

SUSTAINING LIVELIHOODS IN NORTON TOWN AFTER DEINDUSTRIALIZATION IN ZIMBABWE



by

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DECLARATIONS

I declare that the thesis **‘SUSTAINING LIVELIHOODS IN NORTON TOWN AFTER DEINDUSTRIALISATION IN ZIMBABWE’** is my original work and that all sources consulted/quoted were fully acknowledged. I further proclaim that never before have I submitted it at any University/College for obtaining any qualification.

Signature:

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Date:

8 June 2018

ABSTRACT

This thesis explored urban livelihoods in the context of rapid urbanisation and failing economic/industrial growth in Norton town, Zimbabwe. The aim was to explore alternative livelihoods in the town in a constricted socioeconomic environment and address sustainability issues around them. To arrive at the answer, the study first explored the impacts of deindustrialisation on the local economy and livelihoods, examined how social actors are re-enacting their livelihoods, the challenges that confront them and how they are innovating past them. It also employed a hybrid of theories; modernisation, the actor-oriented, theory of practice and the livelihoods approach to enhance the theoretical understanding of critical issues under investigation. The study deployed qualitative research methods; key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, field observations and documentary sources. It discovered how in the absence of functioning formal economy, entrepreneurship; informal and SMEs, and urban agriculture have become instrumental in constructing urban livelihoods and sustaining life. It noted that although these livelihoods face a plethora of challenges, they have developed resilience, devising numerous innovations that have strengthened them. Included here are strategies such as invasion-induced occupation of urban spaces, home-based enterprises, multiple-livelihoods, saving clubs, use of ICT and social media platforms to share information, innovative marketing strategies and adoption of the e-payment system, among others. The contributions to knowledge of the study are manifold. Firstly, it roped in Adichie's 'The Danger of a Single Story' narrative to conceptualise and justify multiple-data collection methods as well as to simplify and emphasise the importance of triangulation in enhancing data credibility. Secondly, it developed the 'Hobbipreneurship' model to suggest how hobbies can be turned into entrepreneurial activities. Thirdly, it 'invented' the idea of 'reverse modernity' as a critique to the modernisation theory. Fourthly, it explored how the informal/SMEs sectors have penetrated the formal supply chain system as part of its resilience, resulting in a new complicated supply chain system. Fifthly, it emphasised the role of 'spirituality', 'hope' and ICT in constructing livelihoods especially in economies in crises and suggests that these should be stand-alone capitals in a revised livelihoods framework.

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DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this thesis to **KENIAS MAGIDI** - my brother who was untimely snatched away during the course of my studies in a horrific road accident that I miraculously survived. His contributions throughout my entire academic journey are unparalleled.



MAY HIS SOUL REST IN PEACE

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADB:	African Development Bank
AMZ:	Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe
BSAC:	British South Africa Company
CBD:	Central Business District
CRS:	Catholic Relief Services
CSOs:	Civil Society Organisations
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EMA:	Environmental Management Agents
EPZ:	Export Processing Zones
(E)SAPs:	(Economic) Structural Adjustment Programmes
EU:	European Union
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
FTLRP:	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
FTZ:	Free Trade Zones
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GMB:	Grain Marketing Board
GPA:	Global Peace Agreement
GOZ:	Government of Zimbabwe
GZU:	Great Zimbabwe University
ICT:	Information and Communication Technology
IDI:	In-Depth Interview
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
ILO:	International Labour Office
KII:	Key Informant Interview
MDC:	Movement for Democratic Change
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organisations
NRZ:	National Railways of Zimbabwe
NTC:	Norton Town Council
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RBZ:	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SDGs:	Sustainable Development Goals
SLA:	Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
SMEs:	Small to Medium Enterprises
SSA:	Sub-Saharan Africa
TOP:	Theory of Practice
UK:	United Kingdom
UKZN:	University of KwaZulu-Natal

UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
US:	United States
ZANU-PF:	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZBC:	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation
ZCTU:	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZESA:	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZCIEA:	Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economies Association
ZIMPARKS:	Zimbabwe National Parks and Wildlife Authority
ZIMPREST:	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation
ZIMSTAT:	Zimbabwe Statistical Agency
ZNLWVA:	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZRP:	Zimbabwe Republic Police

CHAPTER ONE

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 Introduction

*Madzimai*¹ is a mother of two who has been residing in Norton for over twenty years. She earns a living from selling vegetables on door-to-door basis in the town's high density suburbs. *"I started this in the early 1990s before I got married. Jobs were hard to get save for domestic ones. I had two aunts who were into buying and selling. They invited and enrolled me into this trade,"* she narrated. Her husband, now unemployed, used to work for a construction firm and was fairly remunerated. *"Madzibaba*² *used to earn enough; an amount roughly corresponding to US\$500-600 today. Food, rentals, clothing and other needs were never a challenge for us. We would even send some to our parents in the rural areas. I only chose to continue vending out of interest since I was not used to staying at home all day."* Then came a time when the economy began to fail. Firms responded by cutting down production, labour and remunerations. As the situation worsened, some went to the extent of closing shop and retrenched most of their personnel. *Madzibaba's* firm was not an exception. *"At first, they would work for three weeks a month, which were then cut down to two before being sent home on unpaid leave. They would be called when their employer had secured a big project, after which they would return home,"* she recollected. As the situation worsened, their firm finally closed, and *Madzibaba*, among the others got very small exit packages. *"Afterwards, he tried to get another job but to no avail. He also tried to start his 'own thing', but still things didn't work out well. He resolved to try his luck in the diaspora and skipped the border to Botswana but was arrested upon entry and detained for months for being undocumented,"* she recounted. Meanwhile, the family survived on the wife's vending earnings during his absence. *"Yes, I struggled, but managed to take care of the rentals, electricity bills, school fees, buy uniforms, feed and clothe the family,"* she explained. The husband, upon being released, returned home and started taking any piece jobs³ that come along his way to fend for his family as the wife continued vending. For over five years now, they have been surviving that way and they believe they have found their source of livelihood and even believe that they are destined to *"achieve great things in future."*

The story narrated above epitomises what most Zimbabwean urban dwellers experienced as the country went through an unprecedented economic meltdown that cast a dark shadow over their future. An abrupt and unforeseen forfeiture of a source of livelihood can plunge a household into utter disarray, relegating it from leading a decent and healthy lifestyle to endure a tremendously challenged life, often plagued by inadequacy, vulnerability, deprivation and various other forms

¹ Pseudonym for an interview respondent

² Pseudonym for Madzimai's husband

³ Also called piecework – refers to any type of a job task on temporary/part-time basis that one performs for a pay

of poverty on daily basis. Adapting to a new way of life or enacting a substitute livelihood is a process and like any other form of change, it consumes a great deal of time and effort. It is an arduous experience to reconstruct a livelihood after going through such an unforeseen experience as recounted above. The story aptly synopsis a typical urban livelihood experience in an economy in crisis. It tells what normally transpires after a conventional livelihood is lost and captures some of the emerging forms of livelihoods, related challenges and the alternative livelihood ‘*inventions*’, ‘*interventions*’, or ‘*innovations*’ that usually result from crisis situations. This chapter introduces the major aspects that the research sought to address and provides the study’s contextual background and the research problem. It also outlines the study’s research objectives and questions in addition to detailing the research location, the significance of the study, limitations and provides an outline of the whole thesis, providing brief insights on what each chapter addresses.

1.2 Urbanisation and Industrialisation

Global and Regional Contexts

Today’s world is undergoing rapid urbanisation. So intense is the rate of world urbanisation that at least 50% of the world’s population was already residing in urban centres by 2007 (Maxwell *et al.*, 2008) as the world transforms from a “global village to an urban globe” (Jones and Nelson, 1999:1). The global urban population is forecast at 67% by 2025 (UNFPA, 2007; Tienda *et al.*, 2006). Although the first world is the most urbanised, the highest urbanisation rates are experienced in the developing world. An excess of about 90% of these anticipated population upsurges are projected in the world’s poorest regions (Sclar *et al.*, 2005).

While the contemporary African city is largely a creation of colonialism, the continent experienced its first urbanisation wave during the period prior to colonialism (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014; Munzwa and Jonga, 2010; Drakakis-Smith, 2000). It has been noted that the world’s first urban regions were located in what is today identified as the developing world (Wheatley, 1971). In Africa, early urbanisation was experienced in Egypt’s Nile Valley and the Yomba territories in Nigeria. In Southern Africa, Tavuyanago and Mbenene (2008) add Great Zimbabwe as another pre-colonial African urban civilisation. However, Pikirayi (2001) argues that the social, economic and cultural structures of these settlements were different from the present day African city. Consequently, African contemporary cities are regarded as colonial establishments, most of which were born out of ports, mines, military garrisons, hill stations,

railway stations and agricultural settlements created by early European settlers (Drakakis-Smith, 2000).

Urbanisation in Africa during the colonial period occurred at a slightly slow pace (UN-DESA, 2010). There are several factors behind this. Firstly, towns were colonial administrative centres meant to cater for small white populations that were allowed to settle in urban centres. Secondly, some were set as extractive centres and once the resources were extracted, they were ferried to seaports and shipped to overseas plants for processing. Consequently, very little industrial activity other than the actual extraction took place in these centres and hence they remained small (Potts, 2016). Thirdly, migration of black Africans to urban centres was discouraged because rural areas were set aside as food production reserves meant to cater for the urban population such that allowing rural-urban migration was seen as threat to this arrangement (Bilger and Kraler, 2005). Fourthly, colonial governments feared that rural-urban migration would endanger their tax⁴ base and also increase the desire by Africans for better incomes (Chaulia, 2003). Consequently, urbanisation remained suppressed during much of this era.

However, as African countries began to attain independence, rural-urban migration restrictions were lifted and urbanisation went on the rise (Bedford *et al.*, 2011). Today, developing countries constitute the world's most rapidly urbanising regions with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) growing at 5%, Asia and the Pacific region at 4%, North Africa at 3.3% and Latin America at 2.5% (UN-HABITAT, 2008; Tettey, 2005). African cities like Johannesburg, Cape Town, Lagos, Accra, Cairo, Nairobi and Dar-e-Salaam, among others, have since expanded into metropolitan cities. If these rates are to continue as projected, the developing world will be home to about 80% of the world urban population by year 2030 (Khan, 2008). With an annual 5% average population increase, SSA is experiencing an unparalleled urban growth that could see over 300 million new urban residents between 2000 and 2030 (Kessides, 2005; United Nations, 2004). Njoh (2003) estimates that at such a tremendous rate, the region's urban population will multiply by two after every twelve years. The United Nations (2007) argues that urban population in the region rose from around 16% to 40% between 1960 and 2007. Attributed to these increases are factors which include rural-urban migration, natural population growth, and the continuous transformation of rural settlements into urban centres (Grant, 2007; Potts, 2006).

⁴ Native Africans paid taxes for owning assets like huts/houses, land and domestic animals to colonial governments.

There has been a long debate over the relationship between urbanisation and economic growth especially in the African context. To begin with, cities have long been regarded as centres of employment, social and economic growth and are thus thought to be accompanied by improved living standards (Potts, 2016; Collier, 2014; Clos, 2010; World Bank, 2000; Hall, 2000). It is also thought that their superior infrastructure (compared to rural areas) attracts investment, speeds up production and creates employment and other economic opportunities for the urbanites (Africa Development Bank, 2012; Hanson, 2007). This, in turn, is thought to play a huge role in augmenting people's livelihoods and at the same time lowering urban poverty. Just like in the West and Asia, Clos (2010: ii) suggests that the African continent is set to record some positive gains from rapid urban expansion, arguing that "urbanisation is jump-starting industrialisation." Tannerfeldt and Ljung (2006) believe that the concentration of human resources, other productive capitals and infrastructure normally associated with urban centres is a driving force towards industrial, social and economic development. They argue that without urbanisation, the world would not have reached its current stage of technical and social development, and that urbanisation reduces poverty. In this regard, urbanisation has been seen as synonymous with industrialisation and economic development (Scott and Storper, 2014; Spence *et al.*, 2009; Annez and Buckley, 2009). Consequently, rural populations in the developing economies continue to flood urban centres in what I termed '*the scramble for opportunities*.' Factors like declining agricultural yields due to increased droughts, environmental stresses, armed conflicts and natural disasters also play a part in pushing rural populations to towns (Meertens, 2006; World Bank, 2000). Also known as city-led or urban-biased development, this view was heavily informed by the Modernisation theory.

However, such an amplified rate of urbanisation creates numerous socio-economic and livelihood implications to the urban populace. It has resulted in urban centres accumulating more than what they can accommodate in terms of population growth. Most African cities have undergone urbanisation without significant industrial, economic and employment growth (Potts, 2016; Fay and Opal, 2000). As we shall see later, literature suggests that the reality in the Third World is that urbanisation, is not always associated with industrial growth and urban centres are not always centres of socio-economic development (Grant, 2012; Melamed *et al.*, 2011; Tawodzera, 2011; Bryceson, 2006; Owour, 2006). Turok (2013) notes that while studies from

1985-2010 in Asian cities showed a positive relationship between urbanisation and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), this was not the case in most African countries.

Contrary to the city-led development perspective, urbanisation in the region has been argued to be often associated with numerous socioeconomic challenges. Rural-urban migration has also played an active role in transferring rural poverty into urban centres (Tawodzera, 2011). As a result, the scales of urbanisation and urban population growth in the developing countries present some major complications in respect to the economic and livelihood opportunities that the developing world city can avail for its populace (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014; Potts, 2013). As most developing economies continue to struggle, poverty and related challenges appear to be on the increase in most of its cities. Growth is hampered by the failure of manufacturing sectors in what a number of scholars termed '*premature, negative or early deindustrialisation*' (Mbira, 2015; Dasgupta and Singh, 2006; Palma, 2005; Michie, 1997).

In most of the developing world including SSA, poor and falling economic and industrial performance stem from poor investment and poor economic and industrial policies that reduce the competitiveness of products and business confidence (Mbira, 2015). It is also a product of factors such as poor infrastructure, shortage of critical human skills, lack of foreign direct investment (FDI), poor adoption of technology, (Economic) Structural Adjustment Programmes ((E)SAPs) and the continued use of obsolete and less productive manufacturing equipment (Potts, 2016; Grant, 2012; Melamed *et al.*, 2011; Sundaram *et al.*, 2011). Rodrik (2015) argues that the attempt by some developing countries to transition from being manufacturing to service-backed economies before achieving full industrialisation as another of the factors. This failure impacted negatively on the urban populations, throwing their livelihoods and livelihood prospects in jeopardy. It is thus imperative to note that urbanisation in most of the developing world does not always correspond to their rate of industrialisation. This has in turn seen the creation of cities which lack the economic capacity to meet the needs of the ever-escalating populations. Consequently, developing world cities are made to endure an overabundance of socio-economic crises that are associated with rapid urbanisation, among them, high unemployment, inadequate food, housing and related services and generally escalating urban poverty levels (Potts, 2013; Tawodzera, 2011; UN-HABITAT, 2010). Constructing livelihoods under such conditions is extremely difficult and hence the main subject of this study.

The Local Context

Although most Zimbabweans still reside in rural areas, the country is undergoing some significant urbanisation. With rapidly growing centres like Harare, Bulawayo and Chitungwiza, among others, 34% of its population lives in urban centres and has an average annual urbanisation rate of at least 3% (World Bank, 2015; ZimStat, 2013). However, as the country continues to urbanise, the opposite is what is happening to industrialisation and the economy at large (Murisa, 2010; Nhodo *et al.*, 2010). The poor performance by most of the developing world economies as noted earlier has negatively impacted most of the urban populace and their livelihoods and Zimbabwe is one such economy that was not spared (Mbira, 2015). It suffered large-scale deindustrialisation which instigated massive losses of formal jobs and livelihood opportunities since the mid-1990s (Nhodo, 2014; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2012).

The Zimbabwean crisis was a consequence of a political calamity that stemmed from increasing totalitarianism, disputed elections, and disregard for the rule of law and economic decay which sprung from numerous influences extending from government economic maladministration to structural constraints (Murisa, 2010). It has also been attributed to the neoliberalism adopted in the early 1990s (Nhodo *et al.*, 2013; Tekere, 2001). Neoliberalism contends that “human well-being can be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” and thus advocates for “deregulation, privatisation, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been all too common” (Harvey, 2005:2-3). Adopting Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) witnessed the economy collapsing leading to severe job cuts across all sectors (Chirau, 2014; Saunders, 2006; Chipika *et al.*, 2000).

Consequently, it is not surprising that industrial productivity has been on the decline ever since the early 1990s (ZIMCDD, 2011). Capacity utilisation plummeted to below 60% between 1998 and 2008 as the nation’s GDP fell to the 1950s levels from US\$620 to a mere US\$268 (Mutami and Chazovachii, 2013). Moyo and Yeros (2007) estimate that the economy further shrunk by 30% between 2000 and 2007. The period until 2009 saw skyrocketing inflation to more than 230 million per cent (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Chimhowu, 2009). Combined, these factors and developments amounted to what Bluestone and Harrison (1982:6) call “widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation’s basic productive capacity,” as the nation experienced a dramatic

process of economic restructuring (Strangleman and Rhodes, 2014). Formal employment fell substantially (Kachembere, 2013) and was forecast at around 80% in 2010 (Mutami and Chazovachii, 2013; Murisa, 2010). The majority of the urban dwellers lost their conventional livelihoods and were forced to '*invent*' alternative ways of sustaining lives – something that ushers in the main motivation behind this study. Having explored and understood the contextual background of this study, the next section presents the research problem.

1.3 Problem Statement

Zimbabwe has over the last two decades endured severe economic deterioration that eroded the livelihood capacities of both the urban and rural populations (Murisa, 2010; ReliefWeb, 2006). It experienced unprecedented deindustrialisation that saw its once flourishing economy contracting to unimaginable levels (Chirau, 2014). The nation once enjoyed high economic standing and was one of Africa's most industrially diversified economies. This status however severely deteriorated as a result of the degrading economic downturn (Carmody and Taylor, 2004). Firms in all sectors; manufacturing, mining, services and agriculture were forced to either shut down or downsize due to viability challenges such that virtually almost every firm ended operating below sustainable capacity regardless of sector (Mbira, 2015). This deleterious development threw millions of people out of their jobs and related formal opportunities leading to high unemployment (Mutami and Chazovachii, 2013). Since most urban livelihoods relied on formal employment as their livelihoods, loss of jobs also meant loss of conventional livelihoods (Grant, 2005). This impacted negatively on the lives of the majority of urban dwellers as the impacts of deindustrialisation are often crippling and associated with increasing urban poverty - a feature that has somehow since became prevalent in Zimbabwe's urban centres after the crisis (UN-HABITAT, 2010).

Despite the increasingly unbearable urban living conditions owing to poor economic/industrial performance and loss of conventional livelihoods, life still needs to be sustained and this has pushed the urban populace into '*inventing*' alternative livelihood strategies. This study argues that little has been done to explore how the urban populace is surviving in such a difficult livelihoods landscape. What social actors are really engaged in for their survival and how they are doing it has not been fully understood and remains unexplained especially in the context of small and medium-sized towns of Norton's size. The capacity to build resilience and the ability

to ‘*invent*’, ‘*innovate*’, ‘*reconstruct*’ or ‘*re-enact*’ collapsed livelihoods and manage to survive under such severely constrained livelihood circumstances is the major motivation behind this study. While the livelihoods strategies adopted constitute a crucial component of the study, sustainability issues around these livelihoods make another central aspect that also calls for critical interrogation. It is thus against this backdrop that this study is dedicated to investigating livelihoods in Norton after cataclysmic deindustrialisation hit the town and Zimbabwe at large and issues around the sustainability of these livelihoods.

1.4 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions

The main aim of this study was to explore the impacts of deindustrialisation on economy in Norton town and how social actors were re-inventing their livelihoods in the absence of a functional economy. This aim was broken down into six objectives as given below:

- To investigate the impacts of deindustrialisation on urban livelihoods in Norton.
- To interrogate how social actors in Norton have ‘*reinvented*’ their livelihoods after losing conventional livelihoods to deindustrialisation.
- To explore the constrictions that social actors in Norton face in sustaining their livelihoods.
- To explore how actors are innovating in the face of their livelihood challenges.
- To examine the sustainability of the livelihood strategies ‘*invented*’ by social actors in Norton in the aftermath of the industrial and socio-economic collapse.
- To attempt a revised livelihoods framework that best analyses urban livelihoods in economies in crises.

These objectives were then translated into the following research questions:

- What are the impacts of deindustrialisation on local livelihoods in Norton?
- How do social actors in Norton reconstruct alternative livelihoods for their survival after losing their conventional livelihoods to deindustrialisation?
- What constraints do social actors in Norton face as they seek to construct their livelihoods?
- How do social actors innovate in the face of the challenges that confront them as they construct their livelihoods?

- How sustainable are the ‘new’ livelihood strategies ‘invented’ by social actors in Norton after the fall of industry and the economy?

1.5 Locating and Characterising Norton⁵

Norton is a town located in the Chegutu District of Mashonaland West Province. The town is situated 40km west of Harare, along the A5 Highway that connects Harare and Bulawayo and close to Darwendale. It lies between latitudes 17° 50’ S and 17° 54’ S, and between longitudes 30° 38’ E and 30° 45’ E (Chigonda, 2011). The following map locates the town.




Figure 1: Location of Norton (Vushoma, 2016)

1.5.1 History

Norton was born in 1914 out of a farming compound created by early European farmers who settled in the area in the early 1890s and was named after the Norton Family - a white farming family killed during 1896 Shona Uprisings (Vushoma, 2016). As farming in the surrounding

⁵ The choice of Norton as a case site was influenced by two major factors. Firstly, the town has been home to my home for over eight years and I was keen to learn and understand issues that affect my hometown. Secondly, Norton falls under the category of small/medium towns which this study argues to have been side-lined in terms of research, not only in Zimbabwe but world over. More is given in Chapter Five.

areas increased, so did the demand for farming implements. The centre thus slowly developed into a small industrial centre which was meant to serve the surrounding farming community (Norton Town Council [NTC], 2014; World Bank, 2014). The early 1950s saw the construction of a railway siding near the centre, facilitating its growth into an industrial satellite township. By 1960, it had developed into a planned industrial township which was then set as a decentralisation plan to cater for an overflow of industries from Salisbury (as present day Harare was known during the colonial period) due to the post-Second World War industrial boom (NTC, 2014). Upon its designation as an urban settlement in 1914, Norton was administered by a Township Management Board. However, with time it grew into a more organised settlement. The setting up of industries catalysed its growth and consequently attracted more people to come in and settle. It was upgraded to a Town Board in 1974 and attained Town Council status in 1994. NTC looks forward to become a municipal by 2020 (NTC, 2014; World Bank, 2014).

1.5.2 Population and Social Services

Norton's population stood at 12,000 in 1982, steadily rose to around 20,000 in 1992, and yet again accelerated by more than a double to at least 44,000 by 2002 (Potts, 2010). 2012 census figures are pegged at almost 68,000 (ZimStat, 2013). The World Bank (2014) estimated that at such a rate, its population will be at least 111,000 by 2022. The population boom realised by the town is a result of two major factors. Firstly, as it grew into an industrial centre, it attracted people who came looking for employment. Secondly, as the housing woes continued to mount in Harare, impatient residents resolved to look for affordable accommodation elsewhere, and Norton was one such destination. Thus, Norton became home to some people who worked in Harare and partly served as Harare's satellite town (ZESN, 2016). Norton is home to four secondary⁶ and eleven primary schools⁷, among several other small and private schools⁸ offering both primary and secondary school tuition. It also hosts Norton Vocational Training Centre which offers courses in joinery and carpentry, welding and metal fabrication and clothing technology, among other courses. In the sphere of healthcare service provision, it has one public hospital (Norton Hospital) and numerous public and private clinics. Norton also has a number of

⁶ St Eric's, Vimbai, Intellect and Nicholas Bengu

⁷ Chiedza, Vimbai, St Eric's, Norton 1 & 2, Takunda, Knowe, Dudley Hall, Twinlakes, Intellect and Pin Per.

⁸ Tamiranashe Junior, Tamiranashe Senior, Brightlight, Hillside etc.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)⁹. There are also several religious organisations; Christian Pentecostal Churches, Apostolic Sects, Catholics and Moslems in Norton. The town has a fairly good transport infrastructure; road network and a railway line that runs through it (ZESN, 2016).

1.5.3 Land Use and Governance

Norton is made up of a small Central Business District (CBD) – popularly known as *Kwa-Govans*, an industrial area and a combination of high, medium and low density housing. It is divided into thirteen administrative wards, each represented by an elected councillor. The council is headed by the Council Chairperson while the Executive Secretary oversees day-to-day administration. Wards one to four comprise medium to low density housing (Twinlakes, Nharira, Galloway, Damofalls, Trafalgar and Knowe), the CBD and the industrial area. These consume the bulk part of the town, sprawling to cover two thirds of its overall area. The remaining one third contains the remaining nine wards which are made up of high density housing (Katanga, Ngoni, Johannesburg, and Maridale) and peri-urban/semi-formal settlements (Marshlands, Kingsdale/Garikai) (World Bank, 2014). The town is also currently represented in the House of Assembly by an independent candidate. However, its urban nature makes it an opposition (MDC) stronghold yet its close proximity to Zvimba (former President Mugabe’s rural home and ZANU-PF stronghold) also makes the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) – Zimbabwe’s governing party, an influential party as well. As a result, Norton is a ‘swing constituency’ which no party is guaranteed to win in any election. For instance, after being won by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2008 and ZANU-PF in 2013, the seat was won by an independent candidate in the 2016 by-elections who retained it in 2018. Thus, as a political constituency, Norton is a hotly contested seat as both parties seek to control it, hence the political violence that always rocks the town during election times, with 2008 being the worst which damaged and influenced livelihoods across the town (Alexander and Chitofiri, 2010).

⁹ Tsungirirayi Orphanage & Skills Development Centre; Ndaiziva Capacity Development Trust; Tamiranashe Women’s Trust; Help German; Norton Residents & Development Trust; Norton Small to Medium Entrepreneurs Association; Norton Vendors Association, etc.

1.5.4 Climate and the Economy

Norton is located in the country's agro-ecological region two whose climate is made up of hot wet summers and cool dry winters (Mugandani *et al.*, 2012). Its rainfall averages between 650 and 800mm/*pa* (Brown *et al.*, 2012). It has well-watered fertile soils that support a wide variety of crops: wheat, soya, maize, groundnuts, horticulture and vegetable production and also supplement grazing grass for livestock production, providing enticing agricultural prospects (Mudumi and Mundenga, 2015). It is for that reason that many firms with interests in agriculture found Norton a strategic location. Agro-producing firms located around the town include Kent Estates, Kintyre Estates, Triple C Pigs (Colcom Foods), Drummond Chickens, Cold Storage Company's Cattle Pens and Lydiate Farms just to mention a few. Operations in most of these estates have however declined following disturbances caused by farm invasions which started in 2000. Norton also hosts Zimbabwe's second largest Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Depot (Alexander and Chitofiri, 2010) and other agro-processing industries like Hunyani Pulp and Paper, Willgrow Sawmills and Export, Alliance Ginneries, Karina Textiles, David Whitehead Textiles, Cone Textiles, Bellevue Abattoirs, Best Fruit Processors (Schweppes Zimbabwe), National Foods, Dos Santos Shoes and Zagrinda, most of which are however closed. Included on this list are also stock feeds and agricultural chemicals manufacturing firms which include National Feeds, Country Feeds and Novatek Animal Feeds. This rich agricultural potential also attracted Zimbabwe's oldest College of Agriculture, Chibero, which was established in 1961 on the outskirts of the town (ZESN, 2016).

Several engineering firms are/were also found in the town. These include Central African Forge, Allied Steel, Farm and City, Bestobell, Haste/Rio Tinto Industries, Non-Ferrous Die-Casting, National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and Morton Jeffrey Water Treatment Plant. Other notable establishments include Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council (ZIMSEC) Printing Division, Dandy Zimbabwe, Pakare Paye Centre, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) Northern Region main distribution station and key retail outlets like OK Zimbabwe, Food World and TM Pick n Pay. The town also hosts some banks which include the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe (AgriBank), Central African Building Society (CABS), People's Own Savings Bank (POSB), Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and numerous *EcoCash*, *TeleCash* and *OneWallet* mobile money outlets. There are also micro-finance lending institutions which include Tottengram and TAZMAC Money Lenders and international money transfer

agencies offices like Western Union, MoneyGram and Mukuru. As the economy failed, economic activities were shifted from the CBD and the industrial area to shopping centres and the burgeoning informal economy saw Katanga Business Centre emerging as Norton's economic heartland.

Norton also has the potential for a big mining industry. It is strategically located next to the mineral-rich Great Dyke endowed with chrome, platinum and gold deposits. This explains the presence of such mining giants like Zimbabwe Platinum Mine on the outskirts of the town (ZESN, 2016). There are several other small mines around the town and other unexploited mineral deposits around the town (Mudumi and Mundenga, 2015). Though occupying a relatively smaller geographical area, David (2015) notes that Norton is home to many big companies, the majority of which have however collapsed or downsized as the town responded to deindustrialisation. Also on the town's peripheries are the famous '*twin-lakes*' – Chivero (Chibero) and Manyame (Darwendale) (Tendaupenyu, 2012). Chivero is located eight kilometres to the east and is one of Zimbabwe's biggest inland water reservoirs and provides water to Harare and its environs (including Norton). According to Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife website¹⁰, Lake Chivero Recreational Park is home to a variety of wildlife. These include the white rhino, giraffe, zebra and the wildebeest, while numerous bird species have also found a 'paradise' in the park. Lake Chivero is a habitat to several fish species which include tiger fish, yellow fish, Hunyani salmon and black bream among many others. This makes fishing a key economic and recreational activity in Norton's immediate environs (David, 2015). The park also boasts a variety of nocturnal species that include civet, genet, black-backed jackal, porcupine, and several others. A 5-star Hunyani Hills Hotel is one of the numerous hospitality firms found around the lake since it is a known leisure destination for local revellers and international tourists. There are also several wedding and party venues around the lake. Lake Manyame is situated five kilometres to the north and is home to a diversity of fishes, other aquatic creatures and recreational facilities and activities. With such a rich surrounding decorated by a wide range of recreational activities: boating, fishing, game driving and viewing, horse riding and facilities/resources like abundant waters, lodges, caravan, campsites, chalets and picnic sites,

¹⁰ <http://zimparcs.org/parks/recreational-parks/lake-chivero/>

Norton has an expansive potential to blossom into a colourful tourist town. Paradoxically, despite being surrounded by lakes, Norton faces water shortages (Chigonda, 2010).

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study is significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it notes that earlier studies on the subject in Zimbabwe were biased towards large cities like Harare and Bulawayo (Mlambo, 2017; Zivanai, 2016; Mbira, 2015; Munyaka, 2014; Stoneman, 1990) and it thus deviates from this norm to focus on a small town. Results from an internet search based on “*deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe’s small town*”¹¹ also confirmed this as they showed studies from large cities only. World over, small towns remain understudied in almost all areas when compared to larger cities (Donaldson, 2018; Human Science Research Council (HSRC), 2017; Bruen, 2014; Dudek, 2012; Sissons, 2009; Centre for Development and Enterprise [CDE], 1996). This was also confirmed by yet another internet search for “*deindustrialisation in small towns across the world*”¹² which proved that not much in terms of research has been done on the subject in question. Moving away from researching large cities to small ones was also motivated by the realisation that small towns play important roles in national economies. For example, when faced with challenges, some people residing in major cities tend to seek refuge in small towns - yet very little or no research at all has been done to better understand issues that affect them. All my respondents also confirmed that this study was the first of its kind in Norton.

Secondly, understanding deindustrialisation and its impacts can play a part in ‘awakening’ planners and policymakers to the lived realities the communities that they lead. Thus, the study has the potential to influence policymaking at both local and national government¹³ levels in areas like planning, SMEs, informal sector economy and urban poverty reduction. As wa Thiongo (1992: ix) affirms “prescription of the correct cure is dependent on a rigorous analysis of reality.” Pragmatic policies must be informed by thorough research. Chapter Eleven of this study suggests several areas in which this study can be of policy significance.

¹¹<https://www.google.co.za/search?biw=1034&bih=718&ei=tNyeW6JqiJSABtStoIgC&q=deindustrialisation+in+zimbabwe%27s+small+towns&oq=deindustrialisation+in+zimbabwe%27s+small+towns&gs>

¹²<https://www.google.co.za/search?q=deindustrialisation+in+small+towns&ei>

¹³ Both Local Authority (NTC) and National government (Ministry of SMEs) participated in this study and requested a copy of this thesis, indicating that they were especially interested in the findings and recommendations.

Thirdly, deindustrialisation and its impacts; unemployment, increased urban poverty and livelihoods challenges are among some of the most pressing issues affecting not only Zimbabwe but the developing world at large (Fox *et al*, 2016; Timalisina, 2011; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005). Through interrogating these challenges, this study contributes to bodies of knowledge in both livelihood studies and the broad field of urban studies/urban development. The study also adds to ongoing debates on urban livelihoods, SMEs and the informal livelihoods and issues around their sustainability. It also explored how this informal/SMEs sector has penetrated the formal value chain and influenced distribution of consumer goods to result in a complex supply chain characterised by high informality and to become part of the main economy. Moreover, the study re-examines the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework and identifies some gaps which prompted the suggestion of a revised framework and a model of how hobbies can be developed into livelihoods.

Fourthly, the study is also consistent with most of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It has close links to Goal 1 concerned with ending poverty; Goal 2 which aims at ending hunger; Goal 8 concerned with decent work and economic growth; Goal 9 which is set to promote industrialisation; Goal 10 concerned with reducing inequalities and Goal 11 meant to promote sustainable cities (United Nations, 2015). The study resonates with the argument advanced by Tibaijuka (2009) that without sustainable urbanisation, sustainable development can never be attained. Consequently, urban livelihoods sustainability is a step towards achieving sustainable urbanisation which in turn points to the broader goal of realising sustainable development. The research is also consistent with the main objectives of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM-ASSET) - a national economic blueprint meant to guide Zimbabwe's economic recovery launched in 2013 (Government of Zimbabwe [GoZ], 2013).

Lastly, the study conforms to what renowned development economists, Smith and Todaro (2003) identify as one of the major objectives of development, which is to "increase availability and widen the distribution of life sustaining goods and services." Loosely interpreted, this simply refers to the need to direct development efforts towards poverty alleviation. The study encourages capacity building through strengthening of new livelihoods and enhancing their sustainability.

1.7 Thesis Organisation

I organised the thesis into eleven chapters. Chapter One introduces the study. It furnishes insights into some of the major issues that the study tackles, providing the study's background, looking at issues around urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa and its influence on urban livelihoods. It also outlines the research problem, objectives and questions before characterising the study location. It also justifies the study in addition to mapping the outline of the thesis. Chapter Two looks at the conceptual and theoretical issues around urbanisation, industrialisation and urban livelihoods. It interrogates the Modernisation theory, the Livelihoods Approach, the Actor-Oriented theory and the Theory of Practise and how they have influenced urban livelihoods.

In Chapter Three, I narrow down my literature to look at urbanisation, industrialisation, urban livelihoods and deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe. The chapter traces Zimbabwe's path to urbanisation and industrialisation, explores employment and formal livelihoods in the 'city' before focusing on deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe and the crises that followed it, exploring how economic restructuring, economic mismanagement, corruption, the DRC war and the land reform programme contributed. Chapter Four discusses Zimbabwe after the '*industrial upheavals*', examining the impacts of deindustrialisation on livelihoods and the rise of the informal economy as well as the crackdown that followed it.

Chapter Five addresses the methodological component of this study. It details the research methodology and paradigm that guided me throughout the various stages of the study and the data collection methods that I deployed during fieldwork. It also addresses issues around data procession and analysis and research ethics. Chapter Six presents the impacts of deindustrialisation on livelihoods in Norton and how it destroyed livelihood capitals; employment, infrastructure, stalled economic growth and consequently increased poverty and food insecurity in the town. Chapter Seven explores the 'new' strategies that social actors in Norton '*invented*' as they reconstruct alternative livelihoods. It looks at the constraints that confront them while Chapter Eight looks at the various innovations and 'inventions' that they devised to keep their work/'*hustle*' going. Chapter Nine examines the two major views about livelihoods sustainability debates that emerged from this study, one side arguing against and the other one for the sustainability of these emergent livelihoods. Chapter Ten gives an overall discussion of the study's major findings, pointing out my arguments based on my interaction,

understanding and interpretation of the evidence gathered from the field. Chapter Eleven provides a conclusion, recommendations, contribution to knowledge and areas of further research.

1.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced the study. It provided the background to the study, the statement of the problem, and the research objectives and questions. It also mapped the study location, noting how it transitioned from a farming compound to an almost vibrant industrial town, its population growth, administration and land use, climate, economy and social services. It also justified the study and ended by synopsising each of the eleven chapters that constitute this thesis. It emerged from the discussion that Norton belongs to that category of small/medium towns that are continuously alienated when it comes to research despite it being an important town in terms of its strategic location, close to the capital Harare and its impending potential to rapidly expand in terms of population and economic activity. The next chapter examines conceptual and theoretical issues relating to this study.

CHAPTER TWO

URBANISATION, INDUSTRIALISATION AND URBAN LIVELIHOODS: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

2.1 Introduction

After introducing the study in Chapter One, this chapter discusses theoretical issues surrounding urbanisation, industrialisation and urban livelihoods. It interrogates the processes of urbanisation and industrial growth and the livelihoods strategies that are generally associated with urban centres. The chapter also provides both conceptual and theoretical discussions of these issues as well as a clearer conceptualisation of livelihoods in the urban context. It interrogates such theories as Modernisation theory (Rostow, 1971), Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1972), the Actor-Oriented theory (Long, 1990) and the Livelihoods Approach (DFID, 1999). It discusses these theories in consonance with relevant concepts and literature.

2.2 Conceptualising Urbanisation and Industrialisation

Urbanisation is a complex process which has its fair share of controversies and contradictions (Tannerfeldt and Ljung, 2006). The term refers to broad-based changes in population, land-use, economic activities and culture, or any one of these in ways that point to a given settlement's transition from rural to urban structuring (McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2016). Fox and Goodfellow (2016:6) define urbanisation as “a demographic process involving a shift in the proportion of a population living in settlements defined as urban as opposed to rural.” Closely related to it is the term ‘*rate of urbanisation*’ which refers to the speed at which the urban population of a particular urban centre is changing over a given period of time. Another term also worth taking note of is ‘*urban growth*’, which refers to “an increase in the absolute size of an urban population,” a process that gives birth to cities and towns. Fox and Goodfellow (2016:2) also define a ‘*city*’ as “a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals.” There is however no universal consensus on what is an urban centre and what qualifies as urban varies from country to country although factors like population size, economic function and administrative status are often considered (McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2016; 2014).

To demonstrate these anomalies, the United Nations Population Division (2014) gives some varied definitions of the term as used in different contexts. In Angola, urban centres are those localities with at least 2,000 inhabitants while in Nigeria the figure is as high as 20,000. In Botswana, the term refers to agglomerations of at least 5,000 people where 75% of the economic activity is non-agriculture. Zimbabwe recognises as urban centres those settlements with 2,500 inhabitants or more who live in a compact settlement pattern and where more than 50% of the employed people are engaged in jobs that are not in the agricultural sector (United Nations Population Division, 2014). The challenge is exacerbated by extreme cases like Sweden, where just 200 can make an urban centre and in Mali, where a cut-off of 40,000 inhabitants was used in the 2009 census (McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2016). I used the terms '*city*', '*town*' and '*urban centre*' interchangeably in this study.

One of the major views to emerge in urbanisation discourse is that there is positive correlation between urbanisation and gross domestic product per capita (Bravo, 2008; Timmer and Szirmai, 2000). This view reasons that urbanisation, industrialisation and socioeconomic development co-occur. Industrialisation is a process that involves "a rapid transformation in the significance of manufacturing activity in relation to all other forms of production and work undertaken within national or local economies" (O'Brien, 2001:7360). According to this view, industrialisation is the major driving force behind urbanisation, urban growth and development (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). The view evinces that industrialisation and economic growth thrive more in urban set-ups than in non-urban ones. Urban centres are thus believed to take advantage of their superior infrastructure to attract human resources and raw materials to spur industrial and commercial development (UN-HABITAT, 2008), and are perceived as "engines of economic growth and social development" (Potter, 1990:1; Hall, 2000). They provide economies of scale and agglomeration together with the social and economic infrastructure that create the suitable environment for investment where businesses and entrepreneurship can thrive (Grant, 2008; Tannerfeldt and Ljung, 2006). Once industrialised, it is assumed that the benefits derived from the city can trickle down to benefit everyone in the city and even spread to peripheries (Mkandawire, 2014).

The view regards cities as the nerve centres of national economies, which in turn determine the nation's welfare and thus urbanisation must be encouraged and promoted (Knight and Gappard,

2001). The availability of better infrastructure in cities has therefore seen the influx of entrepreneurs coming in to invest and make money out of the 'suitable' environment with such infrastructural resources and abundant labour drawn from the ever-increasing urban populations. Excessive labour force in the cities has been a result of rural-urban migration as people flood urban centres in search of better income earning opportunities and living standards (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). This idea was heavily influenced by the Modernisation Theory (Rostow, 1971), which views development "as a social transformation involving industrialisation, urbanisation and shift from 'traditional' to 'modern' social values" (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016:14). It was born out of the desire to understand the difference in development between 'poor traditional' and 'modern industrialised' societies. It also explores how these so-called 'traditional societies' can catch up with the 'developed societies', emphasising the role of industrialisation in attaining this (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994). It views urbanisation as a natural process through which all societies transition from being agrarian to industry-based (Bradshaw and Noonan, 1997). It has it that the transformation should follow the same development path as travelled by the West. Development is thus deemed to be realised through the introduction of modern production methods which then improve industrial efficiency (Gugler, 1997; Sjaastad, 1962). In this sense, development becomes synonymous with urbanisation and industrialisation (Sharma, 2004; Rostow, 1971). Such a view heavily influenced the development paradigm of the 1960s, promoting rapid urbanisation of the developing world and pushing for its transformation from 'traditional, rural and agrarian-based societies' to 'urban, industrial economies' (Todaro, 1969). Migrants were deemed better off in urban centres than in rural areas and the likelihood of urban poverty was completely overlooked. Rural-urban migration was thus regarded as positive and actually encouraged (Tawodzera, 2011).

Also important in understanding urbanisation in the developing world, and related to modernisation, is the '*urban biased theory*' (Lipton, 2005; Dumont and Mottin, 1983; Bates, 1981) which argues that rapid urbanisation of the developing world is a result of urban biased development policy. This theory contends that Third World governments favour '*modernity*' as their development strategy and thus resort to crafting policies that heavily promote urban development more than rural development (Tettey, 2005). These policies have seen significant infrastructural development (symbols of modernity) taking place in developing cities. In turn, this encouraged massive rural-urban migration which led to unprecedented urbanisation levels

across the region as people were attracted mostly to capital cities (Bradshaw, 1987; Lipton, 1984). Although the modernisation path to development is a reality in Europe and North America where urbanisation largely occurred together with industrialisation, employment creation and improved urban livelihoods and living standards (Frayne, 2001), urbanisation in most of the developing world did not yield the same outcomes. Despite this strongly supported city-led development view, it should be noted that where urbanisation ‘*goes wrong*’, urban centres can be the worst ever place to live especially for the poor, as is the case in global south cities (Owuor, 2006). Previous studies discovered that urbanisation is not always accompanied by industrial employment and economic growth (Grant, 2012; Melamed *et al.*, 2011; Tawodzera, 2011; 2010; Bryceson, 2006). This is so because most urban centres in most developing countries lack the capacity to lure big investments to spearhead meaningful industrialisation and economic growth. Compounding matters is lack of access to capital and credit for firms, poor infrastructure and unskilled labour force (Melamed *et al.*, 2011). These have hampered industrialisation such that urbanisation has been more of population growth and urban sprawl in the absence of economic opportunities and services promoting what is commonly known as urban informality (UN-HABITAT, 2012; Watson, 2009).

In as much as some African economies are reported to have performed very well in terms of industrial growth during the early years of attaining independence from colonial powers, the momentum was short-lived. It was affected by the introduction of economic liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to a decline in industrial productivity and job losses (Tawodzera, 2011; 2010; Carmody, 2001). Africa did not enjoy the same benefits of liberalisation as the rest of the world (Potts, 2009). Highlighting the impacts of liberalisation on urban employment and livelihoods, Watt (2000:103) notes that “the urban poor [are] faced with a price-income squeeze, as the effects of unemployment and downward pressure on wages [are] compounded by the marketisation of public goods.” In this regard, it should be noted that not all cities serve as economic and social transformation engines. This is partly because urbanisation in this region is largely marked by population increases that are not backed by adequate industrial growth or sound economic activity (Bryceson, 2006). Njoh (2003) argues that urbanisation in Africa is partly a result of distorted trading and food pricing incentives in urban areas that encourage migrants to move to the city rather than being attracted by opportunities for more productive employment backed by increased industrial growth and economic activity. This, in turn, has seen

African urban centres being characterised by high levels of unemployment, poverty and deprivation, coupled by shortages of proper housing and other essential infrastructure needed for a city to function normally (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013, Owuor, 2006). The African city has thus received a range of descriptions varying from ‘*excessive urbanisation*’, ‘*parasitic urbanism*’ to ‘*premature urbanisation*’ (Obeng-Odoom, 2009; Ravallion *et al.*, 2007).

While urbanisation has spurred development in the developed world where migrants were lured to the cities by the availability of lucrative jobs, it is not always the case in SSA (Njoh, 2003) where, in some instances, development is “decoupled from urbanisation” (Watson, 2007:208). The ILO (1995) cited in Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014:159) note that “the inability of countries to provide sustainable employment for the growing labour force constitutes one of the most powerful obstacles to social and economic transformation in the developing city.” ILO 1995 World Employment Report also raised the concern that the changing global economy was negatively impacting the development of Third World cities, resulting in deteriorating employment conditions and high levels of unemployment. Attempts to boost industrial expansion in most developing cities did not yield much, such that even with the “new opportunities created by export-oriented industries, growth rates in manufacturing employment failed to keep up with urban population growth” (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014:162).

Lack of formal employment opportunities led to the creation of a large ‘army’ of unemployed population which is poverty-vulnerable. People surviving on US\$1 or less/day had increased by 50 million in urban centres between 1993 and 2007 (Ravallion *et al.*, 2007; World Bank, 2007). While the study concludes that urbanisation to some extent contributes towards poverty reduction, it also notes that poverty in urban centres is increasing. Another study found that the proportion of the population living in poverty world-over has considerably fallen since the early 1990s but the decline has been more in rural than urban areas. It notes that “poverty is becoming more urban in urbanised countries” (World Bank, 2013:87), hence the ‘*urbanisation of poverty*’ thesis has been proposed (Tibaijuka, 2009; Mehta, 2001). Poverty and vulnerability in the urban context manifest in many ways; poor quality housing, tenure insecurity, susceptibility to diseases and accidents, poor access to basic needs, infrastructure and services and reliance on temporary jobs, just to mention a few (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; World Bank, 2005). However, despite the lack of opportunities, inadequate housing and high unemployment levels, life in the city still

needs to be sustained. It is in the backdrop of such developments that deprived urban populations create their own economy (the informal economy) to seek alternative livelihoods outside the formal economy by ‘inventing’ their own jobs (de Soto, 1989). The following section looks at the concept of livelihoods.

2.3 Conceptualising Livelihoods

A livelihood is basically a way of earning a living. According to Chambers and Conway (1992:7), “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living.” Tawodzera (2010) elaborates that a livelihood is not necessarily the same as regular occupation although salaried jobs form part of livelihoods. Livelihoods may occur as multiple activities that households engage for the well-being of members (Owusu, 2007; Rakodi, 2002). An individual or a household’s ability to construct a livelihood depends on the stock of assets that are under their control, the choices made depending on these assets and available opportunities (Tawodzera, 2010). To understand a people’s livelihoods, Hussein (2011) notes the need to explore how limited access to livelihood assets by the poor, the associated risks they face and the institutional environment they operate in impacts on them as they attempt to build their livelihoods in their quest to escape poverty. Another term that is often used in relation to ‘*livelihoods*’ is ‘*coping strategies*’, which refers to a short-term survival plan adopted by a household in response to a crisis so as to meet immediate needs when their livelihoods are destroyed or disrupted (Tawodzera, 2011). Informal economic activities are largely seen as coping strategies and not stand-alone livelihoods (Tesfamariam, 2007).

2.4 Livelihoods in Urban Contexts

Urban dwellers construct their livelihoods through a range of activities. These occur as formal or informal activities.

2.4.1. Formal Livelihoods

Formal livelihoods are those based on employment, paid labour and other income-earning opportunities that exist within a “framework of rules and regulations, usually devised and implemented by the state, on working hours, minimum wages, health and safety at work, or social security obligations of employers and employees” (Daniels, 2004:502). Grant (2006) observes that urban livelihoods are generally backed by non-agricultural activities, formal trading, waged/salaried employment and self-employment. ‘*Employment*’ refers to work that is done in return for a wage or salary (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014). Montgomery *et al.*, (2003)

reason that the urban populace is engaged mostly in industrial and service sector activities for their livelihoods as opposed to agriculture. Fox and Goodfellow (2016) recognise formal employment as an important urban livelihood and cite examples of European, Japanese and North American cities as evidence of how urban living standards may be improved through secure jobs. They note that the intensification of economic activities and mechanisation of manufacturing sectors lure many peasants from rural to urban centres searching for higher wages.

Bacolod *et al.*, (2009) argue that urban centres function by utilising the skills and labour drawn from their populations while in turn, people are attracted into the city by the prospects of work and other opportunities which can better their lives. Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) also share a similar view, noting that there are strong links between urban production, formal employment and poverty reduction and that it is imperative for cities to ensure that they have the capacity to provide sustainable jobs to their population. Grant (2012:8) weighs in, asserting that “the combined benefits of market proximity and the economics of agglomeration offer considerable potential for labour market opportunities as well as meeting the services and infrastructure needs of large numbers of people,” thereby playing a role in urban poverty reduction.

Urban economies are cash-sensitive and all goods and services are sold (Tawodzera, 2011). Surviving in such an economy makes income, either from self-employment or paid labour, an important part of urban livelihoods (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). Beall (2004) uses evidence from poverty assessment studies done in nine cities – three each in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to show the role of employment in constructing urban livelihoods. The results show that jobs and other income-earning opportunities are the most important urban livelihood strategies and are also instrumental in building urban livelihoods and reducing poverty. Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) argue that an individual or household’s wealth/poverty status is mainly influenced by its employment or other related income-earning opportunities. They also note that employment patterns strongly influence urban development and the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Consequently, the subject of urban employment is central to the understanding of current social, economic and development issues. Urban employment is usually expected to grow with industrialisation since growth in manufacturing avails more job opportunities to the urban populace. To demonstrate the importance of employment as a

livelihood, Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) assert that urban employment has become critical in policy formulation and recommend that policies must focus on poor people if the unfolding urban poverty and vulnerability are to be addressed. Thus, most governments prioritise investor-friendly policies which encourage investment both by local investors and FDI to increase economic growth and create employment (Naude, 2013).

The importance of employment can be drawn from the observation on how job creation has become a key message in most of the political parties' election campaign manifestos across the world. World-over, the promise of jobs for the unemployed, better jobs and improved working conditions has become an important tool in luring voters. The African National Congress' (ANC) (South Africa) 2016 election campaign was centred on the promise to '*create jobs and promote job placement*' (ANC, 2016). In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF promised to '*create 2.2 million jobs*' in its 2013 election manifesto (ZANU-PF, 2013). In the US, the Democratic Party pledged to work towards ensuring '*a full-employment economy, where everyone has a job that pays enough to raise a family*' (Democratic National Committee, 2017). National (un-)employment levels have also gained currency as a key measure to determine government competence. Fox and Goodfellow (2016) explore the value placed on urban employment by noting how most governments now prioritise urban development policies that primarily focus on investing in infrastructure and housing for the formal labour force. This is meant to enhance their welfare and as a measure to reduce poverty while at the same time emphasising the value placed on employment in both national and household development.

The manufacturing sector, once established, is deemed to be a source of jobs for all; the educated, uneducated, skilled, semi-skilled and the unskilled. A European Commission's (2010) report argues that manufacturing plays a pivotal role in strengthening the middle class through provision of jobs and wages or salaries from which they can sustain their lives. It also notes that in advanced economies, 25% of private sector jobs are in manufacturing while at least another 25% are found in related services that rely on manufacturing either as a provider or a client. Similarly, Szirmai (2009) notes that there are strong links between manufacturing and other economic sectors. Thus, manufacturing provides a strong basis for other sectors to thrive. Bryson *et al* (2004) noted that most jobs in most cities are manufacturing jobs, although the services and the public sectors are increasingly becoming important employers. However, the rest of the

sectors are heavily dependent on manufacturing such that it is difficult for other sectors in most developing economies to thrive in the absence of a vibrant manufacturing sector.

Upon realising the importance of manufacturing in employment and economic growth, most developing countries devised policies that promote local industrialisation. Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) identify two major policies of this nature. The first one was the '*import substitution*' policy – an arrangement that was meant to promote local manufacturing and exportation of finished products as opposed to exporting cheap primary goods and importing expensive finished ones. Such a policy was deemed instrumental in promoting local manufacturing and boosting local employment creation capacity. The second one was '*industrialisation by invitation*' and was meant to lure foreign firms into establishing plants in the developing cities and then export finished products to overseas market. This arrangement led to setting up of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs). FTZs and EPZs are specialised industrial estates set aside for free trade and export, where firms are normally exempted from paying taxes and duties. Implemented in India, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan, the policy was instrumental in economic growth and employment creation but also in poverty reduction (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014).

In short, formal urban livelihoods conform to the city-led or modernist development perspective since they are based on the notion of urban economic and industrial growth. This in turn avails employment opportunities for suitably qualified urbanites and enhances their livelihoods and living standards. The employed do not only get paid for their service; some are entitled to other indirect remunerations like bonuses, retirement packages, company-provided accommodation, housing and transport allowances, loans, medical insurance, funeral cover and so forth (Dulebohn *et al.*, 2008). These are all important aspects of livelihoods. For those involved in self-employment or entrepreneurship, they are thought to enjoy economic positives associated with urbanisation: favourable business environment, suitable infrastructure and services, enriched markets, suitable labour and access to capital. However, not everyone residing in the city is able to secure a formal means of livelihoods. Some end up unemployed and underemployed (Stevens *et al.*, 2005). The majority, especially in the developing world city fail to do so and end up '*inventing*' their own economy (de Soto, 1989) – what has come to be known as the informal economy. These circumstances are discussed next.

2.4.2 Informal Livelihoods

Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) define the informal livelihoods as those unaccountable and unregistered economic activities that people carry out outside the formal economy to sustain life. Highlighting how lack of employment results in the emergence of the informal economy, Watt (2000:103) asserts that “the majority of new recruits to the labour market [are] left with underemployment in the informal sector as the only option left open to them.” The ILO (2002) summarises the bulk of the informal economic activities commonly ‘*invented*’ by the urban poor. These include barber services, cobblers, garbage collectors, waste recyclers, and vendors of vegetables, fruit, meat, fish, snack-foods, second-hand clothing, and so forth. The emergence of such a ‘vibrant’ secondary economy (the informal sector) ‘*invented*’ by the deprived urban populace to sustain life in a constrained economic environment has strong links to the Actor-Oriented theory by Norman Long (1990) which is explored under the next section.

2.5 Theorising Urban Livelihoods

This section interrogates the theories in which this study is grounded. These are the Actor-Oriented perspective, the SLA and the Theory of Practice.

