



**Non-Governmental Organisations' Role in Conflict Transformation: The Case of Zimbabwe since the inception of the Government of National Unity, 2009-2012.**

**BY**

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**Declaration**

This dissertation represents original work and has not been submitted in any form to any tertiary institution. Work of others used is duly acknowledged in the text.

The research work was carried out in the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban, from February 2012 to November 2013, under the supervision of Dr. Alain Tschudin.

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Signature

## **Abstract**

Zimbabwe as a country has successively been faced with a number of challenges that others argue to be a result of either poor governance or colonial imbalances. However, despite the contestation with regards to the cause of the crisis situation, several armed struggles continued to wreck the economy. This continuous collapse of the economy resulted in the ruling government slowly becoming unpopular to the people, thus it paved way to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); an opposition political party to the dominant Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The formation of the opposition party then triggered tensions, which later saw the March 2008 elections’ tension calling for a power-sharing agreement. Therefore, it is against this background that the research critically examines the role played by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in conflict transformation since the formation of the unity government. In addition, the study is also conducted against the background of scholarly interest to understand the relationship between CSOs and the Zimbabwean government, during the period that marked the introduction of the inclusive government 2009-2012. The study will also look at the key competencies of CSOs, which are complimentary to the process of conflict transformation and further outline the need for active participation from CSOs and other stakeholders to the process. In addition, it is worth noting that while CSOs make numerous attempts to vigorously participate in conflict transformation, factors such as restrictive government policies, lack of funding and government interference continually undermines their contribution. Autonomous and sustainable operations of CSOs in such limiting environments is virtually impossible hence, there is need for drastic measures to be employed in order to address this contradiction.

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## **Dedication**

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandfather Assan Banda

## List of Acronyms

<b>AAG</b>	Affirmative Action Group
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AIPPA</b>	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BSAC</b>	British South African Company
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organisation
<b>CCJP</b>	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
<b>CCMT</b>	Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation
<b>CIO</b>	Central Intelligence Organisation
<b>CPMR</b>	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
<b>CSMUN</b>	Civil Society Mechanism of the United Nations
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organisations
<b>CTJP</b>	Christians Together for Justice and Peace
<b>CZC</b>	Crisis Zimbabwe Coalition
<b>EFZ</b>	Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe
<b>ESCWA</b>	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
<b>FBO</b>	Faith-Based Organisation
<b>GNU</b>	Government of National Unity
<b>GPA</b>	Global Peace Agreement
<b>IBWO</b>	Indigenous Business Women's Organisation
<b>IDAZIM</b>	Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INGOs</b>	International Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>JEM</b>	Justice and Equality Movement
<b>MAZ</b>	Media Alliance of Zimbabwe
<b>MDC</b>	Movement for Democratic Change
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MISA</b>	Media Institute of Southern Africa
<b>MMPZ</b>	Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe
<b>NCA</b>	National Constitutional Assembly
<b>NCSS</b>	National Council of Social Services
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>OAU</b>	Organisation of African Unity
<b>POSA</b>	Public Order and Security Act
<b>PVO</b>	Private Voluntary Organisations
<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>SPLM-N</b>	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
<b>TI-Zimbabwe</b>	Transparency International-Zimbabwe
<b>UDI</b>	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>VOICE</b>	Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise
<b>WOZA</b>	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
<b>WSSD</b>	World Summit on Sustainable Development
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organisation
<b>ZANLA</b>	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
<b>ZANU-PF</b>	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front
<b>ZAPU</b>	Zimbabwe African People's Union

<b>ZCC</b>	Zimbabwe Council of Churches
<b>ZCTU</b>	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
<b>ZEC</b>	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
<b>ZESN</b>	Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network
<b>ZINASU</b>	Zimbabwe National Students Union
<b>ZIPRA</b>	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
<b>ZLHR</b>	Zimbabwe's Lawyers for Human Rights
<b>ZPP</b>	Zimbabwe Peace Project
<b>ZWLA</b>	Zimbabwe Women's Lawyers Association

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## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

This study looks at Non-Governmental Organisations' (NGOs) role in conflict transformation while reflecting on their future, and focusing on Zimbabwe's 2008 post-election political instability that saw the formation of Government of National Unity (GNU). As means to extensively elucidate the growth of NGOs, it is important to connect to civil society considering it being the centre for NGOs successive growth as part of the bigger group of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). NGOs among numerous Organisations within civil society have been at the forefront of making sure that public goods, which are non-excludable and non-rivalled are their primary aim (Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Nevertheless, civil society mentioned in the research includes numerous concepts such as the act of space expansion, whereby individual citizen's influence directly through self-Organisation conditions that they live under and through pressuring the government, creating Organisations independent of formal political groups and by active social responsibility (Anheier et al., 2001, p.11). Therefore, with regards to the civil society concept the study seeks to assess the Zimbabwean government's relationship with CSOs and how it has affected the CSOs operations, and in addition its impact on the socio-economic variable such as income with its shortage creating a risk factor for increased levels of poverty and dissatisfaction (Benzeval et al., 2000). In Zimbabwe, CSOs comprise of numerous civic Organisations such as; charity Organisations, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), NGOs, trusts and other developmental and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) to mention but a few.

On the one hand, Zimbabwe's attainment of independence in 1980 did not necessarily mean the country would naturally transcend into becoming a fully-fledged prosperous nation. On the other hand, just like any other nation, soon after independence Zimbabwe did not experience a smooth transition because of the evident struggles and severe crisis that saw the once sparkling and self-motivated Zimbabwean society and its economy virtual collapse. With regards to the virtual collapse of the economy, many people's developed perceptions based on the understanding that political volatility, anarchy, improper governance brought about the tenacious economic meltdown. Generally speaking, the economic challenges that have been witnessed in

Zimbabwe's economic and socio-political sphere, has had an undesirable wave effect that usually emanates from non-functional states.

Moyana (1984) maintained that the long-term origin of the Zimbabwean crisis has its basis on the inequality experiences of the colonial era that characterized Zimbabwe for 90 years, particularly pertaining to the question on land. This is however believed to have led to a series of armed liberation struggles that were deemed necessary at that time, preceded by the growth in the number of liberation movements. The liberation struggle's very nature displayed anti-democratic tendencies and intolerance of non-conforming viewpoint and also liberal rhetoric. Nevertheless in 1999 the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) arose as Zimbabwe's opposition political party and its daunting challenge to the hitherto unchallenged political supremacy of their rival the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). However, the emergence of MDC's is believed to have developed fear among the member of the ruling ZANU-PF leading to strategies that sort to do away with the opposition. According to Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) merciless attempts were instigated to do away with the opposition that involved the use of violence.

Persuaded that MDC's formation was prompted because of it acting as a front for whites, predominantly in the Zimbabwean white farmers interests, in 2000 ZANU-PF launched a land reform exercise known as the Third Chimurenga economic war, characterized by war veterans taking over white owned farms. Preceding the Third Chimurenga was the First Chimurenga that took place from 1896 to 1897 and the Second Chimurenga from 1962 to 1980. Dawson (2011) argues that the First Chimurenga was more of a tribal struggle between the Shona and Ndebele societies, without any intention to overthrow white settlers, but over cattle, land and taxes. Furthermore, the First Chimurenga is believed to have started as an inspiration from three influential spirit mediums known as Chaminuka, Mbuya Nehanda and Kaguvi and came to a halt after the execution of the mediums. About 70 years after the termination of the First Chimurenga came the Second Chimurenga, and according to Lan (1985) and Ranger (1967) it is unanimously agreed by scholars to have been a land-based struggle led by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and ZANU-PF armed forces against white settlers. Violence and intimidation continued to be the norm especially in the early years after independence; at its climax, brutal

killings known as the Gukurahundi violence (doing away with the dissidents) were prevalent in the Midlands, Matebeleland South, and Matebeleland North provinces.

In the year 2000 the ZANU-PF government lost a constitutional referendum campaign to MDC, this alerted the former of its growing public unpopularity and marked the commencement of political unrest in Zimbabwe. It is during this period of time that the ZANU-PF government is also believed to have let loose a tide of serious threats against commercial white farmers, whom they held liable for giving support to the MDC and its supporters (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). Nevertheless, the disruptive and highly controversial fast-tracked land reform exercise that was implemented by the ruling ZANU-PF government and the ferocious fights against the apparent rival MDC that followed were believed to have resulted in grave human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Unfortunately, as a result of human rights abuses Zimbabwe was left a marginalized state with restrictions from the international community and exposed to economic sanctions (Hove, 2012).

Since the formulation of the Global Peace Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe in September 2008, it is understood that its progress in achieving its set goal and objectives was stalled. The main objectives of the GPA included the need to address the challenges that faced the country, through means upholding territorial integrity and national unity, and doing away with divisions, intolerance and conflicts characterized within the society and politics (Sokwanele, n.d.). The stalling of progress was due to what Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) postulate as a dispute over the implementation and sharing of leadership posts. They further attribute the stifling of progress to ZANU-PF's constant reminder to fellow member in the coalition of them still possessing full control of the essential state's influential powers, to which they have the absolute power to declare a dislike in considering any reform if they so wish (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). The 19 December 2009 statement addressed at the ZANU-PF congress by President Robert Mugabe illuminates this:

ZANU-PF as a party of the revolution and the people's vanguard shall not allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiations for the so-called security-sector reforms...That is the most dependable force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered with. (International Crisis Group, 2010, p.11)

## **1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

In Zimbabwe, although CSOs existed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century they became more visible in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The main reason for their formation is argued to have been mainly for the spreading of values, beliefs and cultures of colonial powers to colonies (Moyo, 1993). Again they are understood to have helped in trying to spread out societal, communal and individual freedoms, as well as being information collecting agencies that indulged in spying activities. Looking back to the Rhodesian era, CSOs were founded under the Friendly Societies Act of 1891. The Friendly Societies Act included Christian Organisations from outside the country, such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Christian Union (CU). With regards to this, the 1960s and 70s era saw CSOs that were church-related, such as the Christian Care, Christian Council and the CCJP being formed in a bid to respond to the strong racial politics of the post-Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) Ian Smith government.

According to Kagoro (2004) just like any other domestic institution, CSOs during the Rhodesian era experienced a not-so-smooth flow of events because of the restrictions of civil formations during that period. This resultantly led to the subjugation of CSOs because of the government suspecting them of being a potential threat to the British South African Company (BSAC) rule. Soon after the attainment of independence in 1980, the government and CSOs relations are understood to have changed drastically. It is against this background that Dorman (2001) mentions that a great transformation took place after independence that saw political Organisations turn to development, by means of following the government's de-racialization and reconstruction lead.

Progressively, the peace agreements concept brought about in Africa has had tendencies of embrace a power sharing approach, which resultantly led to a number of Governments of National Unity (GNU) or coalitions being formulated (Mutisi, 2011). Zimbabwe has not been an exception in adopting this approach as witnessed by ZANU-PF and the MDC coming to consent in doing away with any disagreements and team up in a newly formed coalition (Mapuva, 2010). This was undertaken with the help of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after the 2008 national elections. According to Mukute (2012) the GPA in Zimbabwe was formulated with provisions that sort the involvement of CSOs into programmes such

as community integration and reconciliation as well national healing after a severe wave of violence that dates back to the post-independence period. Therefore, the following are key questions that the research seeks to address in this regard:

- What has been the past, present and future role of Civil Society Organisation's in the conflict transformation process in Zimbabwe?
- How have CSOs maintained sustainability in the politically unstable environment of Zimbabwe?
- What support do both the Zimbabwean Government and CSOs give each other in the conflict transformation process?

In spite of all the above, in this contemporary time no dialogue on issues pertaining to poverty, equality or development is comprehensive without mentioning the role that CSOs play to address these issues. This is true in either the Northern or Southern countries. CSOs today are active, well appreciated and have well-established position to many communities. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War witnessed the rapid progression in the global development aid scene. In this regard, development multilateral funders like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have even come to embrace a new set of development terminologies such as civil society, good governance, democracy, environmental security, gender equality, social capital, empowerment, and sustainability (Hyden, 1997). As a result of these fundamental changes, CSOs have become a preferred medium in driving the development process, while the state is considered incompetent. Deakin (2001) maintains that NGOs are considered as the main actors in the civil society sphere and as such play a noticeable role in this sector.

In Zimbabwe, CSOs are understood to be assuming a quite significant position in the support for individuals and communities, with an objective of improving their well-being. Desai (2005) further mentions that these CSOs roles range from raising awareness, legal aid, counseling and support service, advocacy, and micro finance support. Again the services by CSOs have helped individuals in attaining skills and be well knowledgeable, and to take charge of their own existence and become capacitated. This can be regarded as quite essential in a country like Zimbabwe, where the government is understood to not have the capacity of making a provision

for such services. Although there have been tremendous contributions that have been made by various governments, it is argued that CSOs are a possible substitute to the government in addressing people's needs, which have not been attained by development programmes set by governments (Desai, 2005). Regardless of all these efforts, the sustainability of CSOs in Zimbabwe is questionable, following the statement by the president who said,

We have now a phenomenon of NGOs, or shall I call them phenomena, for they really are a type of government in the background of a formal government. I don't know whether this creature is for the better or for the worse, but in our country we have seen a situation where they have exceeded their terms of reference, and perhaps we might have to reconsider the advisability of having NGOs. (IRIN, 2009).

This has become an exemplification of how CSOs survive in Zimbabwe, uncertain of whether or not they will continue to be in operation. Nevertheless, the early 21st century has had Zimbabwe undergoing grave political instability. This challenge has paved way to a series of human rights violations against the individuals, leading to CSOs having to become a replacement voice with regards to issues of human rights in Zimbabwe. Thus, the assumed oppressive nature of the Zimbabwean government has pushed CSOs to realize the necessity to imminently work on lobbying for an improved and conducive operating environment they require.

### **1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The current study seeks to determine the past, present and future roles played by Civil Society Organisations in the conflict transformation process in Zimbabwe. It also aims to ascertain whether the government has given the CSOs a platform to operate, and how their operations will be sustainable considering the factors such as the relationship they have with the government and the economic, social, and politically unstable environment of Zimbabwe.

### **1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The four objectives of this study are aimed at:



- Gaining greater insight into the literature on the roles played by both the Zimbabwean local and international Civil Society Organisations in the conflict transformation process.
- Investigating whether the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe has created a conducive environment for conflict transformation in collaboration with Civil Society Organisations.
- Outlining the need for Civil Society Organisations to actively participate in the conflict transformation process.
- Pointing out the kind of skills that Civil Society Organisations possess that compliment the conflict transformation process.

## **1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The importance of this study lies in the fact that there is not much comprehensive study on Civil Society Organisations involvement in conflict transformation in Zimbabwe that has been undertaken, let alone a systematic discussion on the appropriate actions for CSOs attempting to manage various kinds of conflicts. As such, the study seeks to:

- Establish what the local CSOs can do to influence national policy formulation in line with conflict transformation.
- Establish a deeper understanding into what hinders progress during the conflict transformation process and also what role the government plays in ensuring that conflicts are resolved in Zimbabwe.
- Enlighten on the understanding of how CSOs actions can become so intertwined that multi-tasking in the conflict transformation environment can often have adverse effects by contributing to the incentive structures that perpetuate the conflict.
- Highlight the practical role played by Civil Society Organisations in relation to their contribution in mitigating conflict and peace building in communities.
- Illuminate the relationship between the Government and Civil Society Organisations in general on their various operations.
- Contribute to dialogue and ultimately to policy review pertaining to issues on conflict transformation and the integration of the individuals concerned in the process.

## **1.6 Methodology**

A qualitative approach will be used for this study, since with qualitative research greater insights are gained through examining the quality characteristics or properties of a phenomenon (Henning, 2004). This will be complemented as a desktop research relying on the use of secondary data in the form of archival records, documents, journals, e-books and newspapers. The research will also record details about the media coverage of events and activities undertaken by the Zimbabwean governments and any of their representatives. Qualitative research seeks to study social phenomena in their natural settings by presenting an understanding of social actions in terms of specific contexts. This is because in human life, different individuals or groups have different perspectives and contexts from which they may live in similar situations. In this case it looks at unique characteristics that the NGOs in Zimbabwe poses as well as the GNU. The research is also both explanatory and explorative in nature. It is explanatory since it focuses on explaining the roles that the state and NGOs are playing in Zimbabwe.

## **1.7 Theoretical framework**

The theoretical framework used for data analysis considers Azar's theory of protracted social conflict, with the understanding that social conflicts occur as a result of communal identity acting as a stumbling block in the satisfaction of basic needs within various communities. Also it is believed that conditions such as the multi-communal nature of the society, colonial legacies and domestic historical settings have a part to play in formulating such social conflicts (Azar, 1990). Focus is put also on the fragility, and authoritarian nature of governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs. A complementary theory that the research will be guided by is that of Shapiro's theory of change, seen as an explicit guide to conflict resolution and conflict intervention evaluation. Shapiro (2002) poses questions pertaining to what change should take place, how much of that change is needed and what strategies need to be used. In this regard, the theory focuses on implementation of strategies to end destructive social conflicts. Examples of such strategies might be those of an anti-racism approach used in changing or shifting policies and practices that maintain racial inequalities or a prejudice reduction approach that aims at doing away with prejudices and internalized oppression.

Snively and Desai (2001) discuss a government non-profit relationship framework developed to analyse the interaction between local government and NGOs in the context of the decentralization of public administration. The framework obtains its rationale from the expanding role of NGOs in development, the character of non-profit social service enterprise that both governments and NGOs share, and the subsequent complementarities that they can share on account of their individual weaknesses and strengths in the fulfilment of their social enterprise services (Snively and Desai 2001, p.248-249). The framework also lends value to the systemic (rather than issue-specific) nature of the study, whose main concern is the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe's conflict transformation process.

## **1.8 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS**

According to Monette et al. (1990) most research faces a number of constraints and as such the current study is no an exception, since it provides a departure point for future investigations into conflict transformation processes in Zimbabwe, with the involvement of CSOs. It should be noted that the study does not represent a long run analysis of conflict transformation efforts in Zimbabwe. Rather, it is an overview of current conflict transformation processes underway, and the evaluation of such efforts by those participating in the processes. Moreover, the study does not account for all conflict transformation processes currently underway because of limited time. Rather, the study represents a snapshot of the peace building processes in the country, and of the roles that CSOs and the government are playing in the process.

## **1.9 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY**

The study is partitioned into the five chapters that follow:

**Chapter One** introduces the study, by placing an emphasis on the background of study, outlining the study aims and objectives, significance of the study, and limitations and delimitations.

**Chapter Two** goes on to present reviewed empirical literature and is organised according to themes. These themes include the definition of NGOs, their historical background, their inter-political and intra-political involvement and an assessment of

their strengths, weaknesses, along with the opportunities and threats that they face. It will also focus on their involvement of CSOs in the peace building agenda and how they act as instruments of development in Zimbabwe. The literature will also consider the Zimbabwean government and local and International CSOs intra-political and inter-political relations. Finally the chapter will review on Zimbabwe's GNU efforts intertwined with that of the CSOs in ensuring conflict transformation

**Chapter Three** will focus on the general role of CSOs in conflict transformation process. Also literature on the Zimbabwean politics in relation to the civil society involvement in the crisis from 2000, because it is the period during which the political crisis in Zimbabwe started until after the formation of the GNU will be used that is from 2009-2012. The chapter also focuses on a SWOT analysis of the CSO as being instrumental in the conflict transformation process.

**Chapter Four** follows with a focus on a discussion of the study findings and it provides an analysis in comparison to previous research on a similar area of study in relation to the government and civic Organisations relations. The chapter will also look at the relations between CSOs and other stakeholders like donors, the private sector and other peer Organisations. Further discussions will be made on what hinders progress during the conflict transformation process.

**Chapter Five** provides a conclusion and summary of the environment that the GNU has left for local and international CSOs to operate within. Also it outlines the probable strategies that local and international CSOs have to use for their unique role in conflict transformation, by means of recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter seeks to present empirical literature that is arranged in different themes. These different themes present thoughts from various scholars, who have significantly contributed substantial knowledge to this line of study. Present in most literature and the media is the fact that in recent years there has been an unparalleled increase, not only in conflicts around the world, but in a comparable amount of literature on issues pertaining to conflict management and conflict transformation. In spite of this, the study highlights the importance of treating peace and conflict concerns in both development and humanitarian programmes as serious matters of concern. Therefore, as a result of the incorporation of the concerns mentioned above, CSOs have gained recognition over the past years. The recognition is largely based on response to addressing security matters, and how best to accomplish the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), issues pertaining war on terror, and the emergence of the fragile states agenda.

Generally in this contemporary time when it comes to the discussion of issues that pertain to economic crisis, which leads to an economy being said to be facing a serious economic crisis, such as problems of poverty, under developed and inequality, it would be considered incomplete not to the role that CSOs have played in trying to address these problems. The need to discuss the role of CSOs is against the background of a myriad of roles that CSOs have played in the bid to make aware and protect people around the world from challenges they face, such as human rights abuse, and poverty while pushing towards the realization of a sense of economic independence and success (Claude, 2007). Although this might be true, others scholars like Crocker (2000) maintain that the same CSOs rather than bringing about the positive change anticipated, have done even more harm to economies that have been facing severe economic challenges.

An overview of International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) and Local NGOs in Zimbabwe, is of importance in this study, because it helps in distinguishing the roles that these institutions play as well as indicating their various positions in society. This differentiation puts much focus on how their roles have developed over time. Again it is against this background that the study will also touch on the underlying principle of the existence of CSOs. This will be done by putting much focus on the strengths that CSOs possess, weaknesses that they are challenged with, opportunities that they take advantage of and finally the threats that they encounter and also look at their intra and inter-political influence. Finally literature on the formation of the GNU will be used, with much emphasis on its origin and its impact on the conflict transformation process in Zimbabwe's social and political conflicts. In this regard, the chapter is organized in such a way that is meant to gather and organize information, which will help in bringing out clearly the relationship between the GNU and the CSOs towards resolving the conflict situation that Zimbabwe has faced before and since the inception of the coalition government.

## **2.2 NGOs AS PART OF CSOs**

Since the study seeks to ascertain the involvement and influence by NGOs in conflict transformation, there is a need to come up with a clear comprehension of what these institutions really are and how they have historically operated and still are operating. Although many scholars have tried to define what NGOs are by means of profiling their involvement in various spheres on issues pertaining to advocacy, humanitarian aid and nation building, some feel there has not been much satisfactory definition of what these institutions really are. An example is Martens (2003) who maintains that even though most NGOs have become recognized actors in international affairs, the term NGO has not yet been lucidly established to what it really encompasses. This assertion is in support to what Ferura (1974) argues that the sociological perspective and the juridical approach are the some of the major ways of distinguishing the NGO interpretations.

It is therefore clear with this in mind that the definition of what NGOs are still remains contested with Martens (2002) further maintaining that in as much as the academic work constantly grows on the subject, the term NGOs still remain vague. In light of this, the term NGO has become a more generally accepted term amongst academics, but what this phrase really incorporates is indistinct. Hence, it is against this background that consequently makes definitions differ, although grounded on the work that the NGO does and the operational context. Nevertheless a more thorough look at the current body of work on how most NGOs around the world operate reveals however, the various and sometimes even more contradicting interpretations of the term NGO.

As Ulleberg (2009) purports, a primary effort to try and define what NGOs suggest mentioning the civil sphere of the society. These civil spheres according to Foley and Edwards (1996) encompass and include some social Organisations, the state, NGOs as well as other Organisations such as armed groups and political parties. Looking at the historical background of the term NGO, it is worth noting that it dates back to the post-World War II era. This is when the term NGO was originally devised under the UN (United Nations). Martens (2002) also mentions that contained in Article 71 of the United Nations Charter since its adoption in 1945, is a postulate that NGOs could be ascribed to the United Nations for consultative purposes. Thus with regards to this, scholars and activists are believed to have firmly adopted and mainly apply the phrase NGOs only as a means of signifying those societal actors or institutions, which function outside the United Nations frame while operating on both the national and international scale (Martens, 2002). Complimentarily to the thought by Martens, scholars like Willetts (2002), also concurred with the thought that the concept of NGOs started being used in 1945, after the creation of the UN that saw the great need to give or play a more advice-giving role to Organisations that were not categorized as part of the state.

Although being mindful of the various definitions of NGOs, the study will adopt the definition by Michael (2002, p.3) that describes NGOs as, “independent development actors that exist apart from governments and corporations, operating on a non-profit basis, with an emphasis on voluntarism, and following a mandate of securing development amenities, embarking on communal development work or promoting developmental issues”. From such a comprehensive definition, the study seeks to bring out clearly as noted by Chimanikire (2003) that the role of development aid has been outstanding, apart from the fact that such development has on several occasions been adversely affected by the lack of a commonly accepted transnational or trans-historical definition of the term NGOs. This is as a result of numerous varying opinions to which these Organisations are conceptualized. An example is an argument that Ferura (1947) above pointed out, namely that there are two major distinguished ways that can be used to interpret NGOs, which involves using the juridical approach or the sociological perspective.

Looking at these distinguished interpretations pointed above of interpreting what NGOs are clarifies the difference in that the juridical approach puts across documentation that the commencement of the 1990s saw most NGOs being actively involved in the enactment of international laws and norms (Martens, 2002). As such they are understood to have been keen on looking for ways of encouraging government representation as highlighted by Levering (1997) through means of an informal way of raising awareness, as well as of convening themselves as experts in official drafting committees. On the other hand the sociological perspective of interpreting NGOs is based on the fact that there is no absolute common definition on what the term NGO refers to, since it has been extensively condemned for its adverse meaning and inaccuracy (Martens, 2002). In this regards Martens goes on to ascertain that this conclusive remark or perspective is derived from the fact that NGOs have been organized from the government’s point of view of and has grown its restrictions in reference to them as being non-governmental (Martens, 2002).



Motivated with the edge of wanting to put much focus on the role of NGOs in social development, scholars like Manji and O’Coill (2005, p.67) give a definition of NGOs as “ a non-profit Organisation, which falls separately to the realm of government and business interests, while being operational in relief services or representing the marginalized group of individuals”. This is true to some areas in which some NGOs find themselves being actively involved in work such as the development work. This is done by means of putting much focus on an open delivery services to the poor individuals and communities, by building social capital, and by promoting equity through activism for a fairer share of national wealth and the advantages of growth and finally by means of substituting state support. In response to this assertion Fowler (2000) concurs by maintaining that these institutions are called non-governmental development Organisations, because they put much emphasis on their role in development, thus it means that their existence is focused on the availing of goods and services to communities exclusive of any input or control from the governments.

Vaknin (2005, p.17) writes that “NGOs are non-profit making and non-governmental entities whose main agenda is primarily on bringing some form of social service and try to ease burden by means of reducing poverty and on behalf of the marginalized people”. Although this can be seen as correct to a greater extent, it does not do away with the fact of contestation surrounding the absolute definition of what NGOs are continuously present. Regardless of that it is widely accepted that these are Organisations, which engage in activities that are meant to lessen the challenges that people undergo, avail basic social services, curb any environment damage by means of environmental conservation, support the marginalized people’s interests, and participate in community development projects (Cleary, 1997). Despite these definitions of what NGOs are, one can note that they have occupied a significant position in both the donor’s eye and public, and also have been able to shape humanitarian response and donor policies. This is true to the fact that we see wide publicity of these institutions, with much emphasis of their achievements especially the emancipation of the marginalized communities.

### **2.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NGOs**

A brief historical background of NGOs is important in this study, since it serves as an indicator of how their role have over time changed in different societies. Lewis and Kanji (2009) further emphasize this thought by maintaining that for one to get a comprehensive understanding of the expansion to which NGOs involvement in various economies have taken shape, there must be entrenched knowledge of the system of operation and their historical background. As noted by Lekorwe (2007) the historical background of NGOs is believed to differ in accordance to the geographical location and historical context. This is because most of the NGOs world over are understood to have fast grown into more complex and large institutions, despite the fact that they came from relatively small Organisations.

Looking at the case of Zimbabwe, Jackson (1947) observes that before it gained its independence in 1980 most Rhodesian Organisations worked mostly on behalf of the white communities' interests, while on the other hand numerous inter-racial church related Organisations were identified that were associated with people from the black community. In line with this, Muir (1992) points out that a considerable increase in the number of NGOs was experienced soon after independence in 1980, and a record of over eight hundred local and international NGO operations in Zimbabwe by 1992.

Sibanda (1994) further mentions that Muir (1992) classified NGOs operating in Zimbabwe into three distinct groups firstly the environmental NGOs that were involved in the conservation of natural resources and exploring various possible way of managing and alternatives of cross breeding. Secondly there were welfare NGOs involved in providing free good and services to the elderly, disables and poor people and lastly is the group of development NGOs that are involved in assisting and elevating that standard of living in different societies. Other scholars like Masuko (1995) also observed that during the time period of the 1910s-1920s most of the African Organisational formations comprised of those Organisations that were meant to ensure the bringing together of black people to urban areas, so as to work in mines. These informal social groups are understood to have brought about Organisations like the mutual aid societies, and burial societies and were created in most mining and colonial towns during the time of war.

In justifying these social groups Sibanda (1994) further points out that the formation of these indigenous NGOs was as a strategy of trying to underpin or try to fill the gap believed to have been left by the government of coming up with lasting solutions to challenges that seek to do away with policies that were discriminating in nature. Dorman (2001) maintains that during the independence era most NGOs in Zimbabwe were seen as more or less not important regarding political and financial matters. Nevertheless, in the drastic course of the late 1980s it turned out that they were rather significant after all as they involved themselves in an intensive exercise of securing employment, availing necessary pro-development resources, and as being political analysts.

Another observation by Tengende (1994) is that most Zimbabwean NGOs during the time frame of the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, there was experienced much emphasis within Prime Minister Mugabe's government to have regular NGO interaction with individual ministries within the government. This on its own showed a form of cooperation and workmanship that was being promoted between the then government and NGOs towards achieving a common good. However, between the year 1997 and 2000 there was an intense change in the Zimbabwean politics, which ended up in there being a constitutional referendum that followed in February 2000 and in the June 2000 election (Ikejiaku and Dauda, 2011).

The sudden changes in Zimbabwean politics that took place during the time period of the year 2000 is understood not only to have been influenced by political changes alone, but there was a series of economic factors that also contributed to the instigation of this political change (Mukasa, 2003). An example of the change that occurred is that of institutions like the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). NCA had the support of other institutions in its establishment, and had to face a challenge of having its year 2000 constitution referendum 'No Vote' campaign and legal action efforts in the extension of the election dates being dismissed (Sokwanele, 2013). Historically, most NGOs in Zimbabwe are believed to have until the year 2000 been part of the matter that dominated the country's political space of inclusion (Helliker, 2012). This was as a result of what was understood as the NGOs conceptual commitment to the development agenda of the liberation movement, their material constraints that are believed to have arisen by NGOs being perceived as institutions

meant for the unemployed to secure jobs, rather than institutions where political or social action takes place. Again the NGOs tactical simplicity that was believed to dominate their decision-making practices is also considered to have been a factor that contributed to them being entangled in the politics of inclusion (Helliker, 2012).

The late 1980s also saw most NGOs increasingly becoming important players in Zimbabwe through their increased donor funding, which not only was seen expanding their employment potential, but also increasing the access to resources such as computers, vehicles to use in their service, and travelling abroad with work (Dorman, 2001). However, even as some activist NGOs attempted to intervene in policy discussions, NGO discourse remained depoliticized around the theme of development (Fisher, 1997). Inasmuch as Jackson (1947) noted that there was a variety of inter-racial, Organisations related to the church, political and welfare associations for blacks, these Organisations developed in response to particular needs and employed varied tactics, depending on their resources and their goals. Soon after independence, there was an observation made of great change that occurred seen as previously policy oriented or political Organisations turning to development, while pursuing leads one or the other reconstruction and de-racialization set for the Zimbabwean economy by the government (Dorman, 2001).

The historical signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 is understood to have made NGOs perform their work easily, since before the signing they were accused of rallying behind ZAPU and creating a discordant hold that prevented national unity from taking shape (Dorman, 2001). At the same time, international funding was beginning to shift towards NGOs and new groups emerged to deal with new sets of issues. Although this was true, according to the Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) (2005) the accord was restricted to the selected few and failed to deal with the effects of the Gukurahundi era especially at grassroots level. As a result of the severe violence to people as many as 20 000 in the name of clearing the chaff during the Gukurahundi era, led to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) who were trying to record the human rights abuses in trouble get arrested (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 2007).

### **2.3.1 NGOs INVOLVEMENT IN THE MATEBELELAND CONFLICT**

Generally speaking, in most instances after a transition from a conflict situation to some form of peace settlement, it is believed that most NGOs reinvent themselves from being development Organisations so as to embrace the new government's agenda of reconciliation, development and bringing about some form of unity with much energy and zeal. While this was the case for NGOs operating in Manicaland and Mashonaland, where the rebuilding process had started taking shape soon after the attainment of independence in 1980, it was not so smooth flowing in Matebeleland. This is because the unbecoming political instability in Matebeleland went on to shape the state-society relations for much of the 1980s period. After independence, it is believed that there was experienced a serious divide in the country (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997). The ten years of war in Rhodesia did not only liberate the country, but also divided it (Cranswick, 2010). This was observed by the rising problem between on the one hand the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) an armed group of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) formed in 1960 and on another hand, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) a section of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed in Tanzania in 1965, resulting in there being violence outbreaks around areas that surrounded the guerrilla holding camps (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997).

This is true of the civic unrest and serious violence that took place in Entumbane in 1981, a western high-density suburb in Bulawayo also known as a place of disturbances. It is called the place of disturbance because it is believed to be where the Gukurahundi genocide was sparked, whereby there were seen groups of armed men involved in damaging property, killing and robbing (Yalae, 2005). This military confrontation was then later followed by the response from the government with attacks on rebels known as dissidents, and army units like the paratroopers, fourth brigade, fifth brigade sixth brigade, police support unit and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Another attack recorded was that on the ZAPU and its civilian supporters in both the cities and the rural areas (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997). Thus in this regard, the CCJP a local NGO posits that the effects noted

as a result of the attacks were individual, familial or communal, since hundreds of people died as a result of the gruesome violence that was experienced during that time (Dube and Makwerere, 2012).

The experience of such atrocities thus saw local NGO Organisations that advocated for human rights, such as the CCJP and the Amani trust receiving reports of human rights violations that were being administered by security forces (Mashingaidze, 2010). In response to this, CCJP as an Organisation put much effort in trying to issue the documentation and publication of the atrocities that were taking place, but the government buffered their efforts in trying to do so (The Herald newspaper, 1984). This was evident with the 1986 arrest of the CCJP influential persons, its former Director, Nick Ndebele and Mike Auret, who was the Chairman, although they were later released with the helped and intervention involving the Prime Minister Robert Mugabe (Dorman, 2002). However, Organisations such as CCJP played a major role in the facilitation of peace talks between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. This is evidently noted by their being instrumental on the initiation of a dialogue between the two parties (Dube and Makwerere, 2012).

### **2.3.2 JUSTIFICATION OF NGOS EXISTENCE**

Since most NGOs have increasingly attracted attention in academic research, Martens (2002) concurs with this by alluding to the fact that NGOs recognition in world affairs as important players was particularly emphasized over the last decades. Again it is echoed also that as a result of the development actor role that they assume, NGOs have assumed the role of being the chief provider of services in most countries because of most government's inability to fulfill its traditional role (Ulleberg, 2009). According to Kajimbwa (2006) most NGOs that operate either locally or internationally are understood to be have either internal or external influences that force them to follow a particular way in which to operate. Internal factors come as a result of the retreat by the government in service delivery meant to benefit the public, thus they come in to fill that vacuum space that is left. This is true with the fact that in Africa after the Second World War and the late 1970s period, the governments major work was mainly on the running of the public sector, while development during this period was state controlled and followed a top-down approach (Lewis, 2005). Thus in

this regard the public was hindered from making optimal use of their natural, human and financial resources.

The external factors noted by Kajimbwa (2006) included increased willingness on the part of the donor community to channel aid through NGOs. This is supported also by an observation that as a means of preventing governments to continue operating, human rights aid is channelled through NGOs from the donors (Nielsen, 2012). This is also evident with statistics of the European Union relief aid channelling of aid through NGOs growing from 47% to 67% in a space of four years from 1990 (The Economist, 2000). This is as a result of what Brown et al. (2007) express that numerous scholars agree that once NGOs are empowered local politics is then affected, thus they help to effected political changes to take place. Others scholars are of the view that these NGOs however, are viewed to have become significant because of their close ties to the actual realities that developing countries are facing and, more importantly as being able to bring about development aid significantly more cheaply than the states or intergovernmental Organisations (Stephenson, 2005). Also highlighted is that most local NGOs have achieved nation-wide representation, by means of having numerous offices in all provinces within the country (Michael, 2002).

Although there are other various justifications for NGO operations, with regards to the positive changes that they bring about, they continue to face many challenges of various levels (Bromid, 2011). For example, as mentioned earlier that Zimbabwe has experienced serious political volatility that has led to a chain of human rights violations against the people, leading to CSOs having to become a replacement voice on human rights violations in the country. Another example is a NGO based in Bulawayo called Christians Together for Justice and Peace (CTJP), which is understood to have made a plea for those affected by Operation Murambatsvina. Operation Murambatsvina was a “clean up” campaign instituted by the government in 2005 that witnessed the displacement of a number of people without any alternative shelter. As such CTJP appealed on the government to attend to the challenge of people being homeless, issues of poverty and unemployment, and also pleaded with all church Organisations to help in supporting the poor and those who became victims of political abuse, while defying the government’s restrictions (IRIN, 2005).

In spite of the attempts to advocate for those needs, CTJP faced a challenge of them being discredited by the government as well as the questioning the authenticity of their operations in the country. This is also evident with the call by the government to reduce the number of NGOs operating in the country, from the recorded number of more than 2 500 NGOs that are operating (Sunday News, 2012). Again Otto (2009) concurs with this by mentioning that in the year 2008 field activities of NGOs were put to a halt from June to August. Such scenarios proved there was a negative force from the government towards CSOs efforts and involvement in all developmental programmes within the country. However, Tongeren (2011) argues that countries at risk of economic and political instability and war would need mechanisms for cooperation with other relevant stakeholders in peace building. Hence, the Zimbabwean situation regardless of the repressive nature of the government, proved beyond reasonable doubt the rationale of both the local and international CSOs involvement in a bid to support the government to meet its obligations towards the people.

## **2.4 INGOs INTER-POLITICAL AND INTRA-POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT**

Northern or International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are understood as NGOs based in a particular country yet seeking developmental objectives abroad (Banks and Hulme, 2012). These INGOs that operate in Zimbabwe include Mercy Corps, GOAL, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and Oxfam GB. Although most of these INGOs have enough resources and finance that would help them in their operations, they are usually faced with a challenge of having little grassroots and country level knowledge (Banks and Hulme, 2012). Regardless of that the number of INGOs is believed to have grown with a record margin of 19.3 percent during the time period of 1992-2002 (Epstein and Gang, 2006). Otto (2009) maintains that INGOs in Zimbabwe during the 1990s period complemented the government service delivery role, as they also worked along the same lines with them significantly in the agricultural sector.

However, there was experienced a drastic change operations as a result of land seizure that the country experienced in 2000. Thus, it brought about the deterioration within



the sector leading to the call for an emergency intervention of the officially accepted INGOs in the country (Otto, 2009). According to Kriger (2011), INGOs that operate in districts that are controlled by ZANU PF and use the local authorities in the distribution of aid in communities have often experienced hijacking of their aid. Their intra political involvement in Zimbabwe is stifled as a result of clause 9 of the NGO Bill, which stipulates that foreign NGOs are restricted from registering if their sole or principal purposes involve or include the issue of governance (Human Rights Watch, 2004). This has become an exemplification of how INGOs operations in Zimbabwe exist in uncertainty regarding the restrictions that they experience.

## **2.5 LOCAL NGOs INTRA-POLITICAL AND INTER-POLITICAL RELATIONS**

Local NGOs can be thought to be indigenously established humanitarian Organisation by local professionals, members of the community or a combination of both (Kandyomunda et al., 2002). Again looking at local NGOs intra and inter politics involvement, it is noted that in Zimbabwe, most local NGOs carry out developmental work in various regions of the country, and it is also believed that many of these NGOs have given highest priority to the establishment of their own regional or provincial offices to which there will be collaboration in decision-making and in creating program responsibilities (Michael, 2002). Chandra, (2004), supports this view, by asserting that for this to be successful there is a need to ensure that there are less costs and comparative ease of travel and communication, which are factors that contributes to the success of their work, also good roads networks that cut across the country.

In the Zimbabwean case, black indigenous NGOs are believed to have been set up as a means of covering the provision of welfare and social services gaps which the government left believed to be having biased policies between the white and black people (Sibanda, 1994). According to Dube and Makwerere (2012) Infrastructure for Peace was an establishment that was made in South Africa, in the two years prior to the historic 1994 elections. The Infrastructure for Peace is believed to have substantively contributed to containing the escalating violence at that time. Another

example is that of the National Peace Council that was also established in Ghana in 2006 (Odendaal, 2013).

Ulleberg (2009) asserts that the common hindrances that are usually linked with CSOs involvement in helping to address challenges is most related to the difficulties in coming-up with going concern strategies and guaranteeing sustainability. This is usually the case because at times CSOs action can be locally carried out on a small scale basis and is often project oriented. However, the past few years has witnessed “development-oriented NGOs have increasingly attempted to become involved in other areas of society than civil society, especially in lobbying in relation to both local and central political authorities” (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003, p.143). Moreover, it is observed that some CSOs activists in Zimbabwe have endeavoured in trying to create networks with one another and involving the state as a means of challenging its sovereignty in making policies on various key subjects (Ditshwanelo, n.d). Thus, with regards to this numerous CSOs are seen as not undertaking lobbying and advocacy activities, since they desire their association to be on non-confrontation basis (Lewis and Kanji, 2009).

Nevertheless a useful analysis that is established to address the CSOs and the state relations, which helps in making sense to why there is a preference for non-confrontational tactics over the confrontational tactics, follows the understanding that CSOs are believed to practice different modes of advocacy by means of collaboration, passive resistance, taking over of political party, and opposition (Moyo, 1992). As Moyo posits, this approach presupposes an existing positive relationship between the state and CSOs, as well as general political trust and honesty, but it does involve attempts by CSOs to modify specific policies (Moyo, 1992). More confrontationally, CSOs may adopt tactics of the oppositional model and use high-profile appeals, protests and demonstrations in attempting to bring about policy change (Dorman, 2001). Since some CSOs operating in Zimbabwe have rapidly gained international status as a result of the political instability, they also have likewise become the eyes and ears of the world. This is evident to what Poskitt and Dufranc (2011) mentions that they are consulted on the current state of affairs in Zimbabwe, since the international community as more impartial and with less prejudice regards them.

The 1990s in Zimbabwe was a two-faced period, which saw CSOs rapid growth while also a period where economic and social conditions in the country became unbearable. In spite of all this, while some CSOs got involved in the social welfare of both urban and rural areas, some were highly active in lobbying and advocacy work concerning economic policy (Chakawarika, 2011). NGOs in Zimbabwe have had a series of ineffective umbrella bodies, which claimed to coordinate them and facilitate their relations to the government since independence. An example is that of the Southern Rhodesian National Council of Social Services (NCSS), at that time predominantly white-run. It went on to be renamed as Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise (VOICE) in 1981, and asked the new President to be its patron, and proposed to move from supporting welfare projects towards self-help (White, 1981)

## **2.6 GNU AND NGO EFFORTS IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION**

Rosenberg et al. (2008) purport that NGOs are often differentiated from the national government, but such separation overlooks the nature and relationship between the two institutions that varies from open to concealed tension in working as a team, depending on numerous factors, such as changes in the NGOs intervention strategies and the nature of the successive government. According to Thomas et al. (2010), the relations between state and NGOs have always been difficult. Regardless of this it is noted that when Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980, it brought with it a numerous changes, which involved the relationship between the state and NGOs. Others viewed these relationships as short-lived and not feasible, whilst on the other hand some saw them as having a long-term positive impact on the country, because of NGOs being seen as a solution to the problems that the country was faced with.

Normally, one of the deterring tasks that many societies face in the aftermath of a period following political crisis is that of rebuilding the society back to its original state or even improving it. This crisis situation has been evident in Zimbabwe with the series of political events that got attention around the world. The chain of events include the violent land seizures of 2000, also marked by violent elections in that took place in June 2000, March 2002, March 2005 and March 2008 respectively. As a result ZANU-PF and its government attracted international criticism for what is understood to have been a poor human rights record, which resulted in economic

sanctions for the top government officials (Machakanja, 2010). Thus in this regard, the positive reality that faces Africa is that many such political and social conflicts have ended in negotiations that often lead to peace agreements and the formation to the GNU in Zimbabwe has not been an exception of this formation seeing the ZANU-PF and MDC forming a similar government in 2009.

However, the peace agreements are believed to be legally binding agreements between parties intended to end a violent conflict and to transform that conflict and ending in secure peace (Bell, 2006). This is again supported with the understanding that most peace agreements are meant to address procedural and substantive aspects of peace, including the technique of achieving peace, the structural changes to be effected as a result of the agreement, as well as the institutional mechanisms for strengthening peace (Mutisi, 2011). The GNUs on the African continent are believed to have come to signify a short way out to those who want to hold onto power and even promote electoral inconsistencies to accomplish this objective (Mapuva, 2010). Mapuva (2010) further puts across the understanding that this has affected the real attainment of democracy because of the nature of the GNU. Nevertheless, an explanation to this form of political arrangement has been projected to possibly lead to the demise of democracy on the African continent.

The establishment of a GNU opened new opportunities for peace building in Zimbabwe. In line with this, the formation of the GNU was in keeping with a mission of attempting to address numerous issues that include mostly human rights abuses experienced during the decade before elections. It is recorded that more than 700 000 people were dislocated in the clean-up campaign that was part of the government's urban renewal programme, which is argued to have claimed to have been inadequately planned and exercised, and had pre-emptive security led attack against the discontented urban population, exercised amid fear for a post-election revolt against the ruling government (IRIN, 2005). However, in spite of all the contestation CSOs also bring new perspectives with so much experience in matters affecting the country such as grassroots development, poverty and most importantly defence of human rights. CSOs are well knowledgeable and strongly committed to issues necessary for the country's emancipation. Also CSOs have shown more sympathy and

comprehension for Africa's severe economic and political crisis as compared to the respective governments and other multilateral institutions (Chawakarika, 2011).

## **2.7 CONCLUSION**

As much as there can be a collaborative effort to try and address numerous issues that the country faces, the GNU and CSOs still face numerous challenges. According to Ulleberg (2009), CSOs continue to experience challenges from shortage of resources and from their general separation from the state, only and unless they partner with the state, and not rivals, capacity-building plans will continue to be stunted. Dress (2005) further suggests that security and peace building issues should not be the sole preserve of government. He calls for a strong horizontal and vertical synergy between peace building structures and the creation of a formal structural relationship. Noted is that the connection between the state and CSOs, since the publication of a new policy, which made it obligatory for all CSOs to apply to their respective provincial governor's offices for permission to operate were declined (IRIN, 2005). Nevertheless, Maunganidze (2009) maintains that deliberations on power-sharing provision done after elections have primarily concentrated on the significance of maintaining peace. This is meant to benefit the nation as a whole and the supposedly contribution of this arrangement to the attainment of that objective. This is done without considering the electorate preferences, who are the key influencers and the ones to direct their affairs. While there is no doubt that effective unity is desired, especially in the furtherance of democracy, Maunganidze (2009) further argues that the form of unity people see developing in countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe may in fact signal the deterioration of democracy, with the elite uniting to advance their own interests while inconsiderate of the citizens.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION**

### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter focuses on the evolution and role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) within conflict transformation practice, which is considered to be of importance (Lederach, 1997; Rupesinghe, 1995). The chapter will start by outlining the general definitions of CSOs, followed by a broader discussion on the international conceptualization of civil society activity, with particular emphasis on conflict transformation. Such an analysis acts as an entry point to civil society literature and finally it will look into civil society activity's literature in Zimbabwe and in a few other examples drawn from other African countries. The need to consider the importance of CSOs in Zimbabwe arises as a result of an observation that soon after the Zimbabwean parliamentary elections that took place in the year 2000, the condoning of civic Organisations was experienced. This was with regards to the belief that they were supporting the Western nations' agenda. Adding to the condemnation of CSOs activities in the country, there was the enforcement of laws that limited or civic space. An example of such a law includes the Law of Public Order and Security Act (POSA) that was enacted in 2002, which criminalized public gathering unsanctioned by the police (see Appendix 1).

The enforcement of POSA led to a strict monitoring and prevention of public meetings, for instance the disruption of the 21 September 2011 peaceful march in commemoration of the international day of peace by Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), which resultantly led to the arrest of 12 activists (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Focusing the discussion on the international conceptualization of CSOs on the one hand is aimed at clearly outlining the CSO activities, in an attempt to address the assertion that views African states as corrupt and incompetent in the developmental drive (Andrews, 2009). With regards to this, it leaves the CSO as the only channel that is able to bring about positive change, thus it creates room for debate on whether or not this is true. Another important factor that is meant to be addressed, is the international conceptualization discussion in line with the observation that the Bretton Woods institutions operations. The institutions include the World Bank and

International Monetary Fund (IMF) who are suspected of having established political conditionality's for loans and action plans that are meant to be CSOs' source of funding, especially NGOs that are believed to be channelling resources to 'honest' civil society from the, corrupt state, thus promoting private and public non-state actors (Allen, 1997, p.335).

### **3.2. GENERAL OVERVIEW**

The state of affairs today, seems to probe a major question that no longer focuses on whether CSOs have a role to play in conflict transformation. Rather, CSOs focus on looking at pre-conditions and other factors that affect their effectiveness, how best they can achieve the goal of effectively advocating for people in various communities, and how and what other possible outside actors can best support or assist them in fighting for this cause. This is supported by Mail et al. (1999) who allude to the fact that CSOs are quite essential in ensuring the necessary peace, support and acceptance and implementation of various agreements to which political leaders would have agreed upon. Sigma (2012) also further supports the notion by re-emphasizing that Zimbabwean civil society, because of its close links to the communities and people, helps in gathering together communities within the countries to collaboratively work towards sustainable development and economic reconstruction. Although this might be true, Tocsin (2008) argues that CSOs can be both agents of change and still be an indicator of various conflict structures. This is also echoed by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) who propose that if only CSOs were to operate within particular structures of conflicts, they would be actors in either the intensification of conflicts, provocation of nationalism, violence, and ethnocentrism.

In spite of the various activities that CSOs engage in, there is also present a continual acknowledgement of a presumed double role believed to be played by CSOs. These existential roles include the role of fostering civic values, seen as essential for a peaceful conflict transformation exercise, while on the other hand they also assume the role of working as agents that directly aid conflict inception and symptoms (Tocsin, 2008). With this in mind, a question is posed regarding how sustainable the conflict transformation process is as implemented by CSO who are perceived as taking up such a double role. This is in line with the understanding that for a country to achieve effective sustainable development, essential elements like the freedom and

fulfilment of social, political, and economical rights ought to be present (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011). A good example that can be used of a country that has witnessed some developmental change as a result of trying to ensure that the pre-requisites of sustainable development have been met is South Africa. Regardless of all these arguments CSOs remain a force to be reckoned in the conflict transformation process (Tocsin, 2008). This is also echoed by Taylor (2003) who points out that amidst numerous differences with regards to scope and capacity, broad trends of civil society activities continue to be visible world over.

### **3.3. DEFINITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS**

CSOs just like any other broad and diverse institution have cannot be thought to have a sole meaning because of their different role and position in different societies. According to Carothers (2000) the modern idea of civil society that was developed in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, by numerous political theorists like Georg Hegel and Thomas Paine has had an imminent view of CSOs being parallel to and yet separate from the state. CSOs are defined broadly as, “the realm between the household or family and the state, populated by voluntary groups and associations that are formed on the basis of shared interests, and are separate and or largely but not necessarily completely autonomous from the state” (Boadi, 2006, p.2). Aheier and List (2005, p.54) concur with this by also giving a definition that views CSOs as, “the sum of institutions, Organisations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market in which, people associate voluntarily to advance common interests”. With regards to these definitions, Lewis and Kanji (2009) further assert that the strength of these CSOs is embedded in the factors such as the circumstance and area to which the Organisations are formed and where their operations take place, unlike the institutions and their activities.

Many other scholars conceptualize CSOs as the informal, semi-formal or formal institutions that are there to promote, protect, and aid in ensuring the practices and principles of pluralism, participation, justice, democracy, and equity among people on a local, national, global and international scale (Samuel, 1998). By so doing they are understood to operate without any conformity to the market force as well as state power, regardless of the facts that they sometimes discuss, pressure and convince the



market and state institutions in having to become accountable and reactive to people's rights and needs as a whole, but with much emphasis on the marginalized (Samuel, 1998). According to Kasaija (2006) CSOs also act as a defence mechanism that is strong enough to curb or prevent the state from becoming dominant and too powerful over society. This can be viewed as one of the major activities that most CSOs embark on in countries faced with a conflict situation. This is why there has been a global visibility of the peace building and conflict prevention effort by CSOs (Ekiyor, 2008). This has also resultantly led to the increase of civil society actors in the conflict transformation discourse and security issues.

In an attempt again to try to define and understand CSOs, Carothers (2000) further suggests that it would not be proper to equate civil society with NGOs. This is because civil society is conceptualized as a much broader concept incorporating associations and Organisations, which operate outside of the state and the market. Polanyi (1945) also mentions that the conceptualization of CSOs in most industrialized societies has even brought about tension that has been realized between civil society and the over-arching imperative of the market economy, as an ever-present social agency for apportioning and distributing resources. However, Sievers (2009) counters that by pointing out that what is of utmost importance about CSOs is that they encourage communities and individuals to make connections and discuss public matters without any influence or disturbances from the state. Although this is true critics argue that an analysis of civil society activity cannot be undertaken independent of the state (World Bank, 2006a). This assertion is as a result of the understanding that the government and CSOs are mutually dependent upon each other in the work that they both intend to achieve, which is assumed to be serving the interests of the people in the best way possible.

### **3.4. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS- HISTORICAL ROOTS AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES**

As conceptualized in the contemporary social sciences literature, civil society is an important concept that involves the organizing ideas to make sense of what is taking place in a particular area (Dudouet, 2007). With regards to that it becomes of fundamental importance to know civil society's historical roots so as to fully

comprehend the international interconnections, which saw most civic groups' activities grow during the interwar also known as interbellum, a period between World War I and World War II (1919-1939). This period was marked by a state of commotion, as a result of the failure by Europe to recover from the detrimental effects of World War I. Arsan et al. (2012) concur by pointing out inconsistencies that were experienced during the interwar period, with one end showing a growing sense of global interconnections, and another end experiencing de-globalization. An example reiterating this observation is a scenario characterized with Europe facing a challenge of recovering from the World War I destructions, while in Ghana during the same period, there was witnessed the rise and throbbing energy in civil society's activities as a result of increase in economic expansion and urbanization (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2000, p.7). With regards to this irony, it is again noted that while some states blocked any possibilities for trade and expansion, others sought to mend old networks and also created new ones in international cooperation and global considerations (Arsan et al., 2012).

