

**Autonomy, relatedness and ethics: Perspectives from researchers,
community members and community representatives**

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DECLARATION

Unless specifically indicated to the contrary this study is a result of my own work.

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ABSTRACT

This study explored the ways in which different stakeholders, namely researchers, community members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios with respect to research. The intention was to understand the tensions within ethical decision-making as a result of competing conceptions of the self, namely, autonomous and relational conceptions of the self. A hypothetical case scenario, mirroring real life experiences, was used to elicit participants' understandings of ethical dilemmas. Thematic analysis was employed in the analysis of interview data. Results show that all stakeholders understand ethical dilemmas with reference to benefit sharing, communal and individual ownership of knowledge, and different ways of knowing and validating knowledge. Tensions were noted throughout these understandings, especially in relation to individualistic and communal concepts of the self. It is recommended that indigenous epistemologies should be acknowledged as vital components in research into the experiences of local communities in particular. Research should be considered as a joint process whereby research participants and communities engage on an equal basis with researchers.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the research

The indigenous people's lived experiences have been misinterpreted, misguided and misrepresented as they have for a long time been studied by people outside of their context (Ermine, Sinclair & Jeffery 2004; Gbadegesin, 1998; Kigongo, n.d.; Mkhize, 2004; Ramose, 2002; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). The occurrence of these misguided interpretations was informed and perpetuated by the belief in universal science, the assumption that human beings are intrinsically the same (Mkhize, 2004). This has been evident in cross-cultural studies which take the existing theories from Western cultures in an attempt to generalise them to other cultures (Kim & Berry, 1993). Concepts such as cognition, motivation and intelligence, to mention but a few, have been widely generalised in studies on indigenous people. Where differences were observed, indigenous people were said to be inferior to the West. This disregards the cultural variability that exists between and within people in different contexts (Mkhize, 2004). It also does not consider the 'situatedness' of concepts such as health and illness and therefore the variability in cultural understanding of concepts such as wisdom, intelligence and illness. Thus, tensions may develop between people being studied and the researchers as they may not have the same understanding of each other and possibly concepts being studied.

The current study seeks to understand conceptions in the minds of researchers, community members and community representatives of what constitutes an ethical dilemma or problem and hence, an appropriate resolution thereof. This study was motivated by observations, writings and publications by some African and non-Western scholars concerning the different ways in which people engage in decision-making processes given certain ethical challenges. While a number of distinct strands of Western ethics, such as virtue ethics, utilitarian ethics, principlism stands out as the dominant strand especially in health research ethics. For a long time, it was assumed that principlism was the only inherent way applicable in thinking about and solving ethical dilemmas (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Engelhardt, 1996; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986;

Kitchener, 2000). Principlism applies an abstract approach to ethical decision-making. African and non-Western scholars, on the other hand, assume that differences in the resolution of an ethical dilemma are likely to arise from varying factors such as differing conceptions of human relationships, socialisation into the research process, and assumptions about research ethics in general.

Ethics constitute a very important part of research. In fact no research study can begin without ethical approval. All institutions of learning and major research institutions have over the years formed ethics committees to scrutinise all research proposals to check if the researcher has thoroughly thought about his or her study and the impact it might have on the participants. Careful consideration of ethical issues before the research process is underway is important to prevent exploitation in addition to all possible risks and abuses that the research participants may suffer intentionally or unintentionally as a result of the study. The Nazi experiments, the Tuskegee syphilis experiment and the Milgram study are three of the well-known cases where human subjects were exposed to horrifying abuses and exploitation in the name of research (Fisher, 2007; Toldson & Toldson, 2001). The discovery of unethical research conduct such as those mentioned above led to the development of the Nuremberg code of ethics, and later the Declaration of Helsinki and other ethics codes, in an attempt to protect human subjects participating in all research studies (Fisher, 2007).

Inevitably, ethical problems, often involving conflict about the 'right' thing to do, do arise in research and it becomes the responsibility of the researcher to assure that all stakeholders are safe, properly benefited, not exploited and have autonomously agreed to the process. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that the participants are well informed about what the research entails before they give their consent to participate in the research study. This process of informing research participants is vital in research. However, researchers need to be aware of and understand that different cultural groups and communities have different ways of engaging in decision-making processes and life in general (Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2004; Sue &

Sue, 1999). In every research study, there is a considerable likelihood that researchers and research participants do not have a shared understanding of what constitutes an ethically problematic situation, by virtue of their relative cultural backgrounds and historical contexts, the assumptions they bring to bear to the task as well as their socialisation in different communities of practice.

Additionally, the idea of the current study arose from the review of the literature, which pointed at a gap between traditional psychology and the realities of practising psychology in the African and other non-Western contexts, which do not fully identify with the Western traditions. The past few years have seen the slow development of non-Western psychologies; scholars are starting to question the implied universal way of resolving ethical dilemmas found within mainstream Western epistemology. Scholars outside the Western traditional framework have been arguing for culturally-specific methods and procedures of engaging with and resolving ethical dilemmas or problems (Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2004; Queener & Martin, 2001). This research study is an attempt to investigate other ways in which people engage in decision-making. The study attempts to establish the relationship between autonomy and relatedness in ethical decision-making.

1.2. Justification for the research

The current study is important for two major reasons. Firstly, it investigates understanding of research ethics and decision-making processes amongst different stakeholders, namely researchers, community members and community representatives. These are the main parties working collaboratively for a sustained period throughout the research process. Despite their prolonged interaction during the research process, it does not necessarily follow that these parties share the same assumptions about the research process, including their understanding of concepts fundamental to the ethicality of the research, such as autonomy and justice. Thus, this study intends to investigate the stakeholders' understanding of what constitutes an ethically problematic situation, and the possible influences of autonomy and relatedness on their

understanding. The study does not seek to reinforce the antinomy or conflict between individualistic and communal understanding of what constitutes ethically dilemmatic scenarios, as between-individual and even intra-individual tensions between these two poles of understanding are envisaged (Mkhize, 2004). Rather, the research seeks to study the nature of these tensions, how they are manifested within the context of (unequal) power relations and to explore mechanisms by which the tensions could be resolved.

Secondly, given the proliferation of biomedical and other research in Africa and developing societies in general (e.g. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1999), it is important to study different stakeholders' conceptions of ethics in different contexts. This is particularly important in view of other studies that have been critical of the universalising tendencies in moral reasoning in general, and in ethics in particular (e.g. Edwards, 1978; Harkness et al., 1981, cited in Verhoef & Michel, 1997; Gilligan, 1977; Lyons, 1988). Further, the study is motivated by the calls for researchers to tap into alternative and/or indigenous ways of knowing about the self and the world in resolving ethical and moral concerns (Doumbo, 2005; Gbadegesin, 1993; Mkhize, 2006; Sinha, 1997; Tschudin, 2006). This study intends to help researchers, local and international, to better understand dilemmas arising from competing ethical and moral systems (Brodwin, 2001).

1.3. Study Objectives and Research Questions

The study seeks to understand how the process of ethical decision-making is related to either concepts of the self or more specifically, the tensions within ethical decision-making resulting from competing conceptions of the self. The competing conceptions of the self are between the autonomous and relational conceptions of the self. The autonomous conception of the self is associated with the Western worldview and epistemology. This is a conception of a self that is considered to be free from significant associations. Generally considered a solitary term, this self engages in decision-making with reference to internally-held, universal and timeless principles (Mkhize, 2004). The alternate view is that of relatedness. This speaks of a self that is

connected to other selves via concrete relational and historical ties; this self values a socially-negotiated account to decision-making (Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2006).

Broadly, this study seeks to understand how different stakeholders, namely researchers, community members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios. It is assumed that people's participation in various cultural systems will have a bearing on their definitions of what constitutes ethical and moral behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 2003, 2006; Triandis, 1989). Autonomy and relatedness are not conceptualised as independent variables in this study. Thus the study rejects the individualism-collectivism antimony; instead, it is the possible interpenetration of the two, in a society characterised by rapid and unstable social changes, which is of interest. While the subjects of the investigation are researchers and community members/representatives, the possibility was not ruled out that competing idea systems and conceptions of the self could occur intra-individually within a single person, leading to complex ethical tensions.

The key objectives of the study are:

- (a) To identify researchers', research participants' and community representatives' understandings and definitions of ethical dilemmas, with reference to autonomy and relatedness;
- (b) To contribute to the growing theoretical and empirical body of knowledge on African/indigenous approaches to ethics;
- (c) To show that the principles of relatedness and autonomy could possibly exist simultaneously within the person, leading to tensions in ethical decision-making;
- (d) To shed insight into the process by which tensions between autonomy and relatedness are resolved in ethical decision-making.

There are three main questions that this research study aims to investigate and they are the following:

- (a) How do researchers, community members and representatives (e.g. community advisory board members (CABs), community leaders) define what constitutes an ethical dilemma?
- (b) How do autonomy and relatedness relate to ethical decision-making (i.e. resolution of an ethical problem) for (a) researchers, (b) community members, and (c) community representatives?

1.4. Summary of Methodology

Three groups of participants were targeted in this study: researchers, community representatives and members of the community who have participated in social science or health-related research (and, for contrasting purposes, community members who have not participated in research). Researchers were sampled mainly from the local university and a major research institution in KwaZulu-Natal. Participation in community, social science and health-related research was the main inclusion criterion for researchers. Community members were sampled from the local Pietermaritzburg community. The study employed a qualitative research design. This research design was appropriate because the study intended to investigate the lived experiences of the participants, especially related to how they engage in decision-making processes. The study used non-probability, purposeful, snowballing and maximum variation sampling techniques. This was because the purpose of the study was to find information-rich cases that were studied and analysed in depth using thematic analysis (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2001).

1.5. Definitions

This section defines the key and controversial terms to establish the position taken in this research study.

- a) Autonomous/ independent self:* it is self defined as a “sense of self that views the self as a bounded entity, clearly separated from relevant others” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.56). Most scholars associate this abstract, self-contained and autonomous view of the self

- with Western culture (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benhabib, 1992; Brodwin, 2001; Gilligan, 1977; Mkhize, 2004).
- b) *Communal/interdependent self*: a construal of the self defined as “a sense of self that views the self as unbounded, flexible, and contingent on context” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.56). This view of the self incorporates the principle of relatedness which is associated with the view that a human being is closely connected to fellow human beings.
- c) *Western*: For the purposes of this research study, the term ‘Western’ will be used to refer to the dominant mindset of Western or European culture that has been generalised to other cultural groups nationally and internationally. Specifically, the term refers to a materialistic approach to the world which is characterised by objectivity, mind-matter dualism and the search for universal and timeless principles, to mention but a few (Myers, 1993). It is duly acknowledged that alternative conceptualisations also exist even in the Western world albeit at the margins of scholarly or scientific discourse. Most importantly, Western philosophies which form the basis of most ethics theories tend to be based on this mindset (Ermine et al., 2004; Matsumoto, 1996). It thus represents observations, knowledge systems, values and beliefs that are derived from the lived experiences of people in European or Western countries (Ermine et al., 2004).
- d) *African/non-Western*: These terms are used to mean people of African descent as well as the non-Western indigenous groups that subscribe to a mindset or worldview characterised by spirituality, interdependence and a holistic approach to life (Grills, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize, 2004; Wiredu, 1996).
- e) *Indigenous psychologies*: “a system of psychological thought and practice that is rooted in a particular cultural tradition” (Enriquez, 1990, as cited in Sinha, 1997, p.132). It tries to develop particular assumptions, theories, metaphors, or a “behavioral science that matches the sociocultural realities of one’s own society” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992, as cited in Sinha, 1997, p.132).

- f) *Indigenous knowledge*: “systematic body of knowledge acquired by local people through the accumulation of experiences, informal experiments and intimate understanding of the environment in a given culture” (Msuya, 2007).
- g) *Colonization*: “both the formal and informal methods (behaviors, ideologies, institutions, policies, and economies) that maintain the subjugation or exploitation of Indigenous Peoples, lands and resources” (Wilson & Bird, 2005, as cited from McCaslin & Breton, 2008, p.511).

1.6. Outline of this report

Chapter 1 of this report provides the background to the research, as well as the research questions, the justification for the research, and a brief summary of the methodology to be used. In addition, this chapter includes the outline of the report, definitions, delimitations of scope and key assumptions. Chapter 2 reviews the literature relevant to the study. The chapter builds a theoretical foundation for the thesis in order to identify controversial issues that have not been answered in previous research. Attempts are made to link the research problems to the wider body of knowledge. Chapter 3 is the methodology section and covers sampling (units of analysis, sampling frame, etc), justification for the methodology with reference to the problem and the literature reviewed, interview schedules and procedures used in data collection, limitations of the methodology, and ethical considerations. Results are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by highlighting conclusions *vis-à-vis* the research questions, conclusions regarding the research problem, and implications for research, theory, policy and practice. The study limitations are also indicated.

1.7. Delimitations of scope and key assumptions

The participants of this research were the three stakeholders in research, namely, researchers, community members and community representatives. All of them were black South Africans. Not all of them spoke *isiZulu* as their mother tongue, but they were all proficient in the language

and that is why all the interviews were conducted in both *isiZulu* and English. Therefore, the findings of this research cannot be generalisable to all research stakeholders as not all of them were equally represented in this research.

1.8. Conclusion

This chapter has laid the foundation of this thesis in that it presented background information to this research study. The research questions and objectives were stated as were the rationale and justification for the study. A brief summary of the research methodology was given, and the key terms were defined. The delimitations and scope of the study were highlighted. The following chapter proceeds to the review of the literature.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter presents a review of the literature relevant to this research study. This research study explores conceptions of self, how people view ethics, and how they engage in decision-making, especially in the research context. The chapter begins with a definition of the concept of a worldview and proceeds to introduce and discuss the theoretical underpinnings of Western and African worldviews. The discussion presents general trends; it does not imply that the two worldviews are mutually exclusive (Myers, 1993). The two worldviews are then contrasted in terms of how they each define the concept of an ethical self, leading up to a discussion of the implications of these worldviews on ethical decision-making.

2.2. Western and African Worldviews

A worldview is a “set of basic assumptions that a group of people develops in order to explain reality and their place and purpose in the world” (Mkhize, 2004, p.25). Worldviews are concerned with how people from different cultural backgrounds see the world and how they may value different events, ways of being and also how people deal with their life circumstances (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Grills, 2004; Kambon, 1998; Sue & Sue, 1999). Thus, they are deeply ingrained in people’s everyday lives as they engage with the self, others and their environment. Worldviews are an integral part of the person’s being because they are what informs and shapes his or her attitudes and values in life (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Mkhize, 2004). Sue and Sue (1999) add that worldviews “affect how we perceive and evaluate situations and how we determine appropriate actions based upon our appraisal” (p.165).

Worldviews also enable people to share their opinions and beliefs about life, which has implications for their behaviour (Mkhize, 2004). Worldviews expose the ways in which people

differ from each other because of their diverse societies that hold differing values, knowledge productions, historical and cultural contexts and backgrounds (Bujo, 2001; Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Ermine et al., 2004; Gyekye, 1998; Mkhize, 2004; Murove, 2005; Ramose, 2002; Sue & Sue, 1999). The different life experiences that people encounter because of their diverse cultural upbringing are not only evident in the differing values, beliefs and attitudes that they possess, the life experiences also inform how individuals think and act towards their world, that is, their frame of reference and their understanding of their existence in the world (Sue & Sue, 1999).

The governance of human behaviour that culture provides forms “a common formulation of ideas including the intellectual, moral and aesthetic standards prevalent in a community and the meanings of communicative actions” (Gambu, 2000, p.7). This then means that the standards of meaning and meaning itself in many societies are socially constructed or generated; that is, meaning cannot be made out of context or without taking cognisance of the social relationships in which the subject is embedded (Gambu, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize, 2006). Shweder (1990) adds that culture refers to “persons, society, and nature as lit up and made possible by some already there intentional world, an intentional world composed of conceptions, evaluation, judgments, goals, and other mental representations already embodied in socially inherited institutions, [and] practices...” (p.101). Therefore culture is not simply a nuisance variable; it encompasses how people live and make meaning of their socio-cultural contexts. However, as has been stated above, the degree to which individuals are good cultural representatives differs (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Sue and Sue (1999) maintain that the concept of a worldview has four critical elements, namely, *cosmology*, *ontology*, *axiology* and *epistemology*. Firstly, cosmology speaks about the structure of reality that people hold. For example, in African culture reality is collective and interdependent; there is unity between humans and the surrounding environments. In Western culture, conversely, the structure is characterised by separateness, independence and conflict between humans and nature (Sue & Sue, 1999). Ontology speaks of how people are orientated to

cosmology in a way that they believe is the most important part of their nature (Grills, 2004; Sue & Sue, 1999). For example, what is of core value to African culture is the spirituality that surrounds their existence and the universe; whereas the core value for Western culture is an over-identification with one's self in which the individual fights to preserve one's ego. It is also the belief that one's existence in the universe is determined by the amount of one's material possessions (Sue & Sue, 1999). As mentioned above, however, this does not mean that African people cannot be materialistic, nor is it implied that all Western people lack spirituality. The focus of the study is on the dominant trends (Myers, 1993).

Axiology concerns the fundamental structural value that is put forth when defining relationships between humans and nature (Grills, 2004; Sue & Sue, 1999). Thus most African cultures are characterised by person-person relationships and much value is put on these human relationships; whereas in most Western cultures person-object relationships are valued (Sue & Sue, 1999). Epistemology is the system of knowing and understanding of the truth about reality based on people's lived experiences, which stems from their different cultural, socio-political and historical contexts (Sue & Sue, 1999). For example, African cultures place more "emphasis on Affective-Cognitive synthesis as a way of knowing reality" (Kambon 1998, p.123); whereas Western culture emphasises "Cognitive over Affective processes as the way of knowing reality" (Kambon, 1998, p.123). Thinking and the application of logic is much more valued than feeling. In this dimension of worldviews, the reality of the world is seen as separate from human beings and "is physical, mechanical and follows rational laws" (Sue & Sue, 199, p.174). The realities assumed by each component of the worldviews may reflect the differences that exist between African and Western epistemological assumptions.

The Western and African worldviews are interesting to compare because of the unequal relationship that exists between them, with the former accorded more power and status than the latter. For many years, African knowledge and discourse or worldviews have been dominated by Western systems of knowledge production (Ermine et al., 2004; Izumi, 2006; Mkabela, 2005;

Mkhize, 2004; Muller, 1994; Murove; 2005; Prozesky, n.d.; Ramose, 2002; Toldson & Toldson, 2001). This occurred because “Western-derived theories, which are assumed to be universal, have been imposed on the non-Western population” (Mkhize, 2004, p.25). Such Western-driven theories are informed by research studies, which are conceptualised and formulated by theorists whose conceptual development is informed by and limited to their historical context. Because of the highly influential power that the West has had on knowledge production and information dissemination, it has managed to marginalise indigenous people’s lived experiences (Mkhize, 2004). Grills (2004) argues that no one particular worldview should monopolise all knowledge systems as the Western paradigm has done for many centuries, especially in the field of psychology. Grills further argues that other worldviews, like the African worldview, should be recognised because of their rich cultural observation, stories, practical life experiences, and so forth, that have been passed down from one generation to the other.

There are many differences between Western and African worldviews, some of which have been expressed in the individualism versus collectivism dichotomy (Guss, 2002; Gyekye, 1998; Khoza, 1994, as cited by Prinsloo, 1998; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989), independent versus interdependent construal of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004), autonomy versus relatedness modes of relating to self and others (Mkhize, 2006), and about ethics in the practice of research, especially in cross-cultural research (Ermine et al., 2004; Simpson, 1974; Tschudin, 2006). Three of the four components of worldviews presented above are most relevant to this study, namely the cosmology, axiology and the epistemology components. These three components will be contrasted in terms of how each one explains the conceptions of an ethical self and the implications this has on decision-making in research and life in general.

2.3. Defining the self: Conceptions of an ethical self

The self is simply understood as the person’s basic understanding of the person he or she is (St. Clair, 1989). Broadly, it can be understood as an organisation of the totality of perceptions

that the individual has about himself or herself and how he or she construes his or her sense of self or being (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; St. Clair, 1989). It is also described as the nature and organisation of beliefs about one's self that are multi-dimensional in that it is both a "descriptive and an evaluative" phenomenon (Mboya, 1999, p.83). The underlying assumption here is that it is possible to put a label or a list of attributes upon an individual which can be used to predict how others relate to that individual depending on their evaluations. Evaluations can be done by self and significant others, as they often play a vital role in the formation of a positive or negative self-concept because it is through their feedback to the individual that he or she grows.

The idea of self-concept or conceptions of the self, which forms the basis of this research study, is fundamental for practitioners embarking on human or social studies to explore and understand. This is mainly because the way people conceive themselves is vital to the way they interact with self, others (including researchers) and their surroundings (Burns, 1979; Matsumoto, 1996; Mboya, 1999; Mkhize, 2004; Nsamenang, 1999). The concept of self has had scholars, mainly in Western countries, pondering and writing about it for centuries. This notwithstanding, the failure to acknowledge the limitations of the definitions and the cultural specificity of the concept of self contributes to its elusiveness (Matsumoto, 1996). This argument is supported by Burns (1979), when he argued that the conception of self "acts as a selective screen, the permeability of which is determined by individual developmental history and the nature of the environment relative to the person" (p.31).

In light of the above, it can be argued that conceptions of the self differ according to different cultural contexts and worldviews. However, this is not to say that people in the same cultural contexts will have exactly the same conceptions of self; they may have similar modes of interaction with self and others (Mboya, 1999; Mkhize, 2004; Nsamenang, 1999). In this study, it is argued that the dominant Western and African conceptions of self differ from one another. Even though the early definitions of self are immensely influenced by Western thought, in recent

years non-Western, including African scholars, have started counteracting the dominant voice of the West with regards to the conception of self and many other issues like morality and ethical decision-making, to mention a few (Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize 2004).

2.4. Western conception of self: Autonomous self

The cosmology of the autonomous view of the self is associated with terms such as ‘individualism’, ‘independent’, ‘rational’ and with statements that consists of ‘I’ (Benhabib, 1992; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989). Individualism means “living as a distinct and unique being among equals” (Benhabib, 1992, p.56). Khoza (1994:3, as cited in Prinsloo, 1998) also defined individualism in the same sense, stating that it is when an individual is “an end in himself and is of supreme value, society being only a means to individual ends” (p.44). This conception of self is known as the independent construal of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996). It basically talks of a self that is an entity which contains fundamental dispositional attributes and is disconnected from history and culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This specifically means an individual who is able to “focus on personal internal attributes – individual ability, intelligence, personality traits, goals, or preference” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.38). Furthermore, this idea holds that these internal attributes are generally unchangeable, or remain constant across time (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004).

The dominant Western conception of the self is individualistic in that it is a “bounded entity consisting of a number of internal attributes that include needs, abilities, motives and rights” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.36). An individual is uniquely made up of the internal attributes which have implications for his or her behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This idea speaks of a self that is independent of any cultural prescriptions or heritage, as the individual is assumed to be responsible for creating his or her own destiny and is in control of the outcomes of his or her actions. Neisser and Jopling (1997) define the self similarly, stating that a self is “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of

awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background” (p.4). Mkhize (2004) also notes that the self in mainstream traditional psychology is conceived “as a bounded, autonomous entity: it is defined in terms of its internal attributes such as thoughts and emotions, independently of the social and contextual factors” (p.26). Sue and Sue (1999), referred to people with an autonomous view of the self to have an internal locus of control and responsibility, where an individual relies on personal attributes for success and failure. This is an individual-centered approach that accentuates self-reliance, individualism and uniqueness (Sue & Sue, 1999).

A number of moral and ethical decision-making theories take the individualistic view of the self as their point of departure. For example, in Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, an individual is free from societal constraints, thus being able to make independent judgments about his or her needs and values (Benhabib, 1992; Gilligan, 1977; Simpson, 1974). This conception draws from Kantian approaches, which take an abstract (“Generalized”) view of the self as their point of departure (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benhabib, 1992; Brodwin, 2001; Gilligan, 1977; Mkhize, 2004). Benhabib (1992) states that the ‘Generalised Other’ “requires us to view each and every individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves” (p.158). Thus, this view accords that all human beings, regardless of their history and lived experience, should be assumed to be operating at the same level of moral reasoning, justice and being because their internal capabilities are virtually the same. This view of the self is in direct contrast with the African view, which is communal and interdependently construed.

Individuals in the Western context are socialised to value and pride themselves in their abilities to separate from others as self-reliant, self-contained beings. This is consistent with the child-rearing practices of most Western cultures where the processes of separation and individuation are most important during the infant phase of an individual’s life (Monroe; 2001; St. Clair,

1986). Using the psychoanalytic theory, a largely Western theory, as an example, the process of individuation involves an infant developing “intrapsychic autonomy” (St. Clair, 1986, p.110) and that of separation involving “psychological differentiation, distancing, and disengagement from the mother” (St. Clair, 1986, p.110). A child in his or her early years is taught or encouraged by his or her parents to be self-reliant, independent and to develop boundaries between the self and others. Individuals raised this way can thus be trusted to make individually informed decisions (Monroe, 2001; Triandis, 1989).

The two processes mentioned above, namely separation and individuation, are thus crucial in the individual’s development of internal attributes that would develop a sense of self or “I” instead of “we”, which implies a conception of self that is very much individualistic in the sense that there is a “sharp distinction between the individual and the roles that he or she plays” (Perrett & Patterson, 1991, p.194). The individual has to think about what is good for him or her before all others around him or her, his or her desires and wishes must therefore come before everyone else’s. Thus, a person is perceived as an atomistic individual where he or she is disconnected from all of his or her relational spheres of being (Murove, 2005).

While an individualistic view of the self is consistent with the dominant Western culture, it may not be generalised or applicable to all Western cultures. That said, the assumption is that the average person in Western culture identifies with the independent view of the self more so than the average person in African and other non-Western cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This is because, within any given culture, “individuals will vary in the extent to which they are good cultural representatives and construe the self in the mandated ways” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p.226). This depends on the individual’s responsiveness to the community or the extent to which the individual is willing to sacrifice personal happiness for the greater good of the community. The responsiveness of the person to the community also depends on the underlying ethical values that particular society holds. The following section discusses one of the dominant ethics theories

in Western thought, principlism, in order to show the relationship between the self and ethical decision-making.

2.4.1. Theories of the autonomous self – Principlism

Ethics can be defined as “the philosophical inquiry into principles of morality and right and wrong conduct” (Muller, 1994, p.448). Ethics are considered fundamental in both Western and non-Western or African societies in relation to this study. Conceptions of the philosophy of ethics will however differ much more between the two cultures than within the societies, in regards to their core practices (culture, socialisation, language, decision-making, etc) and the methods of carrying out their assumptions (Bujo, 2001; Engelhardt, 1996; Ermine et al., 2004; Gbadegesin, 1998; Guss, 2002; Mkhize, 2004; Prinsloo, 1998; Ramose, 2002; Simpson, 1974). The main difference between Western and African approaches to ethics is that the Western approach uses abstraction which applies universal principles rather than the concrete approach, which looks at the circumstances of the person making an ethical decision (Coetzee, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 2003). While it is recognised that there are other branches of ethics in Western thought, such as virtue ethics and utilitarian ethics, the current study focuses on principlism since this branch tends to dominate the research ethics domain.

Principlism is a normative theory of ethics which could also be regarded as “principled thinking or the justice theory” (Tschudin, 2006, p.306). Its fundamental base is that ethical dilemmas or problems should be considered from a standpoint which consists of a rational viewpoint, is fair-minded and free from bias (Facione, Scherer, & Attig, 1991). For this unbiased, fair-minded and rational standpoint to be achieved, the person attempting to make an ethical decision needs to be objective, impersonal and impartial (Facione et al., 1991; Kitchener, 2000; Tschudin, 2006). This enables a person to reach a decision that is justifiable, logical, and coherent and a decision that is not emotionally entangled regarding what should or ought to be done to resolve the ethical dilemma at hand. Principlism is said to be a normative ethical theory, viewing ethical problems and dilemmas as universal regardless of the context within which they arose (Tschudin, 2006).

Therefore, the only resolution to an ethical dilemma would be to apply general ethical principles or universal moral standards (Facione et al., 1991; Kitchener, 2000; Tschudin, 2006). A brief discussion of these four basic ethical principles follows.

2.4.1.1. Ethical principles

The ethical principles are a general but fundamental foundation of ethical codes that most professionals such as psychologists, medical practitioners and social scientists have to adhere to in order to prevent exploitation of human beings, especially in conducting research in developing countries (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000). The ethical principles “provide a more consistent framework within which cases are considered” (Kitchener, 2000, p.11). This is when the ethical principles are compared to ethical codes, as the latter may be too broad or too narrow depending on the cases at hand, especially in relation to human subjects participating in research (Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Kitchener, 2000).

The ethical principles were first introduced and defined in the Nuremberg Code and later reinterpreted in the Helsinki Declaration (Barry, 1988; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). These codes emphasised that the ethical principles “need to be interpreted and applied within different cultural settings, many of which were unfamiliar to the international bodies that originally formulated these principles” (Barry, 1988, p.1083). Thus, careful consideration and sensitivity are needed at the level of application, especially in international or cross-cultural research. Careful consideration at the level of application is also important because, although ethical principles are said to be universal, some have argued that they are, in fact, higher order abstractions with varying local content (Macklin, 1999). On the other hand, others have argued for ethical pluralism, citing the view that ethics codes are underpinned by differing philosophic assumptions about personhood, human activity and human nature (Brodwin, 2001).

There are four main ethical principles that are central when thinking about an ethical problem in research, namely, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and respect for autonomy (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006). The primary focus will be on the ethical principle of autonomy as it is the focal point of this study. The rest of the principles will therefore not receive much attention. That said, it is important to note that the above-mentioned ethical principles are not the only ethical principles that exist; they are just the ones most written about in the Western-driven theories. It is possible for one to arrive at different principles should one start with different worldviews. For example, Tschudin (2006) arrived at a different conclusion when she looked at ethics based on Tibetan Buddhism, which is essentially “philosophy and psychology that view ethical behavior as the foundation of spiritual growth and spirituality as essential for healing body and mind” (p.307).

In no particular order of importance, there is the principle of *nonmaleficence*. Nonmaleficence means that there should be no harm inflicted on the research participants directly or indirectly, intentionally or non-intentionally as a result of the research (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006). This principle is rooted in Western medical science and was made popular by the phrase *primum non nocere*, which means “above all do no harm” (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989, p.30; Kitchener, 2000, p.22). To harm a person generally means that the individual's interests are not considered and not viewed as important. It also means that these interests and the well-being of the person are enormously diminished (Kitchener, 2000).

The principle of nonmaleficence guards against risky behaviours on behalf of the researchers, intentional or otherwise, that may diminish the well-being and the interests of the research participants (Barry, 1988, Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006). Researchers thus have to make certain that harm is not inflicted on participants by exploring and minimising the possible risks (and their magnitude, relative to the

risks of everyday life) that the research might entail (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000). Failure to do so exposes participants to harm which not only diminishes and endangers their well-being, but also renders the research study unethical.

However, the problem with the nonmaleficence ethical principle is that “the concept of harm is ambiguous” (Kitchener, 2000, p.22). This is because what some may consider harmful may not be considered as such by others, especially when contrasting the Western and African conceptions of ethics and thus of nonmaleficence. These two worldviews differ in their approach and application of this principle (Coetzee, 1998). Although a spectrum of defining the concept of harm may exist within each worldview, a greater difference exists between the two worldviews, which leads to complications in how people participating in the research process understand the concept of harm and its implications. In addition, what is considered an “ordinary everyday phenomenon” and hence less risky, may be considered too risky in another setting. For example, going to school could be a risky affair for South African black children living in the township and informal settlements compared to South African white children in the suburbs, because the former have to travel long distances by means of the unpredictable taxi transport system.

The second ethical principle is that of *beneficence*. In research, this principle speaks of doing good for the benefit of research participants (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006). Beneficence “obliges the researcher to attempt to maximize the benefits that the research will afford to the participants of the study” (Wassenaar, 2006, p.67). This also entails that researchers should be competent, kind and charitable to the participants, actively doing good by minimising the risks and maximising the benefits of the research study (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006). This principle also means that the participants should not be injured or exploited while others, specifically researchers and funding companies, further their own interests and professional development.

The Nuremberg Code states that “[t]he degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment” (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986, p.13). Beneficence thus places an obligation on the researcher to balance the risk-benefit ratio of the research. However, this principle of beneficence moves far beyond just being an obligation as it “generates *general moral duties* that are incumbent on everyone – not because of a professional role but because morality makes a general demand of beneficence” (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989, p.31, original emphasis). The demand necessitates the protection of participants from being intentionally harmed in order to serve the interests of others.

In summary, the principle of beneficence consists of two parts (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Kitchener, 2000). Firstly, the research should have benefits for the research participants in ways that promote their well-being and social good (Kitchener, 2000). It is however unclear what form these benefits should take, who decides on them and to what extent the participants are involved in this decision. Secondly, it is essential to balance the consequences that would arise out of potential harm and benefits that the research study might have (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, as cited by Kitchener, 2000). It is however very difficult to weigh the balance as sometimes the principle of beneficence may be in conflict with the principle of nonmaleficence, making it difficult to determine what would be deemed harmful considering that people in various societies living under different circumstances are informed by their contextual histories.

The third principle is that of *justice*. Justice demands that there should be fairness and equity in the research process (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benatar, 2002; Wassenaar, 2006). This principle has been studied more widely than the aforementioned principles, and has received more attention than the principle of autonomy (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989), discussed below. The principle of justice is effective only when a person is treated in a fair manner by being given all the necessary information and services that he or she is entitled to as a research

participant, including receiving all the benefits that the proposed study promised in lieu of participation (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989). However, people may not have a common understanding of what justice is, which has the potential to give rise to more ethical dilemmas.

Researchers and funders should not be the only ones benefiting from the proceeds of research. “*Distributive justice*”, the appropriate distribution of research benefits and problems between all the stakeholders, is important (Smith, 2000). Research should respond to the needs of the society from which the sample is drawn. Benatar (2002) argues that “while researchers are generally privileged people, many research subjects are amongst the most vulnerable in our world, living under the worst conditions of deprivation and exploitation” (p.1131). Thus, the relationship that develops between researchers and participants is that of inequality. Research ethics require that researchers refrain from taking advantage of vulnerable and/or less knowledgeable research participants. The research should be justified and morally correct (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). Above all, participants should be able to exercise their autonomy when they partake in any research study and whatever these are, they should be acknowledged and respected.

2.4.1.2. The principle of Autonomy

The principle of *autonomy*, the main focus of this study, is strongly associated with theorists such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and some liberal feminists. Autonomy is understood with reference to the liberal Western tradition, which emphasises the importance of the person’s freedom of choice in political and personal matters (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Engelhardt, 1996; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Kitchener, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006). Autonomy derives its meaning from the Greek *autos* (“self”) and *nomos* (“rule”), thus “self-rule” (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). According to this principle, individuals are self-governing; they are responsible for determining their destiny and fate (Sue & Sue, 1999). Autonomy has been “analyzed in terms of external non-constraint and the presence of critical internal capacities integral to self governance” (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986, p.8). It

therefore makes a claim that an individual's fate is not determined by secondary factors such as culture, religion or the social context.

Autonomy can be associated with expressions such as “privacy, choosing freely, choosing one's own moral position, and accepting responsibility for one's choices” (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989, p.28), and “voluntary informed consent” (Wassenaar, 2006, p.67). Thus, to be autonomous, people need not to be told, directed, forced or prevented to take whichever decision they feel is in their best interest. Further, one needs to be able to live with the decision, because part of being an autonomous being is being able to live with one's choices. Beauchamp and Walters (1989) argue that “the burden of moral justification rests on those who would restrict or prevent a person's exercise of autonomy” (p.29). The same applies in research: for individuals to exercise their full autonomy, they need to be given a full account of the process in order to make an informed decision based on facts.

The notion of autonomy rests partially on the Enlightenment idea of the individual as an unencumbered, solitary thinker, otherwise known as the “Generalized Other” (Benhabib, 1992). Sampson (1993) traced back the concept of the “Generalized Other” to the writings of Mead (1934) where he explained the notion of the “Generalized Other” to “represent the abstract addressee reflecting our particular group or community” (Sampson, 1993, p.140). This idea speaks of a voice within each individual that conducts imaginary dialogue with the generalised community ensuring that another person is always present even in one's most private and personal space (Sampson, 1993). Thus each and every experience is abstractly not practically shared with others, because the “generalized other” is considered a rationally thinking being, same as the self (Benhabib, 1992). That is why what the self would consider good for it will be accepted as being beneficial to all others as they will be applying similar methods in thinking about a particular ethical problem or dilemma because their internal capabilities are virtually the same.

It is important also to note, as Kitchener (2000) argued, that the four principles mentioned above are sometimes in conflict with one another as they sometimes offer contradictory advice to a person needing to make an ethical decision. For example, a researcher may promise confidentiality to the participant of the research, but there are certain conditions under which sworn confidentiality may be broken to protect a greater number of people against harm. These principles also serve to “direct the inquirer to a particular approach to the solution of the problem” (Engelhardt, 1996, p.103). Thus, the principles “need to be interpreted and applied within different cultural settings, many of which were unfamiliar to the international bodies that originally formulated these principles” (Barry, 1988, p.1083). It is not totally explicit that these ethical principles are culturally sensitive as they are informed by Western frames of reference and the assumption of universality. In light of this, one may ask, how is autonomy as a universal principle applicable in different cultural contexts?

