Browsing by Author "Matolino, Bernard."

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An analysis of the Gutsaruzhinji polity in Zimbabwe.
(2017) Bhasikiti, Kudakwashe.; Matolino, Bernard.
The absence of a sound and robust African political ideology grounded in Africa‘s traditional and cultural philosophy of hunhu/ubuntu has led to Africa‘s continued subjugation and domination by both Western and Eastern bloc nations. Africa has been compelled to choose between capitalism or socialism which are both foreign ideologies. The author strongly contests the above view and provides an alternative ideology which is in all respects African and grounded in Africa‘s richest philosophy of hunhu/ubuntu. Gutsaruzhinji, both as a philosophy and political ideology is entrenched in traditional African cultural ideals rooted in the hunhu/ubuntu philosophy. It is the author‘s contention that gutsaruzhinji is an authentic African philosophy, tested in Zimbabwean politics, deserves to be assigned both regional and international status. The author believes, it is time for ubiquitous philosophy that can be employed to extricate Africa and its people from perpetual poverty and inequalities perpetrated by colonialism. Gutsaruzhinji focuses on effectively meeting the social and economic needs of all citizens who had been marginalised by colonial apartheid development trajectory. This will immediately see the abandonment of both capitalism and socialism as guiding ideologies in African social, economic and political development. Gutsaruzhinji was nurtured throughout the pre-colonial period and is evident in such traditional practices as nhimbe or majangano or letseka, where free labour and service was given to enable every member of the community to get food and be self-sufficient. The merit of this thesis is that it brings a new African political thought and consciousness needed to continue embracing hunhu/ubuntu values which are key to the survival of African Philosophy and good governance. The two important vehicles of African identity and survival, hunhu/ubuntu and gutsaruzhinji are set to continue defending the African intellectual territory and political landscape to eternity. This thesis is intended to also assist in extricating and blending African philosophies like Ujamaa, Consciencism, Negritude and Humanism from the label ―African Socialism and bond them with hunhu/ubuntu philosophy, making them an integral part of gutsaruzhinji polity. Africa will for the first time adopt and use its own political ideology to better the livelihood of its citizens.
"Aristotle's eudaimonia in Aquinas' moral philosophy : a critical study."
(2015) Ezenwanne, Henry Chibuike.; Matolino, Bernard.
This thesis intends to explore the argument among scholars as to whether Aquinas merely Christianises (baptises) Aristotle’s concept of eudemonia in his moral philosophy or whether he substantially develops and transforms it beyond what Aristotle originally presents in his main ethical works of Nicomachean Ethics, Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics. It is true that Aquinas relies on and uses a number of Aristotle’s ethical views, yet he is able to develop and transcend Aristotle. However, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that Aquinas does not only adopt or incorporate Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia (happiness) into his moral philosophy, but he goes beyond what Aristotle envisages in his ethics. For Aristotle, happiness is the reward for the virtuous activity of the rational soul, the highest good (end) to which all things aim. However, for Aquinas, happiness is the participation in the beatific vision of the First and Final Act, he calls God. Happiness, for Aquinas, in the proper sense of the word, cannot be attained in this life since no created goods can satisfy the unsearchable wants and desires of the human being in this life. Hence, Aquinas transcends Aristotle’s moral, socio-political, natural and temporary kind of happiness to develop his metaphysical, ontological, theological and supernatural kind of happiness. Chapter one introduces and sets the boundaries of the thesis. Chapter two explores the debate among scholars as to whether Aquinas Christianises Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia or not. Chapter three examines the fundamental principles in Aristotle’s ethics (moral Philosophy) with the emphasis on understanding the human being. Chapter four explores Aristotle’s overview of the concept of eudaimonia (happiness). Chapter five looks at Aquinas’ basic moral philosophical framework with the emphasis on human nature as well as the participation in the “Divine” Nature. Chapter six examines Aquinas’ concept of virtue, which is a development of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Chapter seven investigates Aquinas’ notion of happiness, as he goes beyond Aristotle’s eudaimonia. Chapter eight concludes and highlights the standpoint of this thesis.
The concept of alienation in the work of Frantz Fanon.
(2017) Ndlovu, Siphiwe.; Matolino, Bernard.
No abstract available.
Conflict resolution and peace-building Initiatives: ethical quandaries in post-colonial southern Africa.
(2018) Chikanga, Joshua.; Matolino, Bernard.
While there is a wide range of literature on the causes of war, an area that has not received adequate attention is in determining the extent to which post-colonial Southern Africa has used military interventions as an instrument of advancing state-centric interests under the guise of pursuing collective security interests. This may partly be because international relations theory has for a long time been predominantly obsessed by the realist paradigm which has always regarded conflict as a permanent provenance or condition in the international system stimulated by what Hans Morgenthau, (1948) regards as the inevitability of competition among the most powerful in their advancement of self-interests even in extent of resolving and managing them. The ubiquitous and recurrent nature of armed conflict situations within a post-colonial Southern African environment implicate the need to search for alternative mechanisms for resolving conflicts other than the adversarial model that emphasises military interventions disguised as instruments for conflict resolution and ultimately sub-regional harmony. This model inherited from Western Europe at the conclusion of World War II appears not necessarily suitable for a region such as that of Southern Africa whose historical past was greatly different to that upon which it was created. For post-colonial Africa, emerging from a brutal colonial and white settler historical past, emphasis among its leadership appeared to have been informed by the need to restore lost African pride such that the nature and construct of its social order and collective security framework had to adopt certain preferred pre-colonial practices (Ajayi and Buhari, 2014). Ideally, such an argument would be in contention with Brehe’s (2012) observation that regards Africa to always have had its own conciliatory, mediatory and arbitral ways of resolving conflict. These African indigenous forms of conflict resolution where military force was only used as a last resort include mediation, diplomacy and adjudication. However, it is not to suggest that these pre-colonial African customary conflict resolution models did not have their own limitations, but the application of military interventions as an instrument for enhancing collective security tends to promote the preponderance of self-interest than those of the collective. In an attempt to have a clear understanding of why member state behave in such a manner, I have considered the collective arrangements that post-colonial Southern African states put in iv place in attempting to resolve the DRC and Lesotho conflicts all of which came at a time when the sub-region’s conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms were in transition from being informal to a more robust and formal entity. The intention is identifying the extent to which state-centrist interests are manipulative of those of the collective even in the presence of formalised structures to advance the interests of the intended collective. To support my arguments, I employ ethical interpretations arising out of the competitive nature among member states in their advancement of self-interests even in pursuit of collective security interests. East and West Africa who share a common historical background of colonialism to that of Southern Africa are used for comparative purposes in determining the extent to which state-centric interests are prevalent in the pursuit of collective security interests. Indigenous norms applicable to contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms in Southeast Asia, though is a non-African region, share in common a historical background to that of sub-Saharan Africa is explored with a view to relate how these can be employed in managing conflicts under a reconciled form of state-centric and collective security interests. This thesis argues that within all these three sub-regions’ state-centric interests, the competitive nature of state-centric and collective security interest are prevalent, especially in situations where military interventions are used as an instrument for conflict resolution and peace-building. I argue from a realist perspective that it becomes imperative not to wish way state-centric interests which by nature, are always omnipresent at any given level (individual, society or state), in pursuit of those of a collective. To this end, I advocate for the development of a relational ethic between state-centric and collective security interests. This can be achieved by way of underscoring the need for transparency as member states openly negotiate the settlement of their state-centric interests within the scope of other states, especially when situations arise where there might be possible chances to engage in military interventions. Ultimately, I raise the argument that failure to create conditions conducive in allowing the development of such a relational ethic between state-centric and collective security interests underlies the ethical challenge inherent to post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives.
The cultural roots of corruption : an ethical investigation with particular reference to nepotism.
(2017) Otaluka, Wisdom Okwuoma.; Murove, Munyaradzi Felix.; Matolino, Bernard.
Since the demise of colonialism, corruption in Africa has gone from an alarming proportion to a critical stage. There is hardly any sector of the economy that is not ravaged by this hydra headed-monster. The most obvious of these practices is nepotism which is rooted in the culture of the people. This cultural dimension creates some confusion on how to understand nepotism in relation to corruption in Africa. Thus, while some people denounce the high rate of corruption in Africa as it concerns nepotism, there are those who think they have justifiable reasons to engage in the practice. Still, there are others, who engage in the practice without the consciousness of the moral implication. Those who think that there is nothing wrong with nepotism anchor their argument on the fact that it is embedded in the culture of the people. For instance, many civil servants are involved in corruption because when they come into office, they are obliged by sense of family responsibilities to use their relatives who are not qualified against the qualified applicants who are not related to them, to build up public offices. Hence, while most civil servants are aware of the rules against nepotism, they still go ahead to indulge in the practice because they believe that such rules are contrary to African culture and therefore should not be obeyed. When these three positions are placed side by side, a central problem arises and can be formulated as follows: is there a cultural dimension to the problem of corruption, especially nepotism in Africa? This thesis therefore is a rigorous analysis of the causes, effects and possible solutions to the problem of corruption with special reference to nepotism in Africa. The thesis stated particularly that African cultural practices of gift-giving and the extended family system encourage corruption particularly in the form of nepotism. It therefore uses African ethical theories of Ubuntu or African communalism, alongside cultural relativism and moderate partialism or relationality to argue that corruption in the form of nepotism is the problem of Africa and that to rid Africa of corruption and put her solidly on the path of sustainable development, merit rather than nepotism should guide public transactions. Critical and historical analyses are used for the methodology.
Culture and democray in Africa: a philosophical inquiry.
(2018) Yaye, Christopher Oyoo.; Matolino, Bernard.
That there is an incessant struggle for the establishment of a viable and meaningful democracy in post-independence Africa is not in doubt. Contemporary Africa is characterized by political instability and abysmally poor governmental performance indicative of lack of consonance and congruence between traditional African political values on the one hand, and the practice of Western democracy on the other. In contradistinction to pre-colonial polity that had highly developed democratic political systems, almost all political regimes in post-colonial Africa have consistently claimed to be democratic and yet their rule has largely been characterized by political authoritarianism, illegitimate seizure of power, massive corruption, political assassinations, escalating insecurity, food crisis et cetera. These challenges are further compounded by the fact that the practice of Western democracy in Africa has created of the African populace a dichotomy, which is diametrically opposed to African humanism. Against this backdrop, the study employs textual and conceptual analysis of philosophical inquiry to appraise the practice of democracy; and investigate the basis of traditional African democratic polity. It also examines whether Western notions of democracy are well-suited for contemporary African polities by asking the following fundamental questions: a) What makes democracy democratic? b) In what ways can traditional African system of government benefit contemporary democratic practice in Africa? In view of the foregoing, the study concludes that: a) The failure of democracy to function properly in post-independence Africa is hinged on illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of Western democracy, which is an illegitimate colonial construct: b) For democracy to be meaningfully and viably established in contemporary Africa, it should be hinged on political communal existence of Africans, which in effect relates to equality within a polity; and, c) There is need for an alternative form of democracy in Africa hinged on African cultural values and practices. In the foregoing respect, the study proposes “Integrated Consensual Democracy” as an alternative form of democracy for contemporary Africa. It is argued that this is a viable form of self rule responsive to the needs and aspirations of Africans as it is premised on their cultural values and practices. The study makes, however, among others, the recommendation that further research should establish why even with communal solidarity, which is so widespread in rural societies of Africa, contemporary Africa is still far from producing modes of governance that the populace can freely accept.
A defence of Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze's conception of reason.
(2015) Ntshangase, Mohammed Xolile.; Matolino, Bernard.
Abstract not available.
Defending Rawls on the self: a response to the communitarian critique.
(2005) Matolino, Bernard.
This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate.
Epistemology in African Philosophy: A critique of African concepts of knowledge.
(2019) Nwosimiri, Ovett Kodilinye.; Matolino, Bernard.
The question of the existence of African epistemology cannot be addressed without the acknowledgement and acceptance of African philosophy. This is of paramount importance as African epistemology originates from the discourse of African philosophy. Didier N. Khaphagawani and Jeanette G. Malherbe explain that to affirm the existence of an African philosophy suggest the existence of an African epistemology. To them, African epistemology can be regarded as a subset of African philosophy. African epistemology, like African philosophy, deals with issues about Africa. African epistemology engages with the nature and concept of knowledge, and the limit of human knowledge. African epistemology includes the African conception of the nature of knowledge, the ways in which knowledge could be gained, the ways in which one can justify an epistemic claim or validate a knowledge claim, and the role that knowledge plays in human existence. The protagonists of African epistemology, like Placide Tempels, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Innocent C. Onyewuenyi, Christopher Anyanwu and others based their argument for a distinctive or unique African epistemology on the premise or proposition all races is gifted with a unique nature and ways of knowing things. Based on the above, one of the conclusions that can be drawn is that the protagonists of African epistemology believe that things like knowledge, language, religion, emotions, perception, and some other ideas make African epistemology distinct and unique. Given the above, it will be of interest to inquire if African epistemology is entirely distinct and unique. Thus, this dissertation is a critique of African epistemology. My aim in this dissertation is to argue that given our ‘common humanity’ (the ideas we share) and our interaction (languages) with each other irrespective of where we come from, African epistemology is not as distinct or unique as the protagonists of African epistemology claim.
From race to culture: reversing racial illusions.
(2016) Musaba, Kasonde Michael.; Matolino, Bernard.
"No abstract available."
Human dignity in African communitarianism.
(2018) Makwinja, Simon Matthias.; Matolino, Bernard.
This study examines the extent to which African communitarian thought succeeds in the promotion of human dignity without having to call upon human rights. As well as being considered as a central value within social and political philosophy, human dignity is also critical to policy formulations within spheres is has tremendous influence such as bioethics, medicine, politics, and law. Generally, the promotion of human dignity has been conceived from the liberal point of view, and specifically through human rights and their institutions. Ontologically, liberalism prioritises the individual and her rights over her community. Respect for one’s dignity is in this regard synonymous with respect for individual rights. This conception excludes the non-liberal thought systems which are regarded as inimical to the human dignity project on the basis that they do not prioritise individual rights and freedoms. On this basis, the non-liberal thought systems have been perceived as anachronistic and authoritarian, and therefore considered as dissing human dignity. However, since human dignity is generally regarded as a concept more fundamental than human rights, it cannot be reduced to a single value system at the exclusion of others. Thus, through human rights, liberalism presents a particular vision of individual-community relationships in which the individual is primary. Subsequently, this relationship points to a particular way of understanding human dignity. As different societies live by different value systems, there exist corresponding ways through which such societies express and enhance human dignity. It is in this regard that the study attempts to demonstrate the extent to which African communitarianism, one of the non-liberal intellectual traditions and considered as a dominant conceptual theme in African thought, is capable of securing human dignity. Specifically, the study examines certain values that are central to the African communitarian thought system for their consistency with the dignity of human persons in its broader sense. Within African communitarianism, the individual-community relationship prioritises the reality of the community over and above that of the individual. This can be seen by emphasis laid on such values as interdependence, consensus and the common good. Normatively, they all point to the centrality of the community and one’s duty towards its flourishing. Thus, the sort of dignity that can be derived from the African communitarian thought goes beyond the bounds of individual persons exercising their freedom as emphasised within the liberal tradition. Dignity in this regard concerns the flourishing of persons not as individuals, but as members of the community. Thus, contrary to the criticism by proponents of the liberal value systems, the non-liberal thought systems can be shown to be capable of securing human dignity to the extent that dignity is conceived from a holistic point of view. Since the basic aim of every community is to serve people who are its members, respect to community and its values is an indication of respect for human dignity. In this way, the African communitarian thought offers a competitive alternative to the liberal conception of human dignity. In this regard it would be wrong to make judgements about the African communitarian thought system by employing a conception of dignity that is inconsistent with the African value systems themselves.
Metaphysical freedom and determinism: an African perspective.
(2017) Gwara, Joyline.; Matolino, Bernard.
The study places emphasis on the critical and philosophical nature of the African concept of destiny as it relates to the problem of freedom and determinism. In light of this, it focuses on the problem of freedom and determinism as we have it in Western scholarship. Historically, there are two contrasting schools of thought emerged. These are; the hard determinists, who argue that all events, including human actions are determined by causal laws; and the libertarians who believe that human beings are not determined and possess freewill. In an attempt to reconcile these seeming contrasting views another school of thought emerged, which is, Compatibilism. Compatibilists believes that choice and causal determination of human actions are not mutually exclusive but are compatible. The compatibilist position was heavily criticized by both the determinists and the libertarians. The philosophers who debated on this issue failed to reach a resolution concerning the nature of human agency in this world. The fact that the problem was not resolved in the Western circles necessitated the need to investigate the problem from an African perspective. In light of this, the thesis observes that the cornerstone for the determinists’ arguments is the principle of causation. To this effect, the thesis considers how Africans understand the principle of causation. This is done in order to find out whether the African understanding of the principle is detrimental to human freedom. The thesis observes that there are two ways of understanding causation in the African worldview, which are, empirical and supernatural causation. The Africans regard the latter to be of paramount importance in explaining phenomena between events. In light of this, I argue that cause as understood by the Africans is not detrimental to human freedom since an individual can appeal or manipulate mystical powers in order to change his or her fate. Thus, the principle of cause, for the Africans, attests to soft-determinism and not hard determinism. The principle of cause as well as the African metaphysical components of a person have a strong bearing on the African understanding of human destiny. This is so because one of the constituent parts of a person is the bearer of destiny. For the Akans, it is the okra which is the bearer of destiny, whereas for the Yoruba people it is the ori. These constituent parts of a human being plays a pivotal role in the Akan and Yoruba people’s understanding of human destiny respectively. The thesis goes on to look at the African understanding of destiny as presented by Gbadegesin and Gyekye. I also argue that the concept of destiny is informed by the Western understanding of predestination. However, in Western scholarship, predestination is understood to be other worldly, whereas for the Africans it is understood to be this worldly. Further to this, two schools of thought have emerged in African philosophy. On the one hand, there are scholars who believe that destiny, once handed down by the Supreme Being, is unalterable. On the other hand, there are scholars who hold the view that, destiny, though handed down by the Supreme being, can be altered for better or for worse. Thus, these schools of thought seem to attest to hard determinism and libertarianism respectively. I argue that there is a middle way between these seemingly contrasting views of Gyekye and Gbadegesin. To push further the argument, the African understanding of destiny does not attest to determinism and neither does it attest to metaphysical freedom. To this effect, I argue that, what is determined for an African person are the circumstances surrounding the individual’s life (events), the individual’s will (action) is undetermined. In other words, the African concept of destiny speaks to soft – determinism.
Metaphysics of race: revisiting four philosophical views.
(2022) Mthiyane, Sibongakonke.; Matolino, Bernard.; Maraganedzha, Mutshidzi.
