto and Dobsonville UBC's collapsed when a majority of the members resigned as a result of pressure from the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC). At the same time other UBC's (and the isolated NAB) ceased functioning.

Under the Community Councils Act, No. 125 of 1977, UBC's were replaced by Community Councils but under Section 5 of the Act Community Councils remained dependent upon the discretionary powers of the relevant Minister in consultation with respective BAAB's. In August 1978 the Ningizimu UBC agreed to adopt the community council system and became the Ningizimu Community Council, NCC. The KwaMashu Bantu Council (henceforth referred to as the KwaMashu Township Council, KTC), however, still functions in accordance with regulations laid down in the Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961.

Shortly after the community council system begun functioning the Riekert Commission's report was released which included recommendations to formalise the relationship between BAAB's and Community Councils. As a result of these proposals the Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982, was passed. The intention of the Act was to create a system of BLA's or local government for blacks, similar to that of white local authorities, but portrayed by the Government as a substitute for democratic participation in Central Government. In terms of the Act Community Councils in 'white' South Africa are being phased out and replaced by City, Town or Village Councils whose powers automatically devolve upon establishment and include responsibility for services such as waste disposal, sewerage and electrification, housing administration, welfare services, construction and maintenance of roads and the employment of staff; in other words, all the functions of Development Boards. While taking on added responsibilities, BLA's have inherited the same financial problems as Development Boards and are denied comparable sources of revenue although profits from the sale of sorghum beer (but not liquor) now accrue directly to them. Local authority status is yet to be conferred upon the NCC.

Community Councils exacerbate tensions in the townships by the type of powers vested in them (including the allocation of accommodation and trading sites) and by their sources of funding (particularly service charges levied on residents). Large numbers of businessmen have sought election to the Councils and have been charged with using them for personal gain. Service charges still form the basis of Community Councils' income which places them in an invidious position: on the one hand, increases in the service charge are often violently resisted, yet on the other hand, the lack of township resources and facilities remains a major grievance. Not surprisingly, Community Councils have been faced by a crisis of legitimacy. During 1985 Community Councils and BLA's throughout South Africa resigned en masse and the NCC is only one of five still operating.⁹⁵ The crisis is compounded by the fact that Councillors liaise with NPA officials which serves to reinforce the popular view of them as Government collaborators.

An examination of election and by-election results for NCC councillors // reveals that the local system has all but collapsed. The NCC is divided into 10 wards, four of which are in Lamont. In Figure 4.1 (overleaf) the election results for these four wards since 1979 are given. The average poll of 42.2 percent in the first round of Community Council elections in Lamont compares well with the national average poll of 41.9 percent,⁹⁶ however, successive elections/by-elections have witnessed decreasing polls and fewer candidates.

Charged with being collaborators and vested with controls over accommodation and services Community Councillors in Lamont have exacerbated tensions in the township. Simply, the NCC has failed to represent community interests on issues such as rent and transport increases. These issues are examined in Chapter 6 while in Chapter 5 the NCC's alliance with Inkatha, whose ideology limits the extent to which it is prepared to confront the Government or its agents, is explored.

As a result of the different balance of power in KwaMashu Township Councillors have been subjected to less hostility than Community Councillors in Lamont. The system in KwaMashu is challenged more by apathy than resentment as the results in the 1985 elections below suggest.

Figure 4.1 Community Council Election Results: Lamont

| 7 Aug '79 | 22 Sep '81 | 1 Mar '83* | 26 Sep '84 |
|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <u>WARD 1</u> | | | |
| Voters 2 647 | Voters 3 371 | Voters 3 440 | |
| Z.L. Ngubane 591 | Ngubane 705 | Ngubane 445 | |
| C.C. Mbonambi 289 | P. Gwala 492 | Gwala 424 | Ngubane |
| E. Mkize 250 | Mkize 51 | M. Kweshube 43 | - unopposed |
| Spoilt 31 | Spoilt 20 | Spoilt/Lost 5/1 | |
| Poll 43.8% | Poll 37.6% | Poll 26.68% | |
| <u>WARD 2</u> | | | |
| Voters 2 458 | | | |
| M. Zicaka 38 | | | |
| M. Gasa 899 | Gasa | | R. Skhane |
| Spoilt 18 | - unopposed | | - unopposed |
| Poll 38.85% | | | |
| <u>WARD 3</u> | | | |
| Voters 2 814 | Voters 3 093 | Voters 3 281 | |
| M.H. Dube 324 | Dube 624 | Dube 984 | |
| H.S Msimang 622 | Msimang 586 | R. Zulu 50 | No candidate |
| M. Kweshube 219 | | | |
| Spoilt 19 | Spoilt 15 | Spoilt 5 | |
| Poll 42.07% | Poll 39.6% | Poll 31.66% | |
| <u>WARD 4</u> | | | |
| Voters 2 557 | Voters 3 082 | | |
| E. Nxasana 638 | Nxasana 648 | | |
| G.M. Kubeka 412 | Kubeka 445 | | Nxasana |
| J.J. Siwela 60 | | | - unopposed |
| Spoilt 19 | Spoilt 3 | | |
| Poll 44.15% | Poll 35.56% | | |

* By-election

Source: Personal correspondence, L. Hooper, NPA

Figure 4.2 Township Council Election Results: KwaMashu 22 September 1985

| <u>WARD 1</u> | | <u>WARD 2</u> | | <u>WARD 3</u> | |
|-------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|---------------|--------|
| Voters (Hostel Complex) | | Voters | 7 350 | Voters | 7 750 |
| | | A.M. Vilikazi | 621 | M.A. Shangase | 1 013 |
| J. Sishi - unopposed | | H.T. Madubane | 363 | D.N. Mgobhozi | 452 |
| | | Spoilt | 5 | Spoilt | 6 |
| | | Poll 13.45% | | Poll 18.98% | |
| <u>WARD 4</u> | | <u>WARD 5</u> | | <u>WARD 6</u> | |
| Voters | 8 100 | Voters | 5 150 | Voters | 8 750 |
| | | J. Moeli | 490 | W.B. Jwara | 1 011 |
| V.P. Mbambo | | E. Buthelezi | 106 | D.P. Mkhize | 324 |
| - unopposed | | Spoilt | 1 | Spoilt | 3 |
| | | Poll 11.59% | | Poll 15.29% | |
| <u>WARD 7</u> | | <u>WARD 8</u> | | <u>WARD 9</u> | |
| Voters | 7 850 | Voters | 7 200 | Voters | 12 000 |
| O.L. Zwane | 802 | G.A. Mnguni | 626 | E.G. Africa | 1 126 |
| S.J. Phahla | 8 | E.C. Dube | 413 | S. Zuma | 143 |
| | | | | M.L. Malinga | 76 |
| Spoilt | 13 | Spoilt | 2 | Spoilt | 0 |
| Poll 10.48% | | Poll 14.45% | | Poll 11.20% | |
| <u>WARD 10</u> | | <u>WARD 11</u> | | | |
| Voters | 6 300 | Voters | 6 850 | | |
| | | C.B. Mngadi | 582 | | |
| N. Mhlongo | | D. Ngobese | 303 | | |
| - unopposed | | J. Hadebe | 4 | | |
| | | Spoilt | 12 | | |
| | | Poll 13.15% | | | |

Source: Personal correspondence, A. Barrowman, KwaMashu Township Manager

In this research considerable attention has been given to the mechanisms by which blacks have been alienated by the administrative and political structures operating in the townships. An understanding of the function and nature of Lamont and KwaMashu enables certain inferences to be drawn

about the nature of discontent in the two townships. In theoretical terms the function of townships serves to limit the number of opportunities for blacks, especially in terms of housing and employment. Of course, other conditions, particularly inferior education and the lack of political rights, compound the depriving nature of the township milieu. (In the following Section perceptions of limitations on opportunities are assessed as one element of discontent. In the 'D Score' model this variable is referred to as interference with opportunities.) The concept of relative deprivation, however, focusses on the gap between opportunities and expectations. In other words, a decline in the number of available opportunities does not necessarily induce discontent unless people expect things to get better, or least stay the same. Earlier it was suggested that during the early 1960's blacks would have gone through a period in which they readjusted their expectations taking cognisance of increased restrictions on their lives. Similarly, during the past ten years concessions and promised 'reforms' may have heralded another period of readjustment. While fairly accurate inferences can be made about the limited range of opportunities available to urban blacks, assumptions about expectations are not likely to be as accurate. For example, does legislation granting free-hold tenure raise expectations if people cannot prove lawful and permanent residence, or does legislation abolishing the pass laws raise expectations if people are subsequently arrested for trespassing offences? To assess black expectations a more direct method is needed and for the purposes of this research community leaders were interviewed. In Section 4.3 the method by which discontent was assessed is described together with the results obtained.

4.3 ASSESSING DISCONTENT: THE 'D SCORE' MODEL

After examining the function and nature of the township milieu I concluded that it is conducive to discontent through its imposition of limitations on opportunities. However, within the concept of relative deprivation induced discontent perceptions of expectations (and other limitations on opportunities) remain to be determined and are certainly also conditional upon macro-political issues. To measure perceptions of expectations and opportunities, and the relationship between them, an operational model, the 'D Score' model, was developed based on Gurr's

concept of discontent. The model was applied in Lamont and KwaMashu to gather empirical evidence of the extent of discontent. It was applied using Muller's "community leaders" technique:⁹⁷ in this case through individual interviews with a total of 25 political and community leaders, in both townships, who were identified as being actively involved in community issues. Representatives from the following 'reactionary' organisations were interviewed; Inkatha Women's Brigade, Inkatha Youth Brigade, KTC, NCC, and United Worker's Union of South Africa (UWUSA). Representatives from the following 'progressive' organisations were interviewed; ANC, Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), Congress of South African Students (COSAS), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), KwaMashu Youth League, Lamont Civic Association (LCA), Lamont Education Crisis Committee (LECC), Malayo, Methodist Church, Natal Organisation of Women (NOW), and United Democratic Front (UDF). This approach follows Wedge in the belief that "progress in political analysis requires bridge building between theory and case study, and study of the behaviour of individual political actors in relation to social systems".⁹⁸

4.3.1 Introduction: Indicators of Discontent

To assess discontent at the collective level Gurr proposes a "simpler formulation" which combines four parallel societal variables of expectations and capabilities and relates them directly to discontent as the dependent variable:

" Thus, a general assessment of any group's potential for collective violence theoretically can be made by determining the rate of change in its absolute share of each class of values; the extent to which other groups in its society are experiencing a more rapid increase in value position; the extent to which values are, or are thought to be expandable; and the number of alternative courses of value enhancing action open to members of the group. "⁹⁹

In this approach each variable has a potential effect on both expectations and capabilities but the exact effect is determined by local

prevailing conditions. For example, the upward mobility of a comparative reference group may increase expectations if values (desired ideological and material conditions) are 'variable' or elastic, or reduce capabilities if values are perceived to be 'fixed' or non-negotiable. Where the status quo is a temporary fixation value stocks are 'variable'. In South Africa the facts that 'reforms' (both economic and political) are on the agenda and that people are arguing for change indicates that the boundaries of ideology are elastic. These conditions tend to suggest therefore that values are 'variable'.

When applying a theoretical model to a specific situation, such as in Lamont and KwaMashu, more rigid assumptions can be made and in this case the assumptions underlying the 'D Score' model differ from those underlying Gurr's simplified model. Each of the four variables incorporated into the 'D Score' model is stated as affecting capabilities and/or expectations. In other words, assumptions are made about the conditions which determine whether each variable has an effect on capabilities and/or expectations. It must be stressed that the 'D Score' model does not directly measure relative deprivation in quantitative terms, rather it is an attempt to qualitatively state the extent to which blacks in Lamont and KwaMashu perceive nullifying interference in their opportunities and expectations. In other words, the model does not quantify the discrepancy between capabilities and expectations but rather attempts to quantify:

- the degree of interference with opportunity;
- the extent to which expectations are being raised; and
- the extent to which expectations are suppressed.

Since it cannot be assumed that expectations and capabilities operate independently of each other, relative deprivation is treated as a cognitive variable and is inferred from the 'D Score' model.

The assumptions underpinning the 'D Score' model can be stated as follows.


- (i) Interference with opportunity is the precursor of discontent: the

greater the interference the more likely is discontent.

- (ii) People whose opportunities have been interfered with probably feel entitled to higher value positions situationally determined by the position of a comparative reference group.
- (iii) The higher the people's expectations with regard to value position the greater is their discontent.
- (iv) The above assumptions operate within a time frame: the ratio between past changes in value position and future expectations of change in value position will generate expectations about continued interference with opportunities and the larger the ratio the greater the anticipated interference.
- (v) While each 'D Score' is a synergism of the above elements and not simply the sum of the scores recorded on each variable, the aggregate of the four elements is nonetheless a useful indicator of the direction of discontent.

A schematic representation of the 'D Score' model is presented below.

Figure 4.3 Schematic Representation of the 'D Score' Model



The operationalisation of the 'D Score' model relies on measurement and quantification of each of the four theoretical independent variables. This requires the measurement of subjective perceptions. To this end an interview schedule (see Appendix 1) was structured to measure these directly. In other words, the interview schedule 'translated' subjective

perceptions into indicators of theoretical variables. The interview schedule was linked to the model by an operational definition of each independent variable. The assumptions upon which each of the four variables rest and the operationalisation of each variable are discussed in turn in Section 4.3.2. No assumptions were made about which values are salient among which groups or the comparative reference group for each group. These were established during the course of the interviews and do not directly affect the operationalisation of the model.

4.3.2 The 'D Score' Model and Results

In this Section the individual variables are isolated and examined under separate sub-headings. For each variable the following is discussed:

- The assumptions upon which the variable rests;
- The operational definition of the variable; and
- The results. The Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a statistical test to determine the level of confidence of observed differences between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' on each variable.

The measurement of subjective perceptions, of course, raises the question of their reliability as indicators of attitudes, intentions and behaviour. This question, and others related to the model's reliability, are examined in Section 4.3.2.5.

4.3.2.1 Interference with Opportunities

This variable measures the extent to which opportunities are perceived to be limited.

4.3.2.1.1 Assumptions

In Chapter 3 it was suggested that when courses of action, that is the number and range of opportunities, available to specific groups to meet their expectations are limited, then their capacity to achieve is correspondingly diminished. Access to education, bank credit, and business premises, the right to partake in peaceful protest and strike,

and the right to free political and social association, are all examples of artificially imposed limitations operating to reduce the capabilities of blacks in South Africa. However, a parallel relationship was also discussed: if new opportunities are opened, for example the legalising of black trade unions, expectations will increase. (However, new opportunities may increase conflict if the gains made by one group threaten another. For example, in the trade union movement, Inkatha alleges that COSATU has "hijacked the South African trade union movement" and therefore usurped Inkatha's role.¹⁰⁰) Gurr suggests a general relationship comprising both postulated effects which gives rise to the assumption upon which this variable rests: the intensity of relative deprivation varies with the number of value opportunities - the greater the number of opportunities the less is the intensity of relative deprivation; the fewer the number of opportunities the greater is the intensity of relative deprivation.¹⁰¹

4.3.2.1.2 Operational Definition

The operational definition of the variable is "the intensity of interference with value enhancing courses of action". Gurr identifies three classes of opportunities, personal, societal, and political, and argues that perceived interference with any class will induce discontent. However, the use of inherited personal capabilities in a model operating at the group level cannot be justified. Consequently, only the societal and political classes were incorporated with acquired personal capabilities (which are directly controlled in South Africa, i.e. education) being included in the former.

Societal courses of action are defined as:

" Courses of action available to people to improve their position in society. "

(Implicit in this definition, of course, is a level of political interference that determines peoples' capacity to improve their lot. For example, access to education is politically manipulated in South Africa.)

Political courses of action are defined as:

" Courses of action available for inducing others to provide value satisfactions. "

Ten different courses of action were listed under each category.

- Societal: improving personal standards of education; changing employment; qualifying for promotion at work; receiving assistance when searching for work; participating in political organisations; moving freely throughout South Africa; enjoying all South Africa's resources and facilities; living in an area of your choice; opening a business; and, voting for people who represent your interests.
- Political: voicing your opinions; striking for better conditions/ higher wages at work; belonging to an effective trade union; associating with people of your choice; participating in peaceful protest marches; negotiating for change in South Africa; participating in work stayaways; making decisions at work with the management; proclaiming your rights in a court of law; and, mobilising people around important issues.

Respondents were asked to nominate the intensity of felt interference with each course. The intensity of interference was measured using a six point continuum ranging from 'nil interference' (scores 0) to 'intense interference' (scores 10). A total score out of 10 for each respondent was calculated by:

- multiplying the intensity of interference with each course of action by the frequency of interference in each category;
- summing the scores of each category and dividing by the number of responses; and
- adding the scores of both categories together and dividing by two.

A schematic representation of this calculation is shown in Figure 4.4 overleaf.

Figure 4.4 Schematic Representation of the Assessment of Interference with Opportunities Variable

Frequency of Interference by Category

| <u>Intensity of Interference</u> | <u>Societal</u> (10 courses) | <u>Political</u> (10 courses) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Intense (10) | 4 = 40 | 6 = 60 |
| High (8) | 3 = 24 | 3 = 24 |
| Moderate (6) | 2 = 12 | - |
| Little (4) | 1 = 4 | - |
| Slight (2) | - | - |
| Nil (0) | - | 1 = 0 |
| Sub-total | <u>80</u> ÷ 10 = 8 | <u>84</u> ÷ 9 = 9.33 |
| Total (17.33 ÷ 2) = 8.66 | | |

As a check respondents were asked if there were "any other courses of action, not included in these two lists, with which people like you have experienced interference?" In such cases the response was categorised and the intensity of interference measured. The final score (in the above example 8.66) measures the intensity of interference with opportunity and as such contributes to discontent. The inverse of this score (e.g. 1.34) is taken as an indicator of perceived capability: in other words, the higher the interference with opportunity the lower the capability.

4.3.2.1.3 Results: Interference with Opportunities

"South African whites treat us as criminals and half human beings because they do not want to share with us. "

UDF respondent

The average perceived intensity of interference with each course of action, listed in the interview schedule, among the sample is given in Figure 4.5 overleaf.

Figure 4.5 Average Intensity of Interference per Course of Action Among the Sample

| <i>Category*</i> | <i>Course of Action</i> | <i>Intensity of Interference</i> |
|------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| (S) | Participating in political organisations | 9.04 |
| (P) | Mobilising people around important issues | 8.96 |
| (S) | Voting for people who represent your interests | 8.88 |
| (P) | Voicing your opinions | 8.80 |
| (P) | Participating in work stayaways | 8.80 |
| (P) | Participating in peaceful protest marches | 8.56 |
| (S) | Moving freely throughout South Africa | 8.32 |
| (S) | Enjoying all South Africa's resources and facilities | 8.24 |
| (S) | Living in an area of your choice | 8.24 |
| (S) | Improving personal standards of education | 8.08 |
| (P) | Striking for better conditions/higher wages at work | 7.68 |
| (S) | Qualifying for promotion at work | 7.36 |
| (S) | Changing employment | 7.20 |
| (P) | Associating with people of your choice | 7.20 |
| (P) | Making decisions at work with the management | 6.96 |
| (P) | Negotiating for change in South Africa | 6.96 |
| (S) | Receiving assistance when searching for work | 6.80 |
| (P) | Belonging to an effective trade union | 6.48 |
| (S) | Opening a business | 6.00 |
| (P) | Proclaiming your rights in a court of law | 5.20 |

* S - Societal; P - Political.