2.4.1.3. Autonomy in Cross-cultural context

In cross-cultural research studies in ethics, defined as “any type of research on human behavior that compares specific behaviours across two or more cultures” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.9), autonomy is considered a universal principle. This means that it is understood to be *equally applicable* and *conceived similarly* in all cultures being compared or studied. In practice, it is assumed that those involved in the research process, such as research participants, researchers, and community representatives (e.g. community advisory board members or CABs), have a *common or shared understanding of the concept of autonomy, and hence will have a similar definition of what constitutes an ethically problematic situation, and the resolution thereof*. In other words, *conceptual equivalence* is assumed. Conceptual equivalence means Western developed meanings of concepts are similarly or equally understood and conceived in all cultures, regardless of their discrete socio-historical contexts.

Psychologically, a concept is “a mental category we use to classify events, objects, situations, behaviours, or even people with respect to what we perceive of as common properties”

(Matsumoto, 1996, p.141). Concepts are thus formed in people's minds to help them receive and evaluate information to enable them to make informed decisions and act appropriately (Matsumoto, 1996). Concept formation is stimulated by how an individual perceives the self, others and the environment that he or she is constantly in contact with. This may differ depending on the social, historical and cultural factors at play in different contexts (Matsumoto, 1996). This is one of the reasons why research findings of studies conducted under different epistemologies should not be generalised to other contexts. Cross-cultural studies in moral reasoning (Mkhize, 2006; Simpson, 1974; Verhoef & Michel, 1997), emotions (Matsumoto, 1996), intelligence (Kwate, 2001), to mention but a few, have been found to be neither meaningful nor informative, especially because of different languages which also entail different conceptions of symbols and concepts.

Expanding on the intelligence example, Kwate (2001) critically evaluated the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III), an intelligence test used all over the world to test the intelligence of children between the ages of 6 and 16 years. He found many problems with this test when it was applied to African children; the test does not test African children's capabilities of surviving and thriving in their own environment (Kwate, 2001). This occurs because most intelligence or cognitive tests, the WISC-III being no exception, lack cultural, conceptual, linguistic and educational equivalence, dismiss other ways of knowing or epistemologies and are mostly developed with the Western definition of relationships between humans and nature in mind and appreciate logical reasoning (Kwate, 2001). The WISC-III was standardised using Western norms and values and these were taken to be universally applicable to all children because of the superimposition of Western culture and epistemology.

Thus, cross-cultural studies have first to demonstrate that the groups being compared define or understand the task at hand similarly. Language plays a major role here. A task initially developed for one group cannot be assumed to be applicable to another until conceptual equivalence has been demonstrated (Kwate, 2001). Hence, the purpose of this study is to

investigate how researchers and community members, including CABs, conceptualise what constitutes an ethical dilemma, with reference to autonomy and relatedness. Conceptual equivalence is not always guaranteed, especially in cross-cultural research, as has been discussed above. Thus, concept formulation may not be equivalent between cultures or the meaning of some cultural concepts may not be equally or similarly understood. This is especially problematic in cross-cultural studies, which assume *conceptual equivalence*, because people's mental representations of their cultures vary, rather drastically in some instances.

Further, differences in understanding and concomitant problems could arise not only from conceptual inequivalence but also from varying definitions of the task at hand, assumptions brought to bear to the situation, cultural variability in the theory of mind as well as notions of the nature of knowledge (epistemologies), including understanding of the relationship between the researcher and the researched (Bruner, 1990; Greenfield, 1997; Goodwin; 2002; Serpell, 1993). Often, these assumptions and definitions are not shared openly during the research process, until a problem is encountered. While there has been a reasonable effort to engage with problems arising from conceptual inequivalence in obtaining informed consent, minimal attention has been directed at understanding what different parties consider to be ethically problematic in any given conflictual research scenario, nor have the possible influences of different philosophic assumptions been seriously considered. This lack of consideration of other cultural philosophies occurs because mainstream Western approaches to ethics, morality and self, which could be dated back to theorists such as Kant and Rawls, and further developed by theorists such as Piaget and Kohlberg, assume that ethical principles are universal (Benhabib, 1992; Matsumoto, 1996; Monroe, 2001; Simpson, 1974). This means that ethical principles are deemed true for all people regardless of their cultural backgrounds and identities (Matsumoto, 1996; Monroe, 2001).

2.4.2. Implications of the independent view of the self for ethical decision-making

Triandis (1989) argues that decision-making processes are discrete in different cultural contexts. Ethical decision-making in the Western worldview is influenced by the information-based model

of decision-making. This means that “judgments and actions are based on information about the situation and our ordinary moral sense” (Kitchener, 2000, p.11). Decision-making occurs when current and up-to-date information is available to the person making the decision, so that the decision is well informed and rational (Sales & Lavin, 2000). When one has to make an ethical decision, one needs to consult the ethical principles that are mentioned above as they provide guidance for ethical conduct (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Kitchener, 2000; Sales & Lavin, 2000). Ethical codes and principles will give a framework or uniform standards enabling researchers to deal with particular ethical problems and allowing for defensible decisions to be made (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Sales & Lavin, 2000).

The independent view of the self reflects Western worldviews. This is the view of the self that associates itself with labels such as autonomous, separate, egocentric, to mention but a few (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Cultural competence is achieved when individuals are able to refer to internally-held principles, thoughts, emotions and behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize, 2004). The implication of this on decision-making is that decisions are made with reference to internally-held, universal principles, and are individually legislated (Benhabib, 1992; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; Prinsloo, 1998; Simpson, 1974). This happens because individuals are believed to be atomistic, separate, individualistic and capable of engaging in ethical decision-making processes on their own, without the influence of significant others (Mkhize, 2004). Thus, decision-making is rational and individualised; individuals decide with “reference to [their] own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p.226). It is imperative for researchers to obtain informed consent before embarking on any research study and the independent construal of the self endorses and encourages individuals to make decisions independently of others. The concept of informed consent is discussed below as an example of the implications the independent construal of the self has on decision-making, specifically for individuals affiliated to the Western epistemology and culture.

2.4.2.1. Informed consent

Informed consent is the process by which researchers seek “explicit and uncoerced agreement from subjects to participate in a research project, based on their full understanding of the procedures involved and their likely effects” (Terre Blanche, Kelly & Durrheim, 2006, p.560). It was introduced by the Declaration of Helsinki, an international guideline for research, as a central requirement for any research conducted (Coughlin & Beauchamp, 1995; Marshall & Koenig, 2004). This international guideline is largely influenced by the Western conception of the self. It thus values individual autonomy when embarking on decision-making processes (Marshall & Koenig, 2004). Kuczewski and McCrudden (2001) support this view, arguing that “the very concept of autonomy is a product of our Western culture, which values individual freedom and self-determination” (p.34).

The usual process of obtaining informed consent involves asking participants to independently read and sign a consent form if they agree to participate in the research study (Dumbo, 2005). No outside influence is required as the choice of partaking or not lies solely with the individual. This approach carries an implicit assumption that all human subjects are literate or have the ability to read and write and can therefore, clearly understand what the research study is about (Dumbo, 2005). It thus proves difficult to gain informed consent following the international, Western guidelines in developing and underdeveloped countries where the population cannot read or write or where social structures are different from those of the West (Dumbo, 2005; Muller, 1994). Beauchamp and Walters (1989) argue that illiteracy should not be confused with a lack of intelligence, because that has often been the concluding findings of some cross-cultural research done, especially on intelligence, an example discussed above.

Obtaining informed consent is complicated if the researcher is working with people from non-Western cultures, owing to different conceptions of personhood, among other factors (Dumbo, 2005). Participants should consent to research only if they understand the subject matter of the research amply enough to make an informed decision (Barry, 1988; Coughlin & Beauchamp,

1995). Thus, autonomy and informed consent, which are essential prerequisites of the research process, might present difficulties in cultures where personal choice is limited or not regarded as important as affiliation to one's cultural group or community (Barry, 1988; Doumbo, 2005, Ikuenobe, 1998). Sharp and Foster (2002) argue that "existing regulatory policies and ethical guidelines concentrate on immediate risks to individual study participants and do not require researchers or ethics review boards to consider potential harm to non-participants" (p,146).

2.4.2.2. Ethical principles and Universalism

Universal principles in ethics assume that ethical principles are "true for all people of all cultures" (Matsumoto, 1996, p.5). This belief originates mainly from theorists such as Hume, Hobbes and Kant, who philosophised that the underlying human building blocks or human nature is fundamentally the same (Benhabib, 2002; Monroe, 2001). Kant proceeded to conjecture that human beings are thus capable of formulating and able to live by "universalizable moral principles" (Benhabib, 2002, p.26). Thus the idea of universalism would infer that people, regardless of gender, race, ethnic background, cultural background, etc would be considered moral equals and should consider ethical issues in similar ways and, if not, then that person or those persons are considered to be morally or intellectually inferior. Markus and Kitayama (2003) argued this generalisation of universalism was "a sign of commitment to science, and the goal of science was to pursue the universal laws of human nature" (p.280).

This idea of universality in ethics is thus in contrast with the view that ethics and the development of the self are culture-specific, meaning that an ethical self develops within a specific cultural tradition (Ermine et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996, 2006; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989). Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that the view of the self and hence the development of morality and ethics, which is deemed universal, is actually quite specific to some subdivisions of Western culture. This assumes cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is a school of thought which states that there is more than one truth to human beings' explanations, perceptions and understanding of the world (Monroe, 2001;

Pack-Brown & Williams, 2003). Cultural relativism developed partly as a critique to universalism and seeks to “identify human cultures not as local variations on a basically universal nature, but as self-contained, unique and organic entities” (Monroe, 2001, p.503).

There were numerous major universalist theorists, whose conclusions from their research studies were generalised to other cultures because they believed in the universalistic paradigm.

Kohlberg (1978) is an example. Following Piaget, Kohlberg concluded that core practices, such as culture, are insignificant and are nuisance variables in the development of an individual’s moral standards (Gilligan, 1977; Simpson, 1974). This view has been widely criticised by African and some Western and non-Western scholars, such as Barry, 1988; Gbadegesin, 1993; Karenga, 2004; Kigongo, n.d.; Mbiti, 1970; Mkhize, 2003, 2004, 2006; Muller, 1994; Ogbonnaya, 1994; Okolo, 2002; Prozesky, n.d.; Simpson, 1974. These theorists commonly argue that culture is not just a nuisance variable but an integral part of an individual’s moral development as it holds a “set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions – for governing behaviour” (Geertz, 1975, as cited in Gilbert, 1989, p.95).

Universalism has been criticised because each and every society is said to have “certain regulations and norms that govern human behaviour, inter-human relationships, and relationship with the environment and the supernatural world” (Prozesky, n.d.). If this speaks the truth of ethics, then ethics cannot be uproblematically generalised or applied to all human beings irrespective of their cultural backgrounds. This is because ethics are closely related to the concept of culture as human beings live according to the values, belief systems and ways of life which are abstracted from their unique and self-contained cultural tradition (Benhabib, 2002; Ermine et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Monroe, 2001; Prozesky, n.d.; Shweder, 1990). Also, this attempt to dissolve culture and all that it entails into the abstracts of universalism is to deny the differences that undeniably exist between the researcher and the research participants, which could lead to a greater number of challenges in the research process. Such challenges are discussed next.

The assumption of universalism in ethics may be one of the sources of ethical challenges in research. This is because, assuming universalism in ethics implies an automatic denial of the vast differences that exist between and within cultural beings evident in the fast growing literature on culture and cultured relativism (Matsumoto, 1996, 2006; Monroe, 2001). Assumptions of universalism may also result in the researcher failing to realise the limitations of his or her study to a particular context and aim at generalising or applying his or her research findings to groups of people for which they may not be applicable (Matsumoto, 1996). This may occur due to a failure to take the dynamic interdependence between mind, behaviour and culture into consideration, meaning that the research findings are “considered to be true for some people of some culture but not for others” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.9). This ignorance sometimes comes with the researchers as they assume the role of the more knowledgeable other or as experts of the people being studied, thus thinking that their knowledge makes them superior than the people being studied. The researcher is however aware of the challenges of extreme relativism which will result in nihilism and non-action. It is beyond the scope of this study to engage the tensions between relativism and universalism and how they can be breached. The study limits itself to an exposition of alternative moral and ethical decision-frameworks, in line with Brodwin’s (2001) call for the study of competing ethical systems.

2.5. African conception of the self: Communal Self

In this section of the thesis, an African conception of the self is discussed. It provides another way of looking at the self that is different from the dominant view of the West. The cosmology of the communal view of the self is associated with terms such as ‘interdependent’, ‘relational’, ‘holistic’, ‘communitarian’, ‘interconnected’ ‘humanism’ and ‘collectivism’ (Bujo, 2001; Doumbo, 2005; Gambu, 2000; Gbadegesin, 1998; Gyekye, 1998; Grills, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996, 2003; Mkhize, 2004; Kambon, 1998; Palmer & Laungani, 1999; Prinsloo, 1998; Triandis, 1989; Wiredu, 1998). This communal or collective worldview of the self is the reality in African and non-Western indigenous cultures and to some extent in some Western cultures (Mkhize, 2004). The communal or collective approach to the

self “defines the self in relation to others” (Gambu, 2000, p.8). In this worldview, a human being is not defined with reference to abstract psychological attributes as in the Western worldview discussed above. Instead, people are defined in terms of their relationships with significant others with whom they are in constant contact with (Gyekye, 1998; Matsumoto, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989; Wiredu, 1998). This occurs because of the interdependence that exists “between individuals and the community, [and hence] personhood cannot be defined solely in terms of physical and psychological attributes” (Mkhize, 2004, p.47).

This worldview of the self fosters the development of an interdependent rather than the independent construal of self. The interdependent construal of the self involves a person perceiving him- or herself “as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one’s behavior is determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings and actions of others in the relationship” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p.227). In this construal of the self, the person’s status and position in relation to the larger social unit is seen to be of great importance because it gives people a sense of where they are and their roles in the differing relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize; 2004). This brings a sense of meaning, purpose and completeness into the person’s life (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence the individual exists in and for the community; personhood is made possible by the societal norms and values that are in place to create social harmony (Mkhize, 2004; Nsamenang, 1999). Thus, this conception of self, also known as the interdependent construal of self, sees the self as “unbounded, flexible, and contingent on context” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.40).

Ellis (1978, cited in Mboya, 1999) states that in African thought “a man is not a man on his own, the individual gains significance from and through his [her] relationships with others” (p.29). Therefore, in the African context, an individual is socialised to assume a “social responsibility and nurturance” (Nsamenang, 1999, p.32), putting great emphasis on how an individual is able to

associate and fit in with others and share responsibilities rather than standing out or separate from others (Ermine et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; Nsamenang, 1999). Wiredu (1998) further argued that the communalist orientation of the self prizes harmony. Therefore the goal in this context is to “harmonize one’s interests with those of the collective” (Mkhize, 2004, p.27). This is because others form an integral part of the self as they enable the self to develop and achieve the fullness of being within the concrete act of relating to others (Benhabib, 1992; Gyekye, 1998; Mkhize, 2004).

The African communitarian approach also takes a concrete view of the self (Barry, 1988; Benhabib, 1992; Doumbo, 2005; Karenga, 2004; Kigongo, n.d.; Mkhize, 2004, 2006; Ogonnaya, 1994; Okolo, 2002; Prozesky, n.d.). The concrete view of the self “requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution” (Benhabib, 1992, p.159). Benhabib (2002) further argues that the concrete Other enables human beings to extrapolate the representations of their similarities and pay attention to the differences or individuality in order for the differences to be used in complementing rather than excluding each other. This conception of selfhood assumes the “Concrete Other” – that is, the self connected to other selves via concrete relational and historical ties – as the point of departure. Such a self values a socially-negotiated account to decision-making, whereby meaning emerges from a *joint process* involving family members and relevant community members, where appropriate (Cottone, 2001; Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2006).

The ‘concreteness’ of this worldview further speaks of the contextualisation of the African self. Contextualisation is a “cultural dimension that refers to the degree to which cultures foster differential behaviors according to the specific context within which those behaviors occur” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.32). African ways of being appreciate behaviour specific to where it occurred, thus behaviour and the context where it happened cannot be seen to be separate from each other (Matsumoto, 1996). This includes the time and space of the occurrence of the behaviour.

The African context is communal and spiritual in its nature. The self is thus realised through participation in the community where webs of hierarchical relationships and other spiritual forces exist to govern self behaviour in its context (Grills, 2004; Mkhize, 2004). God is seen as the Supreme Being followed by the ancestors or the living-dead. The ancestors are people that have died and transited to another spiritual world in a hierarchy above those presently living and those yet to be born. At this point it is important to note that not everybody that dies becomes an ancestor. The belief for African people is that those that have previously occupied this earth and “lived a life characterized by high moral standards can be elevated to the status of an *inyanya*” (Mkhize, 2004, p.41). *Inyanya* or *idlozi* are *isiZulu* words meaning ancestor. The elevation of one to an ancestor or *idlozi* depends a lot on how one lived his life on earth (Mkhize, 2004). For example, people who lived a morally sound and ethical life, once dead and a transition ritual has been done, those people are then considered to be superior beings working as God’s agents in different capacities, to restore and maintain the good health of their families and communities at large. They are able to make the unknown known, because as much as the ancestors occupy space in the universe, they are “believed to be invisible to the naked eye and inaudible to the normal ear, except when maybe they choose to *manifest* themselves to a particular person for a special reason” (Wiredu, 1996, p.53, original emphasis).

On the meaning of community: in African moral metaphysics, a human being is not defined with reference to abstract psychological attributes; rather, a person is his or her “*practice-in-relationships*” (Karenga, 2004, p.254, emphasis original). As Menkiti (1984), Mkhize (2004) and Ogbonnaya (1994) have argued, personhood in African moral metaphysics is defined with reference to an experiential moral community. The term community, in this instance, is not defined in mere geographic terms; it captures the organic relationship between individuals, their social relations and practices towards one another. In this type of community, defined by Karenga (2004) as a “participatory moral community” (p.257), the “person-in-relationship, i.e. in family, community, society, is the center of focus as distinct from modern European individualism, in which the individual, abstract, autonomous and often alienated, is the essential

focus and center of gravity” (ibid, p.257). Thus, ‘community’ is defined by people’s awareness of their mutual obligations and responsibilities towards one another and that is related to the principle of *ubuntu*.

However, the idea of selves that *emerge*, in a way, through participation in a human community, is widely contested by theorists who believe in the principle of absolute autonomy, *à la* Hobbes’s state of nature metaphor (Benhabib, 1992). They argue that if personhood is tied to relations with others, then the person’s autonomous self-definition is restricted to the social relations in which he or she finds him/herself (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003). The socio-cultural school of thought, on the other hand, counters that a dialogic relationship between persons and others fosters learning through participation in the activities of one’s culture or interpretive community (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003).

2.5.1. Implications of the interdependent view of the self on decision-making

The communal view of the self, described above, leads to a different approach to ethics and ethical decision-making. This implies that the ethical theories being applied as a universal guide to the resolution of ethical dilemmas, like principlism, are not sufficient. The ethical theory of *ubuntu* will be discussed below as a logical consequence of the communal self. *Ubuntu* prizes collective and communal decision-making in order to generate mutual understanding of the issues at hand and this is called the *joint process* (Cottone, 2001; Doumbo, 2005). This decision-making model will form the second part of this section of the implications of the interdependent self to ethical decision-making. The last section will focus on ways of knowing inherent in the idea of an interdependent self.

2.5.2. The Ethic of *Ubuntu*

The ethics of *ubuntu* is associated with the view that a human being is closely connected to fellow human beings. It has similarities with ethical theories such as virtue ethics, feminist ethics and the ethics of care (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007). The latter is the one that is closely linked to the discussions of the chapter. Relational ethics deal with “ethical reasoning primarily through development of character traits or virtues and concerns itself with cultural, contextual, relational and emotional-intuitive responses to ethical dilemmas” (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007, p.80).

According to Prozesky (n.d.), the idea of *ubuntu* “underpins the very communal nature of African society and by extension its ethics” (p.4), and derives from this an understanding of personhood. However, *ubuntu* is not a rejection of individuality or respect for persons. That is, the fact that a society values communal practices does not mean there is no sense of personhood or respect for the individuality of persons (Nze, 1989, as cited in Okolo, 2002). Instead, it is the idea of individuality in the modern European sense, of persons as isolated, unencumbered and ultimately alone, that is rejected. Indeed, *ubuntu* incorporates the idea of social justice, caring and compassion for others, and respect for the individuality and humanity of the Other, who is different from us (Mkhize, 2004). This also includes the whole cosmology of African people’s reality, that is, including the people that have died and the people yet to be born, because “a bad deed affects all systems not just the individual” (Bujo, 2001, p.2).

Chikanda (1990, as cited in Prinsloo, 1998) is in agreement with the above, stating that *ubuntu* is ‘African Humanism’, which “involves sympathy, care, sensitivity to the needs of others, respect, consideration, patience and kindness” (p.42). Makhudu (1993, as cited in Prinsloo, 1998) also sees traits such as empathy, understanding, warmth, participation, interaction, cooperation, harmony, sharing, reciprocation and a shared frame of reference to collectively make up the culture of *ubuntu*. The collective culture of *ubuntu* suggests that in any kind of social gathering, social collectivity outweighs individuality. However, this does not become oppressive to the

individual's rights, as has been argued in some Western literature, because the individual is still aware of himself or herself in terms of "I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am" (Mbiti, 1970, p.279).

Ramose (1998) refers to *ubuntu* as the "generalized existence of African people" (p.325). This is because this concept of *ubuntu* involves a process whereby people are continually behaving in such a manner that they are investigating their being, life experiences and the knowledge and truth about their lives (Ramose, 1998). Inquiry into who one is, is a never ending process for African people, as one's identity and becoming is marked by significant milestones in life, as evidenced by the different ceremonies performed at various stages of a person's life. This implies that *ubuntu* is a process that is always in motion (Ramose, 1998). Ramose (1998) also said that the first principle he associates the *ubuntu* ethics with is "freedom from dogmatism ... orientated towards balance and harmony in the relationships between human beings and between the latter and the broader being or nature" (p.326).

The principle of *ubuntu* is manifest and finds meaning in a number of African languages. It is captured in idioms and sayings, such as '*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*' in isiZulu, '*Motho ke motho ka batho babang*' (Sotho), '*hunhu*' (Shona) and '*abantu balamu*' (good humanness) (Kiganda). These idioms roughly translate "I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am" (Mkhize, 2004, p.47). This emphasises the interconnectedness in which relationships and the conception of personhood are conceived in African cultures. Given the paucity of terms referring to individuals as abstract, autonomous subjects in most African societies, the universal grounding of ethics on this notion of the self is questionable. Ramose (1998) further argued that to "dissolve the specificity of *ubuntu* into abstract 'universality' is to deny its right to be different" (p.327). This dissolving of *ubuntu* has been attempted by Western scholars because they have a limited understanding of it. However, this has not stopped them from critically philosophising about it, trying to dominate African understanding of what *ubuntu* is.

2.5.3. Decision-making Model: Communal

The communal conception of the self prizes *ubuntu* ethics: life decisions are made in relation to significant others, be it one's family and, in some instances, the community (Bujo, 2001; Grills, 2004; Mkhize, 2004). This signifies a culture of consultation that the ethical principle of *ubuntu* incorporates when decisions have to be made (Prinsloo, 1998). The consultation process is planned strategically and only selective members of the family and community can be consulted. Those that are most often consulted are the elders of the family or community and they are given more power in the decision-making process. Elders bring their life experience, wisdom and knowledge to the decision-making process (Prinsloo, 1998).

The communal view of the self also values the socially-negotiated account to decision-making. This is whereby meaning emerges from a *joint process*, whereby family members and relevant community members are involved in decision-making, where appropriate (Cottone, 2001; Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2006). This is known as *ibandla* or *inkundla* in *isiZulu* (roughly, a gathering with a view to discuss issues and to reach consensus). For example, Doumbo (2005) embarked on this process of decision-making for his medical study of Malaria in Mali. He and his colleagues held meetings starting with the elders of the community to the various heads of extended families, then proceeded to have meetings with the mothers of the children he wanted in the study and lastly, they obtained individual consent (assent) from those children. From this perspective, therefore, ethical decision-making could be considered as *joint action* (Shotter, 1984, 1993a, 1993b). The *joint action* approach implies that "the theorist shifts attention away from the single individual; the central units of understanding become social collaborations or relational forms" (Gergen, 1990; as cited by Shotter, 1993a, p.60). This helps build more trust and confidence in the research process because all people in the area will be aware of the researchers and their intentions as they come in (Doumbo, 2005). It also promotes active collaboration in decision-making within the family and the community at large (Crawford & Lipsedge, 2004). Crawford and Lipsedge (2004) further say that this active communal collaboration helps to strengthen "existing social ties and increase and increase the family's sense of cohesion and their capacity to work together" (p.144).

2.6. Conclusion

Western and African/Non-western groups' differing conceptions of selfhood and their participation in various interpretive communities or background horizons of understanding (Gadamer, 1975) could have a bearing not only on their conceptions of ethical dilemmas but also on their understanding of how such dilemmas ought to be resolved. Tensions and contradictions arising from differences in horizons of understanding are also explored. The idea is to show, as others have argued, that a truly ethical stance is not to be found in abstract principles *per se*, but that it should involve willingness to listen to others' perspectives (Tshudin, 2006) and, where indicated, the willingness to be changed by the perspective of the Other (Gadamer, 1975). Thus, the purpose of this research is not to substitute one ethical system for another: today's societies are complex enough to contain multiple ethical systems (Brodwin, 2001). Following Brodwin's recommendations, as well as the works of Izumi (2006) in China, the research aims to identify local ethical systems at play in any given research situation as well as their interface with Western ethical systems.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology used to gather and analyse data. It begins with the design of the study. Sampling is then discussed, followed by a description of the data collection process and the procedure that the interviewer used in collecting the data. Following this is a section on data analysis. Finally, design reliability and validity are discussed, followed by the ethical considerations.

3.1. Design

Given the purpose of this study, which is concerned with meaning making, a qualitative research design was employed. The study design was conceptualised during the initial phases in order to maximise coherence between the purpose of the study, the context, the research question and other research issues (Gambu, 2000; Maxwell, 1998; McNeill & Chapman, 2005). While the design was conceptualised from the beginning, it was not fixed as it had to take into consideration not only the issues emerging during the study but also the socio-historical context of the participants (Silverman, 2005). Lincoln and Guba (1985, as cited by Stake, 1985) concur with this; they state that “qualitative research is based on holistic view that social phenomena, human dilemmas and the nature of cases are situational and influenced by happenings of many kinds” (p.440).

The qualitative design allowed for rich and more informative data to be collected in the participants’ context and situational boundaries (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Marshall & Roosman, 1989; Silverman, 2005). Data were collected in the natural setting of the research participants, where the researcher was able to interact informally with them and thereby developing not only a trusting relationship but also a better sense of the context within which the data were collected (Cresswell, 1998; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). The design enabled the researcher to get in touch with the participants’ social and cultural

contexts and not to “appear as an invisible voice of authority, but as a real historical individual with concrete specific desires and interests” (Mkabela, 2005, p.180). To give a practical example, when the researcher of this study had to attend several meetings and traditional ceremonies with a group of traditional healers in one of the local communities, i.e. in their natural setting, she dressed appropriately and in a way that showed she had an understanding of the social context in which they found themselves and respect for their cultural values and norms. This was critical in gaining the participants’ trust and hence their positive response to the study.

The qualitative research design was appropriate for this study because it allowed for in-depth narratives of the different stakeholders with regards to their definitions of what constitutes an ethical dilemma and thus explored how they engage in ethical decision-making. Decision-making is an everyday occurrence for all people and therefore informs people’s everyday behaviour. Silverman (2005) argues that if one’s research study attempts to answer questions about people’s everyday lives, a qualitative research design is most appropriate. In the current study, the flexibility of the design allowed for in-depth probing/questioning and clarifications where it was needed (Silverman, 2005). This flexibility further allowed for the sampling of research participants to be guided by the “increasingly refined research questions” (Marshall & Rossman, 1989, p.26).

3.2. Sampling

The study used non-probability, purposeful sampling, as the purpose of the study was not to make statistical generalisations but to find information-rich cases to be studied in depth (Dawson, 2007; Kerlinger, 1986; Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2001). Purposive sampling is “characterized by the use of judgment and deliberation effort to obtain representative samples by including presumably typical areas or groups in the sample” (Kerlinger, 1986, p.120). The deliberation effort involves the researcher thinking critically about the population of people he or she intends to include in the research study and for what purpose

(Silverman, 2005). This is the basic assumption of purposive sampling: participants are strategically selected or handpicked, depending on the purposes of the study (Dawson, 2007; McNeill & Chapman, 2005).

Snowball and maximum variation sampling (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994) were also used to identify other participants whose participation added depth to the study. Snowball sampling “involves identifying certain key individuals in a population, interviewing them, and then asking them to suggest others who might be interviewed” (McNeill & Chapman, 2005, p.50). One of the key individuals in this study, a male nurse who is also a traditional healer, was able to link the researcher with a number of community members and a community representative (traditional healers) who took part in this study. The sampling also aimed at selecting contrasting cases (e.g. community members who have participated in research versus those who have not participated) in order to test the robustness of the findings. Maximum variation sampling was most useful here; it allowed for this contrasting to occur (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In line with maximum variation sampling, the researcher made an effort to sample across factors such as gender, age, education, occupation, research experience (for researchers) and socio-economic status. These factors were not used as independent variables in the traditional, experimental sense: the purpose was to gain insight into how the socio-cultural *positionality* (cf. Alcoff, 1988) of the research participants and the positions they occupy in society, possibly influence the way they reason about ethical dilemmas.

Three groups of participants were targeted in this study: researchers, community representatives and members of the community who have participated in social science or health-related research (and, for contrasting purposes, community members who have not participated in research). Two researchers were sampled from the local university community and one from a major social science research organisation in the region. Participation in community, social science and health-related research was the main inclusion criterion for researchers.

Community members were sampled from two neighbouring communities in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. Two communities were strategically sampled for two reasons. Firstly, the researcher was likely to find community members who had participated in research in one of the communities, given its established association with research institutions. Secondly, the researcher had access to a key contact who was able to facilitate access to this community. Through this contact, who was also interviewed as a community advisory board member, the researcher was able to link up with a second community advisory board member. This meant that two advisory board members were interviewed. Four interviewees were community members, two of whom had previously participated in research studies, while the remaining two had never partaken in research.

Altogether, nine participants took part in the study, (Table 1 below). This number was not fixed in advance, as the purpose was not to develop sample statistics that approximate population parameters. The nine participants exclude the one interview that was done as a pilot for the study. This pilot interview was significant as it pointed to some factors that needed to be attended to before the main interviews were conducted. The pilot interview was done with a field researcher connected to one of the health-related research institutions. This interviewee was *isiZulu*-speaking, and so the interview was conducted in *isiZulu* using the scenarios and the interview schedules that had been translated from English to *isiZulu*. Amongst other things, the pilot interview allowed the researcher to check for consistency between the *isiZulu* and English versions of the scenarios. There were one or two questions that had to be re-worked in the *isiZulu* version of the interview schedule as they were more comprehensive. A considerable amount of time was allocated to this process of creating and translating the ethical scenarios and when the study was conducted, only minor adaptations were necessary.

Category	Researchers	Community Advisory Board Members (CABS)	Community Members Previously Involved in Research	Community Members Previously not Involved in Research
Number of participants	3	2	2	2

Table 1: Number of research participants by category

3.3. Data Collection Technique

A hypothetical ethical scenario mirroring real life circumstances (Appendix A) was developed to serve as a stimulus leading to the discussion of ethical issues. The scenario involved a moral agent who had to resolve an ethical dilemma (e.g. a dilemma between making decisions as an individual versus deciding with reference to a collective). Participants were presented with this dilemma, followed by a number of probing questions. Each question was meant to elicit a particular dimension of ethical experience, such as autonomy, relatedness, and ideas about the ownership of knowledge.

The method of hypothetical dilemmas, pioneered by Lawrence Kohlberg in the study of moral reasoning (e.g. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b; Kohlberg, 1984), continues to be used in its various forms to study moral and ethical decision-making in various cultural contexts (e.g. Tschudin, 2006). While the researcher could be criticised for relying on hypothetical as opposed to real life ethical dilemmas, she is of the view that the dilemmas captured in the ethical scenarios, which have been developed/adapted from the research and clinical ethics literature (e.g. Gbadegesin, 1993; Bebeau, Pimple, Muskavitch, Borden & Smith, 1995), generally mirrored the life experiences of the participants. Further, during the probing sessions,

participants were asked to relate how the dilemmas in question related to their own experiences. The ethical scenario was available in both *isiZulu* and English.

3.4. Procedure

Data were collected by means of individual interviews. They allowed for an in-depth exploration of the issues in question (Kvale, 1996; Kitzinger, 1995). These were semi-structured interviews characterised by open-ended questions that inquired from the research subjects their opinion about what was happening in the scenario (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). For example, Question One was: “What do you think is a problem here and how can it be resolved?” The research participant answered the questions according to what he or she thought was right or wrong and thus offered a solution according to his or her own frame of reference. There was a standardised interview schedule that the interviewer used for all interviews. As the interview schedule was semi-structured, it allowed for follow-up questioning depending on each research participant’s responses (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

This process also enabled the interviewer to play an active role; she did not merely interact neutrally by way of asking questions in a passive manner, as this is not possible in qualitative research. Rather, the researcher interacted as a person who is also bound by her own history and culture, thus carrying unavoidable conscious motives, desires, feelings and biases making her hardly a neutral interviewer (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). This is very important to note because the interviewer is human and has a vested interest in the outcome of the study. When a researcher designs a study, he or she has certain motives and desires driving him or her to research the particular issue. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) also argued that the “interviewer becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies” (p.696). This research study forms part of the emerging literature on African epistemologies that will hopefully advocate for African culture and indigenous psychologies.

While it had been envisaged that interviews would last for about 90–120 minutes, some went beyond this time frame; permission was sought from the interviewees to continue for an extra 30 minutes or more. The situations and contexts in which the interviews were conducted differed as the researcher interviewed participants in their locale. All the nine interviews were done by the same interviewer and this helped in terms of the free flowing of the interviews as the interviewer was familiar with the scenario and the interview schedule (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Permission to tape-record each interview was sought from each participant before the interview started.

Interviews were conducted in *isiZulu* and English. In some cases the participants were happy to code-switch between *isiZulu* and English and this was welcomed by the interviewer. The usage of either of the languages depended on the language preferences of the interviewees. Wherever possible, data were transcribed within two days of collection, so as to allow the researcher to supplement the data with process notes collected during the interview, which included the interviewer's observation of the interviewee's body language and gestures made (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1994). The researcher transcribed the data herself and this helped to familiarise herself with the data at each stage of the research process.

3.5. Analysis

Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend that data analysis should start as early as possible to assist the researcher to “cycle back and forth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting new, often better data” (p.50). This allowed the researcher to test new hypotheses that emerged during the analysis stages. Thus, data analysis in this study was an ongoing process. It started as soon as the interview was finished and the transcribing process began. As mentioned above, all the interviews were conducted by the researcher in addition to the transcribing and translation. This helped the researcher familiarise herself with the data long before the analysis began.

Thematic analysis was used in this research because it is flexible (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is a “method for identifying, analyzing and reporting [themes] within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79). Data were transformed into findings following Boyatzis’s (1998) thematic approach and also the approach advocated by Braun and Clarke (2006). These two approaches were selected out of the many approaches to thematic analysis not only because of their similarity but also because they spell out simple and understandable guidelines to transform data into findings. This proved useful for the researcher, a novice in the qualitative research field (Cf. Braun & Clarke, 2006). Initially, the thematic analysis proved to be a difficult task. The researcher had volumes of raw data which she had to sift through. Braun and Clarke (2006) argued that the theoretical freedom of thematic analysis “provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data” (p,78). This was exactly the experience of the researcher in this study.

The richness and complexity of the data was overwhelming and exciting at the same time. It felt as though the possibilities with the data at hand were endless and it meant that the researcher had a chance to apply her own epistemological understanding and assumptions to the data, thus playing a very active part in the process of analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Braun and Clarke (2006) provide six phases into the process of thematic analysis and these were very helpful. The first phase involved reading the raw data over and over again until the researcher felt consumed by it. This was done in an endeavour to become familiar with the raw data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Time consuming as the process was, it was facilitated by the fact that the researcher had been involved in all stages of data collection and transcription. The data were actively read to identify recurring patterns or ideas.

The second phase involved the production of a first list of ideas that stood out or were interesting enough to be taken notice of and from which to derive more meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This was the beginning of the ‘coding’ process where “a list of themes; a complex model with themes; indicators, and qualifications that are causally related; or something in between these

two forms” (Boyatzis, 1998, p.4) was generated. This process of coding was helpful in organising the complex data at hand into meaningful chunks and this made the data less overwhelming. The coding process was done separately for the three groups of stakeholders in this research. When the data was coded and organised, the researcher began looking for overarching themes and supporting extracts for those themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Braun and Clarke (2006) explain that a “theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of *patterned* response or meaning within the data set” (p,82, original emphasis). Themes were developed inductively, from the raw data itself, meaning that the themes that were identified and selected were strongly linked to the data (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006). They were also deductively identified with reference to theory or previous research (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006). The researcher was looking for patterned responses related to the research questions. Mind maps were a useful tool at this stage of the research and four main mind maps were compiled. These were for the group of researchers, community advisory board members, community members previously involved in research and lastly, community members previously not involved in research. Once these four mind maps were generated for the different groups of participants, the researcher had to try and source meaning from each of them. This in turn led to a bigger mind map where main themes from all four mind maps were systematically organised. This was yet another complex and lengthy process in the pursuit of meaning. This process involved deciding which themes were to be the main ones and which were to be sub-themes and why (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

At this point the researcher had compiled a number of themes, some of which were a replication of others and some for which she could not find extracts that gave a precise illustration of the particular main theme. This called for all the themes to be carefully reviewed which was the beginning of phase four (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This involved collapsing some of the themes into one or into sub-themes, discarding some of the themes and creating new themes. The themes were then defined and named accordingly, comprising phase five of the analysis (Braun

& Clarke, 2006). This was a challenging process because the themes kept changing according to the researcher's understanding of the data at hand. The end result of this process was the compilation of three main themes, each with its own sub-themes. These themes were most prevalent in the research but the meaning and reasoning behind them sometimes differed depending on the positioning of the research participants. This will become clearer in the following chapter. All of this would not have been possible without the supervising researcher's challenging questions, valuable insights and knowledge and interest in this field of research.

3.6. Design Reliability and Validity

Positivist accounts of reliability and validity are generally not relevant to qualitative research (Janesick, 1994; Marshall & Roosman, 1989; Patton, 1990). The positivist account infers that "social reality is open to outside observations and can be objectively studied rather than being constructed by the perceptions and experiences of its members" (Hall & Hall, 1996, p.38). This is a scientific model mostly applicable to quantitative studies because their success is determined by proving that their methods measure objective constructs. Maxwell (1992) and Gambu (2000) argue that this approach is not suitable for qualitative studies because reliability and validity do not rely on the presence of one encompassing truth upon which all others are compared. This is also because qualitative research acknowledges that researchers are human beings that are influenced by their own epistemological and historical contexts which they also bring into the process of research (Dawson, 2007).

3.6.1. Reliability

In the traditional sense, reliability refers to the consistency of a measure being used to always come up with the same results regardless of the different users (Dawson, 2007; McNeill & Chapman, 2005). However, according to Miles and Huberman (1994), reliability or dependability in qualitative research is concerned with the extent to which the research process was applied consistently across the cases concerned and by the researchers involved. It involves

a clear explication of the process by which observations were treated and turned into findings. The current researcher safeguarded reliability firstly by conducting all the interviews and transcribing them personally to minimise the possibility of bias arising from inter-interviewer differences and transcription inaccuracy. Secondly, a thorough record of the research process was kept. This involved completing a contact summary information sheet (Appendix C) for each participant at the end of each interview, while interviews were recorded and transcribed as soon as possible after data collection. There was no necessity for follow-up interviews as the observations were recorded; a satisfactory measure of accuracy was achieved (Marshall & Rossman, 1989; Silverman, 2001).

3.6.2. Validity

Validity refers to the extent to which the data collection techniques truly assess the underlying constructs; what the researcher intended to measure (Cook, 2000; Dawson, 2007; Hall & Hall, 1996). As has been discussed above, the psychometric approach to validity was not applicable to this qualitative study. Kvale (1995) argues that this is because the psychometric approach “belong [s] to some abstract realm in a sanctuary of science, far removed from the interactions of the everyday world” (p.19). Validity as it applied to this study is discussed next.

3.6.2.1. Theoretical Validation and Transferability

Validity was ascertained with reference to theory (Cook, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Qualitative research does not aim for wide generalisations; rather it aims at establishing transferable findings. Thus, theoretical validation in qualitative research involves the development of a theory or theories “that not only make sense of the particular persons or situations studied, but [that] also shows how the same process, in different situations, can lead to different results” (Maxwell, 1992, p.293). Theoretical validation in this study was ascertained by reading and analysing the findings with reference to theoretical frameworks such as autonomy,

relatedness, taking into account the tensions between indigenous and Western worldviews as spelt out in the literature review.

3.6.2.2. Interpretive Validity

Finally, *interpretive validation* was used as another way of validating this study. This is the extent to which the findings make sense from the perspectives of the people whose meaning is in question (Maxwell, 1992; Miles & Huberman, 1984). Thus the context and other socio-historical and linguistic issues are recognised to be influential in the process of decision-making.

Interpretive validity is guaranteed if the researcher has an exceptional understanding of the language spoken by the participants, as was the case in this study. This was assured in this research by the ability of the researcher to switch between the two languages in which the interviews were conducted, namely English and *isiZulu*.

3.7. Ethical Considerations

Informed consent was negotiated explicitly with each research participant to make certain that he or she understood the research purpose, process or procedure and his or her role in the study. Negotiation of informed consent and the actual interviews were facilitated because they were done using the preferred language of the research participants, i.e. English and/or *IsiZulu* (see Appendices E and F). This was particularly important to avoid assuming conceptual equivalence between and within ethnical groups of research participants; concepts such as autonomy are value-laden.

Interesting observations were made during the interview process, especially with the traditional healers. Firstly, they were not approached as individuals but as a community of traditional healers. On the day of the interview, they all gathered in one place and took turns being interviewed, albeit individually. This occurred despite the fact that the researcher made it

explicit that she could visit each of them in their homes or places of work, but they preferred the gathering. Secondly, once all the traditional healers had gathered, the owner of the home burnt incense (*impepho*). He explained that he was inviting his ancestors to be part of the process and introducing the visitors to them. All those present, including the researcher, had to inhale the incense. This was yet another tradition of the healers that the researcher had to respect. Fortunately, she was familiar with the ritual of the burning of incense as her family practises it as well.

Confidentiality was assured by not using the participants' names during the interviews and in the transcribed text. Permission to audio-tape the interview was obtained before data collection. The tapes will be kept in a safe place for a period of at least five years as they form an integral part of the data. Furthermore, raw data transcription has only been accessible to the researcher and the project supervisor. The names of individual participants or communities from which the data were collected are not revealed in the dissertation or future publications arising from this research. Care was taken to edit out historical incidences that might unwittingly reveal the identities of the communities in question. As far as the research is concerned, participants did not incur expenses by virtue of participating in this study: the researcher travelled to the communities, organisations and individuals that were interviewed. There were no immediate benefits awarded to the research participants. This was clearly stated in the consent form to which they agreed. The long-term benefits of the study for the participants were that they were contributing to a research study and literature on indigenous ethical decision-making.

Permission for this study was granted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Faculty Research Ethics Committee and the letter of approval is attached as Appendix G.

3.8. Conclusion

The research seeks to understand how people, namely, researchers, community representatives and community members, conceptualise and understand ethical dilemmas and therefore how this affects their means of problem solving or ethical decision-making. The chapter discussed the methodology used in this study. Research design and sampling procedures were discussed, as were techniques and approaches used to collect and analyse data. Lastly, issues of reliability, validity and ethical considerations were attended to. The results and discussion of the study constitute the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4. Introduction

This chapter presents the study findings and discussion. The findings presented speak to two research questions: How do researchers, research participants and community representatives (CABs) define what constitutes an ethical dilemma; and, What mechanisms should be put in place for ethical decision-making (ethical resolution) for researchers, community representatives and community participants? Participants considered ethical dilemmas in terms of (a) benefit sharing, (b) communal and individual ownership of knowledge, and (c) different ways of knowing and validating of knowledge, being the three main themes. The main mechanisms for resolving ethical dilemmas are (a) the legalistic versus indigenous dispute resolution processes, (b) the Bio-Prospecting Act, and (c) prior agreements.

4.1. Understanding of Ethical Dilemmas

Ethical dilemmas were considered in terms of (1) benefit sharing, (2) communal versus individual ownership of knowledge, and (3) different ways of knowing and validation of knowledge. Each of these conceptions is presented and discussed.

4.1.1. Benefit sharing

Participants across all categories felt that there were discrepancies or imbalances in the way the proceeds or benefits of the research were shared and this constitutes an ethical dilemma.

Although this theme was shared by all participants, they had different justifications. The following extracts talk to this issue:

Extract 1

Interviewer: What do you think is the problem here and how might it be solved?

Researcher 1: I see these people from the company not being right. We know that the issue of HIV and AIDS¹ and who will come up with a cure or whatever it involves money. To everybody the issue of HIV is a business.

Interviewer: Ja.

Researcher 1: Eh new products that come about that are working and if they are coming with that approach, saying that they want to take ownership, I see that as not being right.

Researcher 1: Personally I believe that everybody has a right to receive help ... In the first place it shouldn't be about money that eh ...for there to even be conflict eh as to who discovered it first, the priority is for people to receive help with this herb, you see.

Interviewer: Mm.

Researcher 1: Money can follow behind but [the] first priority is that everybody should have access to this because in the first place it's something natural, which grows on its own.

Similar views were expressed by Researcher 2 in the following extract:

Extract 2

Researcher 2: ... so definitely they'll have to ... they are running a business more than they are helping people. So that is where it will begin and as much as I can say that, that would affect directly the person who will be getting it, so if there was a good agreement it could either be that the government subsidise that thing or that drug that has been tested and then a person will get it at a lesser price. But definitely somebody will be paying more, it's either the government when trying to help its people by subsidising or there is an actual person or an actual buyer of this cure who will pay more, you see.

The researchers perceived the possibility of an ethical dilemma arising because of the imbalances in the way financial gains are distributed, especially if a researcher is researching a current and topical issue. This speaks to the issues of justice and the equal distribution of the proceeds of research (Smith, 2000). The following extract presents a similar view of what constitutes an ethical dilemma:

¹ Underline: researcher's emphasis.

Extract 3

- Researcher 3: So the traditional healers, I believe that at the time they had not thought about that they just thought that ...
- Interviewer: Because their interest is to help people.
- Researcher 3: They help people mmm.
- Interviewer: They are not that concerned about what they would benefit?
- Researcher 3: That's right. That's right, and also traditionally, a person does not pay before being healed. Okay, the process of healing starts and only after being completely healed can one pay.
- Interviewer: Mmm.
- Researcher 3: However in the western way money comes first. Healed or not money here.
- Interviewer: But you have to pay.
- Researcher 3: You see.
- Interviewer: Yes.
- Researcher 3: So that is where there are differences. So I think the problem here arose because they exploited – I don't know the word exploit in *isiZulu* ...

The above extract from Researcher 3 shares a similar view but also introduces an element of the differences in the way the African (traditional) and the Western (scientific) worldviews conceive the process of healing, where the latter conceives healing mainly as an income-generating process or scheme. The researchers' perspectives on this point differ from that of the CABs because of their different motivations for research. The CABs' views are presented in the next two extracts:

Extract 4

- CAB 1: Apart from wanting to be given the herbs for testing, it appears here that another aim is that they [researcher & pharmaceutical company] want to make profit for themselves after testing these plants/herbs.

Extract 5

- CAB 2: Secondly, there is no hope that when it comes back, coming back having been corrected by western people, what role that they [traditional healers] will play and benefits they will get, it is not clear.

The extracts from the CABs show a lack of trust in and suspiciousness of outsiders (Western researchers) and their intentions for the traditional healers and the community at large. The CABs expressed a concern that traditional healers and research participants were not given adequate information. Similar views were expressed by community members previously involved in research:

Extract 6

Comm Res 1: I think that ... if I hear this story correctly, the problem here is that the traditional healers came up with a herb that helped all the time. After that, came this person from an overseas company who wanted to take over everything that was being done by these people [traditional healers]. The problem I see happening here is that this researcher of this overseas company does not want to come clean with the fact that he is not the one who came up with this herb. [He must] make it clear that this herb is not his and that other people [traditional healers] discovered it ...

Interviewer: Mmm.

Comm Res 1: The way it is now it's like his company is the one that did this research on their own, whereas they took it from someone else ...

Interviewer: Mmm.

Comm Res 1: What I can say is a problem here is the researcher's failure to go to the others [traditional healers] and explain to them about their herb, 'can I please take it and use it like this and that' but they should also have a share ...

Extract 7

Comm Res 2: They [pharmaceutical company] are going to do proper testing. Isn't it that they are taking it to do proper testing to see if it really cures this disease? – unless if they [pharmaceutical company] said that it is now theirs and that is where we can differ about ideas, if they claim it as theirs.

The two following extracts are taken from the two community members who have never taken part in any research study previously. They also had similar views as those expressed by the other participants above:

Extract 8

Comm 1: The difficult problem here is of that person who comes with the knowledge to steal from these other ones [traditional healers]. Taking knowledge away from these others [traditional healers] and they [pharmaceutical company] go and benefit from using this knowledge and gain success with knowledge stolen from the traditional healers, that is where I find it very much problematic.

Extract 9

Comm 2: Eh the problem is that eh from my point of view is that it seems like these people from overseas want to take knowledge from the traditional healers for free. They go use it and benefit.

Interviewer: Yes.

Comm 2: Those they have taken the knowledge from benefit nothing. That is where the problem is, they come and ask for this knowledge for free from us and pay nothing for it.

The tension arising from the above extracts is mainly about justice, namely, the equal and fair distribution of financial gains and burdens between the researchers and the members of the community within which the research study focuses. The principle of justice commends fairness and equity in the research process (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benatar, 2002; McCaslin & Breton, 2008; Wassenaar, 2006). For example, it is noted in Extract 1 that sometimes researchers lose sight of what is important for the collective and focus on individual gains. In her view, helping people should be the researchers' first priority, and not financial gain. However, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has attracted great attention and research funding with obvious financial benefits for those who will develop a vaccine or a cure. Underdeveloped countries, whose inhabitants are highly vulnerable to exploitation (Benatar, 2002; Emanuel, Wendler, Killen & Grady, 2004; Schulz-Baldes, Vayena & Biller-Andorno, 2007), are the ones who are the most affected by HIV/AIDS. This factor facilitates entry by outsiders into indigenous communities and to patent locally profitable knowledge as their own with minimal benefits. In developing countries "personnel costs are lowered, and it is easier to recruit participants" (Schulz-Bades et al., 2007, p.8). For the indigenous community in this instance, an ethical dilemma has occurred.

That indigenous people do not benefit from something they discovered creates unfairness and inequality, especially if their knowledge has been appropriated and patented. This can mean that research participants have been exploited in the process of research by not being compensated accordingly for their participation in the study. Jones (2004) agrees; she states that exploitation through patenting and unfair benefit sharing has not been rectified in many situations, usually because of indigenous people's "lack of the financial resources required to challenge corporate patents" (Jones, 2004, p.2). She makes an example of a native Madagascan plant, the rosy periwinkle plant, that has made huge amounts of profit for Eli Lilly, a pharmaceutical company. This plant contains active ingredients that helped develop anti-cancer drugs. Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world, has barely received anything in return for their indigenous plant because Eli Lilly has patented it (Jones, 2004). The Madagascan natives were clearly exploited in this case because there was no fairness in the distribution of the financial benefits accrued from their indigenous plants.

Extract 3 above raises an interesting issue of how the indigenous healing processes have largely adopted the Western ways of healing and when payments are due. This is partly attributed to the process of colonisation, which changed many aspects of indigenous people's lives and many of the beliefs, values, cultural systems, relationship structures, *inter alia*, and were eroded to make space for what the West was bringing (McCaslin & Breton, 2008; Murove, 2005). In traditional African healing, it is believed that a person has to get better first before he or she can pay for the services provided by the healer. If the person is not healed, he or she is advised to seek more help and will eventually pay the healer who is able to provide the cure. This supports the sustainability of good ongoing relationships that African people hold as one of their core values (McCaslin & Breton, 2008). However, from a Western perspective, one has to pay even for a consultation or a mere referral because they ascribe to the notion "time is money". Western doctors sometimes do not believe or trust African traditional systems as they claim that they are not scientifically sound and "potentially harmful to patients" (Murove, 2005, p.18). This was a statement made by a non-governmental organisation known as Doctors for Life operating in

South Africa when they were opposing the Traditional Health Practitioner's Bill that the South African government introduced in the year 2004 (Murove, 2005).

A great deal of injustice and societal imbalances were created during colonisation and the apartheid regime, which are now being addressed by using a legalistic framework. This legalistic framework also comes from the West and has perpetuated the indigenous people's problems because it is a system that is not within their frame of reference (McCaslin & Breton, 2008). The legalistic framework also brought with it laws and acts that favour Western agendas, interests and endeavours. Consequently, frameworks such as the Fair Benefits Framework (Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, 2001) and practical benchmarks as guidelines for researchers to fulfil research ethics requirements (Emanuel et al., 2004), were proposed as alternatives. These alternatives were proposed as a result of the exploitation that existed flowing from colonisation and the apartheid regime, periods which were marked by a relationship of "power and inequality that continues to shape differential patterns of cultural dominance and social privilege" (Jones & Jenkins, 2008, p.473). Researcher 3 in Extract 3 above touches on the issue of exploitation and expresses that it occurs because of the different worldviews held separately by African and Western cultures.

The Fair Benefits Framework talks about reasonable availability of research benefits for the participants and the community at large. It also complements the ethical principle code for research studies and emphasises the importance of individual informed consent (Participants, 2001). Broadly, it also advocates that participants should benefit from proven interventions of the research study long after its completion (Schulz-Baldes, Vayena & Biller-Andorno, 2007). Reasonable availability speaks of fairness in the distribution of benefits given that the focal community was adequately informed about the research goals and took part in the negotiation of research benefits. Sufficient information is not usually given to people in developing countries and they run a greater risk of being exploited, as they may "assume the risks of research, but most of the benefits may accrue to people in developed countries" (Emanuel et al., 2004, p.930).

CAB members in Extracts 4 and 5 expressed this as a concern that instils mistrust and suspicion in research participants *vis-à-vis* Western researchers. The Fair Benefits Framework has been criticised because while sound on paper, fairness does not necessarily translate into the practice of equality (Emanuel et al., 2004). Therefore, plenty of room for exploitation of indigenous communities is still possible since the framework is also conceptualised from a Western epistemology.

Bergum (2002) argues that justice as a theory and principle derives its existence and meaning from the moral theories of scholars such as Kant, Rawls and Mills. These Western-based conceptions of justice differ from African and many other indigenous communities' and societies' conception. McCaslin and Breton (2008) support this argument by stating that Western definitions of justice differ from those held by indigenous communities, especially where there is a history of colonisation and apartheid (e.g. South Africa). The principle of justice becomes effective only when a research participant receives all the necessary information or services and the benefits due to him or her (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989). Beauchamp and Walters (1989) state that it also helps when it is acknowledged that the principle of justice may be conceived differently depending on the different worldviews. This allows for a shared understanding of the differences opening up possibilities of learning from the Other and will prevent taking possession of the Other's resources without proper remuneration (Jones & Jenkins, 2008). This has been alluded to in the discussions above. The CABs in the interviews above talk about the unfairness and injustice of taking people's knowledge under false pretence; not fully disclosing the intentions for requiring indigenous knowledge and later benefiting from that knowledge.

Lastly, researchers are usually privileged and schooled in Western epistemology and culture; they hold powerful positions *vis-à-vis* the locale. Automatically, an unequal power relationship develops between researchers and participants, especially if "some colonizer researchers who work with indigenous people emphasize the gap of difference" (Jones & Jenkins, 2008, p.474).

This is further perpetuated by the high rate of illiteracy and poverty amongst the research participants, especially from underdeveloped countries. The researcher and the participant should work jointly to make certain that there is fairness and justice for the research participants. Schulz-Baldes, Vayena and Biller-Andorno (2007) emphasise that communities should be able to negotiate benefits that correspond to their communal needs, values and priorities before the research process begins. But because limited education and high rate of poverty, on the part of indigenous communities, researchers often have more power than the participants. Thus, negotiating benefits becomes difficult for the participants. Equal sharing of benefits through “*distributive justice*” is considered “a fundamental test of equality” (NHMRC, 2003, p.15). This is where appropriate distribution of research benefits and problems between all the stakeholders is done fairly (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Smith, 2000). Distributive justice becomes a difficult outcome to achieve if, at beginning of the research, the motives and motivation of researchers and research participants were not the same. Macleod (1983) supports this view by stating that justice has been objectified and has been made marketable and this “contributes to unevenness in the opportunities enjoyed by individuals as well as to inequality in both power and status” (p.553).