On the one hand, looking at the historical and philosophical foundations of CSOs helps to bring out the conditions that made civil society activities in the past possible, while on the other hand trying to address their relevance in the contemporary political atmosphere. Although at times it is viewed more as a more recent phenomenon, the concept can be traced further back to the early 1900s. Contrary to the understanding by Carothers stated above, Bratton (1994) mentions that civil society roots are found in the Marxist and liberal traditions of the European political school of thought. Examples of this school of thought included Gramsci's highlighting the important role played by social institutions in either contesting or strengthening state power and de Tocqueville's emphasizing the significance of voluntary associations in encouraging democratic citizenship (Bratton, 1994). This involvement promotes a sense of public participation that is regarded as being of significance in many societies.

During the 1900s period again there was witnessed the creation of various movements like the women's activist groups, Marxists, religious revivalists, socialists and anarchists, which operated across borders. Historically in Africa, CSOs are understood to have been part of the strong movements that extricated the deep-rooted authoritarian systems within the continent and attempted to replace these with

democratic governance (Ekiyor, 2008). This is evident in the active role that CSOs played in West Africa, through women's groups, student unions and trade unions in the fight for independence in most West African countries (Ekiyor, 2008). However, the positive impact that CSOs have assumed is not only evident in West African countries, but also in other parts of the African continent and in the world as a whole. It is against this background that it is important to note there are variations in magnitude to their efforts still stands, with many factors having to be considered.

Nevertheless a critical analysis again shows that civil society's range and scope are understood to also differ for example within the SADC region, because of restrictive political environments, varying social and historical contexts and differences in the resource base (Taylor, 2003). This comes as a result of the understanding that there has been a closure in active participation on the legal and political environment to which most CSOs operate, with much focus on Africa where there is a drastic decline in political space being afforded to most CSOs (Weijer and Kilnes, 2012). Apart from failure in being afforded operational space, most of the CSOs around the world have also experienced numerous challenges that vary in magnitude (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007). These challenges include lack of funding of the civil society activities, hostile interactions with the governments, and weak Organisation amongst actors in the civil society sector.

### **3.5. CSOs ROLE IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS**

The strengthening of most African state formations has been confronted by numerous challenges that vary in magnitude, before having fully realized their full potential of ensuring a form of good governance. The drawbacks that have been visible include bad governance, widespread poverty, and violent armed conflicts witnessed in most African states during the post-colonial era that came as a result of disintegration in the governance system (Opoku, 2007). However this has led to the question of whether there can be continual dependency on conventional state actors in bringing about some elements of social change in the various African countries. Therefore, as a result of the urge to bring about social change, most CSOs are seen beginning to assume various government's roles and responsibilities as a way of covering the gap that they have left unattended, whilst the role is important. However, this does not suggest the active role taken by the civil society means them having become a political opposition

of the existing government. Again it is worth noting that CSOs involvement in the security and peace issues within the African continent pre-existed the inception of the African Union (AU), although its involvement in such issues during the era of the predecessor body Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was limited (Ikejiaku and Dauda, 2011).

### **3.5.1. AFRICAN CONFLICT DYNAMICS**

Since there are various factors that lead people to engage in conflict, it is therefore worth noting the different types and stages of conflict situations that Africa has experienced in recent years. The numerous types of conflicts include non-state conflict, inter-state, intra-state conflicts and extra-state conflict. Although there might be some similarities between violent conflicts as Sandole (1999, p.1) argues, it is also important to note as he further suggests that there is need to capture the conflict complexities. However, with regards to this it is of importance to have an analysis of each of the different types of conflicts and the parties involved. Table 1 below seeks to familiarize the multi-track diplomacy model of categorizing CSOs formulated by Diamond and McDonald (1996) in a bid to outline the distinct forms and the role that they play in conflict and conflict transformation.

**Table 1: Categories of CSO (from Diamond and Mcdonald, 1996)**

	TYPE OF ACTOR	ACTORS
1	Professionals involved in conflict/resolution	Technical experts and consultants
		Research centers and think tanks
		Professional NGOs
2	Economic	Trade unions
		Business associations
		Professional associations
		Cooperatives and self-help initiatives
		Organized crime networks
3	Private Citizens	Individual citizens
		Groups from the Diaspora
		Family and group based associations
4	Research, Training and Education	Training of NGOs
		Schools and Universities
5	Activism	Public Policy Advocacy movements
		Social groups
		Student movements
		Women movements
		Ex-Combatant groups
6	Religion	Spiritual communities
		Church movements
		Charities
7	Funding	Foundations
		Philanthropists
8	Communication	Art
		Operators of Media

Marchetti and Tocsin (2007) further suggest that the categories of the different CSO actors in conflict are clearly defined, regardless of the interrelations that might occur in the roles that each of the actors assume in bid to resolve conflicts. Inter-state conflicts are usually characterized by a formal declaration between different

governments, who organize their respective armed forces into combat against one another (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011). On the one hand intra-state conflicts relate to conflicts that occur within sovereign states and nations borders (Acikalin, 2011). When such a conflict occurs it involves both the state and state actors contributing to the conflict perpetuation, and usually gets resolved by intervention from a third party. With regards to this, CSOs often take a pro-active role in ensuring a resolution that calls for immediate intervention. Examples of such conflicts include the Zimbabwean situation, the 1994 Rwanda genocide between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, the Sudanese ongoing conflict that started in 2011, and the Somali civil war that started in 1991. Some of the conflicts can either take the form of both intra-state as well as inter-state, and an example is that of the Sudanese war involving the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in South Sudan (Janaina, 2012).

Contrary to the aforementioned types of conflicts, non-state conflicts occur between organized groups that do not have any affiliation to the state government (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011). This type of conflict is further explained in the Human Security Report (2012) that the view to contemporary conflict dynamics overlooks the form that organized violence is taking shape. This is done without considering how many non-state actors like the communal and rebel groups have taken center stage in conflict situations. This is evident with the observation of conflict trends and conceptions that are recorded involving state against state and excluding non-state actors. Another type of conflict is the extra-state conflicts characterized by an independent non-state actor outside a state's territorial boundary in conflict with a government (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011). According to Schondorf (2005) just like any other conflicts, there are specific rules that govern extra-state conflicts, derived from the international humanitarian law general principles that are embedded in the forms that the conflicts take. This is important for CSOs to note so that when they try to intervene they know exactly what they are dealing with.

In spite of the many forms that conflicts within Africa assume, their effects continue to be detrimental. This comes with the complex socio-political dynamics and persistent conflicts that Africa has been faced with for the past years, believed to have emanated from the cold war and colonial effects (Moe, 2009). This is again echoed by

Hoeffler (2008) who posits that the cold war effects and the colonial history are at the core of the argument to why Africa has experienced much civic unrest. With regards to the colonial history, there is the issue of colonially inherited imbalances in the ownership of land between the white and black people. An example to this notion includes the argument by a renowned human rights activist, who suggests that the Third Chimurenga instigated the Zimbabwean crisis (Matchaba-Hove, 2006, p.159).

During the cold war period, policies were established that are believed to have supported the instigation and creation of a conducive environment for violent competitions, scarcity of resources and intense corruption. This is in support of Masunungure and Badza (2010) who argue that the Zimbabwean crisis can be traced back to the post-colonial state policies of the early 1990s. On the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) are of the view that the reasons for Africa experiencing more civil wars can be attributed to economic challenges with regards to low economic growth whilst being dependent on natural resources and having a low income. Looking at these different types and dimensions of conflicts as mentioned above is important, since it has been observed that the detrimental impact and effects of conflict are seen to continue existing for longer than the conflict itself (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011).

### **3.5.2. CSOs INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICTS**

There has been a long-standing history of civil society's involvement in many countries in conflict and during post-conflict recovery. According to Anderson (2012), CSOs have engaged as peacekeepers, basic needs providers, transitional justice implementers, peacemakers, reconciliation motivators, and at times masterminds in conflict situations. In spite of this, Muhumuza and Bataringaya (2009) suggest that most of the CSOs gained much recognition in their collective involvement in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) during the post-Cold War period, which was characterized by the sudden increase in the number of intra-state conflicts taking place. It is during these intra-state conflicts that CSOs and other international institutions play a very important role, although it is viewed as indistinct at times. Since at times in a conflict situation, the role of the CSOs can be viewed as blurred there has been a mutual comprehension of the CSOs having been directly and indirectly involvement to conflict situation (Tocsin, 2008). This

observation is echoed by Kode (2012) while putting much emphasis that the involvement of CSO in post-conflict reconstruction, resolution and prevention often takes distinct forms that are dependent upon the context of the conflict, and the actors involved at different stages in the conflict.

However, it can be noted that the involvement of CSOs in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) as a concept highlighted by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts in 1997 is crucial (Mersha, 2009). This is what the commission expressed by alluding to the fact that since NGOs are regarded as institutes that directly represent the civil society, they are critical in the political strength of practically all countries, and also in their present-day and future possible contributions to the prevention of deadly conflict. The CSOs contribution to areas with mass violence is rapidly becoming one of the post-Cold war era CSOs interventions (Stremlau, 1998). By so doing CSOs will be aiding governments, which at times are busy fighting in a bid to defeat their opponents and acquire military victory at the expense of the responsibilities that they have towards the people during the times of peace. Thus, in this regard their primary responsibility becomes directly and indirectly involved in post-conflict reconstruction and peace negotiations.

As a concept CPMR is structured with essential principles that involve conflict prevention, conflict management and reduction. The priority put on conflict prevention, suggests the activity of the reduction of any form or manifestation of tension as well as the prevention of violent conflicts from reoccurrence (Greene, 2006). This comes in the light of the urgently needed role by the international community to build or formulate a framework of containing violent inter and intra state conflicts of the 1990s (Melander and Pigache, 2007). In this regard, the growing concern of the detrimental effects associated with conflict situations therefore took center stage on issues regarding preventive action. Again this saw resources and international attention being devoted to the cause of ending civil wars and managing and reducing conflicts. This is also understood as a bid suggested by the former Secretary General Kofi Annan, of wanting to move the UN as an institution, “from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention” (Melander and Pigache, 2007, p.9). Although this is might be an ideal mechanism, issues regarding to practical



implementation of the ideal strategies are challenged to be unrealistic or merely empty talk.

Conflict management and reduction on the other hand focuses on the prevention of violent conflict from intensifying or escalating once it has started, and also bringing a war to a halt (Greene, 2006). Once this is done, in a bid to try and bring about resilience and understanding of the causes of the violent conflict there is the introduction of the peacebuilding process. This process includes the activity of conflict resolution, which seeks to address divisions and disputes that might be present. Furthermore, CSOs are understood to have assumed the role of negotiators as a result of them being perceived as neutral and also to make some form of representation in the peace talks, on behalf of the great number of civilians who are adversely affected by the conflict situation (Wanis and Kew, 2008). As they give a voice to the voiceless through representation in peace talks, most CSOs find themselves having first-hand information on matters on the ground from their sources, which happen to be people or actors who are directly involved in the conflict. Lee (2011) again suggests that CSOs also assume the role of tracking the opinions of the public, and monitoring of political violence, corruption and elections. Another vital role that CSOs in Zimbabwe have assumed in order to curb the absence of trust amongst the people, is the building back of that mutual trust between people (Lentfer, 2011).

### **3.5.3. OVERVIEW OF ZIMBABWE'S CSOs**

In Zimbabwe CSOs' operations are understood to have started before the legislation that was meant to regulate CSO activities was implemented in 1967. As Mersha (2009) points, these CSOs are a combination of NGOs, mass Organisations that include women, youth and other groups, research and study institutions, interest groups, community based Organisations and professional associations. With regards to the diverse groups of these CSOs in Zimbabwe there are present women's groups with examples like the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Zimbabwe Women's Lawyers Association (ZWLA); media and professional institutions like Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Media Alliance of Zimbabwe (MAZ), Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ); faith-based Organisations like the Council of Churches, Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ); human rights and

government groups like Bulawayo Agenda, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (IDAZIM); civic education groups like Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC); Community Based Organisations (CBOs) as well as trade union groups like the (ZCTU). All these types of civil society formations in Zimbabwe have been established not to support any interests on issues that go beyond their own immediate concerns (Moyo, 1993).

Many of the CSOs that were operated either by the black or white communities were established in response to different situations. This is evident as observed that some of the CSO groups had to start operating as non-political groups and later on changed to political groups directly involved in the nationalist politics of the country. Sigma (2012) echoes the same sentiment by proposing that theoretically, CSOs have to be non-partisan, but in the case of Zimbabwe there was observed an element of partisan tendencies. This is in line with Makumbe (2008) who pointed out that some apolitical groups like the churches, burial societies and school clubs ended up being representatives of the oppressed and marginalized people to the state. Nevertheless in Zimbabwe, as is common in most African countries noted by Mukute (2012), CSOs are in the line of work of increasing the awareness of the communities and individuals freedoms, and generation of social values. For the CSOs to operate in Zimbabwe they have to be registered with the High Court as a Trust or with the Department of Social Welfare as Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Mukute (2012),

#### **3.5.4. NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON CSOs WORK IN ZIMBABWE**

Although the work of CSOs is praiseworthy in conflict situations, there are various challenges or drawbacks that impact upon the work of these institutions. These challenges vary in scope because of the different circumstances that will be present, considering there might be social, political and economic implications to the work that they will be engaging in. With regards to this, it has been generally agreed upon by most scholars that the conflict situation in Zimbabwe is intra-state in nature. This occurs because the situation is characterized with people being against the political elite rather than it being a military war or an ethnic based conflict (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011). The failure of most governments in assuming their role and resulting

in CSOs covering the vacuum space is noted by Rukuni (2009, p.52), who points out that:

Today, the political systems that we have inherited in Africa, both central government and local government have completely severed the values around sacredness of leadership, namely the need to always demonstrate love, empathy and understanding of your people, and the continual need to unite and inspire people in good and bad times. This function has now been relegated to NGOs, churches and other institutions that are excluded from the functioning of the executive government... There is no connection between the government, politics and the collective aspirations of the people to see a peaceful, just and prosperous society.