2.5.1 Sustaining Life through ‘Other’ Means: The Actor-Oriented Perspective?

This theory is driven by a constructionist perspective which entails “remaking of society through on-going self-transforming actions and perceptions of a diverse and interlocked work of actors” (Long, 2001:1). The choice of this theory in this study was motivated by a number of factors. Firstly, the theory itself seeks to “explore how social actors are locked into a series of intertwined battles over resources, meanings, and control” (Long, 2001:5). Secondly, it emphasises how local actors utilise their linkages to generate satisfying outcomes through the formation of complex networks that form coping strategies and agency of resilience (Bosman, 2004; Long 2001). Thirdly, it also seeks to “identify and characterise differing actor practices, strategies and rationales, the conditions under which they arise, how they interlock, their viability or effectiveness for solving specific problems, and their wider social ramifications” (Long 2001:20). The three characterisations become important in that they raise a number of factors or key terms like ‘resources’, ‘control’, ‘networks’, ‘coping strategies’ and ‘resilience’ among others which tend to receive a lot of attention in most livelihoods discussions. The characterisations are also in resonance with objective one of this study which is *‘to explore the livelihood strategies ‘invented’ in Norton after de-industrialisation.’*

The theory identifies '*social actors*' which it defines as entities that may have some agency and possess the capability to assess and address problematic situations that confront them. It views social actors not as disembodied social categories or passive recipients of information, knowledge and intervention but as active subjects who have the ability to make decisions on issues that affect them (Bosman, 2004; Long, 2001). The theory further argues that no matter what the structural circumstances actors might face, they always find a way out and how they respond differs according to context. As such, a social actor equipped with agency has the capacity to process social experiences and devise ways to cope with the various pressures of life and develop resilience, even when they are operating under the most extreme forms of coercion (Long, 2001). Put in the context of this study, social actors are those ordinary people who struggle to make their living in Norton's constrained socioeconomic environment following the fall of industry and the economy at large. The theory informed the way I viewed my respondents, that is not as just ordinary people but as active social actors who can manipulate their environment and resources to better their lives.

Other than social actors, the '*social fields*' constitute another component of the theory that is important to this study. Social fields are composed of a variety of elements such as material resources, information, technologies, institutional components, discourses and sets of social relationships of various kinds (Long, 2001). As Long (2001) further emphasises, there is no single factor which orders this heterogeneous composition in society. Any order that is observed in a social field comes about because of the struggles, negotiations and accommodations taking place between the competing parties. A social field is thus a platform upon which social actors interact and engage in different ways as they seek to gain access to resources and capital in their bid to build meaningful livelihood outcomes. It is a stage upon which agency is showcased, knowledge constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed and where social networks are established and put into practice. In this study, I equate a social field to the economic platform where social actors converge as they attempt to (re-)construct their livelihoods and sustain life during difficult times.

To be able to compete in a competitive and constrained social field, social actors need to be equipped with some '*agency*'. Agency is a consequence of the actors' ability to cope with change on their own terms. It entails that actors have the potential to confront externally driven change

or intervention which might create an unfavourable and hostile transformation (Long, 2001). Thus, it is essential to consider the various ways in which social actors engage in or are locked into struggles over the attribution of social meanings to particular events, actions and ideas. Agency works together with ‘*knowledge*’ and ‘*power*’. The reasoning here is that it is what people know that shapes the actions that pursue to address their challenges. Knowledge is thus “a cognitive and social construction that results from and is constantly shaped by the experiences, encounters and discontinuities that emerge at the points of intersection between different actors life worlds” (Long 2001:70). Knowledge is an important factor in power relations and the distribution of resources. During crises, power plays a critical role in shaping the course of action and determining access to resources. Agency is therefore regulated by power and knowledge. What the ordinary residents in Norton are doing, how they are do it, how they innovate in face of challenges as they try to invent alternative livelihoods points to their agency and knowledge in the context of this study.

The Actor-Oriented theory is consistent with Robert Merton’s (1972) ‘*Deviation thesis*’ which in part gives an interpretation of how people respond when faced by uncertainties. The reasoning here is that when social actors discover that there are social structures which systematically exclude them from completion and that their legitimate path to success is blocked, they choose a deviant alternative. The justification behind deviation is the realisation that in as much as people might want to be compliant, the path to their desired goals is structurally blocked and the only way to realise their goals is to bypass these roadblocks. Those who opt to deviate are labelled ‘*rebels*’ because of their rebellious manner of defying the structures that prevent them from reaching their goals. The Actor-Oriented theory in concert with Merton’s (1972) arguments, thus, provides insights on how people respond to the destruction of their livelihoods. Loss of livelihoods is indeed a life-threatening experience and the devising alternative livelihoods can mean that they are ‘*action-oriented*’. In the informal livelihoods context, the basic tenets and argument propagated by the Actor-Oriented approach resonates with de Soto (1989) who emphasises the resilience, agency and the creative energies that characterise informal economy actors:

They simply renounce legality. They go out in the streets and sell whatever they can; they set up their shops, and built their homes on the hillsides, or on vacant lots. Where there are no jobs, they invent jobs, learning in the process all they were never taught (de Soto, 1989: xix).

This description of the informal economy captures the attributes of social actors and how they utilise their agency to gain access to the resources in the social field as given by Long (1990) in his actor oriented perspective. Many scholars analysed the Actor-Oriented theory and are content that it is an important theoretical tool that can be usefully applied in development research (Bosman, 2004; Preston 1996; Booth, 1994). However, as a major drawback and when used in the livelihoods context, the theory is only concerned with the various ‘*energies*’, ‘*knowledges*’ and ‘*agency*’ that social actors may use in their quest to ‘*invent*’ new livelihoods and overlooks the sustainability factor which is very important in constructing livelihoods. It is this drawback that necessitates the incorporation of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach in this study which is discussed next.

2.5.2 The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach

The failure by governments and development agencies to deal with ever-increasing poverty challenges especially in urban areas ushered in a new thinking in livelihoods discourse (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). Earlier strategies failed primarily because they were basically temporary remedies meant to address immediate needs and to achieve minimum levels of consumption (Moser, 2007). As a result, they failed to provide sustainable solutions to poverty and livelihood challenges that continue to bedevil the urban poor (Beall, 2005; Jorgensen and van Domelin, 2001; Teandler, 2000). As researchers increasingly interrogated poverty and vulnerability to unpack the complexity of urban livelihood strategies, there emerged the idea of ‘*sustainable livelihoods*’ which rose to prominence to be largely accepted as the answer to the question of poverty and vulnerability (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002). Ever since, livelihoods research has been focused on the poor’s lived experiences to determine how they construct their livelihoods in the context of risk and stress (Bohle, 2009). The concept of sustainable livelihoods was heavily influenced by Amartya Sen’s analysis of poverty and deprivation and was ‘born’ after years of agrarian research (Chambers and Cornway, 1992).

The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) was first designed to analyse livelihoods of the rural poor (Chambers and Conway, 1991; Scoones, 1998; DFID, 1999), but was subsequently used to analyse urban livelihoods (Chirau, 2014; Rakodi, 1998; Moser, 1998 & 1996). The concept also has links to the ‘Integrated Rural Development’ (IRD) thrust – an agricultural development initiative of the 1960s and 1970s (D'Silva and Raza, 1980; Yudelman, 1976). Morse and McNamara (2013) and Morse *et al* (2009) suggest that the SLA was largely

influenced by the Human Development Approach, which focuses on enhancing human capabilities (UNDP, 1990). The SLA is also linked to the '*sustainable development*' concept which asserts that "the development process should meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the options of future generations" (UNDP, 1990:61). The SLA recognises livelihoods as not just income-generating opportunities but include the different capabilities, assets and activities that contribute towards making a living (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). Sustainability refers to meeting people's current needs without compromising the future. As Carney (1998:4) affirms, "a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and the future while not undermining the natural resource base."

The SLA employs a wide conceptualisation of the challenges of poverty and vulnerability. It is part of the integrated development approaches that consider economic opportunities, social protection and environmental sustainability (Scoones, 1998). As an enhanced way of thinking about objectives, scope and priorities of development aimed at better meeting the needs of the poor, it acknowledges that income earned from wage employment represents only one of the many dimensions of individual/household livelihood strategies (Ashley and Carney, 1999). The SLA has been framed in many different shapes by different stakeholders (governments; NGOs like Care International, Oxfam; DFID; UNDP among others), but it is DFID's version that is most influential today (Pain and Lautze, 2002). In its analysis of poverty and vulnerability, the DFID framework invites a holistic approach that acknowledges the existence of a multiplicity of actors and forces that influence livelihood strategies and outcomes (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999-2000). Livelihood or development initiatives informed by SLA often include projects and programmes concerned with employment generation, microfinance programmes, and promotion of participatory approaches to development planning and practice. However, its initiatives are regarded to be more conscious of and attentive to the challenges of building sustainable livelihoods than previous approaches (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016).

The SLA brings together the idea and practice of poverty reduction mechanisms, sustainable development, participation and empowerment of vulnerable populations into a framework for policy analysis and programming (DFID, 1999). Morse and McNamara (2013:20) define it as "a multiple capital approach where sustainability is considered in the context of available capitals

and an examination of the vulnerability context in which these assets/capitals exist.” It identifies assets (capitals) that people use to construct livelihoods by drawing those assets which are within their reach within a broader socio-economic and political context (Rakodi, 2002; Farrington, Carney, Ashley and Turton, 1999). The framework is an analytic tool of peoples’ current livelihoods. It does not only seek to understand existing livelihoods, but also diagnoses what needs to be done to better these livelihoods.

One of the main aspects to consider when studying urban livelihoods is the tendency by city dwellers to adopt multiple activities to diversify and bolster their livelihood security (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; Osuwu 2007; Rakodi, 2002). Moser (2007; 1998), in the context of the SLA, demonstrated how urban households may manage their different livelihood assets and introduced the notion of ‘*intergenerational livelihood strategies*’ which are not only concerned about day-to-day survival but also long-term investment which contributes to secured livelihoods. The DFID version of the sustainable livelihoods framework can be diagrammatically represented as given below:




Figure 2: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (DFID, 1999)

The foremost component of the SLA is the ‘*vulnerability context*’ within which human beings survive. Scoones and Wolmer (2002) noted that poor people face many uncertainties which constitute their vulnerability. The vulnerability context thus frames the external environment in which people live and notes that livelihoods and access to the different livelihood capitals are affected by ‘*trends*’ (population, resource, economic, governance, political, technological), ‘*shocks*’ (epidemics, natural disasters, economic, conflicts) and ‘*seasonality*’ (Seasonal price

shifts, production, food availability, employment) (Twigg, 2001). Such vulnerability contexts impact people's chosen livelihood strategies. They can destroy assets or livelihoods and can force people to dispose some of their assets as a way of coping (Twigg, 2001). The framework takes a broad view of people's strengths and capacities in the form of livelihood '*capitals or assets*'. Moser (2007:2) defines assets as "stocks of financial, human, natural or social resources or capital endowments on which people build their livelihoods but which also give them the capability to be and to act." An asset does not necessarily have to be owned by a household for it to be important but access to it is also crucial (Morse and McNamara, 2013).

'*Human assets*' highlight the importance of skills, knowledge (typically acquired through education), ability to labour and good health in people's pursuit of their livelihood strategies. '*Social assets*' refer to social resources on which people draw in pursuit of livelihood objectives. These exist as social networks and connections; group membership, family, friends and churches to facilitate trust, people's ability to work together and expand their access to wider institutions. Relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchanges facilitate cooperation and provide the basis for informal safety nets among the poor. They help to improve the efficiency of economic relations that in turn can help increase people's incomes. They also facilitate better management of common resources (*natural capital*) and maintaining shared infrastructure (*physical capital*) while at the same time facilitating innovation, the development of knowledge (*human capital*) and sharing of that knowledge among members (DFID, 1999).

'*Natural assets*' denote the natural resource stocks, like land, forests, marine/wild resources, wind, solar and water, from which resource flows and services are derived. In the vulnerability context, it is the most affected capital by natural disasters and once destroyed it impacts negatively on other types of assets in poor people's livelihoods, especially those whose life is largely dependent upon resource-based activities as farming, fishing, and mineral extraction (Twigg, 2001). Since some of these resources are finite, there have been calls to exploit them in a sparing manner as a way of enhancing sustainability (United Nations, 2015). Inconsiderate exploitation of resources may result in such negatives as environmental/land degradation, health concerns and even cause natural hazards and disasters. These in turn destroy other livelihoods assets, together with already existing livelihoods. It is therefore imperative to seek to achieve environmental sustainability when dealing with natural resources/capital. Such environmental

concerns were raised by many researchers including Schnaiberg (1980) who came up with the Treadmill of Production – an economic theory that explains how natural resource exploitation normally disregards environmental conservation. This in turn affects host communities and hence the need for sustainable extraction (CRD, 2014; Long, 2012; United Nations, 2006; Shoko, 2002).

‘*Physical assets*’ refer to the basic infrastructure and producer goods that support livelihoods (transport, shelter, water, electricity, sanitation, information). Lack of particular types of physical assets like of infrastructure, clean water and shelter is considered as a core dimension of poverty (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; DFID, 1999). ‘*Financial assets*’ denote the monetary resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives. These can be obtained through credit-providing institutions, pensions and transfers from the state and remittances. In highly monetised economies like urban centres, financial capital dictates people’s lives (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). However, this capital is rarely accessible to the poor and most go with very little (SIDA, 2005; Twigg, 2001).

Another livelihood component which the framework captured is the ‘*transforming structures and processes*.’ Structures comprise institutions; political bodies, local governments, government departments, judiciary, NGOs and CSOs while processes include cultures, policies and legislation that shape livelihoods. Structures and processes determine people’s access to livelihood assets, strategies, decision-making bodies and sources of influence. They either constrain or enhance people’s access to livelihood capitals. In short, governing institutions (structures) craft laws and policies (processes) which in turn impact people’s livelihoods, either positively or negatively (DFID, 1999; Carney, 1998).

The framework also identifies ‘*livelihood strategies*’ as another aspect to consider in livelihoods studies. Livelihood strategies are the range and combination of activities and choices that people undertake to achieve their livelihood goals which include productive activities, investment strategies and reproductive choices and so forth (DFID, 1999). Livelihood strategies differ across geographic areas, sectors, within households and over time. It has also been discovered that at times people do not necessarily shift from one form of employment or economic activity to another but combine different activities to widen their options through which they can meet their livelihood goals at different times (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Analysing livelihoods when

they are characterised by diversity is a challenge since it becomes difficult to draw a physical boundary to differentiate them (Scoones, 1998; Chambers and Conway, 1992).

The SLA is meant to achieve a set of sustainable '*livelihood outcomes*' from the various livelihood strategies. Anticipated outcomes generally include more income and improved social and economic sustainability of livelihoods; increased well-being; reduced vulnerability for poor people; improved food security and more sustainable use of the natural resource base. It is however also important to note that the outcomes of any livelihood strategy are shaped and influenced by various factors, and these include the availability of and access to capitals, the vulnerability context as well as transforming structures and processes. Where livelihood capitals are more vulnerable and where legislation restricts availability of and access to livelihood capitals, then livelihood strategies are likely to yield less desired outputs (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999; Carney, 1998).

In as much as the livelihoods approach has been widely accepted as one of the best tools to analyse livelihoods, it still received a fair share of criticism (Prowse, 2010; Kruger, 2003). Fox and Goodfellow (2016:120-121) argue,

While approaches such as the assets and sustainable livelihoods framework provides useful principles by which to organise our understanding of social reality, they can also become rigid grids that seek to codify complexity and do not easily accommodate messiness and micro-politics of people's everyday lives.

Morse and McNamara (2013) note the omission of '*spirituality*' as a standalone capital. They argue that spiritual beliefs play an important role in shaping society and call for spiritual capital to be included as an asset. According to Stark and Finke (2000:120), '*spiritual capital*' "consists of the degree of mastery of and attachment to a particular religious culture." Prayer and spiritual beliefs can re-energise an individual during their low moments and give strength to keep fighting with the hope that things will be fine.

Odero (2006) also proposes inclusion of information as a capital, arguing that information is different from intellectual capital and must be given due recognition. Closely linked to this is the role and use of ICT and mobile phones which Sey (2011) suggests as important factors in shaping livelihoods. Another prominent criticism suggests that capitals within the framework must not be merely regarded as factors underpinning production but should also consider how people can engage with one another and what they benefit from such engagements. Morse and

McNamara (2013) bemoan the absence of the people in the framework and as such the principle of ‘people-centeredness’ becomes mere rhetoric. They argue that as a result, the SLA risks becoming a quantitative analysis tool that can only lead to mass production of academic works but doing very little to enhance the livelihoods of the poor. Another aspect that Morse and McNamara (2013) feel was betrayed by this approach is the participatory principle where the affected people should be the main actors in identifying and prioritising their interests. While the people might take part in identifying needs, they lack the power to decide what to do and their contributions might end up being ignored by those in authority whose decisions override every contribution.

It has also been argued that the theory only mentions ‘*culture*’ in passing under the transforming structures and processes although it is an important factor that affects development of any form at community level and thus requires due attention (Tao *et al.*, 2010; Daskon and Binns, 2010). The SLA is also faulted for not putting into consideration issues like leisure, which can have important impacts on resources (Brinson *et al.*, 2009), citing for example how fishing can be leisure to some and a livelihood to others. Summing up these shortfalls, van Dillen (2002:251) argues that the framework “belongs to the group of holistic approach that seeks to capture the enormous complexity of development problems, but do so at the cost of focus, depth and analytical clarity.” However, besides these marked criticism, Levine (2014) still believes that the approach can be used more widely and rigorously given the constant interrogation that it has been receiving over the past two decades, which in turn led to a much more improved understanding of its limitations. Researchers thus apply it with the full knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses.

The livelihoods approach informs this study in a couple of ways. Levine (2014) notes that the approach emphasises that as a way of analysing livelihoods, it is important to first understand what people are doing in order to survive and why they do what they do. It is important these two questions informed one of the objectives of this study which seeks: ‘*To explore the livelihood strategies ‘invented’ in Norton after deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe,*’ – an objective that seeks to unpack what people are doing, why they do it, what they hoped to do and what went wrong. Again factors that shape livelihoods are an important aspect of the livelihoods approach as noted by Levine (2014:2) who argues that:

People's ability to have a sustainable and adequate livelihood is shaped by the interplay of the resources which people are able to use and the institutions and 'politics' which influence how people can use resources and to what effect.

To this end, the SLA helps this study to interrogate the various processes, institutions and policies that shape livelihoods in Norton, exploring how they aid or constrict livelihoods and determine their sustainability. It also helps in understanding the concept of livelihood assets, thus, enabling this study to identify the assets that are available to the people and how accessible they are to the ordinary resident. This, in part, points to livelihood outcomes and how sustainable they are, leading to the ultimate objective of the study, which is to *'Investigate the sustainability of the livelihoods adopted in Norton after the fall of industry.'* The approach is, therefore, of utmost relevance to this study.

2.5.3 Power and Politics in Livelihoods: The Theory of Practice

After realising the strong criticism that the SLA received, Sakdapolrak (2014:19) argues that the 'Theory of Practice' (TOP) can be used to overcome these limitations, paving way "for a more critical view by recognising the role of power and politics." Researchers have thus been increasingly adopting it in livelihoods research with its central theorems of '*habitus*', '*capital*' and '*field*' (Etzold, 2013; van Dijk, 2011; Obrist *et al.*, 2010; Thieme, 2008). It interprets society in terms of domination and relative strength, arguing that these are the main causes of unequal distribution of resources in society (Bourdieu, 1972).

Its first component is the '*field*', which is a platform upon which social agents interact guided by certain field rules. The field is made up of "power-laden relationships between dominant and subordinated actors, who are unequally endowed with different forms of capital" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2006:127). Social agents engage in struggles as they compete over access to goods, resources, positions and power that are at stake. Every field has its own rules which determine the field's '*do's* and '*don'ts*' and in doing so, limiting social mobility and access to resources in the field (Bourdieu, 1998b; 1972). Social fields are based on historically-generated and shared meanings (Iellatchitch *et al.*, 2003). Agents therefore must internalise the rules in order to demonstrate appropriate practices and strategies (Bourdieu, 1983a) and act in a way that is within the confinements of the field rules. A social field is thus a '*locus of struggles*' (Bourdieu, 1975) that represents a network of positions where field rules determine what an agent can and cannot do. Rules limit social mobility and access to resources within the social field (Bourdieu,

1972). Field battles between agents are principally about relative positions within the field and concerned about maximising capital and strategies should be in compliance with the rules that regulate the field (Iellatchitch *et al.*, 2003).

Bringing the theory into the context of this study (livelihoods studies), many researchers (Obrist *et al.*, 2010; Etzold *et al.*, 2009), have proposed Bourdieu's field "as an analytical tool by which to embed livelihoods and to facilitate a politicised analysis." The theory is also deemed useful in mapping out livelihoods and livelihood strategies of society's vulnerable groups "within a web of power-laden social relations" (Sakdapolrak, 2014:23). Field analysis helps to provide answers to questions like; what is at stake in the field? What is the relation of the vulnerable focal actor to other actors in the field? What forms of capital are relevant in the field and how are they distributed? What are the '*rules of the game*' in the field? (Sakdapolrak, 2014:23.) He argues that by addressing these questions, "the embeddedness of livelihoods within a web of power relations can be concretised." In this study, these questions relate to the issue of '*livelihood options available for social actors in Norton.*'

'*Capital*' has a pivotal role to play in the TOP (Bourdieu, 1986). Wilshusen (2012) notes that although there are some identifiable conceptual similarities between the TOP's '*capital*' and the '*assets*' in the SLA, Bourdieu's capital refers to "issues of context, relationality, and power, and thus deeply challenges mainstream non-embedded, ahistoric and static notion of assets in livelihoods studies" (Sakdapolrak, 2014:24). According to Bourdieu (1986) capital is accumulated labour and social energy and it constitutes those resources that are struggled over and the ways through which actors exercise power and influence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2006). Bourdieu (1998; 1986,) introduced four types of capital, and these are '*economic*', '*cultural*', '*social*' and '*symbolic*.' Economic capital refers to an individual's fortunes, revenues, money and can be institutionalised as property rights. Cultural capital points to education and can be institutionalised as educational qualifications and also represents human capital. Social capital represents one's entire social relations and a network of the actual and potential resources (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital allows group members access both to material and immaterial resources, information and knowledge within the social fields (Gretzinger *et al.*, 2010). Symbolic capital is honour and recognition and is a product of all other three capitals combined (Bourdieu, 1998; 1986).

Bourdieuian capital views a livelihood as an outcome of social struggle in social relations controlled by authority within such a framework. van Dijk (2011) views poverty as deprivation of access to entitlements, and not as lack of capital *per se*. Sakdapolrak (2014:25) contends that by making use of Bourdieu's capital in livelihoods research, we are shifting "the focus of analysis away from conducting snapshots of households' stocks of capital and draws attention to the dynamic and temporal dimension of capital", thus approaching the concept of livelihoods from a much more broader context.

Moving on to the '*habitus*', Bourdieu (1984:82) defined it as,

an ensemble of schemata of perceptions, thinking, feeling, evaluating, speaking and acting that structures all expressive, verbal and practical manifestations and utterances of a person" and "a system of dispositions that produce practice in accordance with the schemes engendered by history.

It is a strategy generating principle which activates the agents' ability to cope with the unforeseen and constantly changing life situations. For agents to produce desirable outcomes, they must invest the right types and amounts of capital in the social field. When put in the context of livelihoods studies, Bourdieuian approach offers "simplistic understanding of livelihoods strategies", emphasising the "inherent rationalities of human action and draws attention to its social 'embeddedness' and path-dependent character" (Sakdapolrak, 2014:25). Such a perspective in livelihoods analysis more realistically captures the dynamic and multidimensional nature of how people construct their livelihoods. Bourdieu's analysis of the field in relation to livelihoods brings into discussion issues of power relations and structures of domination and subordination into a politicised understanding of livelihoods and expanding the notion of '*transforming structures and processes*' of the SLA and is thus ideal for a study like this one. The choice of this theory was as a result of the links that it shares with the SLA which is the main theory that this study used. It should be noted that besides the capitals (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) that are identified by this theory have strong links to the SLA's capitals/assets and this similarity enriched the theoretical discussions in this study by bringing in views from different theorists on the same subject. Other than the similarity, the study took note of how virtually everything can easily be highly politicised and found it worthy to bring into discussion the subject of how politics play a part in constructing livelihoods especially when it comes to distribution and access of livelihood resources. In this study, it thus helps to address issues related to policy, legislation or politics-induced challenges faced by social agents in the

social fields as they try to construct livelihood strategies which will in turn yield favourable livelihood outcomes. However, one of its major drawbacks is that much of its attention is focused on power/politics and just like the Actor-Oriented approach; it is less concerned with sustainability, which makes it inadequate on its own for this study, leaving the Livelihoods Approach as the main theory in this study.

While this study chose to dwell on the three theories; the Actor-oriented, Livelihoods approach and the Theory of Practice, a number of other theories/approaches/frameworks can be used in livelihoods research and these include Vulnerability Theories like Capacities and Vulnerabilities Assessment by Anderson and Woodrow (1998), Pressure and Release theory by Blaikie *et al.* (1994), Structural-Functional Theory by Dynes (1970) and Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs among others depending on the exact aspects of livelihoods that one wishes to study.

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter explored the conceptual and theoretical issues around urban livelihoods. It discussed the concepts urbanisation and industrialisation, the Modernisation theory and how they shaped urban livelihoods, highlighting the role of employment and the formal sector in constructing urban livelihoods. It also examined how failing industrialisation in developing cities led to the creation of the informal economies, ushering into discussion the Actor-Oriented theory, the Livelihoods Approach and the Theory of Practice. It highlighted major theoretical issues, pointing out how the modernisation school of thought influenced urbanisation, industrialisation and urban livelihoods in developing countries but at the same time failing to address challenges associated with rapid urbanisation. It also noted how social actors, after failing to get formal jobs, resort to '*deviate*' and '*survive through other means*' as well as highlighting how politics and power relations play a part in access and distribution of livelihood resources. The following chapter focuses on urbanisation urban livelihoods and deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER THREE

URBANISATION, INDUSTRIALISATION, URBAN LIVELIHOODS AND DEINDUSTRIALISATION IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines urbanisation and industrialisation in Zimbabwe. It describes Zimbabwe's geographical and demographic characteristics and traces its urbanisation and industrialisation route from the precolonial to postcolonial times and how these influenced urban livelihoods. It examines the concept '*deindustrialisation*', putting it in the local context and finally unpacks the road that Zimbabwe travelled from being a vibrant economy to become what it is today. The chapter unpacks issues around Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), participation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war, government economic mismanagement and corruption, economic sanctions and political violence and how they led to the demise of the manufacturing sector and the economy at large.

3.2 Locating and Characterising Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a land-locked southern African country with four immediate neighbours; Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia. Sitting on a total area of 390,757sqm which translates to 39,075 million hectares, the country is slightly to the north of the Tropic of Capricorn, occupying the land between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011). A large portion of its geographic area is on a plateau - the Highveld - which is 650km long, stretching from the northeast to the southeast and 80km wide with an average altitude of around 1,200m (Tawodzera, 2011; Chimhowu, 2009). Zimbabwe is part of the global village and sub-regionally it is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The country generally experiences a subtropical climate characterised by hot, wet summers and cool, dry winters. The bulk of its urban centres are located in the central Highveld under Agro-ecological Regions 1 and 2 where there is high rainfall and abundant rich agricultural soils. Zimbabwe boasts a variety of natural resources: minerals; gold, diamonds, platinum, coal, just to mention a few (Naden *et al.*, 1994), wildlife, historical sites like the Great Zimbabwe Ruins and natural sites like the Victoria Falls. A British colony between 1896 and 1980, Zimbabwe was one

of Africa's most diversified economies during the early years of independence. It used to have a strong manufacturing sector, rich mining and agricultural sectors and a thriving tourist industry (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011). Early missionaries estimated that it had a huge potential for prosperity, noting that "the plateau between the rivers Zambezi and Limpopo, in south-east Africa offers rich opportunities for human settlement" (History World, 2007:1 in Shizha & Kariwo, 2011). The Times in London also likened the country to Canaan, a land of '*milk and honey*' - very rich with minerals; gold, chrome and iron (Mlambo, 1972). The observation was slowly becoming a reality until the late 1990s when things began to change dramatically.

Zimbabwe is home to 15.6 million people of whom 34% are urban dwellers. Its urban population is growing at a rate of around 3% per annum (World Bank, 2015; Zimstat, 2013). The nation also has a high literacy level of over 90% (UNESCO, 2009). Education is delivered through a strong primary and secondary school system supported by a wealth of higher learning and skills development institutions: universities, technical, teacher and vocational training colleges and until the mid-2000s, it was one of the best human capital bases in Africa. This was however eroded by a massive brain drain as skilled personnel moved into the diaspora following the economic crisis (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011). The following map locates Zimbabwe.




Figure 3: Zimbabwe Map (Mupfuvi, 2014).

3.3 Urbanisation in Zimbabwe

Urbanisation in Zimbabwe started before the advent of colonialism. Literature suggests there is evidence that people started living in well organised settlements that resemble modern day cities well before white settlers arrived. The Great Zimbabwe monument, which served as the capital of the Shona people until the 15th century, is one widely cited example (Tavuyanago and Mbenene, 2008). The abandoning of hunting and gathering as the main economic activities, followed by domestication of animals and crops saw people organising themselves into kingdoms and large settlements which paved way for the creation of ‘urban’ settlements like Great Zimbabwe, Khami and DhloDhlo (Munzwa and Jonga, 2010; Falola and Fleming, 2009). However, Pikirayi (2001) affirms that the social, economic and cultural structures of these settlements are different from today’s cities and are thus of little relevance to this study. Munzwa and Jonga (2010) also note that the populations of these centres were smaller when compared to today’s cities while economic activities were basically primary; farming, little mining and limited trade. They thus concluded that Zimbabwe’s modern day cities and the rest of Africa are colonial establishments which imitate Western cities.

Contemporary urbanisation in Zimbabwe cannot be discussed outside the context of colonialism. The colonial settlers established early administrative centres meant to facilitate resource extraction (Munzwa and Jonga, 2010). These include Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, Gweru and Masvingo. The extractive nature of these centres designed to cater for very small white populations meant that they did not experience significant growth in their formative years. Harare, for example, remained stagnant and largely ‘undeveloped’ over the first two decades of its formation as it remained home to just 2,000 settlers by 1909 (Yoshikuni, 2006). After failing to find the much-anticipated minerals in Mashonaland in large quantities as earlier projected, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) administration encouraged some of the white settlers to venture into agriculture to supply food to the urban population (Nyandoro, 2012). Under this arrangement, they were supposed to move out of the main urban centres and take advantage of the red fertile and well-watered soils in the Highveld that were suited for crop production (Nyagumbo, 1982). The move saw some embryonic urban settlements like Chinhoyi, Marondera and Chegutu mushrooming (Drakakis-Smith, 1992; Smout, 1975). Since these centres were exclusively meant to serve the interests of the settlers, Africans were allowed into the city only after securing jobs while their families were to remain in their rural homes (Drakis-Smith, 1992).

However, as industry slowly expanded, demand for labour rose resulting in significant growth of urban centres. Trading of goods and services also steadily rose, and, led by the capital, Harare, Zimbabwe began to experience some significant urbanisation. The black urban population in the 1920s was mainly composed of domestic servants but later grew to encompass unskilled labourers employed in the expanding industries. Over the years, Africans in urban areas multiplied to outnumber whites. The Whitsun Foundation (as quoted in Tawodzera, 2011) noted that the proportion of black urban population to white in Zimbabwe shot from 1:1 in 1904 to 3:1 in 1960 and to 5:1 in 1980. The period 1969 to 1975 saw substantial industrial growth, and the demand for industrial labour improved – a factor that encouraged rural-urban migration. Rural-urban migration also increased as a result of the escalating ‘*Second Chimurenga*’ - Zimbabwe’s second war of liberation (1960-1980). This forced people to escape from the increasingly insecure rural areas and migrate *en masse* into urban areas (UNDP, 2008). The war also resulted in the decline of employment opportunities in commercial farms, forcing people to move into urban areas in search of other opportunities.

The mass rural-urban exodus led to the establishment of informal settlements on the edges of the country’s various urban centres - Epworth and Chitungwiza on the outskirts of Harare being prime examples - as the movement of Africans into the city remained restricted (Chirisa, 2013; Tawodzera, 2011; Nyamvura and Brown, 1999). However, at independence the new government lifted the restrictive legislation that banned Africans from moving into towns and extended home ownership to occupants of formerly public-owned rented houses (Patel, 1984). Workers who stayed as ‘singles’ were allowed to bring their rural-based families while the uneven and urban-biased development patterns inherited from Rhodesia also acted as another pull factor. Thus, urban areas continued to lure more rural migrants in apparent response to the modernisation theory call. This saw a rapidly growing urban population during the early years of independence. Realising the increasing challenges emanating from rapid urban population growth, the Government introduced a decentralisation policy which prioritised industrial growth in small urban centres and rural district centres. It was out of this arrangement that small centres like Norton, Kadoma, and Chegutu became visible and began to flourish (Tawodzera, 2011).

3.4 Industrialisation in Zimbabwe

Several scholars suggest that Zimbabwe was one of sub-Saharan Africa's largest, vibrant, most diversified and best integrated economies during its first decade of independence (Chirau, 2014; Murisa, 2010; Chipika *et al.*, 2000). Manufacturing contributed 25% of its GDP since the 1970s. By 1987 it had become the second largest employer, hiring at least 175,000 people - 16% of formal sector labour before jumping to 205,000 by 1991. The country's manufacturing GDP was US\$150 per capita, higher than that of Kenya (US\$36) and Nigeria (US\$21), coming second to South Africa's (US\$566) (ILO, 1993). In 1985, manufactured exports accounted for 50% of the total exports (Riddell, 1990). The country had earlier on enjoyed continuous growth of the manufacturing sector for a period stretching from 1938 to 1988, with the sector playing a pivotal role in the national economy (Sachikonye, 1999).

Following independence, the textiles, beverages and tobacco subsectors grew rapidly between 1981 and 1991 with clothing and footwear, chemical and petroleum products, non-metallic mineral products and transport equipment picking up momentum in the late 1980s. Quick employment growth was realised clothing and footwear, paper, printing and publishing, chemical and petroleum products and transport equipment subsectors (Sachikonye, 1999). As the manufacturing sector was thriving during the 1970s and 1980s, the extractive industry, was also recording some positive gains. Mining initially responded positively to ESAP and enjoyed some huge gains. During the 1990s, the economy capitalised on its competitive mineral resources, well-maintained infrastructure and professionally-managed state institutions to lure many new foreign investors as Zimbabwe asserted itself as one of the giants in African mining (Saunders, 2008). The liberalisation of mines strongly appealed to investors who responded by investing in a number of mining houses (Dansereau, 2005). The sector became an important part of the manufacturing sector. It supplied raw materials to and sourced its inputs/equipment from some manufacturers and also employed many, ranging from unskilled to highly skilled labour. Mine work became a livelihood upon which both rural and urban households relied. Mining also saw infrastructural development in rural areas, expansion of small centres into established towns, notably Zvishavane, Kwekwe, Hwange and Redcliff while a number of others attained city status. Harare and Bulawayo were recognised as metropolitan cities by the early 2000s.

It is important to note that Zimbabwe's urbanisation and industrialisation experiences up to around 1990 supported the '*cities-as-engines-of-economic-and-social-development*' thesis proposed by the World Bank (2000) and Hall (2000) among others. The majority of urban households relied on waged employment - either in manufacturing or related sectors such that paid formal jobs became a livelihood for many. Realising the importance of industrial growth in social and economic development, the government introduced many policies meant to promote industrialisation. This saw the introduction of the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) strategy. EPZs are areas specifically set aside for export manufacturing and are normally characterised by provision of special incentives meant to lure foreign investment for export production. The idea of EPZs originated in Spain and spread to other parts of Europe, Asia and Latin America and was also well-received in southern African by countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Mauritius among others (Jauch, 2003). Zimbabwe passed its EPZs law in 1994, authorising the creation of a supervisory board that was to oversee its implementation. The primary goals of this arrangement were to achieve employment creation and to jump-start export-led industrial growth (Madani, 1999). The EPZs law provided for a number of incentives to attract investors. These include 100% remittance of net profits after tax for investors, a 5-year tax holiday, 15% corporate tax and exemption from import duties (World Bank, 1996). However, among other reasons like policy inconsistency and poor funding, the policy faced resistance from labour bodies which opposed suspending labour laws in the EPZs, arguing that it violated labour rights and could lead to unrest such that the plan failed (Jauch, 2003; Madani, 1999).

The Beira Corridor was another attempt by the government to boost industrialisation. The Corridor is a transport network corridor that links the Mozambican port of Beira with regional, landlocked countries. It has a relatively good transport network which promotes the flow of goods to and from the port for import/export trade (Zhou, 2015). It consists of a railway and a road network linking Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and DRC with the Beira port, an oil pipeline and overhead electric power lines which lead to Zimbabwe. From Zimbabwe, the corridor is used to transport export products like chromium, tobacco, cotton, and food products destined for overseas markets. The corridor also sees the passage of products like oil fuels, fertilisers and heavy industrial machinery and equipment into Zimbabwe (Arnold, 2015). It was established to provide a reliable transport infrastructure which was meant to promote growth in the

manufacturing, mining and agricultural sectors by facilitating imports and exports (Zhou, 2015; de Beer, 2001). However, the falling industry and decreasing agricultural and mining productivity in the country lowered the volume of imports and exports that pass through the corridor such that although it is still in place, it is no longer serving the country the way it used to. The following section looks at urban livelihoods in Zimbabwe before the economic crisis.

3.5 Urban Livelihoods in Zimbabwe

Rapid urbanisation in Zimbabwe saw an upsurge in the urban population as people flocked to cities in search of economic opportunities. The increasing demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in the rapidly expanding manufacturing sector saw most urban dwellers relying on formal employment for their livelihoods (Tawodzera, 2011; UNDP, 2008). The ILO (1993) noted that manufacturing was one of the largest employers in the cities, employing at least 175,000 people in 1987 and to 205,000 workers by 1991. Mining also provided jobs in mining towns, employing up to 85,000 by 1985 (Saunders, 2008). The agricultural and agro-industries employed up to 400,000 (Munangagwa, 2009) and these opportunities bolstered livelihoods. Urban livelihoods before the economic crisis basically relied on the formal economy. However, the informal economy also played a role in constructing livelihoods for some such that between 10% and 20% employed in the sector from 1980 to 1991 (Ndiweni & Verhoeven, 2013; Ngundu, 2010). The next section explores the concept and phenomenon ‘*deindustrialisation*’.

3.6 Understanding Deindustrialisation

The term ‘*deindustrialisation*’¹⁴ refers to a situation when an economy experiences a long-term decline of manufacturing sector’s share of total national employment (Palma, 2014; Kollmeyer, 2009). Schweibberger and Suedekum (2009) define it as a decline in the share of the output of the industrial sector in the nation’s GDP or the share of industrial employment in total employment. Bluestone and Harrison (1982:6) qualify it as “a widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation’s basic productive capacity.” Deindustrialisation has traditionally been regarded as a feature of developed economies as they transform from manufacturing to services- or tertiary-based economies (Mbira, 2015; Hamid and Khan, 2015; Tregema, 2011). Kollmeyer (2009) relates the phenomenon to post-industrial societies in which the economy is centred on the provision of services as opposed to the production of physical goods. Such a

¹⁴ I also interchanged the term with ‘*economic crisis*’ in some instances to avoid repeating it very regularly.

transformation is believed to be a product of technological advancement and economic maturity where most of the manual labour in manufacturing is mechanised and more jobs are then created in the services sector (Rodrik, 2015; Palma, 2014).

Strangleman (2016) traces the roots of deindustrialisation to Europe and the US in the 1970s when it started to unfold on a large scale as the two continents began to experience widespread closures of the basic heavy manufacturing factories. Koistinen (2013), however, is of the view that it started well before that, albeit at a much lower scale. He studied the economic history of New England's textile industry and concluded that industrial retrenchments started as early as the 1920s when North European firms succumbed to intense industrial competition posed by a newly and rapidly industrialising southern Europe. This competition was a part result of the newer manufacturing technologies and lower wages which were largely due to lack of trade unions. In turn, this had an impact on industries in the North where wages were slightly higher and where workers were unionised. Consequently, the 1920s, stretching to the Great Depression in the 1930s saw a huge slump in northern Europe and America's manufacturing, forcing firms, especially the textile sector to retrench. Strangleman (2016) argues that deindustrialisation in the US actually started before World War 2.

After a period of relative manufacturing sector stability, the UK once again experienced some shutting down of mines in the 1960s, regarded as an era of significant industrial losses (Linehan, 2003). Koistinen (2013:187) contends that "deindustrialisation was the principal economic reality in New England for substantial stretches of the Cold War era". Bluestone and Harrison (1982) note that deindustrialisation in the US is also to be linked to the systematic diversion of capital (financial resources, plant and equipment) from productive investment in the basic manufacturing industries into unproductive sectors, mergers, acquisitions and foreign investment. After these early experiences, deindustrialisation then began to spread to all corners of the globe and today it has also become a part of developing economies. Tregenna (2011) identifies two types of deindustrialisation namely positive and negative deindustrialisation as discussed below.

3.6.1 Positive Deindustrialisation

Positive deindustrialisation, also called mature deindustrialisation, occurs naturally as a result of sustained economic growth in a fully employed and mature economy (Palma, 2014). It is largely

a feature of developed economies, which, as they turn into service-based economies, become less reliable on primary and secondary manufacturing. It is also a result of economic dynamism where an economy becomes diversified, relying on other sectors as opposed to depending on primary and secondary manufacturing (Mbira, 2015). This type of deindustrialisation occurs because of rapid productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors which reduces employment in the sectors despite increasing production. It however does not always result in unemployment since more jobs are created in the service sector and is, thus, a sign of economic success (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987).

Studies that examined deindustrialisation in developed countries found out that increasing volumes of imports from the South resulted in reduced manufacturing employment in 23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries between 1970 and 1990 (Tregema, 2011; Saeger, 1997). Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) attributed deindustrialisation in 18 OECD countries from 1963 to 1994 to industrial dynamism. Other studies also argue that trade between less developed nations without involving developed economies also resulted in significant deindustrialisation in the North (Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; Kucera and Milberg, 2003). Mature deindustrialisation has thus been experienced by mature economies. Manufacturing employment in the European Union fell by at least a third in the last quarter of the 20th century (Palma, 2014). The US and the Asian ‘tigers’, (Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, Hong Kong, etc.) also have similar experiences (Strangleman, 2016; Hamid and Khan, 2015; Palma, 2014; Koistein, 2013; Kollmeyer, 2009). OECD economies started experiencing this as early as the 1960s while East Asia later joined in the 1980s (Palma, 2014).

3.6.2 Negative Deindustrialisation

Contrasting positive deindustrialisation is negative deindustrialisation - a phenomenon that largely results from economic failure (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987). Negative deindustrialisation occurs when the manufacturing sector faces operational or productivity challenges to result in decreased industrial output which in turn results in job losses in the sector. Those who lose jobs are most likely not reabsorbed by the service sector or elsewhere, causing widespread unemployment. Mbira (2015), basing on findings from Zimbabwe’s second largest city, Bulawayo, argues that negative deindustrialisation stems from excessively high labour and

production costs and failure to adapt to changing market conditions. Negative deindustrialisation, also called premature deindustrialisation - occurs where firms lack the capacity to offer higher value added products and end up constrained, leading to scaling down of operations (Dasgupta and Singh, 2006¹⁵; Palma, 2005; 2014¹⁶; Michie, 1997¹⁷). Premature deindustrialisation has been happening in most of the developing economies as they experience huge declines in manufacturing shares in both employment and real value added since the 1980s (Rodrik, 2015¹⁸; Hamid and Khan, 2015¹⁹).

According to Michie (1997), this phenomenon is attributed to economic failure as opposed to economic dynamism. It results from poor investment and cost-cutting programmes meant to sustain firms instead of capacity enhancement. Premature deindustrialisation is also attributed to unfavourable economic and industrial policies that result in overvaluation of exchange rates and high interest rates that reduce the competitiveness of products and business confidence (Mbira, 2015). African economies are affected by a range of challenges which impact industrial and economic growth. These include poor infrastructure, shortage of skills, lack of FDI, poor technological advancement and obsolete and less productive manufacturing equipment. These in turn increase the unutilised capacity of the manufacturing industry, leading to higher production costs when compared to manufacturing in the developed world and emerging economies of Asia (Grant, 2012²⁰). The manufacturing sectors in Africa and the rest of the developing world have been weakened by (E)SAPs, liberalisation as well as the wider impacts of globalisation (Sundaram *et al.*, 2011²¹). The attempt by some developing economies to transform from manufacturing to service-based economies before realising full industrialisation is another cause of negative deindustrialisation (Rodrik, 2015).

While economists like Rowthorn (1992) and Rowthorn & Ramaswamy (1997)²² reasoned that deindustrialisation is not a negative economic phenomenon but rather a natural result of positive economic growth and technological advancement, Rodrik (2015) holds a different view when it

¹⁵ Based in Asian and Latin American economies in general

¹⁶ Based on Latin American economies at large

¹⁷ Based on Britain in general

¹⁸ Latin American economies at large

¹⁹ Pakistan in general

²⁰ Drew general examples from Asia, Africa and Latin America

²¹ Sub-Saharan African Economies in general

²² United Kingdom in general

comes to less developed nations. He argues that the technological advancement argument is less evident in and not applicable to most developing economies as is the case in developed economies. The result is shedding of 'excess' workers who in turn are not reabsorbed elsewhere, leading to a 'pool' of unemployed citizens. However, this study notes that nothing is said about deindustrialisation in small towns in all these studies as they tended to focus on national economies in general. The next section examines premature deindustrialisation in selected less developed regions of the world.

3.6.2.1 Asia

In Asia, despite the rising economic giants (China, Japan, Hong Kong, etc.) which have seen mature and positive deindustrialisation, the region has seen some significant premature industrialisation. Citing the Indian case, Dasgupta and Singh (2005) note that although the economy has been growing since the late 1990s, employment growth in manufacturing slowed down from 2.7% to 1.07% from 1990 to 2000, resulting in increased unemployment. This fall in employment is attributable to poor growth in agriculture, mining, electricity and job cuts in community and social services sector which were the top employers. As the rest of the formal manufacturing remained stagnant and unable to create new jobs, it is the informal manufacturing that created significant jobs. The rest of the services sectors recorded higher employment rates than manufacturing. It is however important to note that the economy was rapidly transforming itself into a services-based economy before fully industrialising, something that Rodrik (2015) identifies as one of the causes of negative deindustrialisation. The increase in informal manufacturing can actually be interpreted to mean the economy still had a lot to achieve in terms of manufacturing growth before it could fully industrialise. Clingingsmith and Williamson (2005)²³ attribute India's industrial decline to Britain's productivity gains in the textile and transport industries, especially the sea freight. Improved productivity in the British cottage production and factory goods resulted in falling of textile prices at world markets and this rendered production in India uneconomic. Eventually, Britain managed to gain monopoly of both India's export and domestic market. This negatively impacted local manufacturing (Roy, 2002)²⁴.

²³ Deindustrialization in India in general

²⁴ India in general

Hamid and Khan (2015) studied deindustrialisation in Pakistan and concluded that it is premature and negative. Having managed significant industrial growth since the 1960s, Pakistan abandoned its proactive industrial policies in the early 1990s in favour of liberalisation. However, as was the case in most developing economies, liberalisation did not yield the much-anticipated positive outcomes. Since then, the economy has been underperforming. Industrial production shrunk and the export percentage of the GDP either stagnated or dropped and the country has realised its worst ever industrial and economic growth over 25 years (1990-2015). The country's share of manufacturing to the GDP was 13.5% in 2014 against 16.3% around the 1970s, signalling a decline over the past three to four decades. The period from 2007 to 2014 also saw manufacturing falling from 12.3% to 10.9%. Chinese imports also contributed to industrial decline as they unprecedentedly rose to 25.6% from 8.3% between 2000 and 2013 (Ahmed, Hamid, & Mahmud, 2015)²⁵. Thus, since adoption of liberalisation policies, Pakistan has been experiencing negative deindustrialisation which in turn has impacted on employment and the economy at large. However, literature is silent about the experience of small and medium towns in this region as studies concentrate on large cities and national economies at large.

3.6.2.2 Latin America

The Latin American region also experienced its fair share of deindustrialisation. Despite governments in the region prioritising policies that favour manufacturing employment, the region has seen significant negative deindustrialisation over the past four decades with the average share of manufacturing employment continuously falling since the 1980s (Brady *et al.*, 2008)²⁶. Deindustrialisation in the region has been driven by trade and markets liberalisation, political influence and huge military budgets (Portes and Roberts, 2005)²⁷. Reduced industrial performance in the region has been a result of the IMF and World Bank's SAPs recommendations. These led to the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in the region's economies (Stiglitz, 2002)²⁸. In effect, SAPs undermined the power of labour as they resulted in acute external competition from fast-growing economies like China as demand for Chinese products surpassed that of local products (Kim and Lee, 2014²⁹; Cano, 2012³⁰; Martin

²⁵ Based on Pakistan in general

²⁶ Based on 20 Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile etc.

²⁷ Six Latin American capital cities Buenos Aires, Saulo Paulo, Santiago, Mexico City, Lima and Montevideo

²⁸ Drew examples from Sub-Sahara Africa in general

²⁹ Sampled countries from Latin America and Southeast Asia

³⁰ Brazil in general

and Brady, 2007³¹). This in effect weakened local manufacturing, cutting down its labour force as local firms struggled to survive, with some even collapsing (Harvey, 2005; Portes and Hoffman, 2003).

Brady *et al.* (2008) further note that Latin American states have seen maximum military influence. The huge budgets associated with military governments constrained the manufacturing sector. In Brazil, for example, military involvement led to poor relationships with foreign investors at the same time spending resources on inefficient state-sponsored firms (Evans, 1995)³². This also saw a lot of importing without the creation of local employment and at the same time channelling very little towards local investment such that industry failed (Centeno, 2002)³³. These combined factors have led to a slow and jobless manufacturing sector growth across the region (Dasgupta and Singh, 2006) as the region's average manufacturing employment share fell from 25.5% in 1985 to 24.5% in 1990 before plummeting to 21.0% by 2006 and has since remained low (Brady *et al.*, 2008). The region's manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP has been falling continuously since 1990 (Kim and Lee, 2014). In short, the case of Latin America's deindustrialisation showcases all the signs of industrial failure (Dasgupta and Singh, 2006). However, all these sources are silent on small towns as their focus is largely on national economies and capital cities.

3.6.2.3 Africa

The African region is probably the biggest victim of premature and negative deindustrialisation. While post-colonial African states may have realised significant industrial and economic growth during the early years of independence, this only lasted until the 1980s and 1990s when, just like the rest of the developing world, they adopted the SAPs. Prior to these liberalisation policies, newly independent African states pursued state-centred economic development and industrialisation policies (Grabowski, 2015)³⁴. This approach was meant to promote domestic industries and protect them from foreign competitors as well as to subsidise industrial production. Protection of home industries was done through tariffs, quotas and foreign exchange controls (Anderson and Masters, 2009)³⁵. Industry responded positively and recorded significant

³¹ Developing countries in general

³² Brazil in general

³³ Brazil and Latin America in general

³⁴ This study looked at Sub-Sahara Africa in general without mentioning any cities/towns

³⁵ Focused on Africa as a whole, no cities/towns were mentioned

growth which in turn led to employment growth. Industrialisation and economic growth in the region was anchored on primary production which was driven by the increase in demand of raw materials on the foreign markets (Grabowski, 2015; Bryceson, 2006³⁶; Potts, 2013³⁷). However, liberalisation opened markets and exposed the economies to globalisation. Domestic industries also became vulnerable to external competition as they were once again deprived of state protection and assistance that they used to enjoy. Consequently, industrial and economic growth in most of the region's economies slowed down and even halted in extreme cases.

The over-reliance on primary production also impacted industrial growth in Africa (Grabowski, 2015; Potts, 2013). Resource-rich economies concentrated on the extraction sector, neglecting other areas of potential economic diversification (Imbs, 2013)³⁸ in what Palma (2014) calls the '*Dutch disease*'. African economies relied on exporting raw and semi-finished-based goods which fetched little returns. On the contrary, firms would import expensive finished products from other economies and this cut profitability and industrial development. The continent also experienced some extreme cases of conflict and civil unrest that disrupted industrial growth. A combination of other factors; inadequate funding, poor infrastructure, slow technological adoption and lack of skilled labour also impacted industry resulting in negative deindustrialisation (Potts, 2016³⁹; Gelb *et al.*, 2014⁴⁰; Grant, 2012; Melamed *et al.*, 2011). Poor/negative industrial growth consequently resulted in loss of jobs and widespread unemployment (Potts, 2013). However, as is the case in Asia and Latin America, none of these works looks at small towns as emphasis was put on capital/major cities.

Ultimately, Tregenna (2011) suggests reindustrialisation backed by sound economic and industrial policies as the best alternative to curb negative deindustrialisation. Bartlett (2012) notes that even developed economies like the US, the UK and France are also reconsidering this option after realising the importance of manufacturing. Hamid and Khan (2015) also urged Pakistan to readopt its proactive industrial policies of the pre-1990s since it has become apparent

³⁶ Looked at Zimbabwe's 3 largest cities; Harare, Bulawayo, Chitungwiza, and major/capital cities from the region including Cape Town, Durban, Gaborone, Johannesburg, Lilongwe, Luanda, Lusaka, Maputo etc.

³⁷ Looked at SSA in general and mention capital cities like Yauonde, Luanda, Libreville, Brazzaville and other large cities like Warri, Pointe Noire, Port Harcourt etc.

³⁸ Based on South Africa in general

³⁹ Urbanisation in Zimbabwe and Zambia's major cities, Harare, Bulawayo, Kwekwe, Gweru, Mutare, Lusaka, Copperbelt, Kitwe

⁴⁰ Looked at SSA in general without focusing at any cities

that reindustrialisation is the way to go. The following section narrows down to examine deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe.

3.7 Zimbabwe's Path to Deindustrialisation

Zimbabwe is one of many developing economies that were hard hit by deindustrialisation (Chirau, 2014). Following Rodrik (2015), Mbira (2015), Dasgupta and Singh (2006) and Michie's (1997) contributions to the deindustrialisation discussions given earlier, it has become apparent that the failure of the manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe falls under the negative and premature category. This is because it was a direct consequence of failed economic policies which led to its economy into realising negative growth for a period spanning over two decades (Mbira, 2015). Indeed, it emanated from poor investment owing to poor economic and industrial policies as opposed to attempts to promote economic dynamism – a factor given by Michie (1997) as one of the major causes of negative deindustrialisation. Deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe cannot be discussed outside the broader context of the socio-economic crisis that has haunted the economy for over two decades now. Murisa (2010) notes that the Zimbabwean crisis was a three dimensional interrelated form of collapse which include a political crisis centred on state and ruling party authoritarianism. It was compounded by the repeated incidences of political violence, the economic meltdown whose causes range from economic mismanagement and structural constraints both in the local economy and international economic system. These are discussed in detail next.

3.7.1 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)

Discussion around economic stabilisation and ESAP dominated the development discourse and policy making in Africa and the rest of the Third World since the 1980s. Economic recommendations by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that for the developing world to address its developmental challenges and realise full growth, its economies were supposed to be restructured. Consequently, with the financial support of these institutions, many nations from the SSA adopted the proposal (Chirau, 2014). ESAPs emphasised the need for macroeconomic adjustments, trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, among others (Harvey, 2005). These were expected to turn the economic fortunes of 'poor' economies and result in significant positive change in the manufacturing sectors.

Accordingly, macroeconomic adjustments and exchange rate policies were meant to boost competitiveness in the traded-goods sectors (IMF, 2015; Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 1999). Trade reforms were aimed at removing the bias against exportable-goods sectors, introducing competition from international firms and the adjustment of relative prices to correctly reflect the opportunity cost of resources (Ranga, 2004; Ocampo and Taylor, 1998). Deregulation also aimed to remove the so-called rigidities and distortions that were seen as distracting the manufacturing sector. Privatisation and other public-sector management policies were also set to rationalise public-sector investment and enhance efficiency in the management of public enterprises, thus improving efficiency in resource allocation (RBZ, 2007; Corbo and Fischer, 1995).

At independence, Zimbabwe inherited a vibrant economy that was not comparable to any other newly independent African country, only coming second to South Africa (Chirau, 2014; Murisa, 2010; Chipika *et al.*, 2000). However, the colonial government had created many inequalities along racial lines in the distribution of wealth, incomes and access to social services. Indigenous Zimbabweans who made up the larger proportion of the national population were sidelined in all aspects of life. In a bid to address these inconsistencies, the post-independence government implemented a number of '*developmentalist socialist*' policies which included free provision of basic services like health and education (Murisa, 2010; Sachikonye, 1995). Under this arrangement, the government played the central role in the country's social and economic development (UNDP, 2008). The economy performed well and its growth rate between 1980 and 1990 was higher than that of the SSA region as a whole (Jenkins and Knight, 2002).

