Doctoral Degrees (Philosophy)
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Browsing Doctoral Degrees (Philosophy) by Author "Clare, Julia."
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Item A critical examination of Richard Rorty's liberal lexicon.(2010) Clare, Julia.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.; McDermott, Lydia E.This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation.Item Grounding african political theory on afro-communitarianism: arguments and implications.(2023) Adeate, Tosin Blessing.; Clare, Julia.This thesis critically analyses Afro-communitarianism as a philosophical foundation for modern African political theories and practices. The thesis links the reception of Afro-communitarian political philosophy in modern African political philosophy with its long-standing tension between community and individual as well as the conflict between rights and duty in modern African political philosophy. The attempt to resolve this tension in literature has mainly focused on the ideas of personhood. The thesis shows how development of the personhood approach to resolving this tension was manifested in three senses, i.e. duty-based, rights-based, and Afro-communitarian rejectionism. These three senses are both interrelated and independent discourses in African political philosophy. The duty-based personhood approach holds that personhood is defined solely by the structure of the community and not the self. It contends a notion of the self whose definition of meaningful life is generated outside the reference to community dependency. According to this approach, an ideal individual is a communal conformist, one that prioritises the duty to the community over the self. As a result, this approach defends a political society where concerns of rights, especially individual rights, do not matter. Following this approach is the rights-based personhood response. The rights-based approach responds to the lacunae in the duty-based personhood approach. Rights-based personhood approach is also an independent position at resolving the tension in Afro-communitarian political thought. This approach seeks to defend the compatibility of rights with Afro-communitarianism and its equal status with communal obligation. It argues for certain features of humans that suggest the partial dependency of the self on the community in the definition of human personhood. Grounding on these features, the approach established the place of rights, autonomy, and freedom in the Afro-communitarian discourse. However, what stands clear in this account of personhood is the persistence of the community and its overwhelming nature in framing the functions of the political virtues of rights, autonomy, and freedom believed to be individual properties. Rights only matter to the extent of their coherence with communal values. It becomes apparent that the idea of individual rights remains vague, especially in the face of specific human expression in communitarian African societies. vi The conflicts between individual and community and rights and duty in the idea of personhood in Afro-communitarian thought stirred up the third response and the third sense of the personhood approach, which I refer to as Afro-communitarian rejectionism. Scholars in this camp suggest the need to have a conversation on modern African politics without Afro-communitarian ideas. This position rests on the claim that modern African philosophy will be influenced by diverse orientations, which are sometimes incompatible with the ideas of Afro-communitarianism. However, the challenge with this conception of personhood is that it ruled out the possibility of a developed modern Africa profiting from the merits of Afro-communitarianism. While the tension between the individual and community persists, the thesis argues that attention should be given to the analysis of the community. In analysing the idea of community, the thesis identified the various forms of community that undergird the various ideas of personhood in Afrocommunitarianism, namely cultural community and community as self-interested individuals. The first form of community is the Afro-communitarian notion of community. I show how the idea of humiliation is inherent in the ideal notion of community in Afro-communitarianism and the conception of self it informs. The question of humiliation is omitted in the various conceptions of personhood. For Afro-communitarianism to ground modern African political ideas and practices, its notion of the community must be non-humiliating. Achieving a non-humiliating community involves a review of the norms of the cultural community. I attempt this review with what I call the doctrine of cultural permissibility. This thesis redirects Afro-communitarian debates by arguing for a shift to the community. The thesis concludes that postcolonial African politics can only benefit from Afro-communitarianism preoccupied with the desire for a ‘non-humiliating’ community that accommodates plural conceptions of personhood. This thesis would provide nuanced views on the ongoing conversation among Afro-communitarian theorists.