4.1.2. Communal versus individual ownership of knowledge

Another cause of ethical dilemmas in research that emerged from the interviews relates to the ownership of knowledge, that is, communal versus individual ownership. Communal ownership means that all members of that community together own their indigenous knowledge systems, whereas, individual ownership of knowledge manifests itself primarily in the law of patents. These two contrasting knowledge systems, with their supporting extracts, will be presented separately, starting with the communal ownership of knowledge.

4.1.2.1. Communal ownership of knowledge

The first part of this section presents a general overview of what the participants in all categories thought about communal ownership of knowledge as a contributing factor to the ethical dilemma. Two sub-themes emerged under communal ownership, namely, communal ownership and spirituality and knowledge as a gift from God. These are presented and discussed in detail below, with supporting extracts.

Extract 10

Researcher 2: I would definitely say they belong to the people of Nongoma.

Interviewer: Mm.

Researcher 2: They even belong to a child of Nongoma (laughs) you see ...

Interviewer: Mm.

Researcher 2: As much as a child does not know what that plant is for or a lay man there on the ground who is not a traditional healer ...

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 2: ... not knowing what that plant is for, but there can't be a person that can just invade a community and just ... come and just take the plants you see ...

Interviewer: Mm.

Researcher 2: ... without the community knowing. So, definitely they belong at kwaNongoma, they belong to the people of Nongoma. So it's like when something has to start working it has to start working for the community that it comes from before it works for other people coming from outside.

Extract 11

Researcher 2: Eh if these plants are within the community as you say, situated within – the community they are the property of the people living in that place traditionally it is like that ...

Interviewer: Mm.

Researcher 2: ... meaning that if the place is under the municipality, they are the municipality's property ...

Interviewer: Ya.

Researcher 2: If the community has a chief like Nongoma would, then they are the chief's property.

In the above two extracts from Researcher 2, he perceives ‘communal ownership’ to encompass everybody in that community. He also said that communal ownership depends on the hierarchical structures active in that community. He mentions that if the municipality owns the land, different procedures will be followed than if the land is owned by the chiefs as custodians on behalf of the community. Similar views were shared by the CAB member in the following extract:

Extract 12

CAB 1: It is now up to them if they agree that this knowledge can be researched and traditional healers as we speak they are from KwaZulu, which means they are governed, they are governed by chiefs.

Interviewer: Mm.

CAB 1: Eh these plants are the property of the chiefs. Meaning that upon their arrival the researchers first go to the chiefs where they will get permission. Thereafter, whatever happens must be in agreement with the chiefs and they must be satisfied that if these plants do leave, the community people will not lose it because knowledge [in the past] has been really lost ...

The extracts below point to sharing of information as an important element of communal ownership of knowledge, especially if the knowledge will maintain the well-being of the community. This emphasises the collective, relational and interdependent nature of communal ownership of knowledge.

Extract 13

Researcher 3: Yes because it is the community’s knowledge and me as a member of that community I can use that knowledge.

Researcher 3: That’s right. That is where he gets help because people are able – or many people do not know this law [the Bio Prospecting Act] very well because we [Africans], if something makes me well I go and tell others. As to how the person who came up with this [the knowledge], benefits, [it] does not matter because we still believe that knowledge and other life matters are for everybody.

Researcher 3: Eh, now, that is African tradition.

African epistemology, which is multidisciplinary in scope, allows for there to be no limits to the knowledge discovered because rational logic or linear reasoning is not applied (Grills, 2004). Knowledge is shared with people from within and outside of a community because communal knowledge is not bound by space and time (Grills, 2004). Communal ownership is the view that there has to be a joint effort in the discovery and maintenance of communal knowledge. Researcher 2 in Extract 10 above speaks to this by stating that even a child of that community jointly and equally owns the indigenous knowledge. Logical thinking or reasoning might view a child as too young to own indigenous knowledge. While the child may not have discovered the knowledge *per se* they might play a significant role in the maintenance of the communal knowledge by passing it down to other generations. This is because indigenous knowledge is acquired “through the accumulation of experiences, informal experiments and intimate understanding of the environment in a given culture” (Msuya, 2007, p.3). These experiences are often shared by all people in a given culture.

The element of sharing all that communal ownership of knowledge encompasses makes it vital. A person, as part of a community, has an obligation to all other members. Therefore, if one discovers something worthwhile or in the best interests of the community, he or she is obligated, out of good will, to share that knowledge with the rest of the community members. Such act of goodwill is much valued by all community members, especially if the knowledge discovered will help build and maintain the health of the community. This happens because the community’s needs come before the individual’s (Grills, 2004; Harding, 1998; Mkhize, 2004). This is a selfless act associated with being African because in the African context an individual’s well-being “depends fundamentally upon the welfare of the community, rather than the community’s welfare depending upon the welfare of the individuals who constitute it” (Harding, 1998, p.364). The person is positively reinforced for his or her efforts of wanting to identify with all other community members; this is what being African is about. Researcher 6 illustrated this point well in Extract 13.

Wiredu (1980, as cited by Omoregbe, 1998) speaks about the concept of community thought, which he says is not attributed to any specific philosophers. This is because community thought “mean[s] nothing other than the thought of individuals in the community, for thinking is always done by individuals” (Omoregbe, 1998, p.6). But these individual thinkers and philosophers, or traditional healers in this scenario, as much as they are individuals, share the same African traditional philosophy that helped them engage in critical reflections about the core issues arising from their experience of human life, which is contextualised to their communities (Omoregbe, 1998). Therefore the knowledge acquired, even though it was thought of by individuals, becomes common property of the community, for “the community is not a collection of fundamentally isolated individuals, but is ontologically primary” (Harding, 1998, p.364). Also the individual does not lose recognition for the idea or knowledge he or she came up with because it is through that community recognising and acknowledging that knowledge or idea, that it becomes known and appreciated within and outside of his or her cultural context.

It is evident in the extracts above that the participants of this research believe that knowledge is a shared property of the community. In this view, knowledge is for the good health of the community. This occurs because “the individual’s position in social space is relative to others ... The individual is not a human being except as he is part of a social order” (Dixon, 1976, as cited by Harding, 1998, p.363). This belief is supported by an *isiZulu* proverb that says “*zifa ngamvunye*”; this can be translated in English as “standing in unity”. This means that what happens to one person in the community affects all other members because they live interdependently of each other (Gambu, 2000; Harding, 1998; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989). This is one of the reasons why an individual seeking knowledge becomes emotionally invested and involved with the knowledge, because he or she understands his or her obligation to the community. The individual’s feelings, beliefs and values are instrumental in determining how he or she interacts with that knowledge. Thus one is not able to separate oneself from or be impartial to the knowledge gained or discovered (Grills, 2004; Harding, 1998; Kambon, 1998). This is why it was distressing for traditional healers, especially in the past,

when there was much less awareness of exploitation and indigenous knowledge was appropriated and lost to the founding indigenous community and CAB 1 in Extract 12 illustrated this.

4.1.2.1.1. Communal ownership and spirituality

Spirituality is another core aspect of communal ownership of knowledge in the African cosmology (Grills, 2004). This incorporates a belief that all that exists on earth is provided for by God and other spiritual beings, working together with God to provide normality and connectivity between humans and nature (Grills, 2004). In African cultures, God's agents include the living, future and past generations (ancestors) as owners of knowledge. Presently living beings are responsible for retaining and passing knowledge that is usually stored in their memory that was passed on to them by previous generations. Future generations (children already born and those yet to be born) have ownership of their community's knowledge systems. They are entrusted with the responsibility of carrying the legacy of their indigenous knowledge forward and passing it on to future generations.

Extract 14

Interviewer: What does it [the scenario] also tell us about the processes of healing and ethics?

Researcher 3: Your ancestors call you. Then when you have been called, they will show you the herbal plants. So, even the way you give out those herbal medicines and even the healing process is different because the person being healed is seen as God's subject,[he/she] godly. The person was brought by the ancestors to get help from you.

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: It is not like in the Western ways. So, this is where we differ with Western people. Firstly, it is spiritual healing then a physical healing. That is why we start by saying go perform some ritual and then come back or give us something and we will perform a ritual and slaughter maybe a cow and so on. This is to speak to the ancestors and it is then that the herbal medicines will work.

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: ... because a person – healing is a holistic thing. Even if you have a hand injury, that injury is not just that ...

Researcher 3 in Extract 14 above expressed the spiritual connection of the presently living with the ancestors and how this impacts on the healing systems of African people. He states that healing is conceived in spiritual rather than physical terms. The person is assessed holistically to determine all the factors, be they attributable to the individual or family, that might be contributing to his or her illness. Mbiti (1969 as cited by Toldson & Toldson, 2001) argued that the process of healing in Africa is collectively “believed to be a function of every thought, emotion and activity toward creating balance in the individual” (p.404). The assessment of the imbalances that cause the individual’s illness is done at all levels and this includes the spiritual world of ancestors as they may provide answers to where the problem lies and how it may be resolved. Similar views were expressed by the CAB members in the extracts captured below:

Extract 15

CAB 1: Maybe just because people [traditional healers] also work with the ancestors, they know that if they get a certain amount of herbal medicines, the ancestors tell you how much should be given to each person.

Extract 16

CAB 2: Eh the way I see it, what is at stake for them especially is that they have lost their herbal plants that maybe they were still going to develop further and discover that ‘add such a plant’ because most of the time their formulas appear in their dreams.

Interviewer: Yes.

CAB 2: A person is told in dreams that ‘you see for such a herb to beat that disease you need to add such and such’. Now their knowledge is gone and changed before it reached its highest point.

CAB 2 in Extract 16 also raised one of the ways in which the ancestors are able to pass down knowledge, i.e. through dreams. A community member that has not previously participated in research in Extract 17 below, shares the same view about knowledge being given by the ancestors.

Extract 17

Comm 2: They [the herbs] are yours; the person that has been gifted with [them] because it was not of your own [traditional healers] doing that you just have this knowledge. It is your deceased family elders that have given you the gift to know these plants.

Interviewer: So they stay with you as a person that ...?

Comm 2: They are in my heart ...

The spiritual element of communal ownership of knowledge brings a sense of knowledge as extended or diffused so that everybody has it regardless of their position in the community. Those yet to be born or recently born form an important part of the community because they will soon begin to learn, in the context of their community, certain communal and cultural concepts that will help develop the mind (Wiredu, 1996). Ancestors are also another entity that needs to be involved in consenting to the transfer of communal knowledge to the presently living. The communication between ancestors and the presently living occurs through dreams, spiritual transitions and performance of traditional rituals (Mkhize, 2004; Wiredu, 1996). This communication is symbolically done and the individual has to be able to read and interpret those symbols that were revealed to him or her in dreams (Grills, 2004; Mkhize, 2004). Knowledge in this context is not seen as a commodity in the free market, where anybody can have it; it is a gift from one's ancestors. The above Extracts 14, 15, 16 and 17, illustrated this point.

The ancestors do not only pass on the knowledge, they also guide the person handling traditional herbs how to mix them for the best result for a specific patient (Extract 15). This communication is vital because the goal of the presently living "is to maintain the divinely established order and maintain the transcendental structures which sustain normality, not to escape them or view them as evil, profane or illusionary" (Grills, 2004, p.183). This further speaks of a web of relationships that exists in African cosmology, where everything is interconnected and exists in relation to each other. The provision of knowledge by the ancestors to the living is seen as a gift that is highly valued in indigenous communities and cultures. But the ancestors also received this information from God, the Supreme Being in African thought (Grills, 2004). However, because of the pressures that Western culture, globalisation, colonisation and the apartheid regime have put on indigenous knowledge systems, most of it has become a commodity in the free market (Britz & Lipinski, 2001; McCaslin & Breton, 2008; Msuya, 2007). This means that

indigenous knowledge is susceptible of being sold and bought out of that community. The commoditisation of indigenous knowledge has subsequently led to the constant devaluation of such knowledge.

4.1.2.1.2. Knowledge as a gift from God

While the element of spirituality was present in the interviews with the researchers, they mainly cited God as the owner of all knowledge. An ethical dilemma in this instance occurs when individuals feel the need to privatise or assume ownership of what God has created naturally. God was referred to as “*uMdali*”, *uNkulunkulu* and “*uMvelinqangi*”, all *isiZulu* names for the Creator of all things or the Supreme Being. The following extracts illustrate this point:

Extract 18

Researcher 1: ... but we should give them [traditional healers] a – that right that they discovered this. So they should have those powers to say they discovered it, not powers in a bad way but to be honoured that we are grateful that you were able to establish this thing you see ...

Interviewer: Ja.

Researcher 1: But there should also be that humanity to say that anyway this is something created naturally by God, anyone can have access to it ...

Extract 19

Researcher 3: ... it is moving slowly. Eh and these other [researchers] appear. One group has knowledge of the plants and the others have machines. These two should be on the same side. Plants in a traditional sense are considered to be God’s, okay, they are God’s.

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: No one can just say that this garden, land is all mine, that these plants even if I didn’t plant them are mine, okay ...

Interviewer: Yes.

The researchers agreed that God is the main owner of all that resides on earth. Plants and knowledge of African traditional terms belong to God and no individual can say that he or she owns that knowledge; that would constitute competing against God. The African philosophy of spirituality holds a strong belief that God is omnipotent; the greatest source of power (Grills, 2004; Parrinder, 1969). All that individual human beings possess is a gift from the Creator. This belief goes beyond the social and psychological realities of people because it involves how indigenous people live collectively with surrounding environments. They also believe that because God created these plants, anybody can have access to them. However, those plants would not have been of any use if the traditional healers did not have the powers to decipher and make meaning of the symbols sent to them through dreams and other means of ancestral communication, for example, through “libation and sacrifices” (Mkhize, 2004, p.40). Therefore, the traditional healers should be honoured and acknowledge because they were instrumental in discovering the indigenous plants and the concomitant knowledge.

The conflict arises when Western epistemology is employed in writing about and interpreting African spirituality because it “tends to reduce the profound spiritual reality of African deities to merely social and psychological factors” (Ray, 2000, p.35). This could be characterised as a failure on the part of social anthropologists. Some social anthropologists do not have a strong or deep understanding of their own cultural theories while others that are familiar with their own cultural theories are blinded into thinking theirs is superior (Horton, 1998). Having discussed the communal approach to knowledge ownership, the following section looks at ownership of knowledge from the dominant western perspective.

4.1.2.2. Individual ownership of knowledge

Individual ownership of knowledge is largely associated with the individualistic conception of the self, characterised by separateness, independence and conflict between humans and nature (Sue & Sue, 1999). In the strictest legal sense this manifest itself as the law of patents.

Extract 20

Researcher 3: No one can just say that this garden, land is all mine, that these plants even if I didn't plant them are mine, okay ...

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: White people on the other side say that 'all that is here in my place is mine. If I have bought this land, this land is mine even the rats that live here'. So, that is why they go and buy land and find wild animals and claim that even these wild animals are theirs. Okay, [you] cannot come and hunt here because they are mine. Eh but they did not give birth to those things, okay.

This is a Western conception of knowledge; it does not accord much power to God as the creator and owner of knowledge because individuals believe that they are in charge of their destinies. These individuals further believe that they are the owners of their capacities and talents which Sampson (1993) calls possessive individualism. This view simultaneously creates a negative self-other relationship because if one is looking out for his or her own self-interest first, it will be challenging to put others first (Sampson, 1993).

4.1.2.2.1. Patenting

Patenting is a field of the law that protects individual's rights to intellectual property as long as he or she has proof that a certain plant, a design, etc, is a new innovation or discovery (Britz & Lipinski, 2001). The research participants in this study expressed that they were against this law because it seemed to be protecting those individuals who succeed in appropriating indigenous knowledge systems. In South Africa, appropriation of knowledge was easier in the past, owing to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. In the following extracts, the participants express their views about the law of patents and its dangers.

Extract 21

CAB 1: Eh the results, the problem that will surface if they take these plants and go overseas with them for testing, is that there is this thing called patenting, which means that now it is me who discovered this thing and nobody else can touch that tree ...

Interviewer: Mm.

CAB 1: Even if the tree belongs to the chief's land you can no longer touch that tree as it will be protected. You can no longer use it.

Extract 22

CAB 1: Eh – what is at risk here, if there is no agreement, the traditional healers will not be trusted again in this community because it could happen that the white people could take the herbal plants and never come back with them. And then it will be announced that the herbal plants that are indigenous at Nongoma, people should not use them anymore because they now belong to certain people. Those herbs do such and such activities and they should not be touched because they are protected by the law that we don't even know [about].

Extract 23

CAB 1: The problem, they [locals] have been using these herbal plants for many years. The communities now find out that they cannot use [the plants] because the researchers have prohibited them. They came and took it where the people didn't have the knowledge of what research means and also how knowledge is protected because it now means that their indigenous knowledge was not protected. Indigenous knowledge will be lost [if it is] unprotected and [traditional healers] will not be able to use their indigenous plants because they are prohibited and they will only be accessible to those that say the plants are theirs when in fact they got them from the traditional healers.

The above extracts (21, 22 and 23), from a CAB member who is also a traditional healer, express the dangers that could be faced with outsider researchers appropriating indigenous knowledge. Sometimes even the law has favoured and given them the legal rights to own what is not historically theirs. Thus the need has arisen for traditional or indigenous communities to start protecting their knowledge. The problem however is that they are not educated enough nor

given adequate and appropriate information about these laws so that alternative agendas that the researchers have could be fulfilled. Researcher 3 in Extract 24 below shares a similar view and adds the individualistic way of life that Western people may share.

Extract 24

Researcher 3: Eh but [*okwabelungu*] white people say that ‘whatever I do, no matter that it is going to help the community, there must be something in it for me’.

Interviewer: I must get something in return.

Researcher 3: So there is patenting and patent rights ...

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: They believe a lot in that.

Extract 25

Researcher 3: Ja. So, it should be that they both have that right so it’s a sort of joint custody of the knowledge. But the custodians who came with the knowledge are the people who started with it.

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: They [researchers] just came with technology; so they can patent the technology, but the knowledge of the plants belong to the traditional healers.

In the above extract (25), patenting is perceived as something that is foreign to African people. This was made clear specifically by saying that to patent is “*okwabelungu*”, meaning it belongs to Western or white people’s culture and Western people believe a lot in it. This was seen as one of Western people’s core values and strongest beliefs, that is, even if something is going to help the greater community’s well-being, it cannot be done for free. A person always expects something material or monetary in return, in contrast to the African communal belief systems. Also, the use of ‘they’ and ‘them’ as a distinction from ‘we’ or ‘us’ was evident in trying to differentiate between African and Western people. Similar views were raised by the community members previously not involved in research. The use of identification and differentiation of groups was similar. Extract 26 captures these views:

Extract 26

Comm 1: The thing that will have bad consequences if the white people can take these herbs and keep them to themselves, maybe the doctors, and then we will have problems. Especially, as they have some farms where they say there is no trespassing, only certain people are allowed to dig. We then have a problem because we can no longer get what we need outside of this programme that is still being developed to plant some of these herbal plants so that they do not become extinct.