What does race mean in post-apartheid everyday life? Is race real or an illusion? The answer to these questions lies in the idea of how race emerged and is made real in terms of racial categories. South African apartheid government used to classify South Africans by law into a hierarchy, with correspondingly differential access to human rights and freedoms. These racial categories were based on how one looked, how one lived, and what language one spoke. In this context, race in South Africa became normalized through the assumptions about racial culture understood as an expression of race-given essence. Racial categories further created defined places for people in the material and social world. South Africans came to see themselves as these categories, making them subjectively real. This history means that after apartheid, most South African’s experiences continued to be shaped by racialized material and subjective realities. In this regard, it is worth asking: are we warranted in using classifications? What role do they place in shaping our ordinary ontology of race? What influence do they have on racism, and what do people think about race? Hanslanger questions the importance of using racial classifications and asks if they are warranted. In light of this, this thesis answers the question left by Hanslanger about whether racial classifications give us a fruitful way of understanding facts about race. It will argue that racial categories are not warranted; race is an illusion.
Personhood and human rights: a critical study of the African communitarian and normative conception of the self.
(2013) Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony.; Beck, Simon.; Matolino, Bernard.
No abstract available.
The Problem of the absence of a well-established and contextual philosophy in South African philosophy.
(2022) Dlomo, Njabulo Clement.; Matolino, Bernard.
In Ramose’s argument, “for too long, the teaching of Western philosophy in Africa has been decontextualized precisely because both its inspiration and the questions it attempted to answer were not necessarily based upon the living experience of being-an-African in Africa”. Because of this situation, many thinkers have engaged in Western philosophy more as opposed to African philosophy. Only recently some African philosophers like Kwasi Wiredu, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Kwame Gyekye, etc., established and started engaging in African philosophy. The establishment of African philosophy by these philosophers was due to the need, desire and interest of a philosophy that was reflective of their continent and context. Philosophers like Kwasi Wiredu even went as far as attempting to create a system of governance (Democracy by Consensus) that was inspired by the Ghanaian philosophy of the Akan to reflect the place of philosophy. In South Africa, ubuntu was also invoked as a philosophy by various thinkers such as Mogobe Ramose as a reflection of South Africa as a place of philosophy. Ramose and Wiredu through their reflection did express clearly that Africans as a people are not monolithic. Therefore, each country needs to have a philosophy that will reflect the context and place of a thinker. In South Africa, for a long time, there has been an absence of well-established, relevant, and informative South African philosophy. This can be traced to the practice of South African philosophy from the Apartheid era. During this period, Robert Paul Wolff once visited South Africa in 1986 with the intention of having an experience and an understanding of the academic nature of South African philosophy. His assessment of the nature of this place’s philosophy was not what he expected it to be. The philosophy that was taught in South African Universities, precisely the former white universities, was just an imitation of a philosophy written and taught in American or English universities. This concern proclaimed by Wolff strongly indicates how the place-of-philosophy has been neglected in both African and South African philosophy. Two years after South Africa’s first democratic election and the end of Apartheid, Mabogo P. More, a South African thinker, argued against the failure of South African philosophy to play a significant role in both setting and arguing for an agenda in a political situation that was unfolding in South Africa. This dissertation will seek to point out the problem of the absence of the well-established and contextual philosophy in South African philosophy. The primary contribution of this dissertation to literature is as follows. Firstly, it seeks to show the urgent need for a well-established, informative, and relevant South African philosophy. Secondly, it points out the issues that have emerged due to the absence of a well-established, informative, and relevance of this place’s philosophy. Lastly it seeks to emphasizes the purpose and the relevance of South African philosophy.
The re-invigoration of Pan-Africanism : a critique of Kwame Anthony Appiah's In my father's house.
(2014) Lembethe, Nolwandle Ayanda.; Matolino, Bernard.; Beck, Simon.
Abstract not available.
Rethinking communitarianism and personhood: a critical review of the metaphysical and moral commitments.