In addition to the 20 pre-coded courses of action listed in the interview schedule 23 others were nominated by respondents. The total number of courses of action assessed by the sample was therefore 523 (i.e. 25 respondents multiplied by 20 courses of action plus an additional 23 courses of action. Figure 4.6 shows the total intensity of interference with those 523 courses of action and lists each intensity reading as a percentage of the total interference.

Figure 4.6 Total Intensity of Interference with Opportunities Among the Sample

| | <i>Total Interference with Courses of Action</i> | | | |
|-----------------|--|------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | <i>%¹</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>Societal</i> | <i>Political</i> |
| <i>Intense</i> | 35 | 184 | 98 | 86 |
| <i>High</i> | 35 | 181 | 88 | 93 |
| <i>Moderate</i> | 18 | 96 | 51 | 45 |
| <i>Little</i> | 7 | 36 | 14 | 22 |
| <i>Slight</i> | 4 | 22 | 9 | 13 |
| <i>Nil</i> | <u>1</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>2</u> |
| | <u>100</u> | <u>523²</u> | <u>262</u> | <u>261</u> |

1. All percentages subject to rounding errors.

2. A total of 23 courses of action were nominated by respondents in addition to the 20 provided in the list.

Figure 4.6 shows, for example, that intense interference was perceived 184 times by the sample or, expressed in percentage terms, 35 percent of all interference was perceived as intense. At the individual level this means that of the approximately 21 different courses of action considered by the average respondent intense interference was perceived with over seven courses of action. If intense interference is grouped with high interference then 70 percent of interference was perceived to be in this upper range.

Strikingly, every respondent reported feeling intense interference with at least one course of action. Further, only two respondents, one 'reactionary' and one 'progressive', nominated three different courses of action from the list of 20 with which they experienced nil interference. These were: "proclaiming your rights in a court of law" (both respondents); and "changing employment" and "moving freely throughout South Africa" ('reactionary').

Differences between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' on perceptions of interference with opportunities are pronounced as Figure 4.7 demonstrates.

Figure 4.7 Total Intensity of Interference with Opportunities: 'Reactionaries' and 'Progressives'

| | <u>'Reactionaries'</u> | | | | <u>'Progressives'</u> | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|----|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|----|
| | <i>Courses of Action</i> | | | | <i>Courses of Action</i> | | | |
| | % ¹ Total | Societal | Political | | % Total | Societal | Political | |
| <i>Intense</i> | 14 | 26 | 14 | 12 | 47 | 158 | 84 | 74 |
| <i>High</i> | 29 | 55 | 28 | 27 | 37 | 126 | 60 | 66 |
| <i>Moderate</i> | 25 | 47 | 28 | 19 | 14 | 49 | 23 | 26 |
| <i>Little</i> | 18 | 34 | 14 | 20 | - | 2 | - | 2 |
| <i>Slight</i> | 12 | 22 | 9 | 13 | - | - | - | - |
| <i>Nil</i> | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | <u>100</u> | <u>187</u> ² | | | <u>98</u> | <u>336</u> ³ | | |

1. All percentages subject to rounding errors.
2. A total of seven courses of action were nominated by different 'reactionaries' in addition to the 20 offered.
3. A total of 16 courses of action were nominated by different 'progressives' in addition to the 20 offered.

Among 'reactionaries' only 43 percent of interference was considered to be intense or high, while among 'progressives' 84 percent of interference was considered to be in that range. Among 'reactionaries' 55 percent of interference was perceived in the moderate to slight range. Respondents made little distinction between the two categories of courses of action. Although intense interference was felt on an additional 23 courses of action not mentioned in the two lists, 16 of these were idiosyncratic, for example, "access to literature and exposure to the outside world" and "workers taking control of the factories". Additional courses of action with which interference was perceived and mentioned by two or more respondents included: "holding meetings in the township" ('reactionaries' and 'progressives') and "organising funerals" ('progressives').

In Figure 4.8 the scores on the interference with opportunities variable for 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' are provided.

Figure 4.8 Results: Interference with Opportunities Variable

| <i>Interference with Opport. (Capabilities)</i> | | <i>Total</i> | <i>'Reactionaries'</i> | <i>'Progressives'</i> |
|---|-------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Scores</i> | | | | |
| | | <i>(n = 25)</i> | <i>(n = 9)</i> | <i>(n = 16)</i> |
| | | <i>%*</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>%</i> |
| 9.0 - 9.5 | (0.5 - 1.0) | 16 | - | 25 |
| 8.0 - 8.9 | (1.1 - 2.0) | 44 | 11 | 62 |
| 7.0 - 7.9 | (2.1 - 3.0) | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| 6.0 - 6.9 | (3.1 - 4.0) | 12 | 33 | - |
| 5.0 - 5.9 | (4.1 - 5.0) | 16 | 44 | - |
| <i>Total</i> | | <u>100</u> | <u>99</u> | <u>99</u> |

* All percentages subject to rounding errors.

Appendix 2 lists the score of each respondent.

Only 11 percent of 'reactionaries' (one) scored 8.0 or more on this variable compared with 87 percent of 'progressives' (14). The average interference was 6.36 among 'reactionaries' compared with 8.61 among 'progressives'. This result is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent level of confidence. Differences in the perceptions of interference between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' will be analysed in Chapter 5. As mentioned above the inverse of this score (shown in brackets in Figure 4.8) can be interpreted as an indicator of perceived capabilities.

4.3.2.2 Justified Value Position

This variable is included in the 'D Score' model as a measurement of perceived expectations.

4.3.2.2.1 Assumptions

A central tenet of Gurr's theory is that people have expectations about

the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled. What needs to be ascertained is whether or not urban blacks perceive a discrepancy between their current value position and that to which they feel justifiably entitled. Among people who have experienced interference with opportunity it is most likely that a discrepancy between current value position and justified value position is perceived. Measurement of the gap should therefore constitute an indicator of the intensity of discontent.


While most people have a hierarchy of values it is reasonable to assume that any discrepancy in their most salient value is the strongest indicator of discontent. To this end the remaining variables in the 'D Score' model were measured only in terms of the group's salient value, not in terms of its hierarchy of values.

4.3.2.2.2 Operational Definition

The operational definition of justified value position is the difference between current ranked achievement (i.e. current value position or value capability) of the group, and the achievement level to which the respondent believes the group is justifiably entitled.

To measure justified value positions a self-anchoring 11 point (0 - 10) ordinal scale¹⁰² was used to measure subject comparisons between current ranked achievement and justified value position. The self-anchoring is achieved by asking respondents to describe a worst possible scenario (equates with 0) and a best possible scenario (equates with 10). However, Muller has demonstrated that the use of ordinal scales to measure such discrepancies poses a problem: "frustrated or dissatisfied ... (people) ... do not see themselves as standing farther than about half-way from their best conceivable rewards in life".¹⁰³ If current value positions do in fact group at the centre of an ordinal scale then the measurement of the 'discrepancy' is really nothing more than a measurement of expectations. Thus, in the case of justified value position the 'difference' between current value position and justified value position, although measured on an 11 point scale is in fact reduced to half the value of the scale given that current value positions group in the centre of the scale. A schematic representation of the assessment of this variable is shown in Figure 4.9 overleaf.

Figure 4.9 Schematic Representation of the Assessment of Justified Value
Position (Expectations) Variable



A salient value is the categorisation of 'life concerns' into one of Gurr's seven value sub-classes (economic, self-actualisation, participation, security, ideational coherence, status and communality).

Respondents were asked to spontaneously describe their single most important life concern and then, to eliminate instances where an issue of the day may have been confused with a life concern, they were asked to choose four other life concerns from a pre-coded list of 28. Thus, each life concern carried a weight of 20 percent. A salient value was denoted by two (i.e. 40 percent), or more, life concerns out of a possible five. Where five different life concerns were nominated the salient value was taken as the spontaneously mentioned life concern (notwithstanding the risk of the spontaneous concern being an issue of the day). As a further check that the salient values were correctly identified, respondents were asked if they knew of "any other very important concerns, not mentioned in the above list, and more important than those on the list". Where additional life concerns were mentioned then the pre-coded and additional concerns were ranked and the first four ranked life concerns plus the spontaneously mentioned life concern was used to make up five. According to this procedure it was possible for respondents to have two equally weighted salient values: i.e. two salient values scoring 40 percent. In such cases both salient values were used to assess current expectations and both scores were recorded.

4.3.2.2.3 Results: Justified Value Positions

" The struggle for justice will turn into a bloodshed which no-one (will) survive. "

KwaMashu Youth League respondent

Given that this variable is measured in terms of salient values it is appropriate to first discuss the pattern of life concerns among respondents.

The desire to participate in collective decision making emerged as the salient value among both 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' as Figure 4.10 demonstrates. This result is consistent with Schlemmer's findings cited earlier.

Figure 4.10 Results: Salient Values

| <i>Salient Value Categories</i> | <i>Total (n = 25) %*</i> | <i>'Reactionaries' (n = 9) %</i> | <i>'Progressives' (n = 16) %</i> |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|
| <i>Participation</i> | 48 | 33 | 56 |
| <i>Security</i> | 24 | 22 | 25 |
| <i>Economic</i> | 12 | 22 | 6 |
| <i>Communality</i> | 8 | 22 | - |
| <i>Self-actualisation</i> | 4 | - | 6 |
| <i>Status</i> | 4 | - | 6 |
| <i>Ideational coherence</i> | - | - | - |
| <i>Total</i> | <u>100</u> | <u>99</u> | <u>99</u> |

* All percentages subject to rounding errors.

Participation values were nominated by 48 percent of the sample as their most important life concern followed by security values (desire for

self-determination and freedom from oppression - 24 percent) and economic values (12 percent). Among 'progressives' the ratio of values followed the overall trend but among 'reactionaries' economic values were more highly considered. No respondent nominated two equally weighted salient values.

Considerable importance was attached to the determination of salient values on the assumption that any interference with the salient value is more likely to induce discontent than interference with a lower ranked value. The average perceived level of interference with:

- "participating in political organisations" was 9.04 (8.0 among 'reactionaries' and 9.62 among 'progressives'); and
- "voting for people who represent your interests" was 8.88 (6.88 among 'reactionaries' and 10.0 among 'progressives').

From these results it must be concluded that the concept of political organisation does not differ fundamentally between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' while there would appear to be at least some differences in the concept of interest groups.

Let us now look at the scores on the justified value position variable.

Figure 4.11 Results: Justified Value Position (Expectations) Variable

| <i>Degree</i> | <i>Total</i> (<i>n</i> = 25) * % | <i>'Reactionaries'</i> (<i>n</i> = 9) % | <i>'Progressives'</i> (<i>n</i> = 16) % |
|---------------|--|--|--|
| 0 | 28 | 11 | 37 |
| 1 - 2 | 36 | 55 | 25 |
| 3 - 4 | 32 | 22 | 37 |
| 5 | <u>4</u> | <u>11</u> | <u>-</u> |
| <i>Total</i> | <u>100</u> | <u>99</u> | <u>99</u> |

* All percentages subject to rounding errors.

Muller's assertion that discontented people do not see themselves as standing further than about half way from their most desirable situation was confirmed by this research. Ninety two percent of respondents (23) marked their current value position between 3 - 7 on the ordinal scale and 68 percent (17) placed themselves between 4 - 6. The range of justified value positions varied between 0 - 5 rungs higher on the scale to yield the scores shown in Figures 4.11 (see also Appendix 2 for individual scores).

The majority of respondents, 72 percent, felt entitled to higher value positions with approximately one third of the sample considering their justified value position to be in the range 1 - 2 units higher and another third 3 - 4 units higher. Only one respondent scored the maximum five.

Although 28 percent (seven) of the sample did not score on this variable, only one respondent, a 'reactionary', equated current value position with justified value position in terms of having achieved optimum goals: "I am placed in the position I deserve (at the top of the scale). I am Chairperson of the (Ningizimu Community) Council, a strong leader of Inkatha (and) President of the (Lamont) Bowling Club. What else do I need?" (Of course the personal achievements of leaders are not easily transferable across the group, for example not all bowlers can become President of their club.) On the other hand, among the six 'progressives', no discrepancy was recorded because expectations were tempered either because the organisation was in its infancy (in the cases of COSATU and the KwaMashu Youth League) or because "the struggle still has a long way to go" and is hampered by "three repressive elements, the police, army and Inkatha impis".

While an average score of 2.22 was recorded on this variable among 'reactionaries' compared with 1.56 among 'progressives' (see Appendix 2) the two samples cannot be considered statistically significant.

After marking both their current value and justified value positions on the ordinal scale respondents were asked to justify their justified value position. Among the eight 'reactionaries' who felt entitled to higher value positions seven argued that the contributions made by

themselves and their organisations (Township/Community Councils or Inkatha) entitled them to greater status but that these contributions had not been recognised. (This of course reflects the generally low status of 'reactionary' organisations.) On the same question the 10 'progressives' unanimously agreed that value positions should be determined by individual merit. In explaining why current value positions lagged 'progressives' were equally divided between those who blamed apartheid and skin colour (this reason was also given by one 'reactionary') and those who blamed Government repression.

When describing their optimum value positions (equated to rung 10 on the ordinal scale), both 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' spoke of "peace", "democracy" "economic prosperity". The abolition of apartheid laws was implicit in their descriptions. However, considerable variation on what exactly constitutes a democracy emerged. While 55 percent of 'reactionaries' described democracy as "black unity under Inkatha", 62 percent of 'progressives' favoured one man one vote in a multi-party socialist state. One respondent (a 'progressive') rejected outright any system of qualified enfranchisement as "a sophisticated form of apartheid".

The greatest fear ("worst possible scenario") among both 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' was that violence would continue in the townships. However, perceptions of the source of violence were markedly different. Sixty two percent of 'progressives' saw "Government oppression", "bantustan leaders" and "Inkatha" as the sources of violence while 66 percent of 'reactionaries' blamed township violence on the actions of 'progressives' .

4.3.2.3 Position of Reference Group

This variable measures the extent to which expectations are raised by reference groups.

4.3.2.3.1 Assumptions

The 'demonstration effect' provides the rationale for the third variable. The mere perception of gains made by 'negatively evaluated'

reference groups, that is groups to which membership is not aspired (in contrast to a 'positively evaluated' reference group which is defined as a membership or allied group), is a major source of discontent because such groups are invariably seen as having more opportunities open to them and thus consequently raise expectations about justified value positions. This of course raises the question of which groups act as comparative references?


The notion of reference groups is inextricably linked to salient values because reference is invariably made on salient values. For example, if the salient value of one group is political participation then it is most likely that their reference group will be one whose salient values are political participation rather than say ideational coherence. Gurr argues that if one group makes a comparative gain over another on its salient value the latter group suffers relative deprivation. This argument is based on the premise that reference groups are chosen from similar socio-economic groups. It is with these groups that frequent contact is made. Given the nature of the black township milieu it is difficult to reconcile the concepts of 'negatively evaluated' reference groups emanating from similar socio-economic groups and I propose to extend Gurr's argument: 'negatively evaluated' reference groups may be drawn from any socio-economic strata. This premise is based on the assumption that in South Africa ideology has been unsuccessful in blurring critical consciousness. Thus, whether or not blacks draw their reference groups from outside the township and across racial lines remains to be established.

4.3.2.3.2 Operational Definition

Respondents were asked leading questions to familiarise them with the types of groups, social/cultural/political, which influenced their lives. They were then asked to nominate "the single most influential group". If the respondent nominated a 'positively evaluated' group then no further questions were asked and zero was recorded. If a respondent nominated a 'negatively evaluated' group then the perceived current value position of that group and the current value position of the respondent were both marked on a self-anchoring 11 point ordinal scale. The registered score was simply the difference between the two groups,

although as with the preceding variable, the range of scores was reduced by half the value of the scale given the tendency of people to assess their current value positions at the mid-point of the scale.

Figure 4.12 Schematic Representation of the Assessment of Position of Reference Group Variable



$$\text{Total } (9 - 5) = 4.0$$

4.3.2.3.3 Results: Positions of Reference Groups

The nomination of positively evaluated reference groups (the respondent's membership group or an allied group) was a universal trait among the sample. Three possible explanations are put forward for this result:

- poorly phrased question in the interview schedule;
- the segregated nature of black townships has meant that urban blacks tend to be 'inward looking' and under such conditions urban blacks do not feel relative deprivation unless their ideology tells them; or
- reference groups are 'positively evaluated' for what they have achieved.

Interestingly, in response to the two general questions, "what groups of people (races, classes and organisations) do you know of in Durban", and "which of these groups do people like you think have an influence on

your lives", not one respondent mentioned any white dominated organisations. Further, while several 'progressives' said that they knew of 'reactionary' groups none of the 'reactionaries' admitted to knowing of 'progressive' organisations.

4.3.2.4 Changes in Group Value Position

The final variable in the 'D Score' model is incorporated as a measure of future expectations.

4.3.2.4.1 Assumptions

In Chapter 3 it was suggested that perceptions of expectations and capabilities are a product of a group's past experience of change: past increases generate expectations about future increases; and past decreases reduce perceived capabilities. Gurr suggests a general relationship comprising both postulated effects which give rise to the assumption on which this variable is based:

" Relative deprivation varies with the rate of change in a group's value position: the higher the rate of past change, in whatever direction, the greater the likely relative deprivation; the lower the rate, ceteris paribus, the lower the relative deprivation. "104

In other words, the rate of past change determines perceptions of future change and any discrepancy (positive or negative) in the ratio between previous changes (between an earlier value position and current value position) and expected future changes (between current value position and future expected value position) will induce discontent.

It is important to incorporate this variable for testing, particularly as an insight into black expectations over the next five years. The level of expectations could well explain why some townships have experienced more political violence than others and also the fact that boycotts, strikes and stayaways are resisted by certain sectors of the community.. For example, on the one hand, the ten year crisis in black schools has closely followed a 'protest-concession-protest cycle' where pupils' demonstrations and boycotts have won minor concessions (i.e. the

abolition of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction, and the provision of free text books and stationery) only to be followed by more demonstrations and boycotts to reinforce wider demands (i.e. security forces out of townships, and the abolition of 'bantu' education). On the other hand, co-opted groups such as Community Councillors appear determined to grasp the few concessions they have been given.


4.3.2.4.2 Operational Definition

Operationally, respondents were asked to mark the current value position (1986) of their group, where they considered the group was placed five years ago (1981), and the projected position in five years time (1991) on a self-anchoring 11 point ordinal scale. Each position was marked in terms of their salient value. The ratio of change was calculated using the formula:

$$\frac{VE - VC}{VE} = D$$

- VE is the difference in value position between 1991 and 1986,
- VC is the difference in value position between 1986 and 1981, and
- D is discontent.

Figure 4.13 Schematic Representation of the Assessment of Changes in Group Value Position Through Time Variable



Using this formula respondents may record either:

- a positive discrepancy if VE exceeds VC. That is if respondents expect greater improvements in their value position over the next five years than have been made in the past five years; or
- a negative discrepancy if VC exceeds VE, including where VE = 0. That is if respondents expect fewer gains to be made in their value position over the next five years compared with those made in the past five years.

As with the previous variable, it is assumed that current value positions (i.e. 1986) will congregate in the centre of the scale and thereby limit scores to the range - 4 (where VE = 1 and VC = 5) to + 2 (where VE = 5 and VC = 5).

4.3.2.4.3 Results: Changes in Group Value Position

Figure 4.14 Results: Changes in Group Value Position Through Time
Variable

| <i>Discrepancy in Rate of Change</i> | <i>Total (n = 25) %*</i> | <i>'Reactionaries' (n = 9) %</i> | <i>'Progressives' (n = 16) %</i> |
|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| + 1.01 - 1.50 | 20 | 44 | 6 |
| + 0.51 - 1.00 | 16 | 11 | 19 |
| + 0.01 - 0.50 | 4 | - | 6 |
| 0 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| - VE = 0 | 32 | 22 | 37 |
| - 0.01 - 0.50 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| - 0.51 - 1.00 | 4 | - | 6 |
| - 1.01 - 1.50 | - | - | - |
| <i>Total</i> | <u>100</u> | <u>99</u> | <u>98</u> |

* All percentages subject to rounding errors.

Pronounced differences in the perceptions of 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' were recorded on this variable. While 55 percent of 'reactionaries' expected to make various degrees of improvement in their value position over the next five years compared with those made in the past five years, 55 percent of 'progressives' expected fewer gains in the next five years compared with the past five years. In fact 37 percent of 'progressives' expect no gains at all to be made in the next five years. These respondents tended to blame this uncertainty on "the sophisticated methods of repression" employed by the State, and no doubt the declaration of a state of emergency shortly after these interviews were conducted will reinforce these perceptions. Twelve percent of the sample expected a consistent rate of improvement in value gains over the next five years when compared with the past five years.

Welfare gains including, "better working conditions and higher wages", "opportunities to buy houses", and the "scrapping of apartheid", were the most common reasons given for both past and anticipated improvements. Although, interestingly, one 'progressive' argued that "blacks are slightly better off now because they can channel their demands and half of them are met".

4.3.2.5 The 'D Score' Model

The 'D Score' model is an attempt to quantify:

- the degree of interference with opportunity;
- the extent to which expectations are being raised; and
- the extent to which expectations are suppressed.

Relative deprivation is an unmeasurable concept and is hence inferred from the 'D Score' model. Although relative deprivation is a synergism of the four variables and greater than the sum of the individual variables, the aggregate of the four variables ('D Score') does provide a useful indicator of the direction of discontent among 'reactionaries' and 'progressives'. At this point, however, it is pertinent to discuss the problems of reliability of the model and identify weaknesses and the severity of those weaknesses in the situation in which the model is

being applied.

The first problem concerns quantification and inter-subjectivity through the use of self-anchoring ordinal scales. Muller charges that self-anchoring scales are not good measures of dissatisfaction for a number of reasons:

- dissatisfied people do not see themselves as standing farther than about half-way from their optimum situation;
- large or medium size discrepancies registered on the scale do not necessarily induce frustration, while small discrepancies may be highly frustrating; and
- the distance between current value position and the position to which people believe they are rightfully entitled is reduced by the tendency of people to set their value potential at some point below both the best-off members of a comparative reference group and their aspirations.¹⁰⁵

At this point it is important to stress that the 'D Score' model, while attempting to provide inter-subjective comparisons of discontent between groups, lays no claims to being able to precisely measure discontent in a numerical sense. Although variables are quantified these are simply rank orders.

Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the real problem lies in devising alternatives and Muller's approach is by no means an improvement. Muller measures relative deprivation by asking people what they feel is due to them. This approach is particularly vulnerable in a situation, such as exists in South Africa, where we are dealing with the expectations of marginal communities: literally, some people have to be told what is due to them. For example, the SSRC virtually took control of Soweto between August 1976 and early 1977 and in that time were largely responsible for raising the level of political consciousness among parents and teachers alike (those who resisted were physically assaulted).¹⁰⁶ Further, as Zimmermann points out, Muller's method is unsuitable for predictive purposes where "demagogues or popular oppositional leaders may arise and cause rapid increases in the level of (relative deprivation)", thus

resulting in a lag between aspirations and actual developments.¹⁰⁷ On the question of reference groups which Muller acknowledges raise expectations, he is imprecise and defines a reference group as the "respondent's circle of acquaintances".¹⁰⁸ Clearly a reference group may comprise people with whom the respondent is not acquainted.

The second weakness concerns the reliability of subjective perceptions as indicators of behavioural intentions: can subjective perceptions be relied upon as indicators of attitudes, intentions and behaviour? In other words a discontented individual is not necessarily a potentially violent individual. The classic problem of attitude assessment is that attitudes do not necessarily predict behaviour and Muller recently concluded:

This is a well-known and much debated general problem inherent to survey research on the relationship between attitudes and behavior, for which there is no satisfactory solution. "¹⁰⁹

While Gurr argues that discontent is a pre-condition for political violence this should not be misconstrued as an argument that discontent is the cause of political violence. In his theory Gurr argues that political violence is dependent upon some degree of discontent and the intervening effects of two variables (the beliefs about the justifications for, and utility of, political violence and the organisational capacity and support for dissidents vis-à-vis the government) acting to either amplify or inhibit its effects.

The projection of the opinions of a 'group influential' on the group raises the problem of individualistic fallacy. In this case the values expressed by an individual, no matter how 'influential' are not necessarily the values of other members of the group the respondent is supposedly representing. The conceptual leap between the two is acknowledged and to overcome the risk of committing this fallacy inferences are expressed in probabilistic terms. Large scale attitude surveys are currently in vogue in South Africa for this type of research but there is nothing to suggest that this approach is more accurate. One only has to look at the conflicting evidence produced by surveys on the likes of support among blacks for disinvestment to realise that there are

inherent limitations to this approach.¹¹⁰ A related problem is that the pattern of life concerns may be coloured by the issues of the day. The upshot is simply that care must be taken in evaluating the results of the interview schedule. The model is only as good as the theoretical assumptions upon which it rests, while the data may have been been distorted by a host of factors including suspicion, inadequate knowledge and outright hostility. In other words, the model may be correct and the data incorrect, or the data may be correct and the model incorrect. It is for this reason that considerable attention was paid to the analysis of the societal conditions conducive to discontent in Lamont and KwaMashu.

The 'D Scores' of both 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' are listed in rank order in the right hand column of Appendix 2. Each 'D Score' is the aggregate of the four variables incorporated into the model. An average 'D Score' of 9.37 was found among 'reactionaries' compared with 10.54 among 'progressives'. The two scores are not, however, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

The first conclusion that is drawn from these results is that both 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' believe that the level of interference in their lives is unreasonable. As was expected, interference with opportunities relating to salient values (i.e. political participation) was perceived to be intense, but perhaps more striking was the fact that interference with innocuous courses of action such as "receiving assistance when searching for work" (6.80) and "proclaiming your rights in a court of law" (5.20) are cause for concern.

The 'D Scores' are revealing of both current and future black expectations. Eighteen respondents clearly considered themselves entitled to higher current value positions, while more than one third of 'progressives' tempered their expectations on the grounds that they are uncertain as to what they could realistically expect in the repressive South African milieu. Five of the six 'progressives' who tempered their current expectations similarly expected no improvements on salient values over the next five years. While several respondents indicated that they expect conditions to improve on economic values, they have not raised their expectations on salient values, i.e. political

participation. In other words, at the theoretical level, the 'D Score' approach demonstrates that perceptions of the feasibility of attaining higher value positions show considerable variation.

Although the 'D Score' approach failed to produce the desired result on the reference group variable it nonetheless provided additional insights into black expectations: namely, that township dwellers compare their lot with comparative reference groups inside the township.

Finally, what does the 'D Score' model tell us about relative deprivation?

- (i) The presence of relative deprivation is suggested in the general trend of decreasing capabilities being matched by increasing expectations.
- (ii) Varying degrees of discrepancy between expectations and capabilities were directly measured in 60 percent of the sample (five 'reactionaries' and 10 'progressives'). That is, the scaled score for expectations (measured only on salient values) was greater than that for capabilities (measured indirectly by calculating the inverse of interference with opportunities).

While these discrepancies fit the operational definition of relative deprivation, the presence of a discrepancy between expectations and capabilities is not in itself a sufficient indicator of relative deprivation because relative deprivation is dependent upon certain preconditions, the exactness of which are the subject of some debate.

- Gurr argues that people experience relative deprivation when they think that it is not feasible to obtain X and 44 percent of respondents considered higher value positions unlikely in the next five years.
- Crosby, however, strongly emphasises that relative deprivation is felt by those who believe that the acquisition of X is only probable rather than certain (40 percent of respondents).¹¹¹ Further, Crosby argues "dissatisfaction or jealousy", rather than relative deprivation.

vation, results when people feel it is not feasible to obtain X.¹¹²

The 'D Scores' provide evidence of the presence of relative deprivation although its exact scope cannot be quantified using this model. In addition to relative deprivation, nearly half the sample interviewed are pessimistic about gains that will be made on their salient values over the next five years. This pessimism would appear to be well founded given the nature of Government 'reforms' which do not address political participation in any meaningful manner.

4.4 CONCLUSION

In this Chapter the social conditions conducive to discontent in Lamont and KwaMashu have been identified and empirical evidence gathered about the intensity and scope of discontent. In the first part of this Chapter it was demonstrated that the mere existence of black townships and bantustans is indicative of the Government's attempts to control and regulate black lives through the denial of opportunities. Subsequently, it was shown that in some instances Government control is perceived to be so total that people are uncertain of their expectations. Using the 'D Score' model three particularly pertinent results were obtained:

- 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' rank political participation as their salient life concern;
- 'progressives' perceive a greater intensity of interference with opportunities (8.61) compared with 'reactionaries' (6.36); and
- 'reactionaries' expect to be offered more opportunities for political participation while 'progressives' expect fewer opportunities.

In the following Chapter the second variable in Gurr's model, the politicisation of discontent, will be examined. This of course rests on the assumption that urban blacks are discontented. In this Chapter the main focus will be on the actors in the two townships and their ideological response to the Government's attempts to control their lives.

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74. Ibid. p. 132.

75. See ibid., Chapter 7.

76. South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1984, Vol. 38, Johannesburg, 1985, p. 165.

77. Bekker and Humphries, op. cit., p. 63. However, according to an official from the NDB's Durban Central Labour Bureau with whom I spoke 'administrative' Section 10 rights were never granted to residents of Umlazi.

78. Ibid., p. 36.

79. South African Institute of Race Relations, 1985, op. cit., p. 387.
80. This scheme entitled individual ownership of the house but not the land on which it stands. The scheme was introduced into Lamont in the late 1950's to defray building costs.
81. South African Institute of Race Relations, 1985, op. cit. p. 535.
82. "By racial appointees", Financial Mail, 27/6/86.
83. "Why we're different", Daily News, 1/7/86.
84. "MP attacks sting in tail of bill ending pass laws" The Age (Melbourne), 12/5/86.
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CHAPTER 5

THE POLITICISATION OF DISCONTENT IN LAMONT AND KWAMASHU

" ... relative deprivation can and often does lead to anger. However, anger in itself is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for violent political protest. Anger must be felt collectively as well as mobilised to become politically relevant discontent. "

Ekkart Zimmermann¹

In Chapter 4 empirical evidence suggested that there is a widespread distribution of intense relative deprivation induced discontent among urban blacks in Lamont and KwaMashu. However, in the model under examination, discontent by itself is not a sufficient prerequisite for political violence rather:

- discontent must be politicised (the fact that power values emerged as the salient value among the majority of respondents is evidence of the degree of politicisation in the townships); and
- people must hold specific beliefs about the desirability and utility of violence in response to specific situations.

These beliefs are incorporated into the second independent variable in the model - JUST (the scope and intensity of beliefs in a population about the justifiability and utility of engaging in acts of political violence). In Chapter 5, the beliefs urban blacks hold about the utility of political violence will be explored and the strength of the commitment to violence established. The emphasis is on the peculiar township actors that have mobilised discontent, or what Zulu refers to as the 'collective consciousness'.² The Chapter thus begins with a delve into the ideologies of 'reactionary' and 'progressive' organisations.

5.1 THE IDEOLOGY OF 'REACTIONARIES'

" They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheels of history. "

K. Marx and F. Engels³

Among the organisations working within State created institutions (e.g. bantustans) in Natal, Inkatha has emerged with the largest membership and has been given world wide prominence through its vocal and highly visible leadership, particularly that of Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. Consequently, our attention in this section focusses on both Inkatha and Buthelezi.

5.1.1 An Introduction to Inkatha

Inkatha ka Zulu, referred to as the Zulu National Congress or The League, was founded by Paramount Chief Solomon ka Dinuzulu in 1928 as a Zulu cultural organisation aimed at preserving Zulu heritage and mobilising popular support for the monarchy. The organisation had a short life of less than five years, and while several attempts were made to revive it in the following decades the first serious attempt was not made until the early 1970's. The revival of a Zulu movement under the name Inkatha Yen Kululeko Yesizwe ('the freedom of the nation') was conceived by Buthelezi who perceived the necessity to launch a National Cultural Liberation movement to:

" liberate Africans from cultural domination by whites; to eradicate racialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism; to abolish all forms of racial discrimination and segregation; and to uphold the 'inalienable rights' of Zulus to self-determination and national independence. "⁴

Buthelezi's leadership of Inkatha is based upon both kinship ties and a degree of democratic legitimacy; he was installed as chief of the 30 000

strong Buthelezi tribe in 1953 and was elected Chief Executive Officer of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority in 1970, Chief Executive Councillor of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) in 1972, and Chief Minister in 1977.

While analysis has produced diverging opinions about the ideological classification of Inkatha, three basic viewpoints can be discerned. The first defines Inkatha as a non-violent, non-racial democratic movement attracting broad-based support beyond the bounds of Zulu ethnicity.⁵ Brewer's description of Inkatha as 'Janus faced' provides the second viewpoint: on the one hand, a democratic nationalist organisation (made up of "a coalition of members with different social backgrounds, attitudes, interests and aspirations") advocating liberation and committed to black unity, but on the other, practising dictatorial repression and manipulating Zulu ethnicity.⁶ The third view classifies Inkatha as a populist movement with a limited petit-bourgeois and ethnic base that alienates it from the black urban working class.⁷ In his interpretation of Inkatha as a populist movement Southall argues:

" The defining characteristic of populism is the denial that society is divided along class lines and its insistence that the only important political division is one which opposes the people or nation. Whilst populist movements are expressions of a particular class alliance ... they eschew organisation along class lines, and are typically composed of a dominant leader and his followers ... Although there may be in practice acute conflict between the various elements that compose such a movement, populist parties attempt to subsume such tensions under inchoate, confused and often contradictory ideologies which lay stress upon the solidarity of the people and ascribe their misfortunes to the machinations of their enemies. "⁸

In this analysis of Inkatha two specific facts need to be ascertained:

- X - the extent to which it is a 'reactionary' organisation and State functionary; and

- its attitude towards political violence.

5.1.1.1 Inkatha: 'Reactionary' and State Functionary

In this Section evidence of Inkatha as an organisation not of resistance but of compliance will be presented with specific attention given to:

- direct and indirect relationships between the Central Government, the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha;
- the similarities in strategies adopted by Inkatha and Pretoria in the fight against the 'common enemy'; and
- the level of support for, and alienation of, Inkatha.

In South Africa organisations associating with Government created institutions which perpetuate segregation, such as the bantustans, are labelled collaborators by large sections of the black population. Not surprisingly, given that it operates out of the KwaZulu bantustan, Inkatha has been alienated from mainstream black opposition politics and accused of collaborating with the Government and dividing blacks. While Buthelezi denies these charges, insisting that participation in bantustan Government is an effective strategy in challenging State hegemony, Wellings and Sutcliffe note that "the KLA was ... the vehicle which propelled Buthelezi - a virtual unknown even among Zulus before 'self-government' - and Inkatha to prominence".⁹

The bond between the KLA and Inkatha is irrefutable. Of the 119 members of the KLA 65 came via the Tribal Authority System and 54 were 'elected' (in practical terms nominated by Inkatha). As the party mouthpiece, Inhlabamkhosi (Clarion Call), unashamedly admitted in 1984: "The entire KwaZulu Cabinet forms the executive of Inkatha. In effect, the KwaZulu Government is Inkatha."¹⁰ Just as the direct links between the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha are beyond doubt so too is the KLA's direct reliance on the South African Government and nowhere is this reliance more conspicuous than in its source of funding. In 1984/85, for example, KwaZulu received R466 901 000 from Pretoria and was only able to raise

R175 870 000 from its own sources.¹¹ However, the real relationship between Inkatha and the Central Government is far more subtle than direct funding. For example, the consensus of opinion on issues such as sanctions and the futility of the ANC's 'armed struggle' makes Inkatha an important ally and in effect a State functionary. Let us now look at Inkatha's strategies and how they complement those of the Central Government.

Inkatha's strategy, described as "a mobilised offensive involving cross-ethnic black, worker, union, multi-class and consumer power to confront white oppression, and thereby force what concessions may be wrung", is based on 'the politics of reality', a strategy which:

- "exploit(s) the fundamental weakness of the nationalist regime, which is that their policies cannot be implemented forever without the co-operation of blacks";¹² and
- rejects the armed struggle and violence as unviable alternatives. Confrontationist and spontaneous protests, which Inkatha term 'protest politics', including everything from commuter boycotts to stoning property, are opposed on the grounds that they are unlikely to produce tangible gains and that they have inherent violent implications.¹³

Simply, Inkatha's opposition strategy is based on issuing threats to employ a mobilised and organised mass constituency. Buthelezi argues that change can be induced non-violently by mobilising workers and consumers to force the Government to negotiate. However, only negotiations initiated by Inkatha are acceptable and Buthelezi has vigorously argued and campaigned, locally and abroad, against foreign sanctions and disinvestment on the grounds that these will hurt blacks more than whites. In the absence of a feasible alternative Inkatha has restricted itself to limited critical opposition through institutional channels and operates within the clearly defined rules set by the State.

Just when Inkatha's offensive will begin has never been made clear and Buthelezi's appeal for mass protest remains unspecific. In August

1985, for example, the former Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) attempted to entice Inkatha to participate in consumer boycotts in Pietermaritzburg and Howick to ensure maximum effect. Inkatha refused to partake and vacillated between passive inactivity and active hostility. There is little doubt that Inkatha is committed to moderate political proposals and negotiation.

Inkatha's acceptance of Government created segregated institutional structures was revealed no more strikingly than through its participation in the reviled Community Councils. Although Inkatha opposed the first round of Community Council elections in 1978/79, by 1980 its stance had shifted and at a public rally Buthelezi said:

" I say to you bluntly: Do not be ashamed to enter the *fight* fray at the level of Community Councils ... (they) ... are not the vehicles of individual enrichment. They must be turned into chariots which rush us into battle ... I can see in the short and medium term, blacks pouring their strength into the Community Council system and so joining one council to another so that the very structure of division is turned into a mechanism of unity. "¹⁴

In Lamont candidates in Community Council elections have largely campaigned on an Inkatha platform. However, the low election polls (see Figure 4.1) must be interpreted not merely as a failure of the Councils to secure rewards but also as a rejection of Inkatha and of structures imposed on the people.

