The actually possible: an essay in modal psychology.
| dc.contributor.advisor | Spurrett, David. | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Whitaker, Monique. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Omoge, Michael Oladapo. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-28T06:35:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-10-28T06:35:39Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2020 | |
| dc.description | Doctoral Degree. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Our beliefs about possibilities and necessities face a problem of justification. This is the problem of modal justification and resolving it has become the holy grail for modal epistemology. For a considerable period, the problem has been approached without consulting our experiences of possibilities and necessities. The thought was that it is part of the nature of possibility and necessity that they transcend experience. In this dissertation, I turn this around. I argue that even though it is part of the nature of possibility and necessity that they transcend experience, we should consult our experiences of possibilities and necessities when trying to resolve the problem of modal justification. More importantly, I argue that when we consult such experiences, especially what is going in our minds when we are having the experiences, we can make significant progress with the problem of modal justification. Consequently, I argue that we can perceive and imagine possibilities and necessities, and that when we investigate the perceptual and imaginative processes involved in experiences of possibilities and necessities, the operations of those processes suffice as the evidence we need to show that we are indeed perceiving and imagining possibilities and necessities. By consulting the tribunal of experience, our beliefs about possibilities and necessities no longer have a justificatory problem. Izinkolelo zethu ngokungenzeka nezimfanelo zibhekene nenkinga yencazelo. Ukuxazulula lenkinga sekwaba isinkwa semihla ngemihla kwaba hlaziyi bolwazi (epistemology). Esikhathini eside, lenkinga yayibukwa ngaphandle kwesipiliyoni sokungenzeka nezimfanelo. Lomcabango wawuthi ingxenye yendlela yokungenzeka nezimfanelo kuguquka kweqele isipiliyoni. Kulolucwaningo, ngizukuguqula konke lokhu. Ngizoveza iphuzu lokuthi noma ngabe kuyingxenye yemvelo yokungenzeka nezimfanelo ukuthi kuguqukele kusipiliyoni, kufanele sibuze izipiliyoni zethu kanye nezimfanelo uma sizama ukuxazulula le nkinga yencazelo. Okubaluleke kakhulu, ngizoqhakambisa iphuzu lokuthi sibuza isipiliyoni, ikakhulukazi kulokhu okwenzeka ezingqondweni zethu uma kukhona esikwenzayo, singakwazi ukuyixazulula ngempumelelo inkinga yencazelo. Ngiphinde futhi ngiqhakambise iphuzu lokuthi singabuka siphinde sicabange okungenzeka nezimfanelo, futhi uma sicwaninga indlela yokubuka neyokucabanga efaka isipiliyoni sokungenzeka nezimfanelo, indlela okwenzeka ngayo ivela njengobufakazi esibudingayo ukuveza ukuthi impela siyakucabanga okungenzeka kanye nezimfanelo. Ngokubheka isipiliyoni, ziyashabalala izinkinga ezibhekene nokuchaza izinkolelo zethu. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/18716 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | Modal justification. | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | Modal epistemology. | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | Possibilities and necessities. | en_US |
| dc.title | The actually possible: an essay in modal psychology. | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |