Browsing by Author "Clare, Julia."

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A critical examination of Richard Rorty's liberal lexicon.
(2010) Clare, Julia.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.; McDermott, Lydia E.
This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation.
Grounding African political theory on afro-communitarianism: arguments and implications=Ukuqeqeshelwa injulalwazi yezombusazwe yase-Africa i-African Political Theory phezu kwenzululwazi yokuxhumuna komuntu ongumAfrika nomphakathi i-Afro-Communitarianism: Imibonomcabango Nemithelela.
(2023) Adeate, Tosin Blessing.; Clare, Julia.
This thesis critically analyses Afro-communitarianism as a philosophical foundation for modern African political theories and practices. The thesis links the reception of Afro-communitarian political philosophy in modern African political philosophy with its long-standing tension between community and individual as well as the conflict between rights and duty in modern African political philosophy. The attempt to resolve this tension in literature has mainly focused on the ideas of personhood. The thesis shows how development of the personhood approach to resolving this tension was manifested in three senses, i.e. duty-based, rights-based, and Afro-communitarian rejectionism. These three senses are both interrelated and independent discourses in African political philosophy. The duty-based personhood approach holds that personhood is defined solely by the structure of the community and not the self. It contends a notion of the self whose definition of meaningful life is generated outside the reference to community dependency. According to this approach, an ideal individual is a communal conformist, one that prioritises the duty to the community over the self. As a result, this approach defends a political society where concerns of rights, especially individual rights, do not matter. Following this approach is the rights-based personhood response. The rights-based approach responds to the lacunae in the duty-based personhood approach. Rights-based personhood approach is also an independent position at resolving the tension in Afro-communitarian political thought. This approach seeks to defend the compatibility of rights with Afro-communitarianism and its equal status with communal obligation. It argues for certain features of humans that suggest the partial dependency of the self on the community in the definition of human personhood. Grounding on these features, the approach established the place of rights, autonomy, and freedom in the Afro-communitarian discourse. However, what stands clear in this account of personhood is the persistence of the community and its overwhelming nature in framing the functions of the political virtues of rights, autonomy, and freedom believed to be individual properties. Rights only matter to the extent of their coherence with communal values. It becomes apparent that the idea of individual rights remains vague, especially in the face of specific human expression in communitarian African societies. The conflicts between individual and community and rights and duty in the idea of personhood in Afro-communitarian thought stirred up the third response and the third sense of the personhood approach, which I refer to as Afro-communitarian rejectionism. Scholars in this camp suggest the need to have a conversation on modern African politics without Afro-communitarian ideas. This position rests on the claim that modern African philosophy will be influenced by diverse orientations, which are sometimes incompatible with the ideas of Afro-communitarianism. However, the challenge with this conception of personhood is that it ruled out the possibility of a developed modern Africa profiting from the merits of Afro-communitarianism. While the tension between the individual and community persists, the thesis argues that attention should be given to the analysis of the community. In analysing the idea of community, the thesis identified the various forms of community that undergird the various ideas of personhood in Afrocommunitarianism, namely cultural community and community as self-interested individuals. The first form of community is the Afro-communitarian notion of community. I show how the idea of humiliation is inherent in the ideal notion of community in Afro-communitarianism and the conception of self it informs. The question of humiliation is omitted in the various conceptions of personhood. For Afro-communitarianism to ground modern African political ideas and practices, its notion of the community must be non-humiliating. Achieving a non-humiliating community involves a review of the norms of the cultural community. I attempt this review with what I call the doctrine of cultural permissibility. This thesis redirects Afro-communitarian debates by arguing for a shift to the community. The thesis concludes that postcolonial African politics can only benefit from Afro-communitarianism preoccupied with the desire for a ‘non-humiliating’ community that accommodates plural conceptions of personhood. This thesis would provide nuanced views on the ongoing conversation among Afro-communitarian theorists. Iqoqa Lolu cwaningo luhlaziya ngokunzulu inzululwazi yokuxhumuna komuntu ongumAfrika i-Afro-communitarianism njengenzululwazi eyisisekelo sezinjulalwazi zezombusazwe nokwenziwayo kobu-Afrika. Ucwaningo luxhumanisa ukwamukeleka kwenzululwazi yezombusazwe i-Afro-communitarian yenzululwazi yobu-Afrika yesimanje nodweshu oseluhambe ibanga elide phakathi komuntu ngamunye nomphakathi kanjalo nodweshu oluphakathi kwamalungelo nokwenziwa komsebenzi enzululwazini yezombusazwe yase-Afrika. Umzamo wokuxazulula lokhu kungqubuzana emibhalweni sekugxile kakhulu kokomuntu. Ucwaningo lukhombisa ukuthi kwenziwe kanjani ukuthuthukiswa kwendlela yokomuntu ukuxazulula ukungqubuzana ngezindlela ezintathu okuyilezi; okugxile emsebenzini, okugxile emalungelweni, nomcabango wokwenqaba ngokwe-Afro-communitarian. Indlela yokomuntu okugxile emsebenzini yencike ekuthini okomuntu kungachazwa kuphela ngesakhiwo somphakathi kodwa hhayi ngokomuntu nje. Ngokwale ndlela, umuntu okahle yilowo ohambisana nokomphakathi, lowo oqhuba phambili imisebenzi yomphakathi kunalokho okungokwakhe. Ukulandela le ndlela yindlela ephendula okomuntu, okuyindlela evikela ukuhambisana nezinga elilinganayo ngokwamalungelo nemisebenzi. Nokho-ke, okuzimele obala kulo mbiko ngokomuntu yimbelesi yomphakathi nemvelaphi yawo ngokubanzi ezungeze imisebenzi yamalungelo, ukuzimela nenkululeko. Umqondo wesithathu wendlela yokomuntu yileyo engiyibiza ngokwala kwe- Afro-communitarian. Ongoti baleli qoqo baphakamisa isidingo sokuba nengxoxo ngezombusazwe zobu-Afrika zesimanje ngaphandle kwemibono ye-Afro-communitarian. Isimo sencike ekuqakuleni ukuthi inzululwazi yobu-Afrika yesimanje itheleleka yizimfundiso ezahlukene, kwenye inkathi ezingahambisani nemibono ye-Afro-communitarianism. Ngenkathi kuqhubeka ukungqubuzana phakathi komuntu nomphakathi, ucwaningo luqakula ukuthi kufanele kuqashelwe ukuhlaziywa komphakathi ngokukhomba izinhlobo ezahlukene zomphakhathi eziqukethe imibono eyahlukene yokobuntu kwe-Afro-communitarian. Ngikhombisa ukuthi umbono wokujivazeka ungena kanjani embonweni womphakathi, wesiko nasekwakhekeni ukwazisa okokomuntu. Umbuzo ongokujivazeka uyeqiwa ekwakheni okwahlukahlukene kokomuntu. Ukwenzela ukuthi i- Afro-communitarianism yeseke imibono yezombusazwe yase-Afrika yesimanje, umongo wayo womphakathi kufanele ungajivazi. Ukuzuza umphakathi ongajivazi kufaka ukubuyekezwa kwezinjwayezi zomphakathi nangokwesiko. Ngizama lokhu kubuyekeza ngalokho engikubiza ngokuthi yimfundiso yokuvumeleka ngokwesiko. Ucwaningo luphetha ngokuthi ezombusazwe zasemva kobukoloni zingazuza ngokwe-Afro-communitarianism egxile ekulangazeleleni emphakathini ongajivazi futhi owamukela imibono eyahlukene yokomuntu.
Overcoming Nihilism : Nietzsche on self-creation, politics and morality.
(1994) Clare, Julia.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.
This thesis explores three of Nietzsche in terms of his conception of nihilism and his attempt to overcome it. It is argued that Nietzsche views modernity as being characterized by nihilism and in a state of crisis. Nietzsche responds to this crisis by offering both an aetiology of it, and a vision of a future beyond nihilism. It is Nietzsche's vision which is the primary concern of this work. Nietzsche's first attempt to overcome nihilism is found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this book Nietzsche offers a solution of individual salvation which is elucidated in terms of a trio of ideas - the Superman, the will to power and eternal recurrence. Since nihilism is a social problem, however, this individual overcoming of it is insufficient. In Beyond Good arid Evil Nietzsche, realizing this, offers a more inclusive solution which centres on a political vision of an aristocracy which lies beyond, and outside of, social morality. In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche attempts to show that the creation of such a future does not involve any ahistorical leaps, that the potential for it is already present, though repressed, in Western culture. In sUbjecting Nietzsche' s vision of the future to critical evaluation it is argued that his visions of individual and society are both unattractive and unfeasible. The Nietzschean individual is argued to be less a model of psychological health and well-being than a case study in alienation. The aristocratic society which Nietzsche envisages seems sure to lead to a new crisis. It is further argued that this lack of a workable and attractive vision of the future is based in a misinterpretation of the present, which, I suggest, is not characterized by a crisis.
Philosophical counselling beyond the socratic: a preliminary investigation into expanding and developing philosophical practice.
Sivil, Richard.; Clare, Julia.
A review of philosophical practice, commonly referred to as philosophical counselling, reveals an array of approaches with a variety of aims. These aims include problem solving, therapy, scepticism, self-knowledge, wisdom and virtue. I argue that the various approaches to philosophical practice can be understood as aspects of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic: practical wisdom directed at bringing about / increasing well-being. Contrary to the view that philosophical practitioners use a wide variety of methods, I give evidence that most practitioners endorse a Socratic vision of philosophizing. In accordance with this, the philosophical practitioner applies the Socratic Method and adopts the position of the Socratic gadfly – a critical dialogical partner intent on getting the participant to access and assess her worldview. I argue that such a vision of philosophizing is insufficient to meet the phronetic ends of wisdom and well-being. As such, I maintain that additional visions of philosophizing are required. The central focus of this dissertation is dedicated to exploring alternative visions of philosophizing, with the view to developing and enriching philosophical practice. I associate philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. I identify five essential elements of a philosophical way of life: it promotes a transformative aspiration; the aspiration informs a transformative project; it provides a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested; it provides transformative tools; and it constitutes a self-contained and coherent philosophical system. I offer these five elements as criteria to identify additional philosophies that could enrich and develop philosophical practice. I explore a selection of Western philosophies that, I argue, offer philosophical ways of life. These include: the Stoics, the Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I pair these on the basis of two criteria: shared philosophical aspiration; and divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies. Firstly, each chapter is orientated around a single aspiration: to ‘be happy’; ‘be good’; and ‘become authentic’. Secondly, in each chapter the philosophies have either ‘transcendent’ or ‘immanent’ metaphysical and ethical tendencies. This serves to highlight the richness and diversity of philosophies that share a philosophical aspiration. By investigating these six I make the following contributions: illuminate a divergent array of ethical, metaphysical and epistemological views; increase the scope of phronetic ends; significantly augment the pool of philosophically prescribed practices; expand the range of roles that the philosophical practitioner can assume; and sketch a tentative view of what philosophical practice could look like.