Further evidence of Inkatha's bedfellow relationship with the State and monopoly capital is found in the birth of UWUSA, launched on 1 May 1986. Inkatha Central Committee spokesman on labour matters, Simon Conco, described the birth of trade unionism among Inkatha members as a "spontaneous worker reaction repudiating COSATU's socialist orientation and support for disinvestment".¹⁵ Similarly, Buthelezi argued the necessity of a trade union to challenge the hijacking of the trade union movement by the ANC and the UDF.¹⁶ Interestingly, however, the eight member UWUSA executive comprises politicians, businessmen and personnel

managers none of whom were elected democratically. UWUSA's ability to attract members through successful negotiations with employers on shop floor issues is improbable given Inkatha's "identification with the interests of capital and the State over labour legislation (and) labour action".¹⁷ Similarly, Inkatha's refusal to represent workers on wider political issues such as transport costs and housing rents will not endear UWUSA to workers. Both the Government and Inkatha fear the growth of black trade unionism and the fact that COSATU has made improvements in material conditions for workers through higher wages and benefits is a threat to Inkatha which promised the same benefits through negotiation. Morris argues that UWUSA's high profile Kings Park launch was staged to "embarrass Cosatu politically" by demonstrating the extent of support for Inkatha.¹⁸

On what grounds then do Inkatha and Buthelezi draw support and how much support do they attract in Durban's townships?

In answer to the first question three sources are proposed here: first, there are the appeals to Zulu ethnicity; second is Inkatha's promise of rewards in the form of cheaper rents and access to the likes of pensions and health services; and third is its portrayal as the genuine liberation movement capable of minimising the risk of confrontation. For example, Buthelezi has given assurances that black lives will not be lost through senseless violence. Speaking in the KLA Buthelezi said he was concerned only with "development within the framework of what is allowed by the all powerful White Government".¹⁹

In answer to the second question Buthelezi repeatedly claims Inkatha to be the largest political organisation in South Africa. By September 1986 membership was put at 1 300 000²⁰ (including Inkatha's Youth and Women's Brigades, membership of which was put at more than 350 000 and 344 880 respectively in 1984).²¹ Membership figures need clarification, however, and by no means reflect the number of paid up annual subscriptions. Membership is cumulative and includes those who have died as members and those who have failed or refused to renew subscriptions. In other words, the signing-on fee designates 'lifetime membership' and it is not far fetched to suggest that even those who have tacitly agreed to support are included in membership figures. Buthelezi himself has stated that

only five percent of Inkatha members are fully paid up.²²

The role of coercion in enticing membership cannot be overlooked. Buthelezi has both implicitly and explicitly suggested that opposition to Inkatha is synonymous with disloyalty to the Zulu nation. For example, to justify an assault on students at the University of Zululand in 1983 Buthelezi spoke of the students' disloyalty to "a descendant of the man Zulu after whom our nation and the territory in which the university exists is named".²³ Such statements are undoubtedly powerful incentives to sign up.²⁴ Further, Brewer notes:

" Inkatha membership for some people is a prerequisite for their employment and for the receipt of services and facilities. Of the 105 respondents who were members of Inkatha, 82.3 per cent said they wanted to join; ... Having said this, 81 per cent said Inkatha had helped them in their employment or career and 72.5 per cent indicated that Inkatha membership was necessary in obtaining it. "²⁵

The KwaZulu Cabinet has even gone so far as to consider excluding people who reject Inkatha from using public facilities such as schools and hospitals.²⁶ In the same vein, Buthelezi has threatened KwaZulu civil servants who are members of the UDF with dismissal²⁷ and all civil servants must sign a pledge of loyalty to the KwaZulu Government.²⁸

Although an estimated 60 000 people attended the launch of UWUSA certainly over half were non-workers (elderly men and women and children), an estimated 10 000 were local hostel dwellers and others were bussed in from Transvaal and Northern Natal.²⁹ There were no fraternal messages from any notable organisations read at the launch and the only messages of support came from the Brick and Allied Workers' Union (an alleged front for the Corobrick Staff Association) and the Black Staff Association of the South African Transport Services, SATS (described as the SATS personnel department dressed up as a staff association).³⁰

The KwaZulu education system is an important vehicle for transmitting

Inkatha's ideology to black youth in the bantustan. Since 1978 the syllabus has allowed pupils time to participate in Youth Brigade activities and in 1979 'Inkatha' was introduced at all levels as a one hour per week compulsory subject dealing with the history and organisational structure of Inkatha, the roles of leaders and followers, the role of the Youth Brigade, discipline and conduct of Inkatha members and the importance of the constitution, Inkatha rallies, leadership and training.³¹ Following the 1980 school boycotts and Buthelezi's demands for "well disciplined and regimented impis",³² paramilitary camps for Youth Brigade members were established. Similarly, support for Inkatha's Women's Brigade derives, in part, from control over credit unions and co-operatives through the Inkatha Development Office.

Buthelezi and Inkatha have been widely alienated, especially by the more radically politicised youth. Appeals to the black youth are poorly conceived. For example during the 1980 school boycotts he argued that "the generation of youth now passing through school are going to be among the victorious warriors of the struggle for liberation as we march triumphantly through the future market places of South Africa".³³ The process of alienation occurred against a background of estrangement from the ANC and later the UDF.

Upon revival Inkatha promoted itself as the internal wing of the ANC, openly identifying with its aims (as distinct from its strategies) and adopting its colours and slogans. According to Schlemmer "Inkatha managed successfully to establish some continuity with the ANC in the minds of ordinary Africans, due no doubt to Buthelezi's former membership of the ANC and symbolism of a uniform resembling that of the ANC".³⁴ After the 1976 political violence in Soweto Buthelezi's relationship with the Government began to manifest when he called for an end to the violence and establishment of vigilante groups to protect property. Inkatha's rift with the ANC dates from November 1979 when Buthelezi met for private talks with the ANC in London and subsequently tried to gain political mileage from the contact by claiming that the ANC endorsed Inkatha's strategy of working within the bantustan system. The ANC denounced Buthelezi and accused him of helping to keep blacks oppressed.

The break with the ANC and UDF is now complete: for example, at the Shaka Day rally in Umlazi on 28 September 1985, Buthelezi accused ANC leaders of declaring war on Inkatha, of ordering his assassination, and turning black brother against black brother.³⁵ Repudiated by the ANC, the UDF and other 'progressive' organisations, Inkatha began to present itself as a third force in South African politics by portraying a high profile and broadening its support base. This approach has only served to further alienate the organisation, earn for it the label of 'reactionary', and divide blacks.

Opinion surveys indicate decreasing popularity among urban blacks for Inkatha/Buthelezi. Such results are certainly more consistent with a low paid up membership than a rapidly expanding organisation. In a 1977 survey Buthelezi emerged as the foremost black leader in the country with 44 percent support among urban blacks in Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria. At the time, support cut across tribal lines with 40 percent of supporters being non-Zulus.³⁶ Among Natal Zulus support was even higher in 1978 with 87 percent of trade union members in Durban nominating Buthelezi as their leader although the degree of support declined inversely with age.³⁷ Throughout the 1980's support for Buthelezi has progressively deteriorated. In a survey undertaken in 1980 Brewer found a 41.2 percent membership of Inkatha in KwaMashu.³⁸ In May 1984, Schlemmer's survey of black industrial workers in the Witwatersrand, Port Elizabeth and Durban found that 54 percent of the Durban sample stated that their political allegiance was to Inkatha/Buthelezi, compared to only 14 percent of the Witwatersrand/Port Elizabeth sample.³⁹ In 1985 support for Buthelezi as South Africa's best leader averaged 11.75 percent in four opinion polls among urban blacks (support ranged between 28 percent and five percent).⁴⁰ Meer put support for Inkatha in KwaMashu prior to the August 1985 violence at 32 percent but after the violence she found that support had dropped to 5.3 percent among blacks throughout Durban.⁴¹ Sutcliffe found less than four percent support for Inkatha in Lamont in April 1986.⁴²

Two reasons are put forward here to explain Inkatha's declining popularity among urban blacks: first, support for such organisations depends on their ability to either provide material benefits or an

outlet for the expression of discontent and in both areas Inkatha has failed; and similarly, in the wider arena Inkatha has not been able to extract significant political concessions from the Government.

5.1.1.2 Strategies of Non-Violence?

Despite rejecting anti-State political violence as a strategy, Inkatha 'corporals' have not been shy in employing violence against 'progressive' organisations to preserve the existing status quo. Inkatha vigilantes regularly attempt to suppress resistance. For example, following a student boycott of lectures at the University of Zululand on 28 October 1983 and attempts by students to prevent Buthelezi from addresssing a commemorative service for Zulu Paramount Chief Cetshwayo at the University, an Inkatha Youth Brigade impi invaded student hostels on campus in the early morning of 29 October 1983 killing five students and injuring over 100. More recently, Mathews Sibanda (Inkatha Liaison Officer) and Ntwe Mafole (National Organiser of Inkatha Youth Brigade) were convicted of leading an attack on COSATU Natal Secretary Thami Mohlomi.⁴³ While Buthelezi has categorically stated that the Inkatha Central Committee does not sanction violence⁴⁴ and warned Inkatha members against attacking people or property, these warnings have had no effect and it is difficult to reconcile these warnings with the Central Committee's failure to discipline local leaders who use the organisation as a base from which to launch attacks.

Inkatha's recourse to violence through the use of vigilantes, is closely tied to the process of criminalising protest behaviour which can partly be blamed on the 'blunders' committed by 'progressives'. Crime has traditionally flourished in the poorly policed townships country-wide and to extinguish crime havens neighbourhood defence units were established. To those township dwellers who remained unpoliticised protest activity was regarded as crime especially when the distinction between the two was blurred, for example, the stoning of bottle stores and the looting of tearooms. Further, Ngidi notes:

" Coupled with weak and fragmented communication within the resistance movement - the stoning of buses without prior 'warning' to commuters - blunders were

inevitable. "45

Vigilantes thus set out to tackle crime but in the process failed to distinguish between crime and legitimate resistance. In their crusade vigilantes have been sanctioned by the State and 'reactionary' organisations such as Inkatha, both of which are only too happy to be relieved of their responsibilities in the fight against crime and the necessity to repress resistance.

In the case of Inkatha-backed vigilantes, however, their increasingly frequent excesses (see Chapter 6) are creating disillusionment with Inkatha's claims of being a non-violent organisation and are certainly partly responsible for the decline in the organisation's popularity mentioned above.

To sum up, the following arguments are presented here.

- Inkatha is committed to moderate political proposals and negotiation and is unlikely to confront a Government with which it shares reformist economic sentiments (anti-sanctions and pro-capitalist), on which it depends for funding through its links with the KLA, and with whom it has entered into an unholy alliance to crush dissent. As one Township Councillor claimed in an interview: "The KwaZulu Government and the South African Government are trying to crush disturbances."
- Inkatha has evolved into a State functionary with middle class values and as such its rewards materialise through co-operation not dissent.
- Inkatha's ideology does not espouse normative justifications for anti-State political violence but threatened by the development of an organised working class with a revolutionary consciousness and fearing mass action outside of its control, Buthelezi has distanced Inkatha from 'progressive' organisations and sanctioned their repression by criminalising any form of resistance to the State.
- Paradoxically, as the events of 1986 confirm, Inkatha vigilantes are turning Durban's townships into battlefields. As one respondent lamented, "as long as there are people like Gatsha and other apologists it will take time for us to crush the Government".

5.2 THE IDEOLOGY OF 'PROGRESSIVES'

" Community organisations have helped to make people aware that they can do something about the way they are forced to live. The past years have seen the expression of popular power by communities taking on the authorities ... Marches, demonstrations, boycotts have become the rule of the day, in response to shack demolitions, rent increases and bus fare rises. The challenge has been to channel this high profile resistance into ongoing organisations and structures. "

J. De la Harpe and A. Manson⁴⁶

During the 1980's township communities have become increasingly politicised. This process can be attributed to the proliferation of community based groups including, civic associations, youth movements, pupil and student groups, women's organisations, sporting clubs, and crisis, boycott and stay-away committees. While initially many of these groups mobilised to address specific local grievances, such as rent and transport, an understanding that local issues are linked to the structure of the wider society was gained in a relatively short space of time with the result that demands on national issues, such as political participation, now emanate directly from township based organisations throughout South Africa. Operating outside Government created institutions these organisations are typically referred to as extra-parliamentary groups or 'progressives'. At the national level the most visible extra-parliamentary groups are the ANC, the UDF, AZAPO and the National Forum. The overwhelming majority of 'progressive' organisations in Lamont and KwaMashu are UDF affiliates and their members hold the ANC in high esteem and view its 'armed struggle' as a source of morale and inspiration. In the following analysis of 'progressive' organisations operating in Lamont and KwaMashu attention will focus on:

- the strategies of resistance adopted by 'progressive' organisations, including their commitment to anti-State violence, and the State's pursuit of strategies of containment; and
- local levels of support for 'progressive' organisations.

5.2.1 Co-ordinating Resistance: The UDF

The origins of the UDF can be traced to the mass bannings of black consciousness organisations in 1977. On 19 October 1977, 18 black organisations, 17 of which were black consciousness affiliates, were banned in terms of the Internal Security Act. National activists were thus forced underground and turned to address local community issues such as rent, transport and housing. Consequently, between 1979 and 1980 civic organisations proliferated. Despite their successes local bodies were initially unable to co-ordinate and effectively fight national campaigns because once the local issue was resolved membership and participation inevitably declined. In arguing that national political organisations grew out of grassroots organisation, De la Harpe and Manson make the point that once mobilised, local communities were able to link local issues to the structure of the wider society and local demands to national demands.

that triggered emergency? coming of BC out new institutional plan

many forces

The impetus for the formation of a broad based organisation of 'progressive' forces was the Government's new constitutional plan designed to draw coloureds and Indians into an alliance with whites, and the introduction of the three 'Koornhof (Minister of Co-operation and Development) Bills' (the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, the Black Local Authorities Bill, and the Black Communities Development Bill) which were designed to strengthen controls over black labour. Addressing the Transvaal Anti-South African Indian Council conference in January 1983, Dr Alan Boesak said:

" There is ... no reason why the churches, civic associations, trade unions, student organisations and sports bodies should not unite on this issue, pool our resources, inform people of the fraud that is about to be perpetuated in their name and, on the day of the election, expose their plans for what they are. "47

A commission was appointed to investigate the feasibility of a 'united front' and between May and July General Councils of the UDF were established in Natal, Transvaal and the Cape. On 20 August 1983 at Rocklands Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain, 1 000 delegates from 575 organisations, including, community/civic, youth, students', political, women's, sporting, workers' and traders' organisations, launched the UDF. The UDF is thus an umbrella body of affiliates, each retaining its identity under the UDF banner, but co-operating with other groups on common interests. In effect the UDF co-ordinates resistance rather than imposing directives with the aim of creating a united democratic country, free of bantustans and group areas.⁴⁸

Barrell defines the UDF as a 'progressive nationalist movement' which stresses the involvement of most sections of the community, regardless of race or class, in the political struggle against apartheid and that any distinct class mobilisation should be subsumed within a broader national democratic struggle.⁴⁹ As a 'progressive nationalist movement' the UDF has been criticised by left-wing 'progressives' for, lacking a socialist commitment, being dominated by a radical petty-bourgeois which emphasises national oppression rather than class exploitation, incorporating 'ruling class' organisations such as the Black Sash and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and entrenching ethnicism through racially exclusive organisations like the Indian Congresses.⁵⁰ It is not surprising then that initial tensions between the UDF and the labour movement arose, (placated in 1986 by the adoption of a working relationship with COSATU), and conflict between the UDF and left- and right-wing black consciousness groups, particularly AZAPO, manifested. These conflicts peaked during late 1984 and early 1985 in the Eastern Cape (being placated after intervention by Archbishop Desmond Tutu) and continued during 1986 in Soweto.

The UDF's strategy of resistance is based on the politics of refusal which tactically relies on protest, boycotts, civil disobedience, obstructionism, disinvestment/sanctions and limited violence. However, resistance in South Africa typically manifests at the community level and the nationally based organisations such as the UDF appear more to channel and articulate that resistance rather than plan it. While the UDF has been afforded a high profile by the likes of the occupation of the British consulate in Durban, frequent press statements, and harassment by authorities, including treason trials, it is unclear who

actually wields the authority in this heterogeneous front. Adam in fact argues that the UDF is made up of "many generals but an undisciplined army".⁵¹ Nowhere is this more obvious than in Natal. The Natal Executive of the UDF is largely in the hands of an Indian professional class which has been unable to take charge of and direct the protests of grassroot affiliates, particularly the Youth Leagues. For example, Indians cannot answer the education problems in KwaZulu. This creates a distance between the UDF Executive and rank and file members and means that the perpetrators of violent excesses and 'blunders' go unpunished. The result has been that many local 'progressive' protests have been reactive and lacking cohesion. The UDF appears to be held together more by its inheritance of the ANC mantle than by ideological coherence (about the future the UDF is as ambiguous as Inkatha).

Not surprisingly the State has reacted to contain resistance conducted under the banner of the UDF. However, in Durban the presence of Inkatha has not only masked UDF resistance but facilitated the State's strategy of containment and in the ensuing struggle for power violence between the two organisations has taken centre stage.

Within months of its launch both the UDF and Inkatha had condemned each other. In November 1983, at a memorial service for victims of the massacre at the University of Zululand (described above), UDF speakers denounced Buthelezi as an oppressor and dictator and described Inkatha as a divisive tribal force.⁵² In April 1984 Buthelezi said that the UDF would not survive without Inkatha's support and was in danger of becoming only a paper organisation.⁵³ Addressing a Women's Brigade conference in October 1984, Buthelezi accused the UDF of being an ANC 'front' and added that the ANC had established the UDF to destroy Inkatha.⁵⁴

Throughout 1985, particularly during the State of Emergency, a wide range of security legislation was used to weaken the UDF, including detention without trial and interrogation of national and regional leaders and even rank-and-file supporters, treason charges against 38 national leaders, bans on meetings and the banning of COSAS, a key affiliate. During the same period UDF and affiliate leaders were assassinated, including Victoria Mxenge in Umlazi, and their homes petrol bombed by unidentified organisations/individuals. Evidence of collusion between Inkatha backed vigilantes and the security forces in

suppressing protest is inescapable and Inkatha has taken advantage of this relationship and the UDF's weakened position to attempt to purge Durban's townships of UDF supporters. For example, Winnington Sabelo and Thomas Shabalala, members of the KLA and Inkatha's Central Committee, formed Inkatha 'defence units' in June 1985 to, in the words of Sabelo, "wipe out UDF supporters and troublemakers".⁵⁵ On 13 April 1986 KwaMashu Township Councillor Esther Africa urged people to "burn down the homes of ANC, UDF, COSAS and COSATU troublemakers".⁵⁶

5.2.2 Trade Union Resistance: COSATU

Since COSAS, the UDF, AZAPO, and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) successfully co-operated to organise a two day stayaway in November 1984 the trade union movement in South Africa has actively involved itself in community issues. On 1 December 1985 COSATU was launched uniting 33 trade unions with a paid up membership of approximately 450 000 workers.⁵⁷ Resolutions passed at the launch included: the right of workers to assert themselves politically; the rejection of bantustans and federalism as solutions to South Africa's problems; and support for disinvestment. The President of COSATU, Elijah Barayi when questioned about the orientation of the Congress said: "I believe COSATU is a socialist organisation and I would like to see a socialist state in South Africa. I speak of socialism as practised by the Labour Party in England";⁵⁸ hardly the words of a violent revolutionary.

The success of COSATU as a vehicle for attaining political rights is threatened by State repression and since the declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency hundreds of union officials have been detained although the State's ability to suppress COSATU is limited by its fear of alienating a black workforce on which the economy depends. It would appear that COSATU has been pressed into taking political stances at the expense of realistic economic calculations and worker confidence in COSATU will depend upon its ability to improve wages and working conditions.

Not surprisingly, COSATU has come into open conflict with Inkatha. Buthelezi has accused COSATU of being merely another "ANC pawn ... directed against Inkatha and its leadership".⁵⁹ In July 1986 Buthelezi said "COSATU will not stand the test of time" and argued that its formation was "a misplaced reaction to the slow pace of reform".⁶⁰ (He

added that UWUSA was an antidote to that misplaced energy.) Another potential conflict is between the UDF and COSATU: the bourgeois class character of the UDF leadership and the working class character of COSATU is an antagonism that will not be easily overcome in the long term although temporarily placated at the moment.

5.2.3 Pupil Resistance: COSAS, the LECC and the KwaMashu Youth League

COSAS was formed in May 1979 as a successor to the South African Students' Movement (SASM), which was one of the organisations banned in October 1977. Upon formation COSAS represented black, coloured and Indian school pupils in the tradition of black consciousness. Its principal aim was to "fight for compulsory, free and democratic education in a democratic society".⁶¹ However, as Ngidi reminds us: "Resistance in education is not resistance to enlightenment, literacy or information but resistance to a 'politically planned' education system (and) all parties involved in this conflict are in it for political reasons."⁶² After the 1980 school boycotts COSAS abandoned the black consciousness philosophy and declared its support for the Freedom Charter as a programme for a democratic society and in 1982, in league with student and worker groups, drew up an Education Charter.

In October 1984 COSAS representatives in Transvaal approached trade union leaders to organise a two day stayaway on 5 and 6 November in support of, democratically elected SRC's, the abolition of corporal punishment, an end to the use of unqualified teachers, the withdrawal of the police and army from townships, the scrapping of rent, service charge and transport increases, the withdrawal of general sales tax, the release of detainees and political prisoners, and the resignation of Town Councillors. The Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee (TRSC) was formed and included members of 36 political, community, and pupil/students' organisations. Estimates of between 300 000 and 800 000 workers and 400 000 pupils participated in the stayaway. The demands and number of people involved indicates widespread co-operation among different groups and increasing levels of black politicisation. Clearly, schoolchildren no longer regarded education as "an isolated issue but as part of the broader struggle against oppression and exploitation".⁶³ Buthelezi condemned the stayaway and accused the TRSC of intimidating and dividing workers. While agreeing that blacks must employ worker and consumer power to break "white intransigence", Buthelezi said that

unless blacks were united (presumably under Inkatha), mass action would not succeed.⁶⁴ Later in the year Buthelezi described COSAS as "youth gone mad, thinking that they can inherit the earth by insulting their parents and by dictating to the whole world what they should do".⁶⁵

The school boycott continued during 1985 but COSAS's prominence led to its banning on 29 August 1985 and the collapse of its national organisation. The slogan 'freedom now, education later' emerged in the Eastern Cape following the banning of COSAS and was adopted in Soweto. The implications of children willing to sacrifice their education and the realisation that pupils would be unable to organise outside schools prompted different elements in the struggle in Soweto to form the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC). At a national education consultative conference convened by the SPCC on 28/29 December 1985 a number of resolutions were adopted: that pupils return to school on 28 January 1986; that a National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) be formed; that a new form of education, 'peoples' education', be initiated; and, that unless COSAS was unbanned, the State of Emergency lifted, detained pupils and teachers released, and the SAP and SADF withdrawn from the townships, another conference would be convened in March 1986 to consider appropriate action.

Over the Easter weekend 1 500 delegates of the NECC met in Durban. While it was agreed that the Government had not met any of the demands made at the December conference, the NECC nonetheless called: upon pupils to return to school for 'peoples' education'; for communities to launch rent and consumer boycotts; for COSAS to be unbanned; for political prisoners to be released; and, Inkatha an enemy of the people.⁶⁶

The LECC and KwaMashu Youth League emerged as local successors to COSAS after its banning. Youth League leaders in KwaMashu have been continually harassed, had their houses attacked and have even been killed by vigilantes vowing to rid the township of "troublesome SRC's".⁶⁷ During April the KTC banned SRC's, a tactic which precipitated further violence (see Chapter 6) between pupils and Inkatha vigilantes.

* 5.2.4 Community Resistance: JORAC and the LCA

3 In Durban, as in the rest of South Africa, a ^{innumerable} ~~myriad~~ of community grassroots organisations were established in the early 1980's largely in

response to dissatisfaction with conditions in BAAB townships. Community organisations such as the Lamont Rent Action Committee, the Hambanathi Residents' Association, the Klaarwater Residents' Association, the Chesterville Rent Action Committee, and the Shakaville Residents' Association were formed in PNAB townships. In April 1983 JORAC was formed as an umbrella organisation for the above residents' associations to co-ordinate resistance proposed rent increases. JORAC was to become one of the most prominent UDF affiliates in Durban.

Smit defines JORAC as an urban social movement, which, in common with the UDF, has attempted to bridge gaps between fractions of labour and has successfully organised spatially disparate communities into a single organisation to fight common issues.⁶⁸ Smit attributes JORAC's success to its grassroots-door-to-door organisational ability.⁶⁹

The conception of JORAC began initially with resistance in 1982 to bus fare increases and later to rent increases in PNAB townships. Since these communities were "similarly affected by these increases (they) implemented a strategy of joint action based on the belief that united action had greater potential than individual township action".⁷⁰ On 8 April 1983 the Lamont Rent Action Committee, Hambanathi Residents' Association and Klaarwater Residents' Association joined forces to "hurriedly put together" JORAC.⁷¹ Subsequently local organisations from Chesterville and Shakaville and elected representatives from the hostels joined JORAC.⁷² According to Reintges JORAC "was perceived by its leadership to represent a temporary structure to oppose the increases".⁷³

Instrumental in building support for JORAC and mobilising Lamont residents was the popular Msizi Harrison Dube. Through meetings and general community activity, Dube pointed out the effects of the rent increases and particularly the NCC's non-representation and impotent response to the issue. As a member of the NCC he was well placed to expose and discredit the Council:

"Dube encouraged people to 'see how those guys represent them, literally sleeping through most of these meetings. He was uncompromising in putting across the community's position. This is what earned him the wrath of the other councillors'".⁷⁴

Interestingly, Dube believed that JORAC should contest Community Council elections to take over the Council and challenge the PNAB's hegemony. As a UDF affiliate, however, such strategy was incompatible with outright rejection of, and non-collaboration with, the Community Council system.

JORAC's organisational ability has been deliberately frustrated and limited since the 1985 State of Emergency. Reverend Mcebisi Xundu, Dube's successor, was detained on 27 August 1985 and Executive leaders forced into hiding. Wellings and Sutcliffe assert that the Inkatha/security force alliance has "broken the back of JORAC/UDF sponsored opposition in the (NPA) townships".⁷⁵ In April 1986 the NCC invited the SAP and SADF to conduct an 'anti-crime sweep' in Lamont and at 12.30 am on Wednesday 16 April the township was besieged, roadblocks set up, and homes and individuals searched. Residents returning from work on Wednesday evening claim they were forced by security force personnel to write their name and address next to one of three statements on a form provided: 1. I support the Community Council; 2. I support the UDF; or, 3. I support COSATU.⁷⁶ The 'siege' lasted until 24 April.

Given the State's suppression of JORAC and the need to continue the offensive, 'progressive' organisations in Lamont have united through a recently formed Civic Association. The LCA attracts members from COSAS, Malayo, the Lamont Residents' Association, the Lamont branch of NOW, the churches, Lamont Parents' Association, hostel representatives and JORAC. Individual organisations' activities are channelled through the LCA. The LCA's aims are to conscientise residents and involve them in local issues including the education crisis. The LCA has adopted a low profile and remains unaffiliated to the UDF to reduce harassment. Recruitment and organisation is based on house visits and area committees. Membership is open to all residents, irrespective of political affiliation, and the LCA hopes to, in the words of one respondent, "steal members from Inkatha".

Unfortunately, the State of Emergency and the detention of many Lamont 'progressives' prevented follow up interviews with leaders of the Lamont branch of NOW and Malayo and consequently I was unable to gather more information about the roles of these two organisations in Lamont. The role of women in the struggle, however, should not be underestimated. Black women suffer both political and sexual oppression and have sacrificed more than others in the struggle against the State's

definition of women as appendages of black male workers. Interestingly, during the interview to assess discontent the respondent from NOW argued that: "The Government is creating unemployment deliberately in order to suppress women - if men are inactive membership of resistance organisations will drop." Reintges argues that through the LCA JORAC intellectuals have provided positive direction to the youth in Lamont. The energies of COSAS and Malayo have been deployed constructively in the organisation of LCA meetings, the printing and distributing of pamphlets and the maintenance of contacts with other communities.⁷⁷

Reintges notes that the increased willingness of the churches to involve themselves in political issues has altered what were previously negatively held perceptions of them in Lamont.⁷⁸ Public church support for 'progressive' organisations and the utilisation of church buildings and grounds for meetings and social occasions has contributed to community cohesiveness. Of course, the politicisation of the churches in South Africa has not escaped Buthelezi's attention and he has blamed them for contributing to the violence.⁷⁹

5.2.5 Assessing Support for 'Progressives'

Support for 'progressives' is typically concentrated in NPA townships and is less overt in KwaZulu. As Inkatha Central Committee member and Lindelani shacktown 'mayor' Thomas Shabalala notes: "Lindelani is no home for UDF and COSATU, as townships like Chesterville, Lamontville, Clermont and others are no home for Inkatha."⁸⁰ Survey evidence confirms Shabalala's observations.

- A survey of 100 people in Lamont, Chesterville, and Klaarwater, by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences in October 1983, found that 83 percent of respondents thought JORAC was making a sincere effort to solve township problems and only one percent thought JORAC caused problems. On the other hand, only 20 percent of respondents felt Inkatha was trying to help and 44 percent suggested Inkatha caused problems.⁸¹ In a 1984 survey of Lamont residents by the Built Environment Support Group (BESG) 97 percent of respondents felt Inkatha had not helped the people (n = 756).⁸²

- In September 1985, following the Inanda 'riots', the Institute for Black Research, IBR (University of Natal, Durban) found that 51 per-

cent of blacks in KwaMashu, Umlazi, Inanda and Clermont supported the UDF (n = 227).⁸³

- In a survey of Lamont residents undertaken in April 1986 during the security forces 'siege' of the township Sutcliffe found the following levels of support: UDF - 78 percent; ANC - 21 percent; student/pupil/youth groups such as COSAS, Malayo and the Azanian Students' Organisation (AZASO) - 21 percent; COSATU - eight percent; and JORAC - five percent (n = 255).⁸⁴

In the discussion of the ideology of 'progressives' one is struck by the reasonableness of their demands which are certainly unaccompanied by threats of violence. This leads to certain inferences about the justifications for political violence among 'progressives' .

- 'Progressive' organisations do not espouse ideological justifications for violence to the exclusion of other strategies.
- The utility of violence among 'progressives' is very real: not only has violence achieved concessions but when confronted by the combined forces of the State and Inkatha backed vigilantes 'progressive' forces, particularly youths, have resorted to violence as a means of self-defence and retaliation. //
- The use of violence among 'progressives' to force people to comply with their demands has resulted in many 'blunders' . Just as the Inkatha Central Committee is reluctant to discipline vigilante excesses committed in its name, the Natal UDF Executive is unable to discipline the violent excesses of the youth.
- Given a decade of continuous political violence in South Africa the danger exists that attitudes of expectancy towards violence may be converted into norms justifying violence among township youths.

The evidence suggests that the commitment to anti-State violence is greater among 'progressives' than among 'reactionaries' . An attempt was made to quantify that commitment by asking the sample of 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' who were interviewed when assessing discontent about their willingness to engage in anti-State protest and violence (Appendix 1). Their commitment reflects in a measure referred to as the 'V Score'.

5.3 THE 'V SCORE'

" At the moment the SAP and SADF are busy killing innocent school going children, so people must arm themselves if possible. "

NOW respondent

In this Section the method used to measure the willingness of people to engage in political violence, the limitations of this approach, and the 'V Scores' of 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' in Lamont and KwaMashu are all described.

5.3.1 Method

The 'V Score' was measured on a six point continuum. The low end of the scale implies compliance with the State and an unwillingness to confront the authorities, while on the other hand, the high end of the scale indicates a willingness to confront the authorities in armed battles. The six activities included in the continuum are listed in turn below with the maximum score for each activity given in brackets.

- (a) unwilling to engage in any form of protest that is not sanctioned by the authorities (0);
- (b) willing to take part in protest meetings or marches that are not permitted by the authorities (1);
- (c) willing to refuse to obey laws which are felt to be unjust and defy police orders rather than obey such laws (2);
- (d) willing to join sit-ins, pickets, mass demonstrations and take-overs of buildings (3);
- (e) willing to join violent protest demonstrations, including actions such as destroying public and private property (6);

- (f) willing to take up arms in preparation for battles with the SAP and SADF (12).

To enable the 'V Score' model to operate each activity was assigned an arbitrary value between zero and twelve. The qualitative jump in values between (d) and (e), and (e) and (f) is justified on the grounds that each successive protest activity requires a considerably greater commitment to violence. An unequivocal willingness to engage in a protest activity scored maximum points, an unwillingness scored zero, while "depends" scored half the maximum points. Each score is simply the aggregate of the respondent's willingness to engage in different courses of protest and violence. For example, a person willing to engage in protest activities (b) and (c), who puts conditions on his/her willingness to engage in activities (d) and (e) and who would not participate in activity (f) would score 7.5 (i.e. $0 + 1 + 2 + 1.5 + 3 + 0$).

5.3.2 Limitations of the 'V Score'

Although the most direct means of assessing people's willingness to engage in political violence is to ask them, cognisance should be taken of the limitations of this approach in the South African environment. The first problem lies in the fact that the willingness to engage in any form of protest is always likely to change in response to new events. For example, trade unionists who categorically declare that they would never picket their place of work may well change their minds if they are unjustly dismissed. Similarly, protesters who declare that they would never obey unjust laws may well change their minds when those laws are reinforced by sjambok wielding police. Second, most of the activities provided overstep the bounds of official tolerance which pose problems for the respondents. For example, taking up arms is a treasonable offence and people who are prepared to arm themselves are not necessarily going to declare their intentions to an unknown interviewer.

On the other hand, a declared willingness to take up arms may be influenced by the extent of State violence and not indicate real intentions. Finally, the willingness to engage in violence is partly determined by a delicate reward/punishment relationship. For example, in the current rent boycotts many township residents are caught in the dilemma of being threatened with eviction if they do not pay their rent

and with a necklace (a burning tyre placed around the victim) if the rent is paid. (This same relationship also operates over the level of politicisation: punishment and reward can induce a false consciousness just as they do not necessarily reflect the lack of politicisation.)

In reply to critics who doubt the accuracy of black responses given to opinion surveys dealing with political issues, Schlemmer suggests that the political maturity of blacks in South Africa should not be underestimated. For example, in his survey of rank-and-file black worker attitudes towards disinvestment in South Africa, Schlemmer concluded: "Their replies on political issues show clearly that they are no dull, apathetic and crushed proletariat ..."⁸⁵ The standard of reply in this survey, where community leaders were interviewed, can only serve to reinforce Schlemmer's view.

5.3.3 'V Score' Results

Clear differences in the willingness to engage in anti-State protest and violence emerged between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' (the 'V Scores' of individual 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' are listed in rank order in Appendix 3). While the average 'V Score' among 'reactionaries' was 0.6, only two respondents intimated their willingness to engage in any form of anti-State protest. Each said they were prepared to take part in protest meetings and marches not permitted by the authorities and to defy unjust laws. The general attitude of 'reactionaries' towards anti-State violence was summed up by one Township Councillor: "As an authority it is absurd to show disapproval with one's authority. If I am dissatisfied then I would rather resign and withdraw my services." In other words, 'reactionaries' consider themselves State functionaries and are hardly going to jeopardise the privileges this relationship has secured. Among 'progressives' the average score was 19.6 which is consistent with a level of violence where the willingness to take up arms is certainly not dismissed outright. Six 'progressives' (37 percent) said that they were willing to engage in all protest activities listed. Interestingly, the willingness of four 'progressives' to arm themselves was conditional only upon getting sufficient quantities of weapons, while for the fifth it was conditional upon the "principles of international law".

In applying the Mann-Whitney U Test to determine the level of confidence in observed differences between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' in their willingness to engage in political violence, the results are statistically significant at the 99.99 percent level of confidence. In using Spearman's Rank Correlation to correlate the 'D' and 'V' scores, $r_s = .188$ which is not significant at the 0.05 level. In other words, there is no significant relationship between the level of discontent and the willingness to engage in violence. This result confirms that the willingness to engage in political violence is more a function of ideology than discontent.

5.4 CONCLUSION

In the current South African milieu there is a clear distinction between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives' in their normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence. What has become obvious is that ideology is the key to understanding these differences.

In his theory of political violence Gurr argues that the attitudes and beliefs people hold about the desirability of violence are a function of their discontent which renders them susceptible to ideologies that justify violence. Empirical evidence cited in Chapter 4 demonstrated that there is little difference in the levels of discontent on participation values between 'reactionaries' and 'progressives', however, what has emerged in Chapter 5 is that 'reactionaries' express their discontent in a distinctly different manner to 'progressives'. It would appear that these different expressions are a function of the relationship between the situational location of discontent and ideology. This same relationship also helps to explain the marked differences in the actualisation of political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu. Let us examine this relationship in more detail.

The unevenness of conditions found in Lamont and KwaMashu undoubtedly contribute to differences in social consciousness. Inkatha's links with the KwaZulu Government enable it to enhance its legitimacy and given Inkatha's control over resources in the bantustan, it further creates the impression that the process of affecting a redistribution has begun. Simply, Inkatha's control over affairs within the bantustan contribute to its legitimacy which inhibits the justifications for anti-State

violence. For example, one Community Councillor commented during an interview: "Inkatha must flourish as much as possible. It is the only movement of genuine liberation and must be given more powers by the Central Government." On the other hand, 'progressives' have been excluded from the redistribution process, particularly in Lamont, and not surprisingly regard the South African Government/KwaZulu Government alliance as illegitimate. As one respondent so candidly remarked: "I am fed up with paying taxes to this lay-about Government which does not consider my aspirations." Thus, the very situational location of discontent contributes to people's perspectives of Government legitimacy, or what Gurr refers to as the cultural justifications for political violence, and their susceptibility to ideologies. What emerges from the above discussion is that 'progressive' organisations can only make appeals to discontented people because their source of power lacks a resource base. Simply, the fragmented social consciousness among urban blacks in Durban is the product of two 'structurally diverse forces' complicated by the "material gains that each makes from its structural position".⁸⁶

While this research is concerned with anti-State violence, the resort to violence by State functionaries, such as Inkatha, cannot be ignored although it was not quantified in Chapter 2. Just as the State has legitimised its acts of violence by criminalising both protest action and protesters so too has Inkatha. This process, however, runs the risk of alienating its support base and institutionalising violence against any form of opposition. While the comment was passed that "if Inkatha changes its non-violent strategy it will collapse" was passed during one interview the respondent did not clarify whether this held true for violence directed against 'progressives', the State, or both.

Utilitarian justifications for violence are a function of the past success of violence in winning concessions. Gurr argues that the use of violence as a tactic need only succeed occasionally for people to consider it functional to increasing their value position. In South Africa political violence has resulted in changes but evidence suggests that many acts of violence are aimless reactions and expressions of frustration rather than clear strategy. In Chapter 6 specific outbreaks of violence in Lamont and KwaMashu will be examined and analysed in terms of the organisational ability of the discontented and the repressive capacity of the State including its functionaries.

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CHAPTER 6

THE ACTUALISATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LAMONT AND KWAMASHU

" The uprising of the masses, ...
is not something which is made,
it occurs of its own accord. It
is the result of social
relations and not the product
of a plan. It cannot be manu-
factured, it can only be fore-
seen. "

Leon Trotsky¹

In Gurr's theory, the actualisation of political violence is dependent upon the presence of discontented people:

- whose discontent has been politicised;
- who hold normative and utilitarian justifications about engaging in violence; and
- who exercise pervasive and consistent coercive control and/or have the support of strong organisations vis-à-vis the government.

At this point in the research the specific distribution of the first two variables in Lamont and KwaMashu have been established and it remains to determine the extent of the third, which is referred to in the model as BALANCE. In the analysis of this variable I propose to examine the four main precipitating causes of resistance in Lamont and KwaMashu since 1980, transport, rent, incorporation and education, with a view to determining the conditions under which resistance turns to violence.

6.1 TRANSPORT

On 1 December 1982 residents in Inanda, Clermont, Klaarwater, St Wendolins, Lamont and KwaMashu effected a boycott of Durban Transport Management Board (DTMB) buses following a 12.5 percent fare increase. On

13 December 1982 the Public Utility Transport Company (PUTCO) increased its bus fares by 13 percent and was also boycotted by commuters in the same townships. The boycotts remained in effect in all the townships, until May/June 1983, although in Lamont the boycott of DTMB buses is still sustained with periodic attacks directed at the buses and the occasional withdrawal of services.

The dissatisfaction of black commuters with bus transport has a long history in South Africa given the enforced spatial separation of townships from the work place. In fact, early resistance to housing in Lamont and KwaMashu was partially the result of increased transport costs which were incurred by the forced removal to peripheral locations from the more central shanty towns such as Cato Manor. McCarthy and Swilling point out that:

" Transport consumes between five and 20 percent of working class incomes. Unlike food or clothing, travelling costs are a non-substitutable item in the domestic budget. Consequently, working class households maintain a fragile balance between food and clothing expenditures which must be reduced as bus fares increase. "²

In addition to the often considerable distance between home and bus stop, Durban's township commuters are faced with further irritants including, overcrowding, the absence of timetables, deducted wages for late arrival at work, long waits at bus stops, inadequate bus stop shelters, unofficial stops, inadequate night and weekend services and diminished leisure time.³

Not surprisingly, bus transport in South Africa has become highly politicised and an object of popular struggle. (By comparison train transport has remained largely untouched by boycotts. This is probably due to cheaper train fares - a monthly train ticket from Lamont to the city is R11.00 compared with R24.95 for a bus). In each of the areas where the 1982 boycott broke out a Local Commuter Committee emerged to co-ordinate resistance. In PNAB townships these Committees united to form the Joint Commuter Committee (JCC) which demanded that either the increases be dropped or that PUTCO/DTMB monopolies be eliminated to

allow for more competition and cheaper services.

Although violence, mainly in the form of bus stonings, continued throughout the duration of the boycotts it was particularly intense on the first and second days (i.e. 1, 2, 13 and 14 December). On 1 December 40 buses were stoned in Clermont and KwaMashu and three bus drivers were injured in Lamont. Damage to buses was estimated at R10 000.⁴ On 2 December the first of a series of strategies designed to contain the resistance was employed when the police used teargas to disperse an estimated 1 000 boycotting commuters in Pinetown and another 400 at Westmead.⁵ On 13 December 90 buses were stoned in the KwaMashu-Ntuzuma-Inanda area and 20 on 14 December.⁶ In Lamont 47 buses were stoned between 13 - 15 December and on 13 December police vehicles and the PNAB Lamont Superintendents' Offices were destroyed after the police prevented a community meeting to discuss the fare increases.⁷ The boycotters were repeatedly co-opted and coerced by the State: on 13 December the DCC dropped leaflets from an aeroplane urging commuters to use DTMB buses;⁸ bus company spokesmen repeatedly justified the need for the increases on the grounds of rising costs⁹ and newspapers defended the DTMB and PUTCO in their editorials;¹⁰ taxi and private bus operators were harassed and fined for misdemeanours; and the police forced commuters out of taxis into buses.¹¹

The importance of the boycott was that it raised the level of political consciousness and engendered community and inter-township cohesiveness and in this regard the balance of institutional support would appear to have favoured the JCC. Not surprisingly, given the coercive capacity of the State, the DTMB and PUTCO succeeded in increasing their fares, although their coercive capacity was undermined by the presence of large numbers of taxis and owner/operator bus companies which provided alternative transport for the boycotters. While the associated violence undoubtedly satisfied the boycotters' expressive functions particularly in attacks directed against symbols of oppression, it served no instrumental function in reversing the decision to increase fares. The intensity of violence was exacerbated by the State's use of containment strategies, including the violent dispersal of peaceful protesters and attempts to force commuters out of taxis and into buses. However, even before the bus fare increase issue had been fully resolved Lamont residents were shaken by an increase in rent.

6.2 RENT AND INCORPORATION

On 1 October 1982 Lamont residents were issued with a notice informing them of the PNAB's intention to increase monthly housing rentals by an initial 63.3 percent to be followed by 15 percent increases introduced at six monthly intervals. As mentioned earlier, these increases were introduced as part of the PNAB's drive towards self-sufficiency. Although the PNAB argued that even after the full increases no one would have to pay more than 25 percent of their income on housing this estimate was based on an average monthly household income of R275 which did not take cognisance of the relationship between income, primary and secondary household subsistence levels and unemployment.¹² Further, while the PNAB was prepared to increase rents it also acknowledged that it only undertook minimum maintenance work.¹³

Reintges points out that Lamont residents did not initially react to the notice because the exact date for the implementation was not fixed.¹⁴ The reaction only came when the Minister of Co-operation and Development announced that rentals would be increased from 1 May 1983. Already mobilised to resist the bus fare increases, the PNAB township communities were easily united to resist the rent increases. It was against this background that JORAC was formally constituted in April 1983.¹⁵ Adopting the slogan asinamali (we have no money)¹⁶ the residents unequivocally rejected the increases. However, the event that served to unite the Lamont community against the rent increases, the NCC and the PNAB, was the assassination of JORAC member Msizi Dube on 25 April. Dube's murder was interpreted by Lamont residents as an attempt to silence opposition to the rent increases and precipitated three months of intense violence in Lamont.

On 26 April a mob of 3 000 people stormed the home of Moonlight Gasa, the then Chairman of the NCC who was subsequently implicated in Dube's murder and jailed. Throughout April, May and early June youths in the township stoned and set alight houses belonging to Community Councillors, buses, private cars, beerhalls, police and police vehicles and PNAB property and NCC offices. Burning barricades and roadblocks were a daily occurrence. At Dube's funeral on 1 May three suspected police informers were killed.¹⁷ Interestingly, Reintges quotes a survey of Lamont residents which found that nearly three quarters of the sample

felt that the youths "were trying to be of assistance to the community".¹⁸ The violence was clearly not indiscriminate but rather directed against the symbols of oppression, a point acknowledged by a Ningizimu Councillor in Lamont who was one of the targets. During the interview to assess discontent she said: "My house was stoned three times but I was not attacked as a person. Although my house is stoned the next day I can walk down the street in safety."

The strategy of containment rested solely on police action which merely served to exacerbate the violence to the extent that on 16 June 1983 Lamont was, for all intents and purposes, placed under martial law. By the end of June reports of "horrific events" in Lamont were surfacing and the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) spokesman on Law and Order, Mr. H. Pitman, alleged in Parliament that the police were indiscriminantly using teargas, firearms, dogs and sjamboks against residents.¹⁹ The Minister of Law and Order dismissed the allegations as "infamous lies" but when the police were removed from Lamont at the end of June the violence ceased almost immediately.²⁰

In opposing the rent increases JORAC's attempts to negotiate with the PNAB and the Department of Co-operation and Development were repeatedly frustrated and it was only after intervention by the Mayor of Durban that the Minister agreed to meet with JORAC, Ningizimu Councillors and the Chairman of the PNAB on 8 May 1983. The meeting produced a mixture of concessions and co-optive overtures, for example:

- the 63 percent rent increase was postponed until 1 August;
- the Department of Co-operation and Development granted R250 000 and a loan of R1 250 000 to the PNAB for the purposes of house maintenance and renovation;
- assurances were given that a concerted effort to apprehend Dube's killers would be made; and
- JORAC supposedly agreed to explain the need for higher rents to the communities.²¹

JORAC, however, resisted and disclaimed it had agreed to persuade the

residents to accept higher rentals.²² JORAC, in consultation with the PNAB and the NCC, instead agreed to organise a series of meetings at which PNAB officials would have had the opportunity to justify the higher rentals. At the first meeting in Lamont residents rejected the PNAB's explanation and strengthened their resolve to boycott the increases and the subsequent meetings were postponed.²³

JORAC initiated a rent boycott and between July and November 35 percent of residents payed no rent and 40 percent paid the old rate.²⁴ Although the PNAB decided against implementing the intended six monthly increases,²⁵ the rent boycott in the 13 now NPA townships still continues with a deficit of R2.5 million.²⁶

In imposing the rent increases the PNAB had not consulted the NCC which was clearly betrayed by the State. The Councillors were unable to convince residents that they were not privy to the increases and were even further isolated. In an attempt to restore some credibility to the NCC Inkatha funded a Supreme Court application, lodged by the NCC, to declare the rent increases null and void.²⁷

On 10 May 1983, two days after JORAC's meeting with the Minister of Co-operation and Development, the rent issue became clouded when Buthelezi announced that Lamont should be incorporated into KwaZulu and that "KwaZulu could take care of its people".²⁸ According to Buthelezi Ningizimu Councillors had approached him in 1978 requesting that Lamont be incorporated into KwaZulu and that the KLA had passed this request onto the Central Government. No formal negotiations took place according to Buthelezi because the Central Government replied that it had already decided to incorporate the township²⁹ and on 31 August 1983 the Government formally announced its intentions.³⁰

Buthelezi was clearly attempting to secure urban support by undermining the community cohesiveness fostered by JORAC on the rent issue and in doing so compelled JORAC to organise opposition to incorporation. For the State Lamont's incorporation into KwaZulu would have enabled it to distance itself from the demands of the community and curtail negotiations with Jorac.³¹ JORAC mobilised opposition to incorporation through Diakonia, the PFP, Black Sash, the Catholic Church, the UDF and BESG.

The BESG survey revealed that 87.2 percent of Lamont residents were against incorporation with three main reasons being cited:

- that incorporation would alter residents' legal status in terms of Section 10 rights (44.3 percent);
- that people would be worse off under the KwaZulu Government in terms of the likes of services and pensions (46.8 percent); and
- that the KwaZulu Government was an illegitimate organisation (8.9 percent).³²

JORAC articulated the incorporation issue as a State tactic to divide the community and argued that incorporation would:

" deprive us of the right to make our representations directly to the Central Government where the ultimate and effective power lies. "³³

JORAC added that it was against the principle of incorporation rather than incorporation into KwaZulu per se.³⁴

Violence flared in Lamont between members and supporters of Inkatha and JORAC during July and August 1984. Buthelezi singled out the ANC as the cause of the conflict: "The problems of Lamontville revolve around the divisive tactics of the mission in exile working in cahoots with their surrogates."³⁵ On 22 July some 80 armed Inkatha supporters arrived at the unveiling ceremony of Dube's tombstone, apparently looking for posters denigrating Buthelezi. In the ensuing violence two Inkatha vigilantes were killed and three injured.³⁶ Later in the same week two petrol bombs were thrown at the home of a Community Councillor. In August Buthelezi announced he would hold an Inkatha rally on 1 September in Lamont and invited JORAC officials, members and affiliates to attend. JORAC warned of further violence if the rally went ahead and Reverend Xundu sought a court interdict to prevent the rally. The Supreme Court rejected the application and on 31 August thousands of Lamont residents fled the township in anticipation of violence. Inkatha supporters were bussed from all over Natal and Transvaal to what remained a peaceful meeting. Buthelezi described the issue of incorporation as a "red

herring" and argued that "blacks remain oppressed whether they live in Lamont or KwaZulu" and that "in terms of the rights conveyed on them by Section 10 blacks in Lamont were no better or no worse off than those living in KwaMashu and Umlazi".³⁷

In terms of Gurr's theory the State has acceded to JORAC's demands, at least in the short term: the full rent increases were not implemented and nor has incorporation taken place. Despite these concessions one can hardly argue that the power relations between the State and blacks have been modified. To what extent did violence play a part in the granting of these concessions? Reintges quotes one PNAB official as attributing the failure to implement the rent increases to the riots.³⁸ The balance of institutional support clearly favoured JORAC but when the State unleashed the security forces to beseige the township the balance between institutional support for JORAC and the coercive capacity of the State evened out and it was during this period that the intensity of violence peaked. By widening the scope of its institutional support, particularly through its access to parliament via the PFP, JORAC was able to effect the removal of the security forces and as soon as the State was removed the violence subsided.

6.3 EDUCATION

During the past decade black education has been responsible for precipitating more violence than any other single issue in South Africa. Earlier discussions have demonstrated that KwaMashu residents escape many of the irritants felt by Lamont residents; education is, however, one issue from which they have not been excluded. Pupils in Lamont and KwaMashu fall under different education ministries, the Department of Education and Training (DET) and the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture (DEC) respectively. However, it will be argued here that neither the DET nor the DEC are willing to meet the demands of black pupils for fear of altering the balance of power, and that the pupils themselves do not differentiate between the DET and the DEC at an ideological level.

Although Natal townships were largely excluded from the political violence of 1976/77 that rocked other townships in South Africa, any illusions that Natal, and particularly KwaZulu, were totally immune from political violence were shattered in 1980 when boycotting pupils in KwaMashu fought the security forces and Inkatha-backed vigilantes for the first time. The education crisis of 1980 provides a good introduction to the dimension of the education crisis in South Africa but more importantly enables further conclusions to be drawn about the intensity of political violence in KwaMashu.

Sporadic black school boycotts began in Cape Town in February 1980 and by April had spread nationwide as the grievances which were initially school specific (including, enforced homework, poor conduct by teachers, shortages of text books and compulsory school fees and uniforms) were clarified as resistance to the inferior quality of black education. The politicisation of education was evident in slogans such as 'Education for Social Change' and 'Don't force us to supply cheap labour for capitalism'.³⁹ In Durban Indian and coloured pupils boycotted throughout 1980 while pupils in the DET schools were quiescent. Pupils in the DEC schools, particularly in KwaMashu, boycotted for approximately three months from the end of April in protest against bantu education which one KwaMashu parent described as "an education for domestics and labourers (which) does not train men and women to take their rightful place in the future of South Africa".⁴⁰

What emerges from an analysis of the events of 1980 in both KwaZulu and the rest of South Africa is the increasingly familiar pattern of community resistance being countered by various combinations of force, co-optation, and token concessions which invariably do nothing to alleviate discontent but rather are responsible for smouldering stalemates.

The KwaMashu schools' boycott began on 30 April 1980 and violence erupted on the first day as the police rushed to the township to prevent protesting pupils from marching through the streets. In the first confrontation police dispersed an estimated 1 300 pupils with teargas.⁴¹ In the following days pupils stoned buses, private and police vehicles, and school buildings.⁴² Buthelezi reacted immediately to the boycott and attempted to co-opt pupils by urging them to discipline themselves and

stay at school while at the same time warned pupils that "indiscipline is exactly what will allow us to fall into the hands of 'trigger happy types' who will use us as cannon fodder"⁴³ (emphasis added). Despite community cohesiveness, as demonstrated by a meeting of some 1 000 parents in support of the boycott on 11 May,⁴⁴ the police, in consultation with school principals, decided that parents would be told to order their children back to school⁴⁵ and on 12 May members of the KLA distributed 15 000 pamphlets calling on pupils to return to school and ordering people to attend a rally to be addressed by Buthelezi on 18 May.⁴⁶ On 17 May boycotting pupils and their parents met in the township cinema to discuss the crisis and the planned visit of Buthelezi the next day. Inkatha officials broke up the meeting and pupils emerged from the cinema and stoned police.⁴⁷

The use of violence to contain the resistance was justified on the grounds that innocent pupils were being used for political ends. At the public rally Buthelezi, guarded by an Inkatha impi bussed from Umlazi, ordered pupils to return to school and blamed the ensuing violence on agitators including, "pundits from Reservoir Hills (an Indian suburb of Durban); intellectuals from the University of Durban-Westville and the Black Medical School; activists sitting in white newspaper offices; and Xhosa speaking Transkeian scavengers".⁴⁸ KwaZulu Minister of Education, Oscar Dhlomo, said that:

" Inkatha was not prepared to be led by children (and) that we do not believe that children have the intellect to devise strategies under which the black man is to be liberated. "⁴⁹

In the aftermath of the meeting youths stoned vigilantes and the police and one youth was killed.⁵⁰ Buthelezi's order to return to school was openly defied and throughout May and June the boycotts continued with intermittent violence.⁵¹ Pupils were detained, assaulted and had their homes damaged by vigilantes. In the KLA Buthelezi called on vigilantes to "shoot to kill" people found damaging school property⁵² and at the end of May 11 alleged boycott leaders were detained and taken to Ulundi for interrogation by the KLA.⁵³ In early June Buthelezi issued further threats and said that pupils who did not write their mid-year examinations would not be readmitted to KwaZulu schools.⁵⁴ Replying to a court

application to prevent Inkatha officials from assaulting pupils Buthelezi said the situation in the township was explosive and that "a section of the pupils were being used by the Black Consciousness Movement for political reasons to encourage and foment discontent and unhappiness".⁵⁵

The State's initial attempts to contain the countrywide boycotts included, threats to close schools, the expulsion of pupils, the closure of schools and the selective re-registration of pupils, banning meetings, detaining pupil leaders, and the deployment of security forces in townships. Such actions, however, merely accentuated community resistance and resulted in an escalation of violence. Concomitant State strategies included attempts to co-opt boycotters. In July, for example, a pamphlet titled Our Aim - Education for All was produced which acknowledged the legitimacy of some pupil grievances and outlined the Government's plans for overcoming them.⁵⁶ As a result token concessions were volunteered by the State in the form of increased funds for the provision of better schools, salaries and books. These concessions did not of course meet the long term demands of pupils who insisted on structural changes to the education system. In DEC schools discussions between Department officials and school principals were held during the July holidays with a view to breaking the boycott and although the DEC conceded nothing to the pupils the boycott petered out early in the third term.⁵⁷

Pupils in DEC schools in Durban wrote their end of year exams in 1980 but the issues were far from resolved. In November the Minister of Education and Training argued that 'unrest' in black schools had retarded the DET's development programmes but that the standard of education laid down by the DET was identical to those in other departments.⁵⁸ In practice, of course, blacks do not receive equal education: lower per capita expenditure, underqualified teachers, overcrowding, and poor facilities in black schools all contribute to gross discrepancies in standards between different departments. The 1980 boycotts also prompted the Government to introduce compulsory education for blacks in those parts of the country which had not participated in the boycotts. (Townships under the threat of incorporation, such as Lamont, were not considered for the compulsory education scheme.) Just as the establishment of bantustan education departments enabled the

South African Government to drastically reduce its educational responsibilities, so too did the shift to parents of control over attendance. The move enabled the State to co-opt parents to help prevent future boycotts by criminalising non-attendance.⁵⁹

Between 1981 and 1985 black school boycotts became a regular part of the South African black schools' calendar, albeit on a smaller scale than 1980. In 1985, however, the education crisis intensified countrywide and in Durban the crisis exploded in August in what was to be popularly referred to as the Inanda 'riots' - a period of the most intense and widespread political violence in Durban since 1949. The week long violence was precipitated by the assassination of Mrs. N. V. Mxenge⁶⁰ outside her home in Umlazi on Thursday evening 1 August 1985. At the time of her death Mxenge was the instructing attorney for the defence team in a treason trial against members of the UDF. A brief day by day description of the violence follows.⁶¹

Monday 5 August

Pamphlets printed jointly by COSAS and AZASO called on pupils throughout Durban's black townships to stayaway from school for the remainder of the week as a mark of respect for Mxenge. School principals were urged to release pupils and shops and businesses in the townships were ordered to close. In Lamont and KwaMashu mobs stoned PUTCO buses, police vans, delivery vehicles and administration offices.