Although the post-2000 period received much attention that focused on political development, because of the nature of the Zimbabwean conflict CSOs are understood to have received hostile responses of the military institutes in their bid to try and cover the gap left by the government (Poskitt and Dufranc, 2011). Also just like the Zimbabwean government, CSOs are understood to have suffered from the migration of skilled professionals, thus it left them without experienced personnel (Lee, 2011). Politically, because the Northern countries sponsor most of the CSOs in Zimbabwe, they are prone to dictates of how to do their work (Makumbe, 1998). As a result of the politicization of most societies that most CSOs would want to assist in, their operations in such areas become somewhat problematic. This is as a result of the divisions that Poskitt and Dufranc (2011) allude to be present, because of the different political affiliations that societies adhere to. Mukute (2012) also points out that the governments also play the role of shaping CSOs activities by means of discouraging them to engage in particular activities and at times prohibiting them.

### **3.6. CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING**

CSOs play quite an important role in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. According to the World Bank (2006a) a unanimous complementary peaceful transformation initiative has been viewed to be present between the state and non-state actors in cities such as Harare and Bulawayo. According to Mukute (2012) peacebuilding as a process seeks to increase justice in a social system. This is done by


the complete transformation of both personal and societal level relationships. Richmond (2005) further notes that the emergence of NGOs in the 1990s was based on states and the international institutions' peacebuilding requirements. Spurk (2010), looking at the role of CSOs in the peacebuilding efforts includes service delivery, monitoring for accountability, building community, public communication and advocacy, socialization, intermediation, and facilitation between citizens and state.

Spurk's model of the seven basic civil society functions, according to Dorner and List (2012) is a combination of functions drawn from the democratization theory. They further argue that CSOs will not accomplish all the functions at all times, since some of the functions take precedence over others depending on the stage of the conflict and the time leading to the occurrence of the conflict and peacebuilding efforts (Dorner and List, 2012). Subsequently CSOs have established frameworks within which the peacebuilding process operates with little or non-interference from the government.

### **3.6.1. LOCAL CSOs POTENTIAL IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION**

Considering that conflict analysis alone is not enough, there is great need that after an analysis of the positions and interests in a conflict situation, there is the setting up of frameworks that ensure the transformation of the particular conflict. According to Tocsin (2008), CSO action towards a conflict situation can take the form of having to deal with the symptoms or the causes of conflict. This is further subdivided into adversarial and non-adversarial methods and approach to conflict transformation. Looking at an adversarial approach, it can be divided between grassroots pro-active action in mobilizing the public, and the middle level action aimed at monitoring, advocacy and shaming of the top-level (Tocsin, 2008). This comes with regards to Lederach's (1997) analysis that CSOs are actively involved in both the grassroots level of society as well as the mid-level. This is illustrated in a pyramid outlining the different levels and its composites as follows:

**Figure 1: Civil Society in Conflict Transformation**



Source: Lederach (1997, p.39)

The three society levels in Lederach's pyramid show the link between the grassroots level, mid-level and the top-level CSOs. This is true to the fact that most of the social movements constitute connection of similar minded Organisations that will be operating either at mid-level or grassroots level. According to Traer (1997) most Western conflicts have largely used adversarial procedures in conflict resolution. This is because the West understands conflict resolution to be two sided, which either means taking the adjudication procedures to conflict or the law to protect adversaries (Traer, 1997). With regards to this above observation the Western legal system has therefore turned out to be key to conflict resolution approaches. Contrary to the notion set by the adversarial approach, the non- adversarial approach can be subdivided

between research activity and dialogue, and the mid-level groups usually assume that responsibility (Tocsin, 2008).

### **3.7. CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, CSOs hold a quite significant function within society because of their unifying role of the state, family and market (Tocsin, 2008). This is echoed by Chazan (1992, p.281) who notes that while interrelating with policy and policy issues in its sphere, civil society continue to remain distinct. Contrary to this, Diez and Pia (2007) propose that local CSOs can also take the role of conflict instigators, especially when the activities that they are involved in aggravate the cause of conflict, thus leading to misunderstandings between the different parties involved. Tocsin (2008) further emphasized this point by alluding to the fact that this happens through discrimination, injustice, and the persistence of violence. Again the effectiveness of local CSOs can be said to be mainly dependent upon the laws of a particular country and the parties involved. Also since most of the CSO work is people driven, participatory needs assessment acts as a central point of informing the major focus of the work that they do. The chapter that follows will be focused on the relationship between the various CSOs with the Zimbabwean government, as well as other stakeholders such as donors and other peer Organisations.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CSOs AND THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT**

### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The chapter focuses on a discussion of the study findings and also provides an analysis in comparison to previous research on similar areas of study, with much emphasis being put on the CSOs and government relations. This approach supports the argument by Liebersson (1985) that social research is inherently comparative in nature. A comparative analysis approach simply put is a means of discovering one or all cases or situation through the means of comparing them. It is again argued that there are present in comparative analysis numerous approaches that can be used to provide theoretical progress, through what is known as comparative politics (Cesarini and Shareen, 2009). Thus, the study will identify the experiences that CSOs have been going through on the ground. Looking at the relationship between the government and CSOs, the ESCWA report (2009) suggests that the level of democratization acts as a determinant to the relations that are present between CSOs and the government. This is exemplified by intolerance and suspicion put on independent NGOs, especially by command regimes.

In spite of the above comprehension of the CSO relationship with the government, other scholars further opine that the government and CSO relations change at any time, with instances where they become better and at times become suppressed or worse (Sohail, 2007). With regards to this, numerous factors are considered to be interfering with this relationship, which include political, economic and social challenges. As a result of the reputation awarded to NGOs during the Zimbabwean crisis situation, it is observed that these CSOs have come up with a new viewpoint on matters pertaining to issues of poverty and grassroots development. This is as a result of the vast experience that most NGOs have acquired from operating in the crisis areas. Other NGOs in Zimbabwe have even gone an extra-mile through creating networks amongst themselves and trying to break autonomy that take place in policy-making, by means of state engagement in the activities that they do. This supports the European Commission (2012) assertion that by means of conveying the concerns of

citizens, CSOs become active in their engagement in activities that promote citizens participatory democracy.

Although there have been numerous CSOs in Zimbabwe that have taken part in addressing various issues, only a few have taken a lead role in advocating for democracy within the country. Mukute (2012) mentions some of the Organisations that have assumed that lead role, which include the Zimbabwe's Human Rights Association (ZimRights), Zimbabwe's Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Transparency International-Zimbabwe (TI-Zimbabwe), Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe (MISA-Zimbabwe), Crisis Zimbabwe Coalition Zimbabwe (CZC), Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Solidarity Peace Trust, Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT), Zimbabwean Peace Project (ZPP), and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC). However, due to the nature of the relationship between the government and these CSOs in Zimbabwe, it is worth noting that participatory democracy has not been instituted as effectively as it should have been because of a number of factors that will be mentioned in the study. With, regards to this a comparative analysis of institutions that operate in Zimbabwe, seeks to illuminate the similar and at times different challenges the faced which acted as drawbacks in their work.

## **4.2 THE RELEVANCE OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

A comparative analysis is essential to the study, since it gives a clear understanding of the effect which CSOs in an environment that is politically unstable like Zimbabwe will be going through. Thus, in the comparative analysis a number of factors are put into consideration, which include whether the NGOs to be looked at is are international institutions or a local one, the type of work that they do and finally their source of funding. The source of funding is essential, considering Ungpakorn (2004, p.12) points that "the existence of most NGOs is centred upon the funding acquired from the various colonial governments, thus their course of action is as per their dictates". Again as analysed by Ragin and Robinson (2009), a comparative method approach acts as a bridge between qualitative case oriented research and a variable oriented quantitative research. Thus, in this case a comparative analysis will be



focused on Amnesty International, an international Organisation and the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which are both local CSOs. The criterion for choosing these NGOs was based on the work they do, primarily along the lines of advocating for democracy, human dignity and justice.

A brief overview of the selected CSOs, with regard to their operations and sustainability in Zimbabwe is essential to look at before having a comparative analysis of them. Another factor having affected the decision on which CSO to look at is the accessibility of relevant information by means of written documents. Amnesty International, amongst the numerous international institutions although most of its consultation work is conducted from South Africa, has written a number of reports to the UN with regards to the crisis situations and human rights abuse issues in Zimbabwe. This is evident with a number of reports on the crackdown situation that it mentioned Zimbabwe was faced with. Amnesty International's work mostly involves advocating for human rights, through the means of going to investigate on any human rights abuse that will be taking place and exposing them (Osse, 2012). Amnesty International also extends its work by educating and mobilizing the general public to help and also transform their societies to become safe and ensure that justice prevails.

On the other hand local NGOs like the NCA was established in 1997 by the Zimbabwean Council of Churches (ZCC), as a reaction to a general agreement that the Lancaster House Constitution lacked in many respects, various governmental imbalances that led to numerous amendments and also because of its undemocratic, and compromised origins ZLHR (2011, p.2). Thus, with regards to this a move was brought about with the formation of the NCA to try and draft a Zimbabwean constitution basing on the fact that it is home-grown and democratic in content (Dzinesa, 2012). In spite of all these efforts, it is also assumed that the NCA formation of the NCA is independent of the Lancaster House Constitution, but rather in response to the 1987 constitutional amendments that led to the removal of the prime minister's office giving way to the creation of the executive presidency office (Sithole, 1999). After Zimbabwe's constitutional amendment in 1986 as a means to provide for an Executive President, it saw the abolishment of the Prime Minister's office. However, this brought out what analysts argued to have bestowed great power on the executive president in the country's political and constitutional processes. On the other hand

Makumbe and Compagnon (2000) further point out that the Executive President held unrestricted power to unjustifiably dismiss parliament and conduct state affairs independently of any advice from cabinet members.

The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) on the other hand, was established as a result of collaboration between NGOs and churches passionate about peace building initiatives and human rights concerns in the early 2000s. As an institution, its main agenda is on the monitoring and documentation of politically motivated infringements of peace through violence and human rights violations. This is with regards to the belief that the country had been faced with human rights experiences that evoked perpetual debates. As an institution it recorded various human rights violations emanating from politically motivated violence in different provinces of the country. However, in its efforts to fulfil this mission it had set for itself it encountered various challenges. Amnesty International records that December 3 2008, Jestina Mukoko, human rights activist and director of ZPP was forcibly taken from her home and her whereabouts remained unknown for 48 hours after her abduction (Sokwanele, 2008).

The comparative analysis of local CSOs, ZPP and the NCA and an international Organisation Amnesty International seem to show some elements of similarities in the work that these NGOs engage in, but it is also important to critically look at the differences that they also expose. To begin with a clear contrast that is present can be attributed to the difference in the level of advocacy work that they engage in. This is with regards to how influential some CSOs are over others, as a result of vast exposure and being well-known in areas they operate in. Other factors that expose the differences between CSOs include the understanding that some CSO work is affected by the political instabilities, which at times bring about legislation that interferes with their operation as in the case of Zimbabwe. However, it is important to outline the operating environment that enables efficiency and effectiveness in CSOs work.

#### **4.3 CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO CSOs OPERATIONS**

Although measures have been put in place to try and make politicians accountable to citizens, malfunctioning governments and corrupt public officials continue to be a challenge worldwide (Adresa et al., 2003). For the mere fact that legislation is there to address people's needs, by way of finding the best possible way of improving their

livelihoods does not imply it is the only way. For most NGOs to fully work towards achieving their mandate there are several conditions that are supposed to be present. These conditions include an environment that politically enables NGOs to operate without any form of disturbances, and freedom of expression, association and engagement. Miti and Matatu (n.d) argue that the measurement of the quality of Africa's governance is determined by the citizens' ability to have the state liable to all nations' concerns. The various forms of accountability that citizens demand include political accountability, economic accountability and social accountability. Political accountability includes the need for ensuring the presence of well-established democratic institutions like NGOs, good and democratic governance and also the elections cycle free and acceptable to the citizens.

Social accountability on the other hand, is equally important to address the disparities; Gaventa (2002) points out that there has been an increased concern on genuineness in the relationship between general citizens and the institutions that represent them. This crisis is with regards to the understanding that people both in the North and South feel let down by their governments, based on what they understand as lack of action towards the poor people's needs, lack of interactive connection with the elected government and too much corruption (Narayan et al., 2000). According to Miti and Matatu (n.d) social accountability focuses on the reliance upon civic engagement to make sure that office bearers are accountable. This is echoed by the World Bank (2006b) that refers it to be an actions and mechanism other than a mere vote, which participants use as a means of holding the state accountable, by means of ensuring that there is action from the state, media, civil society and other stakeholders that promote or facilitate these efforts. However, despite that accountability is fundamental to institutional performance, it is also believed that increasing it may also create undesirable effects. This is with regards to an argument by O'Neill (2002) that outside some critical considerations, a further increase in accountability puts forth high chances of a decrease in legitimacy and trust.

#### **4.4 CSOs INVOLVEMENT FINDINGS**

Findings with regards to the work done by the NCA, ZPP and Amnesty International suggest that the Organisations have been and still are actively involved in Zimbabwe, although having faced numerous challenges. This is also echoed in a report by

Lumina (2009) that the NCA has tremendously contributed in the ensuring that the Zimbabwean public is aware of their constitutional and human rights, and has been a quite significant contributor in constitutional reform process. This also comes with the observation by Lee (2011) that there was the creation of divisions within civil society after the establishment of the transitional government and GPA terms. This was illustrated by the strong disagreement over the constitution making process, with Organisations such as ZCTU, NCA and ZINASU strongly opposed to a leading role for Parliament arguing that the process is inadequately people oriented.

#### **4.5 CSOs RELATIONS WITH DIFFERENT KEY STAKEHOLDERS**

In conclusion the study will further present findings on the CSOs relations with different key stakeholders, such as the government, peer Organisations, donors, and private sectors. This is done in order to assess if there are any matches or mismatches between the conditions to which CSOs are to operate under and the realities on the ground. Again it is important to have an analysis on the various and look at how the contribute directly or indirectly in the shaping of the work that CSOs engage in.

##### **4.5.1 CSOs RELATIONS WITH THE ZIMBABWEAN STATE**

Most CSOs relationships with the state have not always been as complementary as expected, although they have tried to fill the gaps that the government has left in public service. Thus, this has led to the general consensus in the understanding that CSOs and the state in Zimbabwe's relationship is complex because of many reasons. One major reason of this tense relationship is that CSOs engagement in advocacy and lobbying is done with the preference of having to keep their relationship on a non-conformity basis. However, when it comes to issues pertaining to constitutional reforms, it is argued that some CSOs have taken a political stance against the state (Raftopoulos, 2001). This is in support of what Mukute (2012) recognizes that most CSOs that are involved in issues pertaining to governance and human rights often experience challenges and become mutually aggressive.

The sour relationships that have been recorded include the arresting of nine activists from institutions such as WOZA (Amnesty, 2012). Also according to Guma (2007), twelve NCA activists were detained in Marondera during a workshop. Thus, this

clearly shows the nature of the relations and the government governance stance. Contrarily it can also be observed that developmental and humanitarian CSOs have had progressive relationships with the government seen by the expansion in their endeavours of serving the people. This comes as a result of them being well knowledgeable and active in areas that have developmental needs. As observed by Hadenius and Ugglä (1996), for a state to fully achieve its objectives it needs CSOs to help them in achieving them. To further explain the perfect relationship between the state and the CSOs, Hadenius and Ugglä came up with a five-stage range model of the civil society and state relationship indicated below.

**Table 2: Civil Society treatment five-stage model**

<b>STAGE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>THRESHOLD ACTION</b>	<b>TYPE OF STATE</b>
<b>1</b>	The state does not tolerate independent civil activity	De facto right to form autonomous Organisations	Hostile States
<b>2</b>	The state accepts autonomous Organisation, but does not provide space for it	State withdrawal opening up a space for independent activity	
<b>3</b>	A space for independent activity exists, but the practice of governance does not promote autonomous Organisation	Favourable institutional structures	
<b>4</b>	The state provides favourable structures but no active support	Active state programmes in support of civil	

		society	
<b>5</b>	The state activity promotes autonomous Organisation		Benevolent State

Source: Hadenius and Ugglä (1996, p.1629)

To clearly help in illustrating the Zimbabwean CSOs relationship status with the state, is essential to use the five-stage model approach. Stage 1 of the model describes a system that is authoritarian in nature, with the state intolerant towards the activities that civil society will be doing. Stages 2, 3, and 4 shows an experience some state support in the activities to which CSOs will be engaging in. The last stage of the model is characterized by the complete active support of the civil society activity by the state. Thus, with regards to the Zimbabwean scenario from the current study, the relationship between the government and the state lies between the first and second stages. Unlike the first stage that allows non-state actors to create autonomous institutions, the second stage permits some CSOs independent activities although there is not much functional space given for them to operate. This is evident with the conditionality's that are meant to guide CSOs activities in the country, with regards to gatherings that would have to be approved by high authorities. In spite of this contestations, it is worth noting that the intolerance by the government in allowing CSOs engage independently in their activities is carried out in an indirect way through the use of laws like the Criminal Law Codification Act, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and many other policies that discourage them to effectively and efficiently work.

This limitation in the freedom that both local and international CSOs experienced had a severe and negative impact on their work leaving the question of their survival and sustainability unanswered. The many experiences and the strained relationships between the state and the CSOs have however left the protection of the ordinary Zimbabwean citizens against human rights abuse not safeguarded, since CSOs operate mostly on behave of the general people. An example of such abuses is that mentioned in the Zimbabwean Independent Newspaper of 28 April 2011 that reported the 16 March arrest of six WOZA human rights activists by police officers at a gathering,

who later on were charged with the contravening Chapter 9:23 of the Criminal Law Act.

#### **4.5.2 CSOs RELATIONS WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

Historically in Zimbabwe, labour movements and unions have always presented or illuminated the interaction or relationship that has been present between CSOs and the private sector. However, present relations have been brought out by CSOs such as the Indigenous Business Women's Organisation (IBWO), Affirmative Action Group (AAG) and Zimbabwe National Farmers Union to mention but a few. These institutions have been supporting indigenous entrepreneurs to add value to their products and getting links to outside markets. Many scholars have observed that relationships of CSOs with the private sector in Zimbabwe have not always been as smooth as others might think. This is explained by what Raftopoulos (2012) posits that of late there has been an increase in business people that engage in unethical and corrupt business practices and get away with it because of them having state protection.

Another factor that is also understood to have had a negative impact on the relationship between the private sector and CSOs is the economic collapse, which saw the formal sector becoming dysfunctional. With regards to this, there was seen the rapid mushrooming of the informal sector within the country. Furthermore, human rights activist Farai Magawu pointed CSOs and private sector relationships like in the case of diamond mining in Chiadzwa. This comes with the understanding the many people were displaced by mining companies without any form of compensation, to the extent of human rights abuses (Magawu, 2012). This is echoed by Human Rights Watch (2009) that point out that from the end of November 2006 to the end of October 2008, there were numerous human rights abuses that included torture, beatings and killings of the miners.

#### **4.5.3 CSOs RELATIONS WITH DONORS**

When focusing on the question that pertains to CSOs accountability, the CSO-donor relationship becomes extremely important. It is against this background that local and international CSOs have been understood to be in one way or another dependent on

some form of external funding, although the sources vary as well as the amounts to which they are sponsored. According to Muthupandian (2006), there are generally three CSOs sources of funding which are foreign development agencies, the government and the general public. Although external sponsors may include the government and the general public, for most third world countries foreign development agencies are the major financiers of local CSOs. These include institutions like the UN, Oxfam, European Commission, the Canadian International Development Agency, USAID, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO), and African Development Bank (AfDB) to mention but a few.

However, the existence of a flexible environment soon after Zimbabwe had gained independence, characterized CSOs being free to decide on the use of funds that they had in their coffers. There was witnessed a consensus by the Zimbabwean authorities in the accusation of the use of local CSOs and international aid agencies by the western countries to sponsor or fund the countries opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In spite of the contestation, it is worth noting that there is a competitive advantage, which CSOs are believed to get financially for the work that they do from both the government and the international donors (Davids, 2005). However, it is not the same with all the CSOs. In Zimbabwe for example there are high chances that some CSOs do not get financial backing from the government. This assertion is in line with a castigating statement in the Herald Newspaper April 17 (2007, p.2) by Zanu-PF national chairman John Nkomo, while addressing delegations in Insiza, “They are creating an unAfrican culture, giving money to people to remove their leaders. They are fronts for regime change who have no real purpose or reason to be in the country”.

Mukute (2012) further adds that donor conditionality’s since the 1990s in terms of things that needed to be funded, implementation of projects and writing of reports is believed to have increased. Thus with regards to this, it is believed that it resultantly challenged the independent thinking of CSOs and their focus areas. This is further analysed by Holland (2012), who posits that CSOs as a result of failing to act independently eventually end up as a member of the aid industry deprived of its own abilities



#### **4.5.4 CSOs RELATIONS WITH OTHER PEER ORGANISATIONS**

Cooperation and competition have been noted to be common characteristics defining the relationships amongst local CSOs in Zimbabwe. In terms of cooperation it is noted that when CSOs are working on similar operations and themes, there are high chances of them working together easily. Organisations that can be identified to have done collaborative work include the Participatory Ecological Land Use Management Association, Human Rights NGO Forum and the Women Coalition Groups, to mention but a few. There also are both interdependent and negative relationships that are present between local and international CSOs. Their collaborative relations can be attributed to them at times having to take common positions on matters of mutual interest on an international platform. International forums that can be identified to have brought local and international CSOs to take common positions include the World Summit on Sustainable development (WSSD) and the Civil Society Mechanism of the United Nations (CSMUN).

The mere fact of having local and international CSOs taking similar positions on matters of mutual interest is understood to enable or capacitate local CSOs to get an upper hand when faced with international structural issues that befall the country (Mukute, 2012). On the extreme end negative implications that befall the relationship between of local and international CSOs, include that argued by Wilson (2012), who purports that negative relations are instigated when INGOs conduct their own programs without local CSOs involvement. Regardless of the cooperative work that some civil society Organisations engage in competitive relations also are prevalent as a result of numerous reasons, such as political space amongst leaders and at times funding. According to Wilson (2012) most of the CSOs find themselves having to compete for visibility for prestige reasons, thus the framework in which they operate in will not be inclusive in nature for other CSO groups that will be working towards a common objective. Another negative implication is that of competing for donor resources resulting in them wanting to be acknowledged by Western donors (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

## **4.6 CONCLUSION**

There is a general consensus on a way forward for CSOs, which promotes a move towards issues of sustainable development engagement without forgetting relief assistance situations that are still present. However, the present state of affairs that Zimbabwe is going through shows that there are still tensions between the government and CSOs relations. This however has resulted in the government having to go to the extent of retrogressively discrediting humanitarian aid institutions, which as result goes on to affect their noble human rights responsibility. This responsibility that the government itself is obliged to undertake includes assisting the poor and marginalized people.

In addition, the controlling environment that the Zimbabwean government has created has resultantly brought civic participation in service production to a halt. Also CSOs responsibility of being watchdogs against policies that the government instigates, which is repressive, has been affected. Again it is important to highlight the need to put up a control mechanism against the state and the CSOs, so as to enable their relations to remain distinct. This helps to maintain CSOs autonomy and for them to remain purely non-governmental. This is as a result of the understanding that CSOs and state partnerships have often become problematic as a result of arrogance usually coming from the government.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

The Zimbabwean current state of affairs has indicated the existence of a tense relationship between the government and CSOs or not cordial and need much focus in trying to consolidate it (Sachikonye et al., 2007). Therefore, the study set out to investigate the crux of the matter, which is to elucidate the relations between the government and CSOs that was obtained from preliminary literature study on CSOs and state relations with regard to the conflict transformation process. The study has also revealed key challenges faced by CSOs, which include funding challenges and negative political pressures.

However, despite all the challenges that CSOs face, great concern was focused on the work that they do and on their survival in the nation-building process through conflict transformation practice. Thus, to attain this information the study set to investigate the relationship between the CSOs and the government, in their effort towards mitigating conflicts and peace building in communities. Although political issues play center stage scholars like Sigma (2011) argue that most CSOs in Zimbabwe have now devoted much of their effort and time to adverse political problems, while overlooking social and economic issues meant to address development and national reconstruction challenges.

### **5.2. SUMMARY OF OVERALL RESEARCH FINDINGS**

As part of the study's findings, it is portrayed that there is an element of inconsistency with human rights obligations, which the Zimbabwean government has to practice and also retrogression in its operations. This has led to most CSOs in the country coming to a halt in their operations, thus leaving the poor and marginalized without any form of assistance. Not only has it affected the poor people, but the inflexible operational environment has also brought civil participation to a standstill. Thus, with regards to this, civil Organisations cease to take up the watchdog or monitoring position of government service provision to the people. Another challenge is that of having to maintain positive relationships, since it is believed to be able to establish a good working environment for CSOs. Just like most African countries, it can be evidently indicated that there is perpetually widespread violence that affects people in

different ways and Zimbabwe is not an exceptional case. This can be attributed to the political polarization that saw the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2009.

Amidst all the challenges that have been evidently noted, CSOs work across the world has also been of paramount importance. For example in Zimbabwe local and international CSOs have been very involved in trying to promote free and fair elections and doing away with any form of violence that is election related. Furthermore, another significance of CSOs is drawn from the assertion that making them efficient and empowering them will create a platform where there is cooperation amongst people in future planning that will first benefit them, then their families and finally the community at large (World Bank, 2006a). This clearly points out that CSOs failures and successes are dependent upon the generosity of the national governments, and the donor community. With regards to being dependent upon aid, there are high risks of disintegration of CSOs activities when funds cease to be given thus it poses a threat to their sustainability.

### **5.3. GENERAL IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS**

The finding of the study intertwined with the Zimbabwean CSOs thrust of clearly addressing the state and CSOs relations, shows local CSOs in trying to get involved in conflict transformation have used strategies such as linking themselves with different stakeholders involved in the developmental research processes. Again other strategies utilized include facilitating the national healing initiatives and helping in capacity building. These strategies could only be implemented by first ensuring that there is mutual trust between the citizens and the CSOs, considering that lack of trust has a negative effect. This is true to McNeil and Malena's (2010) observation that suspicion and distrust identifies many countries when it comes to the understanding of the interaction between CSOs, the state and the citizens. Moreover, it is worth noting that several reforms such as the national healing, constitutional change, electoral and judicial changes had to be instituted so as for the trust between citizens, the government and CSOs to be created and the GNU sought to address that (Church and Civil Society Forum, 2010).

The recommendations that the study provides below have been developed using the key findings from this study. This is in line with what Cranston (1967) purports by mentioning that human rights issues are of great importance and a mere violation of them means causing an offense to justice prevailing. Therefore, with regards to this there is a need for the government and CSOs to collaboratively work together towards protecting and promoting human rights. Again Ndegwa (1996) further suggests that provided there are necessary structures and single-mindedness in operation, CSOs would irrefutably function to the best of their capabilities as acting in-between on matters of good governance and sustainable development. Therefore, the following recommendations are considered necessary to improve the enabling environment for CSOs working in conflict situations.

### **5.3.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL CSOs**

As recommendations to both the international and local CSOs, there is a need for them to cooperatively try and bring about imminent solutions meant to ensure that sustainable peace and prosperity is attained the world over. Again Zimbabwe's local CSOs have to collaboratively try and identify the various hindrances and inconsistencies present, which act as a stumbling block to bringing about peace, and also try to come up with solid objectives, means and strategies to disable them. Furthermore, the CSOs have to show some form of shared vision in the work in which they engage with the international community, and pass the message around the world with peer Organisations who will be facing similar challenges.

Moreover, local and international CSOs have to lobby their governments in ensuring and enabling there to be a safer working environment for all CSOs, especially in countries facing a conflict situation. As a way of giving a helping hand, international CSOs could ensure that issues affecting local CSOs are brought to light, while expressing some form of unity with local CSOs. This is with regards to the understanding that CSOs and the government do not have to see each other as foes, but as necessary parts of a collective solution. Again both international and local CSOs should create a conducive platform that gives room for there to be a mutual sharing of field experience, expertise skills, and other appropriate practices to be utilized in their operations depending on the situation.

International CSOs have to make use of their various international links they have, in assisting local CSOs with the challenges that they will be facing in the different environments in which they will be operating. There is a need for constructive engagement between the government and CSOs, without having to be assumed as part of the government or assimilated, but rather by means of having constructive dialogues. Considering that human and economic rights are a major concern, CSOs that engage in the field of advocating for economic rights and those working on human rights issues have to collaborate and work together towards coming up with strategies that they will all achieve.

CSOs have to implement training sessions and workshops for the general people in communities in which they will be operating, thus by so doing they will be empowering and equipping them with adequate knowledge and information working towards sustainable peace. There is a need for the inclusion of local CSOs by International CSOs in the structuring and implementation of their various programs in different communities, so as to make sure that when they also start their work the activities they undertake will best suit the needs and priorities of the particular communities. There is a need for CSOs to take an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach when it comes to their engagement in communities, which takes the form of having to take into consideration historical background of the setting, and present situation. CSOs should try and use both formal and informal approaches as a means of promoting sustainable peace building, considering that differences in approach impact differently on different people.

### **5.3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DONOR COMMUNITY**

Donors in Zimbabwe have to actively take up the role in coming up with and funding projects that advance people's rights and support the peace processes. Donors should be able to reach out, when it comes to the concerns of the general people and also ensure that there are open and inclusive relationships with local CSOs in Zimbabwe. As a pre-requisite donors need to have a thorough analysis and become aware of their environments in which they will be operating. As a precaution, donors should not have their focus exclusively on humanitarian aid, but maintain sustainable support for CSOs that is long term, so as to enable effective and efficient post-conflict CSO support. There is a need for donors to ensure that the programmes that they invest in

improves the local CSOs operational skills, through means of facilitating the sharing of their work experiences, having exchange visits with peer Organisations, and skills transfer.

The donor community should try and ensure strong connections between international CSOs and local CSOs in the communities in which they will jointly be advocating for positive changes to take place. Again donor communities have to be ready to take and maintain a neutral stance in funding of their projects, regardless of the outcomes in that at times the stance they take would mean a prolonged time frame in operation. This is true on the basis that donors would not accept any outcome that goes against their interests. There is a need for the donor community to be open and transparent at all times in the work that they do. Thus, by so doing it makes them accountable to the community from the implementation of the project until completion. Members of the Donor community have again to familiarize themselves with reporting procedures and accountability mechanisms, because these are essential when dealing with conflict situations in Zimbabwe.

### **5.3.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT**

Governments should allow free participation of local and international CSOs without interference in their work. This is supported by what the European Commission (2012) in their report mention that the government benefits from positive CSOs participation in developmental strategies. Moreover, there is a need for the Zimbabwean government to effectively make sure that everyone adheres to all human rights, for example the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association and being allowed to have peaceful gathering. Again the various governments around the world need to undertake extensive exercises of thorough monitoring and control against human rights violations. Civil dialogue between all stakeholders during a conflict situation has to involve the government. The Zimbabwean government has to collaboratively uphold the international laws jointly with the local CSOs and diligently issue out reports with respect to their human rights obligations. Therefore, by so doing the government will be making sure that those infringing any human rights and causing any disturbances to the work of the local CSOs and other stakeholders working for sustainable peace, will be prosecuted.

#### **5.4. CONCLUSION**

In summing up it is worth noting that CSOs' responses to various societal challenges discussed in the study, illustrate variations based on the nature of the challenge whether it be economic, political or social. Again the CSOs active response is guided by national policies depending on how the policies are interpreted. This will provide a basis on whether or not there will be any support from either local or international CSOs. Nevertheless, Zimbabwean CSOs prove to have and still are in the process of engaging in conflict transformation initiatives that seek to alter government systems and structures, change behaviours, relationships from being undesirable to being positive amidst the challenges they face from government interference. Although much work still needs to be done, it is worth noting that effective conflict transformation can only be experienced given that desirable change at the societal and personal levels (Lederach, 1995).



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## Appendix

### Extract of Section of POSA Law on public gatherings. Source: (Veritas Trust, 2002)

#### PART IV PUBLIC GATHERINGS

##### 23 Interpretation in Part IV

In this Part—

“organiser”, in relation to a public gathering, means every person who or organisation or association which executes or assists in executing the arrangements for or promotes the holding of the public gathering.

##### 24 Organiser to notify regulating authority of intention to hold public gathering

(1) Subject to subsection (5), the organiser of a public gathering shall give at least four clear days’ written notice of the holding of the gathering to the regulating authority for the area in which the gathering is to be held:

Provided that the regulating authority may, in his discretion, permit shorter notice to be given.

(2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that the purpose of the notice required by subsection (1) is—

- (a) to afford the regulating authority a reasonable opportunity of anticipating or preventing any public disorder or a breach of the peace; and

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- (b) to facilitate co-operation between the Police Force and the organiser of the gathering concerned; and

- (c) to ensure that the gathering concerned does not unduly interfere with the rights of others or lead to an obstruction of traffic, a breach of the peace or public disorder.

(3) Any Saturday, Sunday or public holiday falling within the four-day period of notice referred to in subsection (1) shall be counted as part of the period.

(4) Where there are two or more organisers of a public gathering, the giving of notice by any one of them in terms of subsection (1) shall be a discharge of the duty imposed upon the other or others by that subsection.

(5) This section shall not apply to public gatherings of a class described in the Schedule.

(6) Any organiser of a public gathering who fails to notify the regulating authority for the area of the gathering in accordance with subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level five or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

##### 25 Regulation of public gatherings

(1) If a regulating authority, having regard to all the circumstances in which a public gathering is taking or is likely to take place, has reasonable grounds for believing that the public gathering will occasion—

- (a) public disorder; or
- (b) a breach of the peace; or
- (c) an obstruction of any thoroughfare;

he may, subject to this section, give such directions as appear to him to be reasonably necessary for the preservation of public order and the public peace and preventing or minimising any obstruction of traffic along any thoroughfare.

(2) Without derogation from the generality of subsection (1), directions under that subsection may provide for any of the following matters—

- (a) prescribing the time at which the public gathering may commence and its maximum duration;
- (b) prohibiting persons taking part in the public gathering from entering any public place specified in the directions;
- (c) precautions to be taken to avoid the obstruction of traffic along any thoroughfare;
- (d) prescribing the route to be taken by any procession;
- (e) requiring the organiser to appoint marshals to assist in the maintenance of order at the public gathering.

(3) Whenever it is practicable to do so, before issuing a direction under subsection (1) a regulating authority shall give the organiser of the public gathering concerned a reasonable opportunity to make representations in the matter.

(4) A direction given under subsection (1) shall have effect immediately it is issued and may be published—

- (a) in a newspaper circulating in the area to which the direction applies; or



(b) by notices distributed among the public or affixed upon public buildings in the area to which the direction applies; or

(c) by announcement of a police officer broadcast or made orally:

Provided that, where practicable, the regulating authority shall ensure that the direction is reduced to writing and served on the organiser of the public gathering to which it relates.

(5) Any person who is aggrieved by a direction issued under subsection (1) may appeal against it to the Minister, and the Minister may confirm, vary or set aside the direction or give such order or direction in the matter as he thinks just.

(6) An appeal in terms of subsection (5) shall be dealt with as quickly as possible.

(7) The noting of an appeal in terms of this subsection shall not have the effect of suspending the direction appealed against.

(8) A police officer may order the persons taking part in any public gathering to disperse if—

(a) any direction given under subsection (1) in relation to that gathering has been violated; or

(b) the police officer has reasonable grounds for believing that public order is likely to be endangered if the gathering continues.

(9) Any person who fails to comply with an order given under subsection (8) shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level five or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

## 26 Prohibition of public gatherings to avoid public disorder

(1) Without derogation from section *twenty-five*, if a regulating authority believes on reasonable grounds that a public gathering will occasion public disorder, he may by notice in terms of subsection (3) prohibit the public gathering.

(2) Whenever it is practicable to do so, before acting in terms of subsection (1), a regulating authority shall afford the organiser of the public gathering concerned a reasonable opportunity to make representations in the matter.

(3) A notice given under subsection (1) shall have effect immediately it is issued and shall be published—

(a) in a newspaper circulating in the area to which the direction applies; or

(b) by notices distributed among the public or affixed upon public buildings in the area to which the direction applies; or

(c) by announcement of a police officer that is broadcast or made orally:

Provided that, where practicable, the regulating authority shall ensure that the notice is reduced to writing and served on the organiser of the public gathering to which it relates.

(4) Any person who is aggrieved by a notice given under subsection (1) may appeal against it to the Minister, and the Minister may confirm, vary or set aside the notice or give such other order in the matter as he thinks just:

Provided that the noting of an appeal in terms of this subsection shall not have the effect of suspending any notice appealed against.

(5) Any person who knowingly opposes or fails to comply with a notice given under subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level five or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

## 27 Temporary prohibition of holding public demonstrations within particular police districts

(1) If a regulating authority for any area believes on reasonable grounds that the powers conferred by sections *twenty-five* and *twenty-six* will not be sufficient to prevent public disorder being occasioned by the holding of public demonstrations or any class thereof in the area or any part thereof, he may issue an order prohibiting, for a specified period not exceeding one month, the holding of all public demonstrations or any class of public demonstrations in the area or part thereof concerned.

(2) Whenever it is practicable to do so, before acting in terms of subsection (1), a regulating authority shall—

(a) cause notice of the proposed order to be published in the *Gazette* and in a newspaper circulating in the area concerned and to be given to any person whom the regulating authority believes is likely to organise a public demonstration that will be prohibited by the proposed order; and

(b) afford all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to make representations in the matter.

(3) The regulating authority for the area in respect of which an order has been made under subsection (1) shall ensure that the order and any amendment or revocation thereof is published—

- (a) in the *Gazette*; and
- (b) in a newspaper circulating in the area; and
- (c) in such other manner as, in his opinion, will ensure that the order or its amendment or revocation, as the case may be, is brought to the attention of persons affected by it.

(4) Any person who is aggrieved by an order given under subsection (1) may appeal against it to the Minister, and the Minister may confirm, vary or set aside the order or give such other order in the matter as he thinks just:

Provided that the noting of an appeal in terms of this subsection shall not have the effect of suspending any order appealed against.

(5) Any person who organises or assists in organising or takes part in or attends any public demonstration held in contravention of an order under subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level six or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

## **28 Civil liability in certain circumstances of organiser of public gathering**

(1) If the organiser of a public gathering—

- (a) has not given notice of the holding of the gathering in terms of subsection (1) of section *twenty-four*, or
- (b) fails or refuses to comply to the best of his ability with any direction, notice or order given in terms of section *twenty-five*, *twenty-six* or *twenty-seven*; or

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- (c) incites or encourages persons taking part in the gathering to engage in conduct which amounts to or could reasonably be expected to lead to public disorder or a breach of the peace;

he shall be liable, at the suit of any injured party, for any loss of or damage to property and any injury to or death of a person occasioned by any public disorder or breach of the peace caused by or arising out of or occurring at the gathering.

(2) Where there is more than one organiser of a public gathering, their liability under that section shall be joint and several.

(3) In any proceedings in which it is alleged that an organiser of a public gathering is liable in terms of subsection (1) for any loss, damage, injury or death, the organiser shall bear the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities—

- (a) that he gave notice of the holding of the gathering in terms of section *twenty-four*;
- (b) that he complied to the best of his ability with any direction or order that is proved to have been made in relation to the gathering.

(4) This section shall be construed as adding to, and not as derogating from, any other law under which an organiser of a public gathering or any other person may be liable for any loss, damage, injury or death caused by or arising out of or occurring at such a gathering.

(5) Subject to Part XIX of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [*Chapter 9:07*], a court which has convicted a person of any offence in terms of section *twenty-four*, *twenty-five*, *twenty-six* or *twenty-seven* that involves any loss, damage, injury or death for which that person is liable in terms of this section shall forthwith award compensation to any person who has suffered personal injury or whose right or interest in property of any description has been lost or diminished as a direct result of the offence.

## **29 Dispersal of unlawful public gatherings**

(1) A police officer and any person assisting him may do all things reasonably necessary for—

- (a) dispersing the persons present at a public gathering the holding or continuance of which is unlawful by virtue of any direction or order under section *twenty-five*, *twenty-six* or *twenty-seven*; and
- (b) apprehending any such persons;

and, if any such person makes resistance, the police officer or the person assisting him may use such force as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case for overcoming any such resistance.

(2) If a person is killed as a result of the use of reasonably justifiable force in terms of subsection (1), where the force is directed at overcoming that person's resistance to a lawful measure taken in terms of that subsection, the killing shall be lawful.

## **30 ...**

[Repealed by section 282 of Criminal Law Code]<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This section dealt with the offence of **Disrupting a public gathering**. See now section 44 of the Criminal Law Code.