Interviewer: Yes.

Comm 1: That could also help a lot. Even though it [patenting] helps it also hurts a bit because you cannot as a person just go and get your own herbal plants, you need to have a letter that allows you to go and get what you need and you get it in small quantities, it is measured.

Extract 27

Comm 2 : It is clear that you can get arrested if you are found with a certain herbal plant. You are not supposed to have it as the legal people protect it their way. Some of it really has consequences like that.

Interviewer: Yes.

Comm 2: For example, like *izigqiki zoMkhovu* (herbal plant) you are not allowed to plant it and *Nukani* (herbal plant), you are not supposed to be found with them and an individual and even *Losilina* (herbal plant). If you are caught with these plants you get in trouble, even *Izinyamazane* (herbal plant).

The extracts above, from the community members who are also traditional healers, highlight the problems patenting poses to indigenous people. Patenting prohibits indigenous people from any further use of the plants and knowledge that they originally discovered and nurtured for many years. This constitutes an ethical dilemma because indigenous or community people lose something that has been contributing to their livelihood because of Western interferences.

A greater sense of knowledge, understanding and implications caused by patenting of indigenous knowledge exists amongst all stakeholders in this research depending on their position in the communities. Patenting is a legal monopolistic right which is given to an individual or company/group to “exclude others and give the public what it did not have earlier” (Britz & Lipinski, 2001, p.238). Patenting is a legalistic system that is widely accepted in Western cultures because it embraces the individualistic and independent view of the self, where each

individual has to prioritise self-interests. Britz and Lipinski (2001) agree that this occurs to the detriment of indigenous knowledge systems because the “Western patent law does not easily support the shared contribution of the shaman” (Britz & Lipinski, 2001, p.239).

The case of the San people and their usage of the Hoodia Gordonii, a Kalahari Desert cactus, is an example of the patenting of indigenous plants. The San people had for many years used the Hoodia plant to suppress appetite during long hunting trips (Terblanche, 2007). As the years progressed the way of life of the San came under scrutiny and research studies were done on how they lived. This is how the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) discovered this plant and took it for further testing. Its chemical structure and usage were determined and the plant was patented at first by the CSIR who later sold their patent to UK-based pharmaceutical companies without any involvement of the San people (Terblanche, 2007). The San were no longer allowed to use their own plants, which were communally owned, because a certain individual or institution had taken legal possession of it and stood to benefit enormously from it. The San people on the other hand stood to gain very little if anything from the usage of their indigenous plant. The unfairness of this is frighteningly obvious. This seems to be what the traditional healers in South Africa are experiencing with regards to some of the herbal plants like *Nukani*, *Izinyamazane*, *Izigqiki Zomkhovu*, etc, that they now need permission to possess, even as part of their herbal medicines.

Patenting has a certain number of stipulations that an individual has to satisfy before registering it and technology is used to determine, test to check the reliability of the information given. The technology used for testing most often belongs to and is operated from the Western conception of things, which tends to alienate others, especially indigenous people because of their unfamiliarity with such techniques. Indigenous people sometimes interpret the domination of Western technology as yet another way the West assumes more power and status over them. This can lead to mistrust and even defensiveness, which may create a bad name for intellectual property rights (Jones, 2004). This is also because traditional knowledge, which is shared, fails to satisfy some of the requirements of patenting laws. For example, traditional knowledge fails

to satisfy “the ‘novelty’ requirement alone, to say nothing of the ‘utility’ and ‘capable of industrial application’s requirements of the test” (Jones, 2004, p.4). This is because traditional knowledge has been in existence for many years being passed down through generations thus making it difficult to trace the individuals who originated the knowledge.

4.1.3. Ways of knowing and validating of knowledge

The participants seemed to identify two different ways of validating knowing, empirical/scientific method and ‘revealed’ knowledge. These ways differed in their fundamental assumptions about knowledge and being. The empirical/scientific method values science and technical validations, which speaks of value free knowledge characterised by the knower standing apart from that knowledge (Mkhize, 2004). African revealed knowledge, on the other hand, values embodied knowledge; the knowing subject is not separate from that which is to be known (Mkhize, 2004; Sampson, 1993). In the interviews, the different terms such as “*isintu*” or “African” and “*okwaseNtshona*” (of the West) were constantly used by participants. The term “*abelungu*” was commonly used by the participants. This word has its origins from the *isiXhosa* and *isiZulu* languages to mean white people. The participants also used terms such as “*okwethu*” meaning ours and “*okwabo*” meaning theirs to differentiate between the two ways of knowing. Most of these words had to be translated to English. In this scenario most participants, especially the community members and the CABS, included themselves as part of what the traditional healers were going through. In other words, they, as black South Africans, identified more with the traditional healers and used *ours* and *theirs* to differentiate.

4.1.3.1. Empirical testing versus ‘received’ or ‘revealed’ knowledge

The two ways of knowing identified by the researcher participants, namely, empirical validation associated with Western epistemology, and revealed knowledge associated with African epistemology, are highlighted in the following extracts.

Extract 28

Researcher 2: Uhh I think it gives us two different pictures about our indigenous knowledge that we have and the way we generate our indigenous knowledge and the way other countries generate theirs because one challenge like in this scenario is that the traditional healers don't have proper testing tools, like it is not well detailed the way they test (laughs) ...

Interviewer: Mm.

Researcher 2: ... so as a result they can only do one thing at the end and say that the herbal medicine works, but it is that there is a detail in the process and even the way the western countries do their tests is different, so as a result they have to have a written paper that says this is how this research was done and it was done by so and so as a result these are the findings so that they can take ownership of that.

Extract 29

Researcher 2: ... but [let's] take it a step further because you see many things nowadays are being done in a Western way, the Western ways are recognised more than the African ways you see ...

Researcher 2 in Extracts 28 and 29 spoke of the Western influence and domination over African cultures. He also spoke about the differences with respect to the preservation of knowledge, with Western knowledge being written whilst African knowledge is predominantly oral. A community member previously involved in research in Extract 30 below touched on the differences added by technological advancement of Western culture.

Extract 30

Comm Res: The way I see it, I see these people from the West coming to these people [traditional healers], this herb is now going to have a guarantee that it is working in the right way because now they will go and research it in the laboratory, where they will be able to determine for sure as to how effective this plant is because they have been using it before without proper research ...

Western scientific and traditional indigenous ways of knowledge validation differ (Mkhize, 2004; Sue & Sue, 1999). In the Western conception, knowledge is only valid once it is scientifically or objectively proven by means of laboratory analysis. It is believed that knowledge should not be tainted by the values and meaning of the knower (Mkhize, 2004).

Therefore, the knower and the known are separated and independent of each other. This is attainable in the Western self-contained conception of the self because the knowing subject “is stripped of all particularities such as gender, culture, position, and of his or her existence in space and time” (Mkhize, 2004, p.30). However, in African thought the knower and the known are inseparable.

Extract 31

Researcher 3: Your ancestors call you. Then when you have been called, they will show you the herbal plants. So, even the way you give out those herbal medicines and even the healing process is different because the person being healed is seen as God’s subject, [he/she is] godly. The person was brought by the ancestors to get help from you.

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: It is not like in the Western ways. So, this is where we differ with Western people. Firstly, it is spiritual healing then a physical healing. That is why we start by saying go perform some ritual and then come back or give us something and we will perform a ritual and slaughter maybe a cow and so on. This is to speak to the ancestors and then that is where the herbal medicines is going to work.

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 3: ... because a person – healing is a holistic thing. Even if you have a hand injury, that injury is not just that ...

Received or revealed knowledge on the other hand demands that human beings pay attention to what is presented to them through the richness of African stories and also through the interpretation of dreams. Mutwa (2003) states that at first glance, African stories may seem “rather childish and primitive but which on closer examination are revealed to hide mind-boggling facts about the depth of knowledge our forefathers possessed” (p.61). This belief occurs because of the spiritual interconnectedness that exists between human beings, ancestors and their surrounding environments. Dreams serve as part of revealed knowledge because, while they often contain important messages to humankind, it is only if they are noticed, recognised and acted upon that they come true (Mutwa, 2003). This becomes a spiritual aspect of the human psyche because they are connected to the ancestors and the spiritual world that has never

been seen before, but strongly believed to exist by a vast majority of Africans and other non-Western cultures. It is therefore apparent that ways of knowing in Africa are largely connected to the spirituality of the people and that nothing happens without reason, even illness itself.

4.1.3.2. Documentation

In terms of how Western and African worldviews differ on the ways they handle knowledge, the participants talked about different levels of preserving knowledge. In the African worldview (*ngokwesintu*) knowledge is not written but held in the memories of older generations.

Documentation is an important part of preserving knowledge in Western tradition because it is assumed that if a certain phenomenon was unwritten, it means it never occurred. The extracts below illustrate this point.

Extract 32

Researcher 2: ... the whole operation because we, the traditional healers operate in a traditional manner of which it's not something that is written down. Eh ... how can I say this? Eh ... [our knowledge is not] documented so that it will be known that this is intellectual property owned by so and so you see ...

Extract 33

Researcher 2: So because all these things were not written, that knowledge was not written as well ...

Interviewer: Ja.

Researcher 2: So because it was not documented anywhere and was not published they can never claim ownership of that knowledge. So the outsiders will come and give us what is theirs in fact not give us theirs, but they take what we have and they document it nicely and then they say it is theirs ...

Interviewer: Yes.

Researcher 2: Because they always say if it's not written it's never happened.

Western culture, in particular, believes that knowledge has value only when written or documented and the existence of unwritten knowledge is denied. Biakolo (2002) argues that

“Western civilization, owes its origin to writing” (p.13). This occurred as a form of systematising knowledge, which led to many books being written and published. However, this kind of knowledge tends to be removed from its context of origin and mostly offers abstract and analytical discourses (Biakolo, 2002). Therefore, if the African and Western worldviews come together they are bound to cause an ethical dilemma. This is evident from the first writings of Western civilisation, where African people were perceived as being primitive, barbaric, underdeveloped and pre-logic thinkers with savage minds (Biakolo, 2002). Jones (2004) agrees with this argument, stating that the two ways of knowing “embody different values and a different vision” (p.3).

On the contrary, African cultures value the oral tradition of knowledge. Because of this difference in the preservation of knowledge, African culture is less recognised because it is not recorded in the written word but held in the hearts and minds of great people, the elders in particular. Unfortunately, Western values and vision tend to dominate indigenous knowledge systems leading to the former being almost eroded. The erosion occurs because Western systems of knowledge do not recognise and appreciate indigenous knowledge systems. This has led to more and more indigenous people having adopted the Western ways of knowing and this has led to a need for African people to start documenting their indigenous knowledge for the fear of it becoming extinct. This has come at a high cost to the oral tradition as its richness lies in its oral transmission. Credo Mutwa, one of South Africa’s great High Sanusi or Sangoma and sculptor, talks about his internal conflict when he started documenting indigenous knowledge:

“Ultimately I saw that the lore of my people was destined to die with those of us who knew it, and that it would then die forever. I felt I gradually recognised that by breaking my oath – something originally made to protect the sacred lore in times that were very different from these times – I was doing something for my own people, preserving the eternal wisdom that been carried on for centuries; and also doing something for mankind as a whole” (Mutwa, 2003, p. xiii).

To conclude this section, participants understood ethical dilemmas arose from imbalances in the way the proceeds of research were shared. Ethical dilemmas also arose because of differences between communal and individual ownership of knowledge, the latter manifesting itself primarily in the law of patents. Lastly, the different ways of knowing and validating, namely, empirical/scientific validation and revealed/received knowledge, contributed towards the critical dilemmas that they faced. The following section reports and discusses the mechanisms of resolving these ethical dilemmas as suggested by the research participants.

4.2. Mechanisms of resolving ethical dilemmas

Three main mechanisms emerged: the legalist framework versus the tradition framework of ethical decision-making. The legalistic framework also presents itself as the Bio-Propecting Act, which intends to protect indigenous knowledge systems. These are presented and discussed below. The legalistic and indigenous dispute-resolution frameworks are presented together in order to compare and contrast them.

4.2.1. Tension between the legalistic and indigenous dispute resolution

The legalistic framework “give[s] primacy to the individual and emphasises individual rights, self-determination, and privacy” (Muller, 1994, p.450). It is grounded on the principle of autonomy and individualistic decision-making. On the other hand, indigenous framework of dispute-resolution frameworks value communal decision-making, where community members are recognised as having roles and duties in dispute resolution. Tensions between the two approaches were evident in the research.

Extract 36

Interviewer: How can it [ethical dilemma] be resolved?

Researcher 3: So the legal system is the one that can resolve this.
Interviewer: Yes.
Researcher 3: Traditionally, ages ago they would have gone to the chief.
Interviewer: Yes.
Researcher 3: Mmh, and explain to the chief. Eh when they get to the chief they explain. The chief will take a decision: ‘my people here is what we used to live with and here is what these others are coming with’.
Interviewer: Yes. So traditionally they went to the chief and in the modern way if I may say so, they would use the legal system ...
Researcher 3: Ja, because in this ... in South Africa the legal system has the power for now ...
Interviewer: Yes.
Researcher 3: ... the law of justice, eh the courts or magistrates, okay, that is where (inaudible).
Interviewer: That is where the law has the power?
Researcher 3: It is where the law has power. The chiefs unfortunately, the chiefs have had their powers taken away.

The above extract shows the tension between indigenous and legalistic dispute-resolution mechanisms. A community member previously involved in research expressed similar views in the following extract:

Extract 37

Comm Res 2: Yes, the ethical dilemma is abuse/exploitation. (.). I think that this would call for legal advisors to resolve this between us.

It is apparent from the extract above that there seems to a marked difference between the legalistic framework and the traditional framework of resolving an ethical dilemma. The legalistic framework was first introduced as a rational method to deal with the different ethical dilemmas that arise as a result of human conduct (Muller, 1994). It is largely individualistic and focuses on that individual that has done wrong and metes out punishment to the wrongdoer. The Western cultural and epistemological influence is evident. This framework involves obtaining legal representation and going through the court system, which is removed from the individual’s context. Muller (1994) argued that “moral dilemmas and the means to resolving them cannot be separated from the institutional, political, economic, social and cultural contexts in which they are embedded” (p.453). This could be the reason why the legalistic framework, although widely

used in South Africa for example, still bears many challenges for the majority of South Africans who do not identify with this framework.

This system of justice differs from that employed by traditional people before the legal system was introduced. This traditional system focused on reparation and restoring good relationships and harmony (McCaslin & Breton, 2008). A process known in *isiZulu* as *isigcawu* or *isigungu*, translated by McCaslin and Breton (2008) as a peacemaking circle, occurs. The community chief and elders would sit and talk about ways of addressing a certain issue that was brought to their attention. A decision that accorded with the matter at hand and reconnected the community harmoniously would be collectively taken. The extract above speaks to the resolution of the ethical dilemma of appropriation of knowledge by looking at the two different mechanisms, the legalistic framework and the traditional framework and the process that each follows.

The traditional process of ethical decision-making, which is communal and relational, is unfortunately one of the indigenous systems that were eroded with the introduction of the legalistic framework. The community is no longer consulted on issues concerning its members. It no longer has the power to take decisions, such as disciplinary measures for its inhabitants to try and collectively monitor and manage an individual's behaviour. The justice system, a Western phenomenon, which is largely impersonal and individualistic, has brought about a new set of challenges that the indigenous community sometimes fails to deal with as they may not have the proficiency to (McCaslin & Breton, 2008). It has also been argued that the introduction of this legalistic framework has led to the disempowerment of many traditional community leaders such as chiefs, community elders and traditional healers. It has also led to the breakdown of the vital means of communication in indigenous communities.

4.2.2. Bio-Prospecting Act

One of the members of the Community Advisory Boards (CAB 1) referenced the Bio-Prospecting Act, an example of a South African law that has recently been developed to make clear the boundaries of researching and testing of indigenous plants. It also serves to protect indigenous plants and knowledge.

Extract 38

CAB 1: ... Department of Environmental Affairs. This law is called the Bio-Prospecting Act and it guides or makes clear or that protects or directs the way research of indigenous plants here in South Africa. Eh this law protects indigenous knowledge of traditional healers and stipulates that if traditional healers work jointly with scientists there must be an agreement. If this agreement is in place, it explains the discussion about what benefits or what is otherwise known as benefit shares ...

According to the Bio-Prospecting Act, chapter 6 of the Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004), it is illegal not to acknowledging the original founder of knowledge. A disadvantage for the traditional healers is that some of them do not have any knowledge about this Act. It is the duty of community advisory board members to educate traditional healers and the community at large about this Act and other legal aspects pertinent to the preservation and protection of their indigenous knowledge. The argument is that if traditional healers are well informed, they will be able to protect and preserve their indigenous knowledge. However, this is not to say that traditional healers do not have the knowledge, it is just that they are the holders of indigenous or traditional knowledge, which is different from the Western systems of knowledge which the Bio-Prospecting Act is based on. Nevertheless, the introduction of this Act seemed imperative for the protection of indigenous resources. For example, in South Africa, before the introduction of the Bio-Prospecting Act, there had been uncontrolled access to “bioresources, with materials being harvested, sometimes in destructive excessive quantities, and being exported to research and development node abroad, for innovative value addition, and off shore financial benefit” (Crouch, Douwes, Wolfson, Smith & Edwards, 2008, p.355). These offshore countries benefited monetarily and generated huge revenues for their countries. South Africa obtained not even half

of that profit, as was similar in the case of the San people, Australian Aborigines and Madagascan natives.

4.2.3. Prior Agreements

In line with communal processes of decision-making, the participants expressed that all parties involved in the research process should sit down prior to the research study and agree on how the process is to be undertaken. The following extracts illustrate this:

Extract 39

Comm 2 Yes. The decision that I usually think about is that if we meet with those from the other side and for us not to be suspicious of them that they want to take our plants, and take our knowledge. If they need our knowledge they must come and sit on the table and communicate and be helpful to each other and not for them to take it away ...

Extract 40

Comm 2: The researchers from that side and the traditional healers from this side, must sit down and discuss how they will get the help they need from us because we may also need help from them.

Extract 41

Comm Res 2: Them claiming it as theirs would call for us to sit down and discuss with them that if it is going to be theirs there are things that should happen in that process. We must agree that we are trading it and there must also be payments of that herb because it originates from us.

Extract 42

CAB 1: Now he arrives when they are already on top of it. Now this means that ... eh the problem now is that it seems like there is no proper agreement eh, they have not made it clear here as the researchers, that as they now want to deve ... help in that eh, they do not make it clear how will the others benefit?

Extract 43

CAB 1: Now the owners of knowledge are not going to benefit. Eh, this means that this is what is the problem that there is no agreement good enough upon which they agree that 'we ask for you to help us and maybe when you have helped us there may be something that you will need to get for helping us'.

Interviewer: Yes.