Tuesday 6 August

The violence intensified and spread from Umlazi to Malukazi and from KwaMashu to Ntuzuma, Newlands and Inanda. In Inanda violence was directed at Indian landlords and shopkeepers, many of whom fled their homes in fear of their lives. NDB and KwaZulu administration offices and houses belonging to 'informers', Community Councillors and policemen were all razed. An estimated 3 000 youths attacked the KwaMashu shopping centre and were baton charged and teargassed by SAP. During the night township streets were barricaded.

Wednesday 7 August

Buses, cars and taxis were stoned as youths tried to enforce a worker stayaway. Political violence was clearly coloured by the activities of criminal opportunists who looted and burned bottle and trading stores, butcheries, and tea rooms. The security forces intervened with live ammunition for the first time during the afternoon. During the evening, at Mxenge's memorial in Umlazi between 4 000 and 5 000 mourners were attacked by 300 amabutho, allegedly from Lindelani and 17 people were killed.

Thursday 8 August

Inkatha vigilantes, mobilised by Councillors and given carte blanche by the security forces, increased their patrols scattering groups of youths and conducting house to house searches for stolen goods. The death toll rose to 38.

Friday 9 August

The violence receded in KwaMashu and Umlazi during the day but continued on the Inanda/Phoenix border during the night when vigilantes launched a series of attacks, each of which was successfully repelled. At the end of the week 67 people were reported dead, 1 000 had been injured and 180 businesses destroyed.

Saturday 10 August

Inkatha's Oscar Dhlomo addressed a rally in Inanda attended by some 5 000 Inkatha supporters and gave assurances that pupils would return to school on Monday and that Inkatha patrols would stop the violence.⁶²

In the analysis of the Inanda 'riots' the following points are worth noting:

- what began as a political protest was quickly coloured by the activities of criminals and unemployed youths who were only too happy to loot in the name of the 'struggle' and in the ensuing chaos the stayaway lost direction;

- black businesses suffered just as much those owned by Indians;
- the majority of deaths occurred after the security forces began using live ammunition and Inkatha backed vigilantes attempted to restore order. The security forces acknowledged responsibility for 37 of the 67 deaths, the remainder being victims of vigilantes and to a lesser degree opposition in-fighting; and
- pupils returned to school on Monday 12 August because the stayaway was never planned for more than one week not because Inkatha ordered the return.

Sporadic violence has continued in Durban's townships since August 1985 precipitated by resistance to bantu education and the State's and Inkatha's reactionary tactic of posting security forces/vigilantes at schools. COSAS was banned on 29 August which aggravated the conflict. In early September black schools countrywide were boycotted and in Durban clashes between the security forces and Inkatha on the one hand and township youths with allegiance to COSAS on the other were an almost daily occurrence.⁶³ In the same period the homes of both UDF and Inkatha leaders were burnt down.⁶⁴ In mid-September allegations that 181 pupils in Durban had been detained, including 45 from Lamont and 54 from KwaMashu, prolonged the boycotts in both Lamont (until the end of the year) and in KwaMashu (until October).⁶⁵ Inkatha vigilantes responded and stepped up their 'war': during the Shaka Day rally at Umlazi on 28 September vigilantes conducted three separate raids into Lamont (one of which was led by Prince Gideon Zulu), each of which was successfully repulsed by township youths. The raids left six vigilantes dead and 12 people injured.⁶⁶

For the first time pupils in Lamont schools did not write their examinations at the end of the year. When pupils in DEC schools did write Inkatha interpreted this as their victory in containing political violence.⁶⁷ As 1986 demonstrates, however, such claims are exceedingly shallow.

In response to demands made at the SPCC conference the Minister of National Education announced that pupils in DET schools would receive

free books and stationery and would not be required to pay fees, and that grants would be made to each bantustan education department to effect similar concessions.⁶⁸ The DEC's grant of R5.7 million (i.e. R5 per pupil) was, however, inadequate to enable the DEC to abolish school fees. The DEC added to pupil discontent by delaying the release of details as to how its grant would be distributed and when the grant was received in March the DEC vacillated and delayed issuing stationery to pupils.⁶⁹ These issues prompted KwaMashu pupils to boycott classes, stage protest meetings and attack KwaZulu Government property.

The DET reopened its schools on 8 January 1986 but pupils only began to return on 28 January in accordance with SPCC resolutions. However, in schools countrywide, including Lamont, the mere provision of free education and books and stationery did not resolve the crisis. The continued presence of police and troops in the township was contrary to SPCC resolutions and precipitated intermittent boycotts which were in turn countered by security force action and led to an escalation of the conflict. For example, a week long boycott was precipitated by police on 16 March who fired on people leaving a community meeting in Lamont to discuss the school crisis.⁷⁰ The inability of the DET to acknowledge the crisis is evident by the fact that the Department subsequently removed temporary teachers from Lamont High School which precipitated further violence as protesting pupils stoned vehicles and confronted the police.⁷¹

Over the Easter weekend the NECC held its first conference in Durban. Violence erupted when an alleged Inkatha impi attacked the conference in what Buthelezi described as an "expression of black youth anger".⁷² In one of his frequent displays of paranoia Buthelezi claimed that the "NECC did not assemble ... in Durban to concern itself with matters of education just as the SPCC did not assemble ... to concern itself with matters of education".⁷³ Among the resolutions adopted by the NECC was that pupils should return to school in the second term and subsequently in Lamont attendance increased to between 80 and 100 percent.⁷⁴ In KwaMashu, however, violence was precipitated by four issues in April and May:

- the impi that arrived at the NECC conference had been transported in

two PUTCO buses and on 4 April pupils stoned PUTCO buses in the township;

- vigilantes swore to avenge the deaths of colleagues killed at the NECC conference. On 7 April about 12 000 pupils stayed away from school after a rumour circulated that an impi was preparing to attack schools;⁷⁵
- the banning of student representative councils by the KTC. After the banning vigilantes attacked pupils to rid the township of "troublesome SRC's"⁷⁶ and pupils retaliated by stoning and petrol bombing houses belonging to Township Councillors and Inkatha members;⁷⁷ and
- pupils demanded the cancellation of June examinations as no tuition had been forthcoming.⁷⁸ On 20 May vigilantes sjambokked pupils at the KwaMashu shopping centre before proceeding to three schools. In the ensuing battle seven vigilantes were killed. On 24 May five people were killed by vigilantes in a night-time raid on private homes.⁷⁹

When DET schools reopened after the Easter weekend pupils arrived at Lamont High School to be turned away by police who claimed that the DET had suspended classes until 11 April as "a measure to allow parents to restore order and discipline".⁸⁰ The LECC met with the DET to negotiate the reopening of schools and the DET agreed that the second term would begin on 21 April. The DET further agreed to consult with the LECC before issuing new instructions. However, the new cordial relationship between the LECC and DET was short lived: on 8 April a pupil was killed by police after a group of pupils confronted the principal and demanded that school fees be refunded;⁸¹ and on 16 April the security forces besieged Lamont. Notwithstanding the high public relations profile adopted by the security forces in their attempt to de-politicise the seige, in his survey of Lamont residents undertaken during the seige, Sutcliffe clearly demonstrates that residents perceived the intervention within a political framework.⁸² For example, 28 percent of respondents felt that the security forces had come to repress their organisations while nine percent said they had come to disturb their educational programmes.⁸³ More importantly, in this context, was the fact that among the 92 percent of respondents who felt less safe with the security

forces present in the township the majority perceived the security forces as the instigators of violence.⁸⁴ The Minister of Education and Training further exacerbated the education crisis in May when in response to the NECC conference he announced that the Government had a ten year plan to provide uniform education under one department in South Africa.⁸⁵

The DET delayed the opening of the third school term by two weeks to "normalise" and "create a meaningful climate" for black education and to "ensure pupils' safety". The DET's 'Master Plan' for the normalisation of black education included re-registering pupils and issuing them with personal identification cards, constructing security fences around schools and floodlights in schools, and employing permanent security guards at schools, and was simply a tactic to contain school boycotts in the third term.⁸⁶ When schools reopened on 14 July pupils at Lamont High School refused to enter the premises in the presence of the police. Two days later pupils entered the school, demanded their identification cards and proceeded to burn them.⁸⁷ Not surprisingly, in the face of the abolition of the pass laws pupils perceived the identification document as an attempt by the DET to reintroduce passes.⁸⁸ The DET set 25 July as the deadline for pupils to re-register in the presence of their parents who were forced to sign declarations accepting liability for damage during violence. At Lamont High School registration was abandoned as pupils tore up the school's register.⁸⁹ On 28 July the DET announced it would not extend the dead-line for re-registration and that pupils who failed to register would not be allowed to resume school until 1987.⁹⁰ The stalemate continued through August. In September, one week after the fourth term began, Lamont High School was one of 33 schools throughout the country closed until the end of the year.

Pupils in KwaMashu returned to school at the start of the third term and notwithstanding isolated incidents appeared willing to write the end of year examinations. In Lamont, however, pupils did not write their exams for the second successive year and there appears to have been an irreversible breakdown of the education environment.⁹¹

6.4 CONCLUSION

The pertinent question here is, at what point in black resistance does violence reach its peak? In the examples considered above the invariable answer is when the security forces/vigilantes counter protest and violence with violence.

Gurr argues that the magnitude of political violence is greatest when the balance of coercive control and institutional support for dissidents and regimes are equal. In Durban's black townships the ratio of coercive control and institutional support for 'progressives' vis-à-vis the State/'reactionary' alliance demonstrates considerable variation.

In Lamont 'progressive' organisations receive wide support despite their lack of resources to satisfy material expectations. This support appears to be based on the articulation of the source of discontent and has fostered community cohesiveness even if reactive and spontaneous violence undermines the organisational capacity of 'progressives'. Among 'progressives' violence appears to be primarily a channel for the expression of protest. Under these conditions the coercive capacity of 'progressives' is less obvious and it is the State which resorts to coercion to force compliance with its demands.

In KwaMashu the scope of support for 'progressives' is weakened by the presence of Inkatha with considerable institutional support through its ties with the KwaZulu Government and subsequent ability to provide, albeit limited, material benefits and its willingness to negotiate for change at no cost to supporters. On the other hand, 'progressive' organisations in KwaMashu seek to capture the support of discontented people by prescribing new ideologies. In KwaMashu the result is that 'progressives' receive less institutional support and the State can apply more coercion through its alliance with Inkatha.

While 'progressives' have not shied from violence it has largely evolved as a spontaneous reaction and functional only to the extent that it provides a channel for expressing resistance. At the same time however, it must be acknowledged that 'progressives' have committed many 'blunders' in the name of the struggle. For example, it is hard to

reconcile the actions of 'progressives' who attack people for having their hair permed with the resistance movement.⁹² More common of course is the use of violence, for example stoning buses, without communicating intentions. It would be interesting to know how many times youths have stoned their commuting parents in the name of the struggle. While it is true that token concessions have been conceded by the State in the aftermath of violence this should not be misconstrued as an argument that violence has been instrumental in satisfying black expectations. As earlier examples have demonstrated neither the State nor Inkatha are averse to using violence to protect their interests. This violence is justified on the grounds that black communities (i.e. Community Councillors) have urged the Government to restore law and order.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

" It is very difficult to make predictions in a South African setting because the present violence is a self-defence against a system that practises oppression. "

COSATU respondent¹

This research has attempted to explain the conditions under which people participate in anti-State collective political violence. A comparative case-study approach was adopted whereby collective political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu was analysed using Gurr's theory. Theories are designed to explain events in the 'real world' and clearly they structure our realities to some extent. Thus to interpret facts presented as evidence we must first have a well developed theory.² I believe that most of the research into political violence in South Africa lacks a strong theoretical base (Marxist analysis aside) and that too little attention is paid to the theoretical aspects of political violence. While the use of a specific theory to the exclusion of others is always hard to justify, the real problem is to choose theories that illustrate the state of the field. The use of Gurr's theory in this research met the two essential criteria in this regard: first, in terms of the rationale of this research, it is relevant in that it offers a social-psychological explanation for participation in collective political violence; and second, it attempts to organise and synthesize all the literature on political violence.

In Chapter 1 I argued that case studies can serve as building blocks for the development of better theories. Consequently, before drawing the conclusions of this research together, it is necessary to examine the basic strengths and weaknesses of Gurr's theory.

While the variables that determine the outcome of political violence are the characteristics of the groups involved, in this case the Government and its agents and the contending 'progressive' organis-

ations, the psychological attributes of individuals, such as frustration and relative deprivation, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. In the words of Muller, "... there is sound reason to expect that some psychological variables are significant for an understanding of the conditions that make people ready for participation in acts of political protest and violence".³ However, the results of this research give additional weight to Muller's conclusion that, "relative deprivation ... probably bears an indirect relationship to individual propensities for political ... violence, but the evidence is by no means decisive."⁴

Gurr qualifies his proposition relating relative deprivation to political violence by introducing two additional causal variables, normative and utilitarian justifications, which act to amplify or inhibit the effect of relative deprivation. Normative justifications arise from alienation from the political system and ideological approval of violence while utilitarian justifications arise from the belief that violence will secure rewards and concessions. The question consequently arises, what causes these basic motivations? Although consideration must be given to factors such as the degree of government legitimacy, efficacy of past violence, support for dissidents, and the availability of time to participate in violence afforded by unemployment or by being a student, one highly plausible explanation for utilitarian justifications is that these motivations are activated by government repression. Similarly, variables such as relative deprivation and policy dissatisfaction are obvious candidates to explain the presence of normative justifications. If normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence do exist a pertinent question is, what role do organisations play in activating these beliefs? Further, if these beliefs are absent to what extent can organisations mobilise people for violence independently of these two variables? Answers to these questions require that further research be undertaken.

In addition to these theoretical issues the use of Gurr's theory raised certain methodological problems. The basic problem was the measurement of independent and dependent variables. The measurement of relative deprivation and the willingness to engage in political violence are two cases in point. For example, the measurement of a behavioural potential (e.g. the willingness to engage in violence) is clearly different to the measurement of overt behaviour (e.g. actual participation in violence). Such methodological problems, of course, are by no means peculiar to

Gurr's theory, rather they are the problems of social science in general.

Finally, having pointed out the theoretical and methodological issues associated with Gurr's theory, let us draw the conclusions of this research together.

The empirical evidence collated and presented in Chapter 2 demonstrated that collective political violence has been a characteristic of South Africa society since Soweto June 1976 - an event that can be regarded as a watershed in the country's contemporary history. Notwithstanding the increasing number of well planned acts of political violence directed against the State and the disturbing frequency with which security force actions precipitate reactive violence, the majority of incidents can be described as hastily planned and unco-ordinated spontaneous violence initiated by both precipitating and predisposing factors. In attempting to analyse this form of political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu the following formulation was applied:

$$MPV = RD + (RD \times JUST \times BALANCE).$$

The application of this model to conditions and events in Lamont and KwaMashu enabled certain conclusions to be drawn about each of the variables in the model and these are stated in turn.

- (i) Relative deprivation is widespread in both townships across the ideological spectrum.

Widespread qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests the presence of relative deprivation in black townships. In fact comparisons between the townships and the white urban milieu are inevitable and commonsense. In the South African context such comparisons take on a political dimension because they suggest structural and group inequalities. In this research further empirical evidence was sought for the intensity and scope of relative deprivation. The fact that power values (political participation and freedom from oppression) emerged as the salient value for 72 percent of the sample (55 percent among 'reactionaries' and 81 percent among 'progressives') is suggestive of the degree to which

structural inequalities have been politicised in South Africa.

However, in this model of analysis relative deprivation by itself does not precipitate political violence but rather:

- relative deprivation must be politicised (that power values emerged among the majority of respondents as their salient value is evidence of the degree of politicisation of discontent), and
- people must hold specific beliefs about the desirability and utility of violence.

Consequently, to understand the magnitude of political violence it is necessary to delve into the ideology of the actors.

- (ii) While violence per se is sanctioned across the ideological spectrum, the commitment to anti-State political violence is one-sided.

The actors were divided into two camps, 'reactionaries' and 'progressives', and the role of violence in each ideology showed considerable variation.

While portraying itself as a liberation movement, Inkatha has emerged as a State functionary and a 'reactionary' organisation. In this guise Inkatha has redefined resistance as criminal activity and proceeded to criminalise the protester and all forms of anti-State protest not under its control. As one Inkatha leader retorted when asked whether she was prepared to protest against the authorities: "We are the authorities." In this process of criminalisation Inkatha has been able to justify vigilante assaults directed against 'progressive' organisations as 'policing operations'. In this sense then, 'reactionary' ideology sees violence as desirable and functional to preserve the status quo.

After a decade of continuous political violence in South Africa the danger of normative justifications for political violence must be rapidly increasing particularly among the township youth. Simply, the greater the frequency of violence the more people will expect it to occur and depending on the success of violence in winning concessions

attitudes of expectancy may be converted into norms justifying violence. In South Africa resistance/violence has won concessions, for example: the right of blacks to form trade unions; the electrification of some townships; free books and stationery in DET and bantustan schools; and the withdrawal of proposed rent increases in Lamont. The implication of the role of violence as a strategy is not that violence is the most effective strategy but that it secures some benefits, at least occasionally. Thus certainly among 'progressive' youth organisations there appears to be increasing normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence.

Given that these justifications for political violence exist what conclusions then can be drawn about the balance of power in Durban's townships?

- (iii) The balance of power in Durban's townships demonstrates a spatial specificity.

There are fundamental differences between Lamont and KwaMashu in the level of institutional support for the State (including State functionaries, e.g. Inkatha). Institutional support for Inkatha is concentrated inside the KwaZulu bantustan (including KwaMashu) and it is there that Inkatha holds the balance of power (notwithstanding the fact that Inkatha hegemony is being increasingly challenged by the township youth). In townships in 'white' South Africa (including Lamont) institutional support for 'progressive' organisations and ideology prevails and it is there that the Government feels compelled to resort to force to maintain the balance of power.

Functional institutional support for Inkatha derives from three sources and in discussing these sources specific relationships between relative deprivation, the justifications for political violence, and the balance of power also become apparent.

First, Inkatha's links to the KLA and subsequent reliance on Government funding enables it to provide material benefits, however limited, to its followers, for example, lower housing rents and service charges. In the provision of these material benefits the KLA is actively encouraged

by the Nationalist Government eager to entice blacks into the bantustans from 'white' South Africa. The extent to which material rewards off-set the desire for increased political participation was not established in this research but undoubtedly poses a problem for the autocratic Inkatha leadership given that the perceived level of interference with "participating in political organisations" and "voting for people who represent your interests" was so high among 'reactionaries' interviewed in this research.

Second, not only does Inkatha offer its supporters material rewards but it minimises the risk of confrontation with "the all powerful White Government" while promising them 'risk-free liberation'. In return for their pledge of loyalty, Buthelezi gives assurances that black lives will not be senselessly forfeited in the struggle against the Government and reassures blacks that the best liberation is one that has been negotiated by Inkatha leadership. Consequently, the expressive function of resistance is articulated by Inkatha's leadership, particularly Buthelezi. In addition to these two sources of support Inkatha also makes appeals to Zulu ethnicity, ideational coherence and group cohesiveness which may be particularly important in reducing internal dissent in the organisation, particularly on power values.

Thus, in the process of building institutional support Inkatha satisfies the motivations of its members by partly off-setting material relative deprivation and limiting the need to engage in confrontational violence with the State. In other words, Inkatha attempts to dissolve the politicisation of discontent through its ideology and promise of material rewards which limit the justifications for anti-State political violence. This would appear to be the most likely explanation for non-participation in anti-State political violence. Of course, the very nature of Inkatha's relationship with the State (one of reliance based upon funding and one of commitment based upon the shared ideals of capitalism) reduces its ability to build support beyond the boundaries of the bantustan.

On the other hand, 'progressive' organisations hold the balance of institutional support in Lamont despite the fact that the State has all the advantages of manipulative interference based on consumerism and control of the major socialisation agencies. This support has been built

through the politicisation of discontent, that is articulating the State as the agent responsible for discontent, and subsequently achieving a political and emotional alienation from State institutions. While lacking the resources to provide their followers with material rewards 'progressive' organisations in Lamont have nonetheless been able foster a high degree of community cohesiveness in an essentially diverse class-ridden community by giving people a semblance of hope and, in the words of one UDF official, "offering a stream into which organisational energies could be plunged".⁵ Among some sectors of the 'progressive' movement, particularly the ANC, violence is undoubtedly encouraged as an expressive function to stimulate the morale of frustrated and discontented youths.

Thus, what conclusions can be drawn about the patterns of collective political violence?

- (iv) The actualisation of anti-State political violence in Durban's townships demonstrates a spatial specificity.

Community resistance to State hegemony has frequently resulted in violence as the State resorts to coercion to retain its balance of power and the patterns of collective violence in Durban's townships (i.e. KwaMashu in 1980 and 1986 and Lamont in 1983 and 1986) reflect this use of coercion. This very point was made perfectly clear by the respondent whose comments appear above: "... violence is a self-defence against a system that practices oppression." This is by no means a unique conclusion and has been repeatedly acknowledged by other social observers. The Catholic Church, for example, has concluded that "... essentially the escalation of violence is a response by desperate people to the built-in violence in an apartheid society",⁶ while the Anglican Church has similarly stated: "In the spiral of violence ... we see the policy of apartheid ... as the midwife and mother of this violence."⁷

In Lamont the Government has intervened directly through its security forces. For example, the township has been besieged on two separate occasions to crush resistance. In KwaMashu Inkatha vigilantes have acted as proxies for the State. To sum up, violence has primarily erupted as:

- a reactive strategy under provocation from the security forces and Inkatha vigilantes;
- an instrument for securing rewards; and
- an expressive function in the articulation of discontent.

Finally, a general assessment of the causes of collective political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu can be stated as follows:

- (v) The lack of political rights giving rise to relative deprivation induced discontent is the main predisposing factor of political violence, while State reaction to resistance is the primary precipitating cause.

The use of coercion remains the prime precipitating factor in reactive and spontaneous collective political violence. The predisposing condition is the Government's refusal to include blacks in political structures which would free them from regulation and control, increase their opportunities and give them a say in their own lives. As this research has aptly demonstrated it is power relations that induce relative deprivation. Although the exact links between relative deprivation and the range of justifications for violence which seek redress are unclear, it is obvious that any attempt to suppress discontent will increase the intensity and scope of political violence. The trend will be broken only when the Government comes to this conclusion.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES CHAPTER 7:

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

GROUP _____

AGE _____ (Years); MALE/FEMALE

OCCUPATION _____

1. All of us want certain things out of life. When you think about what really matters in life, what is the single most important thing in the lives of people like you?

Spontaneous:

2. Why is this thing the most important?

Classify into one of the following SALIENT VALUE groups:

- WELFARE (We) Economic, contribute to physical well being;
 (Ws) Self-actualisation, contribute to self realisation;
- POWER (Pp) Participation, To partake in political competition;
 (Ps) Security, Desire for self determination, security and freedom from oppression.
- INTERPERSONAL (Ii) Ideational Coherence, Beliefs about nature of society and one's place in it.
 (Is) Status, Measure of prestige;
 (Ic) Communalilty, Desire to participate in stable supportive groups, eg. family, community, association.

Code spontaneous SALIENT VALUE: _____

3. Below is a list of things which people like yourself may feel concerned about. Please read the list and tick the four most important things.

- (Ic) Being a member of a church that cares for all its members.
- (We) Earning higher wages.
- (Pp) To have a say in the running of the township.
- (Ws) Working in a job which gives you a great deal of happiness.
- (Is) Being a well known and important member of the community.
- (Ps) Living in a democratic society where all members are free to express their own opinions.
- (Ii) Being proud that you are a member of the Zulu/Xhosa/_____ nation.
- (Ic) Being a member of a family whose members help and care for each other.
- (Pp) Voting for representatives in a parliament representing all South Africans.
- (Ws) Getting a better education.
- (Ii) Knowing that you are treated by fellow South Africans on your merit not because of your skin colour.
- (Ps) Police and army patrols in townships.
- (We) The rising cost of food and transport.
- (Is) To achieve great things and be recognised by your community.
- (Pp) Releasing imprisoned black leaders so that they can help in the running of the country.
- (Ic) Being a member of a strong workers' organisation that looks after the interests of its members.
- (Ii) Being proud that you are a black South African.
- (We) Buying your own home/ buying a better home.
- (Is) Having many friends and no enemies.
- (Ps) The detention without trial of people because of their beliefs.
- (Ws) Enjoying life to its fullest.
- (Ps) The elimination of corruption by officials in the township.
- (Ii) Being proud of the fact that you are a South African.
- (We) To have all the physical comforts of life that you desire.
- (Is) Being an important and respected community leader.
- (Ic) To raise hard working children who will one day care for you.
- (Pp) To participate in the running of the Regional Services Councils.
- (Ws) To have a job that allows you to show your real potential.

4. Are there any other very important concerns, not mentioned in the above list, and more important than those on the list, that concern people like you,?

5. Why are these things the most important?

6. Now taking the other side of the picture, what are the most important fears and worries about the future that people like you hold?

List coded spontaneous SALIENT VALUE

List four PRE-CODED SALIENT VALUES

| | |
|----------|----------|
| 1. _____ | |
| 2. _____ | |
| 3. _____ | 1. _____ |
| 4. _____ | 2. _____ |
| | 3. _____ |
| | 4. _____ |

List ADDITIONAL coded SALIENT VALUES

| |
|----------|
| 1. _____ |
| 2. _____ |
| 3. _____ |

If respondent records ADDITIONAL SALIENT VALUES then respondent must rank PRE-CODED and ADDITIONAL SALIENT VALUES. First four are used.

If five different codes appear, then initial SPONTANEOUS RESPONSE is recorded as the SALIENT VALUE.

Otherwise, a SALIENT VALUE comprises two or more life concerns from the above list of five. Confirm with respondent. If two life concerns emerge with equal weighting the degree of relative deprivation must be scored twice. Discuss with respondent the fact that two things in his life appear very important.

7. Think for a moment about the single most important thing in the lives of people like you.

8. I want you to describe the best possible situation that you believe can be achieved over the next five years with regard to this single most important thing.

9. I want you to now describe the worst possible situation that you believe you may find yourself in over the next five years with regard to this single most important thing.

10. I want you to look at the following scale. Ten represents the best possible situation that you described above, while zero represents the worst possible situation. I want you to mark the scale where you think people like you would place themselves at the present point in time.

Degree of Relative
Deprivation

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

11. Looking at the same scale once more, do you think that people like you consider themselves entitled to be in a higher position on the scale. Whereabouts on the scale should people like you be placed at the present time?

If respondent believes that he is entitled to be on a higher rung on the scale than he actually places himself, ask:

12. Why should people like you be placed on rung (read value expectation score).

If two equally weighted salient values repeat for second salient value.

13. Thinking about South Africa in the past five years, some people say that blacks have experienced big improvements in their standard of living (higher wages, more consumer durables, and better facilities) and have greater access to political participation (through the homelands and community councils). These people say that blacks are better off now than five years ago. Other people say that blacks are certainly no better off, and may in fact even be worse off now compared with five years ago.

Do people like you feel they are better off now compared with five years ago? YES/NO/UNSURE If yes, why? If no, why not? If unsure, discuss.

14. I want you to think for a moment about the single most important thing in the lives of people like you.

15. I want you to describe the best possible situation that you believe can be achieved over the next five years with regard to that single most important thing.

16. I want you to describe the worst possible situation that you believe you may find yourself in over the next five years with regard to that single most important thing.

17. I want you to look at the following scale. Ten represents the best possible situation that you described above, while zero represents the worst possible situation. I want you to mark the scale where you think people like you are placed at the present time.

Changes in Group Value Position

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

18. Thinking back to five years ago with regard to the single most important thing in the lives of people like you, whereabouts on the scale would people like you have situated themselves five years ago?

Check that response to Question 13 tallies with response to Question 10: i.e. If respondent believes he is worse off in 1986 than in 1981 then 1986 position on the scale must be below 1981 position. If responses do not tally, probe.

19. Looking to the future, do people like you expect to make improvements on the single most important thing in life. Whereabouts on the scale do people like you expect to be in five years time?

20. In the previous question you marked the scale representing the improvements that people like you expect to make on the single most important thing in life over the next five years (read position on scale: see question 19). Why do you think that you will improve to position _____ rather than say, position _____ (add two units, or go to ten, whichever ever comes first)?

21. In South Africa people can be grouped into different groups. These groups may be determined according to race (Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaner, English, Swazi, Indian etc...), class (wealthy business people, working people, poor people and unemployed people), or simply by their allegiance to an organisation: for example, social organisations (sports clubs, recreational clubs, church groups, etc...), cultural organisations (Inkatha), self-help organisations (sewing clubs, health care groups etc...) and political organisations (Community Councils, UDF, AZAPO, JORAC, Youth Brigades, student groups, etc...). What groups of people (races, classes and organisations) do you know of in Durban?

22. Which of these groups do people like you think have an influence on your lives?

23. I want you to think for a moment about the one group that people like you think is the single most influential group. Can you name that group?

24. I want you to describe the best possible situation in society that that group could be in.

25. I want you now to describe the worst possible situation in society that that group could be in.

26. I want you to look at the following scale. Ten represents the best possible situation for the group that you described above, while zero represents the worst possible situation. Whereabouts on the scale would people like you place the organisation that you refer to above at the present?

Value Position of Reference Group

- 10
- 9
- 8
- 7
- 6
- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
- 0

27. Thinking about the single most important thing in the lives of people like you I want you to mark the scale where you think people like you are placed at the present time.

28. During a lifetime a person may decide to take a certain course of action: for example, a rural person may decide to leave his family to search for work in the city; a person may decide to return to school to improve his educational qualifications etc ... Sometimes these courses of action may be interfered with by certain laws: for example, the pass laws interfere with the movement of people to the city. Occasionally opportunities may even be lost because of interference. Below is a list of some common courses of action available to people like you. Look at the list and mark each course of action according to the degree of interference people like you experience. "Nil interference" means that you could undertake this course of action, while "intense interference" means that you have lost opportunities because of restrictive laws.

| SOCIETAL | INTERFERENCE | | | | | |
|---|--------------|--------|--------|----------|------|---------|
| | Nil | Slight | Little | Moderate | High | Intense |
| Improving personal standards of education. | | | | | | |
| Changing employment. | | | | | | |
| Qualifying for promotion at work. | | | | | | |
| Receiving assistance when searching for work. | | | | | | |
| Participating in political organisations. | | | | | | |
| Moving freely throughout South Africa. | | | | | | |
| Enjoying all South Africa's resources and facilities. | | | | | | |
| Living in an area of your choice. | | | | | | |
| Opening a business. | | | | | | |
| Voting for people who represent your interests. | | | | | | |

| POLITICAL | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Voicing your own opinions. | | | | | | |
| Striking for better conditions/higher wages at work. | | | | | | |
| Belonging to an effective trade union. | | | | | | |
| Associating with people of your choice. | | | | | | |
| Participating in peaceful protest marches. | | | | | | |
| Negotiating for change in South Africa. | | | | | | |
| Participating in work stay-aways. | | | | | | |
| Making decisions at work with the management. | | | | | | |
| Proclaiming your rights in a court of law. | | | | | | |
| Mobilising people around important issues. | | | | | | |

29. Are there any other courses of action, not included in these two lists, that people like you have experienced interference with?

30. How much interference in these courses of action do people like you experience (NIL, SLIGHT, LITTLE, MODERATE, HIGH, INTENSE)?

SOCIETAL FACTORS: Courses of action available to people to improve their position in society;

POLITICAL FACTORS: Courses of action available for inducing others to provide value satisfactions.

31. There are many ways for people to show their disapproval of the authorities. I am going to describe a number of such ways and I want to know whether people like you are prepared to engage in these activities.

a) Unwilling to take part in any protest activity that is not sanctioned by the authorities. YES/NO/DEPENDS

Depends:

b) Take part in protest meetings or marches that are not permitted by the authorities. YES/NO/DEPENDS

Depends:

c) Refuse to obey a law which you felt was unjust and defy a police order rather than obey the law. YES/NO/DEPENDS

Depends:

d) Join sit-ins, pickets, mass demonstrations, takeovers of buildings. YES/NO/DEPENDS

Depends:

e) Join violent protest demonstrations, including actions such as destroying public and private property. YES/NO/DEPENDS

Depends:

f) Arm yourself in preparation for battles with the SAP and the SADF.

YES/NO/DEPENDS

Depends:

APPENDIX 2: 'D SCORES' BY RESPONDENT

| | <i>interference with opport. (capabilities)</i> | | <i>justified value pos. (expectations)</i> | <i>rate of change in group value 'D' position (time)</i> | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------------|--|--|--------------|
| 'R Inkatha (Women's e Brigade) | 5.62 | (4.38) | 0 | 0.00 | 5.62 |
| a Inkatha (hostel c dweller) | 5.40 | (4.60) | 2 | 0.00 | 7.40 |
| t Councillor (KM) | 5.60 | (4.40) | 2 | (VE)0.00 | 7.60 |
| i Councillor | 6.00 | (4.00) | 1 | 1.50 | 8.50 |
| o Inkatha - Women's n Brigade (KM) | 6.19 | (3.81) | 2 | (-)0.50 | 8.69 |
| a Councillor (KM) | 6.70 | (3.30) | 2 | 1.33 | 10.03 |
| r Inkatha (Youth i Brigade) | 5.80 | (4.20) | 3 | 1.50 | 10.30 |
| e Councillor (KM) | 7.30 | (2.70) | 5 | 0.75 | 13.05 |
| s' UWUSA | <u>8.65</u> | <u>(1.35)</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>1.50</u> | <u>13.15</u> |
| Average | <u>6.36</u> | <u>(3.64)</u> | <u>2.22</u> | <u>0.79</u> | <u>9.37</u> |
| LECC | 7.60 | (2.40) | 0 | (VE)0.00 | 7.60 |
| Youth League (KM) | 7.52 | (2.48) | 0 | 0.50 | 8.02 |
| 'P Youth League (KM) | 8.20 | (1.80) | 0 | (VE)0.00 | 8.20 |
| r COSATU | 8.20 | (1.80) | 0 | (-)0.50 | 8.70 |
| o JORAC | 8.81 | (1.19) | 0 | (VE)0.00 | 8.81 |
| g COSAS | 8.92 | (1.08) | 0 | (VE)0.00 | 8.92 |
| r AZAPO | 8.77 | (1.23) | 1 | 0.00 | 9.77 |
| e UDF | 8.43 | (1.57) | 2 | (VE)0.00 | 10.43 |
| s Malayo | 9.30 | (0.70) | 1 | (-)0.50 | 10.80 |
| s UDF (unemployed) | 8.84 | (1.16) | 1 | (-)1.00 | 10.84 |
| i COSATU (KM) | 8.56 | (1.44) | 3 | (VE)0.00 | 11.56 |
| v NOW | 8.85 | (1.15) | 3 | 0.00 | 11.85 |
| e Minister | 8.27 | (1.73) | 3 | 1.25 | 12.52 |
| s' UDF | 9.11 | (0.89) | 3 | 0.66 | 12.77 |
| LCA | 9.00 | (1.00) | 4 | 0.83 | 13.83 |
| ANC | <u>9.30</u> | <u>(0.70)</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>0.75</u> | <u>14.05</u> |
| Average | <u>8.61</u> | <u>(1.39)</u> | <u>1.56</u> | <u>0.37</u> | <u>10.54</u> |

KM - designates KwaMashu resident: all others from Lamont

APPENDIX 3: 'V SCORES' BY RESPONDENT

| | 'D Scores' | 'V Scores' |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| 'R Inkatha (Women's e Brigade) | 5.62 | 0.0 |
| a Inkatha (hostel c dweller) | 7.40 | 0.0 |
| t Councillor (KM) | 7.60 | 0.0 |
| i Inkatha (Women's o Brigade) (KM) | 8.69 | 0.0 |
| n Councillor | 10.03 | 0.0 |
| a UWUSA | 13.15 | 0.0 |
| r Councillor (KM) | 13.05 | 0.0 |
| i Councillor | 8.50 | 3.0 |
| e Inkatha (Youth s' Brigade) | <u>10.30</u> | <u>3.0</u> |
| | Average <u>9.37</u> | <u>0.6</u> |
| Minister | 12.52 | 12.5 |
| COSAS | 8.92 | 14.5 |
| 'P JORAC | 8.81 | 15.0 |
| r AZAPO | 9.77 | 15.0 |
| o LCA | 13.83 | 15.0 |
| g Youth League (KM) | 8.02 | 18.0 |
| r UDF | 10.43 | 18.0 |
| e COSATU (KM) | 11.56 | 20.5 |
| s NOW | 11.85 | 21.0 |
| s UDF | 12.77 | 21.0 |
| i LECC | 7.60 | 24.0 |
| v Youth League (KM) | 8.20 | 24.0 |
| e COSATU | 8.70 | 24.0 |
| s' Malayo | 10.80 | 24.0 |
| UDF (unemployed) | 10.84 | 24.0 |
| ANC | <u>14.05</u> | <u>24.0</u> |
| | Average <u>10.54</u> | <u>19.6</u> |

KM - designates KwaMashu resident: all others from Lamont