However, these measures were wholly dependent on government for financing and were not complemented by an increase in government revenues such that they resulted in excessive government borrowing to sustain them (Bond, 1998). Recurrent droughts and a world recession that followed worsened the situation. During this recession, commodity export prices fell, affecting every economy and Zimbabwe was not an exception. Feeling the burden, the government felt that it was high time to revise its economic policies (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). In 1990 it announced a policy shift from state-led development to a market-driven approach (Sachikonye, 2003). This decision was reached after IMF and the World Bank recommended public sector reforms, trade liberalisation, deficit reduction and creation of an environment that favoured economic growth. This meant the introduction of the ESAP. ESAP allowed for an open

market economy driven by a strong export base. It was aimed at achieving a 5% GDP growth between 1991 and 1995; upsurge savings to 25% of the GDP; reduce budget deficit from over 10% of GDP to 5% by the year 1995 and cut inflation from 18% to 10% by 1995 (Kanyenze, 2004). Put differently, ESAP was a measure meant to promote sustained growth through balancing the budget, consolidating the private sector and eliminating trade controls (Munangagwa, 2009).

Once implemented, the immediate effect of ESAP was the cutting down of expenditure for social service provision and the introduction of fees for health and education services in an environment of declining employment. While it was anticipated to work in favour of the economy, ESAP worked to the contrary. Economic growth under these new policies was not realised. Evidence shows that the economy had expanded by a reasonable annual average of 4.3% in the 1980s, but fell to 0.8% after the introduction of ESAP (Mumbengegwi, 2002). Gibbon (1995) notes that the programme actually undermined the nation's industrial manufacturing and heavily impacted the urban population as manufacturing's contribution share to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from around 20% to 16% during the first phase of its implementation. Observers like Mabugu (2001) allege that the use of inappropriate policy instruments and sequencing as well as the imposition of tariffs on intermediate inputs needed for manufacturing were among the chief factors responsible for the failure of a once very promising programme. The failure to realise the projected 5% growth rate under ESAP was largely a result of the adverse effects on the manufacturing industry. Although liberalisation was perceived to be a positive aspect that would boost industry, results proved otherwise. In reality, ESAP exposed the local manufacturing sector to intense foreign competition for which it was not prepared (Munangagwa, 2009). Noorbakhsh and Paloni (1999) are content that while deindustrialisation was expected as a result of competition, it was expected to be short-term and the manufacturing sector was deemed to benefit from the programme in the long run – a projection that nonetheless never came to materialise.

Chipika *et al.* (2000:56) provides a striking example of how competition 'killed' the local manufacturing sector. He notes that prior to ESAP, the country's footwear demand was almost entirely met through local production. However, in the aftermath of the reforms, local manufacturing supplied only 8 million of the 18 million pairs of footwear required annually, as

the rest was cheaply imported from China. It may be argued that this scenario in the shoe-manufacturing sector presents a revealing picture of what was happening in other sectors. Bjurek and Durevall (2001) studied 31 manufacturing subsectors and discovered that the period 1981-1990 showed increased productivity in most subsectors. However, from 1991 to 1995, over 50% of these subsectors were already recording decreasing productivity and this was an early warning that tough times for the manufacturing industry were fast approaching. Similarly, the textile, clothing and footwear subsector was seen as one of the 'engines' of growth during ESAP. However, as early as 1993-1994, around 56% of firms were already recording decreasing profits. About 18% of these firms did not realise any changes as was projected while only 26% managed positive increases (Carmody, 2001; Bjurek and Durevall, 2001). Gunning and Oostendorp (2002) observed that between 1991 and 1996, manufacturing output fell by 16%, while foreign debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 45% to 75% of GDP from 1990 to 1994 (Jenkins, 1997).

Other than falling industrial productivity, liberalisation also led to a significant decline in both real wages and formal employment while at the same time increasing capital intensity, against the projected outcomes of the reforms (Bjurek and Durevall, 2001). Formal employment across main economic sectors declined between 1990 and 1995, as at least 20,000 and 25,000 employees in the public and private sectors respectively lost their jobs. Although some of the manufacturing firms may have recorded increased profitability during ESAP, 84% of the workforce complained about their lowering living standards (Murisa, 2004). As inflation worsened, so did the workers' plight. The decline in real wages shifted income distribution away from unskilled labour where the percentage of wages and salaries contribution to the GDP fell from 57% in the 1980s to 45% by 1995 (Mumbengegwi and Mabugu, 2001). Zimbabwe, since then, has been on an economic slide and even went into free fall in 1997 as the impacts of ESAP began to manifest in full-force. As is expected of an economy in a crisis, the country's per capita real GDP slumped from \$645 to \$437 between 1995 and 1999, tumbling from an annual growth rate of 7.3% in 1996 to -1.0% in 1999. Consumer-price inflation jumped from 22.0% in 1995 to 58.5% in 1999. National foreign currency reserves rapidly depleted as the currency exchange rate against the United States dollar (US\$) rose from 8 Zimbabwean dollars (Z\$) to US\$1 in 1995 to Z\$23 to US\$1 in 1998 before plunging to an artificially controlled level of Z\$38 to US\$1 in 1999 (Bond, 2000; Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 1999). For a programme that was meant to promote productive accumulation and to enable the country to escape the debt trap, such a result

which was further coupled by increasing unemployment, rising inflation and declining real wages, was unexpected.

The mining industry that had earlier on responded positively to mining liberalisation later began to feel the impact of ESAP. Saunders (2008) argues that the same structural adjustment policies that had boosted mining also facilitated to transfer a growing proportion of national income away from the working population and rural communities towards strengthening business and political elites. Facing strong criticism and resistance from labour and civic organisation as well as facing the newly formed MDC, the ZANU-PF-led government resolved to reassert what it called 'sovereign rights' over strategic natural and economic resources. This marked the end of the once enterprising mining sector. Together with the FTRLP, this move undermined investor confidence. The situation was made worse by the threats to attack urban commerce and industry by ZANU-PF war veterans and youth militia led by Joseph Chinotimba as they went around invading and attacking mine owners and workers in 2001. Consequently, the early 2000s saw the closure of at least 14 gold mines (Saunders, 2008). Gold production plummeted from 18 tonnes to 12.5 tonnes between 2001 and 2003 as the economy was affected by chronic shortages of power, fuel, capital inputs and skilled labour while production of other important minerals also plunged owing to rising production costs, materials shortages, degraded infrastructure, skills flight and low returns as a result of distorted exchange rates (Saunders, 2008).

Government took over the Shabani-Mashava Mines (SMM Holdings) asbestos mine in 2004 and it immediately began to experience operational challenges (Shoniwa *et al.*, 2013). SMM used to benefit estimated 200 firms downstream and upstream industries, boasting over 5,000 workers and more than 26 subsidiary companies (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2017). Today, part of the mine infrastructure at Zvishavane now houses the Midlands State University Zvishavane Campus while its Mashava-based King Mine Complex was also acquired by Great Zimbabwe University in 2014. In other related developments that signify the death of the mining sector, the newly-established Gwanda State University uses a complex belonging to the collapsed Epoch Mine. In Shamva, Mashonaland Central province, Madziwa Teachers' College is sited at the defunct Madziwa Gold Mine. In Midlands Province, part of the closed Connemara Mine infrastructure was acquired by Connemara Open Prison after the mine shut in 2000 (Magidi, 2014). These cases present evidence on how the mining industry has been affected in ways that

negatively impacted manufacturing, the economy at large and more importantly, in terms of the focus of this study, thousands of households whose livelihoods for long had relied on mine work (Mzumara, 2012). The Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe (AMZ) quoted in Saunders (2008) noted that mining employment dropped from at least 83,000 in 1995 to less than 50,000 in 1999 and has never recovered. In short, while ESAP was inaugurated in 1991 and expired in 1995, its after-effects continue to haunt the Zimbabwean economy and populace three decades later.

After ESAP failed, the government tried several other strategies to resuscitate the economy and boost industrial growth. It introduced the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) which was set to run from 1996-2000 (Mtapuri, 2008). Under ZIMPREST, the government tried to correct the mistakes made during the ESAP era (Saungweme, 2013). ZIMPREST acknowledged the urgent need to restore macroeconomic stability; reduce inflation, lower interest rates and set stable exchange rate; facilitating public and private savings. It highlighted that investment was necessary to realise growth and recommended the introduction of economic empowerment programmes and reduce poverty through employment creation and promoting entrepreneurship. It also aimed at investing in human resource training, provision of safety nets for the poor, improving democratic institutions, good governance and eliminating corruption. However, the programme was never really implemented and the economy continued to deteriorate (UNDP, 2004; African Development Bank, 2001). It faltered for the same reasons that led to the failure of (E)SAP, that is, government fiscal policy which resulted in high inflation, high budget deficits, low forex reserves and a weak balance of payment (UNDP, 2008).

After ZIMPREST, the Zimbabwean government also introduced several other policies including the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (2001), National Economic Revival Programme (2003), Macroeconomic Policy Framework 2005-2006 and National Economic Development Priority Programme (2006). All these policies were meant to promote economic and industrial growth, create jobs and alleviate poverty. However, they were never fully implemented (Tawodzera, 2010; Government of Zimbabwe/UNICEF, 2006). ZIMCDD (2007) notes that one policy would only last for a few months before another one was launched leading to abandonment of a number of policies.

3.7.2 The DRC Unbudgeted War Expenditure

Zimbabwe's crisis was worsened by the country's involvement in the DRC civil war between 1998 and 2006. At least 12,000 Zimbabwean soldiers were deployed to back President Laurent Kabila's troops. Maclean (2002) branded this move as one of the most unpopular decisions made by Zimbabwe considering its devastating effects on the economy. The decision was unilaterally reached by the President without making prior consultations on its economic feasibility and implications (Rotberg, 2000). It is important to note that the DRC war was not of economic importance to Zimbabwe and it can be argued that it was best avoided. The war was different from Zimbabwe's previous participation in other conflicts like the Mozambique war from 1985 to 1993 where participation was meant to protect Zimbabwe's trade routes through Mozambique to Beira corridor to access the sea (Chigora, 2008; Dietrich, 2000). Contrary to the Mozambique war, involvement in DRC was merely to assist a fellow African nation in its time of need and help to guard its sovereignty (Maclean, 2002).

It has been widely claimed that President Kabila offered diamond claims to top Zimbabwean government officials as compensation for their role overcoming the rebels and also believed that there are top ZANU-PF officials who hold influential positions in government and the military who own diamond mines in the DRC (Global Witness, 2002; Maclean, 2002). As complex deals linking the military and high ranking government officials to mining operations in the DRC were unearthed, it became apparent that the decision to participate in the conflict was not reached to primarily bolster the Zimbabwean economy but for personal wealth to the few involved in maintaining ZANU-PF's power base (Global Witness, 2002) as the regime readied itself to face a the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) that later facilitated the birth of a vibrant opposition party in the form of Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC.

The most devastating thing about this war is that Zimbabwe was responsible for the welfare of its deployed military personnel; paying salaries and allowances for its own troops, purchasing ammunition, food and fuel from its own coffers, yet the war did not benefit Zimbabwe. It was reported that Zimbabwe used more than Z\$10 billion (US\$200 million) during the first two years of its involvement. The war lasted for eight year. To the low ranking Zimbabwean military officers, the DRC war became a lucrative 'project' as they were awarded a US\$14 daily allowance on top of their monthly salaries (Dietrich, 2000). Munangagwa (2009) argues that the

war costs to Zimbabwe were estimated at almost US\$3 million per day while some analysts believe that the government spent Z\$6 billion in unbudgeted expenditure.

It is important to note that such astronomical spending was being done at a time when the economy was on a free fall. The real GDP had already fallen from \$645 to \$437 from 1995 to 1999. Inflation had gone up from 22.0% in 1995 to 58.5% in 1999 then skyrocketed to 80% by June 2000 as unemployment ranged at 50.0% (Rotberg, 2000). The war's unplanned expenses resulted in governments diverting money to fund military operations at the expense of social and economic development (Ikejiaku, 2009). In Latin America, huge military budgets undermined industrial and economic growth resulting in premature deindustrialisation and joblessness (Brady *et al.*, 2008; Centeno, 2002). While there might seem to be no direct link between the DRC war and deindustrialisation, this study argue that these funds could have been used to resuscitate the economy and industry and save many jobs.

3.7.3 The Land Reform Programme: *Emptying the Bread Basket?*

At a time when Zimbabwe's military operations in the DRC were draining state resources without any returns, back home the ZANU-PF regime embarked on a widespread and violent seizure of white-owned commercial farms in what came to be known as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). Many white farmers were kicked out of their farms as the party 'employed' its unemployed youths and war veterans to carry out the violent farm invasions. So brutal was the exercise that it gained itself names like '*Hondo Yeminda/The Third Chimurenga*' which literally meant that the party had declared war against the white farmers who owned land in the country. Indeed the colonial government had created a skewed land ownership system which heavily favoured the white minority and relegated blacks into less productive parts of the country. So huge was the anomaly that about 5,600 whites owned 15.5 million hectares of land while 780,000 black smallholder farmers were forced to subsist on 16.4 million hectares of land. White-owned farms also averaged over 1,000 hectares each while the average size of a communal farm was less than 10 hectares (Moyo, 2013, Scoones *et al.*, 2011, Munangagwa, 2009; Bush, 2007). A land reform programme to address such irregularities was thus imperative and long overdue (Scoones *et al.*, 2011; Stoneman, 2000). However, critics argue that the way Zimbabwe's FTLRP was rolled out was ruthless, noting that it defied judicial procedures as farms were forcefully and violently grabbed (Munangagwa, 2009). Moyo (2013) confirmed that

the process was chaotic, destructive, violent, asset stripping and even resulted in murder of white commercial farmers - an assertion that supports the bulk of earlier literature on the subject (Scoones *et al.*, 2011; Moyo, 2010; Sachikonye, 2003). Farms were thus grabbed and reallocated in a haphazard manner and on the basis of political affiliation.

As we look at the economic impacts of the FTLRP, it is also important to understand the role played by agriculture towards national economic growth. Mahuku and Mbanje (2011) noted that agriculture had become the country's highest forex earner, employing hundreds of thousands in the process. Zimbabwe, then, had a number of deals with the international community as a supplier of agricultural products. In July 1985 it sold 25,000 tons of maize to the European Community that brought in at least US\$4.5 million. December of the same year saw the UK purchasing 14,500 tons of maize for relief in drought-affected Mozambique. In 1986 Australia and Zimbabwe signed an agreement that was to see the former purchasing 30,000 tons of maize meant to be distributed as food aid in various African countries that were threatened by food insecurity. The same year also witnessed South Africa importing 30,000 tons of maize from Zimbabwe. In 1988 Zimbabwe sold 95,000 tons of maize to the World Food Programme and to other donors. Agriculture in Zimbabwe also received massive support from international organisations like World Bank, IMF and other countries that enjoyed trading with it. The sector had become the pillar of the national economy.

However, when the land invasions began, all support was withdrawn and trade agreements were cancelled. The West stopped doing business with Zimbabwe, protesting human rights violations that were unleashed as the programme was unrolled. Even if the European partners had not opted out, agricultural output had fallen significantly that the nation could not even produce sufficient food for its people. What used to be Africa's '*bread basket*' was relegated to an empty '*basket case*' as the nation resorted to foreign aid to feed the starving population (Tawodzera, 2011; 2010).

While the FTLRP successfully transferred over 4,500 large white commercial farms to black owned small scale A1 and A2 farmers, it heavily disrupted agricultural productivity leading to low output of both food and cash crops. This was also compounded by droughts that followed shortly after the commencement of the programme (African Institute of Agrarian Studies, 2009). The adverse weather conditions in conjunction with the disruptive effects of the FTLRP on farm

productivity compounded Zimbabwe's economic woes as it rapidly lost its esteemed title as Africa's bread basket (Scoones *et al.*, 2011; Moyo, 2010; Bush, 2007; Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003). Hawkins *et al.*, (2008) note that the chaotic nature of the programme greatly contributed to the decline in agricultural production and the agro-based industry. The programme did not only affect farm productivity but also jeopardised employment of an estimated 400,000 workers who used to work on the farms. Family livelihoods of these workers were heavily impacted as the majority were kicked out alongside their former employers (Munangagwa, 2009). Mzumara (2012) argues that the farm invasions led to loss of thousands of jobs since the new farm owners were not productive enough to employ as many workers.

The FTLRP also had a ripple effect on the agro-manufacturing sector as supply of raw materials dried up. Munangagwa (2009) argues that the white commercial farmers maximised on economies of scale to produce very high yields at very low costs but the land invasions redistributed farms by subdividing them into smaller portions and thus eliminating this advantage. It was also noted that the new farmers lacked access to loans largely because they lack collateral security and as a result, the government had to intervene, giving out farming inputs and equipment year after year and still without any improvement on the farm output, thus increasing its expenditure in so doing. As a result of the FTLRP, wheat production declined from 270,000 tons to just 62,000 tons between the period 1998 and 2007. Maize, tobacco and beef also fell by about one third of 1998 levels over the same period. As a result, by 2002, Zimbabwe was already experiencing serious shortages of sugar, flour, bread, cooking oil, rice and maize meal. Firms in the agro-manufacturing were reportedly scaling down operations and halting fresh investment while at the same time new investors were scared away upon realising how the government of Zimbabwe disrespected property rights. It was obvious that no-one would ever want to invest their capital in a nation whose government can wake up one day to expropriate all their investment without compensation. Agriculture was one of the largest national income earners but the land redistribution programme lowered the agro-exports by more than 50% and at the same time deprived the economy of the much needed foreign-exchange. In short, the chaotic and violent land redistribution "undermined investor confidence and destabilised the supply of agricultural inputs into an array of local processing industries" (Saunders, 2008:69).

Violence during land invasions and the elections from 2000 and 2008 also negatively impacted on the once promising tourism sector as the nation was branded an unsafe destination by the international community. The EU, the US and Australia which provided the bulk of the country's tourists discouraged their citizens from visiting and Zimbabwe's tourism sector was the ultimate loser. Tourism had reached a peak of 1.4 million visitors by December 1999, but the figure fell by 75% one year later (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011). Imperative and important as it was, the land reform programme is one factor behind Zimbabwe's economic crisis, contributing immensely to its deindustrialisation (Munangagwa, 2009).

While it might appear as if there is no point in roping in agriculture when discussing deindustrialisation, it is important to note the strong links that exist between the two sectors. Agriculture relies on the manufacturing sector for inputs such as stock feeds, pesticides, fertilisers, equipment and seeds. The manufacturing sector in turn relies on farm produces for raw materials. In this case, the agro-industry heavily relies on agriculture for its survival. In some cases, both the farming and the processing occur as departments under one firm such that if any of the departments is hit by a challenge, the whole firm is affected. For example, the closure of a milk processing plant affects the dairy farmer and his workers as well as other firms that provide services to the plant; the bank, the insurance firm, a legal firm, those who provide other raw materials used in processing milk as well as the wholesaler, retailer and hawker/vendor who trade milk products. Similarly, failure by a dairy farmer will not only impact his employees and himself alone but the whole list above, including the stock feeds and pesticides firms. As a result of this intricate relationship, it becomes very relevant to include the agricultural sector when discussing deindustrialisation. In fact, discussion on deindustrialisation cannot be limited to the manufacturing sector alone; it incorporates all other economic sectors since it does not exist in isolation. Consequently, the collapse of the agricultural sector perfectly fits in a deindustrialisation discussion.

3.7.4 Corruption and Mismanagement in Government

Zimbabwe is ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world (Tizora, 2009). Top civil servants are known to be very incompetent and "perform less of public service than to obtain private riches at the expense of the state" (Moyo, 2014:32). They also enjoy a variety of other unofficial benefits which include illicit rents, prebends, and petty corruption which they see as

entitlements that come with their offices (Tizora, 2009). Moyo (2014) argues that ZANU-PF weakened the state administration by using the government in organised patronage and ‘*clientelist*’ practices for individual riches and party political gains. Political mobilisation in Zimbabwe is based on a strong system of ‘*clientelist*’ politics which leads to the formation of such parallel structures like the Zimbabwe Liberations War Veterans Association (ZLWVA) and the ZANU-PF Youth Militia that are endowed with more power and authority on behalf of the party than the formal administration (Mhanda, 2011; Bracking, 2009). Makumbe (2011) notes that these ruling party supporters are in turn rewarded for their loyalty and service by being granted access to state resources; payoffs, jobs, loans, and even immunity to state laws. In the same vein, Gatsheni (2010) has it that the ruling party abuses the judiciary to cover up for its corrupt officials such that even where their ‘deals’ are exposed, no-one would dare touch them.

Rampant misuse of state resources by ZANU-PF has been the norm since 1980. Moyo (2014) notes that, for the purpose of its political survival, the party has maintained its grip on rural voters by manipulating traditional leaders who are in turn rewarded with luxury vehicles, farms, farming implements and inputs and even putting them on the payroll, all this at the expense of the state. Doig (2006) also notes that high level officials in law enforcement, state security, armed forces and the judicial system have also been manipulated to act as ZANU-PF functionaries. This has enabled them to gain access to big deals and contracts for personal enrichment. It also saw the channelling of scarce state resources towards uneconomic projects, starving areas that required critical attention (Moyo, 2014). These include the War Victims’ Compensation Fund which again was looted by senior ZANU-PF officials in government leading the war veterans into rebelling before they were awarded a Z\$50,000 payoff each, accompanied by Z\$2,000 monthly stipends, most of which was given to non-deserving candidates who were connected to top government officials (Kanyenze, 2004; Maclean, 2002). Moore (2001) notes that these unbudgeted gratuities amounted to at least Z\$4.5 billion, leading to a budget deficit and on November 14, 1997 the value of the Zimbabwe dollar fell by 74% after international investors had panicked (Bond, 2000).

In other cases of high level corruption like the Willowgate Scandal of 1988, some implicated top government officials such as Enos Nkala, Sydney Sekeramai, Frederick Shava and Jacob Mudenda, among many others, escaped unpunished as they were immediately granted

Presidential pardon (Nyarota, 2006). A former Finance Minister, Chris Karuneri, also externalised US\$150 million worth of state funds for his own private use. Former Minister of Local Government, Ignatius Chombo is alleged to own four farms, thousands of hectares of urban land, numerous businesses, at least twenty upmarket houses (ACTSA, 2012). His company, Augur Investment, was also controversially awarded contracts to dualise the Harare Airport road and Joshua Mqabuko Airport in Bulawayo, and charged inflated rates (Musanzikwa, 2012). Tendai Biti, a Finance Minister during the Inclusive Government of 2009-2013 was also on record saying the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of Home Affairs and all its departments did not remit any cent to the Treasury during his reign.

New cases of rampant abuse of office and acts of corruption by top civil servants are reported on daily basis. *Nehanda Radio* (2 July 2016) reported that Supa Mandiwanzira, a former Minister of ICT awarded himself US\$200,000 from the government-owned mobile operator Net-One to buy a vehicle although he had received a ministerial vehicle earlier that year. ZLHR (2016) also reports that former Minister of Higher Education, Prof. Jonathan Moyo siphoned about US\$450,000 meant for higher education students skills development and used it for his election campaign. Rusvingo (2014) notes that Cuthbert Dube - a former head of Premier Services Medical Aid Society (PSMAS) - a public service medical aid society used to earn up to US\$500,000 monthly salary. At the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), Happyton Muchechetere grossed a US\$40,000 monthly salary and over US\$250,000 housing allowances between 2010 and 2014 (Rusvingo, 2014). The President also announced in 2016 that the state lost at least US\$15 billion diamond money but no efforts were made to recover the money (Global Witnesses, 2017). Several top government officials including the then Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu, the Military, Police and Intelligence together with Chinese mining firms are being implicated yet no known measures are being put in place to recover the money or at least bringing the alleged perpetrators to book (Shumba, 2016; Partnership Africa Canada, 2012). Sachikonye (2003) also acknowledges the presence of corruption in government. Reference to the need to eliminate government corruption in the ZIMPREST policy document (ADB, 2001) was an open acknowledgement by government that corruption was rife. While some of the cases cited here are very recent, they serve to give some insights into how much damage corruption and mismanagement could have caused to the economy since 1980

As the economy continued to fall, civil society began to organise strikes such that 1997 alone witnessed 232 strikes, the highest number in one year since independence (Kanyenze, 2004). The ruinous depreciation of the Zimbabwean currency in 1997 led to an increase in the cost of agricultural inputs, which in effect undermined the viability of the producers. Producer price of maize was increased leading to hiking of consumer prices by 24% in 1998, triggering nationwide riots. The government stepped in to introduce price controls on all basic commodities (Kanyenze, 2004). Such interventionist measures affected manufacturing and business at large. Strikes, which at times led to looting or turned violent, did a lot to bring industry to its knees. Violence and looting had some repulsive effects to potential investors. The World Bank and IMF advised Zimbabwe to sell off its profit-making state-owned monopolies in capital intensive areas such as communications and energy in the 1990s. This was intended to reduce government deficits, provide better, modernised, and cheaper services, to create new jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities among other projected benefits⁴¹. However, despite welcoming the recommendations, the government did not implement them since the state-owned enterprises remain a source of patronage from where government officials divert resources for their benefit. Disposing these institutions meant that they would also lose the ‘benefits’ of patronising them (Rotbek, 2000). Several researchers (Makumbe 2011; Shana, 2006; Munakiri, 2009; Transparency International, 2010) pin down corruption and economic maladministration as leading factors behind Zimbabwe’s poor economic growth.

3.7.5 Economic Sanctions

As the ZANU-PF government became more defiant to calls to observe the rule of law, the House of Lords (2007) writes that the European Union (EU) resolved to press the regime to reform and stop its ruinous policies⁴². The sanctions, which were first imposed in 2002 were targeted on individuals who occupied top decision-making positions in ZANU-PF and the government, as a way of forcing them to abandon policies that suppressed human rights, freedom of expression and encourage good governance. The USA, Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland also moved in and imposed similar sanctions. Targeted officials were barred from visiting Europe and those whose assets were identified were frozen (Chingono, 2010). While the West maintains that the

⁴¹ Parastatals with a record of failure include Air Zimbabwe, NRZ, ZBC, ZINWA, ZUPCO, GMB etc.

⁴² Crackdown on civil liberties, suppressing opposition, politicising the judiciary, brutal land reform policies

restrictions were meant to stop ZANU-PF's dirty politics, ZANU-PF saw them as an attempt by the former colonial masters to renew colonialism (Chingono, 2010).

Scholars who are sympathetic to ZANU-PF (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011; Mararike, 2007; Mahoso, 2007) interpreted them as a ploy by the West to carry out a regime change agenda as it sought to overthrow ZANU-PF in retaliation to the land redistribution. Mahoso (2007) cites the withdrawal of several European NGOs and donor agencies and the resultant relocation of their offices from Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries to argue that sanctions were not merely set against a few individuals but also against the nation at large. He cited the examples of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) which pulled out from Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2003 and terminated all their on-going projects and retrenching their employees. ZANU-PF used this line of argument and blamed these sanctions the cause of the nation's economic problems.

Hondora (2009) argues that although Zimbabwe's economic crisis can be blamed on the government's controversial economic and political policies, it is also important to consider that the US and EU's blockade of Zimbabwe from accessing loans and credit facilities from international monetary institutions (IMF, World Bank, ADB) also sabotaged and worsened the already struggling economy. The US went on to enact the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZIDERA) which barred the IMF, World Bank and ADB from extending any loan, credit any form of assistance to Zimbabwe government without approval of the US president. Ever since, it has become difficult for Zimbabwe to get financial aid from any of these institutions (Chingono, 2010). Masaka (2012) also reasons that the sanctions created bad publicity and gave the nation a 'pariah state' tag which saw some investors pulling out of the country and others avoiding injecting new investments while some were even ordered by their countries not to make new or further investments in Zimbabwe. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) (2007:2) argues that "far from the claim that sanctions in Zimbabwe are ring-fenced and targeted at a few individuals, the reality on the ground is that the tight grip of the declared and undeclared sanctions is being felt throughout the entire economy."

However, some renowned scholars (Sachikonye, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2009; Clemens & Moss, 2005 among others) as well as civil society and opposition political parties reject this thesis. They argue that the economic crisis is a result of the ruinous policies by ZANU-PF and dismiss

the targeted sanctions and the so-called external interference mantra. They reason that the government continues to use the sanctions rhetoric as a scapegoat to camouflage its rampant economic maladministration, controversial economic and political policies and widespread corruption by its officials. They also argue that the economy was already in a bad shape when the so-called sanctions were imposed and blaming the West is a bias. I however argue from the ‘*middle-of-the-road*’ alongside Hondora (2009) that sanctions have had a stake in bringing the economy down though at a smaller scale than what ZANU-PF claims. I thus place the larger blame on ZANU-PF.

3.7.6 Political Violence

Signs of politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe began to manifest as back as the early 1980s when the government brutally suppressed the Matabeleland uprisings in what later came to be a genocide that gained the term ‘*Gukurahundi*’ - a Shona term that translates to - “the rain that washes away the chaff from the last harvest, before the spring rains” (Rwafa, 2012:313). About 20,000 people including foreign tourists, missionaries, women and children were massacred in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces during the massacres (Alexander *et al.*, 2000; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 1999). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002:110) argues that at independence, the Zimbabwean government at independence “inherited the colonial and violently repressive legal mechanism of the Rhodesian state, if not going even further.” Several years later, President Mugabe later referred to these killings as a ‘*moment of madness*’ (Daimon, 2002).

While literature appears to be silent about the economic impacts of *Gukurahundi*, I am of the opinion that it presented a negative image of the nation which in turn scared away investors and undermined confidence of potential future investors. I draw insights from the Solidarity Peace Trust (2011) which argues that this episode marked the beginning of capital and industrial flight in Zimbabwe. UrbanAfrica (2016) also notes that while some industries only moved from Bulawayo and the Matabeleland region to Harare, others completely relocated to neighbouring countries. However, violence did not end with the 1987 unity accord signed between ZANU and (PF) ZAPU to end the ‘*madness*’. The late 1990s saw a lot of economic discontent due to the damaging impacts of the economic reforms on the people’s livelihoods blame on government economic mismanagement. This led to the formation of the opposition MDC party in 1999.

Sensing defeat in the elections that were to follow in June 2000, ZANU-PF responded by unleashing violence against opposition leaders and supporters. The MDC went on to win 57 of the 120 contested seats. Mude (2014) notes that ZANU-PF youth and war veterans militia groups in Zimbabwe are well-known for torturing, intimidating and killing opponents, citing ‘*Chipangano*’ in Harare and the ‘*Al Shabaab*’-styled group in Kwekwe as some of the major culprits.

Violence intensified during the 2002 presidential elections and further escalated in 2005 parliamentary elections before reaching its peak in March 2008 general election after ZANU-PF had lost to the MDC-T in the first round. An election re-run was forced and youth militia, war veterans, the military and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) members were roped into ZANU-PF campaign, unleashing a wave of terror and killings targeted at opposition leaders and supporters. Mugabe went on to win in a one man election after Morgan Tsvangirai, the late opposition leader had withdrawn, citing extreme violence against his supporters. Maclean (2001) asserts that ZANU-PF has won all national elections since independence through dirty tactics which include patronage and voter and opposition intimidation. The Zimbabwe government was then widely criticised for not following the rule of law and failure to respect human rights. The seizure of farms and the passing of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment legislation of 2007 which pushed for foreign investors to cede 51% of their business stake to indigenous Zimbabweans were also seen to be lack of respect for property rights.

Such acts of violence and policies were bound to have some negative economic impacts in attracting foreign investment which was much essential to lift the collapsed industry and struggling economy. This was happening at a time when Zimbabwe was enduring hyperinflation, depreciating currency value and a massive unemployment rate estimated at over 80%. Infrastructure collapsed owing to lack of maintenance while the education and health systems became completely dysfunctional. ZimRights (2014) characterised the state of affairs in Zimbabwe then as follows:

From 2000 to 2008 the Zimbabwean social, economic and political crisis worsened, characterised by gross human rights violations, disrespect of the rule of the law, shortages of basic commodities, and hyperinflation among other ills [...] the economic crisis resulted in unprecedented unemployment levels estimated to have risen sharply from 50% in 1999 to 95% in 2009.

Political violence and disputed elections thus played a role in ‘killing’ local industry and thus is partly responsible for high level of unemployment that haunts Zimbabwe today.

3.8 Chapter Summary

The chapter explored Zimbabwe’s path to deindustrialisation. It started by locating and characterising Zimbabwe then went on to trace its urbanisation road, the rise of its industry and growth of its urban centres, noting how urban population increased and how formal employment became one of the most important sources of urban livelihoods. The chapter also unpacked the concept ‘deindustrialisation’, exploring what it is all about, its origins and how it came to affect less industrialised economies of the South. It then explored the various factors that led to negative deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe. Factors discussed in the chapter include ESAPs, the fast track land reform programme, economic mismanagement and alleged corruption in government, participation in the Democratic Republic of Congo civil war, economic sanctions, as well as disputed elections marred by political violence. Together, these were found out to be the contributing factors that reduced Zimbabwe’s once vibrant manufacturing industries to ruins. Once the industry had collapsed, it posed some social and economic effects to the citizenry and the nation at large.

CHAPTER FOUR

ZIMBABWE AFTER THE *'INDUSTRIAL UPHEAVALS'*

The point of departure for any discussion of deindustrialisation must be respect for the despair and betrayal felt by workers as their mines, factories, and mills were padlocked, abandoned, turned into artsy shopping spaces, or even dynamited
(Cowie and Heathcott, 2003:1).

4.1 Introduction

After exploring industrialisation, urban livelihoods and deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe and other world regions, this chapter presents Zimbabwe's socioeconomic outlook after the fall of industry. It examines the consequences of deindustrialisation on the economy, people's livelihoods and life in general. It also goes a step further to look at the emergence of the informal economy, both in general and in the Zimbabwean context, as the affected urban populace resorted to surviving through '*other means*' by reconstructing their livelihoods outside the formal economy. It also looks at '*Operation Murambatsvina*' (Operation Restore Order), its causes and its impacts on urban livelihoods, housing and the economy in general.

4.2 Impacts of Deindustrialisation: Lessons from Other Economies

From the earlier discussions in this study, it is clear that premature deindustrialisation comes with a host of negative impacts on the economy and people's lives. Many scholars who studied this phenomenon made various observations. Drawing insights from the US and Europe, Cowie and Heathcott (2003:1) reason that any discussion on the impacts of deindustrialisation must acknowledge "the despair and betrayal felt by workers as their mines, factories, and mills were padlocked, abandoned, turned into artsy shopping spaces, or even dynamited." Winters *et al.* (2011:115), using data from Middletown, Muncie and Indiana (US), note that other than the widely expected financial impacts on communities and families, the effects of deindustrialisation have always been far-reaching and extended beyond economic restructuring. Strangleman (2016), after reviewing articles that focused on industries in England and the US, asserts that it is important to take into account social, economic, cultural and political issues linked to deindustrialisation as these will enhance understanding of how the process continues to shape the lives of affected individuals, families, communities and nations long after the immediate process is gone. This also speaks to Weis (1990) who notes that an unexpected economic shift brings

with it social, economic and cultural changes for the working class whose livelihoods have been for long attached to some type of employment that they would have unfortunately lost.

Mah (2013:3) uses evidence from Canada/USA, UK and Russia to argue that the impacts of deindustrialisation are long, and survive to haunt the affected communities for long. He reasons that “despite their state of disuse, abandoned industrial sites remain connected with the urban fabric that surrounds them: with communities; with collective memory and with people’s health, livelihoods and stories.” Bluestone and Harrison (1982:6) emphasise that after the fall of industry, “[what is] left behind are shuttered factories, displaced workers, and a newly emerging group of ghost towns.” Cowie and Heathcott (2003:5) are worried about job losses and the plight of the retrenched workers, underlining that deindustrialisation is associated with a “body count” – literally pointing out to how retrenched workers are normally ‘counted out’ as they are laid off their jobs. Summing up its broader impacts, Linkon (2014:2), focusing on studies from North America and Western Europe, also asserts that deindustrialisation has:

...a half-life, and like radioactive waste, its effects remain long after abandoned factory buildings have been torn down and workers have found new jobs ... [*which is evident*] not only in brownfields too polluted for new construction but also in long-term economic struggles, the slow, continuing decline of working-class communities, and internalised uncertainties as individuals try to adapt to economic and social changes.

English (2016:130) acknowledges that the impacts of deindustrialisation can be devastating and warns governments to be cautious when introducing new economic policies in future, emphasising the need “for more creative thinking about economic revitalisation strategies and how to create quality employment opportunities in the wake of industrial decline.” However, of importance to note that these studies did not make reference to small cities. This reinforces the observation that, world over, not much has been done in terms of researching small towns as pointed out earlier.

South Africa is one economy that suffered significant deindustrialisation since the early 1990s an experience which weakened economic performance and led to a significant decline in formal employment (Vloks, 2000). Many factories in large cities like Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town closed. This occasioned an outcry from labour bodies as they tried to fight retrenchments. Conservative estimates project that at least 500,000 formal jobs were lost between 1994 and 2000 as the rate of unemployment has been increasing by about 2% per year since then. Many

job cuts have been recorded in agriculture, mining and industrial manufacturing (Slater, 2010). Deindustrialisation in South Africa has also reversed the benefits of economic decentralisation in peripheral areas, resulting in spatial disparities where those regions with the greatest need for employment ended up having the least capacity to develop.

Those who lost their formal jobs were forced to look for alternative livelihoods elsewhere, mostly in the informal sector or as casual/seasonal workers who do not get protection from labour legislation and trade unions, making them vulnerable to exploitation (Phalatse, 2000). Deindustrialisation-induced job losses also saw the emergence of multiple livelihoods in South Africa's urban centres (Slater, 2010). The period from 1990 to 2010 also witnessed insufficient employment creation and stagnation/decline in labour intensive sectors (Wilkins, 2016). Other than South Africa, the entire SSA region is also enduring the impacts of deindustrialisation on food production. Food production in the region has either stagnated or declined over the past two decades, causing increases in cost of food. Consequently, this has resulted in vulnerable populations in both urban and rural areas facing food shortages as they cannot afford either to produce or buy enough for their consumption due to high prices (Grabowski, 2015). However, as noted earlier, all these studies are silent about deindustrialisation and its aftermath in South Africa's small towns.

In India, as the manufacturing sector (mining, agriculture, textile, electricity and transport) was on the decline since 1990, employment growth also declined from 2.7% to 1.07% (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005; Clingingsmith and Williamson, 2005). The stagnation of the economy saw the failure of the formal sector to generate new jobs. It also witnessed the growth of the informal manufacturing sector which ultimately emerged as the new employer that created significant jobs when formal manufacturing could no longer afford (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005). Pakistan is another case of an economy that has been wrecked by premature deindustrialisation. Its industrial production has been shrinking since the early 1990s. The country's share of manufacturing to the GDP slumped from 16.3% to 13.5% between 1970 and 2014. The period from 2007 to 2014 also witnessed manufacturing plummeting from 12.3% to 10.9% while decreasing local manufacturing resulted in Chinese imports tripling from 8.3% to 25.6% between 2000 and 2013, effectively compromising local employment (Ahmed *et al.*, 2015). In Brazil, premature deindustrialisation is linked to the increase in reliance on exportation of primary commodities to

generate forex (Jenkins, 2012). Its manufacturing lost 4.5% points between 2005 and 2011. Lately, the increasing unemployment and high inflation between 2015 and 2017 has also led to declining in real household consumption as poor households cannot afford enough for their sustenance (Domingues *et al.*, 2017). It is important, however, to note that these cited studies looked at national economies and made no reference to small/medium-sized towns in these countries. The following section explores the Zimbabwean context.

4.3 Zimbabwe's Socioeconomic Outlook: 2008 and Beyond

With much of the economic damage already incurred, period 2007 to 2008 was the most difficult that Zimbabwe has ever endured. Most manufacturing firms had already shut down and the remaining few continued to follow suit while those that survived operated on a small scale. The services sector was neither spared and the agricultural sector also continued on a free fall such that virtually almost every firm that survived ended operating far below sustainable capacity regardless of the sector (Mbira, 2015). The public sector went on to freeze all vacancies and recruitment in education, health and other government departments. Industrial capacity utilisation fell to less than 60% between 1998 and 2008 while GDP fell from US\$620 to a record low of US\$268 over the same period (Mutami and Chazovachii, 2013). Moyo and Yeros (2007) estimated that the economy further shrunk by at least 30% between the years 2000 and 2007.

Inflation skyrocketed and the country was officially experiencing hyperinflation by 2007, with prices rising by more than 50% every month (Scoones *et al.* 2010:26). The trend continued through 2007 to 2008 as inflation reached a record high of 231 million per cent by December 2008 (Chimhowu, 2009). As supermarkets ran out of commodities (Chimhowu, 2009), all basic supplies were imported from neighbouring countries and the informal market became the unofficial market where virtually everything, from foreign currency to the smallest basic commodity, was found (Chirau, 2014; Tawodzera, 2010). Formal employment dropped from at least 3.6 million in 2003 to 480,000 in 2008 (*Mail and Guardian*, 18 January 2009). A further 200,000 employees also lost their jobs between 2009 and 2013 (Kachembere, 2013). RBZ (2006) notes that at least twelve banks and finance houses operating in Zimbabwe collapsed by 2004, while some continue to do so. Actuarial Lense (2014) also reported that at least 61 insurance firms were deregistered between 2009 and 2014 after failing to meet minimum requirements owing to a difficult economy. Techzim (2015) reported that Econet Wireless cut its employees'

salaries by 35% in July 2015, citing an unfavorable operating environment. This meant disaster to the economy and the workers before retrenching less than a year later.

Mining employment figures which in 1995 stood at almost 85,000 excluding informal jobs in the sector, fell to less than 50,000 around year 2000 (AMZ in Saunders, 2008). Recent figures are estimated at around 38,000 workers, a figure far less than half of the 1995 total, as mines closed and some turned into training colleges and universities (*Daily News*, 15 April 2015). Murisa (2010) estimated unemployment at 70% in 2008 while Mutami and Chazovachii (2013) dismissed the 11% unemployment by ZimStat (2013), arguing that the figure had already surpassed 80% by 2013. Dekker (2009) further highlights that the unemployment rate was actually estimated to have been pegged between 80% and 94% between 2007 and 2008. This means that quite many urban dwellers were unable to continue earning their living in conventional ways, forcing them to devise alternative livelihoods to sustain their families.

The signing of the Global Peace Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 led to the formation of the Inclusive Government in February 2009 between the two MDC parties and ZANU-PF after the disputed June 2008 Presidential election. This gave some hope and ushered in a 'new era' and a 'new beginning'. The economy responded positively and began to recover. The adoption of the multi-currency regime in early 2009 became an instant solution of the inflation problem. Civil servants who had long abandoned their jobs returned to work, as schools, universities, hospitals and other government departments re-opened. The new government gave some hope to the generality of the population and investors, and industries slowly went back into business.

Sikwila (2013) summarises the socioeconomic outlook between 2008 and 2012. He notes that the adoption of foreign currency (US\$, South African Rand, Botswana Pula and more) as legal tender in early 2009 witnessed real gross domestic product growth rate rising from -14.8% in 2008 to 5.7% by 2009. The period 2011-2012 recorded positive growths of 9.3% and 9.4% respectively. Manufacturing growth shot from -17.1% in 2008 to 10.2% by December 2009 and went up by a further 6% in 2012. The mining sector grew from -33.4% in 2008 to 8.5% by 2009 and continued with that positive trend up to 2012. Growth in agriculture rose from minus 13.3% to 11.6% in 2012. Positive figures were also realised in the service sectors. The era engendered some hope to the people. The country also achieved economic, social and political stability. Consumer goods that had earlier on disappeared from the shelves re-emerged.

This momentum was short-lived. In 2013, ZANU-PF pushed for elections which they won with a two-thirds majority and booted the opposition out of government. This election marked another economic downturn as the economy once again began to perform badly. Thousands across all sectors have since lost their jobs and unemployment figures were estimated at over 80% (Mutami and Chazovachii, 2013). For the few who remained in employment, most earn salaries that are way below the poverty datum line and others go for months without receiving their salaries. Many embarked on long journeys to find refuge in other countries. Crush *et al.*, (2012) note that by 2001, at least 192 out of 222 countries were reported in the UN Migration Stock database to have received at least one Zimbabwean. They further estimated that between 1.5 million to 3 million Zimbabweans were living in the diaspora, with countries like South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada being among the top recipients. This, in effect, resulted in 'brain drain'. Diaspora remittances have since been portrayed as one of the main sources of income that has kept the national economy and the majority of households going, although the contribution is far too miniscule to compensate for the lost skills and fragmentation of families (Tawodzera, 2010).

Meanwhile, negative deindustrialisation resumed, resulting in negative economic growth. This impacted negatively on the urban population whose livelihoods were dependent on waged employment and formal sector-related economic activities. Indeed, in Zimbabwe, the legacy of deindustrialisation continues, leaving behind the economy virtually 'dead', entrenching the urban dwellers into massive urban poverty and uncertainty (Murisa, 2010; Chirau, 2014; Tawodzera, 2011). With a 'dead' manufacturing industry, an 'ailing' service sector and a constrained agricultural sector, the economy has gone well beyond repair. The continued loss of jobs and other income earning opportunities resulted in increased levels of urban poverty (UNHABITAT, 2010). Rotberg (2000:52) claims that as a result of the devastating effects of deindustrialisation most households are one-third poorer than they were in 1980, further noting that "the modern look of Zimbabwe's cities belies their new poverty and the depths to which the living standards of most Zimbabweans have tumbled". The following pictures captured from different industrial locations in Harare present the 'remains' of what was once a vibrant and enterprising industry.



Figure 4: Dilapidating Factory Buildings in Harare (Fortunate Katsvairo, 02/2017).



Figure 5: Closed Industries in Harare (Fortunate Katsvairo, 02/2017).

4.4 Rise of Informal Livelihoods

As highlighted in the second chapter in the discussion around the Actor-Oriented theory, this study views people “not as passive or disembodied social categories but as active participants or subjects who have the ability to make decisions on issues that affect them” (Long, 2001:241). They can even choose the deviation route whenever their way is systematically blocked (Merton, 1965). This study thus links these assertions to the rapid rise of the informal economy in Zimbabwe, as the urban populace felt they were denied access to their right to livelihoods and thus ‘invented’ their own economy and created ‘jobs’ for themselves (de Soto, 1989). The next section examines the emergence of the informal sector as a response to their endangered livelihoods.

4.4.1 Understanding the Informal Sector Economy

The informal economy is a diverse sector that incorporates a range of economic activities. It is meant to meet the needs of low income groups at cheaper and affordable prices. These include manufacturing and selling food, clothing, hardware materials, education, traditional healthcare service, squatter housing and transport outside the regulations that govern the formal sector (Drakakis-Smith, 2000). The ILO (2002:9) gave a characterisation of the sector,

The streets of cities, towns, and villages in most developing countries – and in many developed countries; are lined by barbers, cobblers, garbage collectors, waste recyclers, and vendors of vegetables, fruit, meat, fish, snack-foods, and a myriad of non-perishable items ranging from locks and keys to soaps and detergents, to clothing. In many countries, head-loaders, cart pullers, bicycles peddlers, rickshaw pullers, camel, bullock, or horse cart drivers jostle to make their way down narrow village lanes or through the maze of cars, trucks, vans, and buses on city streets.

Ndiweni and Verhoeven (2013) assert that the term is difficult to define because it generates meanings which differ from context to context. Hussmanns (2004:3) defines it as,

private unincorporated enterprises owned by individuals or households that are not constituted as separate legal entities independently of their owners, and for which no complete accounts are available that would permit a financial separation of the production activities of the enterprise from the other activities of its owner(s).

The International Labor Office (ILO) (2002) regards the informal sector as a separate marginal economy that provides safety nets for the poor and is not directly linked to the main economy. A number of other definitions are used to refer to this type of economy. These include black market (Chirau, 2014), second economy, shadow economy and parallel economy, (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016) while the term small and medium enterprises (SMEs) sector is used in countries like Ghana and South Africa (Abor and Quartely, 2010).

The informal economy is more prevalent in developing countries than in developed economies. Ferguson (2015) notes that in most African economies, a larger portion of the population is largely excluded when it comes to accessing waged labour in the formal economy. As a result, they “piece together livelihoods through a complex mix of other activities” (Ferguson, 2015:91). Thus, informal economy activities become their only available option (Watt, 2000). Schneider and Enste (2000) elaborate this observation, noting that the sector has become the biggest employer and plays an important economic role in many African countries, contributing over 75% of official GDP in Nigeria compared to about 10% in the US. In Zimbabwe 59.4% of GDP in 2004 was generated from the informal sector (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004). Chen (2006)

also asserts that the informal sector constitutes about 72% of total employment in SSA excluding the agricultural sector. Vanek *et al.* (2014) put the SSA figures at 65%, adding that in South Asia, informal employment constitutes 82% and 65% in East and Southeast Asia.

Potter and Llyod-Evans (2014) identify four types of economic activities that constitute the informal economy. The first one is a subsistence goods sector primarily produced for family consumption with surplus sold at the market. It wholly relies on family labour as members take turns to participate. The second one is made up of small-scale producers and retailers who produce and sell to earn a wage. While these basically rely on self-labour, they sometimes employ other workers especially during their absence or peak seasons when business is high. The third is made up of petty capitalists who establish businesses in the informal sector as a way of avoiding the regulation and meeting requirements required at law. They are able to establish formal businesses but they want to capitalise on the benefits enjoyed by the informal sector in order that they can earn higher profits than would be possible with a formal business (Teltscher, 1994). It is the presence of this category in the informal economy that helps to demystify the informal sector as a mere survivalist strategy or an industry made up of the poor. The last one is that which is involved in criminal and socially undesirable activities who take advantage of the somehow disorganised nature of the informal sector to earn income through illegal means.

The ILO (2002) characterises this sector in a number of ways. It notes that the sector is easy to enter and requires relatively low capital to venture into business. Secondly, it is reliant upon indigenous resources as inputs/raw materials. At the same time, it utilises free labour from family members. The sector is also labour intensive, meaning that participants normally work for long hours. Most of the businesses in the informal sector are small in scale with skills acquisition largely outside the formal education/training system. Lastly, the sector is unregulated and consists of very competitive markets. A close examination of these characteristics shows that most of them easily translate to advantages that those involved in the sector normally enjoy. Easy entry, less capital intensive, use of indigenous resources, utilisation of family or own labour, use of adapted technology (which is cheap), informal acquisition of skills, avoidance of tax and other legal requirements that abide formal businesses as well as flexibility in operating times are thus seen as advantages of or benefits deriving from informal economy activities (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014). de Soto (1989) believes that informal

activities also present a chance for local control of the economy, resources and means of production and if supported, have the potential to blossom into established formal businesses in future – a view also aired by Ndiweni and Verhoeven (2013). Drakakis-Smith (2000) views the informal sector as important when it comes to easing the frustrations of the urban poor and unemployed as it gives them alternatives to survive and hence prevents potential civil unrest.

A number of other scholars (Ngundu, 2010; Tibaijuka, 2005; Canagarajah and Sethiraman, 2001) also note that the informal sector is subject to some challenges. These include lack of security; organisation; recognition; social protection and legal representation; lack of government and institutional support; and inaccessible resources, lack of infrastructure; over-crowding and competition. It has also been tarnished by some individuals or groups of people who take advantage of the sector to engage in criminal and illicit deals such as drug-dealing, smuggling, theft and other socially undesirable activities. Drakakis-Smith (2000) noted development policy in many countries recognises development through industrialisation and thus emphasise growth through the modernisation model.

At independence, most African governments invested in modernisation. They embarked on massive infrastructural development projects like construction of hotels, conference centres, shopping malls, air and road ports, railway stations and banks, all designed to lure large scale investors as a strategy for development. As a result of this development path chosen by governments, authorities in most countries have reacted with hostility to the emergence of the informal sector as it is seen as a threat to the modernisation '*project*', and formal sector businesses. It is also regarded as public nuisance that disturbs the peace and smooth flow of business, traffic and people as well as the cleanliness of the city. This, in effect, has seen the suppression, and even eradication of such informal activities like street and stall vending, demolition of backyard industries as well as informal housing settlements. Such an environment thus makes it difficult for participants to operate and hence most do so at the risk of be crackdown, prosecution as well as losing their wares to confiscation by authorities (Drakakis-Smith, 2000).

There are two different views as to the role of the informal sector in national development (Devey *et al.*, 2003). One school of thought “relegates informal activities to low productivity employment or survivalist strategies for poor households” (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013:3).

From this perspective, informal economies are seen as playing very little or passive roles in development and only provide social protection in the absence of vibrant formal economies. Participation in these activities is thus seen as a mere survivalist strategy that is devised to escape poverty (ILO, 2002; Ngundu, 2010). It is also regarded as a means of income diversification, earning a supplementary income or simply trying to survive in the absence of better alternatives (Busse, 2006; Williams and Gurtoo, 2011). Ferguson (2015:94) prefers to call the precarious livelihood situation a “survivalist improvisation” as opposed to informal livelihood, which he argues has very little to do with producing goods and services but making claims from other people’s products. He argues that they hardly bring new products or services to the market but specialise on what is already there. Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) assert that the sector is taken as refuge by recessional workers who only participate in its activities during times of hardships only to abandon it when their income rises to sustainable levels.

In contrast, some view it as a dynamic sector which has a huge potential of creating significant jobs and actively contribute to economic and social growth. Leading this view is de Soto (1989) who strongly argued that the informal sector is not different from the formal sector activities, noting that the distinction only lies in that they are conducted in an informal environment. It views the informal sector as having the potential of being an engine of growth but is held back by government’s policies and regulations (Basu, 2010; Blunch *et al.*, 2001). If governments are to intervene the same way as they do in the formal sector, informal economies can grow and be recorded as success stories. Citing Zimbabwe as an example, Mbiriri (2010) and Ngundu (2010) argue that it’s the informal sector economy that has sustained the country during its worst economic crisis by providing livelihoods for most of the population during the period extending from 2006 to 2009.

It is this view that has influenced the change of attitude towards the informal economy as most governments are, of late, beginning to acknowledge the sector as an important player in the social and economic development of a country. Thus, governments are now encouraging people to venture into informal sector activities especially in the face of ever increasing unemployment rates. Together with local authorities, they are making attempts to formalise the informal sector by allowing them to operate upon paying a fee and even going to the extent of allocating them

some working places (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014). The following section presents an examination of the informal sector in the Zimbabwean context.

4.4.2 The Informal Economy in Zimbabwe

As mainstream industrial performance in Zimbabwe continued to plummet, with jobs in the formal sector increasingly becoming difficult to come by, the informal economy thrived and flourished. It became the source of employment and income for the majority of urban households who had lost their conventional livelihoods to deindustrialisation. A number of scholars who wrote on the subject (Coltart, 2008; Ngundu, 2010; Mudamburi, 2012; Ndiweni and Verhoeven; 2013) contend that the informal economy in Zimbabwe was a result of the massive changes in the country's socioeconomic and political landscape which resulted in a precarious livelihood situation. Chirau (2014) noted that the informal sector economy quickly developed and became the major source of income and livelihoods for the majority of urban families. In the absence of a commanding formal economy, Tamukamoyo (2009) argues that the informal sector became an economy of its own and even went a step further to become the unofficial backbone of the national economy. In support of this claim, Ndiweni and Verhoeven (2013) note that the sector contributed up to 60% of the country GDP in 2000. Coltart (2008) also reasons that at least 3 million Zimbabweans had their livelihoods based on the informal economy by the year 2005, making the sector a significant player and contributor to the national economy and a source of livelihood for many households.

The post-deindustrialisation era in Zimbabwe thus saw the proliferation of backyard or home industries while petty trading became the order of the day (Chirau, 2014). Informal traders took over every available vacant lot in the cities and towns without seeking anyone's permission, 'renouncing legality' (de Soto, 1989), turning them into their trading sites. Vendors also went all the way to the extent of occupying each and every street and even invaded CBDs where business is deemed to be lucrative. Designated vending sites became full and overcrowded and could not accommodate any new entrants while traders shunned them because of their non-strategic locations. Traditionally, vending markets were located in isolated areas, far away from the customers. As a result, in their quest to get closer to their clientele, informal traders resolved to bring their products and services closer to the people. Thus, they moved into the CBDs and took over streets and parks, turning them into their working spaces.

In Harare, the rise of the informal industry saw the emergence of such vibrant sites as Glen View and Glen Norah home industries while at the same time fuelling the growth of already established sites like Magaba, Siyaso and Mupedzanhamo in Mbare. Glen View industrial site specialises with small scale furniture production while the Glen Norah complex (which could not survive the clean-up operation) was home to a variety of activities. Magaba was established well before independence by a group of tin smiths who specialised in production of tin cans, pots and other steel products, but was later invaded by other activities and is now home to many activities. Mupedzanhamo on the hand is the largest second hand clothing, traditional medicine and plumbing materials market (Chirau, 2014). Many other informal industrial locations sprouted all over the city and continue to do so up to now and Harare mirrors the situation in every other urban centre across the country. Informality was not restricted to industry and trade alone but also extended to housing as people sought to find affordable accommodation in the cities. Many low income house owners constructed backyard outhouses from which they would earn some income through renting out these structures to the urban poor at affordable rates (Bird and Prowse, 2008). Informal housing has since become a prevalent feature of most towns and cities in Zimbabwe.

The informal sector became more diversified as the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe after the fall of industry forced the majority of ordinary citizens; the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, to find alternative livelihood avenues to sustain life and families (Chirau, 2014). Informal activities include small scale manufacturing, foreign currency exchange, vending, retail microenterprises, flea markets and illegal trade operations and more involved complex and physically challenging activities such as repair services, metalwork, construction and carpentry among many others which were dominated by men (Dube and Chirisa, 2012; Mupedziswa, 2009; Kamete, 2004; Muzvidziwa, 2000). In a study of informal trading at Magaba market, Chirau (2014) noted how women were more actively involved in the informal sector as they tried to supplement their husband's incomes which were falling by the day. Some women even resorted to cross border trading, going to neighbouring countries (South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique) to buy in bulk cheap products like clothes, footwear, furniture, kitchenware, electrical and electronic gadgets and second hand vehicles for resale at home at a profit (Ndiweni & Verhoeven, 2013). This caused further harm to the already destroyed local industry as consumers preferred cheap imported products to local, expensive ones.

As a result, the informal sector became an ‘employment haven’ for the increasing ‘army’ of the unemployed urban population (Maclean, 2002; Mupedziswa and Gumbo, 2001; Tekere, 2001). Informal employment had been relatively low in the formative years of independence and it constituted a mere 10% of the national total labour force in 1980. However, the figure doubled to 20% by 1987, before jumping seven more places up to 27% in 1991 – the very year when ESAP was introduced and effected (Ndiweni, & Verhoeven, 2013; Ngundu, 2010). In 1996 the informal sector had managed to employ an estimated 1.56 million people as it consistently realised a positive growth while the employment figures in the formal sector continued to drop, such that by year 2000 it was home to at least 50% (Coltart, 2008; Mudamburi, 2012; Kamete, 2004, Maclean, 2002) of the nation’s labour force. The sector was however not immune to the general challenges that are associated with informal economy activities. Even though it continues to grow, it has not been spared from the hostilities from government and local authorities. The following section unpacks ‘*Operation Murambatsvina*’, which is one of the major responses to the growth of the sector by the government and local authorities of Zimbabwe.

4.4.3 ‘*Operation Murambatsvina*’: Driving out Livelihoods?

Operation Murambatsvina was launched in May of 2005. The government, working in conjunction with local authorities, embarked on a nationwide campaign to destroy backyard outhouses, vending sites, flea markets and informal businesses that were erected or established without approval of local authorities in all urban areas. The operation was described as an attempt by government to “control the ‘economic saboteurs’ operating the black market and to improve the quality of urban housing stock by ensuring that planning permissions and building regulations were obeyed” (Bird and Prowse, 2008:19). The government itself argued that the operation was meant to help local authorities in enforcing urban by-laws which prohibited running and erecting ‘illegal’ businesses, structures and urban farming. It also argued that the campaign was aimed at ensuring clean urban centres free from the chaotic and unplanned expansion that is associated with rapid urbanisation which in turn is characteristic of most African cities (GoZ, 2005).

While the government maintains that *Operation Murambatsvina* was a mere clean-up campaign meant to restore sanity and order in urban settlements, critics who include scholars, opposition parties, civil society and independent media believe it was a political move (Bratton and

Masunungure, 2006). They argue that as life became more unbearable in the cities owing to social, economic hardships and poverty that kept on multiplying on a daily basis, fear of discontent that was believed to be mounting among urban populace and possibility of this discontent manifesting and exploding into an uprising gripped the ZANU-PF-led government (Masakure, 2006). The motivation behind the so-called clean-up campaign was thus to be seen as an attempt to disperse an angry urban population that was fast growing impatient as signs pointed to the possibility that an anti-government revolution was brewing (International Crisis Group, 2005). Arguing in the same vein, Masakure (2006) noted that the operation depopulated urban centres, clearing vendors and informal structures from the streets and backyard industrial sites. By so doing, it made it easier for the government to monitor the movement of people in towns and cities thereby undermining the possibility of anti-government activities. Bird and Prowse (2008) saw it as a ploy by ZANU-PF to punish opposition (MDC) supporters for their continued support to the party after the MDC won almost all urban seats in the March 2005 parliamentary elections.

While the mystery remains as to the real reasons behind *Operation Murambatsvina*, one thing that is very clear about this so-called clean-up campaign is that it resulted in widespread loss of livelihoods for many households that relied on the informal sector for their upkeep. Government statistics indicate that about 95,000 dwellings were destroyed displacing at least 570,000 people while 98,000 others lost their jobs/livelihoods that were based on the informal sector (Potts, 2006; Mugara 2007). The UN estimated that about 650,000 to 700,000 people were directly affected either due to loss of shelter or livelihoods or even both (Tibaijuka 2005; Mugara, 2007). Noting the ruthless manner in which the operation was executed, it gained itself the appellation ‘tsunami’ among the local population.

Bird and Prowse (2008) contend that the operation had a long-term impact on urban livelihoods. In its aftermath, strict licensing regulations were introduced. It became a requirement that all vending activities be done at council-designated places and vendors were supposed to be licensed. Anything outside this arrangement was regarded as illegal. The new regulation became a major stumbling block to those aspiring to enter into legal vending. They also noted that long after the operation, many people remained homeless and those who relied on letting backyard shelter for their income effectively lost this important form of livelihood. As some joined the

mass exodus tracing their way back to their rural homes, some, especially those who did not have rural homes, stayed behind to survive under a compromised housing and livelihood situation. Some ended up staying in poorly set up, dilapidated transit camps which did not have proper and adequate sanitation services located far away from work places and at the same time afflicted by transport shortages.

The Catholic Relief Services (2005) noted that mushroom projects sponsored by NGOs for the poor were affected in areas like Hatcliffe, Epworth and Mabvuku-Tafara (Harare) and were stopped as production structures were demolished. Solidarity Peace Trust (2005), on another note, also reported that Harare suffered the most destruction of vending sites as police resorted to brutalising anyone who attempted to disrupt the demolitions and evictions. Sculpture parks situated along major roads were smashed leaving the sculptors with no source of income and plunging them into poverty. Flea markets, which Tekere (2001) had earlier on identified as an important source for many households, were also razed down. The famous Mupedzanhamo, Magaba and Siyaso markets in Mbare - Harare's oldest township - were not spared as thousands of people who were employed there were also evicted (Chirau, 2014).

People lost their homes, jobs, businesses and income from rented accommodation while small-scale operators suffered from disruption of the supply chain. Even some of those whose formal jobs were unaffected ended up leaving their jobs after losing their shelter. The formally employed lost income as they were forced to leave their jobs as a result of the loss of shelter (Tibaijuka, 2005). Those who had earlier borrowed loans found themselves unable to repay after losing their businesses. Urban farming was not spared as it became prohibited, negatively impacting those households whose livelihoods had been based on it. What was disturbing about this operation is that it was targeted at the urban poor, those who were already surviving under precarious conditions. Thus, the clean-up programme worsened their plight and pushed some into destitution (Tawodzera, 2010). However, regardless of this harassment the government failed to fully eradicate the sector. Participants would be dispersed but by the next day they would be back at their trading places. Bratton and Masunungure (2006) argued that while the operation destabilised the growth of sector, the sector became more resilient and highly adaptive in the aftermath than before. Chirau (2014:80) noted how Magaba market survived:

Although the operation [Murambatsvina] 'cleansed' Magaba of informal economic activities, these activities have subsequently re-emerged and have even become more

resilient. It seems that undercutting informal activities is a 'mission impossible' and Magaba remains as a heterogeneous hub of petty traders.

The same can also be said of many other informal activities dotted across the city and in other urban centres. Ultimately, the sector survived and remains an important part of the economy. However, the informal sector still continues to face some suppression and hostility from local authorities and the government in many towns and cities on occasional basis. Demolition of properties still continues today with several residential areas in Harare after being declared illegal. The situation thus remains precarious as national and municipal police can be deployed any time to fight vendors especially in the CBDs. The outbreak of typhoid in Harare in 2016/17 summer season also resulted in government and urban councils threatening to ban trading of all consumables in the streets and other informal markets.

4.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the socioeconomic situation that characterised Zimbabwe after deindustrialisation and the collapse of the economy at large. It presented the impacts of deindustrialisation drawing insights from other affected economies, noting how it always lead to economic crises, widespread unemployment, uncertainty and poverty. The chapter also explored the informal sector and the activities that constitute it. It then narrowed to examine the informal sector in the Zimbabwean context and how it grew to become the main economy and the largest employer, unpacking *Operation Murambatsvina* and how it impacted on informal sector-based livelihoods. The next chapter presents the research methodology employed in this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

EMPLOYING QUALITATIVE METHODS IN URBAN LIVELIHOODS RESEARCH

Go and sit in the lounges of the luxury hotels and on the doorsteps of the flophouses; sit on the Gold Coast settees and on the slums shake downs; sit in the Orchestra Hall and in the Star and Garter Burlesk. In short...go get the seats of your pants dirty in real research (Hammersley, 1989:76).

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the ‘roadmap’ that this research followed, unpacking the actual processes that I followed in collecting data for this study. It explains and justifies the methodological approach and research paradigm that I deployed. It begins by presenting the research design and fleshing out the data collection methods that I employed; namely in-depth interviews (IDI), observations, focus group discussions (FGDs) and secondary sources. I also explain in this chapter how I applied these methods in the study and explore several other methodological issues which include research paradigm, pilot studies, sampling techniques, data processing, analysis and presentation and other critical issues in research which include trustworthiness of the data collected. This chapter also spells out what I learned during the course of my fieldwork.

5.2 The ‘Describe, Apply and Learn’ Sequence

I designed this study’s methodology following the ‘*Describe, Apply and Learn*’ approach (Sert and Seedhouse, 2011; Earley, 2007). The describing component provided a theoretical outline of the ‘prescribed’ ways of using the data collection method. The application part showcased how I used the method in this particular study as an independent researcher. Application is important because conventional knowledge of these methods does not always perfectly fit in every situation in the ‘jigsaw’ manner. Instead, methods need to be ‘tailor-made’/‘modified’ to fit in a particular study the way the researcher wants to use them (Chirisa, 2013). Learning involved detailing what I learnt from my own application of these methods. It is a crucial step that gives other researchers insights on how they can innovate and use the methods in their own studies without strictly following the ‘prescribed’ procedures.

5.3 A Case Research Design

I adopted the case research/case study design in this study. A case research is an explorative study in which a researcher embarks on a program, an event, activity, a process, or a through detailed in-depth data collection that involves more than one source of information that is rich in detail related not only to the phenomena but to the context (Creswell *et al.*, 2003). It is an in-depth exploration of a research problem that is undertaken in real-life settings (case sites) where data may be gathered through using a combination of methods like interviews, personal observations, and internal or external documents (Bhattacharjee, 2012). The design provides a unitary character to the phenomenon under investigation by bringing together and inter-relating a variety of facts to a single or a few cases (Punch, 2004). Case studies focus on one or a few instance(s) of a particular phenomenon with a view to providing in-depth accounts of events, relationships or processes occurring in that particular instance(s) (Creswell *et al.*, 2003). It attempts to examine in detail one or a small number of examples of the entity/entities acknowledged by the research interest. It thus entails an in-depth study of a particular phenomenon by narrowing down a broad area of research that would otherwise be too complex to tackle within one research project (Punch, 2004).

Bhattacharjee (2012) provides some advantages associated with this research design. Firstly the research questions used can be ‘modified’ during the course of the research if the researcher finds the original ones to be less relevant. This makes the process flexible and the application of corrective measures possible where they are required. Secondly, because they “capture a rich array of contextual data”, case studies produce “richer, more contextualised, and more authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of interest” when juxtaposed with other designs (Bhattacharjee, 2012:93). Thirdly, the chosen research design allows incorporation of views from multiple participants and multiple levels of analysis (individual and organisational levels). I maximised on these advantages in my quest to gather quality data. However, as a weakness, such investigations are usually highly contextualised and it is difficult to generalise findings (Bhattacharjee, 2012).

The choice of Norton as my case presented me with the linguistic advantage since all the respondents and I were competent Shona speakers. This ensured soliciting of credible and trustworthy data from the respondents without any language-related barriers (Alexander *et al.*, 2000). My being a Shona first-language speaker helped in creating very good working

relationships with my respondents. Amit (2000) underscores the importance of good interpersonal relationships between researchers and the researched, reasoning that they serve as important instruments for evoking research findings and enriching the study. My selection of Norton as my study site was also influenced by the fact that it had been my home for about seven years such that by the time I undertook this study, I had some significant insights about the town's economy, geography, population, culture and other aspects that are useful to the study.

My staying in Norton for a significantly long time, together with the language factor inspired some respondents to label me an 'insider'. This also strengthened my relations with the respondents, both as individuals and institutions. Respondents viewed me as a 'compatriot', praising the study for being the first 'genuine attempt' by an individual to find 'solutions' to challenges that were bedevilling a society which he was also part of. More importantly, a study done by a researcher who hails from Norton inviting fellow Norton residents to discuss real socioeconomic challenges that the town was facing motivated my respondents to participate in engagements as they believed this was of critical importance to them and their community.

Riach (2009) speaks of 'sticky situations' in conducting social research. I encountered a few of these which arose from my being an insider. Some potential respondents felt that as an insider, I was supposed to have first-hand information about the livelihood situation. For them, it did not "*make sense to move around looking for information that [I] already knew.*"⁴³ I would then provide such cases like how a taxi driver definitely lacks information on what is happening in vegetable vending and vice versa. I also reasoned that since I have been moving in and out of the town regularly I needed to catch up with the latest trends and developments that had happened during my absence. Such explanations helped me to convince potential respondents that their views were of importance to the study.

5.4 The Qualitative Methodology: *Understanding Social Reality*

There are two broad categories in research namely qualitative and quantitative research. The difference between the two lies in that quantitative research employs numerical indicators to ascertain the relative size of the phenomenon under investigation while qualitative research uses symbols and words to explore phenomena (Matveev, 2002). Qualitative research seeks to understand and interpret social interactions in their natural settings. It answers the '*what*', '*why*'

⁴³ A male vendor who declined to participate

and ‘*how*’ questions whereas quantitative research relies on experiments, hypothesis testing, and surveys collecting numerical indicators to answer questions of ‘*how much*’, ‘*how many*’, ‘*how often*’ and ‘*to what extent*’ (Johnson and Christensen, 2008; Lichtman, 2006; Patton and Cochran, 2002). According to Ellis (2000), quantitative methods are better suited for studies that seek to capture states or conditions, while Murray (2002) notes that non-numerical methods are best deployed in research that seeks to understand processes.

I deployed a qualitative methodology in this study. Qualitative research attempts to describe, decode and interpret the meanings of phenomena as they occur in their normal social contexts (Matveev, 2002). The focus is on exploring how ordinary people observe and describe their lives. It seeks to find out and interpret the meanings that people bring to their own actions (Neville, 2007). This study follows that qualitative research is ideal for investigating less tangible aspects like human values, perceptions, attitudes or experiences (Neville, 2007; Collins and Hussey, 2003). It treats human actions as part of a holistic social process and context as opposed to viewing it as something that can be extracted and studied in isolation (Payne and Payne, 2004). Chew-Graham, Carl and Mark (2001:285) emphasise that qualitative methods enhance our understanding of the “authentic perceptions, sentiments and understanding of the subjects.” A qualitative researcher should thus value the respondents’ understanding and interpretations of their own reality as inseparable from their lived experiences or generalizable since experiences are captured from a small sample (Joniak, 2007).

5.5 The ‘*Verstehen*’ Paradigm: *Interpreting Social Reality*

I employed the ‘*Verstehen*’ paradigm in this study. ‘*Verstehen*’ is a German term which in English, translates to ‘understanding’ and is rooted in Weber’s ‘*Interpretive Sociology*’. It is concerned about interpreting social reality and meanings of social phenomena (Schaefer, 2017; Glass, 2005). Linklater and Suganami (2006:101) defined it as,

...an explanation of what goes on in the social field, by penetrating the minds, and uncovering the assumptions and motives, of its relevant actors, and imparting the knowledge or understanding thereby gained to those who are seeking to make sense of the situation.

The ‘*Verstehen*’ follows that a researcher who adequately interacts with their participants can arrive at a point of “felt understanding” which helps to solicit more data (Glass, 2005:3). I thus kept interacting with my respondents during the course of my fieldwork. Being interpretive in

nature, the '*Verstehen*' follows that reality is constructed '*inter-subjectively*' through meanings and understandings developed socially and experientially (Creswell, 2009; Glass, 2005). Deploying this paradigm, I was influenced by Schmidt's (2007:96) observation that, "in social sciences [...] processes are debated, analysed, interpreted and reinterpreted". The approach recognises the social world not as a collection of external facts but a subjectively experienced construct. It is based on the transactional/subjectivist assumption that human beings cannot separate themselves from what they know and what they have experienced. Thus, both the investigator and the object of investigation are linked such that who we are as a people and how we understand the world is a central part of how we understand ourselves, others and the world (Creswell, 2009; Angen, 2000). Bhattacharjee (2012) emphasises that interpretive investigations largely focus on the language, signs, and meanings as they are used and understood from the respondents' perspective. As a researcher, I therefore took extra note of these units of analysis as the study unfolded.

Putting the '*Verstehen*' in the context of this study, it is my argument that livelihood strategies constructed by social actors in Norton can only be better understood by engaging and interacting with them. This was attainable through exploring and interpreting their livelihood activities, what they experienced to get what they are getting, and how they are doing it, their challenges and innovations/inventions as they strive to sustain life. Understanding these realities provided a clearer picture of the people's livelihoods in the absence of a functional formal economy. I thus argue that social actors in Norton have their own ways of constructing their livelihoods which might not be exactly the same as elsewhere. Such a process thus required '*understanding*' and '*interpreting*' lived socioeconomic experiences such that the '*Verstehen*' became the ideal paradigm. Since this study is interactive in nature, a qualitative methodology aptly allowed for the obtaining of detailed in-depth data. This in turn enhanced understanding of the phenomena that I sought to investigate (Creswell, 2007). Had I gone quantitative, it was going to be a tall order to achieve this goal since human experiences, perceptions, attitudes and inner thoughts cannot be captured using statistical methods used in quantitative research (Neville, 2007; Ellis, 2000).

I capitalised on a number of strengths of this approach to achieve my research goals. It gave me room to learn first-hand about the social world that I was investigating by means of involvement

in that world. It also presented me a chance to focus on what actors were involved in and this enhanced my understanding of the phenomena under investigation (Chambers, 2001). This made easier the interpretation of events, stories, activities, processes and experiences of social actors to the enrichment of the study. Understanding was also aided by the fact that I was always among my researched population and interacting with it on daily basis (Joniak, 2007).

5.6 Research Population

A population in social scientific research refers to all the people or items (units of analysis) who/which bear a set of or part of the characteristics that a study seeks to investigate. Units of analysis may range from individuals to organisations. A research population can also be made up of objects or any other entities from which a researcher might wish to draw conclusions (Bhattacharjee, 2012; Best and Khan, 1993). The primary population that this study sought to research were the ordinary residents of Norton who are trying to earn their livelihoods through various means. Norton is made up of a total of 68,000 residents (Zimstat, 2013) but I was interested in the adult population which is approximate one third of this sum. I also targeted institutions whose work is related to or concerned with issues under investigation. At least fifteen organisations of this nature operate in the town. Involvement of both individuals and organisations conforms to Bhattacharjee (2012), who points out that case research designs normally involve multiple levels of analysis.

5.7 Purposive Sampling

Sampling refers to the process by which a researcher chooses a suitable sample to determine the characteristics of the whole population that the study seeks to research (Adams, 2007). It is the selection of a subset from the larger group where conclusions about the larger population will be drawn. Since my target population was comparatively large, I made use of a sample to learn about a larger group (the population) by selecting a set of units (the sample) from all possible units (Adams, 2007). I employed purposive sampling in selecting my respondents. I found purposive/expert sampling a suitable technique for this study. In this technique participants are selected “based on a variety of criteria which include specialist knowledge of the research issue” (Jupp, 2006:244). Purposive sampling is used when a researcher selects respondents with a certain purpose in mind such that it becomes imperative to include certain individuals/groups as their respondents (Chiweshe, 2011). This technique helped me to select information-rich subjects

whose expertise/work experience related to the subject of the study. My key informants were selected from a large sample of academics, organisations like NTC, Government Ministries, schools and NGOs/CSOs. I made use of the following two types of purposive sampling.

5.7.1 Snowballing

I employed snowball sampling to mobilise participants for in-depth interviews and FGDs. IDI and FGDs participants were selected from the ordinary residents; the unemployed and those involved in SMEs and informal businesses. The method involves already selected respondents helping to identify other potential respondents with the required characteristics (Bhattacharjee, 2012). Snowballing has been criticised for producing an almost homogenous sample because of its reliance on networks of people who bear some commonalities (Nueman, 2004). I took that as a positive attribute which played a key role in my identification of subjects and locations that were beyond my knowledge. I employed this method basing on the assumption that people tend to be free to articulate and disclose more information in an environment where there are familiar people as opposed to when they are among strangers. Snowballing also played a part in my observations as some respondents referred me to some locations to prove what they had told me. For example, I asked one respondent about political influence in the allocation of livelihood resources. After responding, he referred me to the vending marts situated next to Zuva Service Station at Katanga Shops. He admonished me to “*witness for yourself*” how they are lying unutilised despite being the best vending complex in town, and challenged me to find out why. Referring me to these marts was indicative of some form of snowballing.

5.7.2 Convenience Sampling⁴⁴

Under this technique, a sample is selected from that population that is close, readily available or convenient to the researcher at the time of collecting data. I selected most of my in-depth interview participants (informal entrepreneurs and SME entrepreneurs) using this method. I would move around shopping centres, vending sites, formal and informal industrial sites and when I identify someone whom I could conveniently approach, I would go to them and present my case. I selected such respondents merely because they were where they were when I met them or because I used the way that passed through where they were when I met them.

⁴⁴Also called ‘Accidental/Opportunity’ sampling

5.8 Data Collection

During data collection, I literally ‘deployed’ myself into the field “as an instrument for gaining access to the experiential, performative and discursive practices” of social actors (Siziba, 2013:101). This technique goes along Bhattacharjee (2012) who argues that the researcher’s involvement in the research is critical in interpretive research. I thus made vigorous attempts to penetrate every corner of my research area, interacting with actors of diverse backgrounds, to enhance my understanding of their lived livelihood experiences. Deploying my being into the field, I was also motivated by Hammersley (1989) who challenges researchers to participate hands-on in collecting and analysing data for their studies. I did most of the fieldwork myself. I was personally involved in designing data collection tools, pilot studies, recruiting participants, interviewing, facilitating FGDs, field observations, compiling and expanding field notes, transcribing and analysing data. This helped to enhance my ‘understanding’ of the situation on the ground for a better ‘interpretation’ in accordance with the *Verstehen* which required me to ‘understand’ the phenomenon so that I will be able to ‘interpret’ it. I however do not mean to minimise the role played by those ‘comrades’ who forfeited their treasured time to give me a hand during the arduous phases of my fieldwork.

Avoiding ‘The Danger of a Single Story’: Multiple Data Collection Techniques

I employed three primary data collection strategies; interviews (key informant and in-depth), observations, and FDGs. These were complemented by secondary/documentary sources. The choice of these methods was premised on Patton’s (2002) assertion that the three work in complementarity with each other and are effective in investigating complex issues like human conduct and social reality. Bhattacharjee (2012) also recognises these methods as the best tools to use in studies that are informed by the interpretive paradigm. I derived insights from Adichie’s (2009) ‘*The Danger of a Single Story*’⁴⁵ concept as I deployed multiple data collection methods. A ‘*single story*’ basically refers to one version/side of the story which, according to Adichie, has three major demerits. Firstly, it creates stereotypes; secondly, it is full of falsifications and lastly, it makes that one story the only story, thus denying ‘*other stories*’ the opportunity to be heard. I incorporated this concept to get rid of such limitations. Using one data collection tool, for example, listening to in-depth narratives by vendors only, or key informant interviews by experts alone, could have led me to a biased, one-sided story. This in turn would have translated to a

⁴⁵ Video presentation available on <http://www.ted.com>

‘single story’ and discredited the truthfulness of my findings. ‘Multiple stories’ in the context of this study translate to multiple data collection tools used on different groups of respondents as they gave me the different ‘stories’ on the same subject. Table 1 summarises the data collection techniques that I employed.

Objective	Evidence Needed	Collection Techniques
Impacts of deindustrialisation on livelihoods	<i>Negative effects of deindustrialisation on economy and livelihoods</i>	FGDs, Interviewing residents, officials; Observations
Livelihoods after deindustrialisation	<i>How actors are reconstructing their livelihoods after deindustrialisation</i>	Interviewing actors + officials, FGDs; Observations
Field challenges and innovations against them	<i>Challenges that confront actors in the social/livelihoods field and how they innovate against them.</i>	Interviewing actors, listening to their ‘stories’, FGDs; Observations.
Livelihood sustainability	<i>How these livelihoods can withstand shocks and stresses</i>	Interviews actors, academics, officials; FGDs; Observations

Table1: Objectives–Data Collection Methods Matrix

5.8.1.1 Key Informant Interviews

Key informants are those people in authority, working within institutions whose work involves issues under study or those who have intimate knowledge of the researched population or place (Meis, 2007). When selecting respondents for these interviews, it is important to note that not every community member is knowledgeable about that society or issues that affect it and hence the need for key informants. On account of their personal skills, knowledge, experience or position in that society, key informants are better placed to provide more and accurate information and have better awareness of what is happening around them (Marshall, 1998). Their main role was to ‘inform’ the study on what they knew and thought about the urban livelihood situation in Norton.

In this study, key informant interviews did not seek to explore the respondents’ personal experiences as ‘individuals’. Rather, they were based on the information or knowledge the participants in these interviews had gained through working with their mother institutions or derived from their interaction with the researched population. Key informants provided expert knowledge since they were drawn from skilled/experienced personnel working with institutions like the central government, local government, NGOs/CSOs and academics knowledgeable in the study’s subject and location. I found it crucial to interact with respondents from these organisations and different backgrounds considering that urban livelihoods are complex,

constituted by diverse activities and are affected by a multiplicity of factors. Table 2 below shows the key informants that I engaged, their organisations and the positions that they hold.

Key Informant	Gender	Role	Organisation
KI/1	Female	Deputy-Director	Ministry of SMEs
KI/2	Male	Deputy-Director	NTC
KI/3	Male	Accountant	NTC
KI/4	Female	Social Worker	NTC
KI/5	Female	Informal Sector Officer	NTC
KI/6	Male + male	Vice-Chairperson + Secretary	NRA
KI/7	Female	Project Officer	Ndaiziva Capacity Development Trust
KI/8	Male	Chairperson	Norton SMEs Association
KI/9	Female	School Head	Ministry of Education
KI/10	Male	Secretary-General	ZCIEA
KI/11	Male	University Lecturer	Lesotho National University
KI/12	Female	Loan/Credit Officer	Micro-finance Firm

Table 2: Key Informants

5.8.1.2 In-Depth Interviews

In-depth interviews or narratives were used to collect data from ordinary residents that allowed them to ‘narrate’ their individuals/household experiences in the social field as they tried to deconstruct and reconstruct their livelihood strategies. They were thus concerned with investigating ordinary people’s lived experiences, understanding how deindustrialisation affected their livelihoods, what they were doing to sustain life, and how they were doing it. They also included elderly respondents or those who had stayed in the town for a long time, which allowed me to detail how the livelihood situation and patterns had changed over time. All interviews lasted between thirty and seventy-five minutes. The interview length depended on the respondent, the amount of information they were willing to give and the amount of time that they dedicated to the interview. Only people who had stayed in Norton for more than ten years qualified for interviewing. The assumption here was that they had stayed long enough to witness how livelihoods had changed over time. As recommended by Saunders *et al.* (2003), I always thanked my interviewees before and after the interview for accepting my request and spending time with me. Table 3 below presents a list of my in-depth interviewees.

IDI	Gender	Age	Livelihood Strategy
IDI/1	Female	-	Vegetable vendor
IDI/2	Male	58	Furniture & Stationery maker
IDI/3	Female	66	Unemployed
IDI/4	Male	68	Grocery shop owner
IDI/5	Male	32	Club operator
IDI/6	Male	-	Auto-spares trader
IDI/7	Couple	-	Rabbits keeping & cake baking
IDI/8	Male	24	Flea market trader
IDI/9	Male	-	Fruit & vegetable trader
IDI/10	Male	38	Cellphone & computer, music/movie CDs software trader
IDI/11	Male	-	Carpenter/welder
IDI/12	Male	33	Tuck-shop operator
IDI/13	Female	-	Flea market trader
IDI/14	Isaiah	-	Small hardware shop owner
IDI/15	Male	32	Accountant at Public Service
IDI/16	Female	-	Pensioner
IDI/17	Female	-	Fish trader
IDI/18	Male	70	Pensioner

Table 3: In-depth interviews

‘Simplifying Complex Realities through Stories’

I employed the ‘Tell me about...’ or ‘Let’s talk about...’ technique in soliciting data from interview and FGD participants. This method of enquiry made the interviews more conversational and give respondents a chance to tell their ‘stories’, experiences and knowledge as opposed to the usual question and answer session which tend to require strict/definite responses. This technique is backed by Eastmond (2007:1) who asserts that “for researchers, [stories] provide a site to examine the meanings people, individually or collectively, ascribe to lived experience. Narratives are not transparent renditions of ‘truth’ but reflect a dynamic interplay between life, experience and story.” I was also alive to the fact that “sometimes reality is too complex [to comprehend and] stories give it form.”⁴⁶ I was influenced by this assertion and incorporated storytelling into my interviews. The respondent assumed the position of a ‘storyteller’ to whose narrative I would ‘listen’ to capture and understand his/her lived experiences and how these shaped deconstruction and reconstruction of local livelihood strategies. I probed wherever I felt there was more to tell. The interviewing technique at large, to

⁴⁶Godard (2015) on <http://thisisablogbykathryn.wordpress.com>

a greater extent worked to my advantage and for the benefit of the study. It afforded me a chance to probe the respondents where I felt they still had more to tell. Follow-up questions allowed me to verify initial responses and both the respondent and I could seek clarification where it was needed. Again, the technique is regarded as the most useful to examine respondents' perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, values and practices (Eastmond, 2007) and these are some of the very issues that this study also sought to explore. I also enjoyed a high response rates among my respondents while at the same time there was no need for my respondents to be literate. In short, Stake (2006:29) applauds the method for affording access into the "details of life that the researcher is unable to see for him/her-self by interviewing people who did see it."

The method however generated a lot of data that took a long time for me to process and analyse. I was also confronted by delays and postponements by most of the key informants who occupied some office or positions in their respective institutions as they were busy. For example, I visited NTC more than five times over two months before I managed to set any appointment. I also had at least five other cases where I received postponement messages via the phone before securing my first appointment, after which I also made several other visits to complete my schedule. I encountered almost similar setbacks at the Ministry of SMEs where I was referred to least six different offices before I finally found the 'right' office where my request was welcomed.

5.8.2 Focus Group Discussions: '*Stimulating Collective Memories*'

I employed the FGD data collection technique to capture numerous views and perceptions at once. FGDs are a qualitative research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic decided by the researcher. Although the sizes differ according to different authors, a focus group normally consists of eight to twelve respondents talking spontaneously and freely on themes of importance to an investigation. FGDs can capture data and insights that cannot be generated in the absence of group interaction. For example, listening to others presenting their experiences and thoughts may stimulate other participants to share their stories (Lindlof and Taylor 2002). Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2005:888) view them as "unique formations of collective inquiry where theory, research, pedagogy and politics merge." The technique creates a platform for a combination of learning and discovery deriving from the interactions between the researcher, the participants and between the participants themselves. FGDs also stir collective memory of participants as they remind each other of their lived experiences and capitalises on

group dynamics to generate in-depth discussions (Chiweshe, 2011). FDGs for this study were made up of nine to fifteen participants except for the SMEs 'meeting' which ended up with twenty three. Discussion length in FDGs over which I moderated lasted between sixty and eighty minutes while the other group lasted two hours. Out of the four FDGs that I conducted, I led the discussion in all but one. Just like in-depth narratives, my FDGs sought to explore the people's lived experiences and how this led to creation of new '*knowledges*' and innovations as they tried to construct their livelihoods in a constrained environment. For participation in the FDGs, I chose respondents who had stayed in Norton long enough to witness livelihood dynamics in the town. I thus preferred those who had stayed for ten or more years.

I recruited group members using the snowballing method. I would initially approach one or two potential 'group candidates' who would in turn help me identify the next candidate; who would also do the same and the cycle would continue until the desired number was reached. FDGs were held with ordinary residents drawn from within Norton. They were made up of residents who were engaged in similar or related livelihood activities. This arrangement was reached basing on the assumption that since they were working together or at least in the same field, they were likely to have shared experiences, challenges and innovations as they tried to survive the turbulent economic environment. This assumption held truth in all groups although there were some few differences based on individual choice of strategies out of the variety available in that field were noted.

As indicated earlier, I led all but one of the four FDGs that were conducted during this study. I employed a unique group discussion in which I played a passive role throughout the discussion. The discussion was composed of individuals in the SMEs sector and was conducted in form of a meeting by local SMEs Association. Participants discussed the different entrepreneurial ventures that they were into, their experiences in the SMEs and informal businesses, the challenges they faced, how they dealt with them and the areas of potential growth. The chairperson of the Association stood in for me as the facilitator of the group discussion while I sat among participants taking down notes. While the association had a been planning a meeting of their own, after approaching the chairperson with my request to engage him and association members

in my study, he resolved to calling the meeting earlier than scheduled. The FGD thus turned out to be a ‘meeting’ – *“the most successful one that the association ever had....”*⁴⁷

I enjoyed three major benefits from this type of a FGD. Having a facilitator who was one of their own, not a stranger like me, created a free and open environment for the informants to participate. Secondly, recruitment was way easier than in other groups as the chairperson did it on my behalf. Lastly, since the group was composed of entrepreneurs who were discussing real entrepreneurship issues, they felt it was ‘their’ discussion and not mine *per se*. Since it gave them a chance to meet each other, learn and share experience, they regarded it as their ‘meeting’. The platform generated a lot of data and contributed a lot to the study. Although the discussion took longer than scheduled, I was content with the manner in which the chairperson managed it. A leader at his church as well as a ward chairperson for his political party, he proved to be an expert in managing groups of people. Although I failed to record this discussion, as was the case in all other FGDs, I managed to capture a lot of detail with the help of my assistant through note-taking.

I also benefitted from other advantages from the FGD technique. These include the generation of rich data more quickly without incurring large expenses as was the case with the interviews. Group settings also encouraged individuals to participate freely, and allowed for the capturing of the views from more individuals at once – something impossible one-to-one situations. I also realised that group interactions encourage other communications like anecdotes and jokes. These helped the participants to express themselves and enhanced my understanding of the issues that they raised. This encouraged open conversations and at the same time facilitated expression of ideas and experiences that were more likely to be missed in one-on-one encounters (Kitzinger, 2004). One example was during introductions, when someone joked; *“I sell anything that is sellable, even if [ordinary] tree leaves are on demand today, I will sell them.”*⁴⁸ Through the use of this comic sentiment, he made clear the nature of his trade at the same time livening up the discussion as he opened the floor, ‘inviting’ others into participating.

However, just like interviews, FGDs produced voluminous data with varied but relevant views which consumed significant time to process and reconcile. Moreover, mobilising participants

⁴⁷ As remarked by the Association’s chairperson.

⁴⁸ Male vendor, FGD

was difficult since most of my potential respondents were involved in some income generating activities, convincing an average of ten people to leave their jobs/‘hustle’ at once to spend an hour and half discussing “*things that do not even change our lives*”⁴⁹ was not easy. However, I managed through use of snowballing although I was forced to reduce my FGDs from the proposed six to four. Tables 4-6 below show how my FGDs were composed.

FGD 1		
Participant	Gender	Livelihood Strategy
Participant 1	Male	Tout
Participant 2	Male	Unemployed
Participant 3	Male	Taxi driver
Participant 4	Male	Air time vendor
Participant 5	Male	Taxi conductor
Participant 6	Male	Shoe repairer
Participant 7	Male	Hustler
Participant 8	Male	Cart pusher
Participant 9	Male	Car washer

Table 4: FGD 1

FGD 2		
Participant	Gender	Livelihood Strategy
Participant 1	Female	Vegetable vendor
Participant 2	Female	Fruit vendor
Participant 3	Female	Catering
Participant 4	Female	Flea market trader
Participant 5	Female	Housewife
Participant 6	Female	Tailor
Participant 7	Female	Fish trader
Participant 8	Female	Fish trader

Table 5: FGD 2

⁴⁹ Male firewood vendor who declined to participate

FGD3		
Participant 1	Female	Tuck-shop owner
Participant 2	Female	Flea market trader
Participant 3	Female	Fish trader
Participant 4	Female	Cross border trader
Participant 5	Male	Builder
Participant 6	Male	Vendor
Participant 7	Male	Poultry keeper
Participant 8	Male	Photographer
Participant 9	Male	Stationery trader
Participant 10	Male	Illegal fisher

Table 6: FGD 3

My fourth FGD was that unique group that I played a passive participant role and was conducted as a SME meeting. It was initially composed of 23 participants but the number kept on rising as the discussion unfolded.

5.8.3 Field Observations: ‘*Seeing is Believing*’

Observation is a data collection technique which involves the researcher’s direct participation in capturing data through seeing, observing or taking note of objects, events, phenomena or behaviours as they occur in their natural setting (Bhattacharjee, 2012). The method can be used as a way of supplementing and validating data derived from other methods. There are two types of observation, namely participant and non-participant observation (Bhattacharjee, 2012). Participant observation entails that the researcher is actively involved in the social phenomenon under investigation. In non-participant observation, the researcher plays a neutral and passive external role and observes from a distance without being directly involved (Bhattacharjee, 2012; Brewer, 2003). In most cases of non-participant observation, the observed lack the knowledge that they are being observed or are part of a research study. In social research, the emphasis is that observations must focus on naturally occurring behaviour and subjects should not be put in experimental situations as this would influence them to alter their ways of doing things. Interpretation of observations must be done from the participants’ perspective (Brewer, 2003). Observations involve note-taking, capturing videos and photographs or engaging in informal conversations as ways of gathering data.

In this study, I made extensive use the non-participant observation technique during data collection. My deployment of this method collecting data was especially influenced by the old

but popular adage, '*Seeing Is Believing*' which basically means that one can better understand something or easily be convinced that it exists and is true if they have a chance to witness it physically (Ammer, 2003). I aimed to achieve three things through observations. Firstly, to observe how Norton had deindustrialised. Secondly, to get insights into what the social actors in Norton were doing to reconstruct their livelihoods. Finally, to learn about the physical constraints/barriers that social actors faced in the field and how they were innovating against them.

Although observations were initially earmarked for specific locations like the industrial area and market places or business centres where people converge as they execute their livelihood activities, I was later referred to other various locations by some of my respondents. I also came to realise that I could do observations anywhere across the town. As a result, other than the planned trips that were specifically meant for observation, I also took every opportunity that I went out even on other business to carry out observations. For example, I would utilise the time when I went out shopping to note one or two things that related to my study. I would also grab the chance to navigate around the industrial area whenever I visited council offices to pay my bills and during my repeated visits to the council offices as I sought to secure interviews appointments.

On a regular basis, I also resorted to informal talks with social actors. These afforded me a chance to discuss, probe emerging issues, as well as asking questions about any events as they unfolded. The casual nature of this technique was very useful in eliciting important information from the 'informal' respondents. I would initiate informal conversations in places like supermarket queues, public transport or clubs. Where informal chatting quickly developed into meaningful conversations, I resorted to Goffman's (1989) technique of taking mental notes then quickly put into writing as soon as I got settled. Besides informal conversations, I also listened to naturally occurring talk. Here, I would pay close attention whenever I overheard people discussing issues that were of interest to this study. The following brief accounts detail how I conducted my observations and informal chats.

5.8.3.1 Navigating Norton: '*Walking the City*'

The longest and most rewarding of all observation sessions that I had was around mid-March 2017 - the day when Fortue visited. Fortue is a good friend of mine, my former student during

my two year duration as a teacher at a school where she did her Advanced Level studies. She had just completed her university studies and was submitting CVs, looking for a job. I had earlier on intimated to her that about 90% of Norton's industries were closed but she would not believe it. I therefore invited her to come and 'see' for herself. Together we toured the town in a kind of De Certeau's (1984) '*Walking the City*' adventure. The chapter '*Walking in the City*' notes that the city is generated by strategies of government, corporations, institutional planning and urban development policies. According to planners, mobility in the city should be in accordance with the dictates of the map or plans, where city walkers are supposed to follow 'prescribed' routes, following given roads/streets/paths if they are to walk from point A to B. However, to an ordinary walker, city regulatory signs and recommended routes do not matter. S/he thus navigates the city the way s/he deems necessary and to her/his own convenience. I deployed this concept as I conducted my field walks, observing the 'city'.

While I would follow some streets as I navigated the town, I did so not following the 'strict' routes that lead to some destinations. Instead, I dissected the city, 'inventing' my own routes and creating some shortcuts, cutting through the 'unauthorised' points in form of vacant lots, paths that cut through undeveloped/uncompleted residential properties, parks, playing grounds and cultivated 'fields'. I would even at times take the longest route to get to some point. In short, I chose that path that I felt was convenient to me and would lead me into discovering what I was looking for. In most cases, I avoided following the 'laid down' paths to ensure that they do not regulate/restrict my movements, or result me into missing out on some important issues relating to my study by leading me where I did not intent to go. In other words, '*walking in the city*' as a concept gave me some 'free play' to get to wherever I wanted to. Shortcutting also allowed me to cover more areas than what strict routes could have afforded me and hence the importance of the concept.

We began our 'tour' at Katanga Shops, walking past Koshen Bakery along Koshen Drive towards Johannesburg, through Marshlands to Maridale. We found an 'unofficial' route that cut through a cultivated 'open' space, with healthy maize crops which signaled a good harvest. The way took us to Garikai Houses close the vandalised and neglected Harare to Bulawayo railway line and Norton-Murombedzi Highway on our way to Knowe. We rounded up Knowe Phase 1 and left out the rest of the suburb before returning to Katanga, going past the '*Durawall*' home

industrial area and *Pa-Speed* informal/illegal vending area. We then proceeded to the industrial area; all the way from Bellevue Abattoirs, past GMB, Norton Hospital, to ZESA depot along South Road. We then branched off into Galloway Road, going past Wilgrow Export, Lucas Batteries, Dandy Zimbabwe and finally Hunyani Pulp and Paper Mill, just to mention a few, before finding our way to '*Kwa-Govans*'. The tour lasted for about six hours and gave us sufficient time to circumnavigate a significant part of the town. We passed through six market places/shopping centres and the CBD where people are normally concentrated as they execute their livelihood activities. We also had a chance to walk through the town's different land use zones: from residential areas, shopping centres, 'open' spaces to formal and informal market places, then the home industry, the main industrial area all the way to the town's CBD. This afforded us a chance to assess what was happening in different zones across the town. It was also an opportunity for us to assess the state of Norton's industry and learning how actors utilised the different town zones in their struggle to (re)construct their livelihoods.

5.8.3.2 Random Informal Chats

OK Zimbabwe had just opened a new supermarket at Katanga when I started collecting data for this study. It was the only grocery shop that was offering plastic money service to clients in the face of a serious cash crisis and was characterised by long winding queues. I would join those long queues even when buying the smallest item that I could find even at any vending stall just to get an opportunity to have an informal chat with other customers. Should I find anyone who was willing to talk, I would then direct the conversation towards the subject of my study. While waiting in the queue for my turn to be served, which sometimes would extend to as long as twenty to thirty minutes, I would gather bits and pieces that later proved crucial in answering some of the critical issues that this study explores.

I also had an opportunity with a carpenter whom I had hired to fix a door at my home. I deliberately avoided boarding a taxi so that we could walk all the way from his workplace at Katanga Home Industry to my place, a distance of approximately 2km. I offered to carry his tool bag and stood in as his 'assistant' as a way of getting time to talk with him, to understand the nature of his work and the industry and how he was making it. For the one hour or so that I spent with him, I got to know more about his trade and how he managed to continue operating despite the precarious economy. I learnt a number of survival '*secrets*' from these informal chats. They

provided seemingly ‘insignificant’ but very important information that I might have missed from formal data collection sessions. There are other informal chats that I initiated which ended up as meaningful conversation.

5.8.3.3 Field Photography: ‘*A Camera Never Lies*’

Besides informal chats I also captured field photographs and videos which I later studied and developed into detailed notes. Pictures and videos helped to serve as reminders while some captured the real phenomena as they occur. I captured most of the photos and videos on the day when I attended a service delivery demonstration that was organised by the residents association against NTC. The demonstration was a result of an array of complaints by the residents, most of which were of interest to my study. I attended as a participant observer. I also recorded some of the speeches that were presented and later listened to them, extracting issues of interest to my study and putting them on paper. I also took photos of closed industries, vending sites and other public informal activities but was very cautious not to capture people’s faces. Figure 6 below shows one of pictures that I captured during the demonstration held at NTC on 10 April 2017.⁵⁰



Figure 6: Scenes at the Demonstration at NTC (Author, 04/2017)

5.8.4 Documentary Sources

I also relied on secondary sources for information. I resorted to newspapers as well as internet sources and managed to obtain articles, pictures and videos which focused on issues under

⁵⁰ Video highlights posted on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvyTPsJRGJ4> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C1sjX1LVNe0>

investigation in this study. By making reference to these, I managed to capture livelihood-related events that took place when I was not present or before I commenced this study. I downloaded articles, videos and pictures and studied them in detail, capturing issues of interest and jotting down notes for later analysis. Documentary sources were easier to find and thus less time consuming when compared to other methods and further played a part in my attempt to avoid *‘the danger of a single story’*.

5.9 Pilot Studies

Before launching the actual data collection, I conducted a pilot study to test two of my data collection instruments; the interview and FGD guides. I tested these two in early January 2017 before embarking on actual data collection towards the end of that same month. The idea behind this pilot study was to pre-test my instruments. I took my in-depth narrative guide and the key informant interview schedule to a test as a way of gauging how suitable they were when it comes to clarity of questions, content or issues/themes of discussion and the time that I was going to spend undertaking the interviews (Tawodzera, 2010). I carried out one FGD session and two interviews (one for an in-depth narrative and another one for a key informant interview). Results from the pilot studies helped to identify potential problems in my instrumentation; that is the strengths and weaknesses of the data collection tools and implemented necessary amendments (Bhattacharjee, 2012).

The use of unstructured questions meant that I would not necessarily ask questions but raise issues that would lead to a conversation. The interviews reflected a conversation as opposed to exact answers to direct questions. I adopted the same on FGD guides. I also realised that questions were not going to be asked sequentially as I had listed them on the guide. Some respondents would go on to answer some questions before they were asked. I resolved to make the interviews and FGDs conversations which were based on themes rather than strict questions.

The pilot study also helped me to find out whether the respondents comprehended the rationale and the aim of the study. This afforded me a chance to test their willingness to take part. It also provided me with a chance to address ambiguity issues that were associated with some of my terminology and questions. It was through this pre-test that I learnt that some terms were not intelligible to some of my targeted respondents. Examples of such terms include ‘livelihood assets or capitals’ which I had to reduce to ‘resources’ as well as ‘sustainability’ which I would

also replace or use together with ‘reliable, secured or dependable’. The pilot study also helped me to realise that the four to six months that I had initially set aside for the whole process of data collection was not long enough, and hence, I had to extend it to between six and ten months. Extending my stay in the field presented me with an unintended advantage. It ensured that my fieldwork spanned across Zimbabwe’s two main seasons; summer and winter. This was important in that it avoided a situation where I would capture data on livelihoods based on one season and miss the rest of the year. The idea behind the study is a holistic understanding of livelihoods in Norton. If I had collected data between January and April/May as initially planned, I would have ended up relying on data biased towards summer livelihoods since some livelihood activities are seasonal and whatever people do outside summer was going to be missed. I also realised through the pilot study that some of my questions did not generate relevant data and were irrelevant. I therefore resolved to refine and delete some of them in addition. It was also as a result of such irrelevant questions that the interviews were longer than expected, stretching up to two hours as opposed to the proposed thirty minutes to one hour each. The majority of the respondents were not prepared to spend that much with me since they were either office bearers whose schedules were tight or residents who in many cases wanted to return to their jobs/‘hustles’ without much delay.

5.10 Data Analysis

Data analysis refers to the systematic process of converting raw data into meaningful and usable information. It involves the systematic generation of meanings, patterns, trends and interpretation of raw data to enhance understanding of the data collected from the field. Depending on the type and purpose of the research, analysed data can be used to approve, disapprove, reinforce, amend or even create new theories (O’Neal and Schutt, 2013; Bogdan and Biklen, 1998). Since all data generated from this study was qualitative, I made use of the thematic data analysis method where information was basically arranged, interpreted and presented based on themes that emerged from the collected data. Although there is no single way of data analysis, most approaches to qualitative data analysis tend to include some common steps. I did my thematic data coding guided by the following steps given by Lacey and Luff (2007) and Miles and Huberman’s (1984) in analysing my data.

5.10.1 Documentation and Familiarisation

I took time to listen to recorded interviews, transcribe and translate them and reading through the transcriptions as recommended by Boch & Piolat (2005) and Laws *et al.* (2003). I also studied field notes, pictures and videos and converted them into intelligible and usable write-ups. By transcribing all interviews on my own, I kept interacting with my data and became conversant with issues central to the study to enhance my ‘*understanding*’ and later ‘*interpretation*’ in an apparent response to the ‘*Verstehen*’. Constant interaction with data also spoke to the iteration in qualitative inquiries. In simple terms iteration refers to the process through which a researcher repeatedly goes over his/her data until he generates some meanings as part of data analysis. Srivastava and Hopwood (2009:76) regard it as “a reflexive process” that plays a key role in “sparking insight and developing meaning.” I went through this process I sought to learn and master more from my data in preparation for an in-depth analysis.

5.10.2 Organisation and Categorisation of Data into Concepts

Here, I identified key concepts, themes categories and subcategories emerging from my data, making reference to the main aim and objectives and questions of the study. The stage also involved connecting data to show how concepts were related. I assigned preliminary codes to my data in order to describe the content. I also searched for patterns/themes from my codes across the various interview transcripts.

5.10.3 Data Verification and Legitimation

This involved testing for data reliability through triangulation and corroboration. I also compared data to identify inconsistencies, discarding such data that sounded untrue or illegitimate. Again, this step was consistent with my attempt to eliminate ‘*the danger of a single story.*’ At this stage I reviewed the themes generated above, defining and renaming them in the process.

5.10.4 Data Interpretation

Here, I was guided by the *Verstehen* as I sought to generate ‘*meanings*’ from collected data through ‘*interpreting*’ researched population’s point of view, looking for associations between themes with a view of providing explanations for the findings and relating the study’s results to findings from other studies and existing literature.

5.10.5 Reporting Findings

This was the final step in the process of data analysis during which I compiled the final report which presented the findings of this study. I used the narrative style which enabled me to present my ‘stories’. I then complimented my narrative with descriptions and explanations as I sought to establish the implications of my findings through discussion, linking them to the objectives of the research and related literature. I used Nvivo software version 9.2 to analyse my transcribed interviews and manually analysed my field notes, pictures and videos. I came up with four broad themes from my interaction with the findings which I presented as Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine, and these formed the basis for a wider discussion.

5.11 Challenges and Limitations

The first challenge had to do with the political environment in the country. Discussion of issues that dwell around a failing economy characterised by the fall of the manufacturing sector alongside other economic sectors, unemployment, inflation and the general livelihood situation was regarded as a politically sensitive issue. Data was collected with the country’s general elections coming barely less than one year away and the political climate was rapidly heating up as political parties were already rolling out their campaigns. Zimbabwean elections have a history of political violence and Norton is one of those constituencies which either ZANU (PF) or MDC-T can win and is thus hotly contested. This scared away some of my potential respondents. I will examples of a few instances. It was on an August afternoon when I entered the Norton Vendors Union offices at Katanga Shops to request their permission to interview them and hear their views regarding their livelihoods. After reading through my consent form, the guy who manned the office declined to grant me permission. In as much as he commended the research for “*making sense*”, he later on said the union would not be able to help me considering “*mazuva atava ano* [these days]” - apparently pointing out to the 2018 general elections that were just by the corner. I also requested him to ‘snowball’ me some of their members but his ‘NO’ was final.

I also engaged a woman who vends at ‘*Musika weMabhero*’ (Second hand clothes market) located behind Liquid Sports Bar at Katanga. She was very sceptical about me, and even asked me “*hausi mukomana here iwe?* [Are you not one of those boys from the president’s office?]” In a response that typifies one of Sun Tzu’s ‘*The Art of War*’ principles which states, “let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night...,” (Tzu, 1994:47), she openly declined to share the

challenges which they encountered on their way from Mozambique and how they dealt with them, fearing that I might end up *“trapping them and foil up our deals.”* She opted not to talk about issues of potential to harm their strategy to an ‘outsider’ like me. Another one – a male electrical gadgets repairer who declined to participate said, *“vamwe vakazviroverwa zvekutaura nyaya dzakadai muna 2008* [Some were assaulted because of discussing such issues in 2008 (election violence)].” I also encountered the same with the two guys who work in a pharmacy at Sagonda Complex (Katanga Shops). They queried, *“how do we know you were not sent by someone up there?”* before excusing themselves on the pretext that they stayed in Harare and only came to Norton daily to work so they did not know much about the town except their workplace. I lost them as potential respondents.

Moreover, as a result of this politically-motivated fear, I failed to get consent to record all the four FGDs and a greater proportion of the respondents who took part in interviews such that I had to rely on note-taking. Some said they did not want to sign the consent form although they had fully agreed to participate. They did not want their names or any of their details to appear anywhere on my research documents. To the majority of the ordinary residents, the request to record them was tantamount to chasing them away. I lost over a dozen potential respondents after mentioning the issue of recording and signing consent forms. They felt recording violated the principle of privacy and confidentiality.

The second challenge involved recruitment of FGD participants. I found it difficult to convince an average of ten individuals at once to come and spend at least one hour in a group discussion. This was worsened by the fact that most people tended to be always busy with their jobs/‘hustle’ and sacrificing their time on something that was not of direct and immediate benefit to them was something that very few were prepared to do. As a result, I thus ended up conducting four FGDs as opposed to the six that I had initially planned.

The fear of the media by my respondents was another sticky situation that I encountered. Journalists were thus cited as the other culprits who have resulted in lack of trust for researchers by the public. During one of my numerous visits to the council offices, I overheard one official doubting me as he discussed my issue with the town clerk’s personal assistant. After being briefed about my issue he thus asked, *“haasi mu journalist here mufana iyeye?* [Is that young man not a journalist?]

He only agreed to entertain me after getting some solid assurances that all

my papers were in order. He even emphasised it when we were about to start the interview boldly highlighting that “*kana ndikazonzwa hangu voice rangu pa-internet or pa-radio tinoburana mufana* [Young man, should I ever I hear my voice being broadcasted over the radio or on internet, we will be in for a collision]”. He also took my contacts in case anything goes wrong in future. Several other people whom I approached also mentioned their fear of being broadcasted on radio or featuring on newspapers.

Another situation was that I failed to get approval from a number of organisations that I was convinced would contribute some insightful data towards this study. These include EMA, ZRP and Norton Constituency Office. Although I could have managed to compensate for such information elsewhere, I still contend that their voices would have enriched the study. Another limitation is also linked to possible exaggeration by respondents when they were telling their stories. This could be so considering that although I had clearly stated that there were no benefits that participants would enjoy, some still thought that there could be some benefits that will come in future. As a result, I cannot rule out the potential of some respondents falsifying their situation so that I would consider them first when “[my] *organisation brings something in future,*” as Madzimai ‘requested’. Above all, the study only focused on Norton town and thus the results may not be generalizable to other areas.

5.12 Quality of Data and Trustworthiness

To ensure that data to be collected is correct, appropriate and of highest possible quality, I employed a number of ways. Firstly, the choice of a case study design was meant to ensure that the study is in-depth and concentrate on a relatively smaller geographical area which will make it possible to extract rich, high quality data (Creswell, 2003). Secondly, I did a pilot study before the actual data study, where I pre-tested all my tools. This gave me hints on their shortcomings and I made corrections where they were needed.

To ensure data credibility, I also resorted to using a number of methods during my data collection. I then corroborated and triangulated data from the different methods, and comparing and verifying it checking for any inconsistencies and possible falsifications which are usually associated with ‘*a single story*’. This was made possible through the use FGDs, interviews and observations which by their nature are complementary to each other and overlapping methods (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Other than methods, I also triangulated sources of data by comparing

views on one issue collected using the same methods from different respondents. This helped a lot in ensuring data credibility. Triangulation of data from different methods and respondents is again consistent with my efforts to avoid '*the danger of a single*' as I elaborated earlier.

In an attempt to address issues around dependability in this study, I engaged an external researcher, who was not involved in any part of the study, to carry out an external audit on the research. This involved examining the data collection and analysis processes. She also examined the research findings, interpretations, arguments and conclusions, and made sure that they were supported by the findings. Again, to ensure the overall trustworthiness in this study, I also paid attention to issues around confirmability of data and findings. Confirmability aims at making sure that findings are shaped by the respondents as opposed to the researcher's biases. To achieve this, I employed the audit trail technique in which I detailed my data collection, analysis and interpretation processes. I also gave the rationale for every approach, technique or method that I used to make sure that I used them where they were suitable and not just using them for the sake of it. I also resorted to extensive use of quotes from my respondents to support my findings, interpretations, arguments and conclusions. Other than confirmability, transferability is another issue that is considered in research. However, because of my case study design, I found it a bit difficult to transfer or apply my results in other contexts although livelihood challenges are basically the same in all urban contexts. I therefore do seek to generalise my results to other urban centres because they are highly contextualised.

I also implemented a number of other measures to ensure that I collect high quality data. Firstly, reducing interviews into 'stories' played a part in simplifying complex realities to make understanding and interpretation easier (Goddard, 2015). Secondly, I utilised research assistants to help me in note-taking and picture photographing during FGDs, interviews and field observations. Since most respondents did not consent to have their interviews recorded, I relied on note-taking to capture their views. Assuming the interviewer role and taking down notes at once was too a demanding task to execute on my own, so to ensure that I capture maximum data, I used assistant. I also made sure that I used as assistants, persons who had prior academic research experience. I then held a refresher session with them during we revised our research knowledge and skills. I also elaborated what the research aimed to achieve as well as the methodology and methods that we were going to use before deploying them into the field.

I also made sure that participation was voluntary, giving each potential participant an opportunity to accept or decline. The reasoning here was if someone participates in something willingly, they are likely to do so wholeheartedly and supply as much and accurate data as possible. This goes against mandatory/coerced participation where an individual might just take part just for the sake of it but not giving out the best information in the way they would have provided had they done so voluntarily. I was thus contented that voluntary participation thus enhanced the quality of data that I collected and enriched the study at large. Finally, I encouraged participants to be frank from the outset of each session, and established a comfortable environment for the respondents from the opening. The ‘insider’ and the language factors discussed earlier also helped to create good working relationships with my respondents and this was to the advantage of the study. Where a positive relationship exists, engagements are likely to produce some rich outcomes. I also make use of probes to elicit detailed data and iterative questioning where I would constantly return to issues that were previously raised the informant through use of rephrased questions as Shenton (2004) recommends.

5.13 Ethical Issues

As a researcher, I made sure that my conduct in the field conformed to the highest possible ethical standards. The first step I made was to get some gatekeeper’s letters from institutions like NTC, Ministry of SMEs and Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economies Association (ZCIEA) which gave me permission to engage them during my study. Secondly, I was given an ethics clearance certificate by my university (UKZN). This authorised me to proceed with my fieldwork after completion of the proposal. The next stage was to seek informed consent from my potential respondents. Obtaining consent from potential informants is a very important part of every research in that if people participate in a research willingly, they are likely to contribute valuable data as opposed to coerced participants. Informed consent is an on-going agreement that is reached between a researcher and a respondent to participate in research after the purpose, the risks or dangers as well as the benefits of taking part are fully disclosed to the participant (Christians, 2005). I thus explained the purpose and objectives of the study to them so that they can be able to make an informed decision on whether or not to choose to participate. I made it clear that participation by respondents was purely voluntary, and that there were no direct benefits to be enjoyed after participation and that they had the right to withdraw their whenever they felt they were no longer interested.

As a way of upholding the principle of voluntary participation, I did not issue any incentive or rewards of any form to lure respondents into agreeing to participate. Informed consent also sought permission to audio-record and/or photograph for later analysis. Where a respondent declined, I respected them and resolved to taking down notes. Research ethics are also guided by the principle of confidentiality (Saunders *et al.*, 2003) and as a way of maintaining observing that, I made sure that I did not publish the names of any of my respondents to ensure privacy and protecting them in case of sensitive information being disclosed. I thus assured them that all data collected was for my consumption alone and that I was going to keep it tightly secured. I also made sure that no real names were going to be mentioned in this report so that it will become impossible for readers to trace who said what during the study.

5.14 Data Collection as a Learning Process

As pointed out earlier in this study, I made use of the ‘*describe, apply and learn*’ approach as I carried out fieldwork. I thus learnt the following during the course of the study.

5.14.1 Use of Snowballing in Field Observations

I learnt that snow balling does not only lead to other respondents with required characteristics or knowledge. Instead, it can also be used in identification of observation sites within the researched area. In this case, a respondent might not necessarily refer a researcher to another respondent but can him/her to locate areas or places where they can go and have first-hand experience of the phenomenon under investigation. In cases like these, one can actually be referred to a place to verify what they would have heard from other respondents. Snowballing is thus not limited to sampling interviews or FGDs respondents but can also include observation points.

5.14.2 The Value of Field Pictures in Social Research

Capturing pictures during field work is more important than I previously thought. Traditionally, pictures are meant to provide some ‘tangible’ or empirical evidence of a phenomenon as it happens in the social field. I however learnt that a researcher can also use them to serve as a reminder of what happened when he or she was in the field. Since it is not always possible to take down notes in the field, taking random pictures can come in as a substitute. The pictures will then act as a reminder and as soon as the researcher sets their eyes on them, they will recall the events surrounding the picture. A researcher can also pose for a photo with a respondent,

especially those who are engaged in informal conversations where recording or note taking is likely to be difficult. Once a researcher sees the picture which features an informal respondent, he or she would remember what the two discussed and draft notes from the picture. However, pictures also can breach the issue of anonymity/confidentiality and it is important to ensure that respondent's faces are not shown.

5.14.3 Disclosure of Researcher's Credentials: A Holdup?

I learnt one thing about academic research during my field work; while it is ethically and morally right for researchers to introduce themselves in full and outline the purpose of their study, this might in one way or the other discourage respondents to say out what they know about the subject under interrogation. I will give an example. It was a fine Monday morning when I entered Katanga market place; one of my favorite 'hunting grounds' where I intended to recruit one or two respondents for my study on that particular day. I approached an elderly man who was manning a second hand clothes and shoes stall in the open area behind Liquid Sports Bar. I introduced myself and my purpose for visiting. He was very receptive. However, the moment he learnt that I was conducting a Ph.D. study, he queried; *“zvino chiiwo chatingakuudza nhai mwanangu isuwo zvedu tisina kana nekumbodongorera nemusiwo we Grade Seven zvayo* [What valuable information do you think you can get from uneducated people like me?]. I could see that from that moment, he was looking down upon himself and doubted if he could make meaningful contribution to such a *“high profile research like mine”*. He finally but grudgingly agreed on an appointment. I almost lost him, and it did not end with him.

‘Mufundisi’ – a clergyman at a new church who is also into bicycle and shoe repairing along Koshen Drive also doubted himself: *“Zvedu ndezvekukiya kiya izvi bamunini, zvingatopindawo mumaPh.D. enyu here? Madii kutsvaga vamwe vanoita zvinhu zvine musoro.* [I am involved in a petty activities; I don't think it's worth studying for a PhD. Why can't you find people who are engaged in better things?]. I lost him as a respondent. This was also the case with a shop owner near Ngoni Shops, who thought that he was *“under-qualified and his business was too small to contribute to a Ph.D. research”*.

5.14.4 The Power of Informal Conversations in Qualitative Inquiries

From my informal conversations, those like *‘Mabhutsu’* – a male cobbler who did not get to know that I was studying, shared their stories without hesitation. He was eloquent and even

‘advised’ me; “*ukawana chinotengeseka tengesai ... patasvika apa pakutoda munhu anoshanda.* [If you find something sellable, please go for it ... the situation requires one to be hardworking].” However, I believe that had he known that I was a Ph.D. candidate, he would not have gone to that extent. I concluded that in as much as it is the right thing to do, disclosing one’s educational credentials might lower the confidence of some respondents, especially the less educated or those who hail from disadvantaged backgrounds.

5.15 Chapter Summary

In this chapter I explored methodological issues of this study. I looked at how the study was undertaken, taking into account how the qualitative methodology was used, justified the use of a case study as well as the data collection methods that I used. I highlighted the use and relevance of the *Verstehen* noting how it emphasises understanding and interpretation as important aspects of qualitative inquiries. It also provided insights on how I made use of interviews, FGDs and observations in collecting my data and how I tailor-made them to fit into this study, the advantages I enjoyed from the methods as well as their disadvantages. It also spelt out how and why I did a pilot study first before the actual study, the ethical considerations like how I observed the informed consent and confidentiality principles, how data was analysed thematically, how findings will be presented as well as how recording, photography, pilot studies and use of research assistants enhanced my data reliability. The ensuing chapter presents the impacts of deindustrialisation on livelihoods in Norton.

CHAPTER SIX

‘BEYOND THE PLANT SHUTDOWNS’ IMPACTS OF DEINDUSTRIALISATION ON LIVELIHOODS IN NORTON

Despite their state of disuse, abandoned industrial sites remain connected with the urban fabric that surrounds them: with communities; with collective memory; and with people’s health, livelihoods, and stories (Mah, 2012:3).

6.1 Introduction

The fundamental objective of this chapter is to understand how premature deindustrialisation impacted local livelihoods in Norton. This part of the study is important in that it sets the pace towards the realisation of the overarching objective of the study by presenting the current situation and influences that actors in Norton confront in their everyday lives. I deemed this to be the best way to enhance the reader’s comprehension of the socio-economic situation on the ground before proceeding to explore what is happening in the livelihoods field. Understanding the circumstances that confront social actors is crucial in informing the study on how these pushed/motivated them into devising new/alternative livelihoods to sustain life or to supplement their compromised livelihoods. It is also through interrogating these impacts that I managed to understand local people’s actions such as their lived experiences in the social field as they strived to reconstruct, invent and reinvent their livelihoods.

6.2 Impacts of Deindustrialisation on Livelihoods in Norton

I found that deindustrialisation in Norton presented a fair share of negative impacts on local livelihoods. These are presented next.

6.2.1 Closure of Firms in Manufacturing and Other Sectors

Deindustrialisation in Norton, just like in other towns/cities in Zimbabwe, resulted in closure of firms across all economic sectors with manufacturing suffering most. I heard testimonies from people who have been staying in the town since its formative stages on how it transformed from being a farming township, to a dormitory town serving Harare and eventually an independent industrial town which was home to numerous big companies. A respondent noted that *“the town used to host notable companies which include Hunyani Plant, Rio Tinto, Dandy, Non-Ferrous Die Casting, Lucas Batteries, Central African Forge, Wilgrow Sawmills and Export, David Whitehead and Karina Textiles”* (VaManyunga, Male, 58, SME, IDI). The list also includes Dos

Santos Shoes, Alliance Ginneries, Zagrinda Fruit Processors, National Feeds, the GMB, ZESA Northern Region main distribution Sub-Station, NRZ Norton Station, Allied Steel, Bestobell, Independent Coachworks, Cone Textiles, Bellevue Abattoirs, Farm & City, Morton Jeffery Water Works, just to mention some. I heard that there were several agricultural estates on the town's peripheries. A former agricultural estate worker noted that "*the town was surrounded by estates like Kent, Kintyre, Triple C Pigs, Cassa Banana and Drummond Chickens among others that were very productive,*" (Mbuya Ma-twins, Female, 66, IDI), adding that there were also some vibrant commercial farms on the town's peripheries and these acted both as upstream and downstream firms to the main industry. Moreover, Zimbabwe's biggest platinum producing mine and the processing plant known as ZimPlats is also located just outside Norton. There are also numerous other small scale gold and chrome mines located on its outskirts. Significant economic activity also used to take place at Lake Chivero "*where a number of firms were involved in large scale fishing*" (Mr Marere, Norton Residents Association, KII).

However, I found that most of these firms are no longer operational and some are now non-existent. The remaining few that still operate are doing so at far below their capacity as revealed by a source at NTC; "*The few [firms] that survived operate at very minimal levels, producing just a small fraction of their full potential*" (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII.). Firms which include Hunyani, Lucas Batteries, Karina Textiles, David Whitehead Textiles, Central African Forge, Allied Steel, Bestobell, Independent Coachworks, Dos Santos Shoes and Wilgrow are among the biggest casualties. Hunyani went on to dispose of all its assets, dismounting every bit of its machinery and equipment and selling them, and at the same time selling off its immovable properties. A former employee noted; "*Today, only a vacant and dilapidating Hunyani Industrial Complex remains*" (Mr Mandebvu). Such an extreme case also applies to Karina Textiles, David Whitehead Textiles, Allied Steel, Bestobell and Independent Coachworks, whose traces in the town are no longer visible. What remain popular are their names but none of their plants and works survived. There are also many other industrial properties whose owners I could not establish, which were permanently locked and unutilised. Some were even in abandoned states with grass and bushes growing all over the complexes.



Figure 7: Closed/Abandoned Industrial complexes (Author, 05/2017)

The few firms that remain are operating partially as the economy continues to perform badly. I also found out that very little activity is happening at such firms like Dandy Zimbabwe, Haste, NRZ Norton Depot, Alliance Ginneries and Koshen Bakery. In the wake of ESAP, Gunning and Oostendorp (2002) found that Zimbabwe's industrial productivity fell by 16% between 1991 and 1996 as firms resorted to cutting down operations and deindustrialising. The finding is consistent with Chipika *et al.* (2000) whose study realised a decline in shoe manufacturing in Zimbabwe owing to a shrinking market as the economy began to plummet. Bjurek and Durevall (2000) also

discovered that most manufacturing firms began to record decreasing productivity between 1991 and 1995 as deindustrialisation began to manifest.

The agricultural and agro-based manufacturing sectors were not spared. Productivity in the surrounding agricultural estates and farms also fell drastically. Field visits around the town's environs where intensive farming used to be practiced showed that a number of estates that are situated along the A5 Highway which used to be evergreen are no longer as operational and productive as they used to be. Field observations noted that vast tracks of land are going untilled, greenhouse infrastructure is collapsing and that there is absence of irrigation equipment which used to be kept mounted back in the day. This explains why the GMB has over the years been unutilised. Sources suggested that its grain storage facilities were in a very bad state *“to the extent that some are actually leaking due to negligence and lack of maintenance”* (Mr Nyamuda, 68, Retailer, IDI/KII). However, I did come across some significant activity at the GMB, Bellevue Abattoirs and Country Feeds. This was largely attributable to the successful 2016/17 farming season when the government introduced the command agriculture programme which also coincided with very good rains to result in a bumper harvest. One respondent stressed that *“what we are seeing at GMB is a new thing, thanks to the good rains and the command farming initiative. We haven't seen this for years. The place has been lying almost idle for close to a decade”* (Mr Nyamuda). I thus came across long queues of trucks delivering grain at the depot during numerous occasions that I *‘walked the city’*.



Figure 8: Maize stocked in the open at GMB. Reports say these silos are leaking so it is risky to use them until they are fully renovated (Author, 05/2017).

To further demonstrate how the economy in Norton has plunged, some of the industrial and commercial premises have been turned into schools. Examples include the complex that at one time used to house a CAPS Holdings branch which is now home to The Vatal Private Primary School. Moreover, Ngoni Beer Hall, one of the town's biggest council-owned alcohol selling outlets now houses Tamiranashe Junior School. As if it is not enough, premises once occupied by Delta Beverages are also now home to Tamiranashe Senior School while Calfa Council Beer Hall is now home to Norton Vocational Training Centre. During a service delivery demonstration held at Town offices that I attended as part of my fieldwork, a speaker queried that *“our [council] beer outlets are now being used as schools at a time when they should be making money for service delivery”* (Unidentified Demonstrator, Male).



Figure 9: 'New look' Delta Beverages Complex (Author, 08/2017)



Figure 10: 'New look' Ngoni Council Beer Hall Complex (Author, 08/2017)

Evidence from field observations also indicated that some industrial premises had been turned into residential homes. To substantiate this, I noted some laundry and blankets hanging on drying lines, kitchenware on drying displays, household fires as well as children playing around the streets in industrial area. Other industrial premises were also been turned into ‘arable land’ and used for subsistence farming. The typical noises that accompany industrial processes like metal cutting, grinding and fabrication, sawmilling and grind milling were nowhere to be heard. The area turned to be very quiet, typically resembling a low density residential suburb. In short, the conclusion can be reached that deindustrialisation is a reality in Norton. The practise of converting disused industrial properties to other purposes resonates with Cowie and Heathcott (2003) who argue that in the aftermath of industrial upheaval, some industrial buildings are turned into shopping malls and schools. Disused mines at Mashava and Connemara were turned into a university campus and a prison respectively (GZU, 2014; Magidi, 2014).

A respondent based at NTC also disclosed that the local authority had many industrial and commercial stands that were available for sale. He was quick, however, to point out that there were no takers coming forward to purchase as investors had also lost confidence not only in the local economy but the country’s economy at large. He noted that “*we [council] have industrial stands which have not been taken, we have advertised in the papers but no one is coming to buy because of the economic situation*” (Mr Tichaona, NTC Official, KII). I also heard that some who purchased their land during the period towards the downturn could not afford to develop it and hence they have been lying idle for almost decades now and are slowly re-vegetating. The industrial site also exhibited serious signs of lack of attention with tall grass and growing bushes as some of the notable features that captured my attention as I ‘*walked the city.*’



Figure 11: Undeveloped Industrial Properties along South Road: (Author, 02/2018)

Norton industrial site in its current state resembles a forgotten city with collapsing infrastructure. It has very little on-going economic activity and can be best described as a ‘*ghost settlement*’. A finding like this confirms Bluestone and Harrison’s (1982) observation that [premature] deindustrialisation results in the collapse and closure of firms, leading to the rise of ‘*ghost towns*’. Strangleman (2016) emphasises that deindustrialisation generally results in widespread closure of manufacturing factories. Linkon (2014), Mah (2012) and Cowie and Heathcott (2003) also accentuate the question of ‘abandoned’ factory buildings, mines, industrial plants and mills as some of the results of deindustrialisation and how the continuous sight of these continue to haunt affected workers and the host communities.

6.2.2 Loss of Jobs and Employment Opportunities

In the unfolding of my research, I heard that prior to 2000 and the total collapse of industry and the economy, unemployment was not much of a problem in Norton. Then, the town sufficiently provided its people with jobs and even had ‘surplus’ jobs which catered for other people from as far as Harare and Chegutu. A former Hunyani employee recalled how around the early 1990s, a single shift at Hunyani Pulp and Paper was made up of up to 500 employees while the company employed at least 2,000 workers. He also referred to Karina Textiles, adding that “*when I came here, Karina was a busy industry and many people would go there to work*” (VaManyunga, Male, 58, SME, IDI). A local school head also disclosed how local firms used to employ many people in the town, noting that “*companies like Hunyani used to employ many people; most of*

our parents here used to work there.” She however noted that following the fall of such companies, most parents were pushed into unemployment, something she could easily tell by simply consulting the school records. *“Yes, we have that information ... we have what we call the social record. You will be surprised to note that most of the parents are no longer going to work [and] it’s quite sad”* (Mrs Tawanda, School Head, 47, KII).

The collapse and subsequent closure of most key companies in Norton led to widespread loss of jobs. Respondents often talked of *“being employed at one time; never been employed at all; job-seeking or children/other relatives who were employed elsewhere”*. I learnt that thousands lost their jobs as most companies downsized, relocated, totally closed or were sold. Companies like Hunyani, Dandy, the GMB, Karina Textiles, David Whitehead, Lucas Batteries, Tinto Group of Companies and Wilgrow, among others, used to be among the biggest employers in the town. Some were employed in estates like Triple C, Kent and other farming estates that were located on the outskirts of the town *“but as these companies were closing up or scaling down, thousands lost their jobs, most of whom could not find jobs elsewhere thereafter”* (Baba Nyamuda, 68, Retailer, IDI/KII). The local authority also used to be a significant employer, but it has since given in to the economic pressures and has since trimmed its workforce. I also recall during the mid-2000s how people who worked in the industries, public service, farming estates and nearby mines were ferried to and from work every morning and evening. This has stopped after most of them were retrenched as firms succumbed to deindustrialisation and the economic crisis.

A local retail businessman testified that at one point he had six branches that employed up to seventy-five employees, but as the economy tumbled, only three of the six branches survived. He noted that *“at one stage we had up to six branches, then in 2008 there was a massive economic downturn which affected everyone including us and today we are left with three branches [... and] I used to employ up to seventy five employees...”* (Mr Nyamuda), but he now employs just twelve. He highlighted that his case was just a snapshot of what the retail sector experienced, with some even shipping out of business and sending their employees home. It is also important to note that formal job losses became a nationwide phenomenon such that even those Norton residents who worked in Harare and other areas were not spared. Since there was nowhere else where these retrenched workers could be reemployed, they were officially ‘enrolled’ into the world of unemployment. Loss of jobs as a result of a failing industry and economy has been

confirmed by several earlier studies with Saunders (2008) noting that the economic crisis saw mining employment dropping below 50,000 from 83,000 between in 1995 and 1999. Potts (2013) also notes that poor industrial growth is characteristic of loss of jobs. Considering the value of formal jobs in constructing urban livelihoods as earlier emphasised by Fox and Goodfellow (2016) and Grant (2006), loss of jobs and high unemployment levels were bound to have negative impacts on many households.

6.2.3 Loss of Income and Income Generating Opportunities

The closure of industries and the collapse of the economy at large was just the beginning of an unfolding wave of challenges that the general populace was to endure. Loss of jobs and employment opportunities in turn translated to loss of income. For households that had relied on salaried jobs as their sole livelihood, “*surviving without a job was bound to be a very difficult experience*” (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII). I learnt that the thousands of residents who lost jobs also lost their income and related benefits that used to cushion their livelihoods. One respondent confided that when he left Lucas Batteries after ten years of service, he and his fellow workers did not receive “*even a single cent*” as exit package. Their employer actually owed them arrears to the tune of two years’ salaries and benefits and never got anything since then. He narrated,

I worked for them from 2006 until 2016 ... then the company closed and we left that company with virtually nothing and up to now they owe us an excess of two years salaries, without talking of other benefits. So we left with nothing (Svosve, Male, 32, Bar-operator, IDI).

Such a case pictures how many retrenched workers left their workplaces since many other respondents also confessed that they either left their jobs unceremoniously without any package or they knew of relatives, friends or other people who had similar experiences. *Madzimai*’s husband’s case presented in the main introduction of this study is also a duplicate of the above scenario. These examples also provide insights on the possible implications of uncompensated job losses to the welfare of their families and the type of life that awaited them at home as we shall later hear.

Besides formal jobs as sources of income, there were also those who owned commercial and industrial properties that they used to rent out to companies to earn them some income. Such entrepreneurs were thrown out of business as companies collapsed in numbers. I remember how the building which now houses OK Supermarket at Katanga Shops went unoccupied for years as

entrepreneurs could not afford to meet its rentals. One source confirmed that “a host of properties including Sagonda Complex were also idle or partially used for some time” (Academic, 38, Norton Resident, KII). I also heard that a number of businesses in the town could not survive the brunt of deindustrialisation and their income and livelihoods were grossly tempered with. One retail businessman chronicled his story.

When I started my business in 1979, I was growing at more than 50% per year. I would say 100% per year in that if I have shop today, next year I would have two then four the other following year... At one stage we had up to six branches then there was the economic crisis which affected everyone. Today we are left with three branches (Mr Nyamuda, 68, Retailer, IDI/KII).

This meant a huge loss of income and he contended that business will never be the same again. He also highlighted that his fate mirrors what many entrepreneurs in his and related sectors also went through. For him, he was “lucky” to have part of his investment spared as some went all the way to “completely lose everything and never recovered.”

Although respondents noted that informal economic activities were uncommon in Norton before the economic crunch, some also highlighted that there were a few who were into some informal but rewarding ventures which were heavily reliant upon the formal economy. Examples include those who supplied catering services to people who worked in industries and those who had some informal deals and were involved in transporting people to and from their workplaces. The fall of industry and the retrenchments that followed meant there was no more business for them and thus income and thus lost their livelihoods. The same applies to those who traded fresh farm produce which they used to procure at nearby farms and estates. The disturbances in the agricultural sector meant their supply was cut and were thus forced to find alternative suppliers at distant markets such as Mbare in Harare. In the end, they had to pay out more to meet transport costs which point to reduced profits and income.

I heard that those who survived the retrenchments and are still in formal employment were not spared either. Salaries have since fallen and most employers are not paying salaries on time. At NTC, it was speculated that the local authority had up to over twelve months of salary arrears while word also had it that the same was happening at GMB and NRZ. The case of Lucas Batteries where the employees are being owed at least two year salary arrears is another snapshot of what most of those who are still employed continue to endure. As a way of cutting down

remuneration-related expenses, I also heard that some employers have resorted to hiring their employees on short contracts basis. This way, they would do away with paying other benefits like bonuses or exit packages associated with fulltime employment and ZimPlats was cited as one such company where upon expiring employees will either be awarded with new short contracts or are sent home. A worker with the mine confirmed,

We have been working as contract workers since 2010. We renew our contracts upon expiry and this deprives us of our other benefits. Besides, you always have this fear that you may not be rehired when the contract lapses (Robson, Mineworker, 38, Informal Chat).

Loss of income and income earning opportunities bear some strong links to financial resources as an important capital that is instrumental in constructing livelihoods. According to the SLA (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999), financial capital includes all forms of income and income earning opportunities and their availability/shortage shape livelihoods positively or negatively respectively. Less income and earning opportunities among social actors thus points to compromised livelihoods. Tawodzera (2011) and Potts (2006) also found that the fall of industry marked the beginning of decreasing real wages.

6.2.4 Poverty and Food Insecurity

I also gathered that there are growing concerns of increasing poverty in Norton as a result of the collapsed industry and economy. In the absence of these jobs which were the major source of livelihood to many, most households were left vulnerable to poverty. With the highly monetised economies that urban centres are, where almost every product is purchased at the market, it thus becomes impossible for one to survive without an income and the likelihood of poverty thus became a real concern. It also became apparent for those who lost jobs and received no compensation, and those who are still in their jobs but are poorly remunerated that since their income was compromised, they were bound to endure poor living standards which typify escalating urban poverty. A school head confirmed that poverty in the town was on the increase, noting that this was easily evident if the simple fact of how most of the parents were defaulting in payment of tuition fees and the poor way in which some of their learners used to dress. A respondent who is in the SMEs sector and operates in the ‘Durawall’ area was concerned with the mushrooming of what he called “*substandard schools which do not have proper school infrastructure where some learners did not even have proper uniforms*” (Baba Tineyi, SME/ex-

soldier, IDI). He added that such things were a ‘new’ phenomenon in Norton and there was more than enough evidence that poverty was fast becoming a part of many people’s lives.

An official at the Ministry of SMEs also commented that the fall of industry was the major cause of increased poverty in Zimbabwe’s urban centres, emphasising how people are now residing in overcrowded homes because they no longer afford to stay under decent conditions and as city housing becomes overwhelmed by the ever-escalating population.

As you can see people are migrating from the rural areas searching for greener pastures, so poverty is actually more in cities as people become overcrowded as they struggle for those few jobs. People think urban areas are greener pastures than rural areas, which is not; so urban poverty has actually increased and is more than it was before 2000. Even the way people are living, they are now overcrowded in the houses. A place that was meant for say four people, you can actually find up to twenty people living there which shows that urban poverty is increased (Mrs Mutandwa, SMEs Ministry, KII).

I also noted as I ‘walked the city’ the mushrooming of substandard housing across the town as some have resorted to setting up temporary structures to ease their accommodation crisis as they try to find alternative means of earning a better income to fund their housing projects.



Figure 12: Sub-standard Housing - Kingsdale (Author, 04/2018).

Closely related to poverty is food insecurity. I heard that Norton was one of the areas that used to be least affected by food shortages. The presence of farms and other agricultural estates within its immediate environs ensured that “food was almost always available at affordable prices in the town” (Mr Tichaona, NTC, KII). Those who used to work in farms and estates were actually often rewarded with some food as part of their benefits. During harvest periods, it was common

to see them carrying such farm products as potatoes, sweet potatoes, tomatoes, vegetables, butternuts, peas, soya beans, maize, chicken, eggs, pork and beef among others which they were generously given by their employers or were sold to them at discounted prices. Some would convert them into cash through reselling them and use the money to settle other demands. However, after ‘*Hondo YeMinda*’ and the economic collapse that followed, “*operations at most of these estates were disrupted and production declined. Workers lost their jobs, income and work-related benefits, resulting in a precarious food security situation in the town*” (Grace, Female, NTC, KII). Prices of food items rose in response to poor supply and increasing demand as the country experienced hyperinflation.

At a local school, a source disclosed that barely one week prior to my visit, one learner passed out and later confided to the authorities that he had gone for two days without a proper meal. The source was convinced that this was just one of the many cases of starvation, and although others were not manifesting, it was easy to tell by merely looking at the learners that quite a significant number of them were also lacking food. Almost every subject that I engaged contended that food insecurity was indeed increasingly becoming a real concern in Norton. Sentiments like, “*surviving on less than a dollar per day; Living from hand to mouth; Zvinhu zvakaoma kunze uku* [Things are really tough out there]” (Common response), featured prominently among the responses that I received.

Tawodzera (2011) studied food security in Harare and realised that most of its dwellers were experiencing food shortage challenges. Increasing food insecurity was also found to be on the increase at national level after the economic crisis (USAID, 2009). FEWSNET (2009) noted that the country at large has been food insecure since the early 2000s. The IFRC (2009) further noted that about seven million Zimbabweans required food aid in 2009. Concerns of poverty and food insecurity speak to increased vulnerability context which social actors are being exposed to. The vulnerability context as one of the components of the SLA states that construction of livelihoods is difficult in an environment where vulnerability is high. With such a precarious food security situation, social actors in Norton are bound to encounter difficulties in constructing their livelihoods.

6.2.5 Abandonment of Livelihoods Projects

I also uncovered that as the economy plummeted with industries closing/minimising operation and employees losing jobs and income, a good number of residents were forced into abandoning some livelihood enhancing projects that they were underway. Some, after investing in residential or commercial stands, their source of income was cut before they could develop their properties such that *“it became difficult to continue with the projects and it was also equally hard to recover the funds that were already invested”* (Mai Mudzi, Norton Resident, IDI). I witnessed countless of these cases as I *‘walked the city’* where I realised that in new residential suburbs like Johannesburg, Maridale and Knowe, there are many undeveloped residential stands and partially-built houses. In Johannesburg, I noticed that one in three to four houses is either a vacant stand or an unfinished house. In Maridale, the ratio is slightly lower to reach about one in every five to six houses. Other housing projects like Galloway and Knowe Phases 2 and 3 Low Density Suburbs were progressing at a very low pace as the economy continues to shrink. The Marshlands Housing Project suffered a stillbirth as the developers could not fully service and develop the land such that all houses that were constructed by year 2005 were demolished under *‘Operation Murambatsvina’*. Although people were defiant and resettled soon after eviction, efforts to service and regularise the settlement are still far from yielding some positive outcome and the settlement remains semiformal. I also got some first-hand insights from the *‘Knowe couple’* which confided that at one time *“we stayed in a house without a roof, because we couldn’t afford it”* after all their savings got drained before the house was complete (Baba naMai Mudzi, Norton Residents, IDI).

I discovered that there are also many commercial properties that suffered the same fate. The giant shopping mall meant to expand the town’s CBD that was also abandoned shortly after its take-off is one such example. Such a project, which was deemed to have the potential of creating many jobs during and after construction, has also been lying in an abandoned state for at least fifteen years now although work was slowly resuming by March 2018.



Figure 13: Part of the Abandoned Norton Mall Construction Project (Author, 04/2018).

Such a finding verifies the importance of owning assets such as houses and related properties in constructing urban livelihoods as given by the SLA (DFID, 1999). In the absence of such assets, which fall under the broad category ‘financial capital’ because of their potential to generate monetary returns, social actors are bound to face some difficulties in building their livelihoods. Although the majority of the residential properties in Norton are fully developed, unfinished and undeveloped properties are very common. It is apparent that the owners are experiencing hard times as they try to earn a living and sustain life.

I also caught up with individuals who confessed to have dropped out of school as the parents could not afford paying their fees. *Welly*, a 24-year old young man who sells second-hand clothes at Katanga recounted that he quit of his A-Level studies after his father was retrenched despite being very intelligent and passing well all the eleven O-Level subjects that he sat for. Some of his colleagues who continued with school were on the verge completing their tertiary education while others were already done and were “*at least employed and earning something for themselves and their families through proper means.*” Many other respondents echoed similar sentiments, having witnessed some parents dropping their children out of school after losing jobs. Had they pursued their studies, they believe they could have been better today and earning their livelihoods through “*more reasonable means,*” according to *Welly*. Yet before the fall of

industry, many employed parents could easily afford to pay school fees for their children. One respondent noted that:

Companies like Hunyani used to look after their employees together with their children in the sense that it catered for their schooling needs. Those who were sharp managed to obtain university degrees yet they were coming from very humble backgrounds (Mr Nyamuda, 68, Retailer, IDI/KII).

Education, according to the SLA and the TOP, is an important resource which plays a part in constructing livelihoods and falls under human capital category (SLA) and cultural capital (in the TOP). Long's (2001) Actor-Oriented regards it as 'knowledge', recognising its role in making informed decisions in the social field and its ability to influence power. Although most of the social actors that I engaged possessed some educational qualifications, it remained a concern to those who could not further their education. The general feeling was that had they been educated, they could be leading better lives. It thus becomes apparent that the fall of industry and the economy made it impossible for people to advance some of their projects which in future could have made some positive impacts on their livelihoods.

6.2.6 Poor Service Delivery and Infrastructural Maintenance

One of my major findings relates to provision of public services in the town. It emerged as one of the most badly impacted areas in Norton as the economy took a slump. Both NTC and the central government failed dismally in meeting this obligation in and around Norton. I found out that for years, public infrastructure has been decaying as no maintenance or upgrading was taking place. As such, deindustrialisation totally paralysed local government, resulting in its failure to execute its duties. At a time when large cities (like Harare), continued to enjoy some vast benefits associated with industry and a relatively large population which contributed more in terms of rates, things were different in small towns. In Norton, industry was completely down and the local authority gained virtually nothing from it for a significant period of time. With a low population, most of which defaults on rates payment, the council was left incapacitated. Consequently, very little or no attention was directed towards areas like housing; water, sanitation and health (WASH) provision, transport and other infrastructure maintenance as well as education as expounded below.

6.2.6.1 Poorly Maintained Transport Infrastructure

I noted that transport infrastructure in the town is poorly maintained. I found out as I 'walked the city' that rail equipment was rusty and dilapidated as it was in the open in an abandoned state at

the railway station. The railway line that links Norton with the main Harare–Bulawayo line has also been neglected with grass and bushes actually growing in and along it. This is a sign that it has been lying unutilised and with no maintenance over a very long period of time now. I can confirm that since moving to Norton in 2005, no train has ever used that line. Moreover, the roads were badly potholed following a 2016/17 summer which had excessive rains and required.



Figure 14: Neglected Norton Railway Line (Author, 04/2018)

The sight of and noise generated by heavy haulage trucks frequenting the industrial site was a thing of the past, again another testimony that very little production is taking place in the town. Road and rail infrastructure belongs to the physical capital category of the SLA (DFID, 1999) and regarded as instrumental in constructing livelihoods. They constitute that infrastructure which investors would first consider before settling to invest in an area. Such poorly maintained infrastructure is likely to scare away investors and hence the prospects of economic resuscitation remain remote.

6.2.6.2 Poor Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH) Provision

Water and sanitation services provision in the town has also slumped owing to increased demand due to a rising population. Despite being located in-between two large water sources (Chivero and Darwendale Lakes), Norton does not have a water treatment plant of its own. It procures all its water from Harare. When Harare is in a water crisis, it also starves its beneficiaries of which Norton is one. It is also important to note that considering that NTC is in cash crisis, it becomes

apparent that it is not able to pay for enough water and is forced to go without adequate water. Considering the large water volumes that most industrial processes require, a shortage of water in the town also points to a dysfunctional industry. This also coincides with worsening health service provision. As the town expanded, health provision centres were not increased to meet the demands of the rising population. The conditions at Norton Hospital and local clinics were appalling such that during the 2008-09 cholera outbreaks, many people died as the health centres could not provide medication. The health situation is also exacerbated by a poor refuse collection system as the local authority only has two trucks meant to cater for the whole town, while a poor drainage system complicates matters during rainy seasons. A source at the council confirmed that the local authority was cash-strapped and lacked financial capacity to provide adequate services. He noted,

NTC itself needs assistance as well. It also has the same challenge as you know just after independence local authorities could have access to long term loans. These could be obtained from the government or the World Bank or other such big banks, but since the coming in of sanction, so-called sanctions, we had other projects, like the water, housing and sewer projects, stopped” (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII).

Bringing the SLA into discussion, it is important to note that it recognises such resources like water as important in shaping livelihoods. Water falls under the physical/natural capital depending on its source. Its availability thus enhances livelihoods while its shortage acts as a setback. In a town like Norton where urban farming proved to be a significant economic activity as we shall see in Chapter Seven, water becomes an important resource.

6.2.6.3 Inadequate Housing

NTC is one hard hit entity, and besides being understaffed, most of its engineering equipment and machinery is obsolete and no longer functional. This could be the reason why it cannot afford to maintain public infrastructure across the town. This led to poor town planning and halting or slowing down of housing delivery. As noted earlier, housing projects like Marshlands collapsed, leading people to setting up informal settlements. Kingsdale is another housing project that typifies an informal settlement as it was set up on non-serviced land, with no running water, electricity, sewer infrastructure and proper roads. This has deprived many residents who are seeking affordable and decent housing. As we shall realise in subsequent chapters, urban housing is more than just accommodation/shelter. It also plays an important role in livelihoods construction (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016, DFID, 1999).

6.2.7 Emergence of the Informal Economy

I gathered that the death of industry marked the birth of informal economy livelihood strategies. Surviving outside formal employment with no source of income in an environment where the cost of living was ever-increasing turned out to be an unbearable experience for many. With the national economy in continuous recession year after year, it was clear that it was impossible for the retrenched to be employed elsewhere again. Social actors then resolved to survive ‘*through other means*’ as proposed by the application of Long’s (1990) Actor Oriented Theory in this study. This saw the propagation of the informal sector in the town. An academic who participated in this study noted that “*the proliferation of the informal economy in Norton coincides with the massive closure of industries from the mid to late 1990s worsening in the 2000s. [...] before, the informal sector was just a minor subsector of the formal*” (Academic, 38, Norton Resident, KII). Another respondent pointed out that the informal sector “*was not something to talk about in Norton*” prior to the economic crisis but only became significant after the fall of the economy, adding that “*nowadays people engaged in informal sector are increasing in number because those people who are losing jobs are trying to find something to do to survive*” (Mr Tachi, NRA, KII). I also witnessed an array of informal sector activities as I ‘*walked the city*’, trying to gain a better understanding of the situation in the town. The informal sector has indeed become a reality in Norton.

It is also pertinent to note that some of the respondents whom I engaged both formally and informally had lost trust in the formal employment system and developed negative attitudes towards the sector. Having gone through frustrating experiences either after being forced off their jobs or after a long period of job-hunting to no avail, some of the informants were of the view that formal employment had lost its worth. This attitude was worsened by reports that many employers, including parastatals and the public service, were failing to pay their employees on time. One fresh produce vendor operating near OK Supermarket at Katanga said,

Of what importance is a job if it does not pay you? We hear in the news on a daily basis that those employed are not being paid at the end of the month while here, although the money might be said to be little, I am at least guaranteed to get that little at the end of each day (Baba Hwaro, Male, Vendor, IDI).

He emphasised that he would only leave vending when offered a job that pays more than \$US500.00 per month with a strong assurance that pay dates were strictly observed. Anything

less than that, he said he could hustle and get it through what he was doing such that a job was not worthy taking.

6.3 Chapter Summary

The chapter tackled the subject on the socioeconomic impacts of the fall of industry in Norton and how the process affected local livelihoods. Major issues or subthemes that emerged from the chapter include closure of companies, loss of jobs and income generating opportunities, poor service provision; education, health, housing, water, electricity, increasing poverty and food security among other issues and the ultimate rise of the informal economy. The chapter laid the foundation for a better understanding of the circumstances that social actors face and how they are likely to influence the alternative livelihoods. Having understood this, we move on to explore what social actors are doing to reconstruct/reinvent their livelihoods and the challenges that confront them.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUSTAINING LIFE IN A DYSFUNCTIONAL ECONOMY: LIVELIHOOD REALITIES IN NORTON AFTER DEINDUSTRIALISATION

7.1 Introduction

The increasingly deteriorating socioeconomic situation in Zimbabwe consequently led to rampant downgrading of people's livelihoods, with the urban areas being the most affected as noted in Chapter Six. With compromised livelihoods owing to declining purchasing power and real wages, hyperinflation, ESAP, deindustrialisation, unemployment and the rising cost of living among other factors, life became excruciating for many. This leaves a lot of questions as to how the urban populace is sustaining life in such a precarious economic/livelihood situation: What are they doing to meet the demands of life? What challenges do they face in the livelihoods field as they attempt to earn a living? This chapter seeks to provide answers to these questions by examining the livelihood realities in Norton in the aftermath of the economic meltdown.

7.2 What Social Actors are Doing to Sustain Life

I discovered a variety of livelihoods that social actors in Norton have devised in their quest to sustain life. Grounded in the Actor Oriented Theory, I view social actors not as passive but as agentive and have the capacity to confront situations that threaten their lives (Bosman, 2004; Long, 2001). Faced with vexing livelihood circumstances, they proved to be equipped with the agency and urgency that it takes to 'reinvent' their compromised/destroyed livelihoods. They thus came up with an array of their own inventions and interventions meant to free themselves from the menaces of hunger, poverty and other livelihood contests that shadow economic crises.

7.2.1 Formal Employment as a Source of Livelihoods

Although I found out that the formal economy in Norton has virtually collapsed, leading to high unemployment, I also noted that there are some people who are still in formal employment. Chapter Five and Six noted that there is still some industrial activity taking place as some firms partially survived the economic shocks while some are slowly getting back to business. Accordingly, some are still engaged in formal sector jobs and hence formal employment still plays a role in constructing/maintaining urban livelihoods. The few jobs that are still available are spread across the manufacturing, retail, construction, services sector and the public service.

I also noted that the town's closeness to Harare is also an important factor to consider when discussing formal employment in Norton. The expansion of the town was partly catalysed by people from Harare looking for affordable housing. Some of these people retained their jobs in Harare and commute to work, making Norton only their place of residence. A NTC official noted that *"a good number of people from Norton work in Harare where they commute to and from on daily basis"* (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII). Moreover, before transforming itself into an industrial town, Norton used to be Harare's satellite town (Mbiba, 2017) with most of its residents working in Harare. Some of these maintained their jobs in Harare even after Norton had developed into an industrial town. Those among the people who were employed outside Norton who survived the retrenchments are still in formal employment. I found the public service to be a key employer in the town with most of its jobs in the education, health, police and security sectors. The private sector is also still a player in formal employment although very few were formally working in the sector by the time when I collected my data. A source at NTC confirmed,

Despite a poor industry, we have people who still rely on formal sector jobs for their survival. Several companies are slowly reviving operations though they are still operating at a much lower capacity. The retail and the public sectors are also among the employers. However, those formally employed remain very few (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII).

Formal employment has also been regarded as one of the most important sources of urban livelihood. Urban researchers like Grant (2006) emphasised that salaried jobs are instrumental in constructing/maintaining urban livelihoods while Fox and Goodfellow (2016) view formal jobs as one of the most secure urban livelihoods. Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) argue that wealth/poverty status of a household is influenced by the nature of their employment, further noting that employment patterns strongly influence urban development, accumulation and distribution of wealth.

Diaspora remittances emerged as another source of livelihoods for many households in Norton. One respondent noted that many people joined the diaspora where they are now employed, arguing that *"these people are now looking after the rest of the family. Many people including myself rely on children who are working abroad. They know our problems and won't turn a blind eye on us"* Baba Nyamuda, 68, Retailer, IDI/KII). Tawodzera (2011) notes that diaspora remittances; cash, goods or food, are instrumental in sustaining most households in Harare after the economic crisis. This finding also coincides with the arguments of researchers like Chirau

(2015) who notes that women informal traders at Mbare, Harare, are receiving remittances sent by relatives working abroad to supplement their earnings. Tevera (2008) also notes that Zimbabweans based abroad were sending home an estimated amount of around US\$360 million annually by 2008. On a global scale, Giesbert (2007) and Mendola (2006) suggest that international migration has brought with it some economic benefits in form of diaspora remittances. Ellis (2003) estimates that international migrants remit at least US\$100 billion annually globally. Adam and Page (2005) contend that these remittances play a role in constructing livelihoods and reducing poverty in nations from which the migrants originate. I also learnt that those formally employed do not earn enough to meet all their needs and are thus involved in other activities to supplement their earnings as we shall see later. Remittances relates to what the SLA (DFID, 1999) refers to as financial capital while Bourdieu's (1972) TOP calls economic capital. Both contend that it plays a crucial role in constructing livelihoods.

7.2.2 Entrepreneurship-based Livelihoods

As formal jobs and employment opportunities increasingly became scarce, I found that social actors in Norton resorted to entrepreneurship as an alternative. Entrepreneurship refers to one or a set of economic activities meant to create value through provision of goods and services to meet market demands (Badal, 2010). I found out that many people have ventured into self-help and income-generating ventures which have turned to be their livelihoods. A key informant confirmed that *“almost everyone here has resorted to some entrepreneurial activities either as their main source of survival or to cushion their livelihood”* (Mrs Mutandwa, SMEs Ministry, KII). Entrepreneurship in Norton exists in a range of activities which I broadly categorise either as the informal sector or the SMEs.

7.2.2.1 Informal Sector-based Livelihoods

The informal sector emerged as the major livelihood source in Norton. After job losses and failure to secure employment elsewhere, most actors turned to informal activities for their sustenance. Most of my respondents confirmed that they were operating on informal basis. Data suggests that informal sector activities range from petty/small items trading to light manufacturing as shown next.

7.2.2.1.1 Informal Trading of Finished Goods

This category includes vending of products like food items: vegetables, indigenous and exotic fruits, groceries, snacks, fish, eggs, chickens, cooked foods (maize meal, rice, roasted/boiled nuts and maize among others). Some are involved in buying and selling of new/second-hand clothing, shoes, blankets while others specialise in household goods: furniture and electrical gadgets; televisions, radios, decoders, DVD players, cell phones and cell phone accessories, musical CDs and DVDs, films and office equipment like computers, printers and files. The category also extends to include selling air time top-up cards, cell phone SIM cards, second-hand books, newspapers, magazines, pesticides, traditional medicines and construction material among many more. I summed this up in one comment by a Ministry of SMEs official, “*many people in the informal sector are now basically making a living out of selling and they are virtually trading anything that they can*” (Mrs Mutandwa, SMEs Ministry, KII).



Figure 15: Informal Market at Katanga (Author, 04/2017)

7.2.2.1.2 Informal Service Provision

I also realised that some entrepreneurs were making a living out of providing some informal services, taking advantage of the collapsed formal economy. These include street-lined and backyard barber and saloon services, repairing electrical gadgets (TVs, radios, refrigerators, DVD players, cell phones, electrical/gas stoves, irons, computers). The services also include furniture repair, mending shoes and clothes, provision of computer and cell phone software, antiviruses and games, music and film ‘loading’, typing, printing, document scanning and

photocopying, auto and bicycle servicing and repair as well as private tutoring. Some were also into events management and hosting, taxi/transport business, satellite dish installation while others are into electricity installation, tile fitting, plumbing, gas refilling, mobile money agents and renting out rooms. The list is long.

7.2.2.1.3 Informal Sector Manufacturing

The following figure shows some products made by entrepreneurs in informal manufacturing.



Figure 16: Informal manufacturing at Katanga (Author, 04/2017)

I also discovered that some players have resorted to manufacturing a range of products on an informal basis as they seek to (re)construct their livelihoods. Such actors apply those skills that they acquired during their time of employment while others learnt these skills specifically for their own self-help ventures. A welder and carpenter confirmed, *“I am using my industrial skills to manufacture these products and this trade has become my livelihood. Many other people in different trades are doing the same...the informal sector is now full of people doing manufacturing* (Baba Rongai, Norton SME Association, Welder/Carpenter, KII/IDI). Products manufactured under this category include bed linen, garments and school uniforms, shoes, furniture; beds, kitchen units, cupboards, drawers, sofas, tables and chairs, wardrobes and shoe racks. Some are also into manufacturing metal and steel products; doorframes, window frames, laundry dishes, buckets, cooking pots, steel gates, steel water tank stands, cooking utensils, shopping and washing baskets, brooms and mops while others make toys from recycled material.

Some are also into fresh farm produce; tomatoes, leaf vegetables, onions, carrots, potatoes, cucumbers, carrots, mushroom, soya beans, peas, while some are into maize farming. In other related studies, researchers (Chirau, 2014; Dube and Chirisa, 2012; Mupedziswa, 2009) also found that there was an influx of manufacturing activities across the country's main cities with carpentry, construction, metalwork, garment and linen manufacturing being among the top.

7.2.2.1.4 '*Hustling*'⁵¹

'*Hustling*' constitutes another category of informal economic activities that I discovered during my livelihoods study in Norton. This category is not composed of a distinct activity but a wide range of small scale activities that involve sports betting, touting, and casual labour/piece jobs like house repairing, cultivating someone's arable land for a fee, gardening, and sinking water wells. It also involves 'illegal' money trading (buying and selling local and foreign currencies), illegal fishing, illegal provision of construction material (gravel, sand and rocks) and gardening among others. Actors in this category usually do not specialise in a single trade as revealed by *Tau*, "*tinokiya yese yese kuno so long pachibuda bag* [we take every opportunity as it comes, as long as we get money in return]" (Tau, 38, Cell phone/computer software dealer, IDI). It is not uncommon to find someone being involved in piece jobs in construction today and the next day they are harvesting fish.

Just like what Chirau (2015), Kamete, (2004) and Muzvidziwa (2000) found in their study of the informal economy, this category is dominated by men. Players here are mainly those who can take any job at any time, and even if they are not qualified, they will find a way, either by learning as they go or 'outsourcing' someone with the expertise. Many actors in this category normally acquire some skills and end up narrowing down to some specific trade. I came across experienced builders, carpenters, motor mechanics and tile fitters, among others, who never received any formal training but taught themselves as they 'hustle'. The informal sector thus becomes an alternative way of training and skills acquisition especially for those who could not have an opportunity to receive formal training at formal learning institutions. '*Jona*', now a builder, disclosed, "*I started as an assistant and I learnt as I went. I would take any related piece jobs. It took quite some time but finally I am now a proper builder, of course without any*

⁵¹ Hustling in this context refers to a way of making money/income out of almost every opportunity. It may include use of deceit, part-time or once-off casual jobs and even taking those jobs that one does not have expertise and work their way out as they go.

[formal] *training...now I can construct even storey buildings*” (Jona, Male, Builder, Informal Chat).

Findings on how the informal sector has become a major source of urban livelihoods are also consistent with de Soto (1989). He observed that when denied opportunities to participate in the main economy, urban populations create their own economy, invent their own jobs outside the formal economy to sustain life. However, observing as an outsider, one is likely to question how some of these seemingly petty and ordinary activities can sustain households. It is thus important to take a step further and explore how people are executing these activities to earn ‘enough’ to sustain their lives. This is the subject of Chapter Eight. The next subsection examined how SMEs have also emerged as important livelihoods in Norton as a livelihoods field.

7.2.2.2 SMEs as Livelihoods

Findings from this study also suggested that the SMEs sector is also playing a crucial role in (re)constructing livelihoods in Norton and some households are depending on them for their upkeep. Just like the informal sector, the SMEs sector is very diversified and made up of a wide range of activities. It also imitates the formal sector economy such that its products are the same as those offered by the mainstream economy. There seems to be no clear boundary between the SMEs sector and the informal sector as most respondents tended to lump them together. The Ministry of SMEs treats all informal sector activities as SMEs, emphasising that the term ‘informal sector’ does not have a place in their vocabulary. Instead, “*anyone who even trades even the pettiest of items is an entrepreneur*,” and they thus broadly classify them as SMEs (Mrs Mutandwa, SMEs Ministry, KII).

However, a source from the ZCIEA heavily objected to this categorisation, arguing that by labelling SMEs or entrepreneurships, the Ministry is only “*glorifying the informal traders for the purpose of maximising revenue collection from them*” without really being concerned about the welfare of the sector (Mr Malaba, 59, ZCIEA, KII). Once one’s business is labelled an SME, it becomes justifiable to tax and charge them any associated costs. He reasoned that tagging everyone who is into some form of income-generating venture as SMEs deceives the unemployed masses so that they see themselves as ‘employed’ or as business persons and forget about formal employment, thus pacifying them when it comes to demanding jobs from the government since they already consider themselves employed. A number of respondents also

raised the same concern, with one noting that the government and local authorities are “*defying logic trying to treat the informal sector the way they treat the formal sector*” (Baba Mudzi, Male, Norton Resident, IDI).

7.2.3 Agriculture as an Urban Livelihood

I noted that agriculture is playing a critical role in constructing and maintaining livelihoods in Norton. Chapter One explained that Norton is located on well-watered red fertile soils in agro-ecological region two where rainfalls is normally very high, this makes the area ideal for crop farming (Mudumi and Mundenga, 2015; Brown *et al.*, 2012). I found that agriculture in the town was done in a couple of ways. Firstly, residents were utilising undeveloped residential and commercial stands and were using these to grow vegetables, sweet potatoes and maize. “*We utilise some of Pfugari’s unoccupied stands for our farming*” (Baba Rongai, Norton SME Association, carpenter/welder who also supplements his income through farming; IDI/KII). Secondly, some invaded the many open spaces across the town and abandoned industrial complexes and were using these as arable land. Thirdly, others engage farm and plot owners located on the peripheries of the town and were using that land for farming. Fourthly, farming for urban livelihoods has also extended beyond urban boundaries or its immediate environments. Some residents noted that due to shortage of land, they would retrace their way back to their rural homes where they would farm and then bring their produce to Norton to support their urban livelihoods.

Thus, agriculture provides food for family consumption. One resident disclosed that in a good season, he can get enough maize to sustain them for at least six months and even for a whole year. This reduces the amount of money that they spend on procuring food which can now be used for other purposes. Backyard vegetable gardens are also used to meet all the household vegetable requirements to reduce spending on these items. Almost all respondents whom I engaged both formally and informally mentioned that they were involved in farming of some sort, or were thinking about it and once they find a piece of land, they would surely go for it. Other than for family consumption, I also found that residents in areas like Knowe, where there are very big stands, were into farming for business. Some grow vegetables which they will then sale to vendors from within the town at wholesale prices. *Madzimai* disclosed that she does not go to Harare or other faraway places for her orders but had found suppliers based in Knowe and

that has become their source of livelihood. *“I get all my vegetables from around Norton. I do not need to go to Harare or other areas for my supplies,”* she disclosed. A respondent from Knowe also highlighted that *“I have seen people prospering out of farming here in Norton. I am currently looking for a piece of land so that I can also venture into agriculture. It’s a very lucrative business and one can live large out of it”* (Mai Mudzi, Norton Resident, IDI). The following figure shows some maize ready for harvest.



Figure 17: Maize Fields (Vacant spaces between Ngoni and Industrial Area) (Photo: Author, May 2017)

Agriculture outside the town also had a role to play in sustaining livelihoods in the town. Both formal and informal traders go to surrounding farms and rural areas to procure agricultural products; maize, potatoes, sweet potatoes, beans, peas, groundnuts, round nuts, among many others for resale in town. I noted that other than growing for family consumption or business, those without access to land were in close links with the rural areas where they would buy in bulk at cheaper prices and resale in town at a profit. Some households were also into chicken farming for commercial purposes while others would go to areas surrounding the town for bulk buying and resale in town to make money. Others would also use their grain harvest or vegetables to feed chicken or rabbits and realise their profits through selling chickens as opposed to the grain itself. In short, agriculture emerged as one of the important activities that did not only supply food for the family but also acted as a source of income to others. Some residents

were also still formally employed in the agricultural estates on the outskirts of the town although the numbers were said to be much lower than they were before the land reform programme.

Several other livelihoods researchers (Murambadoro, 2007; FAO, 2007; Mbiba, 1994) also underscored the crucial role played by urban agriculture in maintaining urban livelihoods in most developing nations. Chirau (2014) found out that residents in Harare are also using the vacant spaces to farm all year round to supplement their earnings from their informal businesses. This has sustained them through the most critical stage of Zimbabwe's economic crisis. These findings are consistent with Tawodzera (2011; 2010) who found that many unemployed populations in Epworth, Harare, were involved in some form of farming as one of the ways through which they sustain their lives. AFSUN (2008) also argue that as of 2008, about 60% of the households in Harare, both employed and unemployed were into urban farming either as one of their major livelihood or to supplement their earnings and enhance their livelihoods. The finding also supports Foeken and Uwour (2008) who maintain that urban agriculture in SSA is gaining significance as one of the many ways that urban populations are diversifying their ways of earning their living.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it is important to note that agriculture requires, chief among others, resources like land and water. These form part of the natural and physical capital of the SLA (DFID, 1999). Access and sustainable use of these resources is thus of importance in construction of livelihoods. The observation that local actors are invading private land, vacant lots and backyard space to raise crops points to the scarcity of land, which is part of the SLA's natural capital, in the town such that farmers are not able to realise their full potential. To compound matters, it was discovered earlier that NTC is not able to provide adequate water to the town (Chigonda, 2010). While seasonal crops may rely on natural rains, it is difficult for such crops like vegetables which are grown all year round. Water is part of the SLA's physical capital and its shortage disrupts off-summer farming impacts negatively on agro-based livelihoods.

7.3 Informal and SME Sectors-based Livelihoods: Operational Constrictions

Many scholars who wrote on informal economies seem to agree that the sector faces several challenges that seek to destabilise its activities (Mbira, 2015; Ngundu, 2010; Tibaijuka, 2005; and Canagarajah and Sethiraman; 2001). Despite the well-documented benefits associated with

the sector (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 2014), the sector is not a smooth flow. Some of these challenges apply to this study and are discussed next.

7.3.1 Lack of Capital

Although literature generally suggests that informal and SMEs activities require very little capital to run, I found that lack of capital is still one of the biggest setbacks that informal and SMEs sectors entrepreneurs are facing. Respondents noted that just like any other business, entrepreneurs in these sectors require some financial capital to start-up their ventures or to bail them out during times of economic stress. Those who intent to ‘legalise’ their trade are required to meet some registration and licensing fees as well as taking care of rentals and other costs before they can start to realise any returns. Some argued that the more one invests is likely to be the more they are going to realise. Now because most of them lack capital, their investments are small and in turn they yield less. Almost every respondent engaged during the study raised this issue as the main challenge crippling livelihoods in this sector in the town.

While personal savings can be used as start-up capital for a business venture, this option was not viable to many, considering the lack of jobs that impacted the town. How to make these savings when one was unemployed became a sticking point. The situation was also problematic for those who were once employed but lost their jobs as the economy collapsed. Chapter Six noted cases of people not receiving their exit packages such that it became difficult for such individuals to think of investing using personal savings. A second-hand clothes trader at Katanga Shops raised the concern:

We face the challenge of lack of capital. If your start-up capital is very small, your business will struggle to grow. We need capital to register, pay council monies and to keep the business going even during loss-making times but there are very limited funding opportunities for us out there (Mai Machisa, Female, Flea-market owner, IDI)

Many other respondents, entrepreneurs and key informants emphasised this as one of their major challenges constraining the SMEs and informal sectors in Norton. Lack of access to capital is largely a result of factors like lack of collateral security while some respondents did not even have bank accounts. This observation is consistent with arguments by Ngundu (2010) and Tibaijuka (2005) that the fact that these sectors lack government and institutional support points to the fact that it is difficult for them to secure funding from elsewhere other than their savings and from within their circles. Elsewhere, Chirau (2014) also highlights that the informal sector in

Harare is also constrained by lack of financial capital. This finding also relates to the SLA's which identifies financial resources as one of the important capitals that are required in construction of sustainable livelihoods. I thus found that financial capital is scarce to many social actors and thus presents a challenge when it comes to enhancement of SMEs and informal sector-based livelihoods. Twigg (2001) and DFID (1999) also note that money is rarely accessible by the poor such that most are forced to go with very little. SIDA (2005) also confirms that the poor lack access to financial capital and income-earning opportunities and hence this subdues their efforts to construct their livelihoods.

7.3.2 Inadequate Entrepreneurial Infrastructure

The following figure shows poorly constructed vending structures at Katanga



Figure 18: Sub-standard Vending Structures (Author, 05/2017)

The study found that entrepreneurs in the informal and SMEs sectors face the challenge of shortage of proper infrastructure that supports their work. Those into vending bemoaned the lack of proper structures and facilities from which to operate. As a result, they are forced to operate under unfavourable conditions. I noticed, as I '*walked the city*', that there are very few vending stalls across the town despite the fact that the subsector is expanding with new entrants joining on regular basis. The few vending marts available are not well constructed. Most of them resemble shacks. They are made of poles and plastic which can easily be damaged by strong wind or rain. Those who could not find a place in the marts operate in the open and normally line

up along the streets at busy shopping centres. The situation applies to all those who are into formal trading, such as vegetables, clothes, shoes, construction material and a variety of other commodities. In times of extreme weather conditions, they are forced to abandon their work stations. This impacts negatively on their returns. The 2016/17 rain season received a lot rains to the extent that it could rain all day long non-stop. In such cases, most could not manage to work as they were restricted to indoors and this in turn compromised their earnings.

Shortage of suitable infrastructure goes along poor general infrastructure across the town as a whole. NTC is struggling to secure adequate water to sustain its population. This becomes a serious constraint for those who sell products like fish, fruits and ready-to-eat food. Cleaning fish requires a lot of water while health wise people are also recommended to wash their hands as well as washing the fruits before consuming them. Water is also critical for the traders themselves to maintain their hygiene. In case they visit the restrooms or get in contact with some dirt, they must wash their hands to avoid contaminating their products. It thus becomes risky to operate where there is no water. They are then left with no option but to carry their own water from home or any other water sources and this accentuates their already tiring work. Other than water, there is also a shortage of public toilets near vending sites. At Katanga, traders rely on beer hall toilets while others resort to using home toilets at nearby residential areas.

Moreover, also absent at most of the vending sites is electricity. Since most of these traders operate for long hours extending deep into the night, electricity becomes a necessity for lighting and security purposes such that its absence forces some to close early for the day, losing potential income. SMEs shops operating in the '*Durawall*' area at Katanga Shops are not connected and operate without electricity at all. This compromises business for those who are into fresh produce and perishables which require refrigeration. Trading fish, meat, vegetables, fruits and other food items is affected where there is no electricity.

Considering that Norton is still growing, by the time when deindustrialisation started, not much had been done in as far as development of informal trade infrastructure is concerned. The observation that the informal sector only began to rise in the town after the fall of industry is also evidence that little was done in promoting this sector when things turned bad. Large cities like Harare and Bulawayo which started to experience the rise of the informal sector way back in the 1980s had an opportunity to prepare for the sector prior to its blossoming. They also used their

significantly high revenue to further develop the required infrastructure. Norton, on the other hand, being a small town, does not have such a privilege since it earns very little and thus has very little to channel towards developing this sector and up-to-date, very little of such infrastructure exists in the town. Even after the fall of industry, many companies remained operational in Harare, though at a low scale and the local authority thus continued to get some revenue. This was however not the case in Norton as its whole industry at some point came to a standstill only to rely on residential rates.

Degraded infrastructure also includes poorly maintained roads and poor drainage systems. When it rains, roads are quickly flooded, exposing them to damage. Roads across the town are badly eroded and potholed. This is a setback for those in the taxi industry, some of whom complained that “*these roads are damaging our vehicles*” (Taxi driver, Informal Chat). I witnessed at one point at the peak of the 2016/17 raining season when commuter operators plying the Harare–Norton route declined to go beyond Katanga Shops. They nicknamed that neighbourhood “*kumakomba*” (the potholed road) and in so doing leaving passengers going to Johannesburg, Maridale, Marshlands and Kingsdale stranded. While the rest could just walk the remaining distance home, this was not an option for those who would have gone for orders; for example the vegetable vendors coming back from Mbare or those who would be topping up their stock at Katanga. This meant extra transport costs and lost business time, thus impacting their work in a negative way.

Studying the rise of the informal economy in Zimbabwe in the wake of the economic crisis, Chirau (2014) emphasised that existing vending infrastructure were overwhelmed by the rising population of informal traders. This resulted in some occupying undesignated points along streets and in the CBD. Bird and Prowse (2008) and Masakure (2006) also illustrate that lack of adequate entrepreneurial infrastructure also saw the proliferation of backyard/home industries in urban centres across the country. The SLA (DFID, 1999) rates infrastructure/physical assets as one of the five capitals that play a part in constructing sustainable livelihoods. With shortage or limited access to it, as is the case in Norton, social actors are bound to struggle to establish their livelihoods.

7.3.3 Lack of Land for Entrepreneurial Premises

Respondents, especially those who are into manufacturing cited lack of land to set up their operations. The demand for land in the town is very high and not everyone is able to get it. While NTC indicated that they have commercial/industrial stands for sale, the challenge of shortage of capital was the major limiting factor. Besides, these stands are meant for large-scale industries such that it becomes uneconomic for someone running an informal or an SME to acquire such. Activities like carpentry, metal fabrication, bricklaying, poultry production, horticultural farming, and vehicle servicing and repairing require significant pieces of land, but not to the size of industrial stands. Demand for land is increasing at a time when the local authority acknowledges that it has run out of land to expand. Most of its land was consumed by residential expansion of the town. A source at NTC noted that the situation is so dire to the extent that the town “*is even running out of burial space*” and until government has availed more land for them, he noted that there was little that the local authority could do arrest the challenge as raised by SMEs (Mr Tichaona, NTC, KII).

The challenge is compounded by the factor that such entrepreneurs are only interested in strategic locations close to the customers for easy marketing of their products. Shortage of land in turn forces them to operate on undesignated points, and sometimes in the open. I verified, through ‘*walking the city*’, that busy shopping centres like Katanga and Ngoni Shops were a hive of informal activities. I observed that carpenters, metal fabricators, black smiths, ‘open auto garages’ and food caterers concentrated on major shopping centres and operating in the open, something that exposed them to negative weather conditions; extreme winds, rains, cold or hot temperatures can easily disturb their work. Furniture and clothing products can easily be affected by high temperatures and rains, making such locations inappropriate. While established cities have plenty of land and can easily convince the central government to help them to acquire more land whenever the need arises, this is not the case with smaller centres like Norton. It being surrounded by commercial farms is one factor that restricts its bid to acquire more land to expand and meet the increasing demand for land.

As noted earlier by the SLA, land is part of the natural capital whose availability and accessibility is important in constructing livelihoods (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999). In its absence, as is the case in Norton, livelihoods are heavily compromised and constricted. As entrepreneurs

lacked access to such a resource, they ended up invading vacant spaces with some even operating in unsuitable places like in the open. This affected their enterprises and livelihoods.

7.3.4 Harassment by Authorities

Social actors in the informal and SMEs' sectors also raised the concern that they are a target of frequent victimisation by NTC police, ZRP and ZimParks officials. They face regular harassment from these authorities as they are sometimes wrongly accused of operating illegally. Harassment includes arrests, assaults, dispersing and evictions from their usual trading points and forcing them to close their shops or marts. They are also sometimes forced to pay bribes, failure of which may result in raids during which their wares are confiscated. They noted that such practices *“hinder us from executing our activities freely and they negatively affects our earnings”* (Unnamed Vendor, Informal Chat). Dispossessing them of their wares also amounts to losses, as respondents highlighted that was difficult to recover confiscated goods.

I am a first-hand witness of these forms of harassment. I also noted the ever-presence of municipal police at busy shopping centres like Katanga as I *‘walked the city’*. This confirmed this challenge. Council security, normally accompanied by members of the ZRP, are almost always present holding spikes and ‘terrorising’ commuter operators, preventing them from touting for passengers and at times impounding taxis. ZRP road blocks have also become a permanent feature on major roads. A 24-hour roadblock has since been set up at Karina, where Norton Road branches off Harare–Bulawayo highway, while another is set at GMB. The third one is normally situated close to Willgrow Export while the fourth one is often set close to Koshen Bakery. Another permanent roadblock is found just by Morton Jeffery Water Works along A5 highway while another one is normally established in Knowe along Norton-Murombedzi highway. Several members of the police are also deployed on bicycle to patrol the town and its surroundings. This high presence of the police on the roads constricts operations by public taxi operators by either forcing them *“off the roads or into losing money through paying fines/bribes”* (Taxi driver, Informal Chat). However, *‘Operation Restore Legacy’* by the military in November 2017 saw the reduced police presence in the roads but victimisation of the informal sector/SME players is still far from over.

The case of harassment is also applicable to fish traders as ZimParks personnel team up with ZRP officers against them as they look for illegal fish harvesters. Once the fish reaches the

market, *“it becomes difficult to tell whether they were caught legally or illegally, so sometimes they just round up everyone caught selling fish”* (Mai Mudzi, Norton Resident, former fish vendor, IDI). They normally confiscate the fish and at times arrest and detain them. Confiscation of their fish, time lost during confinement and the fines/bribes that they pay compromise their work and livelihoods.

Tuck-shop and small grocery shops are among those who cried foul about council police conduct. They noted that police patrol the town looking for those without proper operating documents, fining, demanding bribes, detaining or forcing them to close. This is despite the arrangement by the council to allow those who trade without licences and charge them a monthly penalty which is added onto their monthly rates and utility bills. A tuck shop operated noted, *“we are thus being forced to pay multiple-penalties if we are to consider the bribes that council security demand from us”* (Enduza, 33, Tuck-shop owner, IDI). Harassment extends to those who are into informal supply of construction material: sand, bricks and gravel. Whenever they are caught, they are made to pay a bribe, failure of which results in arrest or impounding of their push carts/trucks, only to recover them after paying the stipulated fines.

However, in as much there are efforts to harass the sector, the local authority lack the adequate resources to fully execute most of these duties. They are underequipped and undermanned such that conducting regular patrols is not possible and this gives the illegal or informal traders a lot of space to carry out their activities. In Harare for example, harassment is more prevalent in the CBD and due to the small nature of Norton’s CBD and its location away from the high density residential areas, very people choose to trade there and hence, it appears as if the local authority has developed an *‘as long as they are away from the CBD, it does not matter much’* attitude.

7.3.5 High Competition and Poor Market

I also found competition to be another major challenge that the informal and SMEs entrepreneurs in Norton face. Competition is as a result of three main factors. Firstly, the sectors are increasingly being flooded as new entrants keep on joining such that there are too many people trading similar wares and this increases competition. For example, I counted on regular basis airtime vendors operating at Katanga commuter terminus and got an average of seventeen. As a result, they increase competition amongst themselves and this impacted negatively on their returns. Secondly, the formal sector still exerts some competition on the informal and SMEs

sectors. Large shops offer a variety of products, while the fact that their products are stored under most ideal conditions also makes them more preferred by customers. For an example, the coming in of OK Zimbabwe at Katanga affected SME shops at Katanga. I discovered as I ‘*walked the city*’ that small grocery shops no longer keep the huge stocks that they used to prior to this development. In Johannesburg, tuck-shop operators also complained that M.D. Investments, a proprietor running three relatively large grocery shops in the area, is snatching their customers.

Lastly, entrepreneurs bemoaned the closeness of Harare, reasoning that those Norton residents who work or ‘hustle’ in Harare are likely to do their shopping there as opposed to bringing the money and shop in Norton. As a result, while having Harare close was perceived as an advantage in some aspects, it also presents competition and ‘kills’ local businesses in Norton. Closely related to market competition, respondents also raised the issue of a poor market as one of the pertinent challenges that they are facing in Norton. Some cited poor purchasing power among many households as the chief cause behind the poor market: “*People do not have money. Most are actually focusing on most important things; rentals, school fees, electricity, food and buying new furniture is seen as a luxury*” (Baba Rongai, Norton SME Association; Welder/Carpenter, KII/IDI). Those who consider buying are always bargaining and not willing to pay stipulated prices.

Entrepreneurs, especially in manufacturing, also mourned the cheap Chinese and South African-made products that keep flooding the local market as these are now being used by customers to determine the prices that they want to pay even for strongly assembled furniture. Said one furniture manufacturer, “*if you do not reduce the price, they will tell you that they are going for the cheaper products, quality is another issue as long as one owns a piece of furniture*” (Baba Rongai, Male, Carpenter, IDI). Another respondent who makes school furniture making cited fewer schools as one of the reasons of a poor market. He noted; “*only if we had many schools here, our market would have been bigger. We have a lot of children seeking schools outside Norton and this means lost business*” (VaManyunga, Male, 58, SME, IDI). Another one who is in rabbit production and cake making also aired the concern that some customers look down upon products manufactured locally in Norton and still view Harare as the ‘big brother’ whose products are superior. He cited for example how one client “*wanted to pay less \$300.00 [to his wife] for a wedding cake that costs at least \$600.00 in Harare*” while local rabbit buyers were

“willing to pay only between \$6.00 and \$8.00 for a rabbit each yet the price is around \$15.00 in Harare” (Baba Mudzi, Norton Resident, IDI) Such a challenge also present how small and informal firms have become vulnerable to globalisation through international trade as cheap and affordable products are imported to find their way to compete with small firms. This also points to how the SMEs/informal sectors themselves are also vulnerable to established formal businesses while operating in a context of high vulnerability also negatively impacts livelihoods driven by these sectors. However, despite competition and a ‘poor’ market, I found that Norton remains a ripe market for those who are into clothing, basic food, uniform and stationery making, liquor business, catering and private tutoring.

The challenge of poor markets and stiff competition is also captured by Chirau (2014) who notes that traders at Magaba Market complained about people coming from all over Harare to compete for with them for the few customers. Ngundu (2010) also emphasises that informal sector is characterised by extreme competition among participants

7.3.6 Cash Crisis and Forex Shortages

Complicating the poor market are cash shortages that Zimbabwe as a whole is experiencing. Subsequently, product prices are pegged differently depending on the mode of payment used. Prices are low when one is paying using the US\$, and increase slightly when one uses the local currency, and again higher for mobile money, swipe or bank transfer. Most of the SMEs and informal businesses do not have POS machines and are reluctant to use bank transfer because it is difficult to withdraw the money once deposited into a bank so they are forced to limit their transactions to cash or mobile money and thus lose customers who might want to swipe. A shortage of foreign currency has also impacted negatively on those who get their supplies from outside the country.

For some of us who buy their products in South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique or Botswana, we are forced to look for foreign currency at the black market and thus lose some of our money in doing so since black market exchange rates are inflated (Mai Machisa, Female, Flea market owner, IDI).

I inquired from street forex dealers and realised that USD100.00 hard cash was selling at between \$115.00 and \$130.00 of bond notes and from \$140.00 to \$150.00 when using mobile money or bank transfer. Although such fluctuations negatively affected most businesses, it is

those involved in cross border trade who were most hard hit, while forex dealers were making a killing out of it.

7.3.7 Political Interference

Interference by politicians and political parties also emerged as one major challenge that influences the allocation of and access to livelihood resources/capitals. Members of Norton SMEs Association raised the concern that the local authority was allocating working land along partisan lines. NTC is run by the MDC-T party and some respondents accused them of parcelling themselves and party members. Similar allegations were also levelled against ZANU-PF, which was accused of forcing residents to close all their operations whenever it had political rallies in the town. Those who did not attend were reported to be threatened with eviction from their trading sites, especially those who were allocated stalls in main vendor marts. It was also reported that the same party is threatening anyone who would accept vending space in the newly constructed vendor mart at Katanga next to Sagonda Complex because it was constructed by a legislator from the opposition MDC-T. Anyone who would move in will be branded as an ‘enemy’ and will be ‘dealt’ with come election time. I also found as I *‘walked the city’* the mart is still lying unutilised for at least five years after its completion.



Figure 19: Unoccupied Vending Mart (Katanga) due to political interference (Author, 05/2017)

A Norton SMEs Association official also blamed those who are “*up there*” accusing them of coming as if they want to assist only to “*steal our ideas and make them theirs and use them for*

their own benefit.” He cited how the council rushed to take over all the vacant spaces around the town and allocating them to churches after the association had proposed the land to be allocated to SMEs. He also complained how local politicians especially from ZANU-PF “*demand to be informed about everything that happens within our organisation and whenever we have gatherings that draw significant numbers of participants,*” noting that this undermined the independence of their association (Baba Rongai, Male, Norton SME Association, KII). Political influence and interference in the distribution and access of livelihood resources as found out by this study easily fits in Bourdieu’s (1972) TOP that argue that domination and relative strength are the main causes of unequal distribution of resources in society. As such, this study recognises power and politics as influential factors that play important roles in constructing livelihoods and must thus be taken into livelihoods research and analysis (Sakdapolrak, 2014).

Respondents from NTC acknowledged most of these challenges but were however quick to defend the local authority reasoning that it was cash strapped and in as much as it was concerned about them, there was very little it can do, at least for now. An official jokingly emphasised that the situation at the council was even worse to the extent that “*even the council on its own also requires some financial assistance*” (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII). They however disclosed that they were engaging stakeholders to see how they can address some of these problems.

7.4 Chapter Summary

In this chapter I looked at how social actors in Norton are reconstructing their livelihoods. Major findings from the chapter include how entrepreneurship has emerged as one of the best alternatives source of livelihoods in the absence of a functional formal economy and formal jobs. Entrepreneurship in this regard was grouped into two main categories, namely SMEs and informal enterprises, both of which are constituted by an array of economic activities which include informal manufacturing, informal services provision, buying and selling of finished and semi-finished goods and ‘hustling’. The chapter also presented the role urban farming in securing food for household consumption as well as for income generation. It also examined the various constraints that entrepreneurs face, chief among them being lack of funding, poor service delivery, little recognition from authorities resulting in harassment and poor infrastructure. The next chapter looked at how social actors are innovating against these constrictions to remain in business and sustain their lives.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONFRONTING LIVELIHOODS CHALLENGES: ENTREPRENEURIAL INNOVATIONS AND ‘INVENTIONS’

8.1 Introduction

Chapter Seven examined the various entrepreneurship activities that social actors in Norton are engaged in as they seek to (re)construct and (re)invent their livelihoods and the various constraints that seek to destabilise them. Considering that these challenges are very numerous, one might be tempted to query how entrepreneurs continue to operate to get some tangible returns when social actors are operating in such a seemingly less conducive environment. This chapter provides answers to these queries by bringing into discussion the various entrepreneurial innovations and ‘inventions’ that the entrepreneurs have devised in the wake of these constrictions. Interrogating these issues will enhance the reader’s understanding of these livelihoods and be in a better position to comment on their sustainability.

8.2 Entrepreneurial Innovations

The continued survival, resilience and thriving of the informal and small enterprises through various innovations, inventions, creativities is supported by a number of scholars who wrote on entrepreneurship. Brem (2011) is of the view that entrepreneurship and innovation work hand in hand while Mets (2005) argue that entrepreneurship starts with innovation. McFadzean *et al.* (2005) are of the argument that that innovation is the primary factor that drives entrepreneurship. Sledzik (2013) believes that entrepreneurs cannot be successful in the absence of innovation. This section discusses the various strategies and innovations that social actors in entrepreneurship ‘invented’ their quest to survive in business as they (re)construct their livelihoods.

8.2.1 Livelihood Diversification

Livelihood diversification emerged as one major innovation that social actors in Norton have come up with in their quest to (re)construct livelihoods in a compromised and constrained environment. Livelihood diversification entails being involved in a wide range of economic activities which are then combined to make up a substantive livelihood. While most households depended on formal jobs for their livelihoods before the economy collapsed, “*surviving on a*

single livelihood strategy in a rather volatile economic environment like this has of late become risky” (Mrs Mutandwa, SMEs Ministry, KII). I have already highlighted how the collapse of industry and the economy led to the fall of real wages and how employers are struggling to adequately remunerate their employees in preceding chapters. Consequently, it is against this backdrop that most households, even those whose members are still in formal jobs, have resorted to other economic activities as they try to supplement their wage income. I noted that skilled personnel have thus resorted to make use of their expertise and skills to generate extra income outside their workplace. I will give some cases to demonstrate this.

I noted how teachers are conducting extra lessons at home where one would have a few learners whom s/he would teach at home for a fee. A primary school teacher disclosed that she had five pupils who she tutors at her home and the number usually increases during school holidays. Each learner pays \$4.00 per week, making a total of \$20.00 per week and amounting to between \$80.00 and \$90.00 per month of extra income. Though not much, she boasted that it was *“easy money which I get at zero expensive in the comfort of my home”* (Mai Angie, Female, 45, Teacher, Informal Chat). That amount, she admitted, takes her a long way and caters for her monthly electricity and bus fare for her and her two children and plays an important role in shaping her family livelihood. She noted that many other teachers are engaged in the same trade, with others tutoring as many as fifteen learners and even charging more. Another example involved ‘Msoja’ - a father of two employed by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and also an auto-mechanic. During off days, he repairs vehicles at his home, charging the owners for his service, and earns some extra income. He also uses his personal car as a taxi when he is not going to work. He even employs someone as a taxi driver when things are extremely bad as he will resort to using public transport. Through these multiple activities, he disclosed that he *“managed to send my daughter to a good boarding school and my wife to college”* (Msoja, 40, Male, Soldier, Informal Chat). He also purchased another second-hand vehicle which he was fixing hoping to use it as a taxi and was also happy that his house would soon be complete.

The use of expertise generated through work experience or through education as social actors seek to diversify their livelihoods justifies the importance of such skills in livelihoods construction. Skills and education falls under the broad category of human capital in the SLA while Bourdieu (1998; 1986) regards it as cultural capital. Tawodzera (2011) in a food security

study in Harare found that households whose members had higher educational qualifications/training/skills are less vulnerable to food shortages than those without. This is so because they can make use of these skills, both inside and outside formal employment, to earn a living. Benson (2007) also found that in urban Bangladesh, most of the food secure families are headed by breadwinners who hold higher levels of education. As is the case in Norton, education and its attendant skills reduce household vulnerability, increase self-sufficiency, enhances earning capacity and diversification options (de la Rocha and Grinspun, 2001; Pendleton, 1996). Possession of human capital also enhances accumulation of other capitals, more notably financial capital (in SLA) or economic capital (in TOP) and other related assets that strengthen livelihoods.

‘*VaManyunga*’ is an instrument technician and a teacher by profession and makes our final case. For over ten years, he worked at Hunyani before quitting in 1997. After that, he was involved in a variety of activities as he sought to reconstruct his livelihood. In 2006, he joined Lucas Batteries, and worked there until early 2016 when the company finally closed, sending its employees home without any exit package. Since then, he has been involved in a variety of entrepreneurial activities. He registered a small company which is into small scale school furniture making. *“I am not a trained carpenter but I mastered the basics from one guy whom I hire when I get big orders. I am also learning metal fabrication from the boys whom I work with here.”* He also uses his home as his business premise. Other than furniture making, he also ‘taught himself’ electrical installation and fixing at Lucas and together with a colleague who is an electrician, they are also into installation of electricity tubing, wiring and fixing minor electrical faults in domestic settings whenever they get an offer. He also makes envelopes, keeps chickens both for sale and consumption and grows vegetables and maize for subsistence at his home while his wife is employed by the public service.

I noted how his various activities complement each other in constructing the ‘master’ livelihood and how income from one activity can be reinvested in or used to bail another activity during times of stress. For example, there are times when the wife’s salary is channelled towards chicken feeds or furniture making. Furniture income can also be invested in chickens and vice versa and thus enhancing economic sustainability and livelihood security. Despite facing challenges, he is satisfied with his work and regrets the time that he *“lost over the years clinging*

on non-paying jobs.” Had he “started his own thing” way back, he could have achieved “something big” by now. The chart below maps how he diversified his livelihoods.




Figure 20: VaManyunga's Multiple Livelihood Activities (Own Construct)

8.2.2 Capitalising on the Collapsed Formal Sector and Poor Service Provision

Although the death of formal economy is the author of today's socioeconomic and livelihood challenges, some social actors are viewing this as a positive which gave them a chance to establish their own businesses. I conversed with 'Mr Tee' who runs a small scale grocery shop that doubles up as a wholesaler and retailer in the *Durawall* area of Katanga Shops. I offered to accompany him to Harare for some orders one day and we had adequate time to discuss business in Norton. He opened up on how his business expanded from a small tuck shop operator to a wholesale which employs up to seven including him and his wife and also owns a heavy truck and a light truck which they use for orders. He was also working on final touches to his supermarket in Shamva which he said he intended to open before the end of 2017. *Mr Tee* attributes his success story to the absence of large chain shops citing that if there large wholesalers like Jaggars, Mohammed Mussa and N. Richards in Norton he would not have made it as an entrepreneur. He emphasised that “*the grounding of the economy was a blessing in disguise for some of us since it made us to realise our entrepreneurial potentials.*” In a normal economy, it was difficult for them to rise since established firms would always suppress them.

Another proprietor running an auto spares shop at Katanga was of the feeling that it is the collapsed economy that made him an entrepreneur. He noted that *“after realising the increasing number of motor vehicles in the town, as the import of cheap ex-Japanese vehicles was on the increase, and noting that there were no real spares shops, I decided to try my luck”* (Baba Tineyi, Male, SME/ex-soldier, IDI). Difficult as the operating environment can be, he does not regret leaving his job as a soldier and believes he is earning enough to keep him going. He managed to buy himself a personal vehicle and all his three children are attending elite schools while he is also in the process of completing his house. *“I wouldn’t have managed this had I remained in service at the ZNA,”* he emphasised. Private tutors have also taken advantage of few high schools in the town. Norton has only two large public secondary schools and two private schools serving about eleven primary schools. This creates a very big deficit and some have taken advantage of and established their own small private colleges teaching high school curriculum. There are so many of these across the town, some utilising abandoned industrial or commercial premises while others are even operating from their homes. Private tutors have also taken advantage of a less strict and less efficient local authority. While in large centres like Harare are better equipped, manned and prepared to monitor and constantly thwart such unregulated activities, small centres like Norton lack the resources and have been forced to be less strict when dealing with such activities.

I noted that some entrepreneurs have taken advantage of electricity cuts to set up diesel grinding mills – something that one can rarely see in large cities like Harare. Norton is surrounded by farms and there is an influx of maize grain into the town especially a good harvest like the 2016/17 season. Now that because power is not always available, some proprietors have moved away from electrical grinding mill to diesel-powered ones to continue operating even after major power outages. Diesel grinding mills charge half the rate charged by those operating electrical ones and thus have lured most of the clients. It is also important to note that diesel-powered grinding mills are a rural phenomenon in Zimbabwe and finding them in an urban centre is very rare and somehow unusual. As a result, as a small town, it can thus be suggested that Norton benefits from some rural ethos in constructing its livelihoods. Still on power outages, some have found ‘good business’ in firewood and charcoal trading in as people consider alternative sources of energy to cater for their domestic needs as others are also into gas filling. While a shortage of electricity has a bearing on livelihoods, it has also come as an opportunity to boost their income

and enhance their livelihoods. The same applies to water shortages. As noted earlier, Norton experiences serious water shortages such that residents are forced to drill water wells at their homes. This then creates an opportunity for those who are into manual digging of these wells. Charging as much as \$20.00 per metre, a pair working together can pocket as much as \$400.00 in one week job and that is “*good money in an economy like this*” (Musa, Male, 38, Piecework jobs, Informal Chat).

As a result, poor service provision and the absence of big or established players in different sectors of the economy across the town has turned out to be an opportunity for some which they are exploiting to better their enterprises, creating their own employment and sustaining their lives. This speaks to the sociological view of entrepreneurship which states that social experiences can push social actors into entrepreneurs (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013; Maphosa, 1998). *Mr Tee*’s case supports de Soto’s (1989) argument that informal/SMEs activities present an opportunity for local ownership and control of the economy. It is indeed true that most of the business entities in Norton are owned by locals.

8.2.3 Use of Modern and Creative Marketing Tools

In face of a poor market and serious competition, I discovered that entrepreneurs in the informal and SMEs have adopted modern marketing tools to sell their products. It emerged that some have roped in Information and Communication Technologies in their attempt to reach out to more clients and penetrate markets beyond the town. The use of the WhatsApp platform is one such innovation. I found that various WhatsApp Groups where entrepreneurs share business ideas and advertise their products as well as making any other updates that can be of interest to the group have been created, I joined two such groups (*Norton Market Place* and *Norton AdvertNews Group*) as part of my data collection and managed to get first-hand insights of how they work and how instrumental they are in promoting entrepreneurship. I also joined a soccer betting group (*SOC CER PUNTERS*) composed of youths who share soccer betting tips. They would organise themselves into small groups and contribute some cash to make joint bets then share the returns if they win. To maximise their chances of winning, they assign each other tasks to research on certain soccer clubs and share the findings to the rest of the group to decide how the bets can be placed. Figure 21 below shows a picture collage of the three WhatsApp groups that I joined as given above.




Figure 21: Picture collage showing the three WhatsApp groups that I joined.

The trend of information and ideas sharing also extends to taxi operators who use such groups, phone SMS and calls to alert each other of roadblocks or when undercover police are planning a raid. A key informant concurred with this observation and hinted that “*they* [informal/small entrepreneurs] use other methods like Facebook and other social media networks to trade their goods” (Academic, Male, 38, Norton resident, KII). Associated to ICT in informal business is the use of the plastic money payment system. With the critical cash shortages, some informal/SMEs businesses have ‘moved with the times’ and are accepting plastic and mobile money payment methods. Some have partnered with large businesses that have POS machines. In one incident I wanted some potatoes at Katanga vegetable market but did not have cash. Upon enquiring if they accept e-money, the woman manning the stall gladly responded; “*we can make a plan*” (Farm fresh produce vendor, Informal Chat). I followed her into a nearby pharmacy where I swiped for the potatoes. I later gathered that entrepreneurs who did not have bank accounts or POS machines were making such arrangements with formal business with the facility. Some have also acquired Ecocash, Telecash or OneMoney merchant accounts which they use to make or receive mobile money payments.

Bringing the SLA into discussion, ICT is regarded as part of physical capital which several researchers (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999) reason to be important for construction of livelihoods. The increasing availability of affordable smart phones accompanied by relatively affordable mobile internet data has promoted people's access to social media and internet and is thus playing an important role in building livelihoods. The use of social media to enhance social networking also ushers in the notion of social capital which is regarded as important in livelihoods construction (DFID, 1999; Bourdieu, 1998). It is thus fascinating to realise how social actors in Norton are combining ICT (physical capital) and social capital as they innovate to better their livelihoods field.

I also discovered the use of '*formal/standard*' advertising billboards to market informal businesses. The billboard advertising technique was previously associated with formal businesses while the informal sector was known for small, randomly set, substandard and illegally erected advertising boards but some are slowly moving away from that.



Figure 22: Standard billboard advertising an Informal business (Author, 04/2017)

I also noticed that others were into some creative and innovative advertising where they would use pre-recorded audio clips which are played on loud speakers repeatedly over and over again. This is in effort to avoid shouting the whole day while marketing products to customers. In this case, the seller can sort some other stuff or interact with others around him or her as the advert continues to run while the technique also saves energy. I also noted that informal entrepreneurs have also resorted to promotions and use of music and dance when advertising their products. In

this case, the advertiser will assume the role of a DJ, playing music and making adverts on regular intervals in a typical 'road show-style' and even invites members of the public on the 'stage' to dance and win some prizes thereafter. This technique lures customers while music keeps them entertained. One respondent noted that this technique has nurtured him into a skilled DJ. He believed that he had learnt a lot and further stated that "*the next time I come across an advert inviting DJs to auditions, I will definitely try my luck*" (Saddam, 32, Musical CDs vendor, Informal Chat). Related to this innovation is good customer service and provision of free after sale services. I have noted that while large supermarkets like OK and TM Pick 'n' Pay sell plastic bags to customers, most informal and small shops offer them for free.

One man who sells kitchen utensils would go all the way demonstrating how to use the various utensils on offer as opposed to formal outlets which just leave their clients to rely on product manuals, which are written in English, or other foreign languages like Chinese which they cannot read and understand. The day in question, he was 'teaching' his potential clients on how to prepare salad using what he called a "special" Chinese-made multipurpose knife, after which a handful of women who were observing showed their intent to purchase. As a result of these demonstrations, he always draws a crowd and realising high sales. Those who are into selling clothes would also cover up for their lack of stock by putting on some of their clothes on offer as a way of enhancing marketing. I thus even saw men putting on such female clothing as weaves and hats as a marketing gimmick.

8.2.4 Converting Homes into Mixed-Purpose Properties

In the face of shortage of working space and land, I discovered that social actors in Norton have resolved to converting their houses and using them for other purposes. In this case, a premise primarily set for residential purposes is also used for commercial purposes. Some even did it with the blessing of the local authority having applied and were approved to do so. Upon approval, the house will be registered as a mixed purpose property and will be placed in a new rates regime specifically created for mixed purpose properties. While some have legalised their rezoning, some have done it without seeking any approval. In such cases, the local authority will charge an illegal trading penalty of \$10.00 per month.

I found out as I '*walked the city*' that most of the houses close to big shopping centres like Katanga and Ngoni have been converted and are now serving as both homes and commercial

premises. It is thus common to see a grocery shop, a barber shop and a car wash all operating at a single residential premise. Other common entrepreneurial activities that are based at homes around Katanga include tyre repair and servicing, fast food outlets, clothing shops, garment making, carpentry, vehicle repairing, gas filling, vegetable vending, schools, preschool centres and car parks among others. While some in some cases, it is the home owners use their properties for business, in other cases they would let out to other proprietors who in turn pay a monthly rent that will cater for the penalty fees for those who have done it without approval.



Figure 23: House turned into Multiple-purpose property, Tuck-shop, car wash, barber & take-away (Author, 08/2017)



Figure 24: Home-based nursery (Author, 04/2018). Plants cost \$1-\$2 each and the nursery's estimated population is around 4,000.

While converting properties for commercial purposes in inner city zones, the trend has spread to reach urban zones that are located far away from CBDs. Other than serving as a solution to the challenge of shortage of working space and land in the town, it also comes with the advantage of lower rentals and rates. I learnt that it is cheaper to rent a shop at a house than at a commercial complex like Sagonda. Besides, rentals are negotiated and can be paid in instalments – something that commercial property owners rarely entertain. It is thus important rezoning does not only provide income to the property owner through rentals or setting up his/her own business there but also gives others a relatively affordable premise from where they can do business. ‘*VaManyunga*’s case presented earlier is another example of how a residential property was turned into a multiple-purpose or mixed use premise.

In sustainable livelihoods literature, a house is an important resource that is important in constructing livelihoods (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016). According to the SLA (DFID, 1999), such properties which can be used to generate cash or can be transferred into cash fall under the category ‘financial capital’. As noted in the finding above, an urban house provides more than just a home or shelter. It is an income earning resource, either through letting residential rooms, using it as business premises or letting out to others, generating some income in so doing. The practice of converting residential properties into multipurpose/mixed-use was also captured by Chirisa (2010) who studied housing in Ruwa and discovered how schools were operating from residential houses and churches.

8.2.5 ‘*Hobbipreneurship*’⁵²

Although I had earlier on adopted the sociological view to entrepreneurship (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013), I have also discovered through interacting with my respondents that developing and investing into one’s own hobby can be one relatively easier path to starting a small scale business. I drew insights when I visited the ‘*Knowe couple*’. They are basically into rabbit rearing and cake baking. Asked how they started their business, they disclosed that they basically start it as a hobby. They would use this time to learn about it and acquire the relevant knowledge and skills before thinking of going commercial. Once they felt that they have learnt enough and when a market opportunity came up, they quickly converted the hobby into an income generating venture. The wife who bakes cakes chronicled how she started baking just to

⁵² Jason Malinak (2012) wrote about a related concept and called it ‘*Esty-preneurship*’

keep herself busy at home as her husband, then employed by one of the leading banks in the country, did not want her to look for a job. *“I started doing cakes just for leisure. I wanted something to keep me busy during the day since my husband didn’t want me to go to work”* (Mai Mudzi, Norton Resident/Cake Maker, IDI). She then slowly acquired the art of cake baking but just as a hobby. It was when things turned bad after her husband had lost his job that she realised her entrepreneurial potential. Many people from her church and community already knew her excellent baking and she quickly took advantage of that and turned it into a business which sustained them for long time after the husband was retrenched.

The husband also started keeping rabbits as a hobby. He recalled starting with just three rabbits which then multiplied to reach about sixty at one time and that is when he decided to turn it into a business. *“I started with just three rabbits and doing it for fun and for our own consumption. I only realised later when they began to multiply that I could make some money out of it”* (Baba Mudzi, Norton Resident/Rabbit Keeper, IDI). He had thirty-six rabbits by the time of my visit on 19 April 2017 and foresaw them multiplying even more than ten folds by year ends and with a proper market, this could be a good business for him. Rabbits are sold at a price of \$15.00 each and around \$7.00 negotiated price. He also disclosed that at one time when he did not have anything demanding to keep him busy after losing his job, he used to spend his time with young children from his neighbourhood playing with them and teaching them school-related stuff. After realising that he was good with children, he decided to start extra lessons before establishing a small class of pupils who would pay him for his tutoring services. For about three years he was into this venture and it earned him some significant income. Resources permitting, he hopes to establish a proper school in future. The couple had also just started bee-keeping as a hobby by the time I visited. They said they would take time to learn about bee-keeping and when they think they have mastered enough; they would then upgrade it into a business and start producing honey for commercial purposes.

Welly, the young man who sells second hand clothing at Katanga’s ‘Musika Wemabhero’ (second-hand clothes market) also shared similar insights. His mother is a tailor and as he grew up, he taught himself sewing and garment designing following his mother’s footsteps but all along he used to do it for fun. However, when things became tough and as he ventured into second hand dealing, he realised that he can make his clothes more attractive and marketable by

adding some value to them. He would then use his tailoring skills to design some of the products. He attributed his survival in the flea market sector business to his designing skills which made his products more appealing. Yet he never dreamt of using this skill in an entrepreneurial venture by the time he was in the process of acquiring it since to him, it was just but a hobby. *“It was all for fun when I used to play with my mother’s sewing machine. I never imagined this growing to become a job for me,”* he confessed.

Having encountered such cases, I was therefore convinced that there can be more to hobbies than just doing them for fun and they can be a good way of learning and finally venturing into a business. I thus argue that entrepreneurship can be realised or developed through nurturing and investing into one’s hobby in what I elected term the ‘*hobbipreneurship*’ thesis to entrepreneurship. ‘*Hobbipreneurship*’ is a term that I ‘invented’ by coining the two terms ‘hobby’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ to simply refer to entrepreneurial venture born out of investing and developing one’s hobby. Malinak (2012) wrote about an almost similar concept which he termed ‘*Esty-preneurship*’

8.2.6 Price Reductions

Informal and small scale businesses have also resorted to cutting down prices of their wares as a strategy to fight competition. Here, informal and small businesses peg their prices slightly below those charged by established shops. For example, where six or seven bananas cost \$1.00 at OK or TM, vendors normally charge eight or nine bananas for the same amount of almost the same quality and there is even room for negotiations. The same also applies to vegetables which are way cheaper at vendors’ marts than in established shops. Small-scale grocery sellers also employed the strategy on their items. I also compared prices at ‘*The People’s Shop*’ and most other small shops against those at OK and found out that OK charges more. While a 2kg pack of brown sugar is generally pegged at \$2.00 at OK, informal traders and small grocery shops charge between 10 and 20 cents less and the trend is basically the same across most grocery items. These low prices charged by informal and small scale operators is attributable to lower rentals and other overhead costs that they pay. While OK has many costs to meet; high rentals, electricity, transport, taxes and salaries, informal/small operators meet very little of these and hence can lower their prices and still realise significant sales.

I also came to realise that being a small urban centre, commercial property rentals are relatively low and affordable in Norton when compared with those charged in Harare. In Norton, a small shop of around 16-20sqm at busy centres like Katanga is charged at between \$50-\$80/month against \$150-\$200 in Harare and this presents a huge advantage for entrepreneurs in Norton as they do not spend much on rentals.

8.2.7 Other Innovations

Closely related to price reductions is the strategic location by informal traders. Most of them set their stalls close to established shops. The big shops then attract many customers, some of whom would be in a hurry and might not have the patience to follow the long queues and will thus end up buying at the informal market. If a customer fails to find the product that s/he wants in the supermarket, or finds the queues too long to wait, they can quickly find it at the informal market just as they exit the shop. For this reason, I discovered that informal traders do research on products that are normally unavailable in shops and make sure that they always have them in stock. Proper packaging of products just the same way large shops do is another strategy that they have also implemented. It has thus become difficult to differentiate fruits purchased in the street and those from a supermarket. At night, informal traders who operate near main shops also benefit from 'free' electricity lights 'provided' by the shops since it was already pointed out that most vending marts are not electrified. Those who trade perishables have also made arrangements with homeowners whose properties are located close to their trading sites where they would keep their products refrigerated and can always rush back to collect whenever they find a client. This way, they are less worried about having their products going bad and it also acts as a way of safekeeping their products. If they are to be raided, they will only lose the little stuff that they are found in possession and the rest stocked in refrigerators will be spared. Entrepreneurs are also using nearby homes as cloak/storage rooms. Under this arrangement, they would leave their stock for overnight storage and pay the house owner a fee. Some are also offering overnight vehicle parking services to taxi operators, charging way less than normal car parking rates.

I also noted that improved hygiene is another strategy used by informal businesses to counter competition. My observation was that gone are the days when informal businesses were associated with dirtiness. Most vendors have improved on this aspect as they are also constantly

inspected by health officials from NTC. This extends to the way they dress. Traditionally, vending was associated with untidiness, scruffiness and shabby dressing. Participants were generally non-presentable, in what I prefer to call the ‘informal body’. I however realised that times have changed when I came across neatly dressed informal proprietors, some wearing nice designer suits carrying out their work in the streets. This demystifies informal job as dirty work and has boosted customer confidence in the sector and thus attracting more clients.

I also found out that going ‘small’ in entrepreneurship is a strategy on its own. Firstly, it does not require a lot of start-up capital making it slightly easier to start as opposed to registering a formal company. Secondly, in an economic environment that is full of uncertainty and where the majority have little purchasing power, it can be advisable to go small. One proprietor recalls how large businesses collapsed as the country’s economic woes unfolded while small operators survived. Another one who runs a small construction hardware shop reasoned that since many people had aborted their construction projects, it was better to go small since the market was poor. People are purchasing construction material in small quantities and it is pointless to go big at this point. He noted that, *“as little as twenty cement bags per day and a few other stuffs are okay for a business like mine but imagine if N. Richards sells the same amount. They would definitely collapse but as for me, it is enough to sustain my business”* (Isaiah, SME/hardware owner, IDI)

A small grocery shop operator also reasoned along the same lines, arguing that *“if my shop is to fail today, I will lose just around \$800.00 but if OK is to collapse, it would lose millions of dollars so it is advisable to go small at the moment...”* (Enduza, 33, Tuck-shop owner, IDI). He also noted that customers nowadays purchase items in very small quantities reasoning that until the era of bulk buying returns, it is pointless to expand. This entails that even though some might have the financial capacity to set up big business, they are deliberately opting to remain small and in this case it becomes an entrepreneurial strategy. The idea of going small speaks to arguments by Jennings (2000:1) who pointed out that it comes to development planning “big is not always better” and that “big outcomes may be born out of small inputs.” The argument further suggests that such a development paradigm promotes a “more readily sustain productive, durable change.” Another innovation is to assess the type of customers that one serves. This will determine the quality of products and services to be provided. Where customers cannot pay for

expensive services, the proprietor would provide cheap products of low quality. It was argued that it is a poor strategy to set high standards which no-one can afford to pay. 'Svosve' runs a night club at Sagonda Complex and he argues that it is unwise to put state-of-art-equipment and décor in his club when no-one will be able to pay for such services. Instead, he chose to remain simple, such that even if he does not get a lot of returns, he would be at peace since he would not have invested much.

I also discovered that faced with the challenges of a shortage of capital and small profits, social actors in Norton have resolved to coming together and starting cash saving schemes collectively in what are called saving clubs. In this case, entrepreneurs come together as a small group and enter into an arrangement in which they would contribute an agreed amount of cash to be given to one individual after an agreed period on rotational basis. An example of such an arrangement that I came across during fieldwork was a group made up of five vegetable vendors. They would make daily contributions of \$10.00 from Monday to Friday and each one would have her day to receive her share while weekend gains were set for individual pocketing. Such an arrangement gave them an opportunity to boost their businesses and allowed them to purchase items or pay bills that require a relatively high amount of cash. Linked to this strategy is regularly contributing a stipulated amount of money which is then kept accumulating and when it has reached the desired amount, they would share it or buy groceries worth that amount which is then shared equally to members. This is normally done towards the festive season or in preparation for a situation that demands a lot of money like opening of schools in January, May or September. The money will then be used to cover school-related costs. This finding supports the notion that social capital plays a critical role in constructing livelihoods and confirms findings by Chirau (2014) who also found that women in informal sector in Harare were organised in saving clubs from which they would help each other to raise capital.

While the closeness of Harare has been identified by some as a threat that destabilises construction of sustainable livelihoods in Norton, some identified it as a positive factor and are using it to their advantage. Firstly, it is a source of relatively cheaper goods and services which can be resold in Norton at a profit. Secondly, Harare provides a better market even for traders from other centres. *Welly* highlighted that he, together with his colleagues in the flea market business, spent the whole day trading in Norton then go to Harare in the evening to sell their

clothes in the CBD during the night. He noted that night prices in Harare are even three to four times higher than what they charge in Norton so they reap higher profits from night trading in Harare than what they get the entire day in Norton. I found that night trading has four major advantages. Firstly, the CBD will be flooded with people as they will be on their way from their different vocations especially between 18:00 hours and 21:00 hours. Secondly, after a day's work, some would have earned some money and will be looking forward to spending it, such that night traders provide them with an opportunity to do shopping since they rarely have time to do that during the day. Thirdly and more importantly, law enforcers would have gone home and there will be no-one to harass or demand bribes from them as they trade. Lastly, it was also the only chance for those who are employed somewhere to attend to their own entrepreneurial ventures. As noted earlier that even those social actors who are employed were doing extra economic activities to supplement their salaries/wages, they would pitch their stalls in the evening after knocking off from their workplaces. Consequently, night trading thus became a winning formula for informal street traders.

Other than that, the informal sector has also managed to find a place in the formal supply chain. The sector has grown to become recognised by the formal sector suppliers. Goods and services are thus finding their way from the formal industry manufactures into the informal sector. I noted on daily basis as producers and distributors (Baker's Inn, Lobels' and Proton Bakeries, Delta Beverages, Dairy Body, Msasa Meats, etc.) delivering orders to tuck shops, street markets and home-based enterprises across the town, something that was unheard of prior to the economic crisis. This comes with the advantage of reduced transport costs on the part of the entrepreneurs and at the same time showcasing the growing resilience of the sectors. Figure 25 below shows a Baker's Inn truck delivering bread to informal traders, street and both home-based enterprises.



Figure 25: Baker's Inn Truck delivering bread at a home-based tuck-shop (Author, 04/2018)

Another strategy used by the informal sector actors in their quest to sustain their lives as discovered by this study is the decision by some to legalise their enterprises. In this case, they would register and get an operating licence from the local authority. They would also pay a monthly fee which is dependent on the type of activities that one is involved in to the local authority. In case of those who do not require large pieces of land, after registration and paying the required fees, one is allocated a small portion which he or she can use. Besides these licences which stipulate one to only operate at their allocated place, there are also mobile licences which give the owner the right to trade wherever they want. Although legalising one's trade comes with some expenses, some believed it was a good for their businesses as they will be assured that they will not be subjected to constant harassment.

While others have considered going legal, some have vowed to remain undocumented. *Madzimai* sells vegetables on door to door basis. She does not have a fixed point to operate from like most vendors. She argued that there is no need to be registered when the local authority cannot provide proper vending infrastructure. Through using a door-to-door strategy, she also enjoys the advantages of not paying any rental or any costs related to operating at a fixed place. She also does not fear any eviction or raids. Walking in the streets with her bags, no-one would ever think that she is selling anything and that is how she escapes council police. She does not shout like what other hawkers do, she enters every of her customers' home. She is also not worried about where to store her wares at night. She reasons that she makes an order of stock that already has customers so it is just a matter of delivering. If a regular customer does not have money, she

would just give him/her vegetables then she gets her money later at once. Some customers also pay her in advance and she thus enjoys the advantage of getting the money at once in form of a 'lump sum'. In her case, I argue that she uses 'her body as infrastructure' to compensate for the missing infrastructural resources. In the absence of transport she carries her commodities around and in the absence a vending site; she delivers her vegetables to her clients and thus literally utilising her body as infrastructure.

Tau and his brother are into cell phone and computer software as well as selling pirated musical and movie discs close to OK supermarket at Katanga. He emphasised that even if they purchase an operating licence, the council will not provide him with a suitable place for him to operate and neither will they make available the services that he requires. He noted that the only public toilet at Katanga is not used for free there were so many people paying council for doing business around the shopping centre but the local authority turned a blind ear on their demands. He argued, "*kusvika ndava kuziva kuti mari dzema rates and penalties dzinoshandei handisi kuzobhadhara* [until I became aware of what the rates and penalties were being used for, he would never pay.]" Instead, he and many of his colleagues who are into related trades - cell phone selling and repairing and money dealing resolved to resist any attempts to evict them. He emphasised, "*Pano tinotonetsana pano. Even iro mafia racho rinotozviziva kuti panorema. Vakauya vachiita zvemusindo ndinongonhonga ngwanda rangu ndorova pasi ndozodzoka kana vabaya* [This is a contested place. Even the council police know well that we are not pushovers. However, if they unleash violence on us, I will just grab my stuff just disappear into the crowds then resurface when they are gone.]" They have been doing that for years and this study found resistance to be a strategy that is sustaining the informal sector in Norton. Choosing to be illegal and not to pay anything is consistent with Merton's (1965) argument of deviation as well as Long's (2001; 1990) ideas from the Actor-Oriented Theory which states that social actors have some agency and possess the knowledge and capability to assess problematic situations that confront them and thus organise appropriate responses to address these negative situations. The finding also confirms de Soto's (1989) assertion that when the situation heats up, informal sector actors renounce legality.

Once again, here the informal/SMEs sectors seem to be taking advantage of a small, poorly equipped and ineffective municipal police which is normally associated by small towns of

Norton's size. While large cities like Harare and Bulawayo among others have received a lot of attention and pressure from the central government to keep an eye and regulate the growth of informal economic activities, it appears not to be the case with small centres like Norton. Large cities have statuses and reputations to protect, for example, the city of Harare regards itself as the '*Sunshine City*', and used to be one of the cleanest and most organised cities on the continent. As such, it is always striving to reclaim this lost glory and is always fighting the informal sector. Other than the main *Operation Murambatsvina* of 2005, the city has had several other similar operations aimed at the informal sector and continues to do so even up-to-date, which however did not extend to small centres. Besides that, NTC is poorly equipped and manned to carry out such operations regularly. Harare for example employs a huge number of municipal police and has invested a lot in such equipment used in raking, towing, demolition and spiking as well as patrol trucks and can easily attract the services of the national police. Norton on the contrary lacks these and this has been an advantage to the informal sector which has taken advantage of this and has sustained the sector. The same is also true when it comes to urban farming. Harare City Council is known for their anti-urban farming stance, and this is completely different when it comes to Norton. Residents there can farm as they wish and none of my respondents mentioned anything to do with being banned or persecuted for farming in the town.

I also found out that the informal and SMEs sectors have now become organised. As noted earlier, they are involved in saving clubs as one way of saving and raising capital. Organisation also entails use of social media platforms for ideas and information sharing, again as earlier presented. Moreover, in their attempt to confront their challenges collectively, they have organised themselves into different groupings. This has seen the formation of informal traders unions such as the Norton Vendors Unions, the Norton SMEs Association and the Residence Association. These groups provide business education to informal and SMEs traders, lobbying and advocating for their rights. As pointed in Chapter Five, as part of my fieldwork, I participated in a demonstration organised by the Residents Association against the Council, where residents expressed their dissatisfaction with service delivery issues which are crucial in livelihood construction. Such a high level of organisation has strengthened them and together they can speak with one bold voice, a strategy that goes along the popular saying '*there is power in numbers*'. Raising the issue of organisation was one academic who took part in the study and noted that the sector "*has definitely reinvented itself and it had to [...] There are now a lot of*

synergies. The informal sector has become more organised in terms of how it presents itself and how it seeks to be more competitive” (Academic, Male, 38, Norton resident, KII).

Other factors behind their survival in business include operating for longer hours than those in the formal sector. This entails starting very early in the morning and closing very late at night and this is in an effort to maximise returns. Some also make use of family labour so that there are no remuneration expenses. Moreover, SMEs/informal businesses are located close to the people and thus bring with them the advantage of convenience. It is also easier to build a customer base through personally knowing one’s customers, something that OK supermarket, for example, cannot do. Some entrepreneurs, based on personal relations and trust, allow their customers to borrow and pay later. This in turn allows them to keep their customers close.

8.3 Social and Spiritual Capitals in Constructing Livelihoods

Most livelihoods literature has concentrated more on the importance of social capital in rural livelihoods and survival strategies than on urban livelihoods (Misselhorn, 2005). It has been argued that social networks (social capital) are less helpful in urban areas due to the deteriorating traditional systems that guide social relations. The fact that the city brings people of diverse backgrounds, cultures and ethnicities to stay together has been used to justify the claim that it is difficult for urbanites to come together as one and build strong social relations (Jabeen *et al.*, 2009). However, in this study I argue that social capital plays a critical role in urban livelihoods especially during economic crises and increased vulnerability. Social actors in Norton thus do not exist in isolation or as individuals but are part of various groupings, membership of which plays a positive role in the reconstruction of their livelihoods and this is done in a number of ways as highlighted below.

Firstly, saving clubs mentioned earlier are based on mutual relationships where members come together as groups. In the absence of such a group arrangement, no savings of this nature would have been possible and it becomes important for one to be a member of such a group. Depending on their arrangement and nature of relationship, group members can also bail out a member who has fallen on hard times, for example when one is not feeling well or in event of death of a close relative. For instance, for those who travel say to Harare for orders, groups can just assign one member to do all the orders on their behalf and the rest will remain behind, minimising transport costs in doing so.

Secondly, most respondents mentioned that they belong to a church denomination and believe that prayer plays a part in one's success. As a result, they come together at church and help each other to pray. Church members also assist each other in times of trouble. For example, if one is not feeling well, they can make contributions in the form of cash, food and other material things to support their fellow church member. Church members are also important customers as highlighted by *VaManyunga* that he gets most of his furniture and chicken orders from his church mates, making it his major market.

Thirdly, friends and neighbours also play an important role if we are to consider *Madzimai's* case. Since she is into door to selling, she cannot move around with her four-year old daughter on daily basis. She would then leave her at a neighbour's place or with a friend who would feed, bath and take care of her while the mother is away on business. Asked if it was the good thing to do to leave her little daughter with other people almost on daily basis, she noted that she was very comfortable with that because the people were trustworthy and they are used to helping each other, so it was just a way of reciprocating. She thus noted that she can spend the whole day away and they will not complain at all. *Welly* also noted that his friends are among his best customers, and they also help him to find markets for his clothes. As a result, his business partly relies on his friends, making social capital important to him.

Other than that, the formation of such groupings as the residents association, vendors unions, entrepreneurial associations as well as the various WhatsApp Groups noted earlier also emphasise the importance of social groups and networking. Many other respondents noted that they rely on family, relatives and friends whenever they fall on hard times and when they want to bail out or expand their businesses. Since banks and money lenders set difficult borrowing conditions which are prohibitive, many resort to borrowing from those around them should there be need. It was also reasoned that social capital is one of the highly rated resources in the African context and has always been part of the African way of life. I engaged one elderly resident in a casual talk and he emphasised that the spirit of oneness, togetherness, sharing, unity, has been part of African societies for a long time and that is the reason why even today they exist as extended families, large clans and even communities. He noted that, "*vanhu vatema takagara takangobatana kubva kare, ndosaka uchiona tine mhuri hombe. Tinokoshesa hukama naizvozvo kubatsirana kuri nyore panguva yenyatwa. Ipapo ndipo pane dzinde rehunhu* [Black people have

always been united, the reason why we exist in big families. We value kinship and that's why it is easy to help each other in times of trouble. That's the root of humanity"] (Sekuru Tuhwe, Norton Resident, Informal Chat). He emphasised that giving, sharing and helping one another especially in times of need is part of the broader '*Ubuntu*' philosophy. His response is consistent with Chinua Achebe (Pan-Africanist, writer and philosopher) who, emphasising the importance of social capital, wrote,

A man who calls his kinsmen to a feast does not do so to redeem them from starving. They all have food in their houses. When we gather together in the moonlight village ground, it is not because of the moon. Every man can see it from his own compound. We come together because it is good for kinsmen to do so. Therefore let us continue with the team spirit and enjoy the power of togetherness (Achebe, 1996:118).

The idea of working together and existing as groups also concurs with Jennings (2000:1) who argues that "more heads are better than one" and thus concludes that social networks and relations constitute a very powerful capital that occupies a central role in livelihood construction. The importance of social capital is also explored by the SLA (DFID, 1999) and Bourdieu's (1986) TOP, who emphasised that social networks: friendship, family and other group memberships are important in constructing livelihoods.

Spiritual capital also plays a part in strengthening people as they strive to construct their livelihoods. Most respondents disclosed that they belong to some church denomination and they help each other to pray and for their businesses. Common responses included "*making it by God's grace.*" Gospel music was also the most common music played by most entrepreneurs who I visited and it is apparent that spiritual capital is an important 'secret' in the survival of their businesses. Such a finding goes along Morse and McNamara (2013) and Stark and Finke (2000) who also argued that spiritual beliefs play a role in constructing livelihoods and proposed to include it as a stand-alone capital in the SLA.

8.4 Exploring the Role of Hope

My interface with social actors as they sought to construct their livelihoods awakened me to realisation that '*hope*' plays a critical role to many people in their attempt to sustain their lives. Hope is the belief or expectation that something that someone wishes to achieve can or will happen regardless of circumstances. In Christianity, it is the virtuous desire for future good. I gathered that even during situations of extreme strain; where things literally proved not to be

moving forward, it is ‘**hope**’ that kept people standing. Most of my respondents disclosed that the faith that tomorrow brings a new day gave them the strength to persevere as ‘*Mai Machisa*’ noted,

*Each day is unique. The market can be poor today but who knows, maybe tomorrow it will be rewarding. I end every day with the **hope** that tomorrow will be better... I wake up each morning with renewed energy, “**hoping**” that it is going to be a great day, and that way I don’t and won’t give up...*

Jona also echoed similar sentiments, “*zvinhu zvinombooma magraft achishaikwa asi hatirase mbereko* [things can be difficult and contracts may be hard to secure but we don’t lose **hope**].”

The urban farmer is also not discouraged by poor rain forecasts even if it is widely broadcasted. Instead, s/he equally prepares for each farming season with the ‘**hope**’ that adequate rains will fall to bring bumper harvests. Many others mentioned ‘**hope**’ as their source of strength and the reason behind their persistence and I thus regard it as an important weapon that one needs to be equipped with as s/he strive to construct his/her livelihood especially during times of distress.

8.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter explored the entrepreneurial inventions and innovations that social actors in formal employment, SMEs and the informal sector entrepreneurships have invented as they seek to address the various challenges that confront them in their quest to construct their livelihoods. It noted that SMEs and the informal economy are very creative and innovative and have since grown beyond petty business to become important parts of the local economy. It looked at such livelihood enhancement strategies like diversification and entrepreneurial innovations like capitalising on poor service delivery, rezoning and the adoption of ICT and other modern marketing tools by the SME/informal entrepreneurs. It also explored the importance of social capital and spiritual capital and emphasised how hope is a crucial weapon in constructing livelihoods. Chapter Nine interrogates issues around livelihood sustainability.

CHAPTER NINE

LIVELIHOODS AFTER DEINDUSTRIALISATION: INTERROGATING SUSTAINABILITY

9.1 Introduction

Having explored the various livelihood strategies that social actors in Norton have devised after the fall of industry and the economy, the challenges that confront them in the livelihoods field and the various ‘inventions’ and innovations that they have come up with to sustain their livelihoods, this chapter interrogates issues around the sustainability of these livelihoods. It derives insights from the evidence that I gathered from the field, the arguments and ideas proffered in by various groups of respondents, their lived realities and observed phenomena. It discusses two major views that emerged from respondents, starting with those arguments that portrayed SMEs and informal sector-based livelihoods as unsustainable. The second view originated from those respondents who were of the argument that despite the numerous challenges that the sector faces, it can still be sustainable.

9.2 Livelihood Sustainability Debates

The issue of sustainability of the ‘new’ livelihoods devised by social actors in Norton after deindustrialisation generated different views from respondents. While some dismissed most of these livelihoods as mere survivalist and unsustainable, some argued that these livelihoods are sustainable and only require adequate support from concerned stakeholders. The following subsection discusses the arguments that challenged the sustainability of these livelihoods.

9.2.1 SMEs/Informal Livelihoods as Unsustainable

One group of respondents argued that the ‘new’ livelihoods are “*not sustainable at all and not something that a household/family can ever rely on in the long run*” (Tongai, Male, 36, Engineer, Informal Chat). According to this view, most of these livelihood strategies are “*merely survival strategies which can only sustain people just for a short period of time*” (Bhule, Male, 33, Accountant, IDI). Typical responses made in support of this view include among others, “*surviving from hand to mouth*” and “*earning for the day.*”

Arguments against the sustainability of these livelihoods were centered on the challenges that actors in the informal and the SMEs entrepreneurs encounter. It was reasoned that since these

sectors are affected by a host of challenges, their sustainability is very questionable and not guaranteed. One respondent cited the challenge of shortage of capital to argue that “*without access to funding, it is very difficult for a business to grow and become sustainable.*” Instead, “*it remains small and the prospects of getting significant returns will forever remain poor.*” He also reasoned that the sectors can “*only start to be treated seriously and with respect when those involved have gained access to funding*” (Bhule, 33, Accountant, IDI). Consequently, lack of or limited access to capital was viewed as a factor limiting the sustainability and reliability of informal and SME sectors-based livelihoods. Queries relating to poor funding opportunities by the sectors resonate with ideas derived from Ngundu (2010) and Tibaijuka (2005) who argued that lack of support sectors complicates SMEs and informal sector-based livelihoods. Chirau (2014) also notes that lack of capital is hindering the growth of informal livelihoods in Harare. The finding is also consistent with the SLA’s financial capital and TOP’s economic capital, both of which regard as a powerful resource which shape livelihoods and a household’s way of living. When available, it enhances livelihoods but if it is lacking, construction of livelihoods becomes difficult and affects their sustainability (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999; Bourdieu, 1972).

It was also argued that since most of the products are similar to those already in the formal markets, the informal markets were not bringing anything new and consumers would rather prefer their traditional formal sector suppliers/producers.

Most of these businesses specialise in selling petty and substandard items...it is doubtful if they can survive in the long-run and neither can they generate enough cash for the owners to sustain their households. Imagine someone selling airtime earning a profit of 7 cents per every \$1.00 top-up card? S/he would require one hundred cards to earn \$7.00. Given the competition that they face, it is not easy to sell such an amount per day and such a business might not be economically viable and sustainable (Gogo Smart, Retired nurse, IDI).

Such reasoning popularised the ‘*from hand to mouth*’ argument noted earlier. Together with the capital shortage factor, proponents of this argument believed that entrepreneurs in these sectors do not earn enough to ensure that their businesses survive; to meet their rental, license and other related expenses as well as sustaining their household needs.

Queries about the sustainability of these livelihoods were also raised based on the violence, harassment and political interference which make most firms in the sector vulnerable. This vulnerability exists in form of crackdown by municipal and/or national police, confiscation of

products, evictions or forced closures, arrests and detention, fines and penalties and disruption of business. Questions were thus asked as to how possible is it for someone to derive an economically sustainable livelihood from a *“business that is constantly under attack,”* further stressing that *“it’s not healthy for an entrepreneur to be always on the run as if he/she is a thief”* (Bhule, Male, 33, Accountant, IDI). As noted in Chapter Seven, harassment disrupts business and minimises returns while wares are at times are confiscated resulting in losses. Such a setback led some respondents to cast some doubts on the sustainability of these livelihoods. This vulnerability of social actors and firms in the informal and SMEs sectors also speaks to the SLA’s vulnerability context. The framework acknowledges that poor people exist in a highly vulnerable environment which makes it difficult for them to construct sustainable livelihoods. Vulnerability may exist in the form of natural shocks like droughts and disasters like earthquakes or man-made shocks like economic crises. Vulnerability can also be compounded by policies, which are part of the transforming processes and structures in the SLA (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999). Harsh response by government and local government as is sometimes the case in Norton points to how most policies do not favor these sectors - something that adds vulnerability to both individuals and firms involved in the sectors.

Arguments were also raised that informal entrepreneurs and SMEs do not contribute to national economic growth because many of them do not pay taxes. They were accused of *“not contributing much to benefit the whole economy at large since they avoid paying taxes”* and that *“they create very few jobs and they remunerate their employees poorly”* (Bhule, Male, 33, Accountant, IDI). It was also argued that most businesses in these sectors do not manufacture but find cheaper products elsewhere for resale. As a result, it is believed that they are partly responsible for importation of poor quality and substandard goods that have flooded the market. Such products have paralysed the market for locally manufactured products and thus aiding the collapse of local industry. It was also claimed that since most of these entrepreneurs were not exporting anything to bring in foreign currency, they were thus partly responsible for the cash shortage crisis that the country was experiencing during the time when the study was conducted. Related to this argument is also the *“flooded and highly competitive nature”* of livelihood activities in these sectors such that *“it is difficult for one to construct a sustainable livelihood out of such an economy”* (Taru, 35, Government employee, Informal Chat). Such arguments thus queried the economic sustainability of some of these livelihoods.

Health concerns were also expressed when it came to those who are into catering and trading food items. Chapter Seven noted poor sanitary provisions as one major challenge faced by entrepreneurs in Norton. It thus became questionable as to how healthy it is to run a food mart at a place where there is no constant water supply and electricity and where litter is often left uncollected for a long time. Some were worried about the conditions where the food is stored as well as its handling and suspected that it is likely to be unhygienic. Queries pertaining to environmental health and conservation also reigned in the unsustainability arguments raised by some respondents. Informal sector players were accused of “*disregarding laws that seek to safeguard the environment as they operate as they please*” (Mr Tichaona, NTC, KII). Those into extraction of construction material - river sand, pit sand, gravel, quarry stones, timber, firewood and brickmaking were accused of damaging the environment. It was argued that “*they leave behind open pits which are not only expensive to fill up but also pose a public health concern*” (Mr Tichaona, NTC, KII). I noted as I ‘*walked the city*’ that these open pits hold water during the rainy season and thus harbor parasites like mosquitoes, reptiles like snakes that might injure people. Some of the affected areas include vacant residential stands such that the owners are supposed to meet the cost of reclaiming the land. Those involved in vending and manufacturing were also accused of littering the environment. Allegations were that “*they are irresponsible in dumping their wastes*” (Mr Tichaona, NTC, KII).

Fisheries and illegal fishermen were also accused of “*overfishing and catching under-sized fish*” such that concerns were raised that the lakes risk totally running out of fish in the near future (Mr Marere, NRA, KII). If this is to happen, it will pose an economic danger not only to the town but the nation at large as the lakes supply fish to the nation and even beyond the national borders. Such issues thus led to arguments that doubted the sustainability of some of these livelihoods when it comes to environment protection. Concerns about the unsustainable use of the natural environment and related resources are consistent with Schnaiberg’s (1980) Treadmill of Production theory which explains how exploitation of the natural environment for resource extraction is mostly done with disregard for the environmental itself. Similar queries were also made by several other environment studies (Centre for Research and Development, 2014; Long, 2012; United Nations, 2006; Shoko, 2002). It is also important to note that SLA researchers emphasise construction of sustainable livelihoods calls for a sustainable use of the environment (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999; Carney, 1998). A disregard of the environment results in land

degradation, shortage of land for other economic activities, floods, climate change, water and atmospheric pollution which can result in health shocks and is largely against the dictates of sustainable development and sustainable livelihoods.

However, while the informal sector entrepreneurial activities are largely blamed for disregarding the environment, I noted that some of their activities are actually environmentally friendly. I noted how those who are into metal fabrication play a part in metal recycling. They would thus move around collecting dumped metals for re-use. Improperly disposed metals can contaminate/degrade the ground making it less conducive for other economic activities while presenting a health hazard to nearby communities. Informal welders/metal fabricators therefore play a part in reducing metal contamination on the physical environment. Related to this is also the role played by toy makers who use waste material like empty containers to make toys. They go around picking up any waste that could be of use to them and make new products. This in turn confirms their role in recycling waste material, reducing litter and playing a part in keeping the town clean.

A shortage of trading space and infrastructure is one factor that influenced some respondents to rule out the sustainability of livelihoods in the informal and SMEs sectors. Chapter Seven noted how this problem affects entrepreneurs. Operating under the direct sun or vulnerable to rains and winds in open spaces is not ideal for a business. Some products are affected by the sun's heat while others are damaged by rains and this definitely kills entrepreneurship, lowering returns and in the end casting doubts on the sustainability of such a business. Operating in the open is unsafe to the entrepreneurs themselves. Lack of entrepreneurial space relates to the SLA's physical capital, which the framework recommends as important in livelihoods construction. A shortage of this crucial resource presents a major challenge in the construction of sustainable livelihoods.

I however realised that most of those who dismissed the sustainability of informal and SMEs-based livelihoods were people who are not into them - either established businesspersons or formally employed. I gained a different perspective from the real social actors who are into these livelihoods, supported by other key informants, who together believed these livelihoods are reliable and sustainable despite the challenges noted earlier. The following subsection interrogates this view.

9.2.2 The Informal and SMEs as Sustainable Livelihoods

As others doubted the sustainability of these ‘newly invented’ livelihoods, a sizeable proportion of my respondents were of the view that informal and SMEs-based livelihoods are sustainable and secure. They argued that it is very possible for a household to lead a very successful life out of informal livelihood strategies despite the well-documented numerous challenges that haunt the social actors in these sectors. The following evidence and arguments were raised in support of this view.

9.2.2.1 The Informal and SMEs as Key Economic Contributors

The first supporting argument was based on my own observations during fieldwork and my interaction with livelihood literature. I argue that if the informal and SMEs sectors managed to sustain the national economy since the early 2000s when the formal economy started to collapse (Ndiweni and Verhoeven; 2013; Mbiriri, 2010; Ngundu, 2010) it is therefore justifiable to argue that livelihoods derived from these sectors can be sustainable. This argument resonates with several earlier researchers who found that the informal sector has become the country’s main economy. Tamukamoyo (2009) argues that as Zimbabwe’s economic woes continued to mount, the informal sector became the economy and actually the unofficial backbone of the national economy. As of the year 2000, the sector was already contributing up to 60% of the country’s GDP (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013; Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004). Mbiriri (2010) and Ngundu (2010) also maintain that the sector managed to sustain Zimbabwe as a whole during the country’s worst ever economic crisis of 2007-08. They note that it managed to provide livelihoods to most of the urban populace between 2006 up to 2009 when the formal economy was virtually grounded and is thus it is a force to reckon with.

The arguments given above are also applicable to Norton. As noted in Chapter One, the town has gone for over fifteen years now without a functional formal economy and it is the informal sector and small entrepreneurs that have kept it going. Both the retail and manufacturing sectors were taken over by the small scale business persons operating as SMEs and the informal sector. Chapter Seven noted that the informal sector in Norton is full of manufacturing entrepreneurs producing a very wide range of consumer products. The construction industry for example, is serviced by small scale hardware shops found across the town. Regarding food, small retail shops and vendors have also been providing all food and grocery items in the absence of large

supermarkets and chain stores and these have sustained the town for a notably long period of time.

The local authority also acknowledged that it is the SMEs and informal sectors that have kept the town and NTC running. Although it is operating at a very minimum budget, the council admitted that at least 80% of its revenue comes from these two sectors. An official from the entity said,

Without the informal sector, we could have closed down and the town would have virtually collapsed. It is through money collected from them that we managed to keep running and deliver the developments that we did over the past year. About 80% of our revenue comes from these people (Mr Mandebvu, NTC, KII).

This observation debunks the argument that informal businesses do not contribute towards the economy and towards development. Norton, as a whole continues to be sustained by the informal sector and small entrepreneurs and thus this can be used to dispute those dismissing livelihoods backed by the two sectors as lacking economic sustainability.

9.2.2.2 The Informal and SMEs sectors as Key Employers

Moving onto employment creation, arguments were made that these sectors managed and still continue to create jobs at a time when the formal sector has no capacity to do so. It was noted that the bulk of Norton's population depends on employment opportunities outside the formal sector and these have kept them going for a long time, enduring and withstanding the various forces and pressures that sought to destabilise or destroy them. Several scholars (Mudamburi, 2012; Kamete, 2004) assert that by year 2000 the informal sector was home to at least 50% of the county's employed population while Coltart (2008) notes that by 2005 at least 3 million Zimbabweans were relying on informal jobs, such that the sector played an important part in building the national economy. Chirau (2014) observes that in the absence of a prospering formal sector, the informal sector economy becomes the major source of income and livelihoods for the majority of urban families. This argument is also consistent with Schneider and Enste (2000) whose observation is that the informal sector has become a key employer and plays an active economic role in many African countries. The study found out that most households in Norton rely on informal sector-based employment and activities for their sustenance. As a result, arguments were made taking into consideration such observations. The main question asked was *"if the informal sector continues to sustain the national economy, how then can livelihoods*

derived from the sector be regarded as unsustainable?” (Baba Rongai, Male, Norton SME Association, KII).

9.2.2.3 The Informal and SMEs sectors as Resilient

I also noted that despite being subjected to numerous challenges, informal and SMEs livelihood activities are resilient. As Tawodzera (2010) puts forward, resilience refers to the capacity/ability to maintain functionality even during times of extreme distraction by making use of available means and skills to manage change. Chapter Eight found that players in these sectors face many problems but it also pointed out that they do not give up. They always emerge stronger and navigate past the many constraints littered along their way. Crackdown operations by local governments and central governments like ‘*Operation Murambatsvina*’ of 2005 and numerous others that followed, which were directed at the sector could not completely eradicate it. Corresponding arguments were also given by Chirau (2014) and Bratton & Masunungure (2006) who conclude that despite the various hostilities, the informal sector always re-emerges stronger, more resilient and highly adaptive to the various constraints confronting it. Entrepreneurs always device new methods of doing business to counter their challenges as Chapter Eight showed earlier.

9.2.2.4 Informal and SMEs Sector Challenges as Externally-driven

A close examination of most of the challenges that affect the sector shows that they are not unique to the informal sector but are also present even in the formal economy. Most of these challenges are not really informal sector failures but can be traced to incompetence by either local or central governments or both. I argue that most of the constraints are externally driven as opposed to emanating from within the sector. For example, an official from the Norton SMEs Association raised the concern,

We [informal and SMEs players] are accused of littering the ground but if we are to check at improperly disposed litter, we realise that some of it carries labels of established shops like OK. The bottom line is that there is shortage of trash bins at busy centres like Katanga. It doesn’t have anything to do with the informal sector (Baba Rongai, Male, Norton SME Association, KII).

From the above quote, it becomes apparent that service delivery is the major problem. After failure by the local authority to provide adequate trash bins and collect refuse in time, people resort to dispose rubbish all over and then the blame is put on informal sector players, who in objecting this emphasised that the council must, “*provide adequate bins and collect rubbish*

regularly and the problem of littering the ground will be a thing of the past” (Baba Rongai, Male, Norton SME Association, KII). I also noticed as I *‘walked the city’* that early in the morning before starting business, vendors at Katanga sweep their workplaces and the surroundings, an observation that left me querying if they are really the ones responsible for littering the environment when they could actually dedicate their time towards cleaning their surroundings. I even noticed that some informal sector players move around the town picking up empty bottles and plastic material which they would then use to make toys for sale. Such a move thus makes points to the fact that they play a role in keeping the town clean and the problem of littering might not entirely be for them to blame.

ZCIEA is the view that challenges faced by players in these sectors are linked to the failure by authorities to deliver services. One of its officials reasoned that the health concerns that are normally raised in relation to the informal sector are actually a result of a shortage of water, electricity and other related infrastructure. However, in case of a disease outbreak like cholera, it is the tendency of authorities to blame the informal sector. It is therefore my argument that most disease outbreaks are a result of shortage of clean water and sanitation services, which in any case can never be the fault of informal traders. Even in the absence of the sector, unclean water can still result in disease outbreak. It is not the duty of entrepreneurs to source their own water and electricity especially in urban set-ups. Instead, there are authorities responsible for that and if they fail to deliver, then they must take responsibility and stop blaming entrepreneurs for their failures. In this instance, I regard entrepreneurs as victims of poor service delivery.

A Norton SMEs Association official also responded to the environmental damage concerns raised against them by some quarters from among the respondents. In as much as those who are into extractive activities are indeed causing damage to the environment, they noted that it was only a symptom and that there is need to look at the root cause of such negative developments. He thus argued that after preaching entrepreneurship to the general populace as one of the solutions to poverty and unemployment, the government and local authorities are not doing enough to promote this policy. Brick-makers among others who are involved in illegal extraction have just showed their entrepreneurial abilities but the conditions do not permit them to explore their preferred economic paths and thus choose to deviate as reasoned by Merton’s (1965) deviation thesis.

In this regard, I thus argue that it is some of the policies and the conduct by government and local authorities that hinder the sustainability of the informal/SMEs sectors and not the informal and SMEs livelihoods *per se*. Poor service delivery and negative attitudes towards the sectors have a negative bearing on livelihoods. In short, pro-informal livelihoods arguments challenged the government and local authorities to “*provide adequate and clean water, sanitation health infrastructure and electricity, working spaces and other required services as you do for the formal sector and see if there will be any problems to worry about*” (Baba Rongai, Male, Norton SME Association, KII). Given adequate services and infrastructure, it was generally contended that informal sector and SMEs-based livelihoods are sustainable.

9.2.2.5 The Informal/SMEs Sectors as Livelihoods, Not Coping Strategies

Respondents who depend on informal sector jobs for their sustenance weighed in with more arguments in support of their ‘industry’ and their jobs as sustainable. Some portrayed the informal sector just as “*an unlucky and suppressed version of the formal sector*” noting that the only difference between the two is that “*the formal sector enjoys a lot of favours from authorities; favours which the informal and SMEs sectors are not privileged*” (Baba Nyamuda, 68, Retailer, IDI/KII). It was also argued that if given the same “*soft treatment is extended to the formal sector, the informal sector is a very good source of income and can lead to very reliable, dependable and sustainable livelihoods*” (Tau, 38, Cell phone/computer software dealer, IDI). Another argument stated,

the fact that there are many informally employed people who are doing better than some who are formally employed despite living their proper jobs way back or who have never tasted formal employment. There are many informal businesses doing far much better than other so-called formal entities (Mai Machisa, Female, Flea market owner, IDI).

It was noted that “*vendors among others in the formal and SMEs sectors are acquiring residential properties, building houses, sending their children even to boarding schools, colleges and universities*” from their “*so-called small earnings and unreliable livelihoods*” Enduza, Male, 33, Tuck-shop owner, IDI). Madzimai, for example, was planning to purchase her own residential stand in 2018 and the source of her funds is vegetable vending. If one can build secure and sustainable livelihoods out of the so-called poor and unsustainable livelihoods, what then can be said about them? A fish vendor who has managed to send her children to school, some up to university, some of whom now have good paying jobs, construct a house which she is renting out rooms, acquire some movable properties, what can be said about its sustainability? Can it still be

regarded as economically unsustainable when it managed to produce several other reliable livelihoods? She recounted her experiences,

When baba [my husband] lost his job, I quickly ventured into fish vending. It was difficult at first but later I was actually surprised that despite the worsening economy, we started leading a better life than when baba was still employed. I managed to send my children to school. Two are already working graduates, supporting us. We built a house here in Norton and bought a small truck. Today even if I am to quit, I won't struggle to survive; I can still live on what I managed to gather through vending. If fish vending helped to achieve this much, I don't doubt its sustainability as a livelihood (Mai Brian, Female, Fish vendor, IDI).

After examining evidences from collected data, I dismiss the view that portray informal/SMEs as short-term '*coping or survival strategies*' adopted during times of stress and not as livelihoods. As noted earlier, a livelihood is a long-term way of earning a living constituted of capabilities/assets and activities (Chambers and Conway, 1992) while a coping strategies is a short-term survival plan adopted by a household in response to a crisis so as to meet their immediate needs when their normal livelihoods are destroyed or disrupted (Tawodzera, 2011). I questioned that if a 'so-called' coping strategy can sustain a household for a period of up to fifteen years or more, does it continue to be a short-term survival strategy and at what point does a coping strategy become to be recognised as a livelihood. One FGD participant queried,

We have been doing this for years. To some of us selling vegetables has become our job and not a mere survival strategy. Yes when I started I thought it was just for a short time while I wait for better opportunities, but they never came, and for over fifteen years now I still survive on it. Things are tough yes but I have made progress in life, I can't complain about how my family is surviving (Vegetable vendor, Female, FGD 2).

One academic recognised vending "*as an independent livelihood that has its own coping or survival strategies*" and it is these coping mechanisms that "*are responsible for its survival and building resilience*" (Academic, 38, Norton resident, KII).

Institutions that are directly involved with these sectors, the Ministry of SMEs, ZCIEA and Norton SMEs Association are also of the view that the informal and SMEs sectors are sources of sustainable livelihoods. The SMEs Ministry argues that if they are treated with respect and are organised in orderly fashion, economic activities in these sectors can be very reliable and sustainable. It further argued that the sectors have provided employment to millions of people across the country and that despite challenges, they have sustained most households. Even with the shortage of capital, players in the sectors have come up with innovations to deal with this constraint. Chapter Eight noted how they have resorted to banking clubs as a way of raising

capital. The SMEs Ministry also noted that it had engaged local banks and convinced them to open SMEs windows to provide the sector with loan funding. While many banks are still to fully embrace this request, it noted that they are slowly coming to realise that the SMEs are the new cash cows and very soon they would be accommodating them. They are also encouraging banks and money lenders to accept immovable property such as furniture and electrical gadgets as collateral security. The Ministry has also been training entrepreneurs on financial literacy, money saving and investing and encouraging entrepreneurs to avoid impulse purchasing of domestic property. For example, instead of buying the latest smartphone, or a big screen TV, or a luxurious vehicle, they encourage them to go for simple gadgets which cost less and invest the other money into a business. Through these measures, the Ministry is content that the small businesses and informal sector was slowly achieving self-sustenance in funding. As a result, the sectors are also moving towards strengthening the sustainability of livelihoods based on them.

ZCIEA also noted that the fact that the sectors are involved in manufacturing shows that they are very crucial parts of the national economy. As such, they can be sources of sustainable livelihoods if treated with the same respect as the formal sector. They also argued that it can be used to drive reindustrialisation, reasoning that the government spends large sums of money bailing very few large companies which in the end fail. It is their argument that instead of giving say an amount like \$1 million to one company which will fail as has been the trend most of the times, it can be logical if it is to be shared among many small scale manufacturers who can utilise it better. A respondent from the organisation commented,

Give informal and SMEs entrepreneurs loans, adequate operating infrastructure and other incentives and see the wonders that they will perform. I can assure you that with adequate support, these guys can drive the country's re-industrialisation process. The fact that they are doing well under a difficult and resource constrained environment is a testimony that they have abundant potential (Mr Malaba, 59, ZCIEA, KII).

The Norton SMEs Association and the Residents Association also shared the similar views. They contended that the SMEs and informal sector-based livelihoods can substitute formal sector-based livelihoods. They argued that although some in the sector were enduring the threat of increasing poverty, the resilience that these livelihoods have exhibited shows that they can survive even extreme distractions. During the peak of the Zimbabwean economic crisis between 2008 and 2009 when supermarkets and shops were virtually empty, it is the informal sector that managed to supply basics like food, forex, detergents, clothing and transport to the people. They

maintained that it is the government and the local authority that suppress them, denying them the financial support that the formal economy usually gets, that paralyse their operations. As such, it will be wrong to classify the livelihoods as unsustainable because if the same hostilities that they face are also directed to the formal sector economy, it will not survive. The fact that the informal sector can survive where there is formal economy was also presented as an argument which supported the notion that it can be a full economy on its own which can sustain an economy. It was also noted that because of its ability to manufacture, the SMEs and informal sector can help revive a collapsed industry. Given the promotion that is needed by industry, informal industries can grow into established firms.

The study also noted that the sectors are slowly getting recognition from both the government and local authorities. The introduction of a whole government Ministry specifically set to oversee these sectors is a giant step towards its sustainability. NTC has also opened a department that is responsible informal and SMEs sectors, allocating them land and organising workshops to improve their entrepreneurial knowledge and this is an advantage to the sustainability of the sector. Other than these two, several NGOs are also coming in to support informal and SMEs-based livelihoods in the town. One such example is Tamiranashe Women's Trust which trains women in various entrepreneurship areas. Help German also helps people who have sound project proposals with training and provision of start-up equipment/material for their projects. Ndaiziva Community Development Trust also equips disadvantaged families with skills, which they would utilise to start their own businesses especially in the informal or SMEs sectors. The formation of a SMEs Association where entrepreneurs meet to discuss business, share business ideas and also attend training workshops is another huge stride towards enhancing the sustainability of these livelihoods. It is important to note that all these efforts are being made after the realisation that the sectors are indeed crucial components of the economy. If they were insignificant as was argued by some, no organisation will be investing its time and resources towards them. Above all, the informal sector was commended for promoting local foods since most of its food products are sourced from surrounding farms and rural settlements. It was thus hailed for not promoting foreign and genetically modified foods which are reported to be unhealthy for human consumption.

The coming of several organisations into the SMEs and informal sectors to equip them with resources to enhance livelihoods resonates with the SLA's transforming structures and processes and their influence in construction of livelihoods. According to DFID (1999) and Carney (1998), NGOs/CSOs, grassroots organisations/social movements play an important role in influencing policy and even encourage authorities to loosen some of their 'harsh' laws. In this case, the involvement of NGOs in some entrepreneurial projects makes it difficult for council and government to crack down on such projects. This in a way 'forces' the authorities to recognise the activities such that at the end, livelihoods are saved. Social movement groups like the Residents Association are also continuously pressurising the local council to be more accommodative and considerate and this is bearing some fruits as vending and other informal sector activities are becoming more recognised and acceptable in the town. Transforming structures and processes play an important role in determining how people will choose their livelihood strategies as given by the SLA. In Norton, the realisation by social actors that council is giving in to pressure on how to treat the informal and SMEs sectors, many are taking advantage and joining the sector to execute livelihood activities that are in line with their resources or expertise. Consequently, as a result of recognition by government and the local authority, entrepreneurs are slowly beginning to realise increased livelihood outcomes. With a bit of assistance, recognition and reduced harassment, actors are reaping more from their income-generating projects. This in turn points to enhanced sustainability of these livelihoods and the many testimonies noted earlier present yet another form of evidence.

With these arguments and evidence, the study recognises that although there are some extreme cases where some only earn to survive for the day, and where there are genuine environmental concerns, the informal and SMEs sectors can be reliable sources of sustainable livelihoods.

9.3 Chapter Summary

The Chapter discussed issues of sustainability of new livelihoods 'invented' by social actors in Norton in the wake of deindustrialisation and the consequent economic crisis. It was based on two main views: arguments against and for sustainability. Arguments against sustainability were moulded along the constraints associated with the 'new' livelihoods while the supporting side used the various innovation and inventions made by the sector and the role it plays in socioeconomic development as legitimate evidence that the livelihoods can indeed be

sustainable. It noted that most of those who disputed the sustainability of SME and informal sector livelihoods were not involved in any of the two. However, those involved including concerned institutions, acknowledged that although they face some challenges, these livelihoods remain reliable sources of sustainable livelihoods. An assortment of evidence was also presented to argue for the sustainability of SMEs and Informal entrepreneurship. These include the ability to create employment at a time when the formal economy was failing to, its economic contribution to the welfare and running of the town/local authority as well as '*graduating*' from being coping strategies to livelihood strategies that households can rely on long term basis. The next chapter discusses the overall findings of this study.

CHAPTER TEN

DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL DEBATES

10.1 Introduction

The subject of urban livelihoods has proved topical and complex. It has drawn several other related subjects which include urbanisation, industrialisation, deindustrialisation, urban governance, urban poverty, urban informality, sustainability and entrepreneurship among others. A number of ‘new’ debates and insights also emerged as the study unfolded. These add some insights into the on-going debates and discussions around urban livelihoods. Having managed to meet the main aim and objectives of the study, I deploy this chapter to discuss the major findings of study, and the various debates that I framed based on the findings and insights derived from the study as a whole.

10.2 Impacts of Deindustrialisation on Livelihoods

Close to two decades of industrial failure left the Zimbabwean economy in a comatose state with all sectors virtually grounded. As emphasised earlier, Zimbabwe’s case of deindustrialisation belongs to that category which Mbira (2015), Dasgupta and Singh (2006) and Michie (1997) called ‘*negative*’, ‘*early*’ or ‘*premature*’ deindustrialisation which was a result of poor economic and industrial performance. This is in direct contrast with the proposition that deindustrialisation is a natural phenomenon which results from positive economic growth and technological advancement, an argument advanced by Rowthorn & Ramaswamy (1997) and Rowthorn (1992). By its very nature, premature deindustrialisation is bound to bring with it some widespread and far-reaching negative impacts on the economy, local populations and more importantly in the context of this study, their livelihoods (Rodrik, 2015; Tregenna, 2011). Several authors (English, 2016; Strangleman, 2016; Mbira, 2015; Mah, 2012; Walkerdine and Jimenez’s, 2012; Winters *et al.*, 2011; Cowie and Heathcott, 2003; Weis, 1990; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982) contend that premature deindustrialisation has long-lasting adverse impacts which live to haunt host communities way after the industrial and plant shut downs are gone. This section discusses the findings on how this phenomenon impacted on livelihoods in Norton.

Premature deindustrialisation in Norton is responsible for the failure and collapse of such firms which include Hunyani, Lucas Batteries, Karina Textiles, David Whitehead Textiles, Central

African Forge, Allied Steel, Bestobell, Independent Coachworks, Dos Santos Shoes and Wilgrow among others. With these and other firms out of business, the local economy came to a standstill and it was the local population that was to bear the extreme brunt of this development as their livelihoods were severely affected. Failure of industry and the economy was actually a nationwide phenomenon as confirmed by several other scholars who wrote on the subject. Gunning and Oostendorp (2002) discovered that from 1991-1996 as deindustrialisation began in Zimbabwe, industrial productivity fell by at least 16%. Chipika *et al.* (2000) studied Zimbabwe's shoe industry and found that it was shrinking together with the economy. Bjurek and Durevall's (2001) study also discovered the manufacturing sector was already recording decreasing productivity as early as between 1991 and 1995 soon after the inception of ESAP. It is important to note that the period in question is the same period that firms in Norton like Hunyani, David Whitehead and Karina, among many also began to deindustrialise, with some setting ground for the imminent total collapse. With so many closed or collapsed firms, I can confirm that Norton industrial site represents an abandoned settlement and perfectly fits in Bluestone and Harrison's (1982) '*ghost town*' description.

The fall of industry and the economy was bound to have some negative impacts on employment in the town. As noted in earlier chapters, urban economies are highly monetised and virtually every product is purchased at the market (Tawodzera, 2010), surviving without an income is a major socioeconomic setback which affects one's livelihood and way of living. Formal jobs are one such source of income, making employment an important form of livelihood in the urban context. Loss of jobs and employment opportunities owing to closure of firms in manufacturing and other sectors in Norton presented a major livelihood challenge as social actors were forced to go without or with little incomes inadequate to cater for their basic needs. Lack of income (financial capital according to the DFID's SLA) also compromised other potential ways through which actors could construct alternative livelihoods. Currently unemployment in Norton remains a major livelihood concern. At a national scale, Saunders (2008) notes that deindustrialisation was followed by massive loss of jobs. By 2010, unemployment was forecasted to be at least 80% (Mutami and Chazovachii, 2013; Murisa, 2010), signifying a massive loss of jobs. For those who remained in their jobs, life was neither easy for them since the fall of industry and the economic crisis resulted in a fall in wages/salaries. This is consistent with Tawodzera (2011) and Potts (2006) who note that Zimbabwe's economic crisis saw the fall of real wages since the early

1990s and the impact continues to be disastrous. Elsewhere in the region, in South Africa, deindustrialisation saw unemployment rising at 2% per annum since 1994 following the closure of many firms and factories in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, something that resulted in retrenchment of many workers (Slater, 2010). With these well-documented impacts of deindustrialisation on employment from the local and international contexts, it becomes apparent that social actors in Norton could not be spared from a harsh livelihood environment that is associated with soaring unemployment.

In cash-sensitive environment that urban centres are, surviving without a job or an income has implications on a household's economic standing. Income determines a household or individual's poverty or prosperity and the food security status. With poor incomes, households in Norton were left with poor prospects of prospering and hence poverty became a real concern. In the absence of a functional economy where jobs are scarce, increasing poverty levels are a reality that haunts social actors. Urban poverty manifests in number of ways and one such manifested in form of poor and housing which has seen some urban dwellers in Norton staying in overcrowded conditions, incomplete houses or sub-standard shelter typical of shanty settlements. This study acknowledges that housing is a vital component of the financial capital which plays an important role in constructing livelihoods and its absence denotes vulnerability as given by the DFID's (1999) SLA. The failing economy with the aid of '*Operation Murambatsvina*' of 2005 resulted in a precarious housing situation, not only in Norton but in all urban centres across the country. Chirisa (2013) and Dube & Chirisa (2012) also realised the upsurge of informal and peri-urban housing in Harare and other urban centres as residents responded to the economic crisis as poverty in urban centres escalated. Several other researchers studied urban housing in Zimbabwe and their findings confirmed that as the country endured a severe economic crisis, urban poverty was also on the increase such that a shortage of decent urban housing became prevalent (Croese *et al*; 2016; UN-HABITAT, 2003; Homeless International, 2009). Some have since resorted to setting up sub-standard shelter and informal settlements and this denotes escalating poverty levels. The presence of such housing schemes like Marshlands and Kingsdale in Norton is a testimony of a town in a housing crisis.

Other than housing, poverty also exists in the form of food insecurity. Without a job or an income in an urban setting, it is difficult for one to provide basic food requirements for their

families and hence food insecurity becomes a reality. This is consistent with Tawodzera (2011) who realised that most households in Harare endure food shortages. USAID (2009), FEWSNET (2009) and IFRC (2009) also confirm this, noting that the aftermath of the Zimbabwean economic crisis saw most urban dwellers experiencing food shortage challenges since the early 2000s with some even requiring food aid. And indeed, concerns over shortage of food in Norton are among the most prominent findings that emerged from the study.

The absence of sanitation services like clean water and proper sewer disposal is another dimension of poverty. Without these essential services, residents are vulnerable to disease and poor health destructs the prospect of building livelihoods. While sickness costs the affected people some money that can be used to enhance a household's livelihood, it is important to note that a sick individual may not be able to execute their duties and his family is bound to succumb to other forms of poverty. Health denotes an important resource which plays a part in establishing human capital (SLA) and when compromised, it affects one's way of earning its livelihood (DFID, 1999). This study confirms that with the shortages of water that the town is experiencing and poor sewer reticulation system, the health situation precarious.

Deindustrialisation and the economic crisis generally resulted in poor service delivery in Norton. Facing financial constraints, responsible authorities are no longer able to adequately provide such services as water, electricity and refuse collection while the general maintenance of public infrastructure was also grossly compromised. In Chapter Six, the study noted that transport infrastructure (road and rail) in Norton has become poor while power cuts have become a new 'normal' over the last decade or so. Other infrastructural development projects (like the construction of shopping mall extending the CBD) were also halted. Vending sites have also been neglected for years, and less new vending infrastructure was developed over the period in question. It thus becomes worthwhile to realise that services and infrastructural developments that are in short supply in the town constitute important livelihood resources which the SLA and the TOP refers to as capitals. They thus play a part in the construction of sustainable livelihoods such that their shortage or short supply presents a major setback in constructing livelihoods (Morse and McNamara, 2013; Moser, 2007; Rakodi, 2002). Bourdieu's (1972) TOP, with the backing of a number of other scholars (Etzold, 2013; van Dijk, 2011) also emphasised the importance of access to such capitals in determining livelihood strategies. As pointed out earlier,

poor roads, lack of entrepreneurial infrastructure, water and electricity are among the most prevalent constraints that are confronting social actors as they reconstruct their livelihoods.

10.3 Livelihood Strategies in a Deindustrialised Economy

The following subsections discuss the livelihood strategies that are linked to urban centres in the context of an economy in crisis.

10.3.1 Formal Employment as a Source of Livelihoods

Having lost their conventional livelihoods which were largely dependent upon the formal economy, social actors in Norton were pushed into devising alternative means of survival. With limited formal sector opportunities, the informal and SMEs sectors emerged as the most accessible options such that the town witnessed an upsurge of such business ventures. However, before moving on to discuss informal/SMEs-based livelihoods, it is important to note that Chapter Seven revealed that some social actors still rely on formal sector jobs as their livelihoods. The study realised that the civil service, the private sector, (especially the retail sector) are still playing an important role in providing formal jobs in the town, though at a very small scale. Although scholars like Fox and Goodfellow, (2016), Grant (2006) and Potter and Lloyd-Evans (2014) emphasised the importance of the creation of formal jobs and maintaining urban livelihoods, this study can affirm the situation is different in Norton where it noted that the formal sector play a very little role in providing and creating employment. Instead, the informal/SMEs sectors emerged as the biggest employers in the town.

10.3.2 Entrepreneurship as a Source of Livelihoods

Upon the failure by the formal sector to provide employment to most of the social actors, entrepreneurship emerged as a powerful force through which social actors in Norton have been constructing livelihoods. Entrepreneurship can be a primary source of a livelihood on its own or a supplement to an already existing one. Acs and Armington, (2006) view it as a positive step towards addressing the challenge of unemployment while Karlan and Valdivia (2011) regard it as a way through which the marginalised persons can earn some income for their sustenance. Hussain and Bhuiyan (2014) contend that entrepreneurship normally reduces poverty and improves people's living standards.

This study adopted a sociological perspective on entrepreneurship which argues that social experiences play a critical role in driving social actors into entrepreneurship (Ndiweni and

Verhoeven, 2013). It argues that the poor socioeconomic environment in Norton played a part in inculcating social actors the agency and urgency that is required to find alternatives to their livelihood challenges, pushing them into entrepreneurship to sustain their lives and families. The study also supports this argument with Long's (2001) Actor-Oriented theory which states that when confronted by challenges, social actors always devise their own ways of dealing with them.

Informal sector-based livelihoods are largely composed of but not limited to informal manufacturing, informal services provisions, trading of finished; new and second-hand products and the broad '*hustling*' category. Social actors venture into a type of entrepreneurship in which they can make use of their available resources, skills and expertise to reap some income and sustain their lives. One notable feature of this sector is the tendency by social actors to defy the rules and regulations that govern their respective fields. While Bourdieu's (1972) TOP suggests that each social field is governed by a set of rules which social actors ought to follow if they are to be 'allowed' to operate in their respective fields, this study argues that in times of economic crisis, the informal/SMEs sectors follow little of these field regulations. Social actors tend to employ some mechanisms to by-pass field rules akin to Merton's (1965) deviation thesis – a notion that also gained de Soto's (1989:xix) backing that when the situation goes out of hand, informal sector actors go all the way to even "renounce legality". This argument can also be seconded by one of the basic tenets of Long's (2001) Actor-Oriented theory which states that faced with difficult situations which threaten their lives, social actors do not normally wait for external intervention but rather 'invent' their own strategies to generate satisfying outcomes. Put in the context of this study, when confronted by a threatening livelihood situation in which formal jobs are scarce, social actors found alternatives in the contested informal/SMEs sectors. How they managed to come up with innovations to counter the challenges that they encounter in reconstructing their livelihoods exhibits their agency (Bosman, 2004; Long, 2001) and deviation tendencies (Merton, 1965).

The role of the informal and SMEs sectors in constructing livelihoods in Zimbabwe has been confirmed by a number of other studies. Chirau (2015) notes that informal trading sites like Magaba, Siyaso and Mupedzanhamo in Harare are home to thousands of self-employed residents earning their living there. Several other studies also confirm that the informal/SMEs sectors have become a force to reckon with in constructing urban livelihood in the wake of the economic

crisis that left the formal economy in a state of paralysis (Tamukamoyo, 2009; Muzvidziwa, 2000; Dube and Chirisa, 2012; Mupedziswa, 2009; Kamete, 2004; Muzvidziwa, 2000). From the global context, several scholars recognise the sectors as crucial in most of the developing world countries (Vanek *et al.*, 2014; Chen, 2006; Schneider and Enste, 2000; de Soto, 1989; Acs *et al.*, 2008; Klapper *et al.*, 2010). Ogundele *et al.*, (2012) argues that it also contributes towards private sector development, industrial development and can be the rallying point towards successful industrialisation. According to Chatterji *et al.* (2014:142) small start-ups have a vast potential to influence local development and “can collectively shape the economic destiny of a locale.” In times of economic stresses such as deindustrialisation in the context of study where large firms tended to be affected most, informal and small enterprises develop quick resilience and survive, and hence normally emerge as the major employers and economic contributors (Shariff and Peou, 2010). With such a host of supporting evidence from both local and international contexts at hand, the role of informal and small businesses in constructing livelihoods and socioeconomic development can never be doubted.

10.3.3 Agriculture as a Major Urban Livelihood: ‘Reverse Modernity?’

This study noted that agriculture is fast becoming one of the main livelihoods in Norton as residents have resorted to ‘invade’ all unutilised spaces, vacant residential stands, abandoned industrial properties and backyards to practise farming. Urban farming is providing food for household consumption while those who have access to large pieces of land have resorted to fresh farm products businesses. However, urban farming is restricted by a shortage of land. It is this study’s argument that land as a natural capital is a very vulnerable in urban contexts since it is easily consumed by infrastructural development projects and transformed into physical capital. Where one finds vacant space in a city, it is clear that the land is set aside for infrastructural projects and will soon be converted into physical capital. wa Thiong’o (1977:81), in one of his creative writings aptly captures how urbanisation and capitalism have consumed natural capital,

‘This land used to yield...What happened [to it]?’ Inquired Ruoro ... [Muturi answered]... ‘You forget that those days land was not for buying. It was for [free] use... [and] was also covered by forests...but the forest was eaten by the railway’

However, even with the little land that is still available, this study can confirm that urban farming still plays a pivotal role in constructing and maintaining urban livelihoods in Norton.

Agriculture plays this role despite the perspective that it is largely regarded as a rural and peri-urban livelihood. This finding stands in sharp contrast with some scholars who recognise as urban livelihoods only those activities that are based on industry or manufacturing and the formal economy at large. Grant (2006) argues that urban livelihoods are supposed to be backed by non-agricultural activities, formal trading, and waged or salaried employment. Montgomery *et al.* (2003) regard urbanisation as the restructuring, reorientation and transformation of economic activities from being agriculture-based towards industrial and service sectors activities. Bryson *et al.*, (2004) realise that the economic boom in East Asian cities was largely a result of the reduction of agricultural labour, replacing it with manufacturing and services sector jobs. Moreover, the definition of an urban centre, although it differs from one context to another, basically excludes agriculture as a main source of livelihoods. Zimbabwe for example recognises an urban centre as that which has at least 2,500 inhabitants of whom more than 50% of the employed must be engaged in 'non-agriculture activities' while in Botswana, an urban centre is that where at least 75% of the livelihoods are 'non-agriculture' (United Nations Population Division, 2014). From Grant's (2006) conceptualisation of what constitutes urban livelihoods to UNPD's (2014) definition of an urban centre, it is clear that agriculture is less regarded as both an economic activity and as a livelihood in urban contexts.

This conceptualisation is also consistent with Rostow's (1971) Modernisation theory which views urbanisation as part of a natural transformation process of societies from agrarian (traditional) to industrialised (modern) ones (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016; Bradshaw and Noonan, 1997; Rostow, 1971). Basing on this proposition, urbanisation thus entails 'phasing out' agriculture-based livelihoods and replacing them with industry/manufacturing/formal economy-based ones. In this regard, agriculture is actually associated with backwardness, 'traditionalness', underdevelopment and lack of civilisation and modernity while industrialisation is seen as the 'modern' way of earning livelihoods and as the only path towards building 'modern' (urban) societies and economies. This study, however, discovered that most of the social actors in Norton who at once used to rely on industry and the formal economy for their survival are retracing their way back to farming in their quest to reconstruct their livelihoods after the economic crisis that crippled industry and the formal economy at large. The study thus argues that agriculture can still play a huge role in constructing urban livelihoods – bigger than that by the manufacturing industry - especially during times of economic stresses. It thus coined

the term '*reverse modernity*' as a critique of the notion of modernity as portrayed by the Modernisation theory. '*Reverse modernity*' in this context refers to a situation where urban dwellers shift from relying on industry to agriculture-based livelihoods. If we are to follow the dictates of this theory, reverting to agriculture thus becomes a 'backward step' in terms of civilisation. This study treats this phenomenon as an innovation that the urban populace devised in response to livelihood crises and not a back-step, and thus questioning the applicability of the modernisation theory in Zimbabwe's case of urbanisation, industrial and economic development. The study also argues that the process of urbanisation does not occur in a linear pattern but rather in more of a cylindrical manner. Such an argument also poses some implication to the discourse of urban development. It ushers in the need to rethink and reconsider the role agriculture in urban development and for planners to plan considering the fact that farming does not quickly disappear to pave way for industrialisation during the process of urbanisation but has the potential to stay longer and be part of the urban processes.

10.4 Livelihood Challenges

While the study found that entrepreneurship has become a key source of livelihood, it has not been without its fair share of challenges. Social actors in the informal/SMEs sectors endure numerous constraints as they struggle to construct their livelihoods. Chief among these challenges is lack of funding, which the SLA refers to as financial capital while the TOP calls it economic capital. Without this important livelihood resource, entrepreneurship is a difficult field to venture. It is true that the informal/SMEs sectors is applauded for demanding little start-up capital, but that is only at a very basic level, probably on a short term or '*from hand to mouth*' basis. For one to construct some significant livelihood, one needs to invest a significant amount of capital so that they can get better returns. Even after starting small, the intense competition in the sectors requires players to, at some point, increase their stock so as to survive in business and this points to more capital. Moreover, licensing, construction of entrepreneurial premises, transport, fines and penalties also require one to have a significant capital. Now that most players in the sector do not have what it takes to access funding, lack of financial/economic capital remains one of their worst challenges. Lack of collateral security, bank accounts and institutional support make it difficult for them to access capital (Chirau, 2014; Ngundu, 2010; Tibaijuka, 2005). Melamed et al., (2011) also noted that in most developing countries lack of

access to capital and credit for is one major challenges affecting business firms. If formal sector firms are facing this challenge as well, then the worst should be expected to unregistered entities.

Lack of access to financial capital and poor recognition by institutions also leads to a shortage of entrepreneurship infrastructure and other essential services like water and electricity. Even where operating space is allocated, in most cases it requires individuals to construct their own structures. Since most lack capital, they end up putting up some sub-standard structures which may not withstand extreme weather conditions. Moreover, the wood and plastic shaky structures are not durable to last long and may not be very attractive and customer-friendly. Their disorganised site that such structures create can also easily trigger crackdown from local authorities, most of which are known to be aiming to achieve clean and attractive cities/towns, leading to destruction of such structures. This is typical of '*Operation Murambatsvina*' that destroyed all 'illegally' built structures and informal businesses in Zimbabwe's urban centres in 2005 (Chirau, 2014; Bratton and Masunungure, 2006). Illustrating a shortage of entrepreneurial infrastructure, Chirau (2014) notes that vending infrastructure in most cities/towns in Zimbabwe is overwhelmed by the rising population of informal sector players as the economy continued to decline, as some went all the way to occupy the streets and other undesignated points. A shortage of entrepreneurial infrastructure also saw the proliferation of backyard/home industries in urban centres (Masakure, 2006). The SLA regards this infrastructure as part of the physical capital and its shortage is a setback in construction of sustainable livelihoods.

Harassment by authorities is another setback that entrepreneurs in the SMEs/informal sectors endure which disrupts the construction of livelihoods. With partial recognition from government and local authorities, social actors in the sectors are vulnerable to harassment by officials. The presence of council police in taxi terminuses, in informal/SMEs sectors industries and market places as well as their regular patrolling of residential areas is a cause of concern to many entrepreneurs. ZimParks officials also patrol the nearby lakes and game parks in an attempt to curb poaching. The ZRP also regularly mounts roadblocks such that commuter operators feel threatened by this move. Harassment results in loss of income as at times social actors are chased away from their workplaces, sometimes arrested, made to pay fines, have their goods confiscated, or have their marts destroyed. Such distractions are not good for business and compromise the process of livelihood construction. The mention of harassment ushers into

discussion ‘*Operation Murambatsvina*’ and the subsequent clean-up sessions that are launched by government and local authorities on regular intervals across the country (Chirau, 2014; GoZ, 2005). The SLA attributes this to policies and legislation which constitute transformation structures and processes, and emphasise that these shape livelihoods depending on how friendly or unfriendly they are (Twigg, 2001; DFID, 1999), something that this study also reinforces.

The continuous influx of more and more players in the informal/SMEs businesses has made the sectors very competitive. Other than competing on their own, they also face competition from established businesses. This is to the disadvantage of many players in the sector as it threatens to reduce their earnings. Several researchers have also noted this and argued that competition is indeed a real challenge that seeks to paralyse the sector (Ngundu, 2010; Tibaijuka, 2005). While Norton’s closeness to Harare has on one hand acted as a positive when it comes to sourcing of cheaper goods and services for resale, on the other hand it is also a disadvantage in that established firms in Harare still continue to lure customers from Norton and this negatively impacts on local firms. For example, Norton residents who ‘work’ in Harare rarely do their shopping in Norton. Harare continues to enjoy that ‘big brother’ role that it has always been and this has left local firms in Norton vulnerable. I thus found the informal/SMEs sector firms to be vulnerable to large players firstly from around Norton and secondly to those in Harare. While vulnerability has been largely discussed with reference to households or individuals, as has been the case in DFID’s (1999) SLA, this study argues that it can extend to include the informal/small businesses, which besides intense competition, are also exposed to various other constraints; lack of capital, harassment, poor infrastructure, political interference, lack of recognition among others. Combined, these factors make the sector itself vulnerability. Consequently, the same SLA vulnerability context as given by DFID (1999) can also be used at a slightly higher level and applied in the context of firms.

10.5 How the Informal and SMEs Sectors Continue to Thrive

When confronted by constraints in the entrepreneurial field, this study argues that social actors are not passive and do not give up. Instead, they make use of a variety of their ‘*knowledges*’ and skills to deal with the challenges that they face as they try to construct their livelihoods. The quest to fight extreme competition from well-established monopolies has seen informal and SMEs sectors players adopting and making wide use of ICT as a marketing tool. The use of

various social media platforms, internet and the mobile phones thus expand the market to faraway places while entrepreneurs enjoy quick dissemination of information to multitudes of audiences. It is a common thing to hear clients from as far as Harare and Chitungwiza making inquiries about products sold in Norton in local advertising WhatsApp groups. Information and idea sharing also got a major boost with the adoption of ICT by the informal/SMEs players.

It has since become easy to disseminate information about a potential risk, or an important gathering which can be of interest or benefit to entrepreneurs. The use of music, poetry, dance and promotion and road-show style of marketing also play a role in luring potential customers and is consistent with Sun Tzu (1994:47) who realises that “on the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough [...and] hence the institution of gongs and drums.” Music and dance thus are the ‘gongs’ and ‘drums’ in such cases which help traders to reach beyond where their voices/shouting can take them since they capture both the ears and eyes of passers-by, who in turn become part of the clientele base. The adoption of plastic money/mobile money as a medium of payment also keeps entrepreneurs in business during times of cash shortages, and also enhanced their competitiveness. Such an innovation plays a part in enhancing survival and the economic sustainability of SME/informal sector-based livelihoods.

Diversification of economic activities is another strategy that social actors in Norton make use of in their quest to build livelihoods field. It entails adoption of multiple economic activities at once, as opposed to one, and bringing them together to constitute the overall livelihood. When one activity is hit by a calamity, a household can still continue to rely on the other activities and can even use income from other activities to bail out the failing one. Although Tawodzera (2010) somehow infers that diversification among the poor merely means doing more to get the same on the contrary, this study argues that doing more of what means getting more livelihood return. Even those in formal employment are also involved in other economic activities other than their jobs to earn extra income. It creates a backup to the main livelihood in an event that it fails. Diversification plays a part in strengthening people’s livelihoods, to resist shocks and stresses and thus enhancing their sustainability. *Msoja* and *VaManyunga’s* cases given earlier attest to this.

Social actors also identify market niches that were left vacant by the collapse of the formal economy to take advantage of them to venture into business. The economic crisis left local

authorities and the corporate world being unable to provide some goods and services which the informal/SMEs players are taking advantage of in piecing their livelihoods. The study realised that in as much as the fall of industry and the economic meltdown was a disaster, it was a blessing to others since it paved the way for them to venture into business. It afforded them the opportunity to use their entrepreneurial skills and abilities, something that they would not have been able to do had the economy remained intact and had they remained employed by someone somewhere. *Baba Tinaye's* and *'Mr Tee's'* cases presented earlier provide examples of how a failing local economy led them into realising their entrepreneurial potential. Such an observation reinforces the sociological perspective on entrepreneurship which argues that social experiences can play a critical role in driving social actors into entrepreneurship (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013; Maphosa, 1998).

The use of residential properties as commercial or multiple/mixed purpose use is another strategy that has seen informal/SMEs sectors moving away from the CBDs where rentals are exorbitant and to public spaces where they are usually regarded as 'illegal' in residential districts. This strategy comes with the advantage of convenience in that it brings the goods and services closer to the people. For example, home-based shops operate for long hours. As long as someone is still awake, then s/he would still be available to serve any customers who might come to buy something. In cases of emergency, it is even possible for customer to make special requests to be served even outside operating hours, for example one can knock to buy pain killers even at midnight if they fall ill - something that is impossible with established shops. Moreover, it also brings with it the advantage of cheaper rentals when compared to pure business properties. Above all, it comes as a solution to the challenge of shortage of entrepreneurial space and infrastructure and related effects. Such a strategy is thus a positive step towards enhancing competitiveness and sustainability.

Investing in one's hobby is another strategy that the study found to be a way of venturing into the world of business. It discovered that a number of advantages that can be derived from this method of starting a business venture. Firstly, there is ample time for one to learn about a business whilst it is still a hobby before transforming it into an entrepreneurship venture. The assumption here is that one will take time to acquire significant knowledge about their hobby and by the time they decide to turn it into a business, they are likely to have a lot of knowledge about

what they are going to be doing. Secondly, hobbies are usually driven by passion and this is likely to come in as an advantage to the entrepreneur. The argument here is if one can do something wholeheartedly and successfully just for fun, prospects are high when they are doing it for economic gains especially during a time when they are facing some livelihood challenges. The same passion they have when doing it for fun is likely to lead their business to success.

Thirdly, one can be ‘opportunistic’ and take advantage of a sudden increase in market demand and enter the market by a storm. If one is into flower growing as a hobby and keeps a significant amount of flowers in their garden, they can quickly create a clientele base by entering the market at that time when supply is short. This way, they can enjoy maximum profits. Someone who is already in the same business cannot do the same since they are already driven by profits and they cannot afford to delay their product from entering the market once it is ready since this will lead to losses. Fourthly, if the business fails, it is for the entrepreneur to go back to the drawing table, downgrade it back to a hobby and start all over again. As a result of these assumptions or projected advantages, the study concludes that investing in a hobby can be a very good way of joining the world of entrepreneurship and hence the introduction of what it called the ‘*Hobbipreneurship*’ thesis. The idea is expanded diagrammatically as shown in Figure 27 below.




Figure 26: The ‘Hobbipreneurship’ Model (Own Construct)

The resilience of the informal and SMEs sectors has also seen them finding a place in the formal supply chain system. As I have noted earlier, before the informal sector became a force to reckon with, players were excluded from the main supply chain. They would either get their products from the retailers, where the consumers also used to shop and this impacted their earnings, or

from cross-border trading. To find small or informal traders directly procuring from the producer or distributor was unheard of. Goods and services used to follow the normal flow, following each and every level of distribution. The following flow diagram shows how products are distributed in normal/formal economies.



Figure 27: Normal/traditional/Formal Supply Chain (Based on van der Vorst, 2004))

However, the rise of informal business activities has seen the distortion of the ‘normal’ supply chain and birth of a new, complicated one. This study attempted a diagram to show these complications as shown below.




Figure 28: Supply Chain Diagram (Consumer Goods) in a Highly Informalised Economy (Own Construct)

It attributes the emergence of such a complex supply chain system to two main factors. Firstly, as the economy continued to tumble, the informal sector pushed its way into the formal supply chain for its survival. Today, informal sector players get their orders from wherever they see convenient; producer, distributor, wholesale, informal middleman or the retailer. It also noted the presence of the informal middlemen who assume the role of distributors but on informal basis. They buy on behalf of those retailers who are located in remote areas, and are given incentives by the producers depending on their sales. Households have also adopted this strategy where

they go to procure their groceries or any other stuff straight from the producer, distributor or wholesaler to enjoy lower prices. Secondly, formal businesses also realised that they were losing a lot of money by excluding the informal sector and have thus moved in to harness the massive benefits that are found outside the formal economy. Producers, distributors and wholesalers now sell directly to the informal sector no matter how small the order may be and this helps us to explain why the sight of producers/distributors delivering goods even at street markets has become very common. In short, the two sectors need each for survival and hence the need to work together resulting in the creation of a very complex supply chain system presented in the above figure. The study also used this case to argue that the fact that the two sectors are working together in harmony is evidence that there is no real distinction between them - an argument advanced by earlier researchers (Valodia & Devey, 2012; Hart, 2007; du Toit & Neves, 2007).

10.6 Social Capital, Spiritual Capital and the Role of Hope

While it has been argued that people of diverse backgrounds put together and the lack of traditional systems that promote social relations makes social capital less significant in urban contexts (Jabeen *et al.*, 2009), this study stands to contradict this. In this study, it emerged that social capital plays a part in enhancing people's livelihoods. Churches, families, other social groups and organisations bring people together to create the once missing bonds that promote social networking. They provide platforms, upon which members interact, build interpersonal relationships, social cohesion and encourage people to exist as entities as opposed to individuals and to confront their challenges collectively as well as bailing each other in times of trouble. These tend to play the role of the missing traditional systems in promoting networking such that the study contends that social capital is an important resource in enhancing urban livelihoods.

Moreover, judging on how most of my respondents believed in supplication and that if one does good for others, their work shall be blessed and they will be rewarded in future, made the study to realise the important role '*spiritual*' beliefs in people's lives. It thus assent with Morse & McNamara (2013) that spiritual beliefs play a role in constructing livelihoods and deserve to be included it as a standalone capital in the SLA. Other than spirituality, the study also argues that '*hope*' is an important tool that equips social actors with the strength to keep standing and even move forward even when things are not moving and where circumstances seek to blow them as

highlighted earlier. Emphasising the significance of hope in effecting human agency, Freire (1993:92) writes,

Hope is rooted in men's incompleteness, from which they move out in constant search... Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it... Hope, however, does not consist in crossing one's arms and waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by hope; and if I fight with hope, then I can wait.

Tembo (2012:19) reminds us that “it is on the basis of hope that people can meaningfully wage a struggle for their own liberation” and that hope makes people to see “agony and misery as temporary conditions that justify struggle.” He further highlights that without it, “life loses its vitality and the masses lose the power to act with will and intent.” Chiwome (2002:239) also enlightens us to the fact that “without hope life crumbles like a clay doll in the tropical rain.” Rooted in such a wealth assortment of arguments on the importance of hope, and supported by how the notion of hope was prominently raised by most of my respondents, the study does not hesitate to argue that ‘hope’ is a powerful resource that plays a central role in piecing up livelihoods during times of distress.

10.7 Sustainability Issues

Findings from the study contributed to the long debate on issues around livelihood sustainability. In as much as informal sector and SMEs based livelihoods are generally regarded as unsustainable, this study denies this umbrella categorisation or stereotyping of all informal livelihoods. It is very true that there are serious sustainability issues raised about the sector but we will have done an injustice if we are to dismiss the sector as wholly unsustainable? What then will we say of the ‘success livelihood stories’ given by a number of social actors earning their living from informal activities? This section seeks to address these queries.

Views querying the sustainability of informal sector and SMEs-based livelihoods were mainly centred on the challenges that players in the sectors constantly face. Such constraints, as presented in Chapter Seven, include lack of capital, little recognition from authorities leading to harassment and persecution of actors in the sector, high competition and a poor/saturated market, political interference and lack of proper infrastructure. The study however noted that critics of these livelihoods only consider the challenges associated with the ‘industry’ and end there. They do not consider the various inventions made by the social actors in the sectors as they seek to

deal with these constrictions. Their doubts are also motivated by the various ‘myths’ or misconceptions of the sector as discussed earlier in the study

The study argues that since most of the critics of informal sector and SMEs-based livelihoods were not participants in these activities, they lack a deeper understanding of how the sector operates. After interacting with informal and SMEs activities, the study realised that livelihoods based on the sectors can be very sustainable. Evidence gathered from the field suggested that although some of these activities are still being done in a haphazard manner for immediate survival purposes, this is not always the case. Those who are involved in these activities professed that their livelihood strategies are very reliable and can be very sustainable if the authorities give them adequate recognition and respect in the same way they do for the formal sector. Despite the many challenges which threaten their livelihoods, social actors involved have devised a number of innovations that have helped them to stay afloat. The adoption of modern day, creative marketing tools, embracing technology and online payment system, introduction of home-based entrepreneurial activities among others have done a lot in strengthening the SMEs and informal sectors.

The major points to note when it comes to the sustainability debate are as follows. Firstly, due to the many innovations that have been developed by players in these sectors, it is true that informal and SMEs livelihoods have grown to become stronger and resistant to various socioeconomic stresses and shocks. If the sectors managed to survive such destructive measures as ‘*Operation Murambatsvina*’, it is a clear testimony that they have become resilient enough and have thus grown to become sustainable. The second argument is based on the livelihood diversification strategy. Engaging in a variety of socioeconomic activities at once by players in the informal sector is one strategy that has been used to enhance the sustainability of their livelihoods. These activities complement each other and are likely to bring more returns than when one is concentrating on a single activity. For instance, when one activity is not performing well, one can still rely on other livelihood strategies and still manage to sustain life. As a result, livelihood diversification as a livelihood strategy has improved sustainability. Although Tawodzera (2010) argued that diversification in the informal sector means ‘doing more to get the same’, this study argues that one can actually earn more by engaging in multiple livelihood activities and hence diversification strengthens livelihoods.

Improved organisation of the sectors also stood as strong argument that supported the notion that informal sector and SMEs deliver sustainable livelihoods. The formation of saving clubs to assist each other in raising and saving capital and use of social media for marketing their products and services provide evidence of how organised they have become. The aspect of organisation also goes on to include grouping themselves into organisations like ZCIEA, Norton Vendors Union, Norton SMEs Association and even the Residents Association through which they can lobby, advocate and speak in one voice when it comes to airing their concerns. This high level of organisation has helped them to get recognition from both the government, local authorities and the non-governmental or other civil society organisations and this has maximised the fight for their rights. As noted earlier, the formation of a whole government Ministry to oversee the sectors. This is also complimented by the establishment of a department that oversees the informal and SMEs sectors within the local authority while on the other hand the coming in of money-lending institutions is yet another positive stride towards enhancement of economic sustainability of livelihoods in these sectors.

The sector has also been credited for its role in training and skills development. As graduates leave school and fail to get jobs in the so-called mainstream economy, some are absorbed into the SMEs and informal sectors where they acquire some skills as they prepare themselves for ‘proper’ jobs in future. Other than graduates, the sectors also equips those without any formal training with some vocational skills in areas like construction, garment making, events management, carpentry, metal fabrication, catering, retailing, marketing and motor mechanics among others. It thus becomes an alternative to formal school training as the trainees will grow to become ‘experts’ in their various areas of trade, an innovation that supports de Soto’s (1989: xix) argument that “where there are no jobs, they [informal sector players] invent jobs, learning in the process all they were never taught.” Ogundele *et al.*, (2012) is also of the view that small entrepreneurs do not only create employment but also contribute towards sustainable economic development, innovation and re-allocation of resources. Jennings (2000) commended this type of businesses noting that they promote sustainable and durable change. Chatterji, Glaeser and Kerr (2014) also applaud small entrepreneurs for joining hands in contributing immensely towards economic growth and development of their respective locales while other researchers (Mbiriri, 2010; Ngundu, 2010; Shariff and Peou, 2010) reason that they can stand up to sustain the economy in times of economic recessions which large firms normally fail to sustain. As such, to

label a sector which plays such an important role in employment creation, economic growth and development, skills training and poverty reduction as wholly unsustainable may not be an 'honest' portrayal.

This is however not to deny the fact that there are also some sustainability challenges that is associated with livelihoods based on these sectors. It is true that supplying of building material; sand, stones, gravel, water, bricks and poles by informal sector players results in environmental degradation concerns. These include reckless clearance of vegetation, open pits; exploitation of undesigned areas mostly set aside for other developments, water, air and land pollution. Disposal of waste substances; engine oils, fuels, glass and paints is also another environmental concern arising from 'open garages' where faulty vehicles are fixed at very affordable and re-sprayed at affordable prices. Such environmental concerns affect the sustainability of these livelihoods since they breach the part of concept of sustainable development which emphasises the need to meet "meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the options of future generations" (UNDP, 1990:61) and the notion of 'intergenerational livelihood strategies' as advanced by Moser (2007; 1998). Such livelihoods also defy Carney's (1998) conceptualisation of sustainable livelihoods which include the ability to cope with and recover from stresses and shocks without undermining the natural resource base.

Nevertheless, before wholly blaming informal sector activities for being environmentally unfriendly, this study noted a few cases where informal entrepreneurs were actually helping to clean the environment. These include toy makers who go around picking up empty plastic bottles, empty cans, rubber, tyres and plastic papers which they later use to make their toys. Metal fabricators also go around collecting and picking up scrap metals for re-use while some move around buying and collecting faulty car batteries which they would repair. They even encourage people not to dispose them but to keep them and consider donating them or selling them to recyclers at a cheaper price. This on its own provides some evidence that the informal sector is also playing a role in trying to maintain a sustainable environment.

In short, the study argues that sustainability or lack of it in the informal sector activities is all about attitude by stakeholders. If those in authority choose to be negative about the sector, then its survival is hugely compromised and sustainability will fail. If the same attitude is also given to the formal sector, it will also definitely fail. Even the argument that informal sector and SMEs

players do not contribute towards national economic development does not hold water. I say so taking noting that that Zimbabwe does not have an effective tax revenue collection mechanism in place (Hove and Hove, 2016; Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, 2016). The argument here is thus that having a poor tax collection system is not the fault of those operating in the SMEs and informal sectors. If we have large corporates failing to remit their taxes and the tax collector is doing nothing about them, do we really expect street traders to be that obedient? If the tax collector cannot tax established and known firms, how then can they manage to collect tax from a business of ‘no fixed aboard’? The study thus argue that only after putting proper tax collection mechanisms can we start blaming informal sector and SMEs for not being tax compliant.

10.8 Revisiting the SLA: Towards a Revised Framework?

Engagement with the SLA by this study realised that there are challenges in using this framework in analysing and understanding urban livelihoods outside the formal economy. In as much as the framework captures the bulk of the important aspects of livelihoods, the study felt there are some areas which need a close examination. These are presented as follows.

10.8.1 Spirituality as a Capital

The study argues that there is need to include ‘*Spirituality*’ as a separate capital. Spiritual capital proved to be one of the most important capitals that influence how social actors construct their livelihoods. During these trying times that social actors in Norton are enduring, the study found out that the majority of the people have resorted to exploiting their spiritual beliefs. Almost all of respondents mentioned something about believing that there is an ‘invisible hand’ somewhere that guides them as the walk the different paths of their lives. Prayer also emerged as an important tool that actors rely on, and this was aided by spiritual music such as gospel. Although spirituality has been classified under the social capital category, this study reasons that inner beliefs do not require networks or groups. It further argues that it is still possible to have members of the same family or any other form of grouping holding different or opposing beliefs. It thus joins Morse & McNamara (2013) and Stark & Finke (2000) in proposing spirituality as a standalone capital in the SLA.

10.8.2 ICT as Liaison Resource between Physical and Social Capital

ICT proved to be an important resource in building livelihoods. As noted in Chapter Eight, it is widely used for marketing products and services not only by formal businesses as has been the

case before, but also by SMEs and informal entrepreneurs. They also widely use social media platforms to share entrepreneurial information while at the same adopting mobile and e-money transfer systems to enhance earnings – something that was never seen before. The study argue that in as much as the SLA regards it as part of physical infrastructure, the role it plays in promoting social networking also makes it an important aspect of social capital. Because of this interplay between physical and social capital, this study suggests that ICT is more than physical capital but also a social networking resource and thus propose it as an independent capital which is located in-between social and physical capitals as given by Figure 30.

10.8.3 Hope as a Livelihood Capital

After noting the role played by hope in encouraging social actors to keep fighting even when the situation and to look forward to a brighter future. Hope enlightens people to see beyond immediate and open their ‘eyes’ to the fact that there is a life ahead and that storms do not last forever. It gives people the reason to confront their challenges as opposed to giving up on life (Tembo, 2012). For this reason, the study once again proposes it as a capital that should find a place in the SLA. Figure 29 below shows the original SLA capitals.




Figure 29: Original SLA Capitals/Assets (DFID, 1999)

The diagram below is a revised version of the one given above in which the study includes ‘Hope’ and ‘Spirituality’ as independent capitals and at the same time presenting ICT as a facilitating resource that exists in-between physical and social capitals. These three, as given in

arguments are underrepresented in the old version and the revised version thus captures them and just like the original capitals, the revised capitals can be used in any context since the notions of hope and spirituality are universal while the use of ICT is more or less the world over. Figure 30 given below shows my proposed livelihood capitals.




Figure 30: Revised SLA Capitals (Own Construct)

10.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the major findings of this study. Discussion centred on the main themes that emerged from the findings. The first part of the discussion looked at how deindustrialisation and economic failure impact livelihoods. The second part looked at the various livelihood strategies that social actors resorted to in the aftermath of the economic crisis together with the challenges that they encounter. The third part discussed the various innovations invented by SMEs and informal sector players to survive in the world of business. The fourth part dwelt on the debates surrounding the sustainability of SMEs and informal sectors-based livelihoods. The chapter concluded by exploring theoretical issues around the SLA before proposing a revised version of its capitals/assets. The following chapter concludes this study.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

11.1 Introduction

The subject of urban livelihoods is indeed a very topical and complex one. It draws into the foray several other related subjects which include urbanisation, industrialisation, deindustrialisation, urban poverty, urban informality, sustainability and entrepreneurship among others. Several ‘new’ debates and insights also emerged as the study unfolded. Through these debates and insights, I added my voice to the on-going discussions around urban livelihoods. This chapter concludes the study and spells out how the study contributed to the overall body of knowledge on livelihoods in challenged, small-town economies, policy implications and areas that I feel require further research in future.

11.2 Key Findings

The first key finding is that in times of economic distress, residents of Norton have turned to the informal economy and SMEs in their quest to reconstruct their livelihoods and continue sustaining their lives and families. In other words, SMEs and informal economic activities play a very crucial role in building livelihoods, not only to those who are not formally employed but to those with formal jobs as well. The informal economy and SMEs sectors in this regard are made up of a range of economic activities which include vending different products which include clothes, foodstuffs, furniture, electrical gadgets and construction material among others.

Secondly, I found that other than sustaining livelihoods, the informal and SMEs sectors play an important in creating employment, local economic development as well as in training and skills development. While some of the entrepreneurs apply their skill from their work, recent jobs or from formal training, these constitute only a minority. The majority venture into fields that they do not have any knowledge of and learn as they go. New graduates who also fail to make it into formal employment also find themselves in the SMEs and informal sector where they shape the skills that they acquired from school and also gain some practical experience and this helps to prepare them for huge and more demanding tasks that are usually found in the formal sector.

Thirdly, I also found out that agriculture plays a significant role in building livelihoods in Norton. Social actors in the town practice farming in their backyards, unoccupied residential and commercial stands, abandoned industrial premises and land that is reserved for some infrastructural projects that are yet to kick off. Some even move out of the town and enter into contracts with some land owners whose plots and farms are situated just outside the town. Some even go all the way to their rural homes where they farm and bring the produce to town to support their livelihoods while others do not do the farming themselves but only go to purchase agriculture produces from surrounding farms and rural areas and ferry them to town for their sustenance. While some just farm for the purpose of producing their own food, others farm for business and use the earnings to meet their needs.

Fourthly, I realised that in as much as the majority of the social actors in Norton are into SMEs, informal sector businesses and farming as ways of sustaining their lives and constructing livelihoods, these livelihood activities are confronted by a number of constraints. Chief among them are shortage of capital to start or expand their ventures, competition from both among themselves and formal sector firms, shortage land upon which they can operate, lack of basic services like water, vending structures, electricity, ablution facilities and shortages of both local cash and foreign currency. These among others make it difficult for social actors and entrepreneurs in SMEs, informal trading or manufacturing and agriculture to operate as they threaten to destabilize or even destroy their ventures.

Fifthly, I learnt that in face of these numerous challenges as pointed out above, the informal and SMEs have developed a wide range of strategies, innovations and coping strategies that have seen them surviving. These mechanisms include use of modern and creative marketing tools, social media platforms and ICT in their operations. This has seen them advertising their products beyond the town as well as easing cash shortages through adoption of mobile and internet payment systems – something that was originally thought to be a trait of formal sector businesses alone. Some have also resorted to multiple livelihood activities as they seek to spread the risk. The informal sector has also reinvented itself such that it is no longer that disorganised sector that it used to be. Involved social actors have mobilised themselves into groups and associations where they help each other to raise funds and make savings as well as sharing information and ideas and lobby for their rights in a collective voice. The sector has since gained some

recognition from the government and local authority and attracted the formal sector such that the two now operate in harmony goods and services now easily flow between them. These innovations have helped them to overcome some of the constraints that they construct their livelihoods and kept them going.

Finally, after interacting with my respondents in relation to the SLA, I found out that the current SLA is somehow a rigid framework that needs flexibility in its application if one is to successfully use it especially in urban contexts. I also found a number of resources which I feel are missing or not adequately captured in the current framework and hence it needs to be revisited. These include the role of spirituality and hope and hope in building livelihoods and that ICT has proved to be more than just a component of the physical capital but should be treated as a standalone asset.

11.3 Results/Objective Matrix

This subsection is meant to show how the research objectives were revisited during the course of presenting results and discussion, linking each objective to its findings and highlighting how they were met. This is presented in form of a table as given.

Objective/Question	Major Finding(s)	Chapter
To investigate the impacts of deindustrialisation on urban livelihoods in Norton.	<i>Closure of manufacturing firms, loss of jobs and income and other livelihoods sources; increasing urban poverty, food insecurity; poor service delivery leading to destruction of livelihood capitals; inadequate housing and the rise of the informal economy</i>	6
To interrogate how social actors in Norton have ‘reinvented’ their livelihoods after losing conventional livelihoods to deindustrialisation.	<i>SMEs and informal economy-based livelihoods; petty trading, informal manufacturing, informal services provision, hustling and urban farming</i>	7
To explore the constrictions that social actors in Norton face in sustaining their livelihoods.	<i>Lack of funding, poor entrepreneurial infrastructure, shortage of land, competition, harassment by authorities, cash crisis, political interference</i>	7
To explore how actors are innovating in the face of their livelihood challenges.	<i>Livelihood diversification, use of creative marketing tools, ICT, competitive prices and services, home-based ventures, and ‘hobbipreneurship’</i>	8
To examine the sustainability of the livelihood strategies ‘invented’ by social actors in Norton in the aftermath of the industrial and socio-economic collapse	<i>Role of SMEs and informal businesses in employment creation, long-term livelihoods construction, organisation, contributors to local and national economy, players taking part in environmental cleaning</i>	9
To attempt a revised livelihoods framework that best analyses urban livelihoods in economies in crises.	<i>Proposed revised livelihood approach which recognize spirituality and hope as standalone capitals and ICT as a liaison resource between social and physical capitals</i>	10

Table 7: Objective/Results Matrix

11.4 Conclusions

As I traversed through this study, interacting with urban studies and livelihoods literature, my respondents, issues that constituted the subject of this study and my own findings from this research, I reached the following conclusions.

Firstly, the study concludes that the informal economy activities and SMEs play a critical in maintaining urban livelihoods during times of economic stress. The majority of households in Norton confirmed that they rely on SMEs and informal economic activities for their sustenance in the absence of a well-functioning formal economy. While some confirmed that they just earn a little and survive from hand to mouth, some disclosed that they can they make significant earnings such that they can afford better quality education for their children, decent lives for their families and dependents while others are even able to make savings, acquire properties, and even expand their business ventures. Although the sector is regarded as already overcrowded and

saturated, in Zimbabwe it continues to grow, absorb and accommodate more participants at a time when the formal economy is failing. As such, the study reached the conclusion that the informal sector and SME businesses are strong forces to reckon with and play very important roles in constructing and sustaining urban livelihoods especially during times of economic crisis.

Secondly, the study concludes the informal sector and SMEs play an important part in employment creation, local economic development and training or skills development in urban centres during times of economic failure. In Norton, the majority of the people are either self-employed or hired by some entrepreneurs in the informal or SME sectors after failing to secure formal sector jobs. The study also acknowledges that it is actually the informal and SME economy that assumed the role of the main economy at a time when the formal economy was failing. Moreover, the sectors also play a part in training those who did not have a chance to get formal training as they learn most of their skills on their own along the way while at the same time giving young graduates an opportunity to sharpen their skills as opposed to remain idle at home after failing to secure formal jobs. At a time when the formal market was literally dry with supermarket shelves virtually empty between 2007 and 2009 in Zimbabwe, it is the informal sector that stood up to supply all basics, from food items, clothing to fuel and hence its importance as an economy. In this regard, this study concludes that in times of economic crises, small and informal businesses actually become the main economy, and become the engine of employment creation and economic growth as well as skills development.

Thirdly, the study acknowledges and comment the crucial role played by farming in sustaining urban livelihoods. In as much agriculture has been dismissed and disqualified as an urban economic activity, this study realised otherwise. Through provision of food to households and trading such products as farm fresh produces, grain crops and small livestock like chickens and rabbits, agriculture proved to be instrumental in reconstructing and maintaining urban livelihoods. Despite the increasing shortage of land, poor rains at times and poor provision of water for off-summer irrigation, social actors make maximum use of the available scarce resources to realise significant returns. The study thus concludes that farming is a major source of urban livelihoods and economic activity in an apparent objection of the proposition made by the modernist school of thought and its scholars.

Fourthly, the study also reached the conclusion that in as much as the informal and small businesses alongside urban farming are strong forces constructing urban livelihoods during in post-deindustrialisation economies; it is not smooth flow for those who take part in these activities. Social actors go through a numerous constraints which sort to destabilise or even destroy their businesses. Such challenges include lack of basic entrepreneurial infrastructure, services like provision of water, electricity as well as land on which they can practice, competition, lack funding harassment by authorities. This is to emphasise that although the sector has proved to be a big player in constructing livelihoods, creating employment, promoting local economic growth and skills development, it is still in a way vulnerable stand a good chance to be disturbed by both internal and external factors.

Fifthly, however even in the face of various antagonisms as noted above – SMEs and the informal sectors have devised mechanisms and innovations through which they navigate past these challenges. As part of building resilience and enhancing sustainability, players in the sector invented a number of innovations that have kept the sector going and even made them competitive as they wrestle for clients with established formal businesses. Such innovations as the adoption of modern marketing tools, social media and ICT, use of plastic money, group savings, home-based entrepreneurship among others as discussed in Chapter Eight have done a lot in asserting the sector as an important constituent of the economy. Forcing its way into the formal supply chain and even pulling the formal sector players to abandon their long tradition of side-lining the sector is another evidence of how powerful the informal sector has grown to become. The study therefore concludes that, with such high level of resistance and resilience, the informal sector is there to stay and has become a crucial part of local economy. The informal sector activities and SMEs have therefore become the backbone of the economy upon which millions of jobs/livelihoods are based and to continue to qualify its activities as ‘survivalist, secondary, petty or disorganised’ is grossly misplaced and wrong.

Lastly, after some vigorous interaction with the SLA, livelihoods literature and findings from this study, this study concurs with Fox and Goodfellow (2016) that the framework is rigid. With the complex nature of urban livelihoods especially in economies in crises, small towns researching livelihoods becomes a complicated task such that if a researcher using the SLA is to be confined to its strictness, s/he is likely to miss a lot. This study thus argues that since

livelihood strategies differ from one context to another, how then appropriate is it to use this framework in different contexts which are regulated by different conditions. If it was originally meant to analyse rural livelihoods, how the proper is it to just lift it as it is and apply it in the urban context considering the huge differences between rural and urban livelihoods. Similarly, how correct is it to apply the same framework when analysing urban livelihoods in a properly and well-functioning economy as well as in a collapsed economy? With these queries, the study proposes that some sub-frameworks that suit for the different contexts must be developed by making some revisions on the original SLF, arguing that the current one must not be ‘*one-size-fits-all*’. It thus conclude that the current framework overlooks a number of aspect which include the important role played by spirituality and hope in constructing livelihoods as well as the role of ITC. These are important resources in building livelihoods and should be included as standalone capitals in the framework.

11.5 Contribution to Knowledge

Apart from meeting the specific research objectives that were set as ‘targets’ on the onset of the research, this study also aimed at making some contributions to the body of knowledge. I therefore identified the following as the areas where the study achieved this.

Firstly, I made use Ngozi Adichie’s (2009) ‘*The Dangers of a Single Story*’ narrative to conceptualise and emphasise the importance of triangulation and use of multiple methods in data collection and analysis. I thus equated the use of one data collection method or one group of respondents to a ‘*single story*’ which needs to be avoided because of its high potential of carrying biases, falsifications, stereotypes and denying other stories an opportunity to be heard. I am therefore content that ‘*the dangers of a single story*’ narration can be used as a tool to conceptualise multiple versus single data collection methods and elaborate simply the importance of using multiple data collection methods in conducting research, the importance of triangulation in data analysis and the disadvantages of relying on one sources of data or using a single data collection tool. Section 5.8 earlier detailed this concept.

Secondly, I roped in De Certeau's (1984) ‘*Walking in the City*’ concept to demonstrate how field observation can be undertaken. This concept guided me as I circumnavigated the town during my field observations. I therefore navigated as I wished, ‘inventing’ my own paths, roads or routes that took me to wherever I wanted to go without really following the street map, as a town

planner might recommend a street walker. I thus propose that the concept '*Walking in the City*' can be used as a technique to provide some fair insights of how field observation can be done depending on the nature of the research as demonstrated under subsection 5.8.3.1.

Thirdly, I used an '*uncontrolled FGD*' technique in data collection. In such a group discussion, I did not play any part from recruitment of participants to the facilitation of the actual discussion. My only input was briefing the facilitator the issues that were meant to be discussed and left everything to him. The fact that I assumed a passive role and did not influence the group or how it the discussion was steered thus points to the 'uncontrolled' nature of the FGD. My motive here was to see if there are any advantages that researchers lose or gain by always involving themselves in FGDs. I realised that this FGD was the best of all my FGDs. I realised that mobilising is easier when participants are being recruited by one of their own. Secondly, group members contribute unreservedly and without hesitation when the discussion is being led by an insider as opposed to someone unknown to them or an outsider of which most researchers are. Although the technique might require further testing, I can provisionally suggest that it could be an alternative way of conducting FGDs.

The fourth contribution is that the study managed to explore the new patterns of consumer goods distribution as the informal sector forces its way into the main supply chain and as formal businesses also loosen up to recognise informal economy players as partners from whom they can derive some positive gains. I thus developed a new supply chain diagram that sought to show and explain this relationship, showing the many linkages and connections that have come create a complex network. I then used these new relations as evidence to support how resilient the informal economy has become.

The fifth area where this study managed to contribute to knowledge lies within the '*Hobbipreneurship*' concept. Although the idea has discovered by other earlier scholars (Malinak, 2012), I 'rebranded' it by giving it a name that literally points to the idea and also went a step further to develop a model that can help to elaborate the whole idea behind the concept. '*Hobbipreneurship*' becomes an innovation through which social actors can explore to venture into entrepreneurship.

Sixthly, I also came up with the notion of '*Reverse Modernity*', which I used to critique the theory of modernisation. It emphasise how people who once relied on industry-based livelihoods might be forced to find alternative means of survival in the urban agriculture in an event of premature deindustrialisation, and questioned how the theory accounts for such cases. Finally, the study also developed a revised livelihood framework by making some amendments on the original SLA. In support of earlier criticism of the framework, I proposed the inclusion of '*Spirituality*' as a standalone capital. I also presented '*ICT*' as a capital that also performs a '*liaison*' function between social and physical capital before finally suggesting that '*Hope*' be included as another independent capital, emphasising how it is an important weapon that keep social actors not to quit and how lack of it can also adversely affect one's urge for better things in life. Other than proposing additional capitals, I also presented some arguments as to the need to value capitals differently (the hierarchy of capitals) in different contexts, citing for example how money/income/financial capital is almost a 'must' in urban centres yet it does not carry the same value in rural areas and how natural capital is important in rural areas, yet in towns/cities, it is very vulnerable and is quickly commercialised/privatised for infrastructural development. The ultimate argument is thus, livelihood capitals should not be treated as the same in different contexts and thus dismissing the '*one-size-fits-all*' approach that it is mostly applied.

11.6 Policy Suggestions

Findings from the urban livelihoods situation in Norton after the fall of industry and the economy at large have raised debates on a number of issues that bear some policy implications. Firstly, the study noted that in the absence of a formal economy, the informal sector can come in and assume the position of the main economy. The informal sector has since become the source of livelihoods for the majority of urban dwellers in Zimbabwe, and has shown strong resilience whenever there are attempts to destroy or destabilise it. As a result, it is high time to come to terms with the reality and accept that the sector is there to stay and is even part of the main economy. However, despite this observation, the informal sector continues to be treated as a peripheral economy and the authorities continue to pass intolerant policies that stir hostilities within the sector. Vulnerability and sustainability concerns that are generally linked to the sector are mostly because of strict, intolerant and unsustainable policies put in place by authorities. Interventions like Operation Murambatsvina and its variants which undermine and destroy the sector need to be reviewed. This study recommends that it high time business and urban

governance policies are reviewed to become more accommodative to the sector if the contribution that the sector has made in constructing urban livelihoods, creating employment and towards the economy at large over the last decade is anything to consider. Gone must be that negative perception of the sector that has seen local authorities engaging in running battles with players in the sector and destroying their businesses.

Linked to the above is the need to improve informal sector infrastructure. The sector has shown a lot of potential and if it has managed to endure operating with very little or no infrastructure at all, it will surely do wonders in the event that adequate infrastructure is put in place. This will involve provision of clean and adequate water, electricity and suitable structures. It is also important take into account issues like setting up for example vending marts near strategic positions like bus terminuses, schools and even malls. Vending malls on nonstrategic points have proved to be less beneficial as they have been shunned by informal traders leading them to invading undesignated points were they even operate without paying anything to anyone.

The study also realised how the SMEs and informal sectors have ventured into manufacturing with some even producing high quality and durable products which can compete with those manufactured by established formal industries. The major factors constraining these manufacturers outside the formal economy are poor capital, shortage of operating land and poor marketing. The study thus argues that if some of these manufacturers are doing well in such a heavily constrained environment, they are bound to flourish if ideal conditions are availed to them, not only for their own benefit but the economy at large. Investing in small scale producers can be a positive step towards reindustrialisation. We have heard of large amounts of money being channelled towards recapitalisation of large firms, but bearing no returns at all. The reasoning is thus that if we can re-channel such funds to small producers who have shown great potential this can promote their growth and maximise economic benefits. There is thus the need to encourage informal and SMEs-based manufacturers through availing funding and other incentives as a way of complementing reindustrialisation efforts by the formal economy.

The study also realised the entrepreneurship abilities and energies that social actors in the informal and SMEs sectors are equipped with. The study heard numerous success stories of entrepreneurs from these sectors and how an informal business venture can be a pathway that can lead to a formal business. Considering that most of the informal and small scale entrepreneurs

have not received any formal training in their respective fields but have acquired their skills and knowledge through informal on-the-job training, this study suggests that there is need enhance these skills and energies through introducing and promoting entrepreneurship education through ‘Training for Entrepreneurship’ (TFE) or Entrepreneurship Education and Training (EET). TFE/EET. There is thus need for policymakers to consider increasing such training programmes or integrate the entrepreneurship component into the mainstream education curricula since this study found them to be very few.

Lastly, urban agriculture has also proved to be an important livelihood for the urban poor. Social actors are involved in farming in two major ways. It is either they do the farming themselves for subsistence and then sell the surplus or they are into buying and reselling of agricultural products at the city markets. However, local authorities are known for being intolerant to those who cultivate on open, unutilised spaces found in urban areas. The City of Harare for example, has been making headlines as it will release its cattle herd to feed on people’s crops or even cut them down.⁵³ If we are to consider the value of agriculture as noted by this study, there is need to introduce urban farming-tolerant policies. Authorities also need to provide adequate water which can allow residents to irrigate their backyard vegetable gardens. The study noted how some are even failing to have vegetable gardens of their own owing to shortage of water and if this anomaly is addressed, it will surely be to the advantage of the residents. Cultivating open spaces and undeveloped land is not enough so it is imperative that urban planners plan with agriculture in mind. Urban farmers also require agricultural extension services to enhance their activities and increase sustainability.

11.7 Areas of Future Research

This study raised some pertinent issues surrounding urbanisation and livelihoods. It explored issues around urbanisation, population growth, industrialisation, deindustrialisation, urban poverty, urban livelihoods and livelihoods sustainability. However, it is important to note that it just focused on one urban centre. In as much as the urban poor can be argued to be living under more or less similar circumstances across the country, I still believe that there are some significant contextual differences between urban centres that need to be considered. There is thus

⁵³ ZBC News www.zbc.co.zw/?p=5519

need to conduct further research in other towns of Norton's size and get a more informed understanding of the lived realities there.

Secondly, this study explored the livelihood strategies 'invented' by social actors in Norton in the aftermath of the devastating fall of industry and the consequent economic crisis. However, the thesis focused more on non-formal and semiformal urban livelihoods with the SMEs and informal sectors dominating most of the discussion. To this end, although the study touched upon the formal sector as a source of livelihoods, it did so at a surface level. As such, not much was done to interrogate formal livelihoods in the town since the general assumption is that the formal economy in Norton and Zimbabwe at large is 'dead' and there is not much to talk about when it comes to the formal economy-based livelihoods. There is therefore need for an in-depth study that specifically looks at formal economy-based livelihoods in a highly informalised economy like Zimbabwe.

Lastly, in as much as this study explored livelihood sustainability issues, its main thrust was to determine how sustainable the new livelihood strategies are. However, after noting some serious sustainability problems, especially in relation to the environment, that are associated with some of these livelihoods in the informal sector, the study ended there. There is therefore a need to further interrogate possible ways which these livelihoods can be enhanced and strengthened for the advantage of both the environment and the entrepreneurs.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE: UKZN ETHICS APPROVAL LETTER



11 January 2017

Mr Martin Magidi 216033461
School of Built Environment and Development Studies
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Magidi

Protocol reference number: HSS/0003/017D
Project title: Sustaining livelihoods in Norton Town after De-Industrialization in Zimbabwe

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 22 December 2016, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

You

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

cc Supervisor: Prof Oliver Mtapuri
cc. Academic Leader Research: Professor Oliver Mtapuri
cc. School Administrator: Ms Nolundi Mzolo


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APPENDIX TWO: MINISTRY OF SMEs APPROVAL LETTER

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252529 253925
253492 250714
Fax: 263-04-731879
Email: info@smecd.gov.zw
Website: www.smecd.gov.zw




Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise
& Cooperative Development
Linquenda House
No. 58/60 Nelson Mandela Avenue
Private Bag 7740
Causeway
Harare
Zimbabwe

Ref: SMED/17/8

21st September 2016

Mr. Martin Magidi
University of Kwazulu Natal
Republic of South Africa



REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON "INVESTIGATING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF URBAN LIVELIHOOD ADOPTED IN NORTON TOWN AFTER DE-INDUSTRIALISATION".

Reference is made to your letter received on 15th September 2016 in respect of the above subject.

The Ministry is pleased to provide you with the requested for information on "Investigating the sustainability of urban livelihood adopted in Norton town after de-industrialisation".

You are hereby directed to approach the Director, Business Development on the 7th Floor, Linquenda House. The Division can be reached on the following contact details: Office No. 714, c/o Mr. D Nyakonda, Cell, 0773280893 email: dnyakonda@smecd.gov.zw.

By copy of this letter, the Division has been advised accordingly.



W Kaerezi

for: Secretary Small and Medium Enterprise and Cooperative Development
cc Director Business Development

APPENDIX THREE: NTC APPROVAL LETTER 1



NORTON TOWN COUNCIL

ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE TOWN SECRETARY

208 Galloway Road
P. Bag 904
Norton, Zimbabwe
KM/rr

Phone: +263 062 2226/7/8
Fax: +263 062 2219
Email: ceo@nortontc.org.zw

25 August 2016

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION
Research Office, Westville Campus
Govan Mbeki Building
Private Bag X 54001
Durban
4000
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609
Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za

Dear Sir/Madam,

Ref: Permission to undertake research for doctoral studies for Martin Magidi 216033461

We write to you in line with the subject cited above.

This letter serves to confirm that Martin Magidi student number 216033461 has been authorised to conduct research (in-depth interviews) with the Norton Council Officials towards his doctoral studies. The permission granted covers research activities associated with his thesis titled: Investigating the sustainability of urban livelihood adopted in Norton Town after de-industrialization in Zimbabwe.

We trust this is in order and should you have queries kindly contact us on the details in this letter.

Yours faithfully

Precious Mufahore
Council Chairperson



FOR THE GOOD OF THE PUBLIC

Page 1

APPENDIX FOUR: NTC APPROVAL LETTER 2



NORTON TOWN COUNCIL

ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE TOWN SECRETARY

208 Galloway Road
P. Bag 904
Norton, Zimbabwe
KM/rr

Phone: +263 062 2226/7/8
Fax: +263 062 2219
Email: ceo@nortontc.org.zw

25 August 2016

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION
Research Office, Westville Campus
Govan Mbeki Building
Private Bag X 54001
Durban
4000
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609
Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za

Dear Sir/Madam,

Ref: Permission to undertake research for doctoral studies for Martin Magidi 216033461

We write to you in line with the subject cited above.


This letter serves to confirm that Martin Magidi student number 216033461 has been authorised to conduct research (in-depth interviews) with the Norton Council Officials towards his doctoral studies. The permission granted covers research activities associated with his thesis titled: Investigating the sustainability of urban livelihood adopted in Norton Town after de-industrialization in Zimbabwe.

We trust this is in order and should you have queries kindly contact us on the details in this letter.

Yours faithfully



Kizito Mufomba
Town Secretary



FOR THE GOOD OF THE PUBLIC

Page 1

APPENDIX FIVE: ZCIEA APPROVAL LETTER



ZIMBABWE CHAMBER OF INFORMAL ECONOMY ASSOCIATIONS

288 Herbert Chitepo Ave/Seventh St
Harare
Zimbabwe
Tel: +263-4-794725
E-mail: info@zciea.org
zcieazim@gmail.com
Website: www.zciea.org

ZCIEA PRESIDENT
+263 775 170 157
president@zciea.org/blondieindlovu@gmail.com
Skype: Blondie.Lorraine
ZCIEA SECRETARY GENERAL
+263 772 361 905
+263 712 724 650
sg@zciea.org/wisbornm@yahoo.com
Skype: wisbornm.malaya1

26 October 2016

All correspondence to be addressed to the Secretary General

UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION
Research Office, Westville Campus
Govan Mbeki Building
Private Bag X 54001
Durban
4000
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609
Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: Permission to undertake research for doctoral studies for Martin Magidi 216033461

We write to you in line with the subject cited above.

This letter serves to confirm that **Mr. Martin Magidi (Student Number 216033461)** has been authorised to conduct research (in-depth interviews) with the *[insert name of organization/institution/ministry/department]* towards his Doctoral studies. The permission granted covers research activities associated with his thesis titled: **Investigating the sustainability of urban livelihood adopted in Norton Town after de-industrialization in Zimbabwe.**

We trust this is in order and should you have queries kindly contact us on the details in this letter.

Yours Faithfully

ZCIEA Secretary General



"The Chamber that delivers"

*For transforming informal economy activities
into mainstream activities*

APPENDIX SIX: IDI GUIDE

Name of Interviewer:

Interviewee ID:

Residential Suburb:

Date:

1. Age category, place of birth, marital status, size and composition of family/ other dependents/ early life up to the present day; period of stay in Norton; where before that, why Norton? Tell me about the ownership of the place your residence? If yes, how did you acquire it? If not, are you paying for the place? How much? Do you own any land in Norton or any other urban centre? If yes, how and when did you acquire it? Do you have any documentation of ownership of that land? What are using it for?

2. Tell me what you think about the general employment situation in Norton; what you are doing to earn a living and for how long; other family members earn an income; your total income per week, individually and as a household? How do you compare your earnings to your expenditure needs? Explain. Tell me about any savings that you might make out of your earnings; if you have a functional bank account; if you have access to credit/loan/borrowing; any form of capital investment that you might have?

3. What do you understand by de-industrialisation? Tell me about deindustrialisation in Norton. How did it impact you, individually and as a family/household and others? How do you compare your life before and after deindustrialisation? Tell me about your entrepreneurship skills do you have; the constraints that you face in the livelihoods field and how you deal with them; the innovations that have you have come up with to enhance your chances of earning more; how you managed to build resilience and adapt to the volatile and hostile livelihoods environment that you operate? What risks do you take in the livelihoods field to earn a living? How do you navigate your way out of these constraints?

4. What is your perception of your current livelihood? Tell me what you think about its sustainability? Can rely on it in the long run? Do you think it can withstand/survive or recover from shocks/disasters? What is your comment on the general livelihood situation in Norton? Do you think other people are surviving through sustainable means? Why? What do you think can be done to improve your own livelihood and the livelihoods situation in Norton as a whole? Do informal activities/SMEs contribute towards the development of the town? How? Given an opportunity to choose between being offered a formal job or continue doing what you are doing, what would you choose and why?

5. Tell me about any social/community groups, formal/informal that you are part of and how membership to these benefits you. Tell me about any organisations that operate here that you might know of, what they are into and their role in the livelihood field. What is your relationship with NTC in execution of your livelihood activities? Tell me about what it's doing to enhance people's livelihoods? Where do you see yourself in the next two to three years if you are to continue to live by your current means? Do you have any questions/contributions?

Thank you for participating.

APPENDIX SEVEN: KII GUIDE

Name of Interviewer:

Interviewee ID:

Residential Suburb:

Date:

Organisation

1. Tell me about your, age; education; place of residence; duration of residence; institution of employment; qualifications, position (previous and current), duties, duration, what your organisation is all about.
2. Let's talk about Norton before deindustrialisation; its economy and industry, firms that operated in here; employment situation; poverty; livelihoods. Tell me about deindustrialisation; your understanding of the term/phenomena. Let's talk about Norton after deindustrialisation; economy and industry, most affected firms, issues around employment, poverty levels etc.
3. Let's talk about livelihoods in Norton after deindustrialisation; what is your understanding of the term livelihoods? How are people sustaining their lives in the absence of a formal economy? What are they actually doing? Tell me about the informal sector economy and SMEs in Norton; the challenges that they encounter; land; Capital; Infrastructure; Harassment; Water; Electricity; Housing; Transport; etc. how they innovate/navigate past these?
4. What is your understanding of the concept of sustainable livelihoods? How would you use it to rate these livelihoods are sustainable? What is the role of your organization in promoting local livelihoods and how successful? What is the nature of your relationship with informal businesses/SMEs? Tell me about any other organizations that you work with or are involved in separate activities aimed at addressing poverty/livelihoods/developmental issues? What are they and what are doing? How successful are they? Do the informal sector and SMEs contribute towards the development of the town? How?
5. Where do you see Norton in terms of economic growth, employment, formal/informal livelihoods etc. in the next five years? Give reasons. Any questions/contributions;

Thank you for participating.

APPENDIX EIGHT: FGD GUIDE

Name of Interviewer:

Interviewee ID:

Residential Suburb:

Date:

1. Introductions

2. Let's talk about Norton before the economic crisis; its economy; industry; employment; poverty; livelihoods, etc.

3. Let's talk about deindustrialisation; what does it mean to us; how did it impact Norton; what companies were affected etc.

4. Let's talk about the socioeconomic situation after deindustrialisation; nature of industry, issues around employment; economic activities; livelihoods; livelihood capitals etc. how it affected [people's livelihoods; what livelihood activities are you/ other people engaged in in the absence of the formal economy and employment opportunities;

5. Let's talk about the informal sector and SMEs in Norton. The main activities that people are into, how they are executing them, entrepreneurship skills; the challenges that they meet; their earnings; the innovations that they invent as they seek to advance their business ventures and enhance or supplement their earnings, etc. How is it contributing to the development of the town?

6. Let's talk about the sustainability of some of these livelihood activities? Can people survive on them without any formally earned income; can they rely on them in the long run? The difference between these and survival/coping strategies; any environmental harms or social dangers; what's your comments on such blames usually put on informal sectors/ SMEs? Temporarily; Littering; Healthy risks; non-payment of taxes, etc.

7. What social/community groupings/organisations are you members or are found in Norton? Let's name them and discuss what they are involved in, in relation to poverty/livelihoods/development work? What is the impact of their work? How many of us are members? What benefits do you derive from being members? Town Council: is it involved in livelihoods issues in Norton? If so what is it doing? Does it have any influence on the way people execute their activities? What do you think is the role of council/government in dealing with issues of poverty/ building strong livelihoods in Norton and Zimbabwe at large?

8. Police/Laws: How do you relate with the police in your livelihood dealings? Do you/people violate any laws/by laws and what the implications?

9. What would you choose between going back to a formal job or continue with what you are doing (for those who are out of formal jobs)? Why? Any contributions/questions;

Thank you for participating.

APPENDIX NINE: EDITOR'S CONFIRMATION



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, LOS ANGELES

CHARTER COLLEGE OF EDUCATION

Division of Applied and Advanced Studies in Education

November 21, 2018

Dear Sir/Madam

Programs in:

Educational
Administration
and Leadership

Educational
Foundations

Instructional
Technology


Teaching English to
Speakers of Other
Languages

**RE: EDITORIAL CONFIRMATION FOR MARTIN MAGIDI'S
PH.D. THESIS ENTITLED "SUSTAINING LIVELIHOODS IN
NORTON TOWN AFTER DEINDUSTRIALISATION IN
ZIMBABWE"**

The above matter refers.

I edited Martin Magidi's Ph.D. thesis entitled "Sustaining Livelihoods in Norton Town After Deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe" that he wrote during his tenure as a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Built Environment and Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN). In editing this thesis, I concentrated on the candidate's language, general expression, punctuation and tone with a view to ensuring coherence and fluidity in the flow of his ideas. While this was my goal, I made sure not to tamper with the candidate's argument in the thesis.

Cordially



Tavengwa Gwekwerere, Ph.D.