CAB 1: This is also our knowledge and it is now not clear enough. The problem here is that no agreement has been made.

Ermine et al. (2004) recommended that “research agreements need to be negotiated and formalised with authorities of various Indigenous jurisdictions before any research is conducted with their people” (p.8). This was part of recommendations made after three major granting agencies, namely, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities Council, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council, engaged in a process of critical reflectivity upon their own policies and guidelines of working with indigenous people’s lived experiences and their knowledge (Ermine et al., 2004). This is exactly what the participants of this research recommended as a way of working together cohesively. In this, the community members, especially the traditional healers and CAB members, revealed their unwillingness to continue as passive owners of their indigenous people, which has been their role in research in the past decades. They now want to sit down and start a conversation with the ex-colonisers and negotiate as equals because they (indigenous people) are starting to realise that they have plenty to offer to the research process as are researchers, thus making them not the only ones entitled to reap the research benefits (Ermine et al., 2004).

The discussion facilitated prior the research would help all the research stakeholders come out with a Memorandum of Understanding documenting the whole research process and the agreements reached, more especially about the benefits of the research study to the people being

studied and the community at large (Ermine et al., 2004). These agreements can only be reached if all research stakeholders are given adequate and sufficient information with regards to the research, especially for the research participants to give informed consent (Schulz-Baldes et al., 2007). The agreements reached also need to be publicised to all community members to allow for the study to be transparent and reduce exploitation (Emanuel et al., 2004; Ermine et al., 2004; Schulz-Baldes et al., 2007). If done this way, the research has more chances of having sustained effects in that community because community members will feel empowered, respected culturally and otherwise, be included in all decisions made, thus greater sense of ownership of the research process and outcomes is likely to develop (Ermine et al., 2004). The community members, especially the traditional healers, will not need to hide their knowledge for fear of it being appropriated or misrepresented because they will be active participants, as they should be with regards to their indigenous knowledge.

4.3. Conclusion

A presentation and discussion of the main and sub-themes that emerged in this study has been offered in this chapter. It has been shown that all stakeholders conceptualised ethical dilemmas and their resolution in similar ways. However, the justifications of the ethical dilemmas differed depending on their position in research. The imbalance or discrepancies that occur because of unfair distribution of research benefits; the differences between communal and individual ownership of knowledge and the different ways of understanding were all conceived to be the sources of ethical dilemmatic situations in research. Mechanisms for ethical problem resolution, such as the legalistic framework, were presented, but it also contradicts with the African traditional systems of problem resolution.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to understand how different stakeholders, namely researchers, community members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios. Hypothetical case scenarios drawn from the literature were presented to participants, followed by questions. The intention was to understand how the process of ethical decision-making was related to autonomous and relational conceptions of the self or, more specifically, the tensions in ethical decision-making as a result of these competing conceptions of the self. The assumption was that people's participation in various cultural systems has a bearing on their definitions of what constitutes ethical and moral behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 2003, 2006; Triandis, 1989).

The findings of this study indicated that participants understood ethical dilemmas with reference to benefit sharing, tensions between communal and individual ownership of knowledge, and the differences between scientific/empirical and revealed approaches to knowledge validation. The issue of injustice and unfairness in research, which may lead to the appropriation of indigenous knowledge, was strongly expressed by the participants as something very common in research studies. Ethical dilemmas were also perceived to arise from tensions between communal and individual ownership of knowledge. In these two systems, knowledge is handled and valued rather differently and this is bound to cause an ethical dilemma when the two worldviews meet. The African and Western ways of knowing and validating knowledge, the former being traditional and the latter scientific, were found to be incompatible at times, thus also causing conflict when they meet. Research processes, especially those done on indigenous people, are often confronted with these ethical dilemmas which sometimes question the validity and reliability of that study. Three mechanisms for combating these ethical dilemmas were suggested by the research participants, namely, the legalistic versus the traditional framework, the Bio-Prospecting Act and prior agreements.

5.1. Implications for Ethics Codes

This study raised significant issues that need to be considered when researchers are conceptualising a research study aimed at participants outside of their contexts.

- a) The ethical codes must address the context within which ethical dilemmas arise;
- b) Ethical codes need to revisit their strict adherence to individuality and also consider factors such as spirituality and connectedness to a range of other factors;
- c) Research ethics need to acknowledge the interplay of contextual, historical and cultural factors in decision-making;
- d) Indigenous ontology, cosmology and epistemology should be acknowledged and respected.

5.2. Implications for Research

The positivist account or the “old order of research” (Ermine et al., 2004, p.13), which infers that indigenous people’s “social reality is open to outside observations and can be objectively studied rather than being constructed by the perceptions and experiences of its members” (Hall & Hall, 1996, p.38), does not serve the interests of indigenous people being studied but prioritises the needs and interests of researchers, and to some extent the funding institutes. The application of this scientific model can be to the detriment of indigenous people and their knowledge.

Therefore, different methods that will endeavour to recognise the survival thrust of indigenous people need to be applied. This calls for the use of qualitative research methods, which permit negotiation of cultural spaces (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Participatory methods are also useful because they allow for learning through practice, which is one of the core values of African and other non-Western cultures. Community representatives in this study called for more collaborative research, where researchers and community members work jointly for mutual benefits. Furthermore, community-based research studies involving one or more community

members playing a significant role from the inception of the study plays a crucial role in the success of the research study (Ermine et al., 2004).

5.3. Implications for Theory

Alternative epistemologies need to be recognised and acknowledged as vital in mainstream psychology and other fields of study. The emerging paradigms in these different fields of study need to utilise indigenous knowledge systems and worldviews for the benefit of the discipline. This will offer a much broader understanding and acknowledge the similarities and differences that exist between persons of different cultures. Thus, a shift from universalism to culture-specific and sensitive paradigms and theories needs to occur. This will permit the restoration of indigenous systems that collapsed due to the negative impact that colonisation and apartheid had on them. Indigenous knowledge can once again be visible and despite domination by the Western epistemologies (Ermine et al., 2004).

5.4. Recommendations for Further Research Studies

In light of the conclusions reached and the implications of this study, it is recommended that ethical dilemmas be considered with regards to situational factors at play.

- The interaction between research participants or the community serving as a focal point of research and the researchers prior to the research study;
- How visible are the CAB members in indigenous communities;
- CABs' perceptions of their roles in the ethics of research;
- CABs and community involvement in the development of research guidelines, rules and regulations for their particular community.

5.5. Limitations

The sample of this study consisted of three researchers, two CAB members and four community members, who were all black South Africans. This sample was too small to allow for generalisation to other groups of aforementioned research stakeholders. This was consistent with the aim of the study, which was not to generalise but to get in-depth narratives of these different stakeholders with regards to what constitutes an ethical dilemma, and exploring how they engage in ethical decision-making. The sample was also not diverse enough resulting in participants associating predominantly with the communal or relational self than the individualistic or autonomous self.

It might also be argued that the scenario was leading, but it is based on many real life dilemmas that have emerged between indigenous healers and international researchers.

5.6. Concluding Remarks

The key objective of this study was to understand how different stakeholders, namely researchers, community members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios, with reference to autonomy and relatedness in ethical decision-making. A hypothetical case scenario drawn from the literature was presented to participants, followed by questions. The results of this study indicate that all stakeholders have common conceptions of what constitute ethical dilemmas, possibly because they were all black South Africans, identifying more with the African conception of the self. The laws and regulations that were introduced to protect indigenous people's knowledge systems were conceived, by the participants, to be working against indigenous people because of their detachment from the actual community.

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APPENDIX A: ENGLISH SCENARIO: OWNERSHIP OF KNOWLEDGE

A group of traditional healers from five villages at kwa-Nongoma have been working in collaboration to try and come up with medicine that will cure HIV/AIDS. They formed this group 3 years ago and they have been working very hard with a lot of dedication to this project. At the beginning, they had 10 plants that they found to be more helpful in their own practices in diminishing the symptoms of HIV/AIDS but they found that none of them could completely cure a person. Their project involved mixing some of these plants in the hope that they would come up with a strong mixture that would be the cure for HIV/AIDS. This time, they thought they were very close to getting the cure. A researcher from one of the major local Universities, who is working in collaboration with a major international pharmaceutical company, hears about this project. He approaches the traditional healers and asks them if they could have some of these plants so that they could be take them to the laboratory in order to isolate the active chemical agents.

The traditional healers did not like this but they were persuaded easily as they were told about a machine that could determine if there is something useful in these plants within a shorter period of time, and they have been doing this project for 3 years now. They thus agreed. The plants were found to have active chemicals that could actually boost the immune system. The researcher and the pharmaceutical company went back to the traditional healers for more of these plants. They wanted to do more tests on these plants, in order to develop a product that could be patented and made available to more people. There was a big conflict between them because of access to plants. The researcher and the pharmaceutical company were of the view that the plants were common property and as such, did not belong to any particular group. On the other hand, the traditional healers pointed to the fact that the plants had been used by healers for traditional healing purposes for many generations. They objected to the patenting of their knowledge for commercial purposes. They also felt that this violated their beliefs about healing, which is holistic and spiritual in nature.

APPENDIX B: ENGLISH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Questions

- a) What do you think is the problem here and how might it be solved?
- b) Who should have access to the plants or the knowledge associated with them?
- c) Who owns which part of traditional healing knowledge?
- d) Ethically, what is at risk for all the parties involved?
 - 1. What is at risk for the traditional healer?
 - 2. What is at risk for the researcher?
 - 3. What is at risk for the pharmaceutical company?
 - 4. What is at risk for the environment and the people who reside in this area?
- e) What does this case inform us about ownership of knowledge?
- f) Taking this scenario into consideration, what things constitute an ethical dilemma?
- g) What does it also tell us about the processes of healing and ethics?
- h) What should be done and who should be part of this?

APPENDIX C: ISIZULU SCENARIO – OWNERSHIP OF KNOWLEDGE

Iqembu labalaphi bendabuko abasuka ezigcemeni ezinhlanu zakwa-Nongoma bebesebenza ngokubambisana ukuzama ukuthola ikhambi lokwelapha ingculazi. Leliqembu lasungulwa eminyakeni emithathu edlule futhi belisebenza ngokukhulu ukuzikhandla ukuze lifeze izinhloso zalo. Ekuqaleni, belinemithi eyishumi alathola ukuthi yabe ikwazi ukunciphisa izimpawu zengculazi kodwa ingayelaphi ngokuphelele. Uhlelo lwabo kwakungelokuhlenganisa lemithi abanayo ngenhloso yokuthaka ikhambi elingalapha ingculazi ngokuphelele. Ngalesisikhathi, babebona sengathi sebeseduzane kakhulu ekutheni bathole lelikhambi. Umcwaningi mumbé osuka kwesinye sezikhungo zemfundo ephakeme, owayesebenza ngokubambisana nenkampani yezamakhambi esuka phesheya, wezwa ngandlebenye ngaloluhlelo lwalabelaphi. Wabe esezama ukugxumana nalabelaphi bendabuko wababuza ukuthi bangamnikeza yini ezinye zalezizitshalo abazitholile ukuze ayozihlola ukuthi iziphi izithako zazo ezisebenzayo nokuthi bazicozulule lezozithako.

Abalaphi laba babengakuzwisisi kahle lokhu kodwa bagcina bevume kalula nje emva kokuthi behehwe ngemishini ekuyiyona engakwazi ukuthi ibonakalise ukuthi zikhona yini izithako ezingasetshenziswa emva kwesikhashana esincane nje, njengoba bona base besebenze iminyaka emithathu. Ekuboneni lokhu bavuma-ke. Kwatholakala ukuthi izitshalo lezi zazinezithako ezikwazi ukusimamisa amasosha omzimba. Umcwaningi kanye nenkampani yezamakhambi bathathe sengathi yibo abathole lezizitshalo. Lomcwaningi kanye nenkampani le baphindela kubalaphi bendabuko ukuze bathole ezinye zalezizitshalo. Babefuna ukuzicwaninga ngokuphindelele lezizitshalo ukuze bakwazi ukuthi bakhe ikhambi labo ababezolihlola kwabanye abantu bese beyalidayisa. Kwabakhona ingxabano ngokuthi ubani ovumeleke ukuba athathe lezizitshalo. Umcwaningi kanye nenkampani yamakhambi babethi amakhambi lawa avuleleke kuwowonke umuntu, ngakho-ke akekho umuntu ongathi ezakhe. Ngakolunye uhlangothi, abalaphi bendabuko bathi phela lezi izitshalo abebelokhu bezisebenzisa ukwelapha abantu kusukela esikhathi samandulo. Baphikisana futhi nangokusetshenziswa kolwazi lwazo ukuze kuzuze abathile ngezomnotho. Babezizwa futhi benukubezekile ngokwezenkolo zokwelapha kwabo, elapha mahlangothi wonke futhi ihloniphekile ngokwendabuko.

APPENDIX D: ISIZULU QUESTIONS

Imibuzo:

- a). Ucabanga ukuthi yini inkinga ekhona lapha futhi ingaxazululwa kanjani?
- b). Ubani okumele athole lezizitshalo kanye nolwazi oluhambisana nalo?
- c). Ubani ophethe luphi uhlangothi lokulapha ngokwendabuko?
- d). Ngokunobulungiswa, ucabanga ukuthi ikuphi okusengcupheni kubo bonke ababalekayo kulesisimo?
 - 1. Yini esengcupheni kubalaphi bendabuko?
 - 2. Yini esengcupheni kumcwaningi?
 - 3. Yini esengcupheni enkampanini yezamakhambi?
 - 4. Yini esengcupheni endaweni kanye nakubantu abahlala kuyona?
- e). Lelicala lisitshelani mayelana nokuphathwa kolwazi?
- f). Liphinde lisitsheleni ngokulashwa kwabantu kanye nobulungiswa?
- g). Ngokombono wakho, ucabanga ukuthi kumele kwenziwe njani noma iyiphi indlela okumele isetshenziswe ukuze kumelwane nezimo/nto ezifana nalezi?
- i). Ubani okumele abe yingxenye yalokhu?
- j). Iziphi izinto ezenza lesisingathekiso esingenhla sibe nokushayisana kwemiqondo uma nje wena usibheka?

APPENDIX E: ISIZULU PROJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM

Isihloko: Autonomy, relatedness and ethics: Perspectives from researchers, community members and community representatives	Inombolo yocwaningo: 1
Umcwaningi: Pinky Zibuyile Majola	Isizinda: University Of KwaZulu-Natal
Indawo: Umgungundlovu	Ucingo: 0734012711
Umpathi: Professor N.J. Mkhize	Isizinda: University Of KwaZulu-Natal
Indawo: Umgungundlovu	Ucingo: 033-260 5963

Ngiyakubingelela,

Lapha senza uphando lapho sibheke ukwazi khona ukuthi ngabe abantu besenza kanjani isinqumo uma bebhakene nesimo lapho kunokushayisana kwemibono enobulungiswa phakathi. Lolucwaningo luyindlela yokuthola ulwazi ngendlela abantu bethatha ngayo izinqumo ezimpilweni zabo nokuthi yiziphi izinto abazibhekelelayo uma bezothatha lezinqumo.

Uyamenywa ukuba ubambe iqhaza kulolucwaningo. Uma ubamba iqhaza, umcwaningi uzokufundela udatshana lapho kukhona umlingiswa noma abalingiswa okumele bathathe isinqumo esithile. Kuzobe sekuba khona imibuzo ezolandela kamumva kwendatshana ngayinye. Lezi zindatshana zizoba zizine (4) kuphela kanti kungathatha isikhathi esingangemizuzu engamashumi amahlanu.

Ukubamba iqhaza kwakho kulolucwaningo ngeke kube okuyingozi. Loluphando ngeke lube namthelela kumuntu ngamunye kodwa umthelela walo uzokuba ekusimamiseni ulwazi olusafufusa lwezifundo zobulungiswa emphakathini wonkana.

Ukubamba iqhaza akuyona impoqo futhi ngeke kuze kube nemiphumela emibi uma ungathandi ukuzibandakanya kulolucwaningo. Ukuzibandakanya kwakho kulolucwaningo kuzogcinwa kuyimfihlo ngokungavezi imininigwane engadalula umuntu siqu sakhe. Uma unemibuzo ngalolucwaningo, uyakhuthazwa ukuba uthintane nabalobwe ngenhla. Ngiyabonga kakhulu ngesikhathi sakho.

Yimi ozithobayo,

Pinky Zibuyile Majola.

APPENDIX F: ENGLISH PROJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Autonomy, relatedness and ethics: Perspectives from researchers, community members and community representatives	Project Number: 1
Researcher: Pinky Zibuyile Majola	Organization: University Of KwaZulu-Natal
Location: Pietermaritzburg	Phone: 0734012711
Project Supervisor: Professor N.J. Mkhize	Organization: University Of KwaZulu-Natal
Location: Pietermaritzburg	Phone: 033-260 5963

Greetings

We are doing research where we want to learn how people make decisions when they are faced with an ethical or moral dilemma. Research is a process by which we try to find answers to (an) important question (s). This research is a way of finding the process which people embark on in their lives when they are making decisions, such as the factors they take into consideration in making the said decision.

You are invited to participate in this research. If you participate, the researcher will read to you a short scenario where there is an actor or actors whom will have to make a decision. There will be questions that will follow each scenario. There will be 4 scenarios in total. This might take approximately 50 minutes in total.

Your participation will not expose you to any dangerous risks. This research will not have any benefits for each individual, but it will contribute to the growing body of ethical knowledge in general.

Your participation is voluntary; there will be no penalties if you do not wish to participate in this research. Your participation in this study will be kept confidential by not giving identifying information will not be given out in the process of reporting about the study, nor for any other purpose.

If you have any questions about this study you are urged to contact the people mentioned above. Thank you for your time.

Yours truly, Ms. Pinky Zibuyile Majola.

ENGLISH CONSENT FORM

University of KwaZulu-Natal
School of Psychology
Private Bag X01
Scottsville
3209

Dear Sir/Madam

I am a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. As part of my studies I have to conduct research on a particular topic. The purpose of this research is to find out how people engage in the process of decision-making when they are faced with a conflicting situation or if their conscience conflicts with what they want to do. I will read to you a scenario where there will be a person who will have to resolve an ethical dilemma (i.e. the person is faced with a difficult decision to make). There will be 4 scenarios. Each one will be followed by questions relating to it. The interview will last approximately 50 minutes. The interview will be recorded by a tape recorder and later be transcribed verbatim so that it can be analyzed.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. The date and time of the interview will be organized to suit you. The researcher will keep all the information given as part of this research confidential at all times.

Should you change your mind about partaking in this research, you have a right to withdraw at any time, even when the research is in process. The researcher will respect you decision at all times: Your withdrawal will not have any negative consequences.

The results of this research will be abridged. Although it may happen that extracts will be taken from your interview to clarify certain points, no identifying information will be given.

Should you wish to participate you are urged to write your name and sign below.

I (name) give consent to participate in this research explained above. Reasons for this research have been fully explained to me, including what it entails. I understand that I can withdraw anytime I wish to.

.....
Signature Place Date

Yours truly, Ms P. Z. Majola