(2017) Mbatha, Lungelo Siphosethu.; Matolino, Bernard.
exists the notion in African philosophy that to be regarded as a person, an individual needs to be morally excellent, and the way to secure this moral excellence is through maintaining good relations with others, meaning that one has duties directed towards others. This is the view which was popularized in philosophy by Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) and is known as the communitarian normative conception of person. Proponents of this view tend to stress the importance of the community in facilitating the development of the individual. Kwame Gyekye (1997) argues against Menkiti for the latter’s over-exaggeration of the role of the community, and calls him a radical communitarian for doing so. However, Gyekye ends up committing to the same error as the radicals. As a result, a debate has ensued regarding the appropriate characterization of the community/individual relationship, with the above-mentioned philosophers, classic communitarians, favouring the community over the individual. However, this paper seeks to argue that this view is unattractive because it faces difficulty in conferring the judgement of who counts as a person. Moreover, I argue that this view is open the incoherency between moral excellence and adherence to communal values. As a result, I seek to defend the limited communitarianism conception of person as it escapes these and other difficulties, by positing that persons consist of a metaphysical identity and a social identity, and as a result of the former identity preceding the latter identity, certain individual rights are inviolable.
Rethinking the concept of race's conundrums in African philosophy.
(2015) Nwosimiri, Ovett Kodilinye.; Matolino, Bernard.
The pattern of discourse in the history of African philosophy resulted from historic events such as slavery, colonialism, race and racism. Historically therefore, the concept of race played a significant part in the existence of African philosophy. Recent years have seen a series of studies on the concept of race, with philosophers at the lead of this research development. These philosophers, including Joshua Glasgow, W. E. B. Du Bois, Lucius Outlaw, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack and Emmanuel C. Eze, among others, undertook to explain the concept of race with articulations on whether it should be conserved or eliminated. Thus Eliminativists and Conservationists standpoints, where the former hold that race is an illusion and race-thinking should be eliminated, while the later contend that race is very real and the concept should be conserved This dissertation is a critical assessment of how the concept of race affects African philosophy and an exploration of how the concept can be transcended. To achieve this objective, the dissertation appraised how the concept of race affects African philosophy. It further discussed the eliminativists and conservationists approaches to race, and how they contribute to and affect the concept likewise, it made an attempt to respectively reconcile the perspectives of the eliminativists and conservationists proponents. In the main, the dissertation explored and considered the possibilities of transcending the concept of race.
Rethinking universalism and particularism in African philosophy: towards an eclectic approach.
(2019) Maraganedzha, Mutshidzi.; Matolino, Bernard.
The study focuses on the dispute between the universalists and particularists in the characterization of the nature of African philosophy. In African philosophy the debate is formulated as a dichotomy between the universalists and the particularists. At the center of this debate is the notion of ‘universal’ and its relationship to the particular. The universalists argue that the nature of (African) philosophy–its methodology and subject matter–has to be universal and should be the same when applied to Western and African thought systems. In essence, the universalist thesis holds that African philosophy should be critical and not descriptive of African beliefs. Nevertheless, against this universalist thesis, the particularist camp argues that different cultures have different ways of explaining reality. Hence, Africans must have a philosophy different from other philosophies. It is evident from the foregoing that there is an impasse between the universalists and particularists’ conception of the nature of philosophy. The study contends that the solution to the impasse lies on investigating the true nature of ‘universal’ as it is at the center of the debate. The researcher is of the opinion that there is a need to go past the philosophical universalism as it neglects the true nature of universals. Consequently, there is a need for an alternative nature of (African) philosophy hinged on acknowledging that the nature of ‘universal’ is dependent on the ‘particular’ but not independent of its ‘particular’. It is argued that the viable and robust nature of (African) philosophy and what African philosophers should aspire to, is premised on their humanity; being a member of particular group and still be a member of homo sapiens at large.
Semantics and race : a response to Appiah's racial eliminativism.
(2013) Mutshidzi, Maraganedzha.; Matolino, Bernard.
